



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

### Usage guidelines


Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

### About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>



*Bankers magazine*




~~PERIODICAL ROOM~~

LIBRARY  
OF THE  
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

*Class*

330c

v. 62

















JANUARY, 1901

1917

BANKERS' MAGAZINE  
ESTABLISHED 1846

RHODES' JOURNAL  
ESTABLISHED 1872

# THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE

## RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING

55TH

CONTENTS

YEAR

	PAGE.
Disposition of the Surplus Revenues	I
Proposed Combination of Silver Producers	4
Responsibilities of the Owners of Bank Stock	6
The Redemption of Bank Notes	7
A Money System for the Philippines	11
Regulation of a Bank-Note Currency	13
The Education of a Banker	29
The Banker in His Public Relations	34
Modern Methods of Banking	43
Banking and Commercial Law Decisions	54
Review of the World's Monetary Progress	71
The Real Napoleon and a Napoleon of Finance	74
Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury	81
Some Defects in the New Financial Law	93
Can Bank Defalcations Be Prevented	101
The Educational Movement Among Bank Clerks	105
The Collection of Country Checks	108
Essentials of Success in a Banking Career	109
National and State Banks in New York	113
General Banking and Financial News	128
Financial Review—Trade and Government Statistics	140
Stock and Bond Quotations, with Comparisons of Prices	159

Including Valuable Statistical Tables, Comparative Prices, and Quotations of all Securities Traded at the New York Stock Exchange.

COPYRIGHT, 1901, BY BRADFORD RHODES.

Published By

BRADFORD RHODES & CO.,

FIVE DOLLARS  
A YEAR.

87 MAIDEN LANE, NEW YORK.

A History of Banking in the United States, by Jno. Jay Knox.

# J. P. Morgan & Co.,

23 WALL ST., cor. of Broad,

NEW YORK.

---

DREXEL & CO., . . . Cor. 5th & Chestnut Sts., Philadelphia.

MORGAN, HARJES & CO., - 81 Boulevard Haussmann, Paris.

---

## Domestic and Foreign Bankers.

---

Deposits received subject to draft. Securities bought and sold on commission.  
Interest allowed on deposits. Foreign Exchange. Commercial Credits. Cable  
Transfers. Circular Letters for Travelers available in all parts of the world.

---

ATTORNEYS AND AGENTS OF

Messrs. J. S. MORGAN & CO.,

No. 22 Old Broad Street, LONDON.

---

## First National Bank of Milwaukee.

United States Depository.

Capital, . . . \$1,000,000.

Surplus and Profits, \$500,000.

FARMERS' and MILLERS' BANK, 1853.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 1863.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK, Reorganized, 1882

---

Transacts a General Banking and Foreign Exchange Business.

Collections promptly made and remitted.

Correspondence invited.

---

F. G. BIGELOW, President.

WM. BIGELOW, Vice-President.

FRANK J. KIPP, Cashier.

T. E. CAMP, Asst. Cashier.

### DIRECTORS:

H. R. CAMP,  
C. F. PFISTER  
E. HARJES,

F. G. BIGELOW,  
FRED. T. GOLL,  
H. C. PAYNE,

WM. BIGELOW,  
F. VOGEL, JR.,  
GEO. P. MILLER.

---

NOTICE.—The articles in this Magazine are copyrighted and must not be reprinted without special permission of the publishers.



THE  
BANKERS' MAGAZINE  
"

RHODES JOURNAL OF BANKING AND THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE

CONSOLIDATED

VOLUME LXII  
JANUARY TO JUNE  
*1901*



NEW YORK  
BRADFORD RHODES & CO., PUBLISHERS  
87 MAIDEN LANE

HG1501  
B3  
v. 62

# INDEX.

January to June, 1901.

## I. Editorial Comment and Leading Articles.

American Bankers' Association, educational work of.....	500	British loan, American subscriptions to.....	186
American Bankers' Association, enlarging interest in conventions of.....	535	Buddha's legacy to the twentieth century...	824
American banking system, the.....	821	Business and speculation, great activity in...	657
Austria-Hungary, check and deposit system in.....	661	Canadian mint, establishment of.....	806
Bank credit, freer use of.....	807	Canal, inter-oceanic, route for.....	504
Banker, education of a.....	29	Carnegie, Andrew, benefactions of.....	513
Banker in his public relations, the.....	34	Charters of National banks, renewals of.....	343
Bank examinations.....	515	Chinese loan, discussion of a.....	499
Banking and Financial Notes:		Chinese Treasury note, a.....	824
Australasian gold production in 1900....	539	Clearing houses, union of banks through....	179
Australia, gold production and banking in.....	73	Collection department of a bank, the.....	521
Bank of England, specie reserve of.....	195	Combination of banks without monopoly, a.....	179
Bank of France, the.....	871	Combinations and their influence on government.....	497
Bank of Japan, semi-annual meeting of.....	538	Conant, Charles A. (regulation of a redeemable bank-note currency).....	13
Berlin, financial disturbances in.....	72	Consolidation of business enterprises.....	497
British finances, state of.....	540	Conventions of American Bankers' Association, enlarging interest in.....	535
Cheque Bank, liquidation of.....	71	Cooke, Jay, aid of in floating civil war loans.....	650
Clearings at New York and London.....	199	Cook, Seymour S. (collection department of a bank).....	521
Crises and their management.....	348	Cook, Seymour S. (the bank messenger).....	200
European combination against America.....	199	Co-operation among banks.....	341
Gold and silver, production of in the United States, in 1900.....	73	Credit, permitting banks to use.....	807
Gold, stock of in the United States.....	539	Deposit of public moneys in the banks.....	334
Great Britain and Ireland, banking in.....	346	Depositors in banks, insurance of.....	645
Great Britain and Ireland, progress of banking in.....	194	Educational work of the American Bankers' Association.....	500
Great Britain, decline in trade of.....	664	Education of a banker, the.... 29, 200, 357,	521
Great Britain, new capital applications in Holland, new American bank in.....	72	Education, value of theoretical and practical	797
Irish rural banks.....	872	Embezzlements, discovery of.....	188
Japan, financial conditions in.....	664	Embezzlements, epidemic of.....	505
Japan, increase of banking deposits and commerce in.....	73	Examinations of banks.....	515
London joint-stock banks, the.....	347	Expenditures of the Federal Government....	331
Mexico, foreign commerce of.....	665	Failed National banks, closing of.....	811
Precious metals in the United States, production of in 1900.....	73	Foreign loans placed in the United States.509,	643
Russian loan, the.....	872	Freedman's Savings and Trust Company, the	368
Salvador, banking institutions of.....	71	French taxation of accumulated wealth.....	503
San Salvador bank report.....	872	Gage, Lyman J., address of, before New York bankers.....	10
Savings banks of Victoria.....	198	Gage, Lyman J., management of national finances by.....	502
South Africa, cost of war in.....	71	Gage, Lyman J., suggestions of for co-operation among banks.....	179
Spanish currency, the.....	872	Gage, Lyman J. (the banker in his public relations).....	34
Specie reserve of the Bank of England..	195	Gold, reduction of estimated stock in the country.....	654
Uruguay, financial affairs in.....	665	Gold, stock of in the Treasury.....	647
Banking in the United States during the nineteenth century.....	189	Great Britain, commercial and manufacturing interests of.....	184
Bank messenger, the.....	200	Insurance of bank depositors.....	645
Bank notes, redemption of.....	7		
Bank notes, restrictions in regard to issue of	507		
Bond purchases by the Treasury.....	683		
Branches of National banks.....	336		

International bank, demand for a.....	641	Philippine Islands, extension of American currency system to.....	649
Inter-oceanic canal, selecting a route for....	644	Philippine Islands, monetary system for.....	11
Johnston, John, sketch of (with title-page portrait).....	353	Prizes offered by THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE..	337
Knor's History of Banking, criticism of.....	510	Railroads, consolidation of.....	801
Learning the routine of bank work.....	357	Redeemable bank-note currency, regulation of.....	13
Lincoln, Abraham, views of on sub-Treasury system.....	810	Redemption of bank-note circulation.....	7
Lottery loan of United States, the.....	688	Regulation of a redeemable bank-note currency, the.....	13
Loving currency bill, the.....	182	Richter, R. M. (learning the routine of bank work).....	361
Mason, David M., comment on views of in regard to American currency legislation....	802	Routine work of bank employees.....	202
Modern Banking Methods:		Russian duties on American iron and steel..	339
Advertising the bank.....	355	Savings banks, taxation of.....	349
Chicago Clearing-House.....	44	Siemens, Louis (routine work of bank employees).....	202
Clearing-house forms, comparison of.....	43	Silver coin and bullion, disposition of.....	181
Defalcations and embezzlements.....	529	Silver, combination to raise price of.....	4
Failures of banks, cause of.....	815	Silver dollars, proposal to make them redeemable in gold.....	177
Forgeries, precautions in regard to.....	686	Silver dollars, proposed exchange of gold for.....	335
Fundamental principles of banking.....	819	Speculation and business, great activity in.....	657
Making the bank popular.....	355	Stockholders of banks, their responsibility for management.....	6
McCulloch, Hugh, on bank management.....	819	Strikes as a means of coercing employers....	794
Minneapolis Clearing-House.....	48	Subsidiary coins, proposed increase of.....	188
Origin of banking, the.....	205	Surplus revenues, methods of disposing of..	1
Safeguarding the bank, methods of.....	533	Taxation of banks, the.....	329
Scranton Clearing-House Association....	51	Taxation of Savings banks.....	349
Muhleman, Maurice L., investigations of in regard to stock of gold.....	654	Treasury system, influence of on money market.....	799 ✓
National bank notes, profits on notes lost or destroyed.....	512	Trenholm, Wm. L., death of.....	187
National banks, branches of.....	336	Wall Street, financial panic in.....	793
National banks, changes in capital and resources of.....	653	Wall Street, speculation in.....	656
National banks, closing of.....	311	Watering of Stock, the.....	659
National banks, renewal of charters of.....	343	Webber John T. (learning the routine of bank work).....	357
Note issues, restrictions of.....	507		
Panic in Wall Street, the.....	793		
Paper money, preference for.....	804		

## II. Banking and Financial Law and Replies to Questions.

Assignment of deposit.....	696	Certified check—alteration after certification—payment in good faith—recovery back—duty of the bank in certifying.....	562
Assignments—certificate of purchase of real estate—rights of assignee—notice to employee—custom of conducting business....	556	Chose in action, assignment of.....	850
Authority of manager.....	693	Deposit book, gift of in anticipation of death.....	690, 691
Bankers' lien—effect of assignment of depositor.....	219	Gift of bank book in anticipation of death.....	690, 691
Bank officers—debts to banks—insolvency—set-off.....	845	Insolvent estate—unlawful preference..	387
Bankruptcy—payment to general assignee through mistake.....	845	Mortgage—hire receipt or vendor's lien—insurance of machinery covered by both—priorities—subrogation.....	561
Bills and notes—Cashier's misrepresentations.....	845	Promissory note joint and several makers—action as against joint makers—merger.....	387
Bills of lading, credits accorded on.....	855	Recovery of stolen money—right of person aiding in recovery to reward.....	852
Bills of lading—payment of draft—title of bank Books of bank as evidence against bondsmen of Cashier.....	212	Security for goods—sole bond of chartered banks.....	850
Books of bank—order of court for their production.....	226	Set-off—bank deposit—promissory note—ranking on insolvent estate of deceased maker who is also a depositor.....	386
Borrowing by officers of a bank—South Carolina statute.....	566	Will, construction of in Quebec—gift of land.....	852
Canadian Banking Decisions:		Cashier, authority of to borrow money.....	692
Accommodation bills—corporation—ultra vires—knowledge of by partly discounting—liability.....	689		



Cashier, continuation of in office without formal re-election.....	568	Deposit of securities with Cashier.....	856
Cashier, individual dealings with.....	694	Depositor's agent—application of depositor's funds for agent's debts.....	569
Cashier—release of liens—set-off.....	837	Depositor's debt, promise to pay—Cashier's authority—statute of frauds—appeal.....	559
Cashier's certificate of deposit.....	854	Deposit, receiving when bank is insolvent—criminal liability.....	682
Certificate of deposit as a demand liability..	686	Deposits as offsets.....	695
Certificate of deposit—attachment of.....	390	Deposits—real party in interest—admission—estoppel.....	557
Certificate of deposit—claim for amount greater than face of.....	70	Deposits, tracing, when bank insolvent.....	854
Certificate of deposit, loss of—indemnity..	56	Deposits, transfer of from one bank to another—authority of Cashier.....	221
Certificate of deposit—necessity for demand	552	Deposit, title to.....	568
Certificate of deposit—necessity for demand statute of limitations.....	676	Director, knowledge of—when not notice to bank.....	680
Certificate of deposit—negotiability.....	372	Directors, liability for dividends improperly declared.....	692
Certificate of deposit—negotiability—authority of trust company to issue.....	550	Directors, meeting of—proof of acts by parol	683
Certificate of deposit—substitution one for another.....	566	Director, withdrawal of funds from bank in view of insolvency.....	854
Certificate of deposit (time), payment of interest after maturity.....	69	Dividend, payment of when unearned—liability of directors.....	856
Certificates of deposit, failure of holder to produce when demanding payment.....	686	Draft attached to bill of lading.....	568
Certification by telephone.....	697	Draft attached to shipment.....	858
Certification of raised check—liability of bank.....	542	False report of bank's condition—liability of officers.....	222
Certified check, refusal of bank to pay.....	388	Forged checks.....	853
Certified checks, stopping payment.....	857	Forged checks—knowledge of depositor—failure to notify bank.....	843
Check, acceptance of.....	855	Forged checks—liability of payee bank—indorsement.....	378
Check endorsed with prefix "Mrs." to name of payee.....	226	Forged endorsement—liability of paying bank	225
Check, forged endorsement of—fraud—liability of bank.....	688	Forged endorsement of check—liability of bank.....	688
Check, liability of bank certifying when raised.....	542	Forged endorsements.....	694
Check, liability of bank paying on forged endorsement.....	225	Forged or altered paper, payment of.....	565
Check, liability of bank to holders of.....	565	Forgery, proceeds of.....	856
Check, liability of payee bank when forged..	378	Garnishment of bank—insolvent defendant—checks delivered before service—payment—equitable assignment—set-off.....	688
Check—no-protest slip.....	69	Garnishment of deposit in National bank...	390
Check, oral notice not to pay.....	389	Garnishment of negotiable paper.....	569
Check, payment of—forged indorsement—liability of bank.....	677	Guaranty by a National bank.....	672, 689
Check—presentation—when presentation dispensed with.....	674	Indorsee of past-due note—presentment and notice of dishonor.....	60
Check—protest for non-payment.....	695	Indorser, notice to—when insufficient.....	55
Check—revocation of.....	695	Insolvency—collections—following trust funds.....	683
Checks and notes, protest of.....	857	Insolvency—collections—following trust funds—rights of beneficiary—appeal—review.....	558
Check, stoppage of payment.....	855	Insolvency—liability of stockholders.....	685
City depositories—authority of council to designate.....	693	Insolvency—receiving deposits with knowledge of—evidence—accomplice's testimony	688
Collection—bank as agent of depositor.....	567	Insolvent bank—payment of preferred claims.....	849
Collections—insolvency—following trust funds.....	683	Insolvent estate—title to funds.....	566
Collections, liability of bank for.....	854	Insurance policies—assignment to creditor—extent of lien—evidence—witnesses—bank directors—competency—transaction with decedent.....	557
Collections—liability of bank where parties are discharged by neglect to properly protest paper.....	554	Interest, amount to be paid when no rate is specified.....	390
Collections—notary's fee.....	564	Joint deposit by husband and wife.....	692, 848
Corporation—increase of bonded debt.....	687	Joint deposit—ownership—intention of parties.....	687
Counties—bonds—subscription to railroad stock—validity—statutory provisions—actions—defenses—broken promise of railroad.....	556	Liability of officer for negligence in making loans.....	691
County treasurer—deposit of misappropriated funds.....	694		
Deposit, application of to note.....	856		
Deposit, assignment of.....	696		
Deposit by corporation, application of to debt due from President.....	692		
Deposit, concealment of.....	568		

# INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE, 1901.

v

Liability of officers for making false reports of bank's condition.....	222	Receiving deposits when bank is insolvent.....	688
Lien of bank on notes left for collection—assignment of depositor.....	219	Restrictive endorsements.....	858
Lien on stock of State bank—Kansas statute.....	546	Revocation of check.....	695
Mortgage—release—acts of directors.....	848	Salaries, claims against insolvent bank when unpaid.....	567
Mortgages—contract—misunderstanding—reformation.....	558	Savings deposit.....	693
National bank, action by—jurisdiction.....	845	Shipment of funds to cover draft—failure of depository bank—priority of claims.....	693
National bank—agent of stockholders—jurisdiction of Federal courts.....	66	Stock held in trust.....	692
National bank—contract of shareholder with bank.....	849	Stockholders, action against—Receiver—Kansas statute.....	683
National bank, exemption of from occupation tax.....	65	Stockholders' liability—loss by Receiver—additional assessment.....	848
National bank, guaranty by.....	672	Stockholders, liability of.....	685
National bank—increase of capital stock—liability of stockholder.....	830	Stock, lien on—Kansas statute.....	546
National bank—loan on real estate security—enforcing mortgage.....	682	Stock of corporation received as payment for debt due a National bank.....	670
National bank—ownership of corporate stock.....	849	Stopping payment on negotiable instruments.....	697
National bank, power of Receiver to sue—authority from Comptroller.....	383	Surety on joint note.....	565
National bank, purchase of corporate stock by.....	687	Surplus and profits.....	691
National banks—receiving corporate stock in payment of debts.....	670	Taxation—assessment of bank shares—increase of valuation without notice—National bank shares—enjoining collection of illegal tax.....	560
National banks, taxation of—Kentucky statute.....	220, 380	Taxation—assessment of trust property—validity.....	558
National bank stock, liability of pledgee of.....	541	Taxation of banks—retroactive effect of decision.....	684
National bank, usury by—limitation of actions.....	849	Taxation of National banks—Kentucky statute.....	220, 380
Negotiable instruments law—order payable out of a particular fund.....	674	Taxation—Savings banks—securities—statutes—franchise tax—record.....	560
Negotiable instruments, stopping payment on.....	697	Telephone, certification by.....	697
Negotiable paper—garnishment—discrimination in favor of local banks.....	63	Transfer of deposits—authority of Cashier.....	221
No-protest slip attached to check.....	69	Trust companies—power to issue certificates of deposit—Federal courts following State decisions—questions of commercial law—certificates of deposit—negotiability.....	561
Notary, negligence of in regard to protest.....	853	Trustee process, liability of various forms of paper to.....	226
Note payable "with exchange".....	70	Trust funds deposited by city treasurer.....	694
Notes—improper protest—damages—measure of damages.....	559	Trust funds—notice to bank.....	566
Occupation tax—exemption of National banks—effect of.....	65	Usury by National bank, limitation of actions.....	849
Officers, liability of when borrowing from bank.....	566	Usury, defense in action against National bank.....	211
Officers of bank, discretion of.....	566	Usury, limitation of actions.....	853
Overdraft note.....	697	Usury—National banks—State statute.....	215
Partnership—fictitious names—certificate—judgment.....	559	Usury—New York statute—private banker.....	375
Pass-book, effect of making payments when stolen.....	568	"With exchange," meaning of.....	70
Pledgee of National bank stock—liability.....	541		
Preferences affected by insolvency.....	566		
Preferred claim.....	567		
Protest—liability of bank for failure to make properly.....	554		
Protest of check for non-payment.....	695		
Protest of notes and checks.....	857		
Real estate, loan on by National bank.....	849		
Real estate security, loan on by National bank—enforcing mortgage.....	682		
Receiver, authority of to draw checks.....	564		
Receiver of National bank—power to sue—authority from Comptroller.....	383		
Receiver's judgment for assessment—subsequent assessment.....	849		

## LIST OF CASES.

Adams, State Revenue Agent, vs. Bank of Oxford.....	884
Aldrich vs. McClaine.....	848
Atlas Nat. Bank vs. Nat. Exch. Bank.....	846
Bank of Hamilton vs. Imperial Bank of Canada.....	562
Bank of Saginaw vs. Title and Trust Co. of Western Pa.....	550, 561
Batley vs. Eureka Bank.....	546
Bingham vs. La Banque Jacques Cartier.....	387
Brooks vs. State.....	65
Brown vs. Toronto General Trust Corporation.....	690
Cammann, et al. vs. Feitner, et al.....	558

Caponigri vs. Alteri.....	375	Mayor, etc., of City of Westminster vs. Westminster Savings Bank.....	561
Carpenter vs. Greene County.....	557	McDonald vs. Gillis, et al.....	387
Chapman, et al. vs. Cutrer.....	845	Mercantile National Bank of Cleveland vs. Hubbard, county treasurer.....	560
Cobble, et al. vs. Farmers' Bank, et al.....	559	Murphy, et al. vs. Bordwell.....	847
Coker, et al. vs. First National Bank of Memphis.....	54	National Bank of Daingerfield, Plaintiff in Error vs. G. W. Ragland.....	849
Continental Nat. Bank of N. Y. vs. Tradesmen's Nat. Bank of N. Y.....	542	National Savings Bank vs. Cable, et al.....	674
Cottle, et al. vs. Marine Bank of Buffalo.....	552, 687	Neal vs. First National Bank, of Lebanon, Ind.....	843
Dedham Nat. Bank vs. Everett Nat. Bank..	378	Neely, et al. vs. Grayson County National Bank.....	688
Deweese vs. Smith, et al.....	846, 849	Nicholson vs. Randall Banking Company....	221
Ellis, et al. vs. First Nat. Bank of Woonsocket.....	837, 846	Notling vs. National Bank of Virginia.....	557
English-American Loan and Trust Co. vs. Hiers.....	680	Ontario Bank vs. Merchants' Bank of Halifax.....	850
First Nat. Bank of Dalton vs. McEntire....	215	Ontario Bank vs. Routhier, et al.....	386
First National Bank of Denver vs. Wilder..	56	Owen County Court vs. Farmers' National Bank of Owenton.....	220
First National Bank of Greenville vs. Greenville Oil and Cotton Co.....	560	Phillip & William Ebling Brewing Company vs. Benjamin Reinheimer.....	55
First Nat. Bank of Pensacola vs. Anderson..	211	Rehbein, et al. vs. Rahr, et al.....	686
First Nat. Bank of Roanoke vs. Speece.....	558	Rennie vs. Quebec Bank.....	850
First Nat. Bank of Sutton vs. Grosshaus....	682	Riester, et al. vs. Horton Land and Lumber Company, et al.....	687
Fulton vs. National Bank of Denison.....	849	Robinson vs. Aird.....	847
Garvey vs. N.Y. Building Loan Banking Co.	558	Scobee, Sheriff, vs. Bean, et al.....	380
Geo. H. Scott vs. Parry L. Dewese, Receiver.....	830	Sims vs. Brown.....	683
German-American Bank of Rochester vs. Atwater.....	60	State Bank of Pike vs. George M. Brown....	212
Gerner vs. Yates, et al.....	222	State vs. Bank of Commerce of Grand Island, et al.....	559-683
Goldie vs. Bank of Hamilton.....	561	State vs. Clements.....	682-689
Guarantee Co. of North Dakota vs. Hanway..	66	Sumpter Turner Syndic of M. Schwartz & Co. vs. F. L. Richardson, Receiver American National Bank.....	383
Hatch vs. First Nat. Bank of Dexter.....	372	Thomas, et al. vs. National Bank of D. O. Mills & Co.....	845
Hayley vs. Hurd, et al.....	63	Thorn vs. Perry.....	691
Hayes vs. Fidelity Ins. Trust and Safe Dep. Co.....	541	Tobin vs. McKinney.....	676
Haynes vs. Wesley.....	674	Tolman vs. American National Bank.....	677-688
Hitchcock vs. Bank of Suspension Bridge, 554, 559		Tourtlot vs. Whithed.....	670
Hutchins vs. Planters Nat. Bank of Richmond.....	672-689	Union Bank vs. Eureka Woollen Manufacturing Company.....	689
In re Bank of West Superior.....	848	Wark vs. People's Bank of Halifax.....	852
In re Bank of West Superior, Goodwin vs. Nichols.....	683	White vs. Commercial and Farmers' Bank of Rockhill.....	849
In re Brown's estate.....	848	Wood vs. Zornstorff.....	688
In re Meyer, et al.....	845	Zeis vs. Potter, et al.....	556
John Joyce vs. H. T. Auten, Receiver.....	219		
Kansas State Bank vs. First State Bank of Marion.....	847		
La Banque Jacques Cartier vs. Tozer.....	852		
Lease vs. Barschall, et al.....	848		

### III. Banking Miscellany, Reports, Etc.

Accounting, ethics of.....	731	Associated banks mutual guarantee association.....	584
Albaugh, Morton, sketch of (with portrait). ..	92	Auditors, responsibility of for false statements.....	126
American Bankers' Association:		Australian criticism of the American banking system.....	734
Conventions of the.....	589	Bank clerks and branch bank managers, dangers that beset them.....	402
Some recent tendencies in its management.....	103	Bank clerks, educational movement among.....	105
American Institute of Bank Clerks, the.....	587	Bank clerks, organization of in New York city.....	591
America's changed international position....	266		
Annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury.....	81		
Annual report of the Superintendent of Banks (New York).....	118		

Banking and Financial News.....	128, 269, 438, 594, 748, 887	New York banks, taxation of.....	260
Bellamy, Edward, prophecy of.....	574	New York Life Insurance and Trust Com- pany.....	110
Boom in Wall Street, the.....	704	New York Savings Banks Association.....	859
Branches of National banks.....	237	New York Savings banks, official state- ment of.....	437
Brosius, Marriott M. (ideal money and bank currency).....	391	New York State Bankers' Association, an- nual meeting of Group VII.....	238
Bryan, Wm. H. (prevention of bank defalca- tions).....	101	New York trust companies, statement of condition (inset).....	224
Canadian bank returns, review of.....	240, 739	Notices of New Books.....	112, 132, 262, 592
Chamber of Commerce Building, the.....	868	Open Letters from Bankers: Reserves of National banks (Geo. M. Coffin).....	127
Collection of country checks.....	108	Ouvrard, Gabriel J., financial career of.....	78
Collection register and diary, form for a combined.....	209	Raymond, Charles T. (associated banks mut- ual guarantee association).....	584
Commercial education in Saxony.....	263	Recent currency legislation in the United States.....	713
Debts of the world.....	735	Redemption of paper money.....	870
Defalcations in banks, prevention of.....	101	Revenue act, changes in.....	885
De Witte, M., portrait of.....	579	Richter, R. M. (educational movement among bank clerks).....	105
Educational movement among bank clerks..	105	Russia, financial affairs in.....	406
Essentials of success in a banking career...	109	Russia, national debt of.....	579
Ethics of accounting, the.....	730	Russian Minister of Finance, portrait of...	579
European banking systems.....	413	Savings Banks Association of the State of New York.....	859
Failures, Suspensions and Liquidations 139, 287, 443, 611, 754, 895		Savings banks of New York, official state- ment of condition.....	437
Fidelity insurance bonds.....	860	Secretary of the Treasury, annual report of.	81
Financial and commercial statistics of the United States (inset).....	576	Silver dollar, bill for maintaining parity of..	233
Functions of trust companies, the.....	698	Southern small loan business.....	210
Gage, Lyman J. (annual report of the Secre- tary of the Treasury).....	81	State Bankers' Association: Arkansas Bankers' Association.....	746
Haviland, F. C. (redemption of paper money)	870	Georgia Bankers' Association.....	882
Hill, Ebenezer J. (some defects in the new financial law).....	93	Kansas State Bankers' Association.....	882
Hollister, Harvey J. (reform in methods of taxation).....	577	Mississippi Bankers' Association.....	881
Ideal money and bank currency.....	391	Missouri Bankers' Association.....	873
Indebtedness of the world.....	735	Northeast Nebraska Bankers' Associa- tion.....	746
Independent Treasury system, the.....	737	South Carolina Bankers' Association...	881
Japan, report on post-bellum financial ad- ministration in.....	227	Texas Bankers' Association.....	874
Life and fire insurance.....	570, 725, 863	Virginia Bankers' Association.....	883
Life and fire insurance as related to modern business economy.....	398	West Virginia Bankers' Association.....	878
Locking up money in the Government's vaults.....	737	State Banks—Reports of Supervising Officers: Connecticut.....	243
Mason, David Marshall, address of before London Institute of Bankers.....	713	Kansas.....	245
Minneapolis Bank Clerks' Association.....	265	Maine.....	252
Napoleon of finance, a.....	74	Massachusetts.....	429
National and State banks in New York.....	113	Missouri.....	432
National bank notes, denominations of.....	397	New York (Savings banks and trust companies).....	425
National bank returns, reserve cities.....	288, 459, 905	Statistics of finance and commerce (inset)...	576
National banks, branches of.....	237	Taxation of banks and trust companies in New York.....	741
National banks, condition of.....	268	Taxation of banks in New York.....	260
National banks of the United States, condi- tion of.....	593	Taxation, reform in methods of.....	577
New banks, changes in officers, etc. 133, 275, 444, 602, 755, 896		Trade balance of the United States, what be- comes of it.....	884
New financial law, some defects in and sug- gested changes.....	93	Trust companies, functions of.....	698
New York, annual report of the Superin- tendent of Banks.....	118	Trust companies of New York, condition of (inset).....	224
		Van Slyke, N. B. (recent tendencies of the American Bankers' Association).....	103
		Wall Street, the boom in.....	704

## IV. Money, Trade and Investments.

## A REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SITUATION.

## COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS OF ACTIVE STOCKS, RAILWAY, INDUSTRIAL AND GOVERNMENT BONDS.

January number.....	140	April number.....	612
February number.....	299	May number.....	764
March number.....	470	June number.....	917

## ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.

January number.....	159	April number.....	622
February number.....	311	May number.....	775
March number.....	480	June number.....	928

## RAILWAY, INDUSTRIAL AND GOVERNMENT BONDS.

January number.....	161	April number.....	625
February number.....	313	May number.....	777
March number.....	482	June number.....	930

## BANKERS' OBITUARY RECORD.

January number.....	175	April number.....	639
February number.....	328	May number.....	791
March number.....	496	June number.....	944

**NOTICE.**—The BANKERS' MAGAZINE having been consolidated with RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING, the volume number of the former only is retained.

**BOUND VOLUMES.**—Beginning with July, 1895 (consolidation of the BANKERS' MAGAZINE with the JOURNAL), the volumes comprise the numbers for six months.

Price, bound in cloth with leather backs and corners, \$3.50 a volume. By mail or express, prepaid, 40 cents additional.



THE

# BANKERS' MAGAZINE

*RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING and THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE Consolidated.*

---

FIFTY-FIFTH YEAR.

JANUARY, 1901.

VOLUME LXII, No. 1.

---

THE SURPLUS REVENUES may be disposed of in two simple ways. One is to reduce taxation and the other to increase expenditure. In 1837, when the public debt was paid and the receipts from the sale of public lands caused the accumulation of a surplus in the Treasury, the public moneys were handled on a different plan than that followed at the present day. The public money was as fast as collected paid into banks designated as depositories by the Government. These banks were located in all parts of the country and were State banks organized under the laws of the States. They had no powers granted by the Federal Government. The funds of the Government under this system of deposit with the banks were never taken out of the general circulation of the business community. The banks loaned the funds to their customers, and the more freely as it seemed improbable that the United States would have any use for the money. There was not the same objection to a surplus under the laws of that day governing the disposition of public money that exists at the present time. Nevertheless, the surplus of 1836-37, was the cause of much solicitude on the part of the statesmen and publicists of the period. It arose from the belief in the minds of the leaders of the party opposed to the Administration that the control of so much money, the power to favor one bank or locality by depositing funds, and punishing another bank or locality by withdrawing funds, gave the Executive a lever for corrupting the nation in its own favor and facilitated a President in securing re-election.

Various plans of diminishing the surplus were suggested. The source of excessive revenues being mainly the proceeds of sale of public lands, one proposition was to dispose of the lands at prices so low as to merely pay expenses. Another was to use the surplus in the construction of public works. These propositions were unsatisfactory, because they must have been carried out by the Executive, and could

have been used to enhance the popularity of the Administration in power. Congress finally saw no better way of solving the problem than by distributing the surplus existing on January 1, 1837, among the States. The idea seems to have been that the States would use the funds so obtained in the construction of public works, and that the whole country would be benefited, while the executive branch of the Government was deprived of the temptation to use public funds as the means of political corruption. The public funds were deposited in eighty-eight banks, and comprised two-thirds of all their deposits. No such draft for deposits was ever made on banks in all the history of banking as was ordered by this measure. It fell the heavier as there was no combination or plan of mutual support among the eighty-eight depositories. The result was the utter breaking down of the banks, and the occurrence of widespread financial panic. The country in less than a year fell from the pinnacle of apparent prosperity to the lowest stratum of business adversity. The Government revenues, from great excess, became unequal to its expenditures. It is possible that much of the inconvenience at this period might have been avoided had the surplus moneys been permitted to remain in the Treasury. The attempt to give them to the States was a shock which the banking system of the day could not endure.

The period from 1846 to 1857 was one of great and solid prosperity. The tariff of the day worked well, and before 1857 the revenues of the Government began to exceed the expenditures. The independent Treasury system began to lock up this surplus and to have a disastrous effect on the circulating medium of the country. There is but little doubt that the surplus revenue and its locking up in the Treasury was one of the chief causes of the financial crisis of 1857. Since the last-mentioned period whenever the country has begun to enjoy prosperity, with its natural concomitant, an increase of the revenues of the Government, the surplus revenue locked up in the Treasury has proved adverse.

There could not be devised a more complete and adequate preventive to the undue development of prosperous times than the independent Treasury system. Like the governor of the engine it acts automatically to accomplish its end. The revenue increases as the people prosper; as it increases the surplus in the form of a large proportion of the circulating medium is locked up. Money becomes stringent, credit receives a shock, a panic occurs, followed by hard times, gradual liquidation, a reduction of revenue, and money idle in the channels of circulation. By degrees credit and confidence return, business revives, prosperity increases, revenues increase and another surplus appears, currency is locked up, and the old round repeated. Those who seek to apply remedies find themselves paralyzed on

all hands. If it be suggested that the public money be deposited with the banks, at once the objection of political inexpediency is raised. The Administration resorting to this remedy is accused just as in the days of JACKSON and VAN BUREN of desiring to reward its friends and punish its enemies. "Pet banks" is the favorite sneer at this time as well as sixty years ago. No Administration seems to be able to endure this mode of attack. To reduce the revenues is another proposed remedy. Changes in the tariff laws are always, as the history of the country shows, matters of the utmost risk. They are made the opportunity of those who seek protection of the tariff for their private interests, and the clash of these private interests is so great that a new tariff bill is always a mass of compromises which may work very differently in practice than was intended by those who initiated the amendment of the tariff laws. The new measure may either increase the revenue or it may reduce it too radically. The discussion of the tariff in the manner in which it is sure to be discussed in Congress, when opportunity is given, always unsettles and retards business.

The only other way to get rid of the surplus is by expenditure, either in payment of the public debt or in new ways devised by Congress. The provisions under which the bonds are issued do not permit them to be called for payment. Until the Government acquires this option, the public debt can be reduced by purchase only. Whenever there is a surplus with which to purchase bonds, the price is sure to be so high as to make a responsible officer hesitate. The Administration, between the real difficulties of the situation and its political fears, is very loath to take any radical step. The real duty of disposing of surplus money belongs to Congress, and that body is more apt to adopt measures which will exhaust it in increased expenditure than to reduce it or dispose of it in allowing purchase of bonds not yet due.

The history of the revenues of the country indicates that as they increase the appropriations made by Congress increase. A decrease in appropriations always follows a decrease of revenue. An increase of revenues is invariably followed by the discovery of new ways of expending them. Moreover, it is questionable whether the people do not gain more by this tendency than they would if Congress sought to devise means of relieving the country from the burden of an unemployed surplus, by some scheme of investment of it.

The deposit of the surplus in the banks in 1833-36, resulted disastrously. It might be more successful at the present time, but its political unpopularity precludes its extensive use. To deposit with the States might turn out better also to-day than it did in 1837, but this plan will probably not be revived. The revenue may be reduced by



Congress, or that body may order bond purchases. It is most probable that congressional action will take the direction of measures of expenditure, included under these heads, subsidies, pensions, and canal schemes, which will probably provide sufficient check to the accumulation of the surplus.

The suggestion that the banks pay interest on the public moneys placed on deposit with them, recently made by Mr. GAGE, is a good one. Of course the banks could afford to pay interest for Government deposits the same as for other deposits, if they are relieved from the necessity of giving special security for them. It is to be apprehended that there would be much opposition to permitting banks to receive Government deposits without securing the Treasury by the deposit of United States bonds. If deposits were given to banks paying the highest interest, it is to be feared that the Treasury might be induced to favor institutions that were not absolutely safe. The less trustworthy institutions would offer the highest interest. If their offers were refused the Government would be accused of favoritism.

---

A SILVER COMBINATION is being planned among the companies and individuals controlling a great portion of the silver-producing mines and plants, the object being to increase the price of silver.

In this era of great economic combinations there is nothing very surprising in this course of action. The wonder is rather that it has not been tried before. The reason it has not seems to be that the silver miners of the United States have been since 1876 looking for protection by some action of the Government, restoring to silver its importance as a money metal. This hope that government would give the silver industry the assistance it demanded has effectually, until now, prevented any attempt at self-help.

There is no industry more exposed to the evils of free competition than the mining of silver. The abundance with which silver-producing ores are found on the two continents of the Western Hemisphere, and the freedom allowed to prospectors and miners under the laws of the United States, led to an activity of production at the old price of silver that at once rendered the maintenance of that price impracticable. This was particularly the case as new and improved processes were invented for working the ores and as more capital was from time to time invested in the business. It must be remembered that unlike gold silver is seldom or never found except in combination with other substances, and that more labor and capital are required for its extraction than is the case with gold. That is, silver is never found in the placer mines from which gold is so easily extracted by simple processes within the power of the individual miner.

When, however, the price of silver was still at the level indicated by the well-known ratio of sixteen to one in the coinage, small capitalists could make money by treating ores of average richness by such processes as their capital permitted them to use, and ores of very low grade could be profitably treated by those whose capital allowed the introduction of adequate machinery. But as the price fell the area of profitable production narrowed, and placed the business more and more in the hands of the possessors of rich ores and adequate capital. Two causes led to the fall in price, the increase in the supply and the tendency of all civilized nations to found the monetary standard of value on gold alone. This tendency, leading to the abolishment of the free coinage of silver at all the national mints, was due to a desire to insure more precision in commercial dealings and in the investment of wealth.

This abandonment of silver as a standard of value has been a great blow to those who possessed silver mines and the machinery for working them. Instead of recognizing the legislation which demonetized silver as the inevitable consequence of a common impulse in the minds of men in favor of gold as the more suitable monetary standard, those interested in silver as a source of profit have chosen to regard it as a sort of great commercial plot against their metallic product, and they have sought to counteract it by attacking this legislation by agitation for its repeal. As the enactments attacked were only the symptom of an irresistible natural law, the efforts to prevent and overthrow them have been futile. The great exertions made by the advocates of silver to stem the tide of gold legislation have not, perhaps, been entirely unprofitable to them, although the campaigns and agitation of the last twenty-five years have been very costly to the silver miners, as well as to the general public, whose opposed will has prevented the remonetization of silver, the main object aimed at.

It is probably susceptible of proof, if those who have so strenuously and persistently struggled for the remonetization of silver as a means of enhancing the price of silver had earlier seen and frankly acknowledged to themselves the real nature of the contest in which they were engaging, and its obvious futility, they might have abandoned it with advantage for the course which it is now proposed to take. If the silver miners, instead of spending their money and intellectual energy in bolstering up a hopeless political cause, had formed an industrial combination to maintain the price of silver, they would very possibly have succeeded to an extent which would have insured them greater profits than any they have obtained by the sales secured by action along political lines.

There are several reasons why a combination by ordinary industrial methods should result in successfully raising the price of silver.

The largest part of the world's supply of silver comes from the Western Hemisphere, and most of it is produced in the United States and Mexico. There is no insuperable obstacle to combination among the mine operators of these two countries. The combination, if made, is not likely to suffer competition from small producers. The conditions under which silver is found all point to the advantage of large capital in its production. It is one of those substances that lend themselves easily to the control of capital, much more so than oil and other products which have been profitably brought under such control. The point at which it exhibits the greatest disadvantage is that of consumption. Once mined the stock is not so easily diminished, but in this respect silver is superior to gold. It wastes more readily by corrosion and exposure. When used for coins it wears by abrasion more rapidly than gold, because more actively in circulation. It is used to a greater extent than ever before in the arts, as its suitability for numerous purposes manifests itself. It is probable that its use for subsidiary coinage will increase after it is once acknowledged that it will never more rival gold as a standard metal. In fact, there are many circumstances that favor the belief that if the business of the production of silver, including the process of refining, should be conducted with the system and skill which can be exerted by a properly organized combination, the price may within a reasonable period be materially advanced, perhaps not to the figure prevailing when it was still a standard metal, but sufficiently high to remove complaints as to the lack of profit in silver mining.

---

THE STOCKHOLDERS OF A BANK are the ones most vitally concerned in its management, and they are the ones upon whom losses by defalcations or bad judgment in making loans fall most heavily. A depositor can in any event lose only what he puts into the bank; but a shareholder may lose his original investment, the premium on his shares, and in addition be compelled to pay an assessment equal to the par value of the stock.

With so much at stake, it would seem that those who own bank stock would exercise the greatest vigilance over institutions in which they are interested and insist on the strict observance of sound banking methods. In Canada and some other countries where there are only a limited number of banks, of very large capital, the stockholders exercise more direct control of the banks and have more of a voice in their management than in this country. Here it is too often the case that the owner of the stock of a bank shows but little concern as to how things are going, so long as he gets his dividend regularly at the customary rate or a little more. When the bank fails no one in

the community is more surprised than he, and no one knows less as to the actual conditions which caused the failure.

In the nature of things, the immediate supervision of the affairs of a bank must be delegated to some authority less numerous than the shareholders; but this shifting of control from the owners to the directors and from the latter in turn to the executive officers does not release the real owners of the bank from responsibility in conserving their property and that which the public has confided to them. The delegation of power, in this case, does not imply its complete abdication, and it is the duty of the principals to see that their agents are faithful. This is the view that the law takes in imposing what is known as the double liability on the holders of bank shares.

An added check upon dishonest or incompetent bank management would be afforded by occasional examinations by a committee of stockholders, made up, wherever possible, of those who were neither officers nor directors, and in turn examinations by directors and officers. There would thus be three examinations—one by the officers, one by the directors and one by the shareholders. This would, as a rule, make collusion among the officers and directors impossible. The system of official examination by State and National authority is good as far as it goes, but it is necessarily often more or less superficial. If supplemented, however, in the way suggested, the safety of banks would be assured so far as it can be by rigid supervision. Preferably the examinations proposed, or at least one or more of them, should be made with the assistance of an outside expert accountant, who is familiar with the routine of bank bookkeeping.

To criticise officers and directors of banks without holding shareholders to a just sense of their responsibilities and duties is like trying to purify the waters of a stream whose source is forever contaminated. Indifference upon the part of those who ought to be most deeply concerned is responsible for the bad government so much complained of in our large cities, and not infrequently the bad management of banks is due to similar causes.

It has been well said that the stockholder is the last creditor to be paid when the bank fails, and so long as he does not lose his investment the public will not suffer. The duty and opportunity of keeping the conduct of the monetary institutions of the United States up to the highest possible standard rest with those who own them.

---

THE REDEMPTION OF BANK CIRCULATION, or in fact of paper notes, whether of the banks, the Government or private individuals, is of the utmost importance in a monetary system. Such redemption may be adequately provided for, but this mere provision does not of

itself insure the actual redemption. As the credit of the issuer acquires greater stability, the notes in the hands of the public approximate more closely to real money and tend to remain in circulation. There is no motive for their redemption, and they increase the stock of money out of proportion to the normal demands of business, and stimulate unduly speculative enterprise. The result is that unremunerative undertakings at length produce failure attended with periodical panic in financial circles, more or less widespread.

Theoretically, the use of paper or representative money is intended to aid the distribution of real money so that it will be always available to facilitate the necessary exchanges of products of all kinds. If the proper distribution of money could be insured there would be less unprofitable enterprise, and less waste of energy in all branches of business. Every failure in business represents a waste of energy, which if it had been applied more skilfully or under more favorable conditions, would have added to the wealth and prosperity of the country.

What is meant by an elastic currency is a currency so adjusted that it automatically effects such a distribution of money as to meet in great measure the occasions for profitable enterprise as they develop themselves. The notes of private individuals, of firms and corporations effect this to a very great extent. They are used to obtain the money or the use of money needed, and as soon as the enterprise is completed they are redeemed and destroyed, or at least become incapable of further use. Checks drawn on banks are another class of representative money, that cease to exist as such when their immediate purpose has been accomplished. The notes of the Government and the banks are a development of the ordinary promissory note, which by custom have lost the characteristic of automatic redemption and effacement which representative money generally possesses. They have thus lost what is usually called elasticity, and while still retaining many indispensable advantages, as an aid to exchange, they do not fulfil all the purposes that they should theoretically.

It is well known that before the Civil War the State banks issued notes which were in various ways redeemed whenever they became redundant, generally at the expense of the public. There were many disadvantages connected with the old State bank circulations, due to conditions which have more or less passed away. It was, however, the rule under the old systems of State banking that where the means of redemption provided by the issuing banks were adequate, the notes having answered their purpose were redeemed and effaced themselves much in the same manner as is now the case with checks and ordinary promissory notes. When redeemed the bank notes were no doubt re-

issued, as it was called; but this, technically, was the same as issuing a new note, just as an individual having paid and cancelled one promissory note may issue another if occasion requires. The Bank of England maintains this analogy by never reissuing a note once paid. The paid note is kept as a voucher or is destroyed.

In all theoretical treatises on the issue of paper money the redemption is something very much insisted on, not only that redemption should always be easily attainable for the maintenance of credit, but that it should occur as a matter of course, whenever the holder of a bank note no longer required it for purposes of exchange. Practically, however, perfect provision for redemption of bank notes and their automatic redemption seem to be incompatible. The perfect credit of the National bank note or the Government note leaves no motive in the mind of the ordinary holder to present it for redemption in coined money. If there is to be any adequate redemption of these notes, to reduce their aggregate volume in circulation at times when they are not needed, it must ordinarily be brought about by the influence of some other motive than the distrust of the means for immediate redemption. That this distrust may arise at times, though usually lacking, was seen in regard to Government notes in 1893. This is a motive for redemption that is to be deplored, and one that should not be depended upon in any plan for insuring automatic contraction of a paper currency. It is very generally agreed, however, that automatic contraction and expansion of a bank currency, although declared by many impossible of attainment, is very desirable, if it could be contrived. As to its possibility it may be prefaced that all of the workings of the modern monetary system, which produce such wonderful results throughout the world, are the outcome of the employment of artificial devices and inventions which are adapted to the natural rules of human conduct. If a bank currency is made to respond in its increase and decrease of volume to the demands of business, without unduly cramping enterprise on the one hand, or unduly forcing and stimulating it on the other; if, in other words, it is to become perfectly elastic, as is said, then this desired result must be accomplished by some artificial means. The clearing-houses are artificial means of exchanging and cancelling checks when the end for which the check was drawn has been fulfilled. Some analogous device can certainly be operated for reducing the volume of bank notes at times when they are excessive, and returning the notes to the issuing banks so that they may be in their hands for reissue when a greater volume is required. Redemptions of bank notes must be accomplished by the banks themselves. Few notes are ever presented by individual holders either under the present or any other banking system.

There is now under the present banking law a redemption bureau established in the Treasury at Washington for the redemption of National bank notes. Why do not the operations of this bureau give a proper elasticity to the bank currency? Perhaps one contributing reason is the situation of the bureau at Washington, where it is not in the main current of the flow of the currency circulation. Everyone knows that the great financial center of the United States is New York city. Here is the great ocean to which all the streams of currency naturally tend, where they fall in by the force of financial gravity. The redemption of notes at Washington compels the sending of them there at an expense for transportation, which would be avoided if the bureau were in New York city. Moreover, New York, while the greatest, is not the only financial center. The redemption bureau, with its main office in New York, should have branches in other financial centers. There should be one in Boston, another in Philadelphia, another in Chicago, and, in fact, one in each of the reserve cities. The notes of any local bank could then be redeemed with the least possible expense for transportation. This expense would be reduced to the charges for returning fit notes to the banks issuing them, and worn and mutilated notes to the Comptroller's office in Washington for destruction.

But the convenient and sensible location of the redemption bureau in all the reserve cities, although of great importance, is not the only improvement that is necessary. The law now requires National banks to redeem their notes at the redemption bureau in legal-tender notes or coin. Any bank or person sending bank notes for redemption receives legal-tender notes or coin in payment. If the law were changed and permitted National banks to redeem their notes in notes of other National banks, a clearing system would be established. Balances only would be paid in legal-tender notes or coin. The effect of this change in the law would be to continually send back to the issuing banks their own notes. This process would be most active when the demand for money was slack, and less so when the demand was active. If the aggregate of bank notes was thus given elasticity, the want of this quality in the legal-tender notes would not be perceived, as the volume of bank currency is sufficiently great to enliven the whole mass of paper money by its fluctuations.

---

THE RECENT ADDRESS of Secretary GAGE to the bankers of New York city, in addition to the important suggestion that banks pay interest on deposits of public money, also included some very clear statements in reference to the nature of and use of bank credit, by means of bank notes, checks, drafts and certificates of deposit.

It is, of course, beyond dispute that the audience to which Mr. GAGE addressed himself, being composed of experienced bankers and financiers, were already well acquainted with the banking principles so tersely and cogently presented by the Secretary, yet the very simplicity and directness with which Mr. GAGE stated well-known principles should be an aid in inspiring his audience to use their influence to remove the obstacles which by law exist in the United States to the free development of the use of bank credit. As Mr. GAGE justly pointed out, the use of bank credit is thrown open to the dealer who desires to use it in the form of checks, drafts and certificates of deposit; but to the man who needs it in the form of immediate cash it is still in great measure denied. There has not for years been a Secretary of the Treasury who has been able to speak so plainly and simply of what for the want of clear and simple exposition is to many a mysterious subject. Mr. GAGE's explanation of the necessity of a more scientific bank-note circulation, as the disseminator of bank credit, will go out to the public with a force derived not only from the eminent character and position of the speaker, but also from the distinguished audience who furnished the occasion for its promulgation.

The address in full, printed from the Secretary's manuscript, will be found in another part of this issue of the MAGAZINE. It is worthy of careful reading by all who are interested in perfecting our banking and currency system.

---

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS use silver in their business transactions, like the Chinese and all the nations of Eastern Asia, with the exception of the Japanese, whose circulation is both paper and coin patterned after the money of Europe and the United States. Spanish silver and Mexican dollars have been the chief coins of the Philippines, and with the introduction of money of the United States much confusion has ensued. In using money based on the gold standard, and in exchanging it for the silver in ordinary use, there is liability to misunderstanding and loss. The foreign trade of the islands, too, is conducted on a silver basis, and it becomes a question of much importance what course should be taken by the United States in furnishing a currency for the future which will adapt itself to the necessities of the islands, and at the same time not conflict too much with the monetary standard of this country.

It has been suggested that Congress authorize the coinage of special silver coins adapted to the manners and customs of the islands. It has been pointed out that the experiment with the trade dollar designed especially for use in common with the people of Eastern Asia did not result very satisfactorily. These dollars did not prove a good substitute for Mexican dollars in China, and as they were rejected



there they were sent back to the United States and by their uncertain status became a trouble to all who held them.

The same thing might easily happen to money coined for special circulation in the Philippine Islands unless prepared with careful adaptation to the existing circumstances. Nor will it be advisable to attempt to settle a matter so important to the future prosperity of the islands in their new relations with the United States, until it is definitely known what these relations are to be. Are the Philippines to become a part of the United States and their inhabitants subject to all the restrictions and privileges of the Constitution, or are they to be treated as mere dependencies? Certain questions have been raised before the Supreme Court of the land involving, perhaps, the decision of these points. Whether the decision of the court settles them or not, they must eventually be passed upon either by the court or by the will of the sovereign people, and before this is done it would be unadvisable to undertake to settle the currency question.

If it were certain that the Constitution affords a guide for the determination of the status of the acquired territory, the decision might be more speedy. Probably, while the Constitution does not forbid the bringing of new territory under the sovereignty of the people of the United States, it also contains nothing that prescribes any definite method of treatment, or confers any special privileges on the inhabitants of such territory. It is for the sovereignty inhering in the Government of the United States, derived from the will of the people, to say what the future status of these acquired populations shall be. This sovereignty expresses itself through the three branches of the Government. First through the House of Representatives and Senate, the legislative branch, and then through the judicial and executive branches. A policy to become recognized as the settled will of the sovereign people must be expressed through suitable legislation, approved by judicial authority and put in operation by the Executive for a sufficient length of time to be regarded as a settled question by all parties.

It is believed while there may be some inconveniences connected with the monetary system in operation in the Philippines, when it comes in contact with that of the United States, the attempt to introduce any special coinage for the islands, not founded on the gold standard, would only make the confusion now existing worse. When the proper time arrives, if the islands are to be colonies, they should be free to have their own colonial monetary system; if they are to be amalgamated with the United States, they should have a monetary system the same as the rest of the country. To try to alter the coinage of the Philippines while they are neither one nor the other would be making the future settlement of the question more difficult.

## \*THE REGULATION OF A REDEEMABLE BANK-NOTE CURRENCY.

### III.—CHANGES IN THE DISCOUNT RATE.

One of the most effective weapons for keeping the banking and currency system of a country upon a solvent basis and in harmonious relations with the supply of the precious metals, is the control of the discount rate. Discount is the charge made by bankers for advancing their credit to borrowers in exchange for their evidences of indebtedness.<sup>†</sup> This charge is usually expressed as a percentage of the face value of the paper and represents the rate of charge or deduction by the year. A discount rate of five per cent. means that a deduction will be made from the face value of commercial paper at the rate of five per cent. per year from the date when it is accepted by the banker to the date when it becomes payable. As most commercial paper runs for three months or less, the actual deduction is usually only a fraction of the nominal discount rate. A bill of exchange of \$1,000, when discounted for three months at five per cent., affords one and a quarter per cent., or \$12.50, to the banker, while the remainder—\$987.50—is carried to the credit of the trader who presents the bill for discount. He may take this amount in bank notes, but the more usual practice is simply to have the amount put to the credit of his deposit account, in order that he may draw against it from time to time as he has need. There is a tacit understanding between bankers and traders in many cases that a considerable percentage of the amount nominally put to the credit of the trader shall be left constantly on deposit in the bank. The rule is not applied rigidly to each particular loan, but it is assumed that a man receiving accommodation at an average amount of say \$100,000—sometimes more and sometimes less—shall not often draw his deposit account below a certain proportion of the average or maximum credit extended to him.

An increase in the rate of discount appears upon its face to mean an increased profit to the banker. This, however, is the least important of its economic effects. The tendency of changes in the rate is to restrict applications to the banks for commercial loans, to diminish speculation on the stock exchanges, to reduce the demand for the settlement of foreign obligations and thereby to diminish the export of the precious metals, retain capital within the country which would otherwise be withdrawn, and attract direct importations of the precious metals. All these effects tend strongly to keep the credit system in harmonious relations with the supply of legal-tender money and to diminish the credits extended by the bank. A diminution of these credits, as pointed out elsewhere,<sup>‡</sup> operates to reduce that form of credit issued in the form of bank notes.

\* Continued from the December number, page 876.

† "*La retenue faite par celui—capitaliste, banquier ou marchand—qui paye un effet avant son échéance.*"—*Dictionnaire du Commerce, de l'Industrie et de la Banque*, II, p. 61.

‡ *Vide* "The Benefits of a Bank-Note Currency," *New York BANKERS' MAGAZINE* (March, 1900), LX, p. 355.

By what methods and by the operation of what economic laws control over the money market is exercised through the discount rate will now be set forth. The first effect which has been named is in restricting the application for loans. There may be a question whether a trader weak in financial resources would be deterred from seeking a loan by an advance in the charge made for it. Such traders usually need money and credit so badly that they will pay any price in order to obtain it, but the granting of such loans is in the control of the bank. They do not add weak clients to their list at a period of monetary pressure, except on rare occasions when the generous grant of banking accommodations seems advisable for staying panic. When the discount rate is advanced, the effect is felt upon borrowers from the bank, most of whom are traders of unquestioned credit and large resources. They often make exceedingly small profits upon large transactions and their profits are seriously impaired by paying an unusual rate for banking accommodation. They are less disposed to present bills to be discounted when the discount rate is high. The operation of an increased rate of discount, therefore, is to diminish the loans of the bank. A diminution of loans means that less credit is given and less currency is paid out by the bank. The metallic reserve of standard money increases in ratio to the liabilities, and the tendency towards the development of too large a fabric of credit upon too small a reserve is arrested.

More important perhaps is the influence of an advance in the discount rate upon loans for speculation. Commercial loans are an outgrowth of current business operations, and the normal demand for them is not likely to decline radically unless the pressure upon the money market is accompanied by business depression. The class of loans known as advances upon securities are susceptible of more radical changes in volume, because they are made largely to brokers for buying and selling stocks for speculative purposes. The margin of profit in stock exchange transactions is small and may be entirely wiped out by a difference of one or two per cent. in the rate for loans. The banks, moreover, usually begin to call in money thus loaned upon stocks and bonds when they feel the influence of commercial pressure and refuse to continue such loans or grant new ones. The credit issued by such loans, whether in the form of deposit accounts or bank notes, is thus curtailed and the amount of notes outstanding is diminished.

#### EFFECT OF THE DISCOUNT RATE IN ATTRACTING GOLD.

The influences exerted by changes in the discount rate which have thus far been set forth tend directly to reduce the volume of credit within a country to safe relations to standard money. It remains to consider the effect of such changes in attracting aid from outside the country. An indirect influence of this character is the effect of high discount rates upon debts due abroad to domestic traders and bankers. This is perhaps the most important effect of an advance in the discount rate. It is a part of the movement of the foreign exchanges, which will be discussed more minutely in another article. As the tangible is easier to comprehend than the intangible, it is proper to deal first with the effects of changes in the discount rate upon the actual exportation and importation of the precious metals, although these movements usually follow rather than precede those in the less visible representatives of capital in the form of credits or titles to money.

The precious metals move back and forth between one country and another where they constitute the standard of money under the influence of changes in the discount rate. While there are other and sometimes deeper influences which may cause their movement, this is the most immediate and direct influence exerted upon them under modern conditions of business and credit. A high discount rate is in itself the offer of a high rental price for the use of money or credit convertible into money. The higher the rate, the less is the probability that credits will serve the purpose of money, and the greater the probability that actual shipments of the precious metals will earn a high rental price. When, therefore, the foreign exchange broker in New York observes that the discount rate has risen to six per cent. in London or Berlin, while it remains at four per cent. in New York, it is obvious to him if he has gold, or titles for which he can obtain gold without cost in New York, that it will earn more abroad than at home. The situation shows that gold is scarce abroad and plentiful in New York in the ratio of the demand for it. The deficient supply has raised the price offered abroad, and this demand is naturally met by the transfer of the idle and superfluous supply in New York to the point where the supply is deficient.

This operation of the law of supply and demand is the governing factor in the changes of the discount rate which are now made by commercial banks in order to maintain the proper relations between the volume of credit and the supply of the precious metals. The operation of the discount rate, in addition to attracting actual shipments of the precious metals, is felt also in arresting their exportation and in making profitable the transfer of credits to the country where the high discount rate prevails. If, for the purpose of simple illustration, a New York banker has in Berlin \$1,000,000 in gold, which he is about to have shipped to New York, the news of an advance in the discount rate in Berlin will lead him to cable at once to his banker or broker there to delay the shipment of gold to New York and lend it in Berlin at the rate of discount prevailing there.

Actual operations in the transfer of international credits are not usually quite so simple as the direct control over physical blocks of gold, but the effect is the same in dealing with titles to the metals. If the New York banker holds a bill of exchange entitling him to a certain amount of money in Berlin, he has the option of sending the bill to his Berlin correspondent and asking a direct shipment of gold to New York, or authorizing the loan of the amount in Berlin. If high discount rates prevail there, he will choose the latter course. When hundreds of these transactions are taking place daily, some of those entitled to gold in Berlin may insist on taking it away from there in any event, while others, for reasons connected with the discount rate or their personal obligations, may direct its transfer to Paris or some other point. The effect of the change in the discount rate is felt, however, upon the balance of transactions. The gold exchange houses, the great banking houses having international agencies, and even the local banks of New York or Berlin which have bills of exchange which can be negotiated through the exchange houses, will all be tempted to divert the funds under their control to the market where they will earn the most. The whole volume of free capital in the world will tend to move towards the market where the rate paid for using it is the highest, as air rushes towards a vacuum, and this movement will be translated by an increase in the supply of the precious metals in this

market, the postponement of demands upon the market, and the gradual readjustment of the supply of the precious metals available for the maintenance of credit.

#### CHANGES IN PRICES OF GOODS AND SECURITIES.

The results of changes in the discount rate which have thus far been set forth may be described as the direct results, which are obtainable by the direct intervention of banking officers in the money market. There are other results, more far-reaching in character, which are influenced by changes in the rate, but are usually due to a combination of causes which grow out of changes in the entire economic life of the country. The outflow of the precious metals, when not due to certain special causes, is usually the result of an expansion of credit, which is accompanied by high prices for goods. High prices at home tend to attract importations of merchandise and arrest exportations, with the result of turning the merchandise balance of trade against the country where high prices prevail and inviting large exports of the precious metals to settle such balances. The operation of advancing the discount rate tends to enforce liquidation upon domestic traders by cutting off their facilities for credit and compelling them to throw their merchandise upon the market at reduced prices. The fall of prices attracts foreign purchasers, while the restrictions upon credit diminish purchases of merchandise for consumption at home. Thus the operation of an advance in the discount rate tends to restore the commercial equilibrium and arrest the undue inflation of credit. A collapse of credit, a fall of prices, and a period of liquidation would come sooner or later without any change in the rate of discount. It is the legitimate function of the central banks of issue to anticipate these events and arrest the expansion of credit and the loss of the precious metals at a point which will avert disaster.

An important factor in restoring equilibrium in a disturbed market, and making easy the flow of the precious metals to the point where they are needed, is the existence of transferable securities. The diminution of loans upon securities diminishes transactions in such securities and causes a decline in their prices. The moment that this decline in the domestic market creates a difference in price in comparison with other markets which will cover the expenses of transfer from one market to the other, gold or the titles to gold begin to gravitate to the market where prices are low from those markets where prices are high and funds are abundant. This operation may be initiated by foreign purchasers in order to obtain the securities under favorable conditions, or it may be initiated by the owners of securities on the market where disturbance prevails, who avail themselves of this resource for meeting the pressing need for cash or for credits having the exchangeable character of money. Thus the operation of changes in the discount rate is felt not only upon the supply of currency and credit at home, and upon the supply attracted directly from the loan fund of foreign countries, but is felt also in the merchandise markets in changing the direction of the import and export movement and upon the transferable resources which make up the reserves of the modern capitalistic nations in the form of negotiable securities.

#### PHILOSOPHY OF CHANGES IN THE DISCOUNT RATE.

The reason for the flow of the precious metals to points where the discount rate is high is found in the fact that money and capital are needed at those

points. While the raising of the discount rate has sometimes been declared to be an artificial operation, it is a natural result of the law of supply and demand. The arbitrary raising of the rate without justification in the condition of the money market would reduce the volume of transactions and drive business from the banks which sought to maintain the high rate.\* The increase of the discount rate, while usually decided upon in the leading European countries by a vote of the board of directors of the central note-issuing bank, is not an arbitrary act, but is the expression of their best judgment regarding the condition of the money market and the demand for credits. Their action in changing the rate usually follows rather than precedes a pressure upon reserves, and down to 1860 usually followed such pressure at too long a distance of time and in a timid and halting manner. The action of modern banking boards in raising or depressing the rental price of money which they have to lend is of substantially the same character as the action of house-owners in raising or depressing house-rents according to the demand or supply, or the action of merchants in raising or lowering the prices of their goods under the same influences.

It is somewhat surprising, in view of the simplicity of the principle, that the scarcity of a commodity should result in an increase of its price, that the rule of governing the ebb and flow of the precious metals by changes in the discount rate was not well understood and intelligently acted upon until after the middle of the present century. Money was considered as a commodity so much apart from other commodities that discount rates were kept unchanged at times when the commodity was scarce and the demand for it was far in excess of the supply. Prof. MacLeod declares that "It used to be the common delusion of mercantile men that gold was only sent to pay a balance arising from the sale of goods, and that therefore it must cease of itself whenever these payments were made."† The fact that the metal might be lent, like a wagon or a ship, if a high rental were offered, and that the charges for it might affect the movements of merchandise, seemed to have escaped the attention of students and statesmen. The bullion brokers, without spending time over theories, had long since learned by observation that it became profitable to export gold when interest rates abroad were higher than at home. They fabricated bills of exchange, had them discounted by bankers, took the proceeds in gold, and shipped the gold to the point where it would earn the highest interest. The bills fabricated for this purpose had the character of accommodation bills in that they represented no merchandise transaction and were drawn for the single purpose of transferring money from the place where it was cheap to the place where it was dear, in order to earn the higher rate of interest.

The possibility of such shipments of gold did not seem to be known, or at least fully understood, up to 1860 by the staid old merchants who formed a majority of the board of directors of the Bank of England. The attempt was made by the Bank Act of 1844 to control the volume of circulating notes by

\* "In any honest banking system the rate of discount cannot be superior or inferior to that imposed by the conditions of the market, or better, by the limit fixed by economic equilibrium. If, in short, the rate of discount is higher than this limit, the bank will not be able to discount and cannot long hold out; if it is lower, the reserve in gold diminishes and finally disappears."—Nitti, *Les Variations du Taux de l'Escompte*, in "*Revue d'Economie Politique*" (1898), XII, p. 375.

† "Theory and Practice of Banking," I, p. 418.

arbitrary devices when they exceeded a due relation to the coin reserves. How completely these devices failed has been set forth in an earlier article.\* The effect of changes in the discount rate in restoring the equilibrium of the foreign exchanges was occasionally referred to as a factor in the discussions which took place in England before the passage of the Bank Act, but such changes were evidently regarded as having only a minor influence. The discount rate at the Bank of England was sometimes increased under the pressure of a crisis by one-half of one per cent. at a time. The increasing ease and cheapness of communication destroyed the value of such advances, when this fraction was divided by fractions of a year. The necessity of meeting a drain of gold by rapid advances in the discount rate, by at least one per cent. at a time, was first set forth in the literature of political economy by Prof. H. D. MacLeod, † was quickly adopted as the true theory by Mr. Goschen and put in force by the Bank, which on this occasion, according to Mr. Bagehot, "and as far as I know on this occasion alone," made "an excellent alteration of their policy which was not exacted by contemporary opinion and which was in advance of it." ‡

#### RECOGNITION OF THE POWER OF THE DISCOUNT RATE.

So completely was the efficiency of the change in the rate of discount demonstrated by events, that such changes soon came to be recognized as the chief means of influencing the foreign exchanges and attracting gold at all the great banks of issue in Europe. The export of gold and pressure upon the money market are now the universal signal for advances in the discount rate, which are flashed by the telegraph around the world, and afford the most certain index of the demand for money and the state of the markets. § An advance in the rate of discount never fails to produce the intended effect of strengthening bank reserves and reducing pressure, unless the advance is inadequate or distrust of the entire commercial system of the country has reached a point which makes lenders unwilling to lend at any price. The latter has happened but once and to only a limited degree among the advanced commercial nations. This was during the great crisis of 1866 in England, following the Gurney failure, when a discount rate of ten per cent. was steadily maintained at the Bank of England from May 11 to August 6. So serious was the shock to British credit by the series of commercial failures which spread over the United Kingdom that it was suspected abroad that the Government would give forced legal tender to the notes of the Bank of England, and it became necessary for the Earl of Clarendon to issue a circular letter to the British embassies throughout Europe, declaring that "Her Majesty's Government have no reason to apprehend that there is any general want of soundness in the ordinary trade of this country which can give reasonable ground for anxiety or alarm." ¶ The prevalence of a discount rate of ten per cent. for three months was in itself a heavy fetter upon British

\* New York BANKERS' MAGAZINE (September, 1900), LXI, p. 356.

† "Theory of Credit," II, pp. 813-818.

‡ "Lombard Street," Works, V, p. 118.

§ "The rate of discount ought to express the true rate of interest—the rate which is suited at each moment to the condition of business of the moment and to the necessities of its liquidation."—Arnauné, p. 397.

¶ Levi, "The History of British Commerce," p. 471.

trade, and distrust abroad seemed strong enough for a time to justify the phrase of Sir Stafford Northcote, that there was "a run upon England."\*

This incident of general distrust simply afforded evidence of the risks which are run by any country which permits unsound investments and the expansion of credit to impair the security of its commercial system. Confidence in British credit was restored in 1866, after the suspension of the limitations of the Bank Act, and the gold reserve was gradually built up. On every other occasion the elevation of the discount rate has acted promptly and efficiently in checking gold exports, attracting gold imports, and reducing speculation in a manner which has increased promptly the ratio of reserve to outstanding notes and other liabilities. The Bank of England has maintained a smaller reserve in proportion to its immediate and contingent obligations than the other great banks of Europe and has more often changed its discount rate. The changes in the rate from the years 1851 to 1898, inclusive, were 159 by the Bank of France, or at the average rate of 3.2 times per year, and 407 by the Bank of England, or at the rate of 8.4 times per year. The changes at the Bank of Prussia and its successor, the Imperial Bank of Germany, from 1855 to 1898 were 183, or at the rate of four per year. The fact that the changes were most frequent at the Bank of England is naturally explained by the fact that England is the center at which the movement of the precious metals is regulated, that her movement of internal and international exchanges is highly developed, and that the vibrations which affect her monetary system and its adaptation to economic changes are necessarily most numerous.†

While prompt and resolute action should be taken in advancing the discount rate when a drain of gold begins as the result of general economic causes, it has not been found necessary during the last quarter of a century to advance the rate to so high a maximum as was formerly required. The reason is found in the greater supply of loanable capital seeking investment at a moderate return, the promptness with which credits may be released by telegraph, submarine cables and telephones, and the small cost at which the precious metals may be transferred by ocean steamers.‡ A very trifling difference between the discount rates in two markets will result in the transfer of credits to the market where the rate is higher, provided only that the difference is large enough to pay the cost of the transfer and afford a small profit. It was found necessary in 1847 and 1866 to advance the discount rate at the Bank of England to ten per cent. The rate has been only four times as high as six per cent. since 1880 and never higher, in spite of several periods of pressure and an acute crisis in 1890. These occasions were in the spring of 1882, the beginning of 1890, the autumn of 1890, and finally, after a long period of easy money, from November 30, 1899, to January 11, 1900.

#### EFFECT OF HIGH RATES UPON INDUSTRY.

A high rate of discount by no means implies so heavy a charge upon industry as might seem to be the case when the rate is computed by the year.

\* Wolowski, "*La Banque de l'Angleterre*," etc., p. 133.

† De Greef, "*Annales de l'Institut des Sciences Sociales*" (July, 1899), V, p. 604.

‡ "The settlement of the account between countries having a normal monetary and financial system is made to-day with less tension in the rate of discount and less prolongation of the high rate than thirty, forty, or fifty years ago."—Leroy-Beaulieu, "*Traité d'Economie Politique*," IV, p. 147.



The higher rate is charged in some cases only to outside borrowers and not to those who have an established and continuous business with the bank. The high rate runs, moreover, during brief periods, and applies only to paper presented during these periods. Paper discounted before the high rate took effect continues to run at the rate originally agreed upon. Even paper accepted at the highest rate is often accepted only a little while before its maturity, so that the discount is charged perhaps only for fifteen days or a month, instead of the entire period of the paper.\* Thus the high rate operates only upon the margin of business which it is desirable to restrain and as a warning to the world that money and capital have become scarce upon the market where the rate prevails and cannot be obtained by all comers at the easy rates which have before prevailed.

Those countries having a central bank of issue, enjoying a monopoly or practical control of note issues, have been able to act more promptly upon the exchanges by the rate of discount than those having a plurality of banks. All the European nations of importance except Switzerland have adopted the system of a central bank. Such a bank is able to act with dramatic and effective influence upon the exchanges of the entire country, and is governed by considerations of public policy as well as by the consideration of its banking profits. It is more difficult to secure coöperation in favor of the public interests from a combination of independent banks. Such ends have been sought by clearing-house committees and by agreements among the banks, but these methods have operated with less certainty than the prompt action of the directing board of a central bank. Switzerland has suffered for several years an adverse rate of exchange and a drain of gold, which has subjected the banks to the expense of importing gold directly in order to maintain their reserves.†

The banking system of the United States labors under the double disadvantage of a plurality of banks and the management of a part of the gold reserve of the country by the public Treasury. A general advance in the discount rate by concurrent agreement is seldom unanimous and prompt, even among the banks of the New York Clearing-House. Even if all the banks in the country acted with energy in advancing their discount rates, they would be hampered in controlling the movements of the precious metals by the fact that gold can be obtained from the public Treasury by the presentation of legal-tender Government notes. The Treasury has no method, either of attracting resources by raising the discount rate or of curtailing the accommodation to the public in the form of discounts, because it does not do a regular banking business. Its nearest approach to influence upon the money market is obtained by its excess of receipts or expenditures. An excess of receipts withdraws money from the market, while an excess of expenditures increases the funds in the market. Unfortunately, the operation of these causes is usually contrary to the requirements of sound policy at the moment—there is

\* Nitti, *Les Variations du Taux de l'Escompte* in "*Revue d'Economie Politique*" (1898), XII, p. 283.

† "Each bank acted according to its own convenience, discounting paper when its own means permitted, but without regard to the general conditions of the market. In this manner common action was prevented and the measures of precaution taken by some establishments to strengthen their position were not only without result, but were generally counteracted by establishments which operated only from day to day and without regard for the general situation."—Raffalovich, "*Le Marché Financier en 1898-99*," p. 565.

an excess of receipts in times of business activity, which withdraws money from the market when it is most needed; there is an excess of expenditures in times of depression, which pours money into the market when it is not needed, with the result of expelling gold. This evil was partially remedied by the act of March 14, 1900, which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to retain in the reserve fund Government notes which have been redeemed until they are exchanged for gold, and provides that the proceeds of bonds sold to strengthen the reserve "shall not be used to meet deficiencies in the current revenues." The latter provision is intended to enable the Secretary to retain redundant supplies of currency until the time is opportune for putting it in circulation by the redemption of the public debt.

#### OTHER METHODS OF PROTECTING THE METALLIC RESERVE.

While the discount rate has been proved by modern experience to be the most certain and efficient means of regulating the movements of the precious metals, it does not follow that every outflow of the metals from banking reserves should be met by an advance in the rate. The rate at the Bank of France was kept steadily at four per cent. from January 13, 1820, to January 14, 1847, and at three per cent. for a period of nearly five years so recently as from 1883 to 1888. The rate was changed only fourteen times during the fourteen years from 1884 to 1898. This limited number of changes was due in part to the fact that the Bank of France always carries a much larger metallic reserve than the Bank of England and that the Paris market is less sensitive than that of London to the influences which affect the international exchanges. These facts, however, do not explain all the reasons for the smaller number of changes in the discount rate at the Bank of France. The difference is due to a distinct difference in policy. The Bank of France, instead of relying absolutely upon the discount rate for maintaining its reserve, relies upon purchases of gold at its own expense and upon charging a premium for gold to exporters.\* Gold can always be had for a price. The difference between the British and French methods of obtaining it are the difference between charging the cost to the mercantile community or charging it to the expense account of the Bank. The Bank of France during 1855, 1856 and 1857 expended 14,000,060 francs in premiums on the purchase of gold bullion to the amount of 1,274,508,519 francs (\$250,000,000).† These large purchases postponed the increase of the discount rate, but did not obviate the necessity for changing it sixteen times during 1857 and raising it to a maximum of ten per cent. The mean rate, however, was kept at 6.81 per cent. during 1857, while the mean rate at the Bank of England was 7.42 per cent.‡

The French method of protecting the gold reserve has found favor in certain quarters, for the strong reason that it obviates needless and frequent changes in the charge imposed upon legitimate business transactions. The French method is not efficient in an economic crisis, however, because it does

\* This charge for gold is computed by Prof. Nitti to amount to a rate of as much as nine per cent. upon short-term foreign bills.—*Revue d'Économie Politique* (1898), XII, p. 385. Its effect upon the financial system of the country will be discussed hereafter under the head of foreign exchanges.

† Juglar, *Des Crises Commerciales*, p. 422.

‡ The report on the last extension of the charter of the Bank of France declared that "French commerce has enjoyed almost constantly for ten years a rate of discount more favorable than that of these two countries (England and Germany) and above all more stable."—*Vide "L'Économiste Européen"* (Jan. 29, 1897), XI, p. 141.

not operate upon the whole commercial structure to restrict loans and speculation and attract capital from abroad. The occasions on which the French method may properly be used are those where credit is not unduly expanded and where a demand for gold has arisen from special and recognizable causes. Such an occasion would be a heavy demand for gold to pay for foreign grain supplies at a time of famine at home or for the settlement of some special item of foreign indebtedness not arising from excessive imports of merchandise or disturbance of the economic system.\*

While the French method of protecting the gold reserve was at first severely condemned by theoretical economists, and while their censure was well founded so far as it applied to the use of this method to counteract the drain of a crisis and redress the balance of the foreign exchanges, it has come to be recognized in recent years that it may be combined in a cautious manner with the English method of advancing the discount rate, with benefits to legitimate business. The choice of either method, or the prudent use of both methods in conjunction with each other, depend largely upon the wisdom of bankers and their ability to judge whether the drastic pressure of sharp advances in the discount rate is required in order to arrest the expansion of credit and check dangerous speculation. It is better to avoid imposing "a fine upon the whole trade of the country" by raising the discount rate, if an adequate gold reserve can be accumulated at reasonable cost and without risk by other methods.† Other devices, which supplement these two, have come into use of late years with the great increase in the surplus capital upon the market and the variety of uses to which it may be put in the purchase of negotiable securities and loans upon margins. The Bank of England sometimes borrows money from the market for the purpose of reducing the loan fund which may be used by the other banks to antagonize its advance in the discount rate. This is done by selling consols with the privilege of repurchase, the fund paid being drawn by the purchasers from their accounts at the joint-stock and private banks. The Bank is then in a stronger position for dictating the general rate of discount and protecting its banking reserve.

The discount rate is the true regulator of the ebb and flow of the precious metals and the safety of a banking currency, because it governs the movements of all transferable capital, of which gold and notes are only a part. This is the secret of the successful operation of the system in England, after the Bank Act of 1844 had broken down. The offer of an increased rental price for currency was felt equally upon all forms of banking credit which had the exchangeable character belonging to money, and kept such capital at home where the device of retiring notes when redeemed in gold had failed to

---

\* In many such cases, especially where a reverse flow of the precious metals is anticipated, no action whatever is required to maintain reserves. "To take a particular case, gold is regularly brought from London to Scotland at the May and November terms to meet the extra issue of notes, according to the act of 1845, but this transfer of gold being known to be only temporary has in general little effect on the bank rate."—Nicholson, "Principles of Political Economy," II, p. 226.

† London "Statist," (May 19, 1900), XLV, p. 759.—"The raising of the rate increases the cost of every kind of manufacture, and therefore eats into the profits of the whole trading community. It may, of course, be absolutely necessary to raise the rate; and if it is, the Bank should not hesitate for a moment. But clearly money should not be made artificially scarce and dear without necessity. Therefore, if it is possible to replenish the reserve of the Bank without raising the rate—or, at all events, without raising the rate again and again—it is obviously desirable that the Bank should take such measures as will effectually do so."

do so. The history of the German banking law of 1875 has illustrated the same principle. The State banks of issue in Germany were permitted to keep afloat a certain fixed maximum of uncovered notes and were under no compulsion to follow the Imperial Bank in raising their discount rate in emergencies. In case they felt a pressure for cash or larger credit resources, they obtained them by rediscounts at the Imperial Bank. The rigid regulation of the volume of note issues, therefore, was ineffective, while they were not regulated either by the volume of business demands, the requirement of fixed reserves, or the changes in the discount rate. How the system operated, before the recent change of law, regulating the discount rate, is thus set forth by Prof. Sidney Sherwood:\*

"These issues remain in circulation as a practically fixed inelastic amount, which embarrasses greatly the efforts of the Reichsbank at critical times to defend its gold reserve, and tends to increase the fluctuations in the notes of the Reichsbank, already excessive. The uncovered notes of other banks are in effect not true bank notes, but, like our National bank notes, have no elasticity and act as a constant menace to the central gold depositary, which in Germany is the Reichsbank, and here is the Federal Treasury. The private or State banks of issue in Germany raid the reserves of the Reichsbank by bringing commercial paper there to be rediscounted. The National banks here raid the United States Treasury by bringing in greenbacks and Treasury notes for redemption."

#### IV.—OFFICIAL SUPERVISION AND REPORTS.

One of the most important agencies of banking regulation developed in recent years is the publicity of their business and the official inspection of their papers and accounts. Publicity was considered for many years as exposing a bank to disturbing criticisms and as increasing the danger of panics. A special committee of the British House of Commons in 1832 reported the amount of bullion held by the Bank of England, while intimating a doubt in regard to drawing such publicity into a precedent,<sup>†</sup> but the act renewing the charter in 1833 for the first time required weekly returns to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which were to be consolidated monthly and published in the London Gazette. These reports were required to show the amount of bullion and securities in the Bank, notes in circulation, and deposits in the Bank.<sup>‡</sup> These reports have been continued until the present time and are now made public weekly, but they are much less in detail in the case of the Bank of England than they have become by degrees at the central banks of issue on the Continent and by the chief joint-stock banks. The Bank of France,<sup>§</sup> the Imperial Bank of Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Bank, the Bank of Russia, and the Swiss banks, among others, all publish at weekly intervals complete balance sheets showing not merely the whole volume of their assets and liabilities, but the character of the loans made and of the obligations held to secure them.

Publicity is alone sufficient, in the case of the great monopoly banks of issue, to afford reasonable safeguards against unsound banking and the undue reduction of reserves. The cash reserves of these banks, their loans, and

\* "The New German Bank Law," in "Quarterly Journal of Economics," (February, 1900) XIV, p. 272.

† Gilbert, I, p. 78.

‡ Gilbert, I, p. 83. "The English private banks did not make full reports until 1891."—London "Bankers' Magazine" (January, 1896), LXVII, p. 9.

§ "The Bank of France was first required by the law of 1840 to publish quarterly balance sheets, and it was not until 1848 that weekly publication was inaugurated, midst much shaking of heads by the timid."—Leroy-Beaulieu, "*Traité d'Économie Politique*," III, p. 573.

their relation to their deposit liabilities, are promptly telegraphed around the world and have become a barometer of monetary conditions, which is eagerly awaited from week to week in every financial centre. These reports almost in themselves afford an adequate means for checking the operations of the bank and keeping them within prudent limits. They are scanned constantly by the most expert financiers and economic students as well as by business men and officials of the Government. Government supervision of the monopoly banks of issue is practically limited to the requirement that these reports shall be made, since the reports themselves afford the evidence that the reserve and the character of securities held are in accordance with the charter of the bank.

Government influence over banks of issue is exerted in several countries by the presence among the governing officers of the bank of officials named by the State. This is the case with the Bank of France, where the Governor and two Deputy Governors are appointed and their commissions are revoked by the Government.\* Official control goes further in the Imperial Bank of Germany, where two of the administrative boards are named by the Government, one of them having the Chancellor at its head.† The control over the operations of the Bank exerted in these cases is intended more for accomplishing broad economic and political ends than to ensure merely the safety of banking operations, but incidentally it contributes towards the latter end so far as it is in danger of being disregarded.

Minute official supervision has been carried further in countries where the system of plurality banking prevails. Such supervision is almost a necessity for securing uniformity in note issues, and it is more needed than in the case of the monopoly banks for insuring safety and conservatism in banking methods. Isolated local banks cannot be subjected to such severe and constant scrutiny from experts in the banking and business community as where their attention is concentrated upon a single institution, and local bankers often lack the wide knowledge, long experience, and high sense of responsibility which govern the managers of great national institutions. In the countries having many banks of issue, therefore, it becomes interesting to inquire what methods have been taken to ensure solvency and sound banking under the supervision of the Government. The principal countries where such a system prevails are the United States, Scotland, Canada, and Switzerland.

#### OFFICIAL SUPERVISION IN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES.

The United States has gradually developed under the National Banking Law a comprehensive system of official supervision of banks of issue. The entire system is under the control of a Federal official, known as the Comptroller of the Currency, who has a large force of clerks at Washington and a corps of visitors to the local banks who are known as National bank examiners. These examiners "have power to make a thorough examination into all the affairs of the association, and in doing so to examine any of the officers and agents thereof on oath; and shall make a full and detailed report of the condition of the association to the Comptroller."‡ These examinations have become much more complete and minute with the progress of time, until they

\* Noel, "*Banques d'Émission en Europe*," I, p. 124.

† *Ibid.*, I, p. 208.

‡ Section 5240, Revised Statutes.

now extend to the character of the commercial paper held by each bank, the amount of paper of a single firm or individual held by different banks, and generally all the details which might throw light upon the soundness of the methods pursued by the bank in granting credit and making loans. National banks are also required to make five reports of their condition to the Comptroller at dates selected by him without advance notice and varying from time to time, and may be called upon at any time for special reports.\* While the system has sometimes been subjected to criticism, because of the failure of examiners to discover dishonesty and bad management on the part of banks which have failed, cases have often occurred where the inquiries of the examiner led to orders from the Comptroller of the Currency to close the bank and thus put an abrupt stop to fraudulent and unsafe banking.

The American system of examination is the most thorough in the world. This has been a natural and almost necessary outgrowth of the fact that the system is the most widely extended and contains the largest number of small independent banks. Safety, therefore, could be less easily secured by reliance upon the action of the banks themselves than in countries where the number of banks of issue is comparatively limited. Government supervision by public officials has not been adopted in Canada. It was always resisted by the banks upon the grounds that public inspectors could not ascertain accurately the real character of banking assets and that the existence of Government inspection would mislead the public by inspiring confidence in the banks which might prove to be misplaced. The wisdom of some supervision, however, to protect each bank against the possible errors and bad management of others, led in the revision of 1900 to the incorporation of the Canadian Bankers' Association as a supervisory body. The association was already in existence, but was for the first time in 1900 given a public character, authorized to establish clearing-houses and make rules for their operation, to take charge, through an officer called a curator, of the affairs of a suspended bank, and to make by-laws governing the printing and issue of notes. Several of these powers can be exercised only with the approval of the Treasury Board.† The large Canadian banks have a system of supervision of their own over their numerous branches, which is exercised by inspectors who are thoroughly familiar with banking methods and lines of credit. The chief inspector is the equal in character and position of the General Manager and is not exposed to the temptation to overlook or connive at any errors which the latter may make.‡

The system adopted in 1900 in Canada, if thoroughly carried out, would combine some of the advantages of uniformity and impartiality belonging to official inspection with some of the advantages of flexibility and expert knowledge belonging to inspection by bankers. These advantages might be secured in the United States by examinations through the clearing-houses, which

\* Section 5211, Revised Statutes.

† The best summary of the reforms of 1900 is presented by R. M. Breckenridge in the "Quarterly Journal of Economics" (August, 1900), XIV, p. 543.

‡ "The General Manager has his own opinion, he has information as complete as they can make it from branch managers: he needs the result of the inspector's observations as to the value and character of his bank's assets, and it is given him with fullness, courage and independence. By comparing the three views, the General Manager has a proper basis for deciding the policy he will pursue."—Breckenridge, "The Canadian Banking System," p. 436.

would enable the great body of the banks to exercise a conservative influence upon those admitted to their associations.\*

The Scotch banks are practically without any official supervision except that derived from the publicity of the weekly reports and their control over their branches. The absence of a proper inspection system probably contributed to prolong the period of immunity for the bad loans of the City of Glasgow Bank, which failed in 1857, and the Western Bank, which failed in 1878. The act of July 21, 1845, "to regulate the issue of bank notes in Scotland," † required banks of issue to render weekly accounts relating to note issues to the Commissioners of Stamps and Taxes, and monthly publication of such returns by the Commissioners. Authority was also given the Commissioners to inspect bankers' books for the purpose of ascertaining the accuracy of returns, but this power has never been exercised.‡ The Scotch banks did not publish full reports of condition until about 1865, when the younger banks led off in giving annual balance sheets, in order to inspire public confidence, and the older institutions soon felt compelled to follow their example.§ The Scotch bankers always, however, kept among themselves a close watch upon each other's business and a check upon unsound banking through the system of prompt redemption of notes which prevails there.

The Swiss banks of issue, which number thirty-four, are under the careful supervision of Government officers in respect to their circulating notes, the maintenance of their metallic reserves, and the commercial securities which complete the cover for the circulation. The Government also requires each bank to accept at par its own bills and those of other Swiss banks which redeem their notes on demand.|| Reports are required weekly, monthly and annually, and while official control relates nominally only to the circulation, the bank inspectors in their annual report do not hesitate to discuss the foreign exchanges, the discount rate and other questions relating to the progress of Swiss banking. Actual inspection of securities by the inspectors takes place at least once a year, but seldom reveals any serious departure from the requirements of law.¶

#### THE PROPER MEASURE AND MEANS OF REGULATION.

The principal methods of regulating the volume and safety of a bank-note currency having been set forth, a few words may be said in regard to the relative merits of these methods and the means of employing them. Some of the regulations which have been referred to are established in certain States by public law, but so far as they are the outcome of sound banking judgment are just as binding upon the prudent banker where they are entirely in his

\* "Special bank examiners, assisted by trained experts, employed by clearing-houses, \* \* \* might be useful to the members of a clearing-house, for the purpose of making examinations. \* \* \* As these men would be in the employ of the clearing-house, they would not be subject to outside influences, and in this way the question of the supervision of banking institutions by directors would be dealt with effectively."—James G. Cannon, "Clearing-Houses," p. 25. † 8 and 9 Vic., c. 38.

‡ Kerr, "History of Banking in Scotland," p. 176.

§ Kerr, "Scottish Banking During the Period of Published Accounts," p. 2.

|| Lévy, "Mélanges Financiers," p. 216.

¶ Thus the report for 1897 declares that "no case of infraction of the prescriptions of the law and regulations has occurred and no serious event has called for comment. In general, the relations between the banks and the organs of control have been normal."—*Contrôle des Bûlets de Banque*, 1897, p. 23.



discretion. Fixed limitation of the volume of note issues is not important so long as the notes are protected by an adequate coin reserve and by sound and convertible assets. It is proper, however, in the case of small banks that some definite ratio should be established between banking capital and note issues. The capital is in some degree the guarantee of all the obligations of the bank, over and above the resources obtained from the public, and should therefore bear some reasonable proportion towards these obligations which will cover probable losses.

In the case of the monopoly banks of issue the capital bears only a modest relation to the amount of note issues, but represents a considerable amount in itself and is sufficient to cover the probable risks assumed in the course of general banking business. Thus the capital of the Bank of France is only 182,500,000 francs (\$35,200,000), while the legal limit of the circulation is 5,000,000,000 francs. The capital of the Imperial Bank of Germany was increased by the new charter of 1899 from 120,000,000 to 180,000,000 marks (\$43,000,000), but the usual circulation is above 1,000,000,000 marks, the average for 1899 having been 1,141,752,000 marks (\$270,000,000). In these cases the notes depend less for their security upon the capital of the Bank than upon the large fund of metallic money and convertible resources which these banks possess. The circulation of the Bank of France is protected by a stock of gold and silver which usually reaches seventy-five or eighty per cent. of the volume of the outstanding notes, independently of other resources, and the metallic reserve of the Bank of Germany falls but little below forty per cent. of its note issues.

The more strict limitation of note issues is justified by banking conditions in countries where there are many isolated local banks. The limitation of the issues to the whole amount of the capital, as under the National Banking Law of the United States, while it is an arbitrary limit, is not an unreasonable one. The limitation in the case of the Swiss banks is twice the paid-up capital. These limits, whatever they may be, impose no serious restrictions upon banking development where they are not accompanied by other requirements and where there is no limit upon the creation of new banks or the increase of the capital of the old ones. Under these conditions the policy is not unreasonable, but only within the limits of sound banking policy, which requires also a customary ratio of the metallic reserve to the amount of notes issued. The same cannot be said of the more severe restriction of the National Banking Law of the United States, which takes the security for the notes out of the custody of the banks and deprives them of that ready control of their note issues which adapts them to business conditions. Such regulation hampers sound banking, tends to increase its cost to the community, and is not justified by experience for the purpose of ensuring the safety of the notes.

The law is justified in enforcing upon all banks the rule that redemption of bank notes shall be convenient, prompt and certain. Few regulations for this purpose are required in the countries having monopoly banks of issue, beyond the notorious willingness of the bank to pay standard coin promptly to any holder of its notes, without any sign of displeasure or the suspicion that discrimination will be made against the note holder in his other business relations with the bank. Regulations of a more elaborate character are required where many small banks compete with each other and where their notes drift far from the issuing bank. The system adopted by the New

England banks prior to the Civil War, the daily presentation of notes by the Scotch banks to each other, and the redemption system of the National Banking Law of the United States, have many features which tend to apply with efficiency the test of the prompt redemption of bank notes in standard coin. The American system is hardly stringent enough for a true bank-note currency, but might be made so by increasing the number of redemption agencies and affording a more direct profit to the banks in keeping their own notes afloat at the expense of those of their competitors.

Official inspection of banking accounts and the publication of detailed reports are necessary incidents of public regulation of banking. *The vital requirement in respect to note issues is that they shall always be what they purport to be, exchangeable for standard coin upon demand without cost or inconvenience to the holder.* Regulation should go no further than is necessary to enforce this requirement. In the case of the leading monopoly banks, except the Bank of England and the Imperial Bank of Germany, regulation by law does not impose upon note issues any serious fetters which go beyond the requirement of sound banking judgment. In the case of the Bank of France, while there is a nominal limit on the circulation, the Bank is only required by its charter to keep a combined amount in coin and commercial paper equal to its obligations—in other words, to be solvent.\* In the case of the National Bank of Belgium, in spite of heavy burdens of taxation, the statutes embody this simple mandate of sound banking policy, "The amount of bills in circulation shall be represented by easily negotiable securities." At all these banks at the present day the details of their business are set forth in reports of many pages each year, and their methods are an open book for the inspection of all responsible inquirers.

The maintenance of solvency and soundness by banks of issue, under the conditions of an efficient redemption system and publicity of accounts, is ensured by the regulation of the discount rate. This method of regulation depends almost entirely upon the sound judgment of the banker, and cannot well be the subject of legal restrictions. The increase or decrease of the rate for the rental of money is simply the index of an increase or decrease in the demand in relation to the supply. It is the application to the money supply of the great rule of all other branches of trade, that a diminished supply results in an increase of price, and that an increase of price upon a given market draws supplies from markets where there are larger stocks. A bank of issue, exercising prudence in the character of its loans, maintaining an adequate cash reserve in relation to its note issues and other liabilities, and employing promptly and efficiently the modification of the discount rate in order to govern its resources by the law of supply and demand, cannot fail to meet its obligations, win the confidence of the public, and perform services of the highest value to the community.

CHARLES A. CONANT.

---

\*Vide Noel, "*Banques d'Émission en Europe*," I, p. 166.

---

GOVERNMENT GOLD HOLDINGS.—The total fund of gold in the hands of the Government, as shown by the balance sheet on January 2, was \$479,349,250—the largest amount held by any country in the world. Of the above amount \$150,000,000 is held in the reserve fund, \$96,561,321 belongs to the general funds of the Treasury, and the balance represents outstanding gold certificates. It is believed that unless some adverse influences arise, the total gold holdings of the Treasury will shortly reach \$500,000,000.

## THE EDUCATION OF A BANKER.

---

### *PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL TRAINING OF BANK CLERKS AND OFFICERS.*

---

There is perhaps no part of the commercial and financial machinery of the country that is more delicate and complex than the banking institutions, and it is therefore necessary that those who conduct them should be adequately fitted to discharge the responsibilities incident to the management of the money and credits that represent to so great an extent the sum of all business transactions. This fact is being recognized as never before, not alone by those in positions of great honor and emolument, but even more, perhaps, by the clerk who is struggling along imperfectly equipped for the work he is called upon to perform.

#### GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS.

Character is the first essential equipment for success in any honest calling. Though some men succeed whose characters will not bear inspection, no bank wishes to take chances of that kind; and the young man who hopes to gain and keep employment in a well-conducted bank should be sure that he is worthy of the confidence he asks others to place in him. More than all others, the man who intends to be a banker should be deserving of the respect and trust of his fellows.

Dr. Holmes, or Mr. Beecher, or somebody, once said, in effect, that a man's education should begin about 200 years before he was born; that one should, in fact, use great care in selecting his ancestors. To be well born, in the best sense, is an advantage which none can dispute. Even in a land that has no aristocracy, birth counts for much. Heredity is one of the most powerful forces in shaping one's career and character. The gentleman born is apt to remain so, whatever his circumstances. Banks will, as a rule, prefer to choose their employees from those who come from good families. The good banker is cautious and does not like to take the risk of employing any one whose antecedents are bad or doubtful. There are hazards enough inseparable from his business without taking on unnecessary ones. But on the other hand the bank ought not to take into its employ any one just because he is the son of Mr. So-and-So. There are more economical ways of providing for the incompetent and lazy than by encumbering the business of a bank with them.

The boy whose birth has been humble, and whose early educational opportunities have been meagre, but who has despite these hindrances fought his way resolutely step by step—that is the sort of boy the bank wants. Fortunately, in so many of our cities there are now free evening schools, and many who are compelled to work by day are thus enabled to fit themselves for higher positions.

#### PRELIMINARY EDUCATION OF A BANK CLERK.

At the foundation of our American system of education is the common school, and many of the most successful business men of the past century,

and of those who are active in the affairs of to-day, never got any further than the foundation; but it was a basis upon which reliance could be placed, for it was securely laid. It is too often the case that young people are anxious to enter on a collegiate course before having thoroughly mastered the branches taught in the common schools and which are the ones most useful in the every-day transactions of life. It is better to dispense altogether with the showy accomplishments of the college or university if they can be had only by neglecting the branches taught in the common schools. If the education furnished by these latter institutions is supplemented by a high school or academic course, and due care is given to thoroughness, the young man who wishes to enter upon a banking career need not hesitate to do so because he has been unable to complete a still more advanced curriculum of studies. He will find a good business college helpful, in improving his handwriting—how few people are able to write uniformly and legibly—and in imparting a general idea of accounting.

If the bank clerk finds that his education has been commenced at the top, he should lose no time in putting a solid foundation under it. For business purposes a knowledge of German, Spanish or French is much better than a knowledge of all the dead languages that have existed; similarly, the study of commercial arithmetic is more profitable than the study of algebra or other branches in higher mathematics, though these are undoubtedly of great value as a mental discipline.

It is not contended that a college education disqualifies one for a banking career; on the contrary, a banker will be the better able to meet fully the requirements of his calling by being liberally educated, but it should be the first concern of the bank clerk to be sure that he is thoroughly grounded in what may be termed the primary branches of education, for the knowledge to be thus gained will be found most useful in the practical work of a bank. If any part of one's education must be neglected it should not be that which relates to the fundamentals of every-day business life. There are many boys in college who ought to be in the common schools, and scores of young men every year waste time in studying the classics when they can neither write nor spell their own language. The colleges are now adding to their courses of instruction branches relating to finance and commerce, and much good will result from this innovation.

It should be the aim of bank clerks especially to cultivate the faculties of attention and observation as an indispensable part of their training. They must also keep in touch with what is going on by reading the daily newspapers and the magazines, not overlooking publications devoted to banking interests.

#### BEGINNING WORK IN THE BANK.

To obtain employment in a bank is somewhat more difficult than in mercantile or other business establishments, there being comparatively fewer banks and a proportionately larger number of applicants. A clerkship in a bank is sought for not so much for the immediate salary as for the opportunities of promotion, and the officers and directors are frequently importuned to place their relatives and friends in line for this promotion. But fitness, as a rule, is the test in making appointments. Influence is often valuable in securing a hearing for an unknown applicant, but in the final analysis self-

reliance will be found more helpful than anything else. In a small town a young man's reputation for scholarship, energy and his general characteristics are sure to be known to the local bank; but in a city employment must be sought by letter or by personal application. A note of introduction from a good customer of the bank sometimes proves serviceable.

#### MORAL AND MENTAL QUALIFICATIONS.

Without certain distinctive mental and moral qualifications no one is likely to reach an eminent place in banking. A farmer may neglect his work and the only harm will be the failure of his crop; but if an engineer or a sentry does not discharge his duty hundreds or even thousands of lives may be lost. And so a bank clerk may, by his carelessness, cause the loss of large sums of money.

Honesty is, of course, essential; and not merely the degree of honesty that differentiates the thief from respectable members of society, but that sterling integrity which makes it impossible for one to stoop to anything to which the shadow of dishonor attaches. Quite aside from ethical or moral considerations, which should, but sometimes do not, prove a strong enough deterrent to prevent wrong-doing, it is true almost universally that sharp practices of any sort do not pay. This is so well recognized that no other principle is allowed to govern the management of properly regulated business establishments. Even in Wall Street operations, regarded by many as bordering closely on gambling, the standard of dealing is generally high.

Neither from principle nor policy can any departure from the strictest rules of integrity be countenanced by any one employed in a bank. Ex-Superintendent Byrnes, long famous as the head of the New York police force, in speaking of a notorious criminal, said he was the shrewdest crook that he ever knew; but that he was nevertheless a fool, like all of them. Satan's longing for one wise man among his victims is well known. The smart embezzler who steals a bank's money and for a time lives royally, finds at last when in a prison cell that instead of being clever he is only a fool to be pitied or despised. Or if discovery is prevented, a more terrible punishment awaits him and his footsteps are forever haunted by the spectre of guilt.

Mr. Crockett's homely motto "First, be sure you're right, then go ahead," is a good one for bank clerks. Mistakes, serious in their consequences, might be avoided in many cases by deliberating before acting. In important matters it is best always to get all the facts possible before coming to a decision. Cock-sureness is also responsible for many errors, and however positive one may be, it is safer to verify our impressions by reference to books, documents and other authorities. Memory is a valuable aid, but not always reliable.

The habit of carefully noting the details of every transaction should be cultivated. Minute observation is essential if costly mistakes are to be prevented. In law a man is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is legally established; not so in banking. Inquiry as to papers, persons, notes and coin is always in order. A spirit of investigation is as necessary to the right kind of a bank clerk as it is to the man of science. Slap-dash methods are entirely out of place, and system must become second nature. Neatness and order are nowhere more essential than in every department of bank work.

## HABITS AND DEPORTMENT.

As exactness is a characteristic of banking transactions, so a stricter compliance with habits tending to success in other lines of business is required of bank clerks. These habits are so well known that it is hardly necessary to enumerate them, though a few call for special attention.

Punctuality is especially to be commended. It is the rule of the New York Clearing-House to impose severe penalties on banks failing to make prompt settlement of balances, and fines are assessed for tardiness generally. Though a clerk may be but a small part of a bank's machinery, his absence within required hours may possibly disarrange the workings of the whole mechanism. From a disciplinary standpoint few things are more important in a bank than to be on hand at the appointed time.

Obedience to orders and rules is to be expected as a matter of course, but this does not imply that even a clerk is never to use his discretion and intelligence. "Theirs not to reason why" may be proper enough for soldiers, but the bank clerk who reasons why at every step will be on safe ground. Rules are not inflexible. A bank may give notice that errors in paying out money will not be rectified after the customer leaves the counter ; but this need not deter a teller from taking back a fifty-dollar bill that he has paid out for five dollars. Better break the rule than lose the \$45. If a rule does not seem to fit a particular case, it will be prudent to consult a superior before acting. Banking cannot be carried on by automatons.

In his life outside the bank the clerk who expects to advance must conform to the accepted proprieties and conventions. While keeping his religion and business separate, he must realize the ethical value of religious training and shape his associations accordingly. Social relations also keep one in touch with those about him and should not be neglected.

A dignified deportment is in keeping with bank work, and courtesy should always mark the conduct of a bank's employees towards its patrons, especially so as customers are more apt to take offense at any real or fancied incivility on the part of a subordinate than if the offender should be an officer. Politeness is one of the best assets a bank clerk can have.

Modesty in dress and bearing will contribute to promotion. The swaggerer and the swell do not belong in a bank. Plain, incisive speech should be cultivated, and both loudness and mumbling avoided. Deference and respect ought to characterize the deportment of clerks, but not servility. Manliness will command the respect that sycophancy can not obtain.

The habits of sobriety, of clean language, of truthfulness and all the other virtues which are universally observed by self-respecting persons, need not be dwelt upon here. There is one other point that should be mentioned. One of the first things a bank clerk should learn is to save something from his salary. It is to be his privilege later on to take care of the money of others, and he can begin his preparation for that important work in no better way than by learning to take care of his own earnings.

---

NOTE.—The above is the first of a series of papers designed to be helpful to bank clerks and officers. Successful bankers and other expert contributors have been secured who will treat thoroughly of the requisite qualifications to win success as a bank clerk and officer. Among the subjects that will be included in the series of papers to be published during the year are the following :

- I. PRELIMINARY EDUCATION.—Common School. Academic. Commercial. Collegiate.
  - II. BEGINNING WORK IN THE BANK.—Obtaining Employment. Moral and Mental Qualifications. Habits. Deportment.
  - III. LEARNING THE ROUTINE OF BANKING.—Junior and Senior Clerks. Messengers-Bookkeepers. Tellers.
  - IV. THE EDUCATION OF A BANKER.—Demand for Educated Bankers. Value of Practical and Theoretical Training. History of Money and Banking. Banking and Commercial Law. Political Economy. Current Banking and Financial Literature. Association and Institute Work. Loans and Investments. General Knowledge. Foreign and Domestic Exchange.
  - V. THE OFFICERS OF THE BANK.—How Promotions are Won. Liabilities and Duties. Relations to Employees and the Public. Bankers as Citizens. Rewards and Honors of Banking.
  - VI. BANKING SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD.—American and Foreign Banks Compared. National Banks. State Banks. Trust Companies. Savings Banks. Postal Banks. Land Mortgage Banks.
  - VII. THE MONEY MARKET.—How Interest Rates are Governed. Effect of Treasury Operations. Reserve System. Moving the Crops. Gold Exports and Imports.
- And many other topics of practical value to all engaged in the banking business.

OLD NATIONAL BANK, GRAND RAPIDS, MICH.—This old and well-known institution has recently issued a handsomely printed illustrated booklet setting forth its facilities for transacting business in its new quarters, recently opened at the old location.

The First National Bank, the predecessor of the Old National, was organized in 1863 with \$50,000 capital, one-half of which was contributed by Martin L. Sweet, who became President. J. M. Barnett was elected Vice-President and Harvey J. Hollister, Cashier. The two gentlemen last named are the present active managers of the bank, Mr. Barnett now being President. The first statement, made in July, 1864, showed deposits \$134,000 and total resources \$219,433. On September 5, 1900, the deposits had grown to \$2,879,394, and the total resources were \$4,145,361. The capital has increased from \$50,000 to \$800,000, and the surplus and profits have grown to \$365,000.

The new quarters of the bank are thoroughly modern in arrangement and appointment, and contain everything necessary for the safe and convenient despatch of business. Thoughtful provision has been made also for the comfort of those who carry on the bank's business—employees as well as officers.

The booklet is as attractive an example of bank advertising as has come to the MAGAZINE'S notice. It gives ample evidence of the careful yet progressive policy which has characterized the management.

The officers and directors of the Old National Bank are: President, James M. Barnett; Vice-President, W. Barnhart; Cashier, Harvey J. Hollister; Assistant Cashier, Clay H. Hollister; Auditor, Hoyt G. Post. Directors: James M. Barnett, Willard Barnhart, Jacob Cummer, Joseph H. Martin, W. R. Shelby, F. Loettgert, E. G. Studley, L. H. Withey, W. D. Stevens, E. Crofton Fox, George C. Peirce, H. J. Hollister, William Judson.

Mr. Harvey J. Hollister, who has been Cashier of the Old National Bank since its organization, has taken a deep interest in the education of young men for the banking profession and is the author of several valuable papers on the subject.

QUICK WORK AT THE CLEARING-HOUSE.—The speed with which business of a clearing-house is transacted seems almost incredible. The actual time required to make the exchanges varies from one and one-half to ten minutes. When the exchanges are made simultaneously, the time varies, as a rule, in proportion to the number of members. In view of the shortness of time required to make its exchanges, the New York Clearing-House affords, perhaps, the best example in existence of the success of modern business methods, as compared with the old ways of doing things. The clearances exceed on the average one hundred million dollars a day, and yet this enormous amount of paper is exchanged between the banks in ten minutes, and often in less time.—“*Clearing-Houses*,” by James G. Cannon.

## \* THE BANKER IN HIS PUBLIC RELATIONS.

---

It is a great honor to be invited to take part in a gathering like this. I appreciate the kindness of your invitation, but I cannot resist the feeling that the burden of obligation would have been greatly increased had you provided me with as good a speech as you have a dinner.

You expect me to talk, I suppose, with more or less reference to those matters which concern the Government's finances; and yet, for more than thirty years these things have been the subject of discussion in business and financial circles as they have been the prolific source of debate in the halls of Congress and on the political rostrum. What can be said that will be new, interesting and instructive? That anything at all is required to be said, is, however, a sure enough token that some of these questions cannot yet be considered as settled and definitely determined.

Forty years ago we had no such questions, or relatively none. There were, to be sure, the ever-present theme of taxation, the true sources of public revenues, and much discussion as to the proper objects of public expenditure. But the great intimacy now apparent between the affairs of the Treasury and the general operations of business did not then exist.

The Civil War changed all this. Under the financial exigencies of that awful strain, we learned to take up people's goods by giving them an indefinite promise to pay, endowing that promise with the power to discharge the obligations of private contract. We struck down by drastic legislation the faulty system of bank currency, and established another, the immediate purpose of which was to facilitate the negotiation of the rapidly-growing public debt. Taxation covering every possible object which could be reached was inaugurated. These influences, operating separately and conjointly, brought in enormous sums of money, which our independent Treasury kept securely locked away in varying millions from the current uses of trade and industry.

And thus our later problems were born. Having discovered, or believing that we had discovered the "greenback" (though adopted with fear and hesitation by all thoughtful statesmen) to be a powerful help in time of war, we were easily led to believe in it as a blessed agency in time of peace. The greenback became associated in the sentiment of our people with things sacred. It was "battle-scarred—blood-stained," and every effort to throw upon it the light of economic truth was and still is, in many quarters, resented as a sacrilegious deed.

Yes, the war burdened us with many problems, and among them all the financial problem was not the least. But, as if those left to us were not enough, we have through political compromise, unavoidable no doubt, been made to assume others. You are familiar with the long history of legislation concerning silver coinage and the money standard between 1878 and 1893.

---

\* An address delivered by Hon. Lyman J. Gage, Secretary of the Treasury, before the annual meeting of Group VIII of the New York State Bankers' Association, at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York city, December 19, 1900.



I need not recite it. We know it introduced new complications into the problem, already sufficiently serious. What is the present situation? We have in circulation among the people, and as a reserve fund in the banks, 346 millions of Government notes. They constitute an enormous public debt payable on demand. We have, or will soon have, substantially 600 millions of silver, or paper representatives of silver, whose parity with gold value the Government is under obligation to maintain. The ultimate measure of this obligation is the difference between the commercial value of the money metal and the face value at which it circulates. This difference is not far from 300 millions of dollars.

We have a system of bank-note currency whose volume is but faintly related to the needs of the community, which a properly constructed bank currency most economically serves. It is, on the contrary, as you all know, controlled as to volume by the price of interest-bearing United States bonds in Wall Street. Our independent Treasury, to which I have already referred, absorbs the circulating medium when active business most requires its use, only to disburse it again when falling revenues—the effect of industrial dullness—bring about an excess in expenditure. Industrial activity increases the public revenues, but it is checked, if not throttled, by its enlarged contributions to the idle fund in the public Treasury.

It is these influences, thus hastily sketched, which have brought our industrial and commercial life into a too dangerous dependency upon our public finances. This marriage between these two whom God did not join together, ought to be put asunder. But not by any hasty South Dakota divorce method is the separation to be accomplished. The children of this wedlock must not be dishonored. Time, attention and great care must be exercised.

Sometime since I had the pleasure of a long talk with the financial minister of a South American republic, one of the most securely established in its political life and most advanced in the elements of material growth and industrial prosperity. Desiring to know his government's methods, and their points of view in certain economic particulars, I asked him a series of questions, to which he made the most gracious and frank replies. I confess that I was surprised and not a little humiliated, as a citizen of this great republic, at the clear perception of economic relationships, and the evident willingness he displayed to forego tempting advantages in the present, out of obedience to the requirements of higher considerations. I do not believe I can do better than to repeat the substance of that conversation. It throws some clear side lights on our system of finance.

"You have," I asked him, "some sort of banking system in your country?"

"Oh, yes. We have a system operating under federal authority, governed by federal law, and subject to inspection and control by federal agents. We have eight large banks, each with several branches, so that all sections of our country are supplied with banking facilities."

"Why do you allow banks with branches? Why not make them entirely independent of each other, the same as we do?"

"Well, we believe that a fagot of many twigs is safer and stronger than the separated twigs could be. It has worked well. We have had no bank failure for many years."

"Do they issue notes to circulate as money?"

"Yes, limited in amount by their relation to capital, and by the percentage of specie which they are required to carry against note issues."

"Why do you not make the banks secure their notes, as we do, by the pledge of Government bonds? By requiring them to do this, you would enlarge the market for your securities and thus lower the rate of interest on your Government debt. At the same time you would make the bank note absolutely secure to the holder."

"Yes," he replied, "but this apparent advantage might prove to be fallacious in the end. In the first place we consider the bank currency entirely safe to the holder as it now is. In the next place, to require what you suggest would involve a tie-up of so much of the bank capital, all of which we think ought to be available to the uses of industry and trade."

"Again, he added, "we think the Government's finances should be involved, to the smallest degree possible, with general industries and business affairs. If we should become engaged in a protracted and exhausting war, the price of our bonds might fall. The value of the securities upon which the safety of the bank-note was supposed to rest thus declining, distrust and panic might set in at the most inopportune time—an inopportune time because it is precisely in time of war that the Government must make the severest financial exactions from its people. It is therefore doubly important that general business should be protected from, rather than exposed to, the perturbations in Government finances when the latter are under stress and strain. It is just then that we need the greatest strength and the most steadiness in the personal affairs of our people, for it is from them we must draw resources and supplies."

"One more question," I urged. "You have, I know, revenues somewhat in excess of expenditures, and necessarily carry a working balance on hand. Where do you keep this cash—in your own strong-boxes as we do?"

"No," he answered, "we are a small country, not rich like you. If we locked up this money, amounting sometimes to twenty, sometimes to thirty millions of dollars, it would be an economic crime. We deposit our idle funds among the eight great banks, and they serve as an important aid to industrial activities, while they are always subject to our call when needed."

I hope you have listened to my report of this talk with the interest which was excited in my own mind in the hearing of it. I have thought about it often and have realized the truth of that proverb which ought to be found in sacred writings somewhere: "A teachable spirit is essential to the gaining of wisdom." His talk stimulated me to inquire as to the economic effects of our own independent Treasury system.

#### THE HOARDING OF PUBLIC FUNDS.

Sixty odd years ago President Jackson made a reckless distribution of public moneys among a lot of reckless "wildcat" banks. Consequence A: The Government lost two and one-half millions; consequence B: the people were taught to hate banks and refused to trust them, one and all, with a dollar of the public money. Strange inconsistency, for if the great corporations of the land were to follow this high example and lock up in strong-boxes their gathered receipts, instead of depositing their idle funds, as they do now, where they serve useful purposes in aid of industry and commerce, a storm of unexampled indignation would sweep over the country.

Has the Government's course been a wise one? Taking the last thirty years, what sum on the average, in excess of an ample working balance, has the Treasury kept under lock and key and away from all current uses in the fields of industry and exchange? The amount is found to average fifty millions of dollars.

If these surplus millions had been deposited with National banks in the clearing-house cities, in the proportion the relative capital of each bank bears to the whole capital; and if, secondly, the only security to the Government had been, in case of bank failures, a prior lien on such banks' assets, what loss would the Treasury have suffered? Answer: Not a cent.

Next, if under these conditions the banks had paid interest to the Government at the rate of two per centum upon the funds so deposited, how much would the Treasury have been benefited? Answer: Thirty-two millions of dollars.

Lastly, with this fund as an aid to their general operations in the field of trade and commerce, to what extent, on the average, would the banks have been able to increase credit accommodations to the people? Answer: Two hundred millions of dollars.

Have we not been guilty of an enormous economic waste by reason of our peculiar Treasury system?

#### CREDIT CURRENCY AS AN AID TO COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY.

There is another direction to which I invite your consideration. It leads to our system of currency. Indulge me if I enlarge upon it.

You know how bank credits, available through checks and drafts, supply commercial necessities, yet it is nevertheless true that in the wide field *where currency or paper money is essential*, the bank credit is powerless. That is to say, the conditions of law under which the bank may extend credit to its dealer by issuing to him its own notes payable on demand, are entirely different from the conditions under which it may give him credit upon its books, to be availed of by checks and drafts. Yet there is no difference in principle between the two. In the one case the banker says in effect: "Draw your checks on me as understood. I will redeem and pay them." In the other he would say: "Here are my own notes of denominations to suit your convenience. Use them where you will. When they are presented for payment they shall be paid." In the case of the credit made upon his books, the banker is not required by law to put up security for the payment of his dealer's checks. To require this of him would be to destroy the credit operations of the banking community. Every loan would be a loan of capital, not of credit, since it is plain that an investment of capital would in advance be made in the securities pledged. That, however, is precisely what, under present condition, the banker must do before obligating himself in credit form by the issue of his *notes*. He has indeed a nominal liberty to issue his notes without the pledge of security for their redemption, but if he exercise that privilege he must pay a penalty tax of ten per cent. per annum on his notes so issued. This is, of course, prohibitory. I need not stop to explain that the security now required as a condition precedent to bank-note issues is the deposit of United States bonds with the Government.

Let us see how this works in practice. Suppose three men of equally good and satisfactory standing, one behind the other, at the banker's desk, each

an applicant for a loan of ten thousand dollars. The banker is in a fair condition as to his reserves, and may safely extend his credit to the extent of, say, \$30,000. The first applicant explains that he desires a credit upon the banker's books, against which he may check as occasion shall require in the ordinary course of his business affairs. The second desires the banker's certificate of deposit which he may take with him to a distant point, to pay for certain property for which he is negotiating. To both these men the banker gives a cheerful yes, for he knows by experience and the law of averages, that in the case of the first applicant some portion of the borrowed fund will remain undrawn, or, if wholly drawn on some occasion, it will be covered in again to the borrower's credit, in part or in whole, while the obligation he takes from the borrower is running to maturity. The situation in the second case is not essentially different. The certificate of deposit will remain for some days in the hands of the borrower. When it passes from him to another, the second party may himself retain it for a period, and when it takes a backward journey toward the banker, other days will be consumed in its transition. In the meantime, the borrower, having his note in the banker's hands, begins to save his funds to pay it when due, and these funds he, of course, deposits with his banker to his own credit on account. He thus, to an extent, himself furnishes the banker the wherewithal to pay the certificate of deposit when it finally comes in for payment. Things do not always work so favorably to the banker as in the manner just sketched, but the statement illustrates in a fair way how in general these matters are conducted.

The third man now steps forward with his application for a loan of ten thousand dollars. In answer to the banker's inquiries he states that he must at once have the money in cash form, gold, silver or paper currency. He wants to pay loggers in a logging camp, or cotton pickers in the South, or harvest hands in the West, or fishermen on the Atlantic coast, or operatives in mill, foundry or mine. Now, if the banker could issue to this proposed borrower his own notes in small denominations, he would be as able to accommodate this man as he was to accommodate the other two; but this it is not possible for him to do. To serve this man he must at once take from his cash reserves the sum necessary. So doing would weaken him in relation to the undertaking he has just entered into with the other two. He is, therefore, obliged to decline the third application. It is thus perceived that a discrimination of necessity exists in favor of those who in the larger affairs of business can make use of checks, and against those who in a smaller, but no less useful way, are engaged in affairs which cannot be handled by such instruments, requiring as they do, something that has the form and ready negotiability of money. We have thus come to the point of vital distinction between the two systems of bank-note issues; the one known as currency against assets, and the other as currency secured by the deposit of bonds. The first named furnishes an instrument of credit (costing nothing) as effective in the exchange of property as real money; the second is an instrument of capital, or what to the lender of credit is as costly and expensive as capital. If the banker acquires gold, silver, or any form of Government money, he is obliged to give a full equivalent value in exchange for it, or if he secures his own notes, prior to issuing them, he has tied up in that investment an equal sum of loanable capital. If, on the other hand, he issues his notes, without this pledge of security, he has not thereby made an investment of capital. He has put

afoat for a time an instrument of credit which, if properly recognized, is as efficient to perform all the functions of money in exchange of goods, and in payment of debts and wages, as is money itself. Like the credit upon the banker's books, availed of by checks and drafts, the bank note is an economizer in the use of capital. Indeed the bank note is in essence the check or draft of the banker upon himself, payable on demand to the holder thereof.

For thirty-six years our business community has been denied the use of the credit currency described. What has been the economic loss to the community? It is impossible to measure the loss in dollars. It can be truly said, however, that the borrowing class has paid a larger rate of interest as a consequence of our system, and will continue to do so while the system lasts.

But has not our system, which requires the deposit of United States bonds as security for circulation, been helpful to the public credit and resulted in a lower rate of interest cost to the Government on its debt obligations? The answer to this question must be in the affirmative.

Has not also the issue of paper money by the Government, bearing no interest at all, yet absorbing very fully the field of circulation, been a great economic saving to all the people? The answer to this question would have to be also in the probable affirmative, and yet, when we consider the actual money carried by the Treasury to guard the Government notes, the periods of stress and sacrifice occasionally made necessary to protect them, the amount of saving must be greatly reduced. And if further we take note of the severe perturbations in business affairs, resulting from doubts as to what the Treasury would or could do, as exigencies in Government finances have appeared, the margin of saving will perhaps wholly disappear. But if it were demonstrated that a public saving had been secured in either or both of the ways just considered, it should then be remembered that this saving has been secured at a cost, not to all the people, but at a cost to the borrowers alone, or through the borrowers, at a cost to those using borrowed credit in the prosecution of commerce and industry. This must be true, if it be as I have tried to show, that the average rate of interest has, by reason of our system, been constantly higher to the borrower. Now, it has never been considered consistent with correct principles of taxation to tax people in proportion to their debts, but rather in proportion to their property. If, then, the economies to the National Treasury have been gained at the expense of the borrowers who prosecute trade and industry, that course has been inconsistent with recognized principles of equity, and no doubt injurious to productivity and the exchange of commodities. There is no reason why the Government when it buys goods should not pay for them like others, or if forbearance in payment is desired, it should pay for that forbearance as all private corporations and individuals are compelled to do under such circumstances. In that case the cost of forbearance, namely, interest, would be derived from the sources of general revenue and would not be imposed by an indirect process upon the private borrower.

Admitting for argument's sake that the bank note issued against general assets is a better economic instrument than the one we have, ought not the privilege of such issues, if accorded, be so limited and hedged about by some kind of guaranty, which would render them safe in the hands of the people? Certainly so, and there is no reason to doubt that these limitations could be imposed, yet leaving sufficient liberty and these guaranties secured. There

are many models, both in this country and in other countries, which time and experience have demonstrated to be both effective and safe.

Is not this discussion a purely academic one? In other words, is any change in our currency system at all probable, or even possible, no matter how much to be desired? To this question it must be said that no immediate change is at all probable, but looking forward to a period in the not distant future, some change in our system seems to be inevitable. In the first place, in the absence of extraordinary expenditures for war, the present outstanding public debt ought to be largely reduced, or wholly paid. As this eventuates, the now required form of security for bank-note issues will be lacking, and modifications in present law will be necessary. Again, if I may express a direct opinion, it will come to be perceived, as time passes, that the Government is not and cannot be well prepared to deal with a large mass of floating debt payable on demand. The obligation to maintain parity between our nearly six hundred millions of silver money and gold adds to the complication, and the lawmakers representing the people will be glad to diminish the present great responsibility. It will be further seen, as time goes on, that a true paper money unites in itself two qualities—it is a medium of exchange, and at the same time it is a convenient and useful instrument by which credit may be extended. Government paper money, like gold or silver, may be equally a good medium of exchange; but all alike they lack the quality of being instruments of credit. The banker who loans his notes, lends his credit. The banker who lends his greenbacks, gold or silver, lends his capital, or that which is as expensive for him to acquire as is capital.

#### A UNION OF BANKS WITHOUT MONOPOLY.

As to the system of a few larger banks, with a multiplicity of branches, which my friend from the South so thoroughly endorsed, and which the experience of France, Great Britain and Canada commends to your approval, can a similar system be inaugurated with us? Probably not. While recognizing the value of it as to strength, we are too afraid of centralized power and authority. It antagonizes the spirit of our institutions. But it may be possible to secure to a degree its advantages while avoiding the apprehended danger. Our political system is representative. It begins in small units. The townships, associated by representation, constitute the county, the counties in like manner the States, and from the States that indissoluble federation, the general Government. With no powers not specifically extended to it or clearly implied, the Federal authority nevertheless stands for the general defence and the general welfare.

Something like this is vaguely defined in my thought as possible in our banking system. No consolidation of interests, no absolute sovereignty, no powerful head, with authority to create and control, but association with reference to a common defence against common dangers; the individual bank an independent unit; the district clearing-house a center of association, where the surplus strength of the strong could be made available to support with entire safety, and with proper reward, the exposed position of the momentarily weak.

The district clearing-houses, associated in a similar way, might be made to constitute the national clearing-house, and thus, in lines almost parallel to our political institutions, we might secure in the field of banking what we

enjoy in our national life, namely, individual freedom with an associated strength, which in the nation has been found equal to all emergencies.

The operation of your own clearing-house in times of peculiar stress and peril typifies what may be realized along the broader lines to which I refer.

By the aid of the strong in support of the imperilled, you have saved from disaster those that were not unworthy, and aided in times of crises exposed interests in the fields of trade and industry. Without specific warrant of law your action in these respects has everywhere been approved as judicious and wise. Is it not possible under the sanction of law to perfect and extend for the general good of the country a similar plan and one which has been so well demonstrated? The idea is not new. It has been presented and urged by one or more of your own financial men and with great force by Honorable J. H. Walker, of Massachusetts.

#### FUTURE POSSIBILITIES OF OUR FOREIGN TRADE.

I omit reference to other features of National finances which furnish equally important subjects for your study and reflection. I do so that I may suggest to you the growing importance of our international trade and our international finances. If the course of trade with foreign nations which has marked the last three or four years, is to continue, we are to assume not long hence a financial relationship heretofore unknown. In the long past we have been under tribute of interest for the use of capital furnished from abroad. The promise is that we shall soon become recipients of interest on capital furnished by us for use abroad. To bring about this desirable end, new conditions are imposed, new questions arise, new knowledge is to be acquired. Our horizon expands, and you, the bankers, must be ready to meet the enlarging scope of your operations and to occupy wisely and well the broader field where your offices and powers are to be exercised.

Here at home, in our own land, we are witnesses to what is nearly a metamorphosis in previous conditions and methods of business. The consolidations of capital, the centralization of industries, excite new and serious inquiry as to the consequences and effects they may carry in their train. Are they the natural and healthful unfolding of a true economic movement? Will they carry beneficial fruits which will find an equitable distribution through the body politic as a whole, or will they prove to be engines of power by the aid of which the few can exploit the many?

My faith is strong in the first direction, but the real meaning and future influences of these modern phenomena should be studied and made clear to the general comprehension. Grave consequences depend upon it. Two dangers are apparent. One is that through prejudice and ignorance we may block the path of natural progress. The other is that the force and power involved in these great organizations may be utilized for oppression and robbery. The peculiar position of the banker as an intermediary in affairs gives him a special advantage in the study and comprehension of the question. His interests, tied in as they are to varied and multiplied business activities, put him under bonds to do all he can for the general welfare. Upon his character, intelligence, fidelity and truth, as applied to all of these questions, the country has the right to rely with confidence.

If I possessed the gift of eloquence I would try to describe the magnificent prospect which opens before us in the opening years of the coming century.

With a land whose material resources are just fairly coming into view; with a climate stimulating to mental and physical activity; with a population strong, vigorous, inventive and full of enterprise, what may not be expected in the way of material accomplishment? But these conditions and forces will be deeply affected by the moral quality and political wisdom of our people. A right knowledge of our true relationships, a mutual confidence between sections, a loyal adhesion to true economic and financial laws, are conditions precedent and indispensable to the highest degree of attainment, whether in material progress or social happiness. To promote these conditions, to help to the realization of these results, the judicious coöperation of intelligence and patriotism is necessary. In the needful coöperation may the banker never be found wanting. A true sense of patriotism and a due regard for your own lasting interests unite in demanding from you your best thought and your best efforts in the cause of country, which we are glad to believe is the cause of humanity.

---

### KNOX'S HISTORY OF BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES.

#### OPINIONS AS TO THE MERITS OF THE WORK.

ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY (Philadelphia): The History of Banking in the United States, by the late John J. Knox, is a work that should find a place on the shelves of every student of banking. Not only is it commended by its comprehensive scope, but also by its authorship. Mr. Knox was a practical banker. Moreover, his experience in public service—five years as Deputy Comptroller and twelve years as Comptroller of the Currency—placed him in immediate touch with all the sources of information necessary to the preparation of such a treatise. His intelligence and scholarly devotion to the subject of banking led him to mature consideration of all the questions and interests which his long life of public and private activity involved. It is seldom that an author is found with such qualifications for scientific and literary writing. The work of Mr. Knox, after his death, was left in hands quite as competent to bring it to a close. It has been revised and brought up to date by Mr. Bradford Rhodes, Editor of the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* of New York, and assisted by Mr. Elmer H. Youngman, his associate.

The book begins with a general view of the history of banking in Europe. This is followed with a sketch of colonial banking and bank operations under the Continental Congress. Systems both National and State are subsequently set forth in orderly arrangement and completeness of detail. The history of the National banking system is largely drawn from the personal experience of the author, whose literary activities and public service began about the time of the introduction of the National banking system. A special feature of this work is the space given to the history of State banking. This part of the subject is treated first by giving a general history of the movement and of the special features in State banking. The author then describes the systems as they have arisen in each State separately, grouping the States geographically for the purpose of the discussion. Much statistical information is incorporated in the work which can not be found elsewhere in convenient form. Attention is also given to the legislation involved in our financial development. The work is handsomely illustrated with engravings of leading American bankers and financiers.

PHILADELPHIA RECORD: The conspicuous lack of a complete and trustworthy history of the banking interest in this country will be fully met by a volume just published by Bradford Rhodes & Co. This is *A History of Banking in the United States* by the late John Jay Knox.



## \* MODERN BANKING METHODS.

### A NEW SERIES ON PRACTICAL BANKING—HELPFUL HINTS DERIVED FROM EXPERIENCE.

One thing may be noticed when examining the clearing-house sheets of most of our cities, and that is the absence of many bank numbers. These absent numbers formerly applied to banks which have gone out of business for one reason or another. When a bank ceases to exist its clearing-house number also ceases.

In this chapter upon the clearing-house I will show for comparison the principal forms in use in three cities of different size, Chicago, Minneapolis and Scranton, Pa. In the first two cities a room is used especially for the clearing-house business, but in the latter place one of the banks is designated to act, and this selection lasts for two years.

BANKERS NAT. BANK ON METROPOLITAN NAT. BANK.	BANKERS NAT. BANK ON HIBERNIAN BKG. ASS'N	BANKERS NAT. BANK ON BANK OF MONTREAL.	BANKERS NAT. BANK ON UNION TRUST COMPANY.	BANKERS NAT. BANK ON CHICAGO NAT. BANK.
\$129.62	\$1.05	\$28.08	\$4.50	\$20.69
7.00	1.50	70.95	11.80	2.25
27.00	12.99	6.00	40.00	65.50
100.00	15.63	18.71	1.53	15.00
51.00	35.73	124.90	62.62	73.72
30.00	20.00	72.14	5.64	6.76
168.00	19.51	32.27	11.85	260.25
248.26	1.82	17.25	2.00	8.68
194.90	9.90	17.07	201.26	40.25
42.00	8.20	8.50	249.96	48.10
264.80	1.88	18.98	509.66	114.77
48.55	1.68	43.24	200.00	100.00
24.55	150.00	280.50	100.00	4.10
65.36	300.00	1,108.25	41.71	63.68
23.96	119.95	47.64	235.02	100.00
65.14	55.20	175.40	12.82	6.88
10.21	11.80	509.42	147.05	400.00
46.59	468.28	14.76	24.88	275.00
12.94	2,962.45	204.57	26.58	100.00
83.13	340.00	138.87	31.83	63.27
112.01	560.00	4.00	91.00	89.91
45.94	5.88	200.00	53.62	14.11
112.08	300.00	8.25	272.73	40.00
1,424.40	300.00	86.37	79	18.55
11.80	2,000.00	4.40	9.66	7.18
7.27	1,000.00	46.85	26.25	15.00
81.00	250.00	18.64	247.67	105.45
107.77	50.00	2,770.67	45.00	110.00
40.00	6.75	88.50	50.45	304.48
591.64	17.45	129.62	19.57	43.26
220.11	5.00	100.00	117.75	1.75
661.63	28.50	51.00	43.00	570.62
144.80	78.00	157.00	247.67	81.25
844.95	.05	600.00	117.75	
	.75			
\$5,528.15	\$9,142.05	\$7,135.26	\$3,813.81	\$3,156.49

FIG. 1.

\* Continued from the December number, page 914. This series of articles commenced in the MAGAZINE for August, 1898, page 790.

While in the first two cities the payments of the balances are made by and to the clearing-house, yet in the latter city these are made between the banks direct.

### THE CHICAGO CLEARING-HOUSE.

In Chicago it is the custom to have the exchange slips made in long sheets, 9½ inches wide, containing the names of six banks; the sheet being perforated lengthwise between each bank enables them to be torn apart easily. The object of this is the saving of time. This sheet is made just the proper width for the arithmometer, and when used is placed in that machine in connection with an unperforated sheet and carbon paper. By the act of filling out the sheet with the machine an actual copy is also made at the same time on the unperforated sheet. This copy is retained in the bank.

No. 24

## CHICAGO CLEARING HOUSE.

BANKERS' NATIONAL BANK.

SETTLING CLERK'S STATEMENT.

Oct 3

1900

Thayer &amp; Jackson Stationery Co., Chicago 255852

Debit Balance	No.	BANKS	Credit Balance	BANKS DEBIT	BANKS CREDIT	No.
2442.800	1	First National Bank,		419587.85	174762.69	1
	2	America National Bank,	20.100	50201.02	70382.26	2
	3	Merchants' National Bank,	7600	35193.33	42868.92	3
	4	N.-Western National Bank,	95.700	10205.06	105893.37	4
721.00	5	Commercial Nat. Bank,		96128.22	24015.96	5
	6	Union National Bank,	33900	14836.05	48758.74	6
78.700	7	Mer. Loan and Trust Co.,		103569.48	24862.53	7
33.600	8	Corn Exchange Nat. Bank,		95824.85	62179.22	8
	10	Metropolitan Nat. Bank,	20.900	71323.93	92240.58	10
	11	Hibernian Banking Ass'n,	5.100	2700.20	7873.38	11
	13	Bank of Montreal,	14.300	7786.80	22103.04	13
3.400	15	Union Trust Co.,		8187.78	4767.46	15
	18	Chicago National Bank,	139.300	7161.26	146475.73	18
	19	Continental National Bank,	5000	69031.70	74038.82	19
	21	Fort Dearborn Nat. Bank,	2000	7627.46	9684.32	21
12.500	23	Nat. Bank of the Republic		33052.32	20546.79	23
	24	Bankers' National Bank,			15408.77	24
16.700	25	N. Trust		20218.95	4071.27	25
14.300	26	Ill. Trust		19522.22	5216.51	26
	27					27
	28					28
Total Clearings:		Footings,		1072158.48	956150.36	
		Balance,			116008.12	
		Proof,			1072158.48	

FIG. 2.

The slips when separated at the perforations are, as elsewhere, sent to the clearing-house with the checks. Fig. 1 shows such sheet of slips.

Fig. 2 shows the settling clerk's statement as used in Chicago.

Figs. 3 and 4 show the form of credit ticket and balance ticket respectively. The latter being printed in red ink on yellow paper.

**CHICAGO CLEARING HOUSE**

**BANK No. 1** **Chicago, Oct 3 1900**

**CREDIT**

FIRST NATIONAL BANK, - - - 296841320

*Amount of exchanges to Clearing House this day per Messenger.*

S. P. Lansing TELLER.

FIG. 3.

**Balance Ticket**

**No. 1** **Chicago Clearing House Oct 3, 1900**

Amount Received, \$	268579606
Amount Brought, \$	296841320

Debit, \$            Balance Due Clearing House.

Credit Balance Due FIRST NATIONAL BANK, \$ 28261714

13. J. Kane Settling Clerk.

FIG. 4.

Fig. 5 is an order on the clearing-house from a creditor bank authorizing them to pay their messenger the amount due them in the settlement of the day's exchanges.

**CHICAGO CLEARING HOUSE.**

C. H. Bank No. 24  
Bankers Natl. Bank Chicago, Oct 3 1900  
 W. D. C. STREET, Manager.

**Pay** George S. Jackson our authorized messenger,  
 when accompanied by Reyn. A. Allen \$ 116008.13  
One hundred sixteen thousand and eight  
and 13 DOLLARS.

Being the Balance due us from the Associated Banks in to day's Exchanges.  
 Orders (if any) given to other banks this day will be received in part payment.

J. P. King Cashier.

FIG. 5.

Fig. 6 is a form of draft or order on the clearing-house, and is used to transfer funds to some other bank, similar to the transfer check used in Boston.

BANK NO. 144  
W. D. C. STREET, Manager.

Chicago, Oct 3 - 1900

### CHICAGO CLEARING HOUSE,

Pay Natl. Reserve Bank or order, \$ 50,000.<sup>00</sup>/<sub>x</sub>

Fifty thousand Dollars,  
and deduct from balance due us this day.

L. S. Clark  
CASHIER.

FIG. 6.

Figs. 7 and 8 go together. They have a perforated line between them to permit of easy separation. They are used to pay errors in the exchanges of large amounts, also to redeem large checks that may be returned for any reason. Fig. 7 is printed in red ink, and is retained by the teller as a voucher, and goes from him to the general bookkeeper. Fig. 8 is an order on the clearing-house and is the portion given in settlement. This is returned to the bank the next day through the clearing-house.

11-77-2 B

### CREDIT CLEARING HOUSE CHECKS.

		PAYABLE TO <u>\$22 Natl. Reserve Bank</u>
CHECKS.	20	Error footing
	100	miscount
	65 98	"
	18 50	"
	12 50	"
	3 00	"
ERRORS.	62 46	"
	<u>724 69</u>	
		\$ <u>724.<sup>69</sup></u>

CHICAGO, Oct 3 1900

THE BANKERS NATIONAL BANK WILL PAY THROUGH THE  
CLEARING HOUSE, FOR THIS MEMORANDUM,

To Natl. Reserve Bank \$ 724.<sup>69</sup>

Seven hundred twenty four & 69/100 DOLLARS,  
J. L. Clancy CLEARING HOUSE CLERK. S. P. Smith CARRIER.

FIGS. 7 AND 8.

Figs. 9 and 10 are the obverse and reverse of one slip. They are a statement in aggregate of the out clearings, or checks going to the clearing-house, and the in clearings, or checks received from the clearing-house respectively. After the clearing has been completed these statements are made for the officers of the bank, for their reference.

Another slip is used for the benefit of the officers and is shown in Fig. 11. This is filled up at the close of the day and shows in the aggregate the checks that have come in during that afternoon that will be sent to the clearing-house the next morning. The checks that come in through the mail in the morning are added.

One peculiarity of the Chicago method is the keeping of two books, one

**THE BANKERS NATIONAL BANK,**

CHICAGO.

**OUT CLEARINGS.**

*Oct 3 1900*

A to K Teller	2094346		
L to Z Teller	190274		
Note Teller	51324046		
Paying Teller	40166		
P. M. Checks	5517927		
Differences Paid	203		
Differences Received	108828282		
Less Deducts	928528		
Clearings Sheet	107899734		
Short or Over	107215848		

Particulars of Difference

*J. G. Jones*

CLEARING HOUSE CLERK.

FIG. 9.

**THE BANKERS NATIONAL BANK,**

CHICAGO.

**IN CLEARINGS.**

*Oct 3 1900*

General Ledger	10090073		
Country Ledgers	17292812		
National	7474551		
A-L	5660053		
M-Z	3784424		
City Ledgers	6363378		
A-G	10386416		
H-O	34763468		
P-Z			
Payer			
Differences Received	2203		
Differences Paid	95817378		
Clearings Sheet	702342		
	95615036		

*J. G. Jones*

CLEARING HOUSE CLERK.

FIG. 10.

called in clearings, and representing in aggregates the checks that have come in from the clearing-house, after they have been distributed to the various departments, general and individual. Fig. 10 is compiled from this statement. Fig. 12 shows a page from this book.

Another book is kept called out clearings, representing the checks on other banks going to the clearing-house, showing the checks at the close of the day or P.M. checks, and the checks received by the bank in the following morning's mail which are added to the clearing-house sheet.

Fig. 13 shows one of the pages of this book.

Fig. 9 is compiled from this book.

The clearing-house proof-sheet is similar to that used elsewhere. It differs

chiefly in the addition of the two columns styled settlement. These columns are used in which to note the debit or credit settlement made by the clearing-house.

In Chicago the drafts or orders on the clearing-house, such as shown in Fig. 6, are much in use, and when a settlement of a balance is made by the clearing-house these drafts are of course considered and they are noted in the settlement column, thus keeping a record of the character of the settlement. Fig. 14 shows a clearing-house proof sheet in abbreviated form.

**THE BANKERS NATIONAL BANK,**  
CHICAGO, ILL.

**CLEARING HOUSE CHECKS.**

*Oct 10 1900*

Payable & Debit, Credits.				
Paying Teller, . . .		322	17	
Receiving Teller A to K, .	18	462	93	
" " L to Z, .	7	387	14	
Note Teller, . . .	298	765	90.	
TOTAL,		3249	3814	

Signed, *J. P. Smith*  
Clearing House Clerk.

FIG. 11.

#### THE MINNEAPOLIS CLEARING-HOUSE.

Minneapolis being a smaller city than those before mentioned, the method of clearing is naturally more simple. Both in Minneapolis and Chicago the package clerk's receipt is used, and this being identical with that used in New York, a description of it is unnecessary.

In Fig. 15 is shown the settling clerk's statement, which as is seen is much simpler than any before shown.

Fig. 16 shows the credit ticket, or teller's ticket as it is called in this city. This is made out and signed by the teller of the bank and given to the messenger, who deposits it with the Manager on entering the clearing-house.

Fig. 17 is the balance ticket used. This is similar to the same in use in other cities, and is made up by the settling clerk after the exchanges have been made, and is given to the Manager.

Figure 18 is the form of receipt given by the Cashier of a creditor bank to the Manager upon receiving the funds in settlement.

Fig. 19 is the form for the receipt given by the Manager to a debtor bank upon payment of the balance due.

DATE Oct. 3 1914

**IN CLEARINGS.**

No.	Name of Bank	Debit		Credit		Balance, 10/1	10/2	10/3	10/4	10/5	10/6	10/7	10/8	10/9	10/10	10/11	10/12	10/13	10/14	10/15	10/16	10/17	10/18	10/19	10/20	10/21	10/22	10/23	10/24	10/25	10/26	10/27	10/28	10/29	10/30	10/31	Total
		Debit	Credit	Debit	Credit																																
1	First National Bank	13,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	12,000.00																															
2	Second National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
3	Third National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
4	Fourth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
5	Fifth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
6	Sixth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
7	Seventh National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
8	Eighth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
9	Ninth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
10	Tenth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
11	Eleventh National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
12	Twelfth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
13	Thirteenth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
14	Fourteenth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
15	Fifteenth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
16	Sixteenth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
17	Seventeenth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
18	Eighteenth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
19	Nineteenth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
20	Twentieth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
21	Twenty-first National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
22	Twenty-second National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
23	Twenty-third National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
24	Twenty-fourth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
25	Twenty-fifth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
26	Twenty-sixth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
27	Twenty-seventh National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
28	Twenty-eighth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
29	Twenty-ninth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
30	Thirtieth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
31	Thirty-first National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
32	Thirty-second National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
33	Thirty-third National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
34	Thirty-fourth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
35	Thirty-fifth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
36	Thirty-sixth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
37	Thirty-seventh National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
38	Thirty-eighth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
39	Thirty-ninth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
40	Fortieth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
41	Forty-first National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
42	Forty-second National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
43	Forty-third National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
44	Forty-fourth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
45	Forty-fifth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
46	Forty-sixth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
47	Forty-seventh National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00																															
48	Forty-eighth National Bank	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	1,000.00	0.00					</																										

## OUT CLEARINGS.

Oct. 3 1900

DIFFERENCES				BANKS	CLEARINGS	
DEBIT		CREDIT			P. M.	A. M.
		3897		1 First National,	82336211	41958785
				2 Nat. Bank of America,	1090103	5020102
				3 Merchants Nat. Bank,	573227	3519333
				4 North-Western Nat. Bank,	1360405	1020506
				5 Commercial Nat. Bank,	4502628	9612842
				6 Union Nat. Bank,	1890102	1483605
		913571		7 Mer. Loan & Trust Co.	1685662	10356948
		11060		8 Corn Exchange Bank,	3770953	9584485
11				10 Metropolitan Nat. Bank,	1173459	7132393
100				11 Hibernian Bank'g Ass'n,	139120	240020
				13 Bank of Montreal,	732995	778680
				15 Union Trust Co.	349372	818778
				18 Chicago National Bank,	321111	716126
	92			19 Continental Nat. Bank,	1657726	6903170
				21 Ft. Dearborn Nat. Bank,	199600	762746
				23 Nat. Bank Republic,	1062483	3305232
				25 Northern Trust Co.	437512	2021895
				26 Illinois Trust & Savings B'k	940107	1952222
				27 P O	272564	
				28 N. Teller	683886	
203		928528			55179226	107215848
				Checks as per Scratcher,	55179226	
				Total Checks per Scratcher		
				Difference Acct.		

FIG. 13.

## CLEARING HOUSE PROOF.

Chicago, Oct 3 1900.

SETTLEMENT	No.	BANKS	BALANCE DUE TO CLEARING HOUSE	BANKS DR.	BANKS CR.	BALANCE DUE TO BANKS	No.	SETTLEMENT
		1 First National Bank,		268579006	29684220	2826714	1	
		2 America National Bank,	5341728	84632817	79041689		2	
		3 Merchants' National Bank,		61849280	63172642	1020262	3	
		4 N. Western Nat. Bank,		7561196	78848228	3211232	4	
		5 Commercial Nat. Bank,	3353344	40757463	86730219		5	
		6 Union National Bank,		5946114	6302481	3096762	6	
		7 Mer. Loan & Trust Co.,	2133114	75760930	73031816		7	
		12 Other Banks	79231063	147024603	140223219	53716511		
			9009557	215673914	215623914	9009551		

FIG. 14.



Fig. 20 shows the Minneapolis clearing-house proof sheet, which in that city is bound in a book instead of being a loose sheet as in the former cities.

SCRANTON, PA., CLEARING-HOUSE.

In this city, as in all the others, itemized lists of the checks are of course made at the bank. The totals of these are then entered upon a slip called

No. 10

MINNEAPOLIS CLEARING HOUSE

From First Natl. Bank

Settling Clerk's Statement Oct 3 1900

NO.	BANKS	AMOUNTS	RECEIPT	
1	Northwestern Nat'l Bank,	1279614	1049838	1
4	Security Bank of Minn.,	1434468	993137	4
6	Minneapolis Co. Sav. B'k,	1046219	839218	6
10	First National Bank,			10
13	Nicollet National Bank,	1284439	964131	13
14	Nat'l Bank of Commerce,	704492	936493	14
19	Flour City National Bank,	968139	1364139	19
20	Swedish Amer. Nat'l Bank,	886216	981135	20
21	Metropolitan Bank,	1138291	849655	21
	<i>Footings,</i>	8698178	7981741	
	<i>Balance,</i>		716437	
	<i>Proof,</i>		8698178	

FIG. 15.

No. 10 Minneapolis Clearing House Association, Oct 3 1900

CREDIT

First Natl. Bank \$ 86981.78

AMOUNT OF CHECKS PER MESSENGER.

E. P. Long TELLER.

FIG. 16.

No. 10 MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., Oct 3 1900

Amount received, \$ 79817.41

FROM First Natl Bank

Amount brought, \$ 86981.78

Debit balance due Clearing House, \$ \_\_\_\_\_

Credit balance due above named Bank, \$ 7164.37

Elo Jones SETTLING CLERK.

FIG. 17.

CASHIER'S RECEIPT.	No. <u>10</u>	MINNEAPOLIS, <u>Oct 3/1900</u>
	RECEIVED FROM THE <u>Minneapolis Clearing House Association,</u>	
	<u>Seventy one hundred sixty four &amp; 37/100</u> DOLLARS.	
	In full for balance due this day to <u>First Natl Bank</u>	
	<u>\$7164.37</u>	<u>M. Price</u> Cashier.

FIG. 18.

the exchange list, which fills the place of the settling clerk's sheet used in the large cities, and before described. The messenger takes the checks and list to the designated bank, where the various messengers meet and make the

MANAGER'S RECEIPT.	No. <u>20</u>	Minneapolis Clearing House, <u>Oct 3/1900</u>
	Received from <u>Swedish Am. Bank</u>	<u>\$6212.87</u>
	<u>Sixty two hundred twelve &amp; 94/100</u> DOLLARS.	
	In full for balance due this day to Minneapolis Clearing House Association.	
	<u>N. L. Smith</u> Manager.	

FIG. 19.

proper exchange of checks. The exchange list mentioned is left at this bank, which acts as a clearing-house (the banks having their own memoranda).

Fig. 21 shows the exchange list mentioned.

Oct 3/1900

No.	BANKS	BANKS DUE C. H.	BANKS DR.	BANKS CR.	BAL. DUE BANKS
1	NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL BANK		65438.72	70381.14	4942.42
4	SECURITY BANK	13917.53	83328.75	69381.22	
6	HENNEPIN COUNTY SAVINGS BANK		48515.81	56282.17	7766.36
10	FIRST NATIONAL BANK		79817.41	86981.78	7164.37
13	NICOLLET NATIONAL BANK.	10596.09	59318.40	48722.31	
14	NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE		38609.46	41325.11	27156.5
19	FLOUR CITY NATIONAL BANK		46541.32	51436.82	4595.50
20	SWEDISH AMERICAN BANK	6212.94	32431.14	26218.20	
21	METROPOLITAN BANK		25311.16	28583.42	3272.26
	TOTAL	30756.56	479312.17	479312.17	30756.56

FIG. 20.

From these exchange lists a record is kept daily by the bank acting as clearing-house in a book prepared for the purpose. Fig. 22 shows the form used in this book.

No proof sheet is in use here and none is necessary, as no settlements are

## Scranton Clearing-House Association.

## EXCHANGE LIST.

From Traders National Bank.Oct. 11 1900. 100

1	First National Bank	448.466
2	Scranton Savings Bank	63.83
3	Merchants and Mechanics Bank	457.04
4	Third National Bank	195.251
5	West Side Bank	66.775
6	County Savings Bank and Trust Co.	163.72
7	Lock's Trust & Safe Deposit Co	173.004
8	Traders National Bank	
9	Dime Deposit & Discount Bank	296.42
		<u>1883.897</u>

FIG. 21.

SCRANTON CLEARING HOUSE ASSOCIATION											TOTAL RECEIVED FROM CLEARING HOUSE.
BANKS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
1. First National,		105.022	14.165	6.265	31.964	75.938	2.714	48.246	5.008	2.744.135	
2. Scranton Savings,	4.613		20.85	17.211	24.292	38.211	22.224	63.183	17.242	1.032.048	
3. Merchants and Mechanics,	17.017	1.07.57		83.615	3.016	2.211	6.042	45.122	72.232	15.112.89	
4. Third National,	11.95.94	77.005	24.207		3.906	31.212	16.057	1.98.285	12.127	27.819.13	
5. West Side Bank,	29.321	8.449	6.785	6.203		2.422	18.129	66.728	6.202	3.266.00	
6. County Savings Bank & Trust Co.	4.98.37	1.15.27	4.278	24.216	2.285		1.942	16.122	5.117	12.184.29	
7. Lock's Trust and Safe Deposit Co.	3.22.27	4.25.60	4.917	13.277	2.216	2.916		1.93.22	18.242	15.247.11	
8. Traders National,	1.01.692	21.122	12.822	3.298.5	22.611	1.121	4.918		2.222	15.166.16	
9. Dime Deposit and Discount,	3.69.39	9.444	7.200	24.201	1.221	2.222	2.263	2.262		1.799.77	
10. Dime Deposit and Discount,	6.11.513	1.06.621	24.204	2.16.22	4.231.2	1.221	1.11.22	1.57.222	1.57.222	1.57.222	

FIG. 22.

made by or through the clearing-house bank. The banks settle with each other directly, paying or receiving the balance due.

This method, as is seen, is very simple, and the forms used very few, but it accomplishes the purpose, and for a city of this size seems all that is necessary.

A. R. BARRETT.

(To be continued.)

# BANKING LAW DEPARTMENT.

---

## IMPORTANT LEGAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST TO BANKERS.

---

All the latest decisions affecting bankers rendered by the United States Courts and State Court of last resort will be found in the *MAGAZINE'S* Law Department as early as obtainable.

Attention is also directed to the "Replies to Law and Banking Questions," included in this Department.

---

### *BILL OF LADING—PAYMENT OF DRAFT—TITLE OF BANK.*

Supreme Court of Georgia, October 29, 1900.

*COKER, et al. vs. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MEMPHIS, TENN.*

The drawee of a draft, to which is attached a bill of lading, under which goods are consigned to the order of the drawer, acquires neither the right to the possession of the bill of lading, nor title to the goods, until he pays or secures the payment of the draft according to the custom of the trade, or the course of dealing between himself and the drawer.

Where a bank advanced money upon such a draft, taking as security therefor the attached bill of lading, properly indorsed, and, after a levy upon the goods as the property of the consignor, filed a claim thereto, its right to maintain this claim was not lost merely because, while the claim case was pending, the drawee refused to accept the goods and pay the draft, and in consequence the bill of lading was "indorsed over" to the consignor for the sole purpose of having him dispose of the goods for the bank's exclusive benefit.

---

LUMPKIN, *P. J.*: An attachment in favor of W. H. Coker & Co. was levied upon two carloads of corn, as the property of the Moulton-Davis Company, and claimed by the First National Bank of Memphis. The property was found not subject, and Coker & Co. excepted to the overruling of a motion for a new trial filed by them, the grounds of which presented the questions discussed below.

\* \* \* \* \*

In one portion of his charge the judge, in effect, instructed the jury that delivery to the bank of bills of lading covering the shipments of corn with drafts attached, passed title to the corn into the bank. This charge is excepted to on the ground that mere delivery of bills of lading, unindorsed by the consignor, cannot operate to pass title. The criticism on the charge is well founded, but the error thus committed was harmless, because the evidence showed that the bills of lading referred to were properly indorsed, and as to this fact there was no controversy.

It appears from the record that the corn was shipped by the Moulton-Davis Company under bills of lading issued to it, and stipulating for a delivery of the corn to the "shipper's order." These bills of lading, properly indorsed, as already stated, were delivered to the bank, and upon each was a memorandum giving direction to notify one Ragan, who was expected by the Moulton-Davis Company to pay the drafts and take the corn on its arrival at Rome—his place of business. The bank, on the faith of the security thus afforded, advanced money to the Moulton-Davis Company. In this connection the Court charged:

"When a bill of lading is attached to a draft drawn on a third person, it will be treated as security for the draft, and neither title to the goods nor right to the bill of lading will pass to the drawee until, as required therein, he accepts, or accepts and secures, or pays, the draft, as the case may be."

This charge was excepted to on the ground that it was not pertinent to any issue involved in the case. We think otherwise; for surely it was proper for the court to inform the jury, as was in effect done, that title to the corn would remain in the bank until Ragan, the consignee, arranged with the bank to pay the drafts, and procured from it a transfer of the bills of lading covering the shipments of corn.

---

*INDORSER—NOTICE TO—WHEN INSUFFICIENT.*

Supreme Court of New York, Trial Term, October, 1900.

THE PHILIP & WILLIAM EBLING BREWING CO. vs. BENJAMIN REINHEIMER.

A notice of protest mailed to an indorser at a street address where he does not reside, or have his place of business, though in the city of his residence, is insufficient to charge him as indorser, where the notice is not received by him.

---

This was an action against the defendant as indorser of a promissory note.

MCADAM, J.: Section 160 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (1897, Chap. 612) provides that "except as herein otherwise provided, when a negotiable instrument has been dishonored by non-acceptance or non-payment, notice of dishonor must be given to the drawer and to each indorser, and any drawer or indorser to whom notice is not given is discharged." In case the notice is mailed, Section 179 directs where notice is to be sent: "Where a party has added an address to his signature, notice of dishonor must be sent to that address; but if he has not given such address, then the notice must be sent as follows: (1) Either to the post office nearest to his place of residence or to the post office where he is accustomed to receive his mail; or (2) if he live in one place, and have his place of business in another, notice may be sent to either place; or (3) if he is sojourning in another place, notice may be sent to the place where he is sojourning."

The indorser, Benjamin Reinheimer, did not add any address to his signature. He resided in the Borough of Manhattan, so that under the statute a notice of protest mailed to him at that place would have been sufficient. The plaintiff, however, did not so mail the notice, but directed it to the indorser at "No. 74 East Houston street, New York city," where the indorser did not reside or have a place of business. As a matter of fact, the said Benjamin Reinheimer resided at No. 255 East Seventy-first street, Borough of Manhattan, New York city, for several years prior to the maturity of the note in suit, and in that house carried on a real estate agency. The plaintiff, to sustain the service by mail at No. 74 East Houston street, proved that the indorser owned the house; that his sons, the makers of the note, did business there; that the father visited the place about twice a week, and that his sons resided with him. The father testified that he was not accustomed to receive his mail at the sons' place of business, and that he never received any notice of protest of the note in suit. No attempt was made to prove that the plaintiff had used any diligence or made any effort to ascertain the place of residence or business of the indorser, which could have been easily discovered, and the

question is whether, upon the facts stated, there has been a legal service of the notice of protest.

The Court feels constrained to find that there has not, and as a consequence the indorser is discharged from all liability upon his conditional contract to pay.

By the contract of indorsement the indorser agrees to pay if the maker does not, provided he is promptly notified of the maker's default, that he may at once seek recourse from those primarily liable. This condition is a substantial and not a formal part of the contract, and the holder must show its performance before he can recover. If the holder does not know where the indorser lives, but can acquaint himself with the place by reasonable endeavors, he must do so. (1 Pars. Notes, 490; *Greenwich Bank vs. De Groot*, 7 Hun [N. Y.] 210; *Manchester vs. Van Brunt*, 2 Misc. Rep. 228; *Brewster vs. Shrader*, 26 Misc. Rep. 480; *Bacon vs. Hanna*, 137 N. Y. 379.)

If the notice had been mailed, addressed to the indorser at the "Borough of Manhattan," or even the "City of New York," it might have reached the indorser through the mails in due course, but, as it was addressed to "No. 74 East Houston street," the Post-Office Department discharged its full duty by leaving it at that place. Under the circumstances the risk of the mail was upon the holder of the note, and, as the indorser never received the notice of protest, the court must find that no notice was served in any manner that the law sanctions.

The question came up in *Cuming vs. Roderick* (28 App. Div. 253) in which the Court, referring to a notice of protest mailed to the indorser, said:

"He did have an office in Brooklyn, but it was not at the address to which the notice was directed. If the notary had directed the notice to the indorser at the city of Brooklyn, without limiting or specifying any particular place in that city at which the letter was to be delivered, the notice would have been sufficient. \* \* \* But the notice was expressly limited; it was directed to a particular person at a particular place, and the indication to the postal authorities was that the individual to whom that communication was addressed was to be found at that place; hence the risk of non-delivery was taken by the sender of the communication, and it is not to be thrown upon the addressee of the notice."

Applying these principles to the case at bar, it follows that there must be judgment in favor of the defendant, Benjamin Reinheimer.

Judgment in favor of defendant, Benjamin Reinheimer.

#### CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT—LOSS OF—INDEMNITY.

United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, October 8, 1900.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF DENVER *vs.* WILDER.

Where a certificate of deposit, which is capable of negotiation to a *bona fide* holder, has been lost, the bank issuing the same has the right to require of the payee a suitable indemnity before paying him the amount thereof.

In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado.

Before Caldwell, Sanborn and Thayer, Circuit Judges.

THAYER, *Circuit Judge*: The case presented for decision is as follows: George W. Wilder, the defendant in error, on November 19, 1898, brought an

action against the First National Bank of Denver, the plaintiff in error, to recover the amount due to him on two certificates of deposit (one for \$500, and the other for \$3,000) which were issued to him as payee, by the bank, on or about December 1, 1897. Each of the certificates, by its terms, was "payable in current funds to the order of self [that is, the payee, George W. Wilder] on the return of this certificate properly indorsed." The plaintiff alleged that he had never indorsed or transferred the certificates to any one; that on or about March 4, 1898, he had lost them by their being taken from his possession without his consent; that he had immediately informed the bank of the loss, and subsequently, in September, 1898, had demanded payment of the certificates, which was refused. The bank admitted the issuance of the certificates and their non-payment, giving as an excuse for its refusal to pay them when payment was demanded that the certificates were not at the time produced by the payee, that he made no tender of indemnity on the occasion of the demand for payment or subsequently, and that it had no sufficient information on which to base a belief whether the certificates were lost or stolen, as the plaintiff alleged, or whether, if lost or stolen, they were at the time unindorsed by the payee.

Concerning the testimony adduced at the trial, which was before a jury, it will be sufficient for present purposes to say that the plaintiff testified, in substance, that on January 5, 1898, he went from Tacoma, Wash., to Skagway, in Alaska, landing there on January 10, 1898; that he carried the certificates in a belt which he wore about his body; that he took up his abode at Skagway in a small hotel; that on the night of March 3, 1898, he took off his belt, which contained the certificates, some gold, and a diamond, and laid the same on one side of his bed, and went to sleep; that, when he dressed the next morning, through oversight he failed to put on his belt, and left it in his room, where he had placed it when he retired; that he did not return to his room until 10 o'clock P. M. of that day, and never missed his belt until his return; that on his return, when he undressed for the night, he missed it; that he searched for it, and could not find it; that he suspected his landlady of having made way with or stolen it, and subsequently made efforts to find and recover it, but that such efforts were unsuccessful. The plaintiff below produced several other witnesses to corroborate his statements concerning the loss of the certificates; but the knowledge of the loss possessed by these witnesses was derived, as it seems, wholly from statements made by the plaintiff, and inferences drawn from his conduct subsequent to the alleged theft. They appear to have had no other means of knowledge. The Cashier and the Assistant Cashier of the defendant bank testified that in the summer of 1898 a letter was received by the bank from the plaintiff, detailing the circumstances under which he had parted with the certificates, in which he said that he had been forced to sign his name on the back of the same, and that, if he had not done so, he would have been taken out and hung. They were unable to produce the letter, because, as they said, it had been mislaid, and could not be found after diligent search. The bank proved by another witness, resident in Denver, Colo., who appears to have been an old acquaintance of the plaintiff, that he had also received a letter from the plaintiff in the summer of 1898, in which he stated that he had been forced to sign or indorse the certificates on the threat of being hung, and requesting him to make that fact known to the defendant bank. The record contains other evidence from

which it appears that the plaintiff was a professional gambler; that he went to Skagway for the purpose of following that occupation; that he played for high stakes, and sometimes lost and sometimes won; that during his residence in Skagway he was forced on one occasion by its citizens to leave the place on account of some transaction in which he was engaged; and that during the summer of 1898 he was for a time confined in the jail at Skagway, Alaska. The trial court was of opinion that if the certificates in question were lost or stolen in the manner related by the plaintiff, and at the time of such loss or theft were unindorsed by the payee, he might recover without tendering the bank any indemnity against the future production of the lost instruments. It accordingly instructed the jury to that effect, and the plaintiff below recovered a verdict for the full amount of the certificates and interest. The principal contention in this court is that such instruction was erroneous.

The negotiability of the certificates when they were executed and delivered by the defendant bank is not challenged by either party, and we shall accordingly assume that they were negotiable, though "payable in current funds," and that they were subject to all the rules applicable to notes and bills drawn in such form as to be negotiable by the law merchant. Neither was the question raised in the lower court, nor argued in this court, whether the remedy to recover the contents of a lost negotiable instrument, such as a note, bill or bond, is exclusively in equity, or may be pursued at law. On behalf of the bank it is conceded, apparently, that by the modern practice a suit at law may be maintained on a lost negotiable instrument, and that courts of law in such cases have power to require a proper indemnity against the reappearance of the lost instrument; while on the part of the defendant in error it is said, in effect, that courts of law may entertain such actions, and properly require indemnity to be given in those cases where the defendant will be exposed to a risk of loss by permitting a recovery. It is claimed, however, that in the present case the defendant bank can safely pay the certificates, because the jury have found that they were unindorsed by the payee when lost; that, in consequence of this finding, no one can ever acquire a valid title to the paper; and that a recovery was properly allowed without an indemnifying bond.

We are aware of no sufficient reason why a court, especially if it is one which is vested with jurisdiction both at law and in equity, may not require a bond of indemnity as a condition precedent to a recovery in a suit at law brought therein upon a lost negotiable instrument. Whether such an action be brought on the law or equity side, the court has the same opportunity to determine accurately whether, in view of all the circumstances attending the loss, the case is one in which the defendant would be subjected to a risk of loss or expense if compelled to pay the lost instrument, and the same opportunity to determine the amount of indemnity, if any, which should be exacted. In these days courts of law manifest a strong disposition to administer the law in accordance with those principles of justice which are recognized by courts of equity, and instances are not wanting where they have entertained defenses and enforced obligations, without express statutory authority, which at one time would have been entertained and enforced only by courts of equity. No substantial objection to such action is perceived, when a court possessed of legal and equitable powers can conveniently give effect in a legal proceeding to a well-established equitable right without harm to either party.



Some courts of high reputation have heretofore entertained actions at law upon lost negotiable instruments, and have exercised the power of requiring the plaintiff to give a bond of indemnity as a condition precedent to a recovery, and some of them have maintained their right to exercise this power by reasoning that is very persuasive. (*Fales vs. Russell*, 16 Pick. 315; *McGregory vs. Gregory*, 107 Mass. 543, 546; *Bridgeford vs. Manufacturing Co.* 34 Conn. 546; *Fisher vs. Webb*, 84 N. C. 44; *Bank vs. Benedict*, 18 B. Mon. 307, 311; *Robinson vs. Bank*, 18 Ga. 65, 110, 111.)

Conceding, then, that the practice of requiring indemnity in suits upon lost negotiable instruments originated with courts of chancery, which were the first to recognize a right of recovery on lost instruments, no substantial reason can be assigned at present why a court of law should not adopt the practice, and exact indemnity under the same circumstances where a court of equity would exact it.

Passing to a consideration of a principal question discussed in the briefs and at the bar, namely, whether, in view of all the facts disclosed by the record, the case is one in which the plaintiff should have been required to furnish indemnity, we observe in the first instance that, according to the plaintiff's own showing, the certificates in suit were not overdue at the time of the alleged loss, but were capable of negotiation to a *bona fide* holder. In the second place, the finding by the jury that the certificates were lost and never negotiated, as well as the finding that when lost they had not been indorsed by the payee, rest upon fallible human testimony, which might be discredited by another jury called to determine these issues in a suit brought by a third party against the defendant bank on the certificates. It is hardly necessary to observe that the finding of the jury on the above issues in the present case would not operate as an estoppel, and would not even be admissible in evidence against a third party suing on the certificates, who was able to produce them, bearing the plaintiff's indorsement.

No prudent banker, on the facts disclosed by this record, would pay the certificates voluntarily without proper indemnity; and what a prudent man would not do voluntarily, surely a court should not compel the defendant bank to do. As between the maker of commercial paper and the payee and all subsequent holders thereof, there is an implied understanding that when payment is demanded and received the paper will be produced and surrendered as a voucher; and, although it is now well settled that this obligation is not so imperative that the payment of commercial paper cannot be enforced under any circumstances without its production and surrender, yet when this cannot be done, in consequence of its loss or destruction, reasonable security against its future appearance should be required, unless the proof that the paper has been actually destroyed is so cogent that there is practically no risk of its reappearance.

One who has lost a negotiable instrument, and is unable to produce it on the day of its maturity, in accordance with the implied understanding that it shall be produced, should not be allowed to cast the burden of his misfortune upon the maker, but should be compelled to tender a reasonable indemnity. (*Welton vs. Adams*, 4 Cal. 38, 41; *Gordon vs. Manning*, 44 Miss. 756, 762; *Wade vs. Banking Co.* 8 Rob. 140, 142; *Fales vs. Russell*, 16 Pick. 315, 316; *Bullet vs. Bank*, 2 Wash. C. C. 172.)

We are accordingly of opinion that the plaintiff should have been required

to indemnify the defendant bank against all further liability on the lost certificates before a judgment was entered on the verdict of the jury. As such action was not taken, the requisite security should be given before the judgment is enforced. We might allow the judgment to stand, and direct that execution thereon be withheld until such security is given by the plaintiff; but as the lien of such a judgment, especially if it existed for some time, might prove a source of considerable embarrassment to the bank, we have concluded to vacate the judgment, and allow the verdict of the jury to stand unaffected by such action. It is accordingly ordered that the judgment of the lower court in this case be, and the same is hereby, vacated and annulled, but that the verdict on which the same is based be permitted to stand unaffected by such action, and that the case be remanded to the circuit court, with directions to enter a judgment on such verdict, on the motion of any party in interest, at any time after the right of action upon such certificates of deposit shall have been barred by the statute of limitations of the State of Colorado applicable thereto, provided no action shall have been brought thereon in any court prior thereto; also, to enter a judgment on such verdict at any time hereafter when the plaintiff, or any one in his behalf, shall have executed a bond, with security satisfactory to the court, in the penal sum of \$4,500, payable to the defendant bank, and conditioned that the obligors therein, on the payment of said judgment, will hold the defendant bank harmless of and from all liability, claim, or demand which may thereafter be preferred by any owner or pretended owner of said certificates, and that they will also refund such reasonable attorney fees as may be incurred by the defendant bank in defending any action or actions which may be brought in any court upon said certificates.

---

*INDORSEE OF PAST-DUE NOTE—PRESENTMENT AND NOTICE OF DISHONOR.*

New York Court of Appeals, November 27, 1900.

GERMAN-AMERICAN BANK OF ROCHESTER *vs.* ATWATER.

- \* An indorsee of a past-due note is bound to demand payment of the maker within a reasonable time after receiving it, and, on default of payment, to notify the indorser at once. What is a reasonable time within which to demand payment depends, in each case, upon its circumstances. Where the indorser of a past-due note delivers it to a bank under an agreement that it is not then to be drawn against, but that the surplus, if any, of the proceeds of certain assets which it held of the maker should be applied in payment of the note, it becomes the duty of the bank, when it ascertains that the assets are not sufficient for that purpose, to demand payment of the maker, and, upon default, to give immediate notice of dishonor to the indorser. Notice in such a case, served nearly two weeks after the demand, is too late to hold the indorser.
- When the indorser has, in the meantime, contrary to the agreement, been permitted by the bank to draw against the note, a demand by the bank that the moneys be returned is not equivalent to a notice of protest.

---

Appeal from judgment of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirming a judgment of the Special Term.

---

\* It will be noticed that the transaction out of which this case arose took place before the passage of the Negotiable Instruments Law. But that statute has not changed the law. By section 26, it is provided that "where an instrument is issued, accepted or indorsed when overdue, it is, as regards the person so issuing, accepting or indorsing it, payable on demand;" and by section 131, that "where it is payable on demand, presentment must be made within a reasonable time after its issue."

The action was brought to recover on certain promissory notes made by the firm of Atwater, Armstrong & Clark to the order of the defendant, the wife of Atwater, which notes she indorsed to the plaintiff after maturity. The plaintiff, shortly prior to April 29, 1896, was the holder of considerable paper that it had discounted for the benefit of said firm, and the latter, being unable to pay their obligations, assigned all of the assets of the partnership to the bank as security for the partnership obligations held by it. The firm, as well as this plaintiff and defendant, were of the opinion that the assets were likely to prove more than sufficient to pay the bank in full, and Atwater was anxious that the balance should be applied in payment of the notes held by his wife, upon which there was due, on April 29, \$7,467. The other members of the firm and the plaintiff were willing that she should have the benefit of any resulting surplus to the extent of the amount due to her, and they undertook to make an arrangement that should accomplish that purpose. The plan adopted was that the defendant should indorse the notes to the bank, which in return should give the defendant credit in an amount equal to the sum due on the notes, the deposit to stand as security for the payment of the notes. Four days later the defendant, through her husband, who acted for her in these matters, asked permission to draw \$1,175 of the deposit, to be used in part payment for a property that the defendant had previously purchased, and, upon his promise to replace the amount, he was allowed to draw it. June 8 the defendant drew out \$4,399.19, and with it she paid the bank for property purchased from it by the Rochester Box and Lumber Company, of which she was a member. Other sums were drawn from time to time down to December 23 following, when there remained on deposit only the sum of \$181.18. These moneys were withdrawn without any promise to return them, except in the first instance, but the plaintiff's Cashier demanded their return on several occasions. A day or two prior to March 24, 1897, the Cashier, having failed to secure the return of the moneys thus withdrawn, told the defendant's husband that she was liable as an indorser upon the notes, which he denied, and on the 24th a formal demand in writing was made for the payment of the notes, and about two weeks later, upon April 9, 1897, notice of protest in due form was given.

The trial resulted in a dismissal of the complaint, and the judgment entered thereon was affirmed in the Appellate Division. Other facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion.

PARKER, *Ch. J.*: That the plaintiff had to make a demand on the makers for payment, and give notice of dishonor to the defendant in the event of non-payment, in order to recover of her upon the notes, is of course conceded. The time at which demand should have been made and notice of protest given has been the subject of sharp controversy; but we regard the law applicable to this situation as settled by the *Eisenlord* case (15 Hun, 23; affirmed in this court on the opinion below, 79 N. Y. 617). In that case, as in this one, the defendant indorsed the notes after maturity, but denied liability, notwithstanding the indorsement, because of the failure of the indorsee of the notes to make a proper demand for payment and give notice of dishonor; and the Court stated the law in this State to be that where a party indorses past-due paper "the law implies a contract \* \* \* that he will proceed with reasonable diligence to demand payment and give notice if not paid. Failing in this, the indorser is discharged."

The plaintiff in this case caused a notice of protest to be given to defendant on April 9, 1897, nearly a year after the latter had indorsed the notes, and we are to inquire whether the effect of that protest was to charge the indorser.

What is a reasonable time cannot always be measured by months; indeed, an investigation of a limited number of authorities discloses that as short a period as three months and as long a one as twenty-one months had been held to be within a reasonable time, depending upon the special facts of each case. The period of three months seemed at one time likely to be adopted by the courts, because that is the period for which notes intended for discount are usually made. But an arbitrary period of time, it was found, did not often measure a reasonable time within the apparent understanding of the parties, and so the rule came to be adopted that what constitutes a reasonable time shall depend upon and be ascertained from the facts of each case. In this case we think it not difficult to determine the time when it became the duty of the plaintiff to make a demand and give notice to the defendant in order to hold her liable as indorser.

It was thought desirable that the notes held by defendant should be paid next after the obligations of the firm held by the plaintiff, and to effectuate that result the notes were indorsed to the bank and the amount due on them placed to the credit of the defendant, but to stand as security for the final payment of the notes. This arrangement indicates that it seemed probable to both these parties that the assigned property would prove sufficient to pay all the notes, including those indorsed to the bank by defendant; but they were not sure of it, and hence the precaution requiring the proceeds of the notes to stand as security until in the course of liquidation of the assets it could be determined whether there would be realized therefrom sufficient moneys to pay either the whole or some part of the notes indorsed by defendant. When that fact was ascertained the defendant was entitled to have the demand made and notice of protest given to her, for, under the arrangement of the parties, that constituted a reasonable time within which the plaintiff should have performed the contract implied by law upon the delivery to it of the past-due notes indorsed by the defendant.

A day or two prior to March 24, 1897, the plaintiff's Cashier, having previously informed defendant's husband that the assets had not turned out as well as had been anticipated, said to him: "I understand that your wife is liable as indorser on these notes." To which Mr. Atwater replied that he did not so understand it. On March 24 formal demand in writing was made for their payment, but notice of protest was not given to defendant until nearly two weeks afterward, on April 9. It appears, therefore, that as early as March 24 the plaintiff had ascertained that the assets were not sufficient to pay the notes and had determined to look to the indorser, and hence within the scope of the arrangement between the parties the time had arrived to make demand and give immediate notice of dishonor. But instead the notice of protest was not given until two weeks after a formal demand. The implied contract between the parties required that the demand should be made within a reasonable time, and that protest should follow dishonor at once, not that demand should be made within a reasonable time, and notice of protest given within a reasonable time afterwards.

We agree, therefore, with the courts below in holding that the delay in giving due notice of protest operated to discharge defendant as indorser.

The appellant further insists that oral notice of dishonor was several times given during the summer of 1896.

Within a few days after April 29, 1896, when the defendant was given credit for the amount due on the notes, defendant asked permission to draw from the deposit \$1,175, to be used in paying for certain property, promising to return the money. Other cash was drawn from time to time, up to and including December 23, when only \$181.18 remained on deposit, but as to such amounts there was no promise to redeposit. The plaintiff demanded the return to the account of the moneys thus drawn out, and it is now insisted that the demands thus made were equivalent to notice of protest. A sufficient answer to this claim is that it is not pretended that such demands were intended to be or understood as a notice of protest. It was originally agreed that the proceeds of the notes should remain on deposit as security for their payment. It was doubtless thought that these moneys would not be required to pay the notes, but the arrangement was made to assure the plaintiff against possible loss. Without a change in the agreement, but in spite of it, nearly all of the moneys were withdrawn; and the request that they be returned was in harmony with plaintiff's right to have the original contract carried out. The demand in fact was that the situation should be restored as it was before the defendant, without right, withdrew from the account the greater part of the money. A demand that the defendant should live up to her agreement by restoring the moneys improperly withdrawn was no more a notice of dishonor of the notes than was the original agreement that the money should remain on deposit as security for their payment.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

Gray, Bartlett, Martin, Vann, Cullen and Werner, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed.

---

**NEGOTIABLE PAPER—GARNISHMENT—DISCRIMINATION IN FAVOR OF  
LOCAL BANKS.**

Supreme Court of Vermont, February 14, 1900.

HAWLEY vs. HURD, *et al.*

The statute of Vermont providing that negotiable paper may be attached by trustee process before notice of transfer, and that such paper actually transferred to a bank within the State before due shall be exempt from such attachment, is not unconstitutional as a discrimination against banks in other States.

---

MUNSON, J.: The plaintiff and the trustee are residents of this State, and the defendant is a resident of New York. The indebtedness on account of which the trustee was held chargeable in the court below was evidenced by two promissory notes executed by the trustee in this State, made payable to the defendant's order at the First National Bank of Hoosic Falls, N. Y., and discounted by that bank in the regular course of business before notice of the service of the trustee process was received.

It is not necessary to consider the conflicting decisions concerning the location of a debt for purposes of attachment. It is held in this State that a resident trustee is chargeable upon a debt payable to a non-resident in the State of his domicile. (*Nichols vs. Hooper*, 61 Vt. 295.) In this case the court expressly refused to be governed by *Towle vs. Wilder* (57 Vt. 622), saying there was nothing to show upon what point that case turned. In saying, as the court did in *Craig vs. Gunn* (67 Vt. 92), that it found no occasion to

depart from the decision in *Towle vs. Wilder*, it evidently assumed that the case was disposed of upon the question of jurisdiction over the trustee; for *Nichols vs. Hooper* was cited as determinative of the other points involved. V. S., § 1306, first provides generally that negotiable paper may be attached by trustee process before notice of transfer. It provides further, however, that negotiable paper actually transferred to a bank in this State before due shall be exempt from such attachment. This leaves paper transferred to a bank without the State to be governed by the general provision, and the trustee contends that this restricted exemption works a discrimination against National banks without the State, from which they are protected by Article 4, § 2, of the Federal Constitution, and Article 14, § 1, of the amendments thereto.

Although this question is raised by the trustee, and without the bank being made a party, it is to be considered and determined as if presented by the bank as claimant of the fund. A trustee can defend upon the ground of rights acquired by an assignee who does not appear. (See *Holmes vs. Clark*, 46 Vt. 22.)

If these notes have become payable to the bank by virtue of a transfer which the Federal Constitution requires us to recognize, the trustee can not be held. Article 4, § 2, provides that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States. Corporations are not citizens within the meaning of the term as here used. (*Paul vs. Virginia*, 8 Wall. 168; *Pembina Consol. Silver Min. & Mill. Co. vs. Pennsylvania*, 125 U. S. 181.)

It is true that many of the reasons given for this holding are inapplicable to corporations created by act of Congress, and that the rights of National banks were not involved in any case which asserts the rule. But the distinction suggested can not be made without ignoring the positive statement of the cases cited that the term applies only to natural persons. Article 14, § 1, of the amendments provides that no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.

It is held in *Insurance Co. vs. Daggs* (172 U. S. 557), that a corporation is not a citizen within the meaning of this provision; and the extended discussion in earlier cases as to what privileges and immunities were intended seems to exclude the possibility of an exception in favor of National banks. (See *Slaughter-House Cases*, 16 Wall. 36.)

The section last cited also declares that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The term "person," as here used, is held to include corporations. (*Railway Co. vs. Beckwith*, 129 U. S. 26.)

But this check upon the State relates only to persons "within its jurisdiction." A corporation not created by this State, nor doing business here under conditions that subject it to process issuing from the courts of this State, is not within its jurisdiction. (*Blake vs. McClung*, 172 U. S. 239.) It must be remembered, however, that the right of a National bank to protection from State interference does not depend upon its being brought within any of these provisions. As an instrumentality of the Federal Government, it is protected from hostile legislation by the supremacy of the Federal Constitution. Independently of specific prohibitions the State has no power, by

taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted to carry into execution the powers vested in the general Government. (*McCulloch vs. Maryland*, 4 Wheat. 316.)

The State can exercise no control over a National bank, nor in any wise affect its operation, except as Congress may permit. (*Bank vs. Dearing*, 91 U. S. 29.) But there is a well-recognized limitation to the protection which this Federal supremacy secures to a National bank. It protects the bank only from such legislation as tends to impair its utility as an instrumentality of the Federal Government. (*Waite vs. Dowley*, 94 U. S. 527.)

As regards the construction of contracts, the acquisition and transfer of property, the collection of debts and the liability to suit, the bank remains under the control of the State. (*First Nat. Bank of Louisville vs. Kentucky*, 9 Wall. 353.)

The most that can be said of the discrimination complained of is that it enables a bank within the State to discount with safety paper which a bank without the State could not discount without risk, and that to this extent it operates as an incidental restriction upon the business of the latter bank. It is clear that this touches only the general business relations of the bank and can have no appreciable effect upon its continuance and utility as an agent of the Federal Government. It is not claimed that our statute is in conflict with any act of Congress.

Judgment affirmed.

---

#### OCCUPATION TAX—EXEMPTION OF NATIONAL BANKS—EFFECT OF.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, June 2, 1900.

#### BROOKS vs. STATE.

The statute of Texas providing for the levy of an occupation tax on every person, firm or association engaged in banking is not void, under the provision of the State constitution requiring all occupation taxes to be equal and uniform on the same class of subjects, by reason of the fact that it cannot be enforced against National banks in the State.

---

This action was instituted in the county court of Grayson county by the county attorney in the name of the State of Texas, to recover of Brooks, Bass & Johnson certain occupation taxes alleged to be due by them to said county and State and accruing since September 2, 1896. It was alleged that they had, since said date, been engaged in the business and occupation of bankers, discounting and shaving paper, in the city of Denison, where there were 15,000 inhabitants. The defendants answered by demurrers and pleas, claiming, among other things, that the statute imposing the tax sued for, as applied to them, was unconstitutional and void. A trial resulted in a judgment for the taxes claimed for the several years, with interest, amounting to \$776.75, and from that judgment the defendants prosecuted this appeal.

It was assigned for error that the statute of Texas imposing the occupation tax sued for is unconstitutional for the reason, among others, that it does not and can not apply to National banks engaged in the same business and occupation as the defendants.

BOOKHOUT, J. (omitting part of the opinion): By the terms of article 8 § 2 of the constitution of Texas, it is provided "that all occupation taxes shall be equal and uniform upon the same class of subjects within the limits of the authority levying the tax." This State, by statute, has levied an occupation

tax upon "every person, firm, or association engaged in discounting or shaving paper, or engaged in business as money brokers or bankers," etc (2 Sayles' Civ. St. art. 5049, subd. 5.) The appellants are a banking firm engaged in the occupation of banking in the city of Denison, Tex. In the city of Denison there are two National banks. National banks are created by virtue of the banking laws of the United States, and are held to be instruments designed to be used to aid the United States Government in the administration of an important branch of the public service, and not liable for an occupation tax levied by a State or county. (*McCulloch vs. State*, 4 Wheat. 316; *Bank vs. Dearing*, 91 U. S. 29; *Osborn vs. Bank*, 9 Wheat. 738; *Express Co. vs. Seibert*, 142 U. S. 389.)

Does the above statute violate the State constitution by reason of its not being enforceable against the occupation of banking when pursued by National banks? Our supreme court held a statute which levied an occupation tax upon "every person, firm or association of persons, owning or running any palace, sleeping or dining-room cars, not owned by the railway company, on any railroad in this State," void, under a clause of the constitution similar to the above, because the law exempted the railroad from the tax when such railroad own the cars, and pursued the business or occupation of running such cars upon its own road. (*Pullman Palace-Car Co. vs. State*, 64 Tex. 274.)

In that case the law expressly limited its application to the occupation when pursued by persons not owning the cars. The business, when pursued by a railroad company owning the cars, was held as much a business or occupation as when pursued by one not owning the cars, and, as the law exempted a railroad company that owned such cars from the tax, it was held that the law was not equal and uniform. There is no such exemption in the law under discussion. It applies to every person, firm or association of persons engaged in banking. It is general in its terms, and broad enough to include National banks.

It is clear that the law upon its face is not subject to the objection that it is not equal and uniform. But it is contended that because the law cannot be enforced against National banks it is not equal and uniform in its results. The constitution provides that the tax shall be equal and uniform upon the same class of subjects within the limits of the authority levying the tax. It is not within the limits of the authority of the State to levy an occupation tax upon National banks. The fact that the State has no authority to enforce the law against National banks does not make it void for the want of uniformity. It is equal and uniform on the same class of subjects within the limits of the authority of the State to tax. (*Railway Co. vs. Wright* [Ga.] 13 S. E. 578; *Lionberger vs. Rouse*, 9 Wall. 468; *McHenry vs. Alford*, 168 U. S. 651.)

---

#### NATIONAL BANKS—AGENT OF STOCKHOLDERS—JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS.

United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, October 9, 1900.

GUARANTEE COMPANY OF NORTH DAKOTA vs. HANWAY.

The Federal courts have jurisdiction of an action by or against the agent of the shareholders of a National bank chosen under the act of June 30, 1876, and the amendments thereto, regardless of the question of citizenship; and such a suit may be removed from a State to a Federal court.



Before Caldwell, Sanborn, and Thayer, District Judges.

SANBORN, *Circuit Judge* (omitting part of the opinion): The first objection to the judgment here is that this case was not removable to the Federal court, and that the United States Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to hear or decide it. But the United States Circuit Courts have jurisdiction "of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of two thousand dollars, and arising under the constitution or laws of the United States," and every suit of that character may be removed from a State to a Federal court. (Acts of March 3, 1887, and August 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 434, c. 433, §§ 1, 2.)

This is a suit arising under the laws of the United States. It is a suit against a shareholders' agent, chosen by the stockholders of a National bank in pursuance of "An act authorizing the appointment of Receivers of National banks and for other purposes," approved June 30, 1876, and its amendments, to obtain a share of the trust funds he is administering. (19 Stat. 63, c. 156; 27 Stat. 345, c. 360; 29 Stat. 600, c. 354.)

An action by or against a Receiver of a National bank, appointed under this act, is an action arising under the laws of the United States, because the act of Congress creates his office, grants his rights and powers, and imposes his duties. In the absence of this act there would be no such Receiver, and no suits against him could arise. Every action by or against him necessarily involves the exercise of some of his rights, or the proper discharge of some of his duties and invokes a consideration of the proper construction and effect of the laws of the United States from which he derives them. For these reasons, in contemplation of law every action by or against him arises under the laws of the United States. (*McDonald vs. Nebraska* [C. C. A.] 101 Fed. 171, 172; *Auten vs. Bank*, 174 U. S. 125; *In re Chetwood*, 165 U. S. 443, 458, 459; *Armstrong vs. Trautman* [C. C.] 36 Fed. 275; *Grant vs. Bank* [C. C.] 47 Fed. 673.)

The same reasons bring actions by or against a shareholders' agent under the same rule. He is chosen under the same act of Congress. He is selected for the same purpose. At a certain point in the administration of the trust the act of Congress empowers the shareholders of a National bank to determine by ballot "whether the Receiver shall be continued and shall wind up the affairs of the association, or whether an agent shall be elected for that purpose." If they vote to continue the Receiver, subsequent actions by or against him arise under the laws of the United States. If they vote to choose an agent for the same purpose under the same laws, it is difficult to perceive why actions by or against him do not also arise under the laws of the United States. Those laws empower the agent, when chosen, to hold, control, and dispose of the property of the banking association which he receives for the benefit of the shareholders, to sue and to be sued, and to do all lawful acts necessary to finally settle and distribute the assets in his hands. They authorize him, with the consent and approval of the circuit or district court of the United States for the proper district, to sell, compromise, or compound the debts due to the association, and require him to report to, and obtain a final settlement of his accounts in, one of those courts. They specifically prescribe the purposes to which the proceeds of all the property which comes to his hands as the agent of the shareholders shall be devoted, and the order in which they shall be applied to those purposes. As Mr. Chief Justice Fuller

aply said in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court *in re Chetwood*, (165 U. S. 459):

"The agent proceeds in the settlement with like authority to that conferred upon the Receiver, although at the conclusion of his duty he is required to render to the circuit or district court of the United States for the district where the business of the bank is carried on 'a full account of all his proceedings, receipts and expenditures as such agent, which court shall, upon due notice, settle and adjust such accounts and discharge said agent and the sureties upon his bond.' "

The purpose of this suit was to control the official conduct of this shareholders' agent, and to compel him to pay to the plaintiff out of the trust fund in his hands \$4,000, which the agent claimed he was required under the laws of the United States, from which he derived his appointment, to distribute to the shareholders. Since his conduct as agent must be regulated and tried by these laws, this action and every action by or against a shareholders' agent chosen under this act of Congress invoke the consideration of, and arise under, the laws of the United States.

Again, by section 4 of the acts of 1887-88 (25 Stat. 436) it is provided that National banks shall be deemed citizens of the States in which they are located, and that the Federal courts shall not derive jurisdiction of suits by or against them from the mere fact that they are organized under the laws of the United States. But this provision is followed by an exception in these words:

"The provisions of this section shall not be held to affect the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in cases commenced by the United States or by direction of an officer thereof, or cases for winding up the affairs of any such bank."

This is clearly a case for winding up the affairs of such a bank. It is a suit to take \$4,000 from the fund realized from the collection and sale of the assets of the National Bank of North Dakota in the process of winding up its affairs under the act of Congress, and to pay it to the plaintiff, instead of permitting it to be distributed to the shareholders.

Moreover, it is now well settled that a Receiver of a National bank is "the agent and officer of the United States," and that the Federal courts have jurisdiction of actions by and against him as such an officer, under the provisions contained in section 4 of the Acts of 1887-88, which we have just quoted. (*In re Chetwood*, 165 U. S. 443, 458; *Frelinghuysen vs. Baldwin* [D. C.] 12 Fed. 395; *Price vs. Abbott* [C. C.] 17 Fed. 506; *Armstrong vs. Ettlesohn* [C. C.] 36 Fed. 209; *Armstrong vs. Trautman* [C. C.] 36 Fed. 275.)

Now, a Receiver is not an officer of the United States because the nation has any pecuniary or other interest in his acts or omissions, but simply because an act of Congress authorizes his appointment, prescribes his duties, and designates the appointing power. By the same mark, a shareholders' agent is an agent and officer of the United States. The same act creates his office, authorizes his appointment, designates the appointing power, and imposes upon him the same duties. While at a certain stage in the proceedings for winding up the affairs of a National bank the power designated to appoint the agent may exercise its option to continue the Receiver or to choose the agent, when that option has been exercised, and the agent has been appointed, he discharges the same duties as the Receiver, and becomes the

"agent and officer of the United States," in every sense in which the Receiver is such an agent and officer. (*McConville vs. Gilmour* [C. C.] 36 Fed. 277, 498; *Snohomish Co. vs. Puget Sound Nat. Bank* [C. C.] 81 Fed. 518, 519; *Speckart vs. Bank* [C. C.] 85 Fed. 12, 19; *Brown vs. Smith* [C. C.] 88 Fed. 565, 566.)

The result is that the Federal courts have jurisdiction of an action by or against the agent of the shareholders of a National bank chosen under "An act authorizing the appointment of Receivers of National banks and for other purposes," and its amendments (19 Stat. 63, c. 156; 27 Stat. 345, c. 360; 29 Stat. 600, c. 354), in the absence of diversity of citizenship, and such a suit may be removed from a State to a Federal court.

## REPLIES TO LAW AND BANKING QUESTIONS.

Questions in Banking Law—submitted by subscribers—which may be of sufficient general interest to warrant publication will be answered in this department.

A reasonable charge is made for Special Replies asked for by correspondents—to be sent promptly by mail. See advertisement in back part of this number.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

ALTON, Ill. Dec. 26, 1900.

SIR: On December 23, 1896, we issued a certificate of deposit of which the following, for all purposes, is a copy:

### EIGHTH NATIONAL BANK, ALTON, ILL.

Certificate for \$.....

No.....

December 23, 1896.

This certifies that John Doe has deposited in this bank Five Hundred Dollars, which is payable on return of this certificate properly endorsed, six months after date with interest at six per cent. per annum.

Countersigned

.....Teller.

.....Cashier.

The owner of this certificate forgot all about the deposit and only recently made demand for the same. He contends that he should be entitled to interest to date of payment, while we of course contend that the certificate is only entitled to interest for six months.

We reduced our rate of interest quite a number of years ago and do not pay interest on demand certificates.

CASHIER.

*Answer.*—The rule is that where an instrument is by its terms payable at a special place, and the maker is able and willing to pay it there at maturity, such ability and willingness are equivalent to a tender of payment on his part, and may be pleaded in bar of interest subsequent to maturity. (*Cox vs. National Bank*, 100 U. S. 713; *Wallace vs. McConnell*, 13 Peters, 136; *Parker vs. Stroud*, 98 N. Y. 379, 384.) While the certificate of deposit mentioned is not expressly made payable at the Eighth National Bank, yet this is plainly to be implied from the words "has deposited in this bank," and "payable on the return of this certificate." The instrument being by its terms payable "six months after date," it matured June 23, 1896, and the bank being in a position to plead that it was able and willing to pay the same then at the place where it was payable, the holder can not recover interest for any period subsequent to that date.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

WESTMINSTER, Md., December 15, 1900.

SIR: A check is sent for collection with the words "no protest" attached to it. The letter conveying the item says nothing about the protest. Is or is not the bank of payment authorized to protest the check if there are no funds to meet it?

J. W. HERING, Cashier.

*Answer.*—The use of the "no protest" slip is very common among bankers, and by general custom it is understood to mean that the paper to which it is attached is not to be protested if dishonored. It is, by general usage, an

explicit direction to that effect ; and in the absence of a contrary instruction in the letter of advice, the bank receiving a check with such a slip attached should not protest the same.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

GREENVILLE, Ala., December 17, 1900.

SIR: Please give us your opinion through the columns of your valued journal, on the term "with exchange," when appearing as follows:

"\$1,088.75

GREENVILLE, Ala., September 5, 1900.

November 15, after date, we promise to pay to the order of..... one thousand eighty-six and  $\frac{7}{8}$  dollars, with exchange, value received, at Bank of Greenville, Ala. Signed....."

We received the above note from a distant correspondent for collection and returns in New York exchange. The maker, at maturity, tendered us a check on a local bank here for the \$1,088.75. When we asked for exchange he stated that the check was exchange within the meaning of the term, inasmuch as the note was payable here, but that he would give us Montgomery exchange if we preferred it, and that we had no right to demand the price of New York exchange, inasmuch as there was no stipulation as to the character of the exchange. He therefore declined to pay exchange, and we charged our correspondent for making returns in New York exchange. Our correspondent from whom we received the note insists that the maker should have paid for *New York exchange*. We are inclined to think that the maker had the option of paying cash or tendering exchange upon any point, and we took this position with our correspondent. He, however, can not agree with us, and we shall very much appreciate your opinion on the point.

J. F. JOHNSON, *President*.

*Answer.*—The terms "with exchange" as they appear on the face of the instrument, are ambiguous. Had the note been dated in New York, instead of at Greenville, then the proper construction would seem to be that it was exchange on New York that was intended. But as the instrument is dated at the place where it is payable the meaning cannot be ascertained from the paper itself ; but the words (if not wholly void from uncertainty) must be interpreted in the light of the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time the instrument was executed and delivered. This would be the rule applied in an action between the holder and the maker, where the court or jury, as the case might be, could be apprised of all these facts. But a collecting bank would have no way of thus ascertaining what the parties intended, and, in the absence of instructions, would discharge its full duty by accepting payment without exchange.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

MAQUOKETA, Iowa, December 19, 1900.

SIR: I should like to have your opinion upon a case just decided in the courts here in which a jury brought in a verdict for the plaintiff. The plaintiff, a woman, instructs her attorney to receive a sum of money (\$669.84) and deposit it in the bank for her. After the payment had been made this attorney has the money pinned in his inside vest pocket and started for the bank. Upon his arrival there the money is passed into the Cashier who counts it and finds \$569.84; the Cashier makes out a certificate of deposit for that amount and it is accepted and taken away. Now, after ten days the depositor returns and claims that the certificate of deposit is \$100 less than the amount he handed in, and threatens to bring suit if that amount is not given him. When the case came to trial there were but three witnesses—the Cashier of the bank, the depositor and his office boy. The latter testified that on the day of the deposit he heard his employer call by telephone for the bank and say that he would be down there right away with \$669.84; this the depositor also swears he did, but this is contradicted by the Cashier. The bank then produced its books in court to show that the entries were properly made of that, or any amount over. The jury remained out five hours.

JOHN L. SLOANE, *Cashier*.

*Answer.*—This is a question of fact, which it was exclusively the province of the jury to determine. But it is very questionable whether it was proper to admit the testimony of the office boy as to the statement made over the telephone by his employer that he would be down to the bank with \$669.84. This was nothing more than a man's declaration of what he intended to do, and is not competent evidence of what he did do. Unless this testimony was rendered admissible by other evidence brought out by the bank, we think it was legal error to admit it, and unless this error was cured in some way, the bank, if it interposed a proper objection and exceptions, is, we think, entitled to a new trial.

## BANKING AND FINANCIAL NOTES.

---

### REVIEW OF THE WORLD'S MONETARY PROGRESS.

---

#### BANKING INSTITUTIONS OF SALVADOR.

The "Diario del Salvador" of recent date contains an interesting article entitled "The Banks of Salvador."

From this article it appears that the banks of that Republic are in a prosperous condition, the volume of their business having increased considerably during the past year. The profits realized during this period were also satisfactory, and never before have the financial institutions of the nation enjoyed the confidence of the people to a greater extent or attained more real prosperity. Take, for example, the transactions of the four principal banks of the country for the first half of 1900. The Salvadorian Bank was established in 1885 with \$6,000,000 authorized capital, of which \$4,200,000 was subscribed and \$2,520,000 paid in. The financial statement of this institution, embracing the period covering the six months ending June 30, 1900, shows that it has a reserve fund of \$887,346.40, and bank notes in circulation amounting to \$526,990. The net profits for the half-year mentioned were \$44,346.44, or a dividend of \$10 a share.

The Occidental Bank, founded in 1890 with an authorized capital of \$2,000,000, of which amount one-half has been paid in, has a reserve fund of \$151,000. This institution has bank notes in circulation to the amount of \$359,833, and its net profits during the first half of 1900 were \$21,103.

The Agricultural Commercial Bank was founded in 1895, with an authorized capital of \$5,000,000. Two million and fifty thousand dollars of this amount was subscribed, of which \$922,500 has been paid in. The reserve fund of this bank is \$26,000, and its notes in circulation amount to \$120,000. The net dividend for the first half of 1900 was \$20,500.

The branch of the London Bank, according to its balance sheet of September 13, has a capital of \$500,000, a reserve fund of \$339,586, and bank notes in circulation to the amount of \$385,570. At that time it had on hand in coin and notes of other banks \$567,110, its real estate was valued at \$167,966, and its other securities amounted to \$42,744.

#### LIQUIDATION OF THE CHEQUE BANK.

After a somewhat precarious existence, the Cheque Bank, of London, has decided to go into liquidation. Its principal business was intended to be the issue of checks or drafts against deposits to circulate much the same as money. The directors say that the competition of other banks and the post office, and numerous forgeries, have made a continuance of profitable business impossible. Some objection was made to the business of the bank on the ground that it practically issued notes, though not permitted to do so legally.

#### COST OF THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

The supplementary war expenditure for £16,500,000 recently authorized by Parliament, raises the total direct cost of the South African war to £85,-

423,000 (£427,115,000), and the permission given to the Chancellor of the Exchequer to raise new loans for £11,000,000 means that the war will be paid for as to £66,140,000 by loans, as to £14,551,000 by revenue, and as to £4,640,000 by the suspension of the sinking fund. It is expected that the subjugated provinces will be made to pay a large part of the military expense, but revenues from this source can hardly be made available for some time.

#### NEW AMERICAN BANK IN HOLLAND.

An American bank was recently organized at Rotterdam, with a capital of 20,000,000 florins (about \$8,000,000), of which 6,000,000 florins are paid up. The institution has for its aim the advancement of American trade, and will be called the *Deposit en Administratie Bank*.

Such banking enterprises as are established by American initiative in foreign countries must be launched without authority from the Federal Government, as the National Banking Act does not permit branch banks at home or abroad, and so far Congress has refused to charter an international banking institution, though a bill with that object in view has been up for consideration several times in recent years.

#### FINANCIAL DISTURBANCES AT BERLIN.

Regarding the recent difficulties of some of the German land mortgage banks, the London "Statist" of December 15 says that these banks have been established on the same principle as the French *Crédit Foncier*. Their business is to lend on houses and lands, and properly speaking, they ought not themselves to deal in real property. They do not directly advance the money required, but they give their own bonds to the borrowers, who dispose of them as best they can upon the Stock Exchange, the profit to the mortgage banks being the difference between the interest they pay on their own bonds so advanced and the interest they receive from the owners of houses and lands mortgaged to them. But two in particular—the *Preussische Hypotheken Actien Bank* and the *Deutsche Grundschuld Bank*—are alleged to have formed other companies for the purpose of speculating in landed property. It is further asserted that some of the directors were personally interested in these operations. When the official investigation into the affairs of the two banks above mentioned was ordered, the holders of their bonds naturally became alarmed, and they rushed to sell as quickly as they could. The holders of bonds of other banks were infected with the fear, and the selling of the bonds of mortgage banks, which are believed to have been excellently managed, and to be perfectly sound, has been going on on a large scale. The banks are in the habit of buying up their bonds when offered, and it is said that one single institution has since the panic began redeemed £800,000 worth of its bonds. Some of the banks, however, have found it impossible to go on buying at the rate at which the bonds are being offered, and this has increased the general apprehension. That, of course, brought into danger institutions which are in good credit. For if blind fear were to spread, it would be impossible for even the strongest banks unaided to buy up their own bonds as fast as they were offered. In consequence, the leading banks in Berlin have combined to stop the alarm by providing funds to pay the January coupons on the bonds.

Little doubt is entertained amongst the best informed in Berlin that the combination of bankers will be able to stop the panic and to prevent heavy

losses occurring outside the two or three banks which notoriously have engaged in unsound business. Fortunately the Imperial Bank is much stronger than it was at this time last year. It holds some \$17,500,000 more cash, and has only \$500,000 more notes in circulation. Hence the excess note circulation on December 7 was only \$555,000, as against \$17,550,000 last year.

#### GOLD PRODUCTION AND BANKING IN AUSTRALIA.

On January 1, 1901, "The Commonwealth of Australia" took its place among the nations of the world. For although nominally a dependency of Great Britain, the Australian colonies are practically sovereign. The new federation comprises New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia, and has an area of 2,972,906 square miles and a population of over 3,000,000.

One of the problems to engage the early attention of the legislative body will be the creation of a Federal banking system, and already the matter is being discussed by the financial publications of the country, opinion seeming to favor the erection of a strong central bank as the nucleus of the banking and note system. A gold production of 3,111,989 ounces is reported for the first nine months of 1900, which is a slight decrease compared with the same period in 1899. "The Review," published at Melbourne, estimates the probable output for 1900 at \$62,500,000.

#### INCREASE OF BANKING DEPOSITS AND COMMERCE IN JAPAN.

Deposits in the associated banks of Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Magoya, Yokohama and Kobe, Japan, rose from \$81,300,000 in January, 1899, to \$121,450,000 in May, 1900. Not only has there been a marked gain in bank deposits, but in nearly all other lines of business, as may be seen from a review of an article by Mr. Sakatani, of the Finance Department, published in a recent number of the "Japan-American Journal:"

	1899.	1899.
	Tons.	Tons.
Freight traffic over State railways.....	4,000,000	11,000,000
Mercantile marine.....	200,000	700,000
	Number.	Number.
Telegraph messages.....	13,000,000	31,000,000
Letters carried by post.....	320,000,000	610,000,000
	Yen.	Yen.
Foreign trade.....	170,000,000	490,000,000
Advances by the Bank of Japan.....	50,000,000	*150,000,000
Bills cleared in Tokio.....	200,000,000	1,700,000,000
Shares of capital companies.....	230,000,000	900,000,000

\* Maximum amount at one time for the respective years.

#### PRECIOUS METALS IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1900.

George E. Roberts, the Director of the Mint, recently made public his preliminary estimate of the production of gold and silver in the United States during the calendar year 1900. The aggregate of gold is given as 3,837,213 fine ounces, valued at \$79,322,281, and of silver 59,610,543 fine ounces, which, at the approximate average price of sixty-one cents for the year, makes the value \$36,362,431. During the calendar year 1899 the gold production was \$71,053,400 and the silver production 54,764,500 fine ounces.

The Nome gold and silver production for 1900 is given as \$5,100,000, and that of the Klondike, which includes both the American and Canadian fields, \$22,287,566.

Colorado leads all other States, both in gold and silver, the value of the former being \$28,500,000 and the latter \$20,292,000.

## THE REAL NAPOLEON AND A NAPOLEON OF FINANCE.

---

During the French Revolution the National Assembly was responsible for some radical changes in the public debt and financial methods of the Government. The confiscation of an immense amount of landed property belonging to the church suggested the idea of making it the basis for the issue of paper money. The assignats, so often used as an awful example by the defenders of honest money, were the consequence. As the Revolution progressed and involved France in wars with her neighbors, the difficulty of supplying means to support armies increased, until when Napoleon became First Consul it was difficult to find money enough in the Treasury to equip a courier, and credit was utterly extinct. The Government had also regulated the public debt by compelling the holders to surrender all their titles and evidences under penalty of repudiation. In return for this surrender the amount and ownership of the claim were inscribed in what was called the great book of the French debt. The right to receive the principal of the debt was forever abrogated. The interest was fixed at a uniform rate of five per cent. This interest had for many years been paid in assignats and mandates, but the value of this paper sinking to nothing, at the beginning of Napoleon's reign they were paid in certificates of arrearage, which received their value from the fact that they could be used to pay taxes and other public dues. Civil servants and soldiers went without pay. The armies were provisioned by taking supplies wherever found, for which receipts were given, having also a certain value for making payments. The contractors who supplied other material to the armies received orders on the Treasury, which entitled them to the first money received, and consequently they were generally able to get their hands on such actual cash as did happen to stray into the Treasury. In addition there were orders issued on the public lands, which could be used in purchase of portions of these domains. The possessors of real money, not knowing whom to trust, had concealed it, so that such exchange as there was was carried on either with the certificates of indebtedness of various kinds issued by the Treasury or with land warrants. It is evident that in the dearth of specie those who controlled the supply had a great advantage in dealing in these various Government certificates. They could buy them at very low rates from the distressed and necessitous people who took them of the Government, and employed them at par in meeting the taxes and requisitions of the Government. Speculation in these various forms of indebtedness became very wild, and when a more regular order of things was established by the Consulate, the rise in price of these securities was the foundation of many fortunes.

The financiers of the United States have never been called upon to meet so frightful a state of monetary and economic affairs as existed in France, when Napoleon became First Consul. The funding of the Revolutionary debt by Hamilton has been regarded as a great feat, but the conditions were not unfavorable, the Colonies had been recuperating for nearly ten years from the ravages of the war, their strength had been increased a thousand fold by the union of 1789, taxation was light, and there was no disproportion between the strength of the country and the expenditure of the Government. Moreover, there was no scarcity of specie, and there were several banks whose notes were good as specie. The finances of the United States were no doubt in very bad condition during the War of 1812. The State banks had suspended specie payment, their bills were at a discount, so were the exchequer or



Treasury notes issued by the Government. The loans of the Government could only be placed below par. But there was still money to be had, specie was above ground, and could be obtained. Taxation did not press heavily in a new country. In fact, as the monetary situation of that period is examined in retrospect, the material difficulties then existing seem to be much less than the difficulties which arose from the lack of knowledge and courage to guide things aright. Ignorance of finance on the part of the people of the United States and their leaders has had more to do with the monetary troubles of the country, throughout the whole course of its history, than any deficiency of means ready to the hand of those who have had the opportunity of guiding the finances of the nation. This ignorance has fostered a contempt of the tried and proved methods which produce monetary prosperity under adverse circumstances, and this contempt has been enhanced by the fact that circumstances have been too favorable, and have always been propitious enough to insure the country from the results of the most stupid financial mismanagement. If some of our statesmen who are considered to have been in their day men learned and experienced in monetary mysteries, had been placed face to face with a situation such as existed in France in the year 1800, it is possible they might have risen to the occasion.

However that may be, the First Consul proved equal to it. Many of the ordinary taxes had been lightened ostensibly in favor of the poor by the different assemblies, during the Revolution, and an income tax substituted which was supposed to reach the rich. This last became very oppressive and vexatious and instead of producing revenue only led to the concealment of all resources. This tax was abrogated and other taxes on land and personal property laid in its place. The effect of the repeal of the income tax was so good that the bankers of Paris immediately produced and loaned to the Treasury 12,000,000 francs in specie, to be repaid out of first receipts. The greatest obstacle in the way of a new *regime*, was the various certificates of indebtedness which were outstanding, which were receivable in payment of public dues. A modern financier or even an English financier of the year 1800 would have funded this floating debt, but Napoleon had a dislike to all loans and always used this device sparingly. The result he aimed at was the collection of the revenues in cash or its equivalent at as early a date as possible. Much routine preparation had to be made before the taxes could be collected in an orderly and definite manner. Lists and assessments had to be made out, and there were many other inconveniences attendant upon the transfer from the old to the new management of affairs. Resources had to be obtained for immediate use. The loan from the bankers of Paris was a mere palliative. To meet the situation the receivers of taxes in the several departments were each required to give notes falling due from month to month for the whole estimated sum which he expected to receive from the direct taxes during the year. This gave a leeway of about four months on the average to the taxpayer. To secure the payment of the notes of the receiver of taxes, these officers were each obliged to give a security in cash, a sort of bond, before they could hold office. As they had the use of the money collected from taxes in the intervals before the maturity of their notes, the receivers' position was a lucrative one. They could afford to give security much as the National banks of the United States can afford to secure the public moneys deposited with them. The money deposited by the receivers was kept as a common fund, from which any of the notes not paid at maturity at the office of the receiver who issued it, could be paid. This fund was analogous to the fund in legal-tender notes deposited with the United States Treasury by the National banks to retire their own notes. The fund contributed by the receivers was in fact used by the French Government exactly as the National bank redemption fund has been used by the United States Government, that is, it being found that a small part of it only was sufficient to meet the notes

presented from time to time for redemption, the remainder was at once available for the use of the Treasury. For the year 1800, it was calculated that the receivers would collect from direct taxes, as they were called, 800,000,000 francs. If it had not been that there were so many certificates of indebtedness outstanding, receivable for taxes, the receivers could have given notes payable in cash for this whole sum, but as they were liable to receive these certificates of indebtedness instead of cash, in payment of taxes, some calculation and provision had to be made.

As has been explained, Napoleon did not care to refund this floating debt. The certificates of arrears of payment of interest on the public debt being definite in amount were continued on the old footing. The land warrants were refused further currency, and the holders were forced, as we would say, to locate their land. The holders of certificates of indebtedness for supplies, etc., were thrown into what we would style a court of claims which, as is usual, had sufficient inertia and patriotism to make their allowances with due regard to the necessities and conveniences of the Government. After making all deduction for the probable use of such certificates as still remained acceptable for taxes, the notes of the receivers of taxes brought a very large sum into the hands of the Minister of Finance. These notes were available for discount. The instrument by which these notes could be turned into cash was also at this time brought into existence.

The whole scheme of collection of taxes, of receivers' notes, etc., was not new. It was really a revival of the plan followed under the kings, when the discounts were made by the great private bankers of Paris, often by the receivers of taxes themselves. Knowing the system, we may readily perceive how men like Fouquet and other gorgeous creatures described by Dumas acquired this wealth. The system itself was not a bad one, but it opened opportunities under careless masters for shave after shave and monopoly within monopoly. Specie was the real basis for an intricate system of discounts. Its importation was the monopoly of the superintendents of finance and tax receivers. It is not difficult to understand why the Captain-General of the Jesuits made chocolate caramels of his gold-bars when he brought the treasure of the order to France. Under Napoleon there was no danger of such abuses. To prevent them he instituted the Bank of France. The capital was at first 30,000,000 francs. It was intended to discount bills representing real transactions but not accommodation bills. It issued its notes without limit as long as they were redeemable in specie on demand. The Bank discounted the notes of the receivers, and furnished what was very much needed—a safe paper money which at once filled the channels of circulation within the borders of France. The credit which at once followed these measures brought the specie of the country from its hiding places. The first statement of the Bank of France, of February, 1800, shows note-issues amounting to about twenty millions of francs.

Although the improvement of the financial methods of the Government at once restored public and private credit, there were still many legacies left from the former *regime* which were unfavorable to continued prosperity. The public lands were a great field for speculation. The various forms of claims against the Government were another, and there was during the five years following a vast amount of speculative enterprise, which ran to greater lengths, perhaps, because for so many years before capital had almost deserted the country. To take advantage of the opportunities offered many mercantile companies sprang up. Among these was a company called the United Merchants, of which a man named Ouvrard was the head. Gabriel Julien Ouvrard was born in 1770, and at this time was about thirty-five years old. He had made money as a contractor for naval construction, and had engaged with profit in all the speculation of the time. Associated with Ouvrard in the company were M. Desprez, who had charge of the discount department, and M. Vanderberghe, who superintended contracts for the supply of the army with pro-

visions. M. Ouvrard reserved a general direction of the entire business of the company.

Notwithstanding the creation of the Bank of France, its conservative ways of doing business seem to have prevented it from meeting the demands of the Government, especially when these demands were increased by Napoleon's preparations for the invasion of England, and for the war which he apprehended with the other powers of Europe. The preparations for the invasion of England included great expenditures on the French and Spanish fleets, which were intended to keep the English fleet occupied, and were finally defeated and dispersed at Trafalgar. Spain, at this time in alliance with France, had engaged to pay large sums to Napoleon. Spain, at that time still in the possession of Mexico and South America, was the source of the greater part of the specie received in Europe. The lack of specie was the chief difficulty encountered by the Bank of France in extending its accommodations. It had imported quantities of dollars or pieces of eight from Spain, only to see them exported from France to meet bills incurred for the purchase of sugar, coffee and other colonial products. Previous to her isolation by the rest of Europe France had procured large amounts of these supplies from her own colonies and was on the whole a seller rather than a buyer. But the English blockade had changed all this.

Ouvrard, a man of the type distinguished in modern times by the title of "Napoleon of Finance," but rather in its best sense than in that in which it is now most commonly used, saw an opportunity for great and profitable negotiations. He certainly obtained the confidence of M. Marbois, Napoleon's Minister of the Treasury, who had immediate charge of the receipts and disbursements. It was the fashion after a crisis in monetary affairs had developed, to excuse M. Marbois and to say he had been deceived by a trusted clerk, etc., but it is evident to anyone that M. Marbois, finding the Bank of France unable to meet the demands for discount of the bills comprising the main resources of the Treasury, turned readily to so bold, so confident and really so able a manager as Ouvrard. As far as can be judged from the accounts of the time, he had the confidence not only of the Government and of business men generally, but also of the Bank of France itself. Spain had paid a subsidy promised to Napoleon in paper. The Treasury was having great difficulty in securing discounts to raise the necessary cash. Ordinary Government paper could only be discounted at nine per cent. per annum, and even at this rate with difficulty. Marbois applied to Ouvrard to discount the notes of the Spanish subsidy, and the latter undertook the operation. His attention thus directed to Spain, Ouvrard conceived the idea of utilizing the great resources in precious metals possessed by Spain as the sovereign of Mexico and Peru, and thus relieve the struggling money markets of France. He went to Spain and found the royal family in great distress. Yellow fever, dearth of provisions, combined with the demands of Napoleon to aggravate the situation. Ouvrard came on the scene almost as an answer to their prayers to all the patron saints of the Spanish monarchy. He paid the subsidies for several years, he furnished the Court with ready money, he sent cargoes of wheat from France and broke up the local monopoly of grain, and finally provisioned the Spanish squadrons which were to act as the allies of Napoleon's fleets. He did not do this without taking ample security, and in all that he did he was working directly in the interest of Napoleon. He enabled the Spanish authorities to pay money which was needed by Napoleon. He enabled the Spanish fleet, which was no less needed, to sail. This should be marked now, because it will aid in judging of the justice with which Ouvrard was subsequently treated by Napoleon.

As security for these aids to Spain he obtained a concession of the exclusive privilege of exporting from the Spanish colonies to Europe dollars in silver or in gold, which he was to account for to Spain at the rate of three francs, seventy-five

centimes. This allowed him a profit of twenty-five cents on each dollar of one hundred cents. The difficulties in the way of the safe transportation of these dollars were great indeed, but Ouvrard, with a genius far in advance of his contemporaries, conceived the plan of making these very difficulties serve him.

The difficulty in obtaining specie was not peculiar to France, but it was felt in England also. The Bank of England had been compelled to suspend specie payments on account of the export of the coin to pay subsidies on the Continent and to meet the expenses of her army and naval forces abroad. The English fleets blockaded all the seas, but they could not obtain the coveted supply of metal. Those who owned it would not risk it on the ocean.

There were banking houses that had connections both in England and on the Continent, and Ouvrard's proposal was for these houses to get the consent of the English Government to their importation of specie. His margin of twenty-five per cent. was sufficient to allow of a division of profit. He also contemplated the importation of the Spanish specie into the United States, whence it could be exported in neutral American vessels, or used to purchase products and supplies which could be exported in the same way. The whole plan was feasible if time had been given, and was subsequently appropriated and carried out to some extent by Napoleon himself.

If modern methods of communication had existed, it would have been easy to arrange matters in a few days or weeks that then took months to complete. The United Merchants were, however, very much pressed. The Treasury owed the company thirty million francs, which it could secure only by securities that required time for liquidation. This sum was locked up. Then it had to pay the Treasury the Spanish subsidy of between forty and fifty millions of francs. It had also to pay for the other assistance rendered Spain. But it is evident that its interests were so connected with those of the French Treasury that the latter, impelled by its own necessities, could refuse the company nothing, and in fact, the Treasury could not get the notes turned in by the receivers of taxes cashed except through the United Merchants. The latter took the notes and discounted them with all sorts of capitalists, often at usurious rates. The Bank of France discounted a part of these notes, and some of its council objected to the extent of the discounts made, but the general sense was that in helping the United Merchants the Bank was aiding the French Treasury.

This was the situation before Napoleon started upon the campaign which terminated three months later at Austerlitz. The commercial interests of France might well have been alarmed at the outset of this campaign. England, Austria and Russia were combined against France, and Prussia was waiting to join the winner. Over four hundred thousand men were on the march against France. As a last straw, when Napoleon set out in September, he demanded that twelve millions in specie should be sent to him at Strasburgh and that ten millions more should be sent to Italy. The company with great difficulty complied with these demands. At this time no suspicion of the extent of the relations between the company and the French Treasury seems to have existed in the mind of Napoleon; or, what is more probable, is that he was aware of the whole business and did not look upon it as at all irregular, which in fact it does not appear to have been.

The root of the whole evil, if evil there was, lay in the extravagant expenditure attendant on the plans of the Emperor. These large expenditures caused a large deficit, which could only be met by drawing on the taxation of future years, since the Emperor was averse to loans. Future taxation could only be made available by the assistance of the largest capitalists. Ouvrard and his company were the largest capitalists in France. The Treasury was forced to turn to them. That Napoleon knew of this connection is evident from the fact that Marbois himself had years

before represented to him the danger of using as bankers of the Government men to whom the Government were indebted, and Napoleon threatened at this time to arrest Ouvrard. Bourrienne, in his memoirs, records the following scene :

"Bourrienne," said Napoleon in 1800, "my part is taken. I will cause M. Ouvrard to be arrested." "General," replied the Secretary, "have you any proofs against him?" "Proofs? What are required? he is a contractor, a scoundrel. He must be made to disgorge. All of his tribe are villains. How do they make their fortunes? at the public expense. They have millions and display an insolent extravagance when the soldiers are without shoes or bread. I will have no more of this."

But Ouvrard was indispensable, or at least Napoleon in 1800 did not think the sponge full enough to squeeze. Napoleon was always willing to gain popularity at the expense of the contractors. Fancy Chase in 1861 using language of this style about the New York associated banks, or Cleveland in 1893 talking like this about the bond syndicate!

It is evident that the Treasury, the United Merchants and the Bank of France were all mixed up together. Napoleon distrusted this connection, and wrote to the Minister of Finance in September warning him against the danger of excessive issues of its notes by the Bank of France. However, the Minister of Finance did not interfere with the operations of M. Marbois, who was the Minister of the Treasury.

The financial crisis arrived just before the battle of Austerlitz in December. M. Desprez and other Paris capitalists failed and M. Vanderberghe was with difficulty sustained by the greatest efforts of the Bank and the Treasury. M. Desprez, who had been engaged in securing discounts for the Treasury, had issued a species of bank note of his own to serve as money and a large part of his payments to the Treasury had been made in these bills. The news of the victory of Austerlitz had a great effect in dissipating the panic attendant on the financial crisis. Napoleon arrived in Paris January 26, 1801. He called before him M. Marbois, the Minister of the Treasury, and also Messrs. Ouvrard, Desprez and Vanderberghe. Marbois had a report drawn up which he began to read. Napoleon soon interrupted him, saying, "I see how it is. It was with the funds of the Treasury and those of the Bank that the Company of United Merchants calculated on providing supplies for France and Spain. And as Spain had nothing to give but promises of piastres, it is with the money of France that the wants of both countries have been supplied. Spain owed me a subsidy and it is I who have furnished her one. Now Messrs. Desprez, Vanderberghe and Ouvrard must give me up all they possess. Spain must pay me what she owes them, or I will shut those gentlemen up in Vincennes and send an army to Madrid."

This is a very clear and succinct summing up, but it is unfair in confusing the common use of money with its use in a banking sense. It is hard to tell where Napoleon's supplies would have come from if the efforts of the men he denounced had not sustained the credit of the State. Desprez and Vanderberghe were so awed by the Emperor that they are said to have shed tears, but M. Ouvrard was calm and composed and urged upon the Emperor that he ought to be permitted to liquidate his own affairs, and that he could bring over larger sums from Mexico than had been advanced by France.

An investigation made by those who were certainly not favorable to Ouvrard and his associates, ascertained the indebtedness of the United Merchants to the Treasury to be 141 millions of francs. The company owed twenty-three millions of francs to the receivers of taxes, they had outstanding seventy-three millions of their bank notes, they owed fourteen millions for drafts furnished them by the Treasury, M. Desprez was indebted personally seventeen millions, and last there was bad paper to the amount of fourteen millions, furnished by the company and held by the Treasury.

On the other hand, the Government owed the company forty millions for supplies furnished. Hope & Co. had obtained ten millions worth of the Spanish piastres and transmitted them to Paris. The company had other property to the extent of thirty millions, making eighty millions in all. The remaining sixty millions was covered by credits due to the company from Spain. This was subsequently paid, and the Government lost nothing by the company.

It is in fact highly probable that if M. Ouvrard had been permitted to liquidate his own affairs there would have been a large margin of profit for himself and partners. The amount of specie which Ouvrard had secured from Spain, the right to export from the Spanish Colonies, was said to have been 272,000,000 francs.

As examples in high finance the operations of Ouvrard excel those of any of his contemporaries. He was unfortunate in being obliged to deal with so tyrannical a ruler as Napoleon. The transition of the latter from Consul to Emperor, from servant of the people to master, was so rapid that it was impossible to foresee the gigantic growth of his demands on the resources of France. In fact, Napoleon after having crushed the only man whose financial skill was equal if not superior to his own, was ever after his own Minister of Finance. Those who bore this title were in reality mere clerks. In fact, both in civil and military matters it was impossible for Napoleon to accept assistance from any who had original ideas. By degrees men of the first class refused to serve him, and his downfall was largely due to the incapacity of the subordinates on whom he was finally obliged to depend.

## KNOX'S HISTORY OF BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES.

### OPINIONS AS TO THE MERITS OF THE WORK.

NASHVILLE (Tenn.) AMERICAN : The History of Banking in the United States is the most comprehensive work of the kind ever published in this country. \* \* \* Mr. Knox was probably the best equipped man for this work that could have been found in the Union. He had made the subject one of intelligent and exhaustive study, and his position, first as Deputy Comptroller, then as Comptroller, a service altogether of seventeen years, gave him unusual opportunities for storing his mind with those facts so necessary to the preparation of a work of such magnitude.

A special feature of the work and one of more than local interest because of the participation in its preparation by John W. Faxon, of Chattanooga, is the space given to the history of State banking. \* \* \* Without desiring to disparage the efforts of any other of the numerous financiers who contributed to the State banking section of the work, it may not be amiss to say that no more interesting chapter can be found in the book than that contributed by Mr. Faxon. Considering the meagerness of the records from which he had to get much of his material, he has written a most excellent history of the State banking system of Tennessee.

BUFFALO COURIER : As a text-book and reference-book on finance its value is assured.

MORNING OREGONIAN (Portland) : Knox's History of Banking is invaluable to bankers and students of finance.

PITTSBURG POST : An elaborate and careful History of Banking in the United States meets what may be called a want in banking and financial circles. Such a book is before us by the late John Jay Knox. \* \* \* As a whole the book is one that concerns men of affairs and especially all in the banking business. It gives the reasons for their existence and business pursuits as laid down in history.

DETROIT TRIBUNE : The History contains much valuable information and is a most important addition to financial literature. It is a work well worth having.

# ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1900.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,  
WASHINGTON, D. C., December 4, 1900.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report:

## RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES, FISCAL YEAR 1900.

The revenues of the Government from all sources (by warrants) for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1900, were \$869,595,431. The expenditures for the same period were \$590,068,371, showing a surplus of \$279,527,060.

In addition to the revenues collected during the year and the amounts received on the indebtedness of Pacific railroads, the cash in the Treasury was increased by the following sums: From subscriptions to the three per cent. ten-twenty bonds issued under authority of the act of June 13, 1898, for the Spanish war expenditures, \$113,920, and from the issue of four per cent. bonds in liquidation of interest accrued on refunding certificates converted during the year, \$1,490, making a total of \$115,410.

The securities redeemed on account of the sinking fund were as follows:

Fractional currency.....	\$2,413.25	
Bounty land scrip.....	100.00	
Compound interest notes.....	1,710.00	
One-year notes of 1863.....	220.00	
Two-year notes of 1863.....	100.00	
Loan of July and August, 1861.....	500.00	
Seven-thirties of 1864 and 1865.....	750.00	
Funded loan of 1861, called.....	300.00	
Funded loan of 1891, called.....	36,600.00	
Funded loan of 1891, continued at two per cent.....	3,384,650.00	
National bank notes.....	669,503.00	
Bonds purchased—		
Funded loan of 1907.....	\$14,310,350.00	
Loan of 1904.....	4,990,300.00	
		19,300,650.00
Premium on bonds purchased—		
Funded loan of 1907.....	\$1,824,569.40	
Loan of 1904.....	548,983.00	
		2,373,552.40
Premium on bonds exchanged—		
Funded loan of 1907.....	\$22,071,956.35	
Loan of 1904.....	4,736,486.72	
Loan of 1908-1918.....	3,965,109.34	
		30,773,552.14
Total.....		\$56,544,556.06

As compared with the fiscal year 1899, the receipts for 1900 increased \$58,613,426.83. There was a decrease of \$117,358,388.14 in expenditures.

The revenues of the Government for the current year are estimated upon the basis of existing laws at \$887,773,253.92. The expenditures for the same period are estimated at \$607,773,253.92; or a surplus of \$280,000,000. It is estimated that upon the basis of existing laws the revenues of the Government for the fiscal year 1902

will be \$716,683,042. The estimates of appropriations for the same period, as submitted by the several executive departments and offices, are (exclusive of sinking fund, \$690,874,804.24 ; or an estimated surplus of \$26,258,237.76.

#### OPERATIONS OF THE TREASURY.

The Treasurer calls attention to the marked irregularity in the receipts and expenditures, pointing out that while in July, 1899, there was a deficiency of \$8,-506,882, in June, 1900, a surplus of \$17,895,158 was realized. The greatest difference between income and outgo on any one day was \$4,047,396 in favor of the Treasury. The corresponding maximum deficiency was \$2,318,621. In the face of such wide fluctuations the necessity for ample available reserves is apparent, and the Treasurer names \$50,000,000 as a proper sum to keep in the Government vaults.

Promptly on the passage of the act of March 14, 1900, there were transferred to the divisions of issue and redemption the records and accounts relating to the issue and redemption of the Government notes and certificates. Up to October 1 the total redemptions in gold from the new reserve fund of \$150,000,000 were \$22,530,854 in United States notes and \$3,594,708 in Treasury notes. The sums drawn from the reserve have been daily restored from the gold in the general fund. Exclusive of that reserve, the assets and liabilities of the new divisions were \$723,062,283 on the day of their creation, \$723,544,179 on June 30, and \$740,965,679 on November 1.

Comparison of the state of the Treasury shows an increase of \$24,887,093, in the available cash balance, exclusive of the reserve of \$150,000,000, for the year. The cash actually in the vaults of the Treasury, as distinguished from the deposits in banks and other assets not consisting of money, increased by \$6,621,398. The most notable increase was in the smaller denominations of paper currency, which are in demand for moving the crops. Of these, the Treasury held \$14,062,172 more than last year. The excess of assets over current liabilities was, on June 30, \$49,723,017 in 1899, and \$50,327,501 in 1900.

As the resources of the Treasury became greater than its immediate needs, a series of measures were adopted for restoring the surplus to the uses of business. After September 18, 1899, interest due October 1 was paid in advance of maturity to the amount of \$3,208,027. From October 10, in like manner, anticipation was made of \$916,038, due November 1, and after December 15, of \$3,398,504, due January 1. An offer made on October 10 to prepay all interest accruing to July 1, 1900, at a rebate of two-tenths of one per cent. a month, was accepted to the amount of \$2,-229,191, on which the rebate was \$21,101. On November 15 a proposal was made to purchase \$25,000,000 of the four and five per cent. bonds due in 1904 and 1907 at a fixed price. This was responded to by offers to the amount of \$19,300,650 of principal, on which the premium was \$2,373,502.40. Notice was given May 18, 1900, for the payment of the \$25,364,500 outstanding two per cent. bonds redeemable at the option of the Government, and by November 1 all but \$2,255,000 of them were retired. The conversion of threes, fours and fives into the new two per cent. consols of 1930, provided for by the act of March 14, 1900, amounted by June 30 to \$307,125,850 of principal, and by November 1 to \$345,530,750. To the latter date payment for excess of value was made out of the Treasury for \$34,338,342, and the net saving to the Government was \$3,685,618.

In the year ended September 30 1900, notes and certificates of the value of \$528,-192,000 were impressed with the seal of the Department and prepared for issue, as against \$362,412,000 in the twelve months preceding. A largely increased share of the new currency was of the denominations of \$20 and under. The redemptions of worn paper money in the same periods were \$303,219,824 in 1900 and \$255,027,980 in 1899.

The authority to increase the issue of subsidiary silver coin to \$100,000,000, which



was granted by the act of March 14, 1900, has been a convenience both to the Treasury and to the people. The Department, through the Mint, has been enabled to supply all demands for them, and their circulation increased by October 1, 1900, to \$79,432,193.

## COINS AND COINAGE.

The receipts and deposits of bullion at mints and assay offices, including redeposits, aggregated \$238,755,736, of which \$208,553,813 was gold and \$35,201,922 silver. Silver bullion purchased under the provisions of Section 3526, Revised Statutes, for coinage of subsidiary silver aggregated 1,290,055 standard ounces, costing \$908,868. The coinage executed during the fiscal year was:

Gold.....	\$107,987,110.00
Silver dollars.....	18,244,984.00
Subsidiary silver.....	12,876,849.15
Minor.....	2,243,017.21
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$141,351,960.36</b>

There were coined 50,000 Lafayette souvenir silver dollars, which are not included in the above coinage of silver dollars. The silver dollars coined were from bullion purchased under the act of July 14, 1890. The total coinage of silver dollars from bullion purchased under the act of July 14, 1890, from August 13, 1890, to July 1, 1900, was \$115,250,950, containing 99,043,785 standard ounces, costing \$68,968,270, giving a seigniorage of \$31,287,679.

In addition to the above coinage, there were manufactured at the mint at Philadelphia for the Government of Costa Rica 320,000 gold pieces, of various denominations, of the value of \$1,396,050.

Uncurrent gold coins of the face value of \$1,401,454 and mutilated silver coins of the face value of \$5,261,070 were received.

This represents in new gold coin \$1,839,096, and in new subsidiary silver coin \$4,960,070.

Of the subsidiary silver coinage \$4,765,512 was coined from worn and uncurrent silver coin transferred from the Treasury for recoinage, \$8,111,336 from silver purchased for subsidiary silver coinage and from silver purchased under the act of July 14, 1890, on which the seigniorage was \$3,008,428.

The balances of silver bullion on hand at the mints and assay offices of the United States for the coinage of silver dollars, subsidiary silver coins, and for payment of deposits of silver bullion in fine bars, July 1, 1900, was:

ITEMS.	Standard ounces.	Cost.
Purchased under act of July 14, 1890.....	83,268,064.02	\$67,806,388.21
For subsidiary silver coinage at mints and assay offices.	845,471.42	340,925.77
At United States assay office, New York, for payment of deposits in fine bars.....	127,165.52	77,248.33
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>83,740,699.96</b>	<b>\$68,224,562.31</b>

Including the balances on hand at the mints July 1, 1878, the net seigniorage on the coinage of silver from that date to June 30, 1900, was \$102,275,480.

## SILVER QUOTATIONS.

The highest quotation in the London market for silver 0.925 fine during the fiscal year was 28 9-16 pence, equal to \$0.62612 in United States money, per ounce fine. The lowest quotation was 26 5/8 pence, equivalent to \$0.58865. The average price for the fiscal year was 27 3/8 pence, equivalent to \$0.60017. The bullion value of the United States standard dollar, at the highest price for the year, was \$0.48426, and the lowest, \$0.45141, and at the average price, \$0.46419. The commercial ratio of gold to silver at the average price was 1 to 34.44. The number of grains of pure

silver at the average price that could be purchased with a United States silver dollar was 799.77, equivalent to  $1\frac{1}{2}$  fine ounces.

#### IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF THE PRECIOUS METALS.

The net exports of gold during the fiscal year were \$3,693,575, as against the net imports of \$51,429,099 for the fiscal year 1899. The net silver exports were \$21,455,978, as against \$25,534,817 for the previous fiscal year.

#### USE OF GOLD AND SILVER IN THE INDUSTRIAL ARTS.

The value of gold and silver consumed in the industrial arts by the United States during the calendar year 1899 was: Gold \$17,847,178; silver, coining value, \$15,677,668—a total of \$33,524,841.

There were consumed in new material, in the manufacture of bars, gold \$15,112,193; silver, \$13,630,079.

The amount of new material consumed in the industrial arts in the world was: Gold, \$72,658,500, and silver, coining value, \$52,990,500.

#### METALLIC STOCK IN THE UNITED STATES.

The total metallic stock in the United States on July 1, 1900, was: Gold, \$1,034,439,264; silver, \$647,371,030.

#### PRODUCTION OF GOLD AND SILVER.

The estimated production of the precious metals in the United States during the calendar year 1899 was:

METALS.	Fine ounces.	Commercial value.	Coining value.
Gold.....	3,437,210	\$71,063,400	\$71,063,400
Silver.....	54,764,500	32,858,700	70,806,626

#### WORLD'S COINAGE.

The total coinage of gold and silver by the various countries of the world during the calendar year 1899 was: Gold, \$466,110,614; silver, \$166,226,964—a total of \$632,337,578.

The total metallic stock and uncovered paper in the world, as estimated on January 1, 1900, was:

Gold.....	\$4,841,000,000
Full legal-tender silver.....	2,322,600,000
Limited-tender silver.....	926,300,000
Total metallic stock.....	\$8,089,900,000
Uncovered paper.....	2,960,100,000
Grand total.....	\$11,050,000,000

#### PUBLIC MONEYS.

The monetary transactions of the Government have been conducted through the Treasurer of the United States, nine sub-treasury officers, and 444 National bank depositaries. The amount of public moneys held by the bank depositaries on June 30, 1900, including funds to the credit of the Treasurer's general account and United States disbursing officers, was \$98,786,806, an increase since June 30, 1899, in amount of holdings of \$22,453,151. Of the bank depositaries, nearly 240 were specially designated to hold funds deposited therewith temporarily, and the balances held therein will be reduced gradually as the moneys are needed for current disbursements.

After the removal of the deposits from the Bank of the United States in 1833, local institutions were used for this purpose. Upon the establishment of the National bank system, depositaries were selected from its members, and have been used as the convenience of the Department and the surplus funds would permit.

The largest deposits ever held by National banks at the end of a month were \$279,544,645, in June, 1879, when the net cash balance of the Treasury was \$475,663,096. In August of that year these deposits fell to \$97,090,074, and at the end of June, 1882, were \$11,258,965. From that minimum the deposits in the National banks varied with the differences between receipts and expenditures, reaching \$95,014,970 at the end of October, 1898. Deposits include receipts from internal revenue, post offices, public lands, and miscellaneous sources; but the chief additions since the loan of 1898 was placed have been from its proceeds, as the war with Spain called for less outlay than had in caution been provided for. Thus without inconvenience to the Treasury, and to the great advantage of general business needs, public moneys were kept on deposit in National banks until the maximum of \$108,598,610 was reached February 10, 1900, in addition to \$5,496,267 to the credit of disbursing officers.

For these funds the Treasury held as security United States bonds for the full sum at par for fours and fives, with a margin of five per cent. on threes and ten per cent. on twos. No guaranty for moneys could be more safe and certain. The bonds so pledged, when they were highest, were:

TITLE OF LOAN.	Rate of interest.	To secure public moneys.
Funded loan of 1891, continued.....	2	\$2,007,500
District of Columbia.....	2.65	485,000
Three per cent. loan of 1898.....	3	81,982,080
Funded loan of 1907.....	4	47,089,650
Loan of 1925.....	4	18,756,450
Loan of 1904.....	5	15,997,000
Total.....	.....	\$111,217,680

In every State except Mississippi and Nevada, and in every Territory except Arizona and the Indian Territory, depositaries were designated. While the surplus permitted, every applicant, wherever located, offering the necessary bonds received the share of deposits desired.

These depositary funds are available for the use of the Government as the convenience of the Treasury may demand. In order to meet the payment for the funded loan of 1891, called May 18, 1900, notices as follows were served on the banks, asking for the transfer to the sub-treasuries of a percentage of the funds held by them: On May 23, for the transfer of \$4,941,900 on or before June 5; on June 7, for the transfer of \$4,966,000 on or before June 26, and again on June 27, for the transfer of \$4,945,800 on or before July 16. These funds all reached the sub-treasuries at or before the times fixed without the slightest default.

The attention of Congress is called to the inconvenience of handling the public moneys in Hawaii and, prospectively, in Porto Rico, resulting from the provision in Section 5153, Revised Statutes, forbidding the deposit of receipts from customs in National bank depositaries.

At present the collector of customs in Hawaii is obliged to send all moneys collected by him on account of duties on imports to the sub-Treasury at San Francisco, while public moneys required for use in Hawaii may, as a consequence, have to be transmitted by express or otherwise to the islands. Thus double expense, increased risk, and unnecessary delay in the public business may be and are occasioned. There seems to be good reason why customs receipts of Hawaii and other island points should be excepted from the provision of Section 5153, Revised Statutes, which requires the deposit of customs receipts in a sub-treasury. Liberty should be given to collectors of customs at the places indicated to deposit receipts with designated depositaries, as is now permitted by law in the case of collectors of internal revenue.

## INCREASE IN THE CIRCULATION OF NATIONAL BANKS.

The amount of outstanding circulation, by denominations, on March 13, the day prior to the passage of the financial act, and on October 31, 1900, was as follows: March 13, \$254,026,230; October 31, \$331,613,268.

From the foregoing statement it appears that there has been a growth in National bank-note circulation, from March 14 to October 31, of \$77,507,038. This increase is probably no more than sufficient to keep pace with expanding trade. Under existing law, National banks are entitled to take out circulation to the full amount of their capital, which on October 31 was \$632,502,395. There is no likelihood that this privilege will be availed of to the fullest extent. The antecedent requirement for the purchase and deposit of United States bonds acts through advance in price under increased demand to check automatically undue expansion of note issues. It may be here noted that with the two per cent. bonds at the present market price the net advantage to a bank in taking out circulation is one and five-hundredths of one per cent. per annum, as figured by the Actuary in this Department. The advantages to banks in taking circulation under the law, based upon other bond issues, are found to be as follows:

On five per cent. bonds of 1904, a loss of substantially one-half of one per cent.

On four per cent. bonds of 1907, a profit of substantially twelve-hundredths of one per cent.

On three per cent. bonds of 1908, a profit of about three-tenths of one per cent.

On four per cent. bonds of 1925, a profit of about fifteen-hundredths of one per cent.

*These figures show clearly enough that our currency system, under which the volume of circulating medium is more responsive to the market price of Government bonds than to the requirements of trade and industry, is not yet satisfactory.*

## LOANS AND CURRENCY.

The interest-bearing debt July 1, 1900, included unmatured United States bonds outstanding amounting to \$1,023,448,390, there having been a reduction since July 1, 1899, of \$22,567,530. This was brought about by the purchase, under announcement of the Secretary of the Treasury on November 15, 1899, of four per cent. bonds, funded loan of 1907, amounting to \$14,310,350, and five per cent. bonds, loan of 1904, in the amount of \$4,990,300. There were also redeemed, under the Secretary's call of May 18, 1900, United States bonds of the funded loan of 1891, continued at two per cent., in the amount of \$3,884,650. The total reduction in these three loans up to July 1, 1900, was \$22,685,300, but the net reduction, as stated above, was \$22,567,530, there having been issued during the fiscal year three per cent. bonds, loan of 1908-1918, amounting to \$113,920, and \$3,850 in four per cent. bonds, funded loan of 1907, in conversion of refunding certificates, of which \$1,490 were issued in payment of accrued interest on said certificates.

The call of May 18, 1900, was for the redemption of the bonds of the funded loan of 1891, continued at two per cent., the amount being \$25,364,500, and August 18, 1900, being fixed as the date of maturity.

The amount of refunding certificates of the act of February 26, 1879, outstanding July 1, 1900, was \$35,470. In the last annual report it was recommended that Congress limit the time within which such certificates may be converted into the four per cent. bonds, funded loan of 1907, but no action was taken. In view of the provisions of the act of March 14, 1900, under which the outstanding four per cent. bonds, funded loan of 1907, are exchangeable for the two per cent. bonds of the act of March 14, 1900, the above recommendation is renewed, as is also the recommendation that the Secretary of the Treasury be authorized to redeem in cash any of such

certificates on presentation, and to pay the accrued interest thereon to date of redemption.

The character of the interest-bearing debt outstanding July 1, 1900, is materially different from that outstanding July 1, 1899, owing to the issue of two per cent. bonds payable, principal and interest, in United States gold coin, under authority of the act of March 14, 1900, in exchange for certain classes of United States bonds outstanding bearing higher rates of interest.

#### FOREIGN COMMERCE.

Four great facts characterize the foreign commerce of the fiscal year 1900: First, it exceeded that of any preceding year, and for the first time the grand total of imports and exports passed the two-billion-dollar mark; second, manufacturers' materials formed a larger proportion of the imports than ever before; third, manufactured goods formed a larger proportion of the exports than ever before; fourth, exports were larger than ever before, and were more widely distributed than in any preceding year.

The imports of the year were \$849,941,184, against \$697,148,489 in 1899, an increase of \$152,792,695. This large increase, however, is chiefly in manufacturers' materials. The class "articles in a crude condition which enter into the various processes of domestic industry" shows a growth of from \$222,657,774 in 1899 to \$302,426,746 in 1900, an increase of \$79,768,972; and the class "articles wholly or partially manufactured for use as material in the manufactures and mechanic arts" shows a growth from \$60,664,183 in 1899 to \$88,433,549 in 1900, an increase of \$27,769,366. Thus more than two-thirds of the entire increase in importations was in manufacturers' materials. On the other hand, the class "articles manufactured ready for consumption" was but 15.17 per cent. of the total imports of 1900, against 15.54 per cent. in 1899 and 21.09 per cent. in 1896. While manufacturers' materials form a constantly increasing percentage of our imports, finished manufactures continue to form an increasing percentage of our rapidly growing exports.

The total exports of the year were valued at \$1,394,483,082, of which \$1,370,763,571 were of domestic production. Of this vast sum, manufactures formed 31.65 per cent., against 28.21 per cent. in 1899, 23.14 per cent. in 1895, and 17.87 in 1890. The total exportation of manufactures during the year 1900 was \$433,851,756, against \$339,592,146 in 1899, an increase of nearly \$100,000,000, or about twenty-eight per cent. Agricultural products also show a gratifying gain over 1899, the total for the year 1900 being \$835,858,123, against \$784,776,142 in 1899, while every other class—mining, forestry, fisheries and miscellaneous—also shows an increase in 1900, as compared with the preceding year.

Comparing imports of 1900 with those of 1890 by grand divisions, it appears that those from Europe and North America have slightly decreased; those from South America show little change, while those from Asia and Oceania show a marked increase. Imports from Europe, which in 1890 amounted to \$449,987,266, were in 1900, \$440,567,314, a decrease of 2.09 per cent.; from North America, in 1890, \$148,368,708, and in 1900, \$130,032,754, a decrease of 12.36 per cent.; from South America, in 1890, \$90,096,144, and in 1900, \$93,667,108, an increase of four per cent.; from Oceania, in 1890, \$28,356,568, and in 1900, \$34,611,108, an increase of 21.9 per cent.; from Asia, in 1890, \$67,506,833, and in 1900, \$139,842,830, an increase of 107 per cent., and from Africa, in 1890, \$3,321,477, and in 1900, \$11,218,437, an increase of 237.7 per cent.

In exports, the growth of our trade with Africa, Asia, and Oceania also shows a corresponding increase. Our exports to Europe in 1890 were \$683,736,397, and in 1900 were \$1,040,167,763, an increase of 50.6 per cent.; to North America, other than the United States, in 1890, \$94,100,410, and in 1900, \$187,594,625, an increase of

ninety-nine per cent.; to South America, in 1890, \$38,752,648, and in 1900, \$38,945,763, an increase of five per cent.; to Oceania, in 1890, \$16,480,209, and in 1900, \$43,391,275, an increase of 163.6 per cent.; to Asia, in 1890, \$19,696,820, and in 1900, \$64,918,807, an increase of 229.6 per cent.; and to Africa, in 1890, \$4,613,702, and in 1900, \$19,469,849, an increase of 322 per cent.

Our commerce with the island territories which have been brought into closer relationship with the United States by the events of the past two years also shows a rapid growth, despite the fact that in Cuba and the Philippines production and consequently purchasing power have been partially interrupted by war conditions. Imports from Cuba, which in 1897 were \$18,406,415, in 1900 were \$31,371,704; from Porto Rico, in 1897, \$2,181,024, and 1900, \$3,078,648; from Hawaii, in 1897, \$13,687,799, and in 1900, \$20,707,903; and from the Philippine Islands, in 1897, \$4,383,740, and in 1900, \$5,971,208, making the total for these four island divisions, in 1897, \$38,658,978, and in 1900, \$61,129,463, an increase of 58.1 per cent. in 1900 as compared with 1897. In exports, the increase is more rapid. To Cuba, the exports in 1897 were \$3,259,776, and in 1900, \$26,513,400; to Porto Rico, in 1897, \$1,988,888, and in 1900, \$4,640,449; to Hawaii, in 1897, \$4,690,075, and in 1900, \$13,509,148; and to the Philippines, in 1897, \$94,597, and in 1900, \$2,640,449, making the total to the four island divisions, in 1897, \$15,083,836, and in 1900, \$47,303,446, an increase of 214.6 per cent. in 1900 as compared with 1897.

The commerce with Porto Rico has shown especially rapid gains since May 1, 1900, at which date the act of April 12, 1900, providing revenues and a civil government for Porto Rico, went into effect. In the first five months of the operations of the act, extending from May 1 to October 1, the imports into the United States from Porto Rico were \$3,816,334, compared with \$2,040,789 in the corresponding months of the preceding year, and \$1,219,128 in the corresponding months of 1897, in which year Porto Rico was under the Spanish flag; while exports from the United States to the island in the five months under consideration were \$2,807,909, against \$1,378,622 in the corresponding months of 1899, and \$768,802 in the corresponding months of 1897, an increase of 265 per cent. over 1897. Commerce with the Hawaiian Islands showed a remarkable growth in the fiscal year 1900, the first year following the completion of annexation, the imports from the islands increasing from \$17,831,463 in 1899 to \$20,707,908 in 1900, and the exports to the islands increasing from \$9,305,470 in 1899 to \$13,509,148 in 1900.

#### BALANCE OF TRADE.

The fact that the exports of merchandise constantly exceed the imports of merchandise and specie by several hundred millions of dollars annually has suggested an inquiry as to the method by which this vast trade balance in favor of the United States is settled. While a share of this is doubtless accounted for by freights, interest, and expenditures of Americans abroad, it is equally apparent that a considerable share must be represented by American securities returned to the United States, and that to this extent we are as a nation reducing our foreign indebtedness.

A desire has been frequently expressed for the adoption of a plan by which these movements of securities can be measured and the methods of adjustment of the trade balance more accurately determined than at present. The question is now being carefully considered by the Department, with a hope of arriving at a plan which will measure these movements without proving detrimental to the interests involved.

#### REFUNDING THE PUBLIC DEBT.

The act of March 14, 1900, contained a provision for the refunding of certain outstanding bonds, bearing interest at three per cent., four per cent., and five per cent., into two per cent. thirty-year bonds, payable, principal and interest, in United States gold coin of the present standard value.

Up to and including November 15, 1900, there were received for exchange \$352,083,450 of the three classes of bonds in question, and an equal amount of the two per cent. thirty-year bonds issued in their place. The saving in interest, the premium paid, and the net saving resulting from refunding operations up to and including November 15, 1900, are set forth in the following table:

CLASS OF BONDS.	Amount refunded.	Saving in interest.	Premium paid.	Net saving.
Loan of 1906-1918 (three per cent.).....	\$79,788,900	\$6,590,070	\$4,499,055	\$2,091,015
Funded loan of 1907 (four per cent.).....	212,221,900	30,458,364	24,545,744	5,912,620
Loan of 1904 (five per cent.).....	60,077,650	6,701,624	5,877,207	824,417
Total.....	\$352,088,450	\$43,750,058	\$34,922,006	\$8,628,052

NOTE.—The "saving in interest" is computed upon average dates of redemption, and may differ slightly from the actual saving.

For a better understanding of the above tabulation, it may be well to explain that by the payment of \$34,922,006, future payments of interest, which would have amounted to \$43,750,058, have been anticipated, with a net and final saving of the difference, \$8,628,052.

Another effect of the operation is to reduce the charge upon the Treasury for the payment of interest from the dates of refunding to February 1, 1904, by the sum of about seven million dollars annually. From February 1, 1904, to July 1, 1907, the annual interest charge will be reduced by the sum of about five millions, and for the thirteen months ending August 1, 1908, by about one million.

Of the \$352,083,450 bonds surrendered for exchange, \$244,046,150 were held by the Treasurer of the United States as security for circulation or public deposits in National banks. The remaining \$108,037,300 bonds were surrendered by individuals and institutions other than National banks, but a considerable proportion of the two per cent. bonds issued in their place were eventually sold to National banking institutions, and are now lodged with the Treasurer of the United States. The amount held November 15, 1900, as security for circulating notes of National banks was \$272,779,100, and the amount held as security for public deposits in National bank depositaries was \$52,565,350.

As a result, there was left outstanding on November 15, 1900, of bonds admitted to the privilege of refunding by the act of March 14, the following:

Of the five per cent. loan of 1904.....	\$34,922,050
Of the four per cent. loan of 1907.....	338,125,700
Of the three per cent. loan of 1906-18.....	119,008,740
Total.....	\$487,056,490

On November 21 the Secretary gave public notice that refunding would be indefinitely suspended at the close of business on December 31, 1900. The considerations which induced this action may be briefly stated:

First. Nine months will have elapsed since the passage of the refunding act. Thus the holders of bonds will have had abundant opportunity to make the exchange authorized.

Second. To leave the privilege open indefinitely is simply to give a continuing option to bondholders without any sufficient consideration to the Treasury.

Third. It may be fairly assumed that with this privilege discontinued at the close of the year, refunding in the meantime will be stimulated, and that the total refunding to that date will approximate \$400,000,000.

Fourth. The sinking-fund law contemplates the retirement of the interest-bearing public debt, either by payment or purchase of substantially \$50,000,000 per annum.

Fifth. The refunding of \$400,000,000 will leave outstanding and maturing

within the next eight years, say, \$439,000,000, or an average of something more than \$50,000,000 per year.

The Secretary believes that the suspension of the refunding process will put the maturing debt under better conditions (the Government's interest alone considered) either for purchase from time to time or for payment when due.

It will, of course, remain open for the Department to resume refunding should the interests of the Government and the general conditions of finance make such a course desirable.

#### REDUCTION OF REVENUE.

From the estimate of receipts and expenditures for the fiscal year 1902 there promises to be an excess of receipts to the amount of \$26,000,000. It is hardly necessary to point out that estimates are at best approximate. Exigencies in the public service which can not be anticipated may require expenditures not contemplated. Congressional appropriations, extraordinary in character, or failures to realize fully estimated revenues, are also influences which may operate seriously to derange all advance calculations. A conservative margin should, therefore, be reserved in forecasting definite results based on hypothetical calculations.

An annual excess in receipts over expenditures is the best indorsement of the national credit, while a deficit is a depressing factor in public finance. It has been our wise policy in the past to reduce the public debt in time of peace, and to this good policy may be attributed, to a high degree, the low rates of interest, hitherto unprecedented, which now attach to our Government debt obligations. It is true that for a period of six years from 1894 to 1899, inclusive, annual deficits appeared; but it may be hoped that this was a temporary interruption to a history of twenty-eight years, when each year showed annual expenditures less than annual revenues.

The operation of the act of February 25, 1862, providing for a sinking fund, contemplates the payment or purchase and cancellation of substantially \$50,000,000 annually of our interest-bearing debt obligations. Owing to the unfavorable conditions in the Treasury during the six years just referred to, the sinking fund was entirely neglected.

In the absence of any expression to the contrary, it may be safely assumed that it is the desire of Congress to observe faithfully the general requirements of the sinking-fund act, and to provide revenue sufficient to meet the charges thus imposed upon the Government. The present and prospective easy condition of the Treasury justifies the belief that the sinking-fund requirement can be met, both for the current fiscal year, and for the next fiscal year, and still permit a moderate reduction in taxes imposed by the War Revenue Act. A reduction to the amount of \$30,000,000 is therefore recommended to the consideration of the present Congress.

#### THE MONEY STANDARD AND THE CURRENCY.

The operation of the act of March 14 last with respect to these two important matters of our finances has well exemplified its wisdom. Confidence in the purpose and power of the Government to maintain the gold standard has been greatly strengthened. The result is that gold flows toward the Treasury instead of away from it. At the date of this report the free gold in the Treasury is larger in amount than at any former period in our history. Including the \$150,000,000 reserve, the gold in the Treasury belonging to the Government amounts to over \$242,000,000, while the Treasury holds, besides, more than \$230,000,000, against which certificates have been issued.

That provision of the act which liberalized the conditions of bank-note issue was also wise and timely. Under it, as previously shown in this report, there has been an increase of some \$77,000,000 in bank-note issues. To this fact may be chiefly attributed the freedom from stress for currency to handle the large harvests of cot-



ton, wheat and corn. In this respect the year has been an exception to the general rule of stringency which for several years has so plainly marked the autumn season.

Nevertheless, the measures referred to, prolific as they have been in good results, will yet need re-enforcement in some important particulars. Thus, as to the redemption fund provided for in said act, while the powers conferred upon the Secretary are probably ample to enable a zealous and watchful officer to protect fully the gold reserve, there appears to be lacking sufficient mandatory requirement to furnish complete confidence in the continued parity under all conditions between our two forms of metallic money, silver and gold. Upon this point further legislation may become desirable.

As to the currency, while the liberalizing of conditions has, as previously noted, found response in a necessary increase of bank-note issues, there is under our present system no assurance whatever that the volume of bank currency will be continuously responsive to the country's needs, either by expanding as such needs require or by contracting when superfluous in amount. The truth is that, safe and desirable as is our currency system in many respects, it is not properly related. The supply of currency is but remotely, if at all, influenced by the ever-changing requirements of trade and industry. It is related most largely, if not entirely, to the price of Government bonds in the market. Between the needs of trade and commerce for a medium of exchange and for instruments of credit, which a proper bank note furnishes, and the investment price or value of Government bonds, which is at present the most influential factor in determining the currency supply, there is no discernible relation whatever.

I forbear at this time, in view of the many other important subjects which demand attention during the present short session of Congress, to press these questions for immediate action, but I can not refrain from inviting the attention of Senators and Representatives to a careful consideration of the matters thus suggested. In the act of March 14 a forward step was taken, to the great benefit of all our material interests. Nothing should prevent timely and well-considered amendments where necessary to solidify and complete the work so well inaugurated.

L. J. GAGE, *Secretary.*

TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

## KNOX'S HISTORY OF BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES.

### OPINIONS AS TO THE MERITS OF THE WORK.

**PHILADELPHIA EVENING BULLETIN :** It covers everything needful to a complete understanding of our monetary system from A to Z. The work is authoritative in the highest degree, and as a permanent book of reference is invaluable.

**BALTIMORE MORNING HERALD :** It is brimful of the facts of the history of banking in this country, and is very likely to be the authority on the subject.

**SUNDAY STATES (New Orleans) :** A History of Banking in the United States by the late John J. Knox is an exhaustive and exceedingly valuable work. \* \* \* The work is finely printed. The high standing of its authors and the splendid shape in which they have put the material at their disposal make it quite certain that this will remain for many generations the standard work of its kind.

**INDIANAPOLIS (Ind.) PRESS :** Of the highest excellence and the greatest value is A History of Banking in the United States, which has just been published by Bradford Rhodes & Co., New York. \* \* \* The whole work has been done with the most painstaking zeal for completeness and accuracy ; and, in consequence thereof, it is a masterpiece of financial history. The excellent matter has been adequately presented in a handsome book, beautifully printed on fine paper and illustrated with steel engravings of prominent American financiers.

## A NEW BANK COMMISSIONER IN KANSAS.

Hon. Morton Albaugh, who has been tendered by Governor Stanley the Bank Commissionership of the State of Kansas, and who has signified his willingness to accept, was born on a farm near Shoals, Indiana, February 10, 1862.

In 1883, at the age of twenty-one, he moved to Kansas, locating at Kingman, in that State, which place has been his home during his entire residence in Kansas.



HON. MORTON ALBAUGH.

Since 1884 he has been engaged in the newspaper business.

For the past ten years he has been an extensive wheat grower, operating on this line in his own county. Ever since he became a citizen of Kansas Mr. Albaugh has been an active participant in public affairs, and for several years has been one of the noted citizens of his State.

In 1895 he was appointed by Governor Morrill a member of the Board of Charities of Kansas, and was by the board made its chairman. He filled the exacting duties of this position with credit for two years.

During the State campaign of 1898 and the National campaign

of 1900 he was chairman of the State Republican Committee, in both of which campaigns his party was successful.

In February, 1899, he was appointed by the Comptroller of the Currency Receiver of the First National Bank, of Emporia, Kansas, and he administered the affairs of that trust with unusual skill and success.

While Mr. Albaugh has not been identified in any especial manner with the banking interests of his State, those who know of his executive ability, his knowledge of men and public affairs, and his high order of integrity, confidently predict a full measure of success for him in the administration of the office of State Bank Commissioner of Kansas, the duties of which he will assume about March 1, 1901.

## SOME DEFECTS IN THE NEW FINANCIAL LAW AND SOME SUGGESTED CHANGES.

[Speech of Hon. Ebenezer J. Hill, of Connecticut, in the House of Representatives, December 12, 1900.]

The President of the United States, in his annual message to Congress, says :

"It will be the duty, as I am sure it will be the disposition, of the Congress to provide whatever further legislation is needed to insure *the continued parity under all conditions* between our two forms of metallic money, silver and gold."

The Secretary of the Treasury, referring to the act of March 14, 1900, says :

"Nevertheless, the measures referred to, prolific as they have been in good results, *will yet need re-enforcement in some important particulars*. Thus as to the redemption fund provided for in said act, while the powers conferred upon the Secretary are probably ample to enable a zealous and watchful officer to fully protect the gold reserve, there appears to be lacking sufficient mandatory requirement to furnish complete confidence in the continued parity, *under all conditions*, between our two forms of metallic money, silver and gold. Upon this point further legislation may become desirable. In the act of March 14 a forward step was taken, to the great benefit of all our material interests. *Nothing should prevent timely and well-considered amendments* where necessary to solidify and complete the work so well inaugurated."

This language is advisory and recommendatory ; but on November 6 last the American people, who make Presidents and Secretaries and Congressmen, in my judgment, issued a peremptory order that the gold standard should be so firmly and definitely established that it could not be overthrown either by the negligence or willful act of any man or Administration, but that it should continue as the basis of our financial system until *the people themselves* should declare for a reversal of the policy just as emphatically as they have twice declared for its inauguration.

No higher duty devolves upon us than to heed that order and obey it now when the prosperity of the country and Treasury conditions make it possible. Until this is done the many and deserving projects for the development of our banking system, the upbuilding of our commerce, and the aggrandizement of the nation can well afford to wait, for until the foundation of our financial system is firmly laid all of these other things will be but flimsy structures built on shifting sand.

I propose, as briefly as possible, to call attention to the defects in the act of March 14, 1900, entitled "An act to define and fix the standard of value and to maintain the parity of all forms of money issued or coined by the United States," and to attempt to show what changes are necessary to perfect the measure so that it will *do the thing* which its title indicates.

When the bill went from the House it made every obligation for the payment of money in the United States, both public and private, payable in gold or in conformity with the gold dollar as the standard unit of value. When it came back to the House this was wholly eliminated, the silver dollar was continued as legal tender, and gold redemption was only provided for United States notes and certain bonds, provision for the issue of which was made in the bill itself, leaving all other outstanding obligations, both public and private, and all future contracts not specifically drawn as payable in gold dependent wholly upon the parity clause of the act, *but prescribing no method and providing no means by which such parity of gold and silver could be maintained*.

As the law stands to-day, we have two classes of Government obligations, one

payable in gold and one in coin, and all private obligations solvable by legal tender, payable in either, or in paper promises to pay gold, in the shape of United States notes.

As the law stands to-day, we have two forms of money, one gold and promises to pay gold, the other legal-tender silver, redeemable in itself, exchangeable at the demand of the holder in nothing, dependent for its parity with gold upon its use by the people and its receivability at the custom houses; in other words, nearly six hundred millions of silver promises to pay money good only for domestic use and dependent for their value here upon the continued prosperity of the people and the continuance in power of a political party which will not increase the quantity, and thus destroy their usefulness as a stable medium of exchange.

I submit that it is unworthy of this great nation, that it is beneath the dignity of 76,000,000 of the richest, the most intelligent and progressive people on earth to permit the issue of a single dollar of full legal-tender money which is not *exchangeable on demand at any time for any other legal-tender dollar which it may coin or issue*, and I declare my firm belief that the rank and standing of this nation as a world power among the other powers of the world is more clearly marked and fixed by the character of the money by which its commerce is carried on at home and abroad than it is by the size of its armies and the strength of its fleets.

As the bill went from the House, while it provided no specific reserve fund for the redemption of silver dollars, it did authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to use the gold reserve to maintain their parity by exchanging them for gold, and for the continued maintenance of that fund to issue bonds at his discretion. When the bill came back the exchangeability clause *was wholly gone*, the gold-reserve fund limited to the redemption of United States notes, and the bond power limited to this purpose only. That this is the clear intent as well as the language of the law is shown by the declaration of a Senator in explanation of the bill. He said :

"The committee believe that under these conditions, or in fact under any which are likely to arise, there will be no difficulty in maintaining a parity without directing the Secretary to exchange silver dollars for gold at the demand of the holder of the silver. They believe, in fact, that no public interests will be served by the adoption of a legislative provision for such an exchange."

And then follows this remarkable sentence :

"To make all our silver currency a direct charge upon the gold reserve *might imperil at a critical time the sufficiency of that fund*. We fear it would serve as an invitation for unfriendly drafts upon the Treasury resources."

I submit that the very reason given by the distinguished Senator for refusing to allow our immense volume of legal-tender silver to be a burden upon the gold reserve is the best possible one which can be given why some provision should have been made for the maintenance of its parity.

The discussion showed that it is the intent of the bill to accomplish this by use and by use only. There can be no mistake about this. It was not, as intimated in an able editorial in the "Washington Post" on December 9, a misunderstanding of the effect of the law, or, as was frequently suggested during the last campaign, a purpose to keep the question open for political effect, but it was an honest belief in the wisdom of the course deliberately taken.

Said another Senator :

"We have not provided here for the exchange of silver notes for gold. We have not made that provision because the committee think it wholly unnecessary, and unwise as well."

I lay down the broad proposition that parity can not be maintained between the two metals except by exchangeability at the will of the holder, when both are a full legal tender, and that no nation on the globe engaged in foreign trade ever has maintained silver at parity with gold at any fixed ratio for any length of time where ex-

changeability was refused as a clear and understood policy of government. Of course, I do not include any country where silver is used only as subsidiary coin or change money and where the quantity is so limited that the daily requirements of the people under all conditions hold the entire amount in constant use, so that it could not be presented either for public dues or for redemption; but I do mean every nation where silver is used as a general medium of exchange and for trade purposes. I do not mean a country like Great Britain, where gold is the circulating medium, with a per capita of \$11.50, and silver is only change money, with a per capita of \$3.78, and where no small bank notes are issued. Under such circumstances the silver is token money only, and tin money would do as well. But even there silver is a limited tender. I do refer to France, where silver coinage is limited under the agreements of the Latin Union, and where parity is maintained by exchangeability through the Bank of France, and where silver is thirty per cent. of the general monetary stock, and where, in the past eleven years, the Bank of France has thought it wise to nearly double its holdings of gold and to largely reduce its silver stock. I refer to Germany, which, in 1873, when it adopted the gold standard, had a per capita of silver of \$7.47. Three years later its federal council was authorized to reduce the legal-tender silver to subsidiary coin, but instead of doing it sold it down to one-half of its former volume, and, still unable to keep a per capita of only \$3.98 in circulation, have this very year legislated for its gradual recoinage into subsidiary coin.

MR. LOVERING: Is it not true that a very large percentage of the subsidiary coinage is some other metal than silver?

MR. HILL: Yes, probably; of course, the gentleman refers to the nickel.

If Germany, with only twenty per cent. of its monetary stock in silver, has been compelled to take this course, what hope have we of carrying 38½ per cent. and maintaining its parity, wholly unsupported by the gold reserve and with no part of the burden placed upon the banks, as is done in France and Germany? Indeed, with us the very reverse is true, for with any slackening of business here, the whole effort of the banks will be to force the silver certificates back upon the Treasury and thus make room for their own circulation.

But if it is true that use without exchangeability will maintain full legal tender silver at parity when circulating concurrently with gold, it must be true that use will so maintain it when it is the sole currency of a country, and here we have a striking illustration of the utter falsity of the proposition.

I cite the case of Porto Rico. It is a little country, but so far as its money system was concerned, it was a little world by itself. Up to 1885 its currency was the Mexican dollar, with free right on the part of its people to import or export it at will. In 1885 the fall of silver depreciated the value of the Mexican dollar and the government, believing that its parity could be maintained by use if the quantity was limited, forbade any further importation of it, and so ran on to 1890. It continued to fall in value. In 1891 it was worth eighty cents; in 1892, seventy-seven cents; in 1893, seventy-three cents; in 1894, sixty-five cents; in 1895, fifty-nine cents, and the necessities of the island had proportionately risen in price. The theory that parity could be maintained by use had utterly failed, and every adjustment of trade balances with other nations only emphasized that fact.

\* \* \* \* \*

The Porto Rican Government then concluded that they would have a currency of their own, which would not be affected by the value of silver in the outside world, but which, exactly adjusted to the needs of trade among their own people, would thus maintain its parity by use. So they gathered in the Mexican dollars at ninety-five cents each, and coined from these the Porto Rican peso, or dollar, with less silver in it, and issued them at a dollar a piece in lieu of the Mexicans, which had all been withdrawn. It was a full legal tender, redeemable in nothing, exchangeable

for nothing, exactly adjusted to the wants of the trade, for when the island would absorb no more the undistributed balance was sent back to Spain, and free coinage was not permitted; and so every element which could enter into the problem of maintenance of parity by use existed in a marked degree. There was one thing, however, which they did not do. They did not build a fence around the island and stop the import and export of commodities, and everything which went out or came in just as truly marked the value of the money there as if it had been gold, for the commercial world was doing business with gold as the measure of values. Instead of equaling a dollar in gold in purchasing power among their own people, it started off in 1896 at 64½ cents, fell in 1897 to fifty-nine cents, and when the American occupation came in 1898 went to forty-two cents, its bullion value, and in just three years the curtain was rung down on the farce of maintenance of parity by use. The illustration is all the more striking when we remember that in two out of three of these years the balance of trade with the world has been in favor of Porto Rico. With unexampled generosity and at great loss to itself the United States is now taking in this money at sixty cents on the dollar, this being its average circulation value during its three years' life, and so as fair as anything could be to debtor and creditor alike.

If the papers report correctly, that the American commission in the Philippine Islands is putting a ten per cent. export tax on Mexican dollars, the reverse of the experiment is now to be tried. Porto Ricans in Porto Rico tried to maintain the value of their silver coinage by stopping its increase. Americans in the Philippines try to prevent the Mexican dollar from an appreciation in value by stopping its export. One attempt proved a failure and the other will, and the producers of the exportable commodities of the Philippines will pay the cost of the experiment.

But it is said we are on a gold basis and that the act of March 14 makes it the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to maintain the parity of the silver dollar. I admit that legally we have the gold standard, but its maintenance is a question of conditions as well as of law. Laws do not enforce themselves.

Other nations in Europe and South America measure values with gold and pay with silver and irredeemable paper. Now, I deny that there is any power given under the act of March 14 to maintain the parity of the silver dollar, but claim that the powers which Secretary Carlisle had under the resumption act, and which he exercised in 1898 to sell bonds for gold, are actually nullified by the act of March 14, and that the powers therein conferred are not only limited and restricted to the redemption of the United States notes alone, but that the authority given under the new law is less than that previously held under the old one.

Let me quote again from a distinguished Senator's explanation of the bill. Referring to the Secretary's power to issue bonds to maintain greenback redemption, he says:

"Therefore this power is only a limitation and not an extension of the power which he now has. It is a power which requires him, under these provisions, first to exhaust other means and methods before he resorts to the extraordinary method of selling bonds for the purpose of maintaining redemption of these notes. So who is there on either side of this Chamber who can criticise this limited power compared to the power now on our statute books? I do not see how any one can criticise this power adversely in view of the existing law, which gives the Secretary unlimited power for a like purpose."

MR. HENRY, of Connecticut: Does my colleague undertake to say that the Secretary of the Treasury would not have this power—

MR. HILL: The power to maintain the parity of the two metals?

MR. HENRY, of Connecticut: Yes, sir.

MR. HILL: He has neither the power nor the means under this new law. He must exhaust the greenbacks and the gold and the current funds of the Treasury before he can issue a bond; and when he issues bonds the proceeds can only be ap-

plied to the redemption of greenbacks and not to the maintenance of the parity of silver with gold. If the gentleman will refer to the law, he will see that I am absolutely right about this matter.

MR. HENRY, of Connecticut : I am not challenging the gentleman's statement.

MR. HILL : I am aware that it has been claimed that under the present law the Secretary can sell bonds for gold, that with this gold he can redeem greenbacks, and that under the power implied in the phrase "for any lawful purpose" he can exchange those greenbacks for silver, and so maintain its parity. The law does not so read, for it specifically provides that bonds can only be issued for the maintenance of the greenback redemption fund, and both gold and greenbacks in the current funds of the Treasury must be exhausted before the right to issue bonds is available.

The test of the law has not yet come. To-day the balance of trade is enormously in our favor ; our revenues are largely in excess of our expenditures, and a river of gold is flowing in upon us. You have but to turn the current the other way to show the weakness of our position and demonstrate the inadequacy of the law to maintain the parity of our two forms of money.

When the bill went from the House it gave discretionary power to the Secretary of the Treasury to coin the bullion in the Treasury into subsidiary coin and concurrently retire the Treasury notes, and thus relieve the gold reserve of the burden of their redemption. As the law now is, after coining about twenty millions of subsidiary the balance is made into full legal-tender dollars, and nearly forty millions of additional liability created by the coinage of the seigniorage. And this notwithstanding the fact that every ounce of that bullion could have been coined into change money and absorbed by our own people, with no probability of its ever being a burden upon the Treasury of the nation. Unless the law is changed in this respect, the time will soon come when we shall have to buy more silver to meet an urgent and pressing demand for small coin.

The truth is that for twenty-two years this country has been engaged in wild and reckless financial experiments, and now when we come to face the results of our own folly we have not the courage to retrace our steps.

We will soon have nearly six hundred millions of legal-tender silver outstanding, full half of which will be shrinkage and promise, and nothing else. Do not prudence and wisdom, and even common honesty, demand that we throw around this the same guaranties and give it the same redemption privileges as have been provided for the greenback currency, and meanwhile reduce the volume by a gradual change to subsidiary coin ?

#### THE GREENBACKS A MENACE.

But there is another feature of our currency system which is sure to prove no less dangerous to the maintenance of the gold standard than the immense volume of silver, and that is the greenback or United States note.

Never in the experience of this generation, at least, has there been any object lesson in finance which has so impressed itself upon the minds of our people as that process of repeated greenback redemption, which has been most fittingly described as "the endless chain," by which, under the compulsory-reissue law, and in a time of deficient revenues, a small volume of greenbacks was kept in continual operation drawing gold from the Treasury.

Again and again the President of the United States has recommended to Congress that when a greenback was once redeemed in gold it should not be paid out again until gold was redeposited for it ; thus, under what was termed the impounding process, practically making legal-tender gold certificates of them.

There is not a school boy in the United States who has ever read the President's recommendation but that knows that the purpose was to break the endless chain by

holding the redeemed greenback until gold came in by voluntary deposit to take its place, so that never again should this great Government be compelled to hawk its bonds before bankers' syndicates to secure the gold to maintain its honor and credit.

Has the endless chain been broken and the possibility of the drainage of the Treasury gold been stopped? By no means; but, on the contrary, it is made the duty of the Treasury itself to procure the gold by exchange or purchase or bond issue, and then the compulsory reissue law is re-enacted in express and specific terms.

I am aware that fifty millions of greenbacks can be redeemed and held in the redemption fund, but when that limit has been reached, the mill begins to grind again and the "endless chain" to revolve.

Here is the danger as it was in 1893. It is true that we have vastly more gold in the Treasury than we had then, but it is also true that through its demand notes the United States stands before all the world offering gold to anyone who wants it, without any power to control the demand by interest rates as the banks of Europe do. The difference between *what is* and *what was intended to be* can be clearly shown.

The Treasury has outstanding to-day more than two hundred and fifty millions of gold certificates, and if every dollar of them was presented for payment to-morrow morning it would disturb nothing but the equanimity of the Treasury clerks who would have to count out the gold. But the presentation of a like amount of greenbacks for gold would shake the financial world.

Now, I do not believe that the conditions of 1893 are soon, if ever, to be repeated in this country; but that panic was caused by presentation of greenbacks for gold at the Treasury, under the belief that with insufficient revenues and an excessive and increasing volume of depreciating silver gold redemption would soon cease and silver take its place.

Every dollar of greenbacks which was outstanding then is outstanding now, and our volume of silver is being increased about forty millions by the coinage of the seigniorage.

To-day our revenues are large, and the balance of trade with other nations is enormously in our favor. *What ought we as prudent men to do?* Drift on in confidence that to day's conditions will never change, or so act now that, in the language of the President, we shall "*insure the continued parity under all conditions between our two forms of metallic money, silver and gold.*"

I do not propose to go into a demonstration of the false economy of the greenback system. It has been shown over and over again that they have been in the past and are to-day costing the country millions upon millions more than any saving made, by being practically a loan without interest. Even if it were true that the system was a financial benefit to the country, *the vicious object lesson in flatism* which it is continually presenting to the people would more than offset any advantage gained. *But above and beyond that* is the greater objection that they make our whole monetary system dependent upon the prosperity of the country and the sufficiency of governmental revenues, when, as a matter of fact, there should be no relation between them and under any proper relations would not be. Does anyone suppose for a moment that a shortage of revenue in Great Britain, no matter how long continued, would in any way affect the validity and soundness of the gold and silver money of Great Britain?

Why should we longer tolerate a system which is strongest when not needed and weakest when reliance is to be put upon it? Prudence, economy, the experience of other nations, and still more bitter experience of our own, demand that behind every dollar of this paper money should be a dollar in gold; and if by some magic power every greenback could be called in and a legal-tender gold certificate issued in lieu thereof to-morrow, I believe every business man and bank and commercial organization, and the Treasury Department itself, would thank God and take courage for the



future which awaits us. Well, why wait for the magician's wand, when the plain common sense of the American people can be infinitely better relied on?

Where is the business man that, with a demand note and a secured loan on long time and at an extremely low rate of interest, both outstanding, would strip himself of funds to take up in advance the long-time paper and permit the other to remain as a perpetual menace to his solvency? And yet this is what the Government is doing, for the sole reason that it has no other way of using its surplus revenue.

I have no doubt that the present redemption fund, together with the surplus of the fiscal years of 1901 and 1902, would be sufficient to enable the Treasury to transfer every United States note into a gold certificate and do away with the burdensome and dangerous greenback system and forever break the "endless chain."

There is another reason why this should be done, and that is for its effect upon the silver and silver certificate. When the demand for gold comes, as come it surely will, it will first manifest itself by the presentation of greenbacks for redemption, and not, as indicated in the debates in the other House, by the cashing of gold certificates. The gold represented by certificates, though nominally held by the Treasury, is actually owned by the holders of the certificates, consisting largely of banks and other financial institutions. Human nature is much the same there as elsewhere, and the Treasury gold rather than their own will be the first drawn upon. That this is true is shown by the fact that in the nine months since March 14, 1900, thirty-two millions of greenbacks and Treasury notes have been redeemed in gold, and yet in the same time gold certificates have been increased by \$45,000,000.

With the greenback out of the way, the natural tendency would be to use the gold certificates held in the bank reserves and by moneyed institutions on which to draw gold rather than to gather up small silver certificates, even if they were exchangeable for gold, and present them for that purpose. Indeed, if the greenbacks were changed into the gold certificates of large denominations it is doubtful if silver or silver certificates could be gathered together in sufficient quantities to produce any strain upon the Treasury, even if they were exchangeable for gold, so that making such exchange compulsory would, under these circumstances, be largely a matter of sentiment.

\* \* \* \* \*

The act of March 14, 1900, was a long step forward toward a sound currency in this country. Its declaration for the gold dollar as our standard unit of value alone justified its enactment. For the first time in our history it put gold into a bond as a means of payment, and thereby lowered the interest rate. It strengthened the greenback redemption fund and provided for its maintenance. It loosened the rigid restrictions upon our National banking system, *but it did not repeal the compulsory reissue law of greenbacks, it did not break the "endless chain," and it did not provide any means for maintaining the parity of the silver dollars or arrange for the reduction of their excessive volume.* Until these things are done the permanency of the gold standard is not assured and the will of the American people has not been met by their Representatives in Congress.

#### PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE LAW.

Now, what are the remedies for this condition?

I venture to suggest something in the line of the following as perhaps worthy of some consideration as a basis for our action:

First. Whenever greenbacks are redeemed in gold they shall not be reissued, but shall be cancelled, and when the gold has been secured, either by redeposit or under the provisions of the present law, legal-tender gold certificates in like amount shall be issued in lieu thereof. All gold certificates should be made a legal tender. The provisions of the present law for the maintenance of the gold redemption fund should

be made to apply to keeping it at the same relative proportion to the remaining greenbacks which it now bears to their present volume.

Second. The silver bullion in the Treasury and enough of the legal-tender silver dollars to meet the requirements of the people should be recoined into subsidiary coin and all surplus legal-tender silver made exchangeable for gold at the will of the holder.

If this is done, the burden of greenback redemption will be thrown off and of maintenance of silver parity greatly lessened.

If England needs \$3 per capita of change money and Germany \$3.50 per capita, we can float a like amount, and that means two hundred and seventy millions instead of one hundred, as now provided.

The coinage of the Treasury bullion into subsidiary coin has been earnestly recommended by the Treasury for a long time, and the Committee on Coinage has reported favorably upon it for the past two sessions.

Mr. Chairman, other gentlemen may have better and far more effective plans for strengthening the gold-standard law. The President of the United States and the Secretary of the Treasury recommend some action at this session of Congress. The New York Chamber of Commerce, on December 8, declared as follows :

[Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York. Founded A. D. 1768.]

At the monthly meeting of the Chamber of Commerce, held Thursday, December 6, 1900, the following preamble and resolutions, reported by its committee on finance and currency, were unanimously adopted :

*Whereas*, the President of the United States in his annual message has expressed the hope and the wish that Congress will provide whatever further legislation is needed to insure the continued parity, under all conditions, between our two forms of metallic money, silver and gold : and

*Whereas*, in the various discussions relating to the gold standard, made during the late Presidential campaign, it became evident that the action of Congress in March of this year, declaring for the gold standard, and providing for the redemption or payment in gold of United States notes and Treasury notes, made no provision for making as good as gold the silver currency of the country ; and owing to this fact, grave fears were entertained lest the accession to administration of a party committed to the free coinage of silver might be followed by an attempt to force the country upon a silver basis in advance of any legislation to that effect ; and

*Whereas*, we are confident that the mercantile interests of the nation, as well as the interests of every individual, and particularly wage-earners, demand that the gold standard shall continue and be known to be permanently established as the basis of our currency system, and believe it to be a grave necessity that the matter should now be eliminated from partisan discussion by the passage of suitable legislation at the present short session of Congress, when no election is pending or near at hand to be considered ; and

*Whereas*, the recent election has shown conclusively that the majority of the people of this country are in favor of the maintenance of the gold standard and a sound currency ; and

*Whereas*, we believe prompt action on the part of Congress to remove any question of doubt as to the right to substitute silver for gold will be hailed with satisfaction by the people, and add another strong link to the confidence which now exists throughout the nation : Therefore be it

*Resolved*, That the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York respectfully request and urge upon Congress the vital importance of adopting at the present session a bill authorizing and directing the Secretary of the Treasury to exchange gold coin for any other money issued or coined by the United States whenever it may be necessary to do so.

*Resolved*, That a copy of the foregoing preamble and resolution be sent to the President of the United States, the members of his Cabinet, and to each member of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

Attest : GEORGE WILSON, *Secretary*.

MORRIS K. JESUP, *President*.

NEW YORK, December 8, 1900.

What are we going to do about it? Other measures are pressing for right of way. Subsidies, ship canals, irrigation schemes, armies, and fleets, all putting greater burdens upon the people and involving the Government in greater obligations, and no man can guess the ultimate cost. Along with these comes an urgent demand for reduced taxation, and no man can estimate accurately the net income remaining.

Is it not wise, is it not prudent, to establish our currency system beyond the possibility of failure before we subject it to the test which surely awaits it? But this test is one for which we alone are responsible. There will be another which will come from without.

Our rivals to-day in the race for the industrial supremacy of the world are Great Britain and Germany. One is already in condition and the other preparing for the greatest contest which the world has ever seen. It will be one which will tax all of our energy, all of our resources, all of our strength. We can and will win, but to do it we must meet the enemy on his own battle ground with equal weapons, and at the same time be impregnable to attack at home.

The world's best money is none too good with which to fight the world.

## CAN BANK DEFALCATIONS BE PREVENTED?

---

In the attempt to answer this question the writer desires, at the outset, to say that after every known precaution has been taken against defalcations, a shrewd thief will find a way to cover up his method of stealing for a shorter or longer period, according to his ability. It would, therefore, be folly to assert that defalcations can be made impossible.

It is the purpose of the writer to call attention to the open doors for defalcations that now exist in some banks and to show why and how those doors should be closed, thus making speculation more difficult and less frequent.

Perhaps the most fatal mistake which the officials of a bank make is that of overconfidence in the honesty of their employees.

It is absolutely essential that those in charge of the bank's funds should be trusted, but that does not signify that no precautions should be taken against defalcations. Lack of precaution opens the door and makes it easy for one, who is inclined, to steal.

It is clearly the duty of the officials of every bank to bond their employees in some strong surety company, and not require the clerk or officer to furnish a personal surety, which has so often proved to be of no value. Surety companies know no mercy and the possible defaulter is often deterred from stealing because of his knowledge of that fact. There are quite a number of banks which have not adopted this precaution. All well managed banks bond their employees as a wise precautionary measure.

### FAULTY SYSTEMS OF BOOKKEEPING.

Another reason for defalcations is found in the faulty systems of bookkeeping which some banks use. They have a system which THEY consider good and they will not adopt any new ideas. They have done business at the old stand, in the same old way for many years, and when improvements are suggested they reply, "Oh, we get along all right; we are satisfied with our system." Some of them have learned when too late that their "good-enough-for-us" system has been good enough for some one in their employ to rob them of thousands of dollars while they were taking comfort in their easy way of running the bank.

Recent defalcations have caused many bank officers to look into their methods of bookkeeping, resulting in changes that will make defalcations far more difficult and less frequent. A good system of books contains a check against every known opportunity for stealing. Such a system every bank should have. A bank that fails in this respect is defective.

Each State should enact laws giving its Commissioner of Banking power to require banks doing business under State charters to adopt every known precaution against possible defalcations, and Congress should enlarge the powers of the Comptroller of the Currency in this direction, so that he could compel National banks to repair any defects which he may find in their systems.

### PROPER COMPENSATION OF EMPLOYEES.

Again, many banks make the mistake of underpaying their employees. The writer is acquainted with many Cashiers and clerks, who hold responsible positions, who are paid but little more than a motorman. It is impossible for some of these

men to pay family expenses and save any money, and the temptation to steal is constantly before them. At this point some men have faltered and fallen. The directors of a bank have a duty to perform to the clerks and officers as well as to the stockholders. Too often, in the desire to pay large dividends and to make a big showing of profits, they overlook their duty to their employees. This should not be. A bank that is well managed takes care of both stockholders and employees. Pay a man well and he will work with a will. Poor pay works destruction.

#### DUTIES OF OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS.

Again, careless management on the part of the directors or executive officers or both has been the cause of some defalcations. The directors of the bank, by a committee, should make one or more careful examinations of the bank's affairs each year. They should count the cash, make a total of the loans and discounts and see that the notes are genuine, and check up the securities to see if they are correct as stated by the general ledgers, and verify the bank balances on both sides of the bank's statement. This committee should check up all large balances on the individual ledger. They should also inform themselves as to the character and habits of their employees and embody their findings on these points in their reports to the board. One thorough examination each year is far better than a greater number of superficial examinations. Nearly all banks are weak at this point, and defaulters have taken advantage of this weakness to work their pet schemes.

In the handling of trust funds there ought not to be any carelessness on the part of those entrusted with their care, and it is the solemn duty of the directors of a bank to inquire into and know for themselves exactly how the bank is managed, and if they find careless management on the part of the executive officers, or a poor system of books, they should use the authority vested in them to correct these matters so that defalcations may not be encouraged, but made difficult, if not impossible. Depositors and stockholders of a bank have a right to insist that the men who occupy the positions of directors shall be more than mere figureheads. They should be directors in fact as well as in name.

It is no infrequent thing to read in the public prints an account of a defalcation in a bank, and the public mind is shocked to learn that many defaulters are able to carry on their stealing for years without detection. To the outsider it is a matter of wonder how, if a bank is properly managed, it is possible for such a thing to exist.

There is a large amount of responsibility resting upon the directors of a bank that is in some banks not met at all and in many cases it is shifted to the shoulders of some one else. It is hoped the day is not far distant when directors will direct and officers will adopt every precaution against defalcations, thus making them of infrequent occurrence.

The writer has endeavored to point out some of the reasons for defalcations and how they may be prevented. It should be borne in mind that many men with keen intellects never rise higher than a clerkship. In many banks there are as bright men among the clerks as can be found among the officers, and it is a noticeable fact that defaulters are to be found among the bright men, and so if defalcations are to be prevented it follows that the men who direct the affairs of the bank shall be wide awake to the importance of closing every open door and making it as difficult as possible for any new doors to be opened.

WILLIAM HOWARD BRYAN,  
*National Bank Examiner.*

NEW YORK, January 2, 1901.

## THE AMERICAN BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

---

### *SOME RECENT TENDENCIES IN ITS MANAGEMENT.*

---

To one who has generally been present from the first to the last meeting of the American Bankers' Association and who appreciates the benefits derived therefrom, and realizes the good work done, with the expectation of its continuance, there seems to be an unfortunate drifting away from the legitimate objects for which the association was organized.

The purposes of the association were clearly expressed in the presentation of its constitution by the following declaration :

"In order to promote the general welfare and usefulness of banks and banking institutions, and to secure uniformity of action, together with the practical benefits to be derived from personal acquaintance, and from the discussion of subjects of importance to the commercial and banking interests of the country; and especially in order to secure the proper consideration of questions regarding the financial and commercial usages, customs and laws which affect the banking interests of the entire country, we have to submit the following constitution and by-laws for the American Bankers' Association."

It is because of the marked departure from these premises as laid down, that with the best intention and kindest motive, the writer frankly ventures to mention some of the changes which have gradually taken place, and questions whether it is in the right direction for the ultimate good of the association and the influence that such a body should exert.

In contrast with the declaration made, and the work of the earlier conventions, is the manifest disposition of a comparative few to make up the slate—"fix things" as the active secretary terms it, for the nominations—practically the election of officers—the advisable course ?

In politics it is expected that those in office will endeavor to keep there, or that their party friends at least shall have places of profit and honor, to the exclusion of the opposition; delegates from the local caucus up to the national conventions are selected for this purpose—that's what they are there for; but a convention of bankers, assembled for the purposes declared, where every member is a delegate and entitled to equal voice, is there need for coaching, button-holing, lining-up or special exertion on the part of any one to commit another to favor any preconceived plan for securing the election of any particular person, this for the simple honor conferred? I think not.

Honorable as a position may be, its value is materially lessened when sought and obtained through personal solicitation, or the undue influence of officials whose duties are not in that direction.

It is safe to say that both at Cleveland and Richmond more interest was shown in the choice of candidates for office than any other subject presented for consideration.

From the date of the St. Louis convention this has been more and more disclosed each succeeding year, and such a condition of affairs largely detracts from the legitimate business for which the meetings are held. With the increased and capable membership, there should be no direct continuance in office, other than by promotion, and even the usual custom of moving up the vice-president into the presidency is sometimes not for the best interests of the association. A fair distribution of the honors should be made with due reference to locality, keeping in mind always the fitness of men for the positions to which they are called.

Open nominations for the principal offices, viz.: president, vice-president and the members of the executive council chosen by the convention, would be more democratic than the present method of nominations by a committee. Nothing should be done in a corner. Under a simple order of procedure as customary in deliberative bodies, let the roll of States be called for nominations, and then at the proper time vote for these several nominees by ballot. This plan would take but little time; would take away the business of the advance "slate-maker," remove every vestige of objection to the methods of electing officers, and allow delegates their undoubted right of having a voice in the matter.

The American Bankers' Association is not a political organization, nor a herd of office-seekers, and it were better that the office should seek the man. More work for measures and less for men would surely add to the profit of the association.

Another question. The limited time of the annual conventions is none too long for the deliberate discussion of the important topics presented; there are but few whose experience and views are not worth knowing, and none too old to learn. Were there but one or two special addresses and more of open discussion, it would more instruct and better satisfy a majority of members.

It was evident at Richmond that had a reasonable time been given for the discussion of some of the measures proposed and hastily disposed of, it might have changed the result. The haste shown in changing the constitution may be cited as an example. Had time been given to express the views of members, it is thought that a majority would have preferred that each State having a State association should nominate its own members of the executive council, thus giving all a representation in that body, which would then consist of as many members as there may be organized State associations. Such a system would but slightly increase the membership of the council, and do away with the objectionable features here criticised.

As the constitution now stands, the elections are an object of too much strife, and not a little dissatisfaction is caused thereby.

Another drift is that along the current of social entertainments. Pride of location and desire to do no less than others have done in this direction prompt the local fraternity to entertain the guests with too liberal hospitality; too much has been done, perhaps too much expected, unless the association bears the entire expense. For some time past the executive council has appropriated a considerable amount each year toward the entertainment expenses, the local committee at the city where the convention is held paying the balance.

While all appreciate the cordial greeting and are grateful for the good cheer extended and pleasure derived from this service, it well may be asked whether the annual meetings are not held more for pleasure than the originally intended profit, and whether, as an institution of business men, its proceedings are not now looked upon as of less importance than heretofore. We are told that the social feature draws many into membership, increases the attendance and the funds, and popularizes the association generally. With some it may, but the protective and instructive benefits are pre-eminently more important, and add much more to the value of membership, than all the entertainments so lavishly provided.

The quality of the proceedings is quite as important as the quantity of members in the conventions. Some spice improves the flavor of substantial food, as some recreation better fits one for work; so there should be a medium, with a sense of propriety in the action of the association, if it expects to maintain a dignified standing as a deliberate body of experienced financiers, and command the respect and influence it ought.

Finally, should it not more closely adhere to its declared purpose?

MADISON, Wis., Dec. 24, 1900.

N. B. VAN SLYKE.

## THE EDUCATIONAL MOVEMENT AMONG BANK CLERKS.

---

### WHAT IS BEING DONE IN SAINT LOUIS.

---

*Editor Bankers' Magazine :*

SIR: Your valuable publication has recently allotted unusually much space to the subject of providing for the better education of bank clerks. Although the idea itself has for a long time been recognized as of importance, it is only recently that definite moves are being made toward crystallizing and reducing it from theoretical flights of fancy to a well defined, tangible proposition. The proceedings of the American Bankers' Association at its late meeting in Richmond have served to bring us near a practical solution of this question, and the valuable work of the committee on education, reported fully in print and distributed broadcast, cannot be praised too highly.

The subject has already been so ably stated in your columns that it may appear unnecessary to add anything further, unless something strikingly new can be suggested. While this would be quite beyond my scope, I feel that possibly a simple statement from the quarter interested, I mean the vast army of American bank clerks, would find some attention. Everything said heretofore came from the pens of our most eminent bankers, men who have probably many years ago graduated from the ranks, and when in service there were laboring under decidedly different circumstances. Not that their efforts are for that reason less appreciated; but on the contrary great credit is due them for considering the matter.

We have in this country an excellent example in the work done by the Minneapolis bank clerks, as will readily be seen by referring to the committee's report. Why should not others be in a position to do likewise, organize those at work in the financial institutions of our cities and afford them an opportunity to learn what otherwise, by individual effort, would be a mere piecemeal attempt at gaining knowledge?

This is the way a small group of St. Louis bank clerks argued. The results of such an undertaking could be figured out with almost mathematical precision, and so work was commenced and after much soliciting and corresponding the Bank Clerks' Economic Society of St. Louis exists to-day, regularly organized with a total membership of 100.

To show the good will and intentions, the second section of the society's constitution was worded as follows: "Its primary object shall be the educational advancement of the members in such branches of law and science as appertain to the business of banking; such object to be accomplished either independently, in co-operation with the American Bankers' Association or such others as may design plans for the same purposes."

In other words, we are simply preparing the ground for the good work of the committee on education. While at present perfectly organized in every respect, the moment the American Bankers' Association is ready to propose definite plans, the society intends to adopt them.

Many suggestions have been made regarding the administration of this St. Louis organization, and at the instance of Mr. G. W. Garrels, President of the Franklin Bank, the following course has been decided upon.

Regular meetings are to be held every two weeks, and a systematic course on commercial law under the instruction of an experienced attorney will be taken. It is not the intention to make a lecture course as ordinarily understood out of this. As has been pointed out before, a lecture pure and simple does not give the individual an opportunity to assert his views, and the fundamental principle of all educational schemes like this one is to preserve and develop individuality and prevent the man from becoming a mere machine.

As outlined at present the evening will be divided as follows: First a half-hour or so spent in listening to the instructor's remarks on the subject matter at hand. To follow that, quizzing and arguing under the rules of debate, and possibly the deliverance of a discourse prepared in advance by an active member of the society; and lastly, the arranging of a set of questions to be worked out for the following meeting.

The above is to constitute the regular programme. Aside from this it is intended to arrange for a series of addresses by prominent financiers and business men on various topics of interest to bank employees. No doubt but little difficulty will be experienced in this direction.

Examinations will probably not be a feature. While theoretically they may be well to the point, the difference between individual members so far as general education is concerned, as well as the varying intellectual scope, would be apt to work hardships. The supposition is that these financial "students" are entering the society voluntarily, hence their good intentions alone should be respected. Every one will make such progress as his ambition and time permit, and if there should be any who failed to take full advantage of all the opportunities presented, the damage would revert to them.

On the other hand, close attention and intelligent work would of their own accord become evident, and after all we must not expect, for a while at least, that a written examination taken with high honors in a more or less experimental school will admit the graduate to the lucrative positions in our banks. While such a civil-service course would be desirable, at present it does not appear to be practicable.

Evidently this question of educating the bank clerks (and all will admit its importance) needs considerably more advertising before it will be looked upon as a necessity. We found in our local work considerable apathy, not to say indifference, and although this has been quite offset by the kindness of a number of our eminent officials, no one ought to misunderstand the purpose.

This is a specializing age. The man in his particular line of business must not only understand it, but he must also be able to represent it in such a way as to meet and defeat the ever and ever keener growing competition of the day. The banker above all others must be a man well versed in the branches of commerce he deals with, and in that respect he needs a broader, farther-reaching education than is necessary in most any other business. But this same banker, who must be such a versatile individual, cannot wait until some board of directors thrusts the honor of an official position upon him. He cannot expect then suddenly to take to books and instructors to learn what long ago already should have been familiar subjects with him. If he comes from the ranks, and probably most of our officers do, it was his duty there to gain an insight into the intricacies and the technicalities of his profession, and he will surely be considered a preferable candidate if he has taken advantage of his opportunities in this respect.

Not alone, however, for an official career in a bank should the clerk prepare himself. He may fill an honorable position in any financial institution to the full satisfaction of both himself and his employers without the distinguished title that seems so desirable a prize to many. His knowledge will serve him as well without it.

Get another view. The best man to deal with among a bank's customers is he



who knows the ins and outs as well as do the Cashier, teller and bookkeeper, and if a bank clerk resigns his position to go into business or to accept a mercantile career, the knowledge he gained in the bank will always serve him well, and if he has seen fit to supplement his practical experience by the pursuit of proper studies, he will be the better off for it.

Our St. Louis society congratulates itself on having secured the consent of the following gentlemen to act as an advisory committee:

Walker Hill, President American Exchange Bank, ex-president American Bankers' Association; Breckinridge Jones, First Vice-President and Counsel Mississippi Valley Trust Company; G. W. Garrels, President Franklin Bank; Geo. A. Held, Cashier International Bank; Chas. Hamilton, Secretary Lincoln Trust Company.

The good will and support of quite a number of others has been promised. The entire matter is an assured success and nothing should prevent the organization of a national system of such societies, as is contemplated.

Since your interest in these affairs has been a sincere one, I take the liberty of informing you of the progress we have made here, and remain,

Very truly,

R. M. RICHTER,

*President Bank Clerks' Economic Society of St. Louis.*

ST. LOUIS, Dec. 31, 1900.

## KNOX'S HISTORY OF BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES.

### OPINIONS AS TO THE MERITS OF THE WORK.

BROOKLYN (N. Y.) STANDARD UNION: The victorious close of the thirty years' "holy war" for the maintenance of the gold standard and the establishment of sound currency in the United States, is a fitting occasion for the publication of the great work of the man who, unaided and alone, had the courage to begin the fight, though his life ended eight years before final success was attained. That Mr. Knox held during his official and his private life the very first rank as a financier was long ago demonstrated, and the course of banking in the United States could have had no worthier, more appreciative, nor more competent historian.

The work which Mr. Knox had projected, though terminated by his untimely death, was so far advanced and its plans so clearly outlined, that the duty upon his successors was definite and readily understood. Mr. Rhodes, whose *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* has long testified to his ample qualifications for the work laid down by Mr. Knox, has worthily performed that portion which has devolved upon him, and the complete history is at once an adequate and symmetrical review of the financial history of the United States from the beginning.

The work has been carried out with sound judgment of proportions; the National bank system has been, in the first place, thoroughly and exhaustively treated; then the State banks with their histories, their evolutions and revolutions, so that the student or historian, whether he reads for general information, for the current and drift of the financial progress of the country, is carried in a steadily flowing stream; or whether he seeks precise and definite information concerning some historic or important incident, some "high" or "low" point of statistics, or a critical stage in legislation, finds readily and exactly what he desires.

All this work, as is proper and becoming, is without conscious bias, and enables the intelligent reader to draw sound and just conclusions from a country whose number of banks and variety of systems exceed every other in the world.

Many valuable statistical tables, nowhere else available, and running back over a long series of years, are also given, so that the book, as a whole, stands as a cyclopedia to date of all that is of permanent historic interest of the evolution of the financial system of our country.

The end of the century; the termination of the gold-silver-greenback struggle, all mark the epoch, and the publishers have chosen a fortunate time in which to present their work to the public.

An excellent portrait of ex-Comptroller Knox, accompanied by a carefully prepared biographical sketch, together with portraits of Morris, Hamilton, Girard, Gallatin, Biddle, McCulloch, Chase and Sherman, the great national financiers and legislators, the impression of whose work was felt by the whole country, also enhance the interest and value of the work which has so thoroughly exhausted the subject that any which follow it must inevitably take up special departments and incidental topics, rather than broad fields of national banking and commercial development.

## COLLECTION OF COUNTRY CHECKS.

---

The methods that have been adopted for the collection of country checks have all been more or less expensive for the city banks, upon whom has fallen the burden of collecting. This is shown in the rulings of the New York and Boston clearing-houses to charge exchange to their customers on nearly all points. This has occasioned much vigorous remonstrance on the part of the country banks and customers of the banks generally. Many thousands of dollars of deposits have been transferred from New York to Philadelphia and other cities where collecting is done at the expense of the city banks.

That the present method of collecting is expensive is evident from the number of banks through which many of the checks pass in order to reach their destination. Very often a check will go through a half-dozen banks, and, of course, each of those banks must credit and charge and endorse every check, making an amount of unnecessary labor in handling that would be difficult to estimate.

The city banks are striving to get as many direct correspondents among the country banks as they can, in order to collect rapidly, and in the hope of getting new accounts and an increase of deposit balances. It is doubtful if much is really accomplished in this direction, as the country bank balances are not thereby increased much, considered as a whole. The tendency is to divide the balances and multiply the accounts without compensating gain except in the betterment of collection facilities.

There is a vast number of accounts kept among banks, for collection purposes only, that are of no profit to any one.

The lack of economy here manifested is in striking contrast to the skill shown by industrial enterprises, in other lines of business, through their organization into combinations for the reduction of expenses.

From a good business standpoint, the end to be aimed at in collecting checks is to get them to the paying bank and secure the returns in the shortest possible time and at the least possible cost.

As a means to this end, I would suggest that the clearing-houses in several of the largest cities in the United States adopt a plan for collecting checks on out-of-town banks substantially as follows :

All checks are to be collected by a department of the clearing-house. The member banks are to send to this department their collections daily at an appointed hour in the afternoon, and receive therefor a certificate for the total amount of the bunch. This certificate the bank is to put through the regular clearing-house on the following morning. When the checks are all in, they are to be sorted and sent directly to the bank on which they are drawn, as nearly as possible.

This is done in the name of the city bank, which the country bank has previously designated as its principal correspondent, and a debit certificate is made to correspond with the letter, reading something like this : "There has been forwarded to the ——— Bank of ——— checks and cash items amounting to \$——, for the credit of ——— Bank."

These debit slips are to be sorted and taken by the clearing-house officials and put through to balance the credit certificates brought in by the banks.

When received from the clearing-house, along with the regular clearings, these debit slips are charged up to the country bank accounts as though they were checks.

The expense of this system would be met by assessments on the member banks in proportion to amounts collected for them, and the cost would naturally be less than it is by the present individual methods of collecting.

E. H. WILKINS.

PORTLAND, CT., Dec. 28, 1900.

## ESSENTIALS OF SUCCESS IN A BANKING CAREER.

Some of the essential qualifications for a successful banking career are thus stated by "A Branch Bank Manager," in the "Journal of the Institute of Bankers," of New South Wales:

"The essential qualifications for a successful banking career, as indeed for any career, are not to be attained except as the result of patient labor and work; and my belief is that men who aspire to high positions in the bank, as in other walks in life, must attain their object step by step. The knowledge fitting them for promotion must come to them little by little. Knowledge acquired by reading, study or experience may not be of immediate use, but will yield its fruit in due season, often unexpectedly and at opportune time. Sooner or later it will be found that knowledge acquired in past years can now be assimilated and made use of. Therefore, to obtain the essential qualification for a banking career the preparation should commence in boyhood, and be carried on to the period which then appears so remote, the period for retirement from active work; and the best guarantee for a vigorous, intellectual old age is not in sloth but in mental activity.

But what are the qualifications for a successful career? I take them to be as follows:

1. Stability of character.
2. Education and the possession of business ability.
3. Address and manner.
4. Experience and the power of applying it.
5. The attainment of a certain amount of social position.

For a successful banking career all the above qualifications are essential in a degree, and, granted stability of character, conspicuous ability in any one particular branch of banking should be a proof of a capacity to carry out with sufficient ability the multitudinous duties devolving upon the bank officer, and his fitness intellectually for his position.

1. *Stability of Character.*—The result largely of heredity and early training, may yet be greatly influenced by the exercise of our will power, the choice of our friends and the class of books we read, to say nothing of the higher restraints of religion and philosophical research.

2. *Education and Business Ability.*—In the present age these qualifications are within the grasp of every one who has sufficient determination; for our public libraries and technical colleges are open to all: education pursued rationally and with due regard to health undoubtedly strengthens the intellect.

3. *Address and Manner.*—Innate, but if we have not the virtue better assume it if we can.

4. *Experience.*—Time and opportunity only can yield us this qualification.

5. *The Influence of Friends.*—We can all choose our friends, and if we have stability of character, education, address and manner, and experience we are not likely to lack friends, who will not forever allow us to hide our candle under a bushel.

But why is stability of character so essential a qualification? Because opportunities for fraud are great; because to lack stability, to be unreliable, counts—and rightly and necessarily so—in the bank's eyes as the one unpardonable sin.

*Education and the attainment of brain power.*—Because in the present age, when we live so fast, our highest officials must live and work even more rapidly. They have to deal daily with an enormous amount of correspondence, hence the extreme desirability that their subordinate officers should have the capacity to grasp their meaning and intention, and in replying be able to express themselves in terse and lucid language.

Herbert Spencer, in an interesting essay entitled the 'Philosophy of Style,' points out how necessary it is in these days to economize the time and attention of our readers, and, by many happy illustrations, makes his meaning clear. He thinks that the secret of a good style of composition lies in the writer's appreciation of this fact, and in his ability to convey the full purport of his thoughts to his readers with as little mental effort to them as possible, and in a few plain Saxon words, as more readily understood than those of Latin origin. Most sentences bring before the reader's mind a succession of pictures, clear or indistinct in proportion to the writer's gift as an author; and it should be our aim to photograph correct mental images at once, so that time may not be lost and the attention wearied in revising the impression later on.

*Address and Manner.*—Because the public generally form their estimate of the worth of the book by its cover, and it is only given to a very few of our most intimate friends to read us through and through. Therefore it is that the cover, which hides our many qualifications or disqualifications, is so necessary, and should be attractive and not repellant.

*Experience.*—Because, however well read we may be, however strong our intellectual powers, however reliable our character, however attractive our manner, we need to learn expediency; we need to find out that, with the world as at present constituted, the theoretically right is often impracticable; we need to see, as Herbert Spencer points out in his magnificent essay on 'Prison Ethics,' that at present we must be chiefly interested in the *relatively* right and not in the *absolutely* right. That is to say, that we can only aim to act in the best way under circumstances as they exist at that time, and that we cannot successfully shape our course undeviatingly in any one direction, however desirable such a course might be."

## AN OLD AND SUCCESSFUL TRUST COMPANY.

---

The New York Life Insurance and Trust Company, at 52 Wall street, is virtually the oldest of all the trust companies. It is one of the most interesting of the great financial institutions of America, both on account of its antiquity, and its curiously specialized line of business. It was chartered in the year 1830, and therefore became the earliest life insurance company in the State of New York, and the pioneer of that wonderful group of insurance companies whose business and resources are now of such enormous proportions. Its originator and first President was William Bard, an enthusiast in the then new field of life insurance, and for many years a widely-known and respected authority on all matters connected therewith, being succeeded January 1, 1843, by Stephen Allen, who had also a notable reputation in political life. June 3, 1845, John R. Townsend became President, and was succeeded April 1846, by David Thompson, during whose long and prosperous rule the company began to develop its present position of power. In 1871 the presidency was conferred upon Henry Parish, under whose administration of over a quarter of a century vast progress has been made.

The New York Life Insurance and Trust Company is now the foremost corporation in the world in the management of private trusts, such as come from wills, deeds of trust and similar documents. It avoids railroad and corporation trusts, and thus escapes the perils attendant upon widespread financial convulsions. The business in life insurance, once so important a feature, has been largely reduced, this reduction having begun soon after the year 1840, when the great mutual companies came into existence. In this regard, its history resembles those of the two other famous corporations which arose about the same time, and are still in existence—the Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance Company and the Pennsylvania Company for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities.

The company's building stands on the site of the United States Branch Bank, which was erected in 1797, and bought in 1812 by the City Bank, from which the New York Life Insurance and Trust Company purchased half the estate. A new building was erected here in 1838, and replaced in 1867 by still another, which was largely extended in 1888. The original corner-stone of the United States Branch Bank, with its long inscription (see accompanying illustration), is sacredly preserved in the directors' room.

The company does not take mercantile deposits, but receives and allows interest on deposits from executors, trustees, treasurers of religious and benevolent societies, and lawyers and other persons acting in a fiduciary capacity. Its annuity business has been kept up, and shows a continuous enlargement. Aside from its large and profitable investments in State stocks, in railroad bonds of the highest grade, in bonds and mortgages, etc., the company always keeps several million dollars in cash in its impregnable vaults, so as to be at all times superior to the shocks which agitate "the street." The conservative policy of the present administration is proven successful by the market price of the stock, which is between \$1,300 and \$1,400 per share, on an original par value of \$100. The permanence of this prosperous policy is ensured by the method of electing the trustees, which is done, not by the stockholders, but by the trustees themselves, who thus stand as a self-perpetuating body. By its charter, the trustees must be citizens of New York. Henry Parish is President; Walter Kerr, First Vice-President; Henry Parish, Jr., Second Vice President; Geo. M. Corning, Secretary, and Z. W. Van Zelm, Assistant Secretary. The trustees are :

William W. Astor, Edmund L. Baylies, Geo. S. Bowdoin, William E. Dodge, Stuyvesant Fish, Henry C. Hulbert, C. O'Donnell Iselin, H. Van Rensselaer Kennedy, W. Emlen Roosevelt, Wm. C. Schermerhorn, Frederic W. Stevens, Rutherford



CORNER-STONE U. S. BRANCH BANK.

Stuyvesant, Charles G. Thompson, Henry A. C. Taylor, Henry Parish, Henry I. Barbey, John Jacob Astor, Joseph H. Choate, Samuel Thorne, John L. Cadwalader, Augustus D. Juilliard, Henry Lewis Morris, George G. De Witt, Cornelius Vanderbilt.

An idea of the company's standing may be had from the following semi-annual statement, made to the State Banking Department at the close of business June 30, 1900:

ASSETS.		LIABILITIES.	
Real estate.....	\$565,000.00	Capital.....	\$1,000,000.00
Bonds and mortgages.....	3,088,537.00	Surplus and undivided profits...	2,514,863.80
Loans on collaterals.....	6,061,387.99	Deposits in trust.....	31,180,416.35
Bills receivable.....	12,733,955.45	Annuity fund.....	1,254,207.63
Cash in company's vaults.....	1,425,000.00	Life insurance fund.....	405,021.22
Cash in bank.....	1,723,525.82	Interest due depositors, taxes, etc.....	608,828.19
Accrued interest, rents, sus- pense account, etc.....	705,597.81		
Bonds and stocks (market value)	11,655,383.62		
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$37,963,337.19</b>	<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$37,963,337.19</b>

## NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

---

[All books mentioned in the following notices will be supplied at the publishers' lowest rates on application to BRADFORD RHODES & Co, 87 Maiden Lane, New York.]

---

**THE UNITED STATES IN THE ORIENT.** By CHARLES A. CONANT. Boston and New York : Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

In the necessity for finding an outlet for marketing surplus products and to provide for the productive investment of saved capital, the author finds the principal explanation of the desire to expand our territory and trade in the Pacific. He devotes his attention largely to a discussion of the economic problems involved in the situation of affairs in which the country has been placed by recent events, and points out with great care and generally with scientific precision the conditions precedent to the mastery of the markets now more widely opened to American commerce than ever before.

It is a notable fact that the bankers of this country have been heretofore reluctant to enter the foreign field, and Congress has seemed to take the view that it would be dangerous to charter a bank with the privilege of establishing branches abroad. Mr. Conant states that it is essential that the system of furnishing credit should be greatly improved if our manufacturers are to be equipped most effectually to hold their own in competition with other nations whose banking systems are highly developed. He says that "A banking system capable of conducting great transactions through branches in all parts of the world is almost as essential to financial supremacy as a definite monetary standard."

Occasionally the author betrays a disposition to dogmatize, as witness the following :

"Old restrictions upon trade, and useless superstitions, must be abandoned in the contest for commercial supremacy. The policy of protection must be adapted by its friends to the new conditions, or it must be abandoned. Protection may be useful in stimulating infant industries : it becomes a relic of mediævalism when it stimulates production which has already become excessive, and which can find an outlet only in a field which protection cannot enter."

Upon the whole, however, few economic writers show less bias or more candor in discussing questions which have been subjects of controversy. Mr. Conant's clearness and force in presenting his facts and arguments, and his wide information in respect to the matters under consideration, render the work an interesting and valuable contribution toward the right solution of problems of present and far-reaching importance to the people of the United States.

---

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH CONVENTION OF THE MARYLAND BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

Through the courtesy of Secretary Lawrence B. Kemp the MAGAZINE has received a copy of the Proceedings of the Fifth Convention of the Maryland Bankers' Association, held at the Blue Mountain House, July 11 and 12. The pamphlet is handsomely printed and bound in gold—a fitting color, as the first act of the association when it was organized in 1896 was the passage of a strong gold-standard resolution, which has been reaffirmed at every subsequent meeting. The last convention was notable for a joint meeting with the Pennsylvania Bankers' Association.

# NATIONAL AND STATE BANKS IN NEW YORK.

## THEIR GROWTH IN RECENT YEARS.

Tables showing the growth of the National and State banks of New York in the past few years are presented on following pages.

In studying these tables it should be borne in mind that the character of the business done by the banks varies greatly, and this affects the rate of increase. Many of the institutions reported do a purely local business, and are outside of the influences that have built up some of the others. Those that finance Stock Exchange operations and carry the accounts of out-of-town banks naturally show the greatest gain.

Absorption of other banks has been partly responsible for some of the phenomenal advances made—notably in the case of the National City, National Bank of Commerce, Western National, and the Corn Exchange. Remarkable increases are to be noted at the National Park, Hanover, Chase and many others.

The table given below summarizes the expansion shown in the larger tables:

NEW YORK CITY BANKS—COMPARISON OF PRINCIPAL ITEMS.

	NATIONAL BANKS.		STATE BANKS.	
	Oct. 6, 1896.	Dec. 13, 1900.	July 12, 1895.	Dec. 4, 1900.
Capital.....	\$51,650,000	\$62,800,000	\$16,764,000	\$14,722,000
Surplus and profits.....	60,043,000	76,286,000	15,160,000	17,820,000
Total deposits.....	446,597,000	884,273,000	*121,871,000	*185,744,000
Total resources.....	567,857,000	1,072,558,000	181,795,000	250,026,000

\* Demand deposits.

It will be seen that from October 6, 1896, to December 13, 1900, the National banks of New York city increased their total resources from \$567,857,000 to \$1,072,558,000—a gain of \$504,701,000, or about 100 per cent., representing an annual addition of twenty-five per cent.

From July 12, 1895, to December 4, 1900, the State banks of New York city increased their total resources from \$181,795,000 to \$250,026,000—a gain of \$68,231,000, or over thirty-seven per cent., representing an annual addition of less than eight per cent.

The State banks of New York city do mostly a local business and have not the opportunity of enlarging the volume of their transactions as the National banks do by keeping the reserves of other banks all over the country. They can not be expected, therefore, to grow so rapidly.

Both the National and State banks of the city have been growing in recent years at a remarkable rate, and this expansion has been, in the main, sound in character. In about five years the State and National banks in the Boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx have increased their resources to the extent of nearly \$678,000,000. If the other divisions of the city were included and the comparisons extended to trust companies and Savings banks, these figures would be swelled enormously.

The tables presented on the succeeding pages are a striking indication of the advance of New York to the position of the world's banker.

## NATIONAL BANKS.

NAME OF BANK.	CAPITAL.		SURPLUS AND PROFITS.		TOTAL DEPOSITS.		TOTAL RESOURCES.	
	1896.	1900.	1896.	1900.	1896.	1900.	1896.	1900.
AMERICAN EXCHANGE NATIONAL BANK.....	\$5,000,000	\$5,000,000	\$2,527,000	\$2,140,000	\$22,080,000	\$28,106,000	\$33,694,000	\$42,309,000
ASTOR NATIONAL BANK.....	.....	350,000	.....	296,000	.....	4,972,000	.....	6,918,000
BANK OF N. Y. NAT. BANKING ASSOCIATION.....	2,000,000	2,000,000	1,853,000	2,074,000	16,830,000	26,024,000	20,749,000	30,266,000
CENTRAL NATIONAL BANK.....	2,000,000	1,000,000	519,000	557,000	9,869,000	16,478,000	12,736,000	17,300,000
CHASE NATIONAL BANK.....	500,000	1,000,000	1,445,000	2,110,000	18,711,000	43,430,000	21,106,000	48,090,000
CHATHAM NATIONAL BANK.....	450,000	450,000	987,000	994,000	5,936,000	6,014,000	7,623,000	8,438,000
CHEMICAL NATIONAL BANK.....	300,000	300,000	7,434,000	6,881,000	26,327,000	29,862,000	33,073,000	37,056,000
CONTINENTAL NATIONAL BANK.....	1,000,000	1,000,000	230,000	518,000	5,803,000	8,088,000	7,439,000	9,901,000
DOMESTIC EXCHANGE NATIONAL BANK.....	.....	300,000	.....	6,000	.....	1,003,000	.....	1,609,000
EAST RIVER NATIONAL BANK.....	250,000	250,000	137,000	161,000	1,186,000	1,624,000	1,778,000	2,099,000
FIFTH NATIONAL BANK.....	200,000	200,000	308,000	347,000	2,042,000	2,345,000	2,719,000	3,084,000
FIRST NATIONAL BANK.....	500,000	500,000	7,208,000	9,220,000	21,281,000	41,408,000	29,036,000	62,876,000
FOURTH NATIONAL BANK.....	3,200,000	3,000,000	2,040,000	2,467,000	23,844,000	31,496,000	30,615,000	37,023,000
FRANKLIN NATIONAL BANK.....	200,000	.....	240,000	.....	464,000	.....	753,000	.....
GALLATIN NATIONAL BANK.....	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,624,000	1,873,000	6,916,000	13,482,000	10,429,000	17,317,000
GARFIELD NATIONAL BANK.....	200,000	200,000	700,000	1,093,000	4,159,000	7,836,000	5,237,000	9,182,000
HANOVER NATIONAL BANK.....	1,000,000	3,000,000	2,053,000	5,178,000	20,207,000	65,797,000	24,646,000	79,849,000
HIDE AND LEATHER NATIONAL BANK.....	500,000	500,000	99,000	325,000	1,505,000	2,592,000	2,492,000	3,800,000
IMPORTERS AND TRADERS' NATIONAL BANK.....	1,500,000	1,500,000	5,500,000	6,107,000	22,064,000	26,165,000	29,112,000	32,711,000
IRVING NATIONAL BANK.....	500,000	500,000	346,000	468,000	3,324,000	5,077,000	4,993,000	6,291,000
LEATHER MANUFACTURERS' NATIONAL BANK.....	600,000	600,000	492,000	436,000	2,953,000	4,202,000	4,486,000	5,707,000
LIBERTY NATIONAL BANK.....	500,000	500,000	220,000	604,000	2,353,000	6,883,000	3,524,000	8,467,000
LINCOLN NATIONAL BANK.....	300,000	300,000	617,000	919,000	6,838,000	13,436,000	7,979,000	14,904,000
MARKET AND FULTON NATIONAL BANK.....	750,000	900,000	853,000	1,047,000	6,869,000	8,687,000	8,930,000	10,910,000



MECHANICS' NATIONAL BANK.....	2,000,000	2,147,000	2,251,000	9,871,000	18,432,000	14,038,000	17,488,000
MERCANTILE NATIONAL BANK.....	1,000,000	978,000	1,239,000	8,203,000	14,860,000	10,644,000	18,591,000
MERCHANTS' EXCHANGE NATIONAL BANK.....	600,000	175,000	224,000	4,645,000	6,107,000	5,705,000	6,979,000
MERCHANTS' NATIONAL BANK.....	2,000,000	998,000	1,190,000	11,823,000	17,952,000	14,821,000	21,043,000
NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE.....	5,000,000	10,000,000	3,589,000	6,900,000	18,543,000	30,314,000	90,410,000
NATIONAL BANK OF NORTH AMERICA.....	700,000	582,000	734,000	5,874,000	13,897,000	7,202,000	18,368,000
NATIONAL BANK OF THE REPUBLIC.....	1,500,000	868,000	1,140,000	12,606,000	23,613,000	15,814,000	26,729,000
NATIONAL BROADWAY BANK.....	1,000,000	1,598,000	1,600,000	4,741,000	5,631,000	7,385,000	8,434,000
NATIONAL BUTCHERS AND DROVERS' BANK.....	300,000	208,000	86,000	1,127,000	1,384,000	1,989,000	1,815,000
NATIONAL CITIZENS' BANK.....	600,000	331,000	407,000	3,104,000	3,962,000	4,270,000	5,264,000
NATIONAL CITY BANK.....	1,000,000	3,587,000	5,490,000	31,780,000	151,479,000	37,122,000	181,014,000
NATIONAL PARK BANK.....	2,000,000	3,212,000	3,568,000	29,728,000	66,242,000	34,983,000	71,861,000
NATIONAL SHOE AND LEATHER BANK.....	1,000,000	100,000	206,000	3,879,000	4,989,000	5,248,000	6,246,000
NATIONAL UNION BANK.....	1,200,000	538,000	.....	8,989,000	.....	11,556,000	.....
NEW YORK COUNTY NATIONAL BANK.....	200,000	427,000	386,000	3,979,000	4,018,000	3,770,000	4,655,000
NEW YORK NATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK.....	300,000	67,000	109,000	1,467,000	3,494,000	2,109,000	4,164,000
NINTH NATIONAL BANK.....	750,000	333,000	68,000	3,950,000	3,767,000	5,079,000	4,633,000
PHENIX NATIONAL BANK.....	1,000,000	347,000	241,000	4,262,000	7,317,000	5,638,000	8,608,000
SEABOARD NATIONAL BANK.....	500,000	279,000	813,000	7,606,000	20,085,000	8,467,000	21,891,000
SECOND NATIONAL BANK.....	300,000	644,000	888,000	6,096,000	10,382,000	7,083,000	12,117,000
SEVENTH NATIONAL BANK.....	300,000	100,000	216,000	1,966,000	4,336,000	2,411,000	5,152,000
SIXTH NATIONAL BANK.....	200,000	229,000	.....	1,472,000	.....	2,180,000	.....
STANDARD NATIONAL BANK.....	200,000	29,000	.....	478,000	.....	799,000	.....
THIRD NATIONAL BANK.....	1,000,000	244,000	.....	8,947,000	.....	10,624,000	.....
TRADESMEN'S NATIONAL BANK.....	750,000	80,000	.....	2,054,000	.....	3,062,000	.....
UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK.....	500,000	534,000	.....	6,333,000	.....	7,589,000	.....
WESTERN NATIONAL BANK.....	2,100,000	397,000	1,871,000	12,239,000	46,611,000	15,472,000	50,633,000
Total.....	\$51,650,000	\$60,043,000	\$76,286,000	\$446,597,000	\$684,273,000	\$567,857,000	\$1,073,588,000

## STATE BANKS.

NAME OF BANK.	CAPITAL.		SURPLUS AND PROFITS.		DEMAND DEPOSITS.		TOTAL RESOURCES.	
	1895.	1900.	1895.	1900.	1895.	1900.	1895.	1900.
ASTOR PLACE BANK.....	\$250,000	.....	\$332,000	.....	\$1,831,000	.....	\$2,451,000	.....
BANK OF AMERICA.....	3,000,000	\$1,500,000	2,116,000	\$2,980,000	17,724,000	\$21,845,000	33,911,000	\$36,284,000
BANK OF NEW AMSTERDAM.....	250,000	250,000	194,000	444,000	1,292,000	5,396,000	1,945,000	6,931,000
BANK OF THE METROPOLIS.....	300,000	300,000	791,000	1,018,000	6,231,000	6,582,000	8,013,000	8,557,000
BANK OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.....	1,200,000	1,200,000	505,000	543,000	6,588,000	13,723,000	8,418,000	15,808,000
BOWERY BANK.....	250,000	250,000	551,000	724,000	2,780,000	3,338,000	3,582,000	4,501,000
BRONX BOROUGH BANK.....	.....	50,000	.....	35,000	.....	344,000	.....	443,000
CLINTON BANK.....	300,000	.....	21,000	.....	913,000	.....	1,259,000	.....
COLONIAL BANK.....	100,000	300,000	43,000	194,000	419,000	2,349,000	563,000	3,032,000
COLUMBIA BANK.....	300,000	100,000	270,000	128,000	2,162,000	1,812,000	2,876,000	2,058,000
CORN EXCHANGE BANK.....	1,000,000	1,400,000	1,242,000	1,807,000	9,416,000	27,943,000	16,426,000	34,682,000
EAST SIDE BANK.....	100,000	.....	1,000	.....	15,000	.....	116,000	.....
EIGHTH AVENUE BANK.....	92,000	.....	4,000	.....	5,000	.....	101,000	.....
ELKVENTH WARD BANK.....	100,000	100,000	216,000	129,000	1,293,000	1,289,000	1,611,000	1,518,000
EMPIRE STATE BANK.....	250,000	.....	119,000	.....	1,265,000	.....	1,635,000	.....
FIDELITY BANK.....	.....	200,000	.....	98,000	.....	29,000	.....	327,000
FIFTH AVENUE BANK.....	100,000	100,000	1,035,000	1,326,000	7,909,000	10,156,000	9,116,000	10,175,000
FOURTEENTH STREET BANK.....	100,000	100,000	78,000	55,000	776,000	1,410,000	964,000	1,628,000
GANSEVOORT BANK.....	200,000	200,000	56,000	20,000	774,000	748,000	1,061,000	1,056,000
GERMAN-AMERICAN BANK.....	750,000	750,000	306,000	365,000	3,549,000	5,032,000	4,991,000	6,728,000
GERMAN EXCHANGE BANK.....	200,000	200,000	621,000	738,000	3,319,000	3,272,000	4,143,000	4,215,000
GERMANIA BANK.....	200,000	200,000	642,000	818,000	4,793,000	3,803,000	5,636,000	5,183,000
GREENWICH BANK.....	200,000	200,000	184,000	173,000	979,000	811,000	1,462,000	1,283,000
HAMILTON BANK.....	200,000	200,000	51,000	102,000	884,000	1,451,000	1,166,000	1,843,000

HOME BANK.....	100,000	.....	76,000	.....	768,000	.....	935,000	.....
HUDSON RIVER BANK.....	200,000	.....	176,000	.....	938,000	.....	1,821,000	.....
MANHATTAN COMPANY.....	2,050,000	2,050,000	2,198,000	2,114,000	19,511,000	82,149,000	26,870,000	48,141,000
MECHANICS AND TRADERS' BANK.....	400,000	400,000	371,000	194,000	2,334,000	2,452,000	3,328,000	3,102,000
MOUNT MORRIS BANK.....	250,000	250,000	111,000	59,000	2,021,000	2,776,000	2,587,000	3,303,000
MUTUAL BANK.....	200,000	200,000	86,000	135,000	977,000	1,607,000	1,262,000	2,029,000
NASSAU BANK.....	500,000	500,000	290,000	274,000	2,929,000	3,069,000	3,736,000	3,845,000
NEW YORK PRODUCE EXCHANGE BANK.....	1,000,000	1,000,000	332,000	378,000	3,581,000	3,714,000	5,321,000	6,668,000
NINETEENTH WARD BANK.....	100,000	100,000	27,000	59,000	913,000	1,801,000	1,052,000	1,861,000
ORIENTAL BANK.....	300,000	300,000	413,000	401,000	1,577,000	1,912,000	2,668,000	2,953,000
PACIFIC BANK.....	422,000	422,000	485,000	434,000	3,811,000	3,509,000	4,721,000	4,417,000
PEOPLE'S BANK.....	200,000	200,000	245,000	337,000	3,070,000	3,017,000	3,536,000	3,578,000
PLAZA BANK.....	100,000	100,000	127,000	175,000	1,016,000	2,227,000	1,266,000	2,721,000
RIVERSIDE BANK.....	100,000	100,000	82,000	116,000	623,000	997,000	807,000	1,224,000
STATE BANK.....	100,000	100,000	26,000	238,000	933,000	3,653,000	1,060,000	4,049,000
TWELFTH WARD BANK.....	200,000	200,000	123,000	54,000	1,106,000	1,703,000	1,520,000	1,998,000
TWENTY-THIRD WARD BANK.....	100,000	100,000	25,000	69,000	572,000	1,235,000	723,000	1,440,000
UNION SQUARE BANK.....	200,000	200,000	220,000	351,000	2,076,000	2,674,000	2,496,000	3,226,000
WASHINGTON BANK.....	.....	100,000	.....	23,000	.....	408,000	.....	536,000
WELLS, FARGO & CO'S BANK.....	500,000	500,000	9,000	125,000	495,000	1,028,000	1,625,000	3,835,000
WEST SIDE BANK.....	200,000	200,000	295,000	426,000	2,984,000	3,162,000	3,614,000	3,931,000
YORKVILLE BANK.....	100,000	100,000	69,000	180,000	730,000	1,548,000	906,000	1,898,000
Total.....	\$16,764,000	\$14,722,000	\$15,160,000	\$17,820,000	\$121,871,000	\$185,744,000	\$181,795,000	\$250,026,000

# ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

TRANSMITTED TO THE LEGISLATURE JANUARY 2, 1901.

The growth and prosperity of the institutions under the supervision of the Banking Department of New York during the past four years has been unexampled and marvelous. Naturally the foreign mortgage companies licensed to do business in the State have decreased in number as business has improved, interest rates gone lower and indebtedness diminished. The aggregate resources of the banks of deposit and discount, the Savings banks, the trust companies, the safe deposit companies and the building and loan associations are larger now by more than seven hundred million dollars than at the date of the first annual report which I had the honor to submit to the Legislature four years ago. Nearly one and a half million dollars of this gain has been made by the safe deposit companies, about sixteen millions by the building and loan associations, nearly one hundred millions by the discount banks, two hundred and thirty millions by the Savings banks, and four hundred millions by the trust companies. Disregarding details, and dealing with each group of institutions as a class, I think it an accurate statement of fact that the banks of deposit and discount, the Savings banks, the trust companies and safe deposit companies, and the Savings and loan associations all improved in condition during the year. Most of the banks have prospered, and several which had long required special vigilance and care have been greatly strengthened: the Savings banks have gained in accounts such as it is legitimately their province to carry, and lost in those which they ought to eliminate; the business of the trust companies has increased enormously, and has been generally of a profitable character. \* \* \*

That all of the tests were borne by the banks and trust companies of the State, not only without a single failure or the loss of a dollar by their customers through them, but with their condition as a whole actually improved at the close of the year, is exceedingly gratifying, and certifies their general soundness, and the usually prudent and safe management which they enjoy. It is gratifying also to be able to add that there has been no considerable loss, and, indeed, none at all as far as I have been able to ascertain, by defalcation in any State bank, trust company or Savings bank during the year.

## DISCOUNT BANKS.

There occurred during the fiscal year a net decrease of eight in the number of banks of deposit and discount in the State system, ten having gone out and two having organized. The whole number remaining was two hundred. Of those withdrawing two were merged with other State banks, two went into voluntary liquidation with transfer of their business to National banks so far as they could control it, and six were converted to the National system soon after the enactment of the currency and banking legislation by Congress in the spring. The provisions of this act were thought at the time to promise considerable advantages to National banks, and for the moment there were indications that the number of State banks to be won over by it might be large. But the movement in that direction has not continued, and apparently experience does not confirm such profit-possibilities under it as would be likely to stimulate a recurrence of it. The gains from bank-note circulation do not equal the popular supposition, nor even the theoretical percentage ascribed to it, while in other respects the advantages enjoyable under the State law may be confidently claimed as at least equal to those offered by the National Banking Act. That bankers generally entertain this belief would appear from the fact that in the two years last past the net increase in the number of National banks in New York has been but eleven, of which number all but one is to be credited to the last year, and principally to the period following close upon the passage of the law heretofore referred to. In the same time the number of State banks has been slightly reduced, but the loss is nearly accounted for by the merger of banks which are continued as branches, but which are not counted as separate institutions.

The total resources of all the State banks on September 4, 1900, the date of reports by them nearest to the close of the fiscal year, was \$351,080,252, which is a decrease of \$21,902,228 from the previous September, but a gain of \$27,215,509 from the low point in the year, in the

preceding March. Nearly seven million dollars of the loss from September to September represents the resources of the banks which had in the meantime withdrawn from the system.

I am indebted to the Comptroller of the Currency for corresponding figures concerning the National banks in this State, of which there were three hundred and thirty-six on the thirtieth day of September, of this year, with a combined capital of \$97,218,210, a combined surplus and undivided profits of \$97,720,013, and total resources to the amount of \$1,312,870,212. Thirteen National banks were authorized in this State during the year, and three closed. The aggregate capital of the thirteen authorized was \$1,120,000, and of the three which closed \$1,355,000.

#### TENDENCY TOWARD BANK CONSOLIDATIONS.

There continues to be manifested a tendency toward combination or consolidation of competing banks, especially in the more important financial centers. Besides actual merger or absorption as a means thereto, the method is employed of unifying interests by effecting a controlling ownership by identical parties in two or more separate institutions, which are thus made auxiliary or co-operative in their transactions, as occasion may arise. A few of the State banks in Greater New York are proceeding in a like direction by acquiring other banks by the process of merger, and then continuing them as branches, with satisfying results. The Corn Exchange Bank has taken over four banks in this manner, and has, besides, two branches which it has opened independently. The Union Bank of Brooklyn recently acquired the Hamilton in the same borough, and is conducting it as a branch. The Bank of New Amsterdam, the Colonial Bank, the Hamilton Bank in New York, the Twelfth Ward Bank, the Brooklyn Bank and the Bank of Jamaica, also, have opened branches, or are preparing to do so. Twelve branches in all had been opened to September 30, and they reported deposits averaging nearly a million dollars each, while the gain in the resources of the parent institutions since they were opened aggregated \$3,271,592. The system of branch banks is permissible under the law only to State institutions, and to these nowhere outside of Greater New York, and only "for the receipt and payment of deposits, and for making loans and discounts to the customers of such branch offices only." Passing any objections which might be cited to the authorization of branch banks generally, I am unaware of any unfortunate results or injurious complications springing from them in the instances where they have been established. They appear to have been managed conservatively, and to have extended the relations of the central banks which they represent to localities and interests which could not have been reached otherwise, while at the same time the contact between the customers and the bank has been as close and harmonious as is ordinarily the case between small institutions and their clientele, a relation the advantage and importance of which I am sure can not be overestimated. Proceeding with this more modest movement in bank expansion and enlargement, several consolidations of large institutions have been effected, the most notable having been in New York, where a second National bank with ten million dollars in capital and half as much of surplus has been instituted. These great banks attract a vast volume of business, and become potent factors in the world of finance. While no bank can be too strong, it might be that one could be too great. Any single institution overshadowing all others, and occupying in fact or even in appearance a dominant or quasi-monopolistic rank, could, if it chose, use its power arbitrarily, so as to become a great disturbing factor in legitimate business. But the development of a number of giant banks carries with it conditions of competition and of distribution of power, and is but a natural adjustment of banking interests to the convenience and necessities of modern business. Indeed, the movement of banks in this direction has hardly kept step with the similar tendency which has been so markedly shown by transportation and manufacturing companies. These latter mighty interests, the volume of whose transactions for a single year would eclipse the record for a decade but a few years ago, require accommodations and facilities which even the concert of a number of small banks could not satisfactorily or even safely extend. Our industrial activity is so intense, our mechanism of credits and commerce so changed and enlarged, and financial operations so much more important, that an augmentation of banking capital some time since ceased to be a question of doubtful expediency, and came to be recognized as a vital requirement of existing conditions. But while it is admitted that such institutions have become a necessity and serve a beneficent purpose, it ought not to be forgotten that the small bank, with the strength that assures safety, and with resources proportionate to its opportunities for their profitable use, has a legitimate place in the business even of great centers like New York city. It gets nearer to its customers of moderate means and modest wants in sympathy and in intelligent understanding of their needs and of their circumstances, and gives them more consideration than they could hope to receive from a large bank whose interest lies in the direction of larger transactions. It will be a day of misfortune should the time ever come, as some predict it will, when the banking business of New York or of any other city is so consolidated as to extinguish the small banks.

## THE TRUST COMPANIES.

Four trust companies, the Bankers', the Merchants', the Trust Company of New York and the Albany, all except the last named located in the city of New York, were authorized during the fiscal year. All but the Albany had taken the initiatory steps for organization prior to the first of January, last, and were a part of the remarkable movement which engaged wide attention, and suggested that almost all of financial New York had been seized of the belief that to establish a trust company was to be pledged distinction and certain fortune. That movement spent itself quickly, however, and has even had its reaction, the tendency since the beginning of the current calendar year having been toward contraction rather than expansion. Not only have no certificates of organization been filed by proposed trust companies in New York since December, 1899, but the purpose to complete the organization of two companies which had previously filed their certificates, I understand, has been practically abandoned, and I am unaware of any contemplated new ventures in this field in any of the larger cities. Besides, the State Trust Company of New York merged with the Morton some months ago, the International Banking and Trust Company into the North American, and more recently the Bankers', but a year old, has been merged into the Atlantic. This record and outlook may fairly be taken, I think, as confirming conclusively the opinion advanced in my report of a year ago, that there was not occasion for me to set arbitrarily the limit where trust company organization should stop in New York, but that the question might be left with safety to capital to determine for itself. It would seem from events that the field is now regarded by financial interests generally as fully occupied, and it will hardly be further invaded until the want of increased accommodations of the character that trust companies extend is sensibly experienced. But this opinion must not be interpreted as in any way suggesting that the companies already in business are not prospering, for the contrary is the fact. Except the Delaware Loan and Trust Company at Walton, which closed its doors in November and began proceedings in voluntary liquidation, and except also the Holland Trust Company in New York, which several years ago began liquidation, and which has paid nearly all its depositors, with ample assets on hand to pay the balance, and which is not seeking new business, these institutions report a great increase in deposits and large net earnings. The figures, as of July 1, 1900, which are the latest available, show a total capital employed by trust companies amounting to \$48,250,000, a combined surplus and undivided profits of \$89,825,969, total resources of \$799,483,887, and deposits aggregating \$640,837,146. As compared with their January condition, the capitalization had increased two hundred thousand dollars, the surplus and undivided profits five and three-quarters millions, the total resources over a hundred and twenty-four millions, and the deposits more than one hundred and seventeen millions. The earnings of all the trust companies for the six months from January to July were seventeen and a third million dollars, and their expenses, including interest payments and taxes, a fraction under ten millions.

## THE SAVINGS BANKS.

The number of Savings banks in the State was decreased by one during the year, no new bank having been chartered, and the Fulton County Savings Bank having surrendered its charter after payment to every one of its depositors in full, with an extra dividend. The total resources of the Savings banks increased \$37,660,060 from January, 1900, to July, and there was a gain in the number of their open accounts of 54,645. What has been the movement since July there are no official reports as yet to show.

The Bowery Savings Bank of New York, which is the largest mutual institution for savings in the country, has happily seen the way clear to announce that, for the six months ending December 31, 1900, its rate of interest to depositors will be four per cent., an increase of one-half of one per cent. Calculated upon the market value of its securities, the surplus of this bank exceeds fifteen per cent. of its deposits, and some of its securities, obtained many years ago, pay far higher interest rates than are now prevalent. Proceeding upon the theory that the depositors are entitled to the largest benefits which it is practicable to afford them, with a due regard for possible losses or depreciation of securities, the officers of the bank have decided upon the course stated. How long it will be continued no one undertakes to say, but that it can not be supported indefinitely is all but certain, as it is apparent also that only exceptional conditions permit it to be undertaken even as a temporary policy. The tendency generally is all the other way, and since the date of my report of a year ago a considerable number of Savings banks have been compelled to reduce the rate of dividends which they had been paying to their depositors from four per cent. to three and a half per cent. This action by the banks was merely a necessary adjustment of their affairs to conditions which had been developing for some years. \* \* \* With the marvelous prosperity which the country has enjoyed in recent years, bonds in which the Savings are entitled to invest are producing a lower rate of income than has ever been known before. It has, therefore, been impos-

sible for many of the Savings banks to continue to pay former rates of dividends, which means of course a hardship to those who are disqualified by age, or otherwise, from adding to their accumulations, but the worker finds in the country's larger prosperity more than compensating conditions. In the intenser life, the marvelous growth and the bounding activity which characterize these later years, broader opportunities are offered to all of the people, and the easier accumulations which may be added to principal minimize the loss due to a decrease in the dividend rates.

#### BANKING LAW AMENDMENTS.

Legislation relating to moneyed corporations under the supervision of the Banking Department was not voluminous in 1900.

One act was passed permitting the conversion of foreign moneyed corporations into domestic moneyed corporations, and prescribing methods therefor; but no institution with banking powers has taken advantage of its provisions.

A particularly desirable change was made in the requirements regarding the holding of annual meetings for the election of directors of discount banks. Hereafter every bank must hold such an election on the second Tuesday in January in each year or within ten days thereafter. The State law is thus made to correspond substantially with the National Banking Act in this particular.

Section fifty-five of the Banking Law was amended so as to extend to private bankers the exemptions as to penalties for usury which have long been granted to incorporated banks and to individual bankers.

Sections thirty-four, thirty-five and thirty-eight of the Banking Law were so amended as to simplify the procedure for merger of banking corporations, and to strengthen the provisions conferring the succession of the continuing institution to all of the relations, obligations, trusts and liabilities of the merged corporation.

A new section, 79a, was added to the Banking Law, which provides a method less expensive than a receivership for closing a bank in voluntary proceedings for the purpose of winding up its affairs.

A slight change was enacted regarding the securities in which Savings banks may invest their deposits and the income derived therefrom. The first mortgage bonds of the Chicago and Alton Railroad Company were added to the list, and a disputed point, as to whether the refunding bonds of the railroads outside the State which are specified in the act may be purchased, was made clear and explicit.

Heretofore the Banking Law has permitted the appointment of a trust company as guardian of the estate of any infant the annual income of whose estate exceeded one hundred dollars. An amendment passed by the last Legislature omits this limitation.

A salutary amendment to the general corporation law adds "trust," "banking," "assurance," "guaranty," "savings," "investment," and "loan" to the words which may not be used as a part of the name of any corporation hereafter organized under the laws of this State except by a corporation formed under the Banking Law or the Insurance Law.

#### TOTAL RESOURCES.

The total resources of the institutions under the supervision of this Department, as shown by their reports as of the dates stated, are as follows:

Banks of deposit and discount, September 4, 1900.....	\$351,080,252
Savings banks, July 1, 1900.....	1,037,869,160
Trust companies, July 1, 1900.....	796,483,887
Safe deposit companies, July 1, 1900.....	5,297,905
Foreign mortgage companies, January 1, 1900.....	5,236,422
Building and loan associations, January 1, 1900.....	66,034,789
Total.....	\$2,262,002,415
In comparison with the previous year the gain is.....	115,018,554

#### NEW BANKS.

Two banks were organized during the fiscal year, viz.: Bank of Hammondsport, Hammondsport, January 22, 1900, capital, \$50,000; Washington Bank, New York, July 28, 1900, capital, \$100,000; total, \$150,000.

#### LIQUIDATING OR MERGED BANKS.

Ten banks closed during the year as against seven in the preceding year. Two of them were merged into other State banks, six were converted to the National system, and two went into liquidation, but practically with absorption by other banks. The list is as follows:

	<i>Date.</i>	<i>Capital.</i>
Home Bank, New York.....	February 21, 1900..	\$100,000
Onesida County Bank, Utica.....	February 23, 1900..	125,000
Robert Gere Bank, Syracuse.....	March 3, 1900.....	100,000
People's Bank of Mt. Vernon, Mt. Vernon.....	March 31, 1900.....	50,000
American Exchange Bank, Syracuse.....	April 14, 1900.....	200,000
Bank of Holland Patent, Holland Patent.....	April 21, 1900.....	30,000
Hamilton Bank, Brooklyn.....	April 23, 1900.....	100,000
Bank of Skaneateles, Skaneateles.....	May 19, 1900.....	60,000
Mamaroneck Bank, Mamaroneck.....	June 18, 1900.....	35,000
Bank of Syracuse, Syracuse.....	June 30, 1900.....	125,000
Total.....		<u>\$825,000</u>

## INCREASE OF CAPITAL.

Bank of New Rochelle, New Rochelle, May 29, 1900. Capital.....	\$70,000
--	----------

## DECREASE OF CAPITAL.

State Bank of Randolph, Randolph, August 14, 1900. Capital.....	\$30,000
---	----------

## CAPITAL.

The appended table gives the aggregate capital of the banks of deposit and discount in the State system on September 30, 1900, with the changes therein during the year:

Amount of capital, September 30, 1899.....	\$29,545,700
Capital of banks organized during the year.....	150,000
Increase of capital of banks previously organized.....	70,000
Total.....	<u>\$29,765,700</u>
Decrease of capital of banks previously organized.....	30,000
Capital of banks closed.....	<u>925,000</u>
Capital stock, September 30, 1900.....	\$28,810,700
Capital stock, September 30, 1899.....	29,545,700
Decrease for the year, net.....	<u>\$735,000</u>

## RESOURCES AND LIABILITIES OF BANKS.

The aggregate resources and liabilities of the State banks of deposit and discount, as shown by their quarterly reports as of September 4, 1900, are given herewith in comparison with their reported condition at the corresponding date in 1899:

	<i>1899.</i>	<i>1900.</i>
<b>ASSETS.</b>		
Loans and discounts, less due from directors.....	\$191,370,544	\$201,578,995
Liability of directors as makers.....	7,479,085	7,632,175
Overdrafts.....	106,121	193,639
Due from trust companies, banks, bankers and brokers..	29,803,601	31,212,315
Real estate.....	10,339,155	10,831,746
Mortgages owned.....	3,753,028	3,888,103
Stocks and bonds.....	26,298,265	24,673,640
Specie.....	24,728,319	23,143,001
United States legal tenders and circulating notes of National banks.....	13,759,681	18,538,998
Cash items.....	64,047,911	28,190,711
Assets not included under any of the above heads.....	1,241,164	1,146,282
Add for cents.....	666	647
Total.....	<u>\$372,982,538</u>	<u>\$351,080,252</u>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>		
Capital.....	\$29,543,700	\$28,810,700
Surplus fund.....	18,449,746	18,311,631
Undivided profits.....	9,204,473	9,996,807
Due depositors on demand.....	270,033,433	238,194,498
Due to trust companies.....	28,543,629	38,545,094
Due to Savings banks.....	15,492,494	14,535,526
Due the treasurer of the State of New York.....	1,204,750	2,283,637
Amount due not included under any of the above heads..	507,981	402,039
Add for cents.....	332	320
Total.....	<u>\$372,982,538</u>	<u>\$351,080,252</u>



## SECURITIES AND CASH HELD IN TRUST.

Securities and cash had been deposited with the Superintendent of Banks in trust by the several banks, individual bankers and trust companies, and were held by him at the close of the fiscal year, as herewith shown:

United States two per cent. bonds.....	\$64,000
United States three per cent. bonds. ....	294,000
United States four per cent. bonds.....	647,000
United States five per cent. bonds.....	22,000
New York city two and one-half per cent. bonds.....	600,000
New York city three per cent. bonds.....	1,345,000
New York city three and one-half per cent. bonds.....	2,180,000
Brooklyn city three per cent. bonds.....	320,000
Brooklyn city three and one-half per cent. bonds.....	350,000
Brooklyn city four per cent. bonds.....	100,000
Buffalo city three and one-half per cent. bonds.....	20,000
Niagara Falls city four per cent. bonds.....	20,000
Rochester city three and one-half per cent. bonds.....	50,000
Rochester city six per cent. bonds.....	80,000
Mount Vernon city five per cent. bonds.....	1,000
Bonds and mortgages.....	50,000
Cash.....	378
Total.....	\$8,093,378

## RECOMMENDATIONS.

The Stock Corporation Law requires a certificate of increase or reduction in the capital stock of any domestic corporation to be filed in the office of the clerk of the county where the principal place of business of the corporation is located, and a duplicate in the office of the Secretary of State. Incorporated State banks are required to file their certificates of incorporation only in the office of the county clerk and in the office of the Superintendent of Banks, and it is an inconsistency of law that they should be required to file a certificate which modifies the original in an office other than those where such original is filed. I suggest that there would be less cumbering of the records of the office of the Secretary of State, and less inconvenience and expense occasioned to the banks, if the requirement specified were repealed, and such certificates required to be filed only as the originals are.

Subdivision four of section twenty-five of the Banking Law implies that an officer of a Savings bank may borrow money from the corporation with which he is officially connected, provided the trustees thereof give their consent. This is in express conflict with section one hundred and twelve of the same statute, and the words "or Savings bank," and the word "trustees," should be stricken out of the section first referred to.

Section twenty-two of the Banking Law has always been construed by the Superintendent of Banks to require publication in the State paper of the reports of incorporated banks and individual bankers only, but it may be argued with considerable effect that it covers also the reports of trust companies, safe deposit companies and building and loan associations. If construed to include these reports the requirement which it imposed would be impossible of performance by anything like the force employed in the Department. The matter may not be important, but it would at least be preferable if the section should be recast so as more clearly to mean what it has always been the practice to impute to it.

Ten per cent. of the deposits of a Savings bank may be deposited with a discount bank or trust company provided such deposit shall not amount to more than twenty-five per cent. of the capital and surplus of the depository, and in the event of the latter's failure the statute makes the Savings bank a preferred creditor to the amount of any lawful deposit which it may have carried therein. But the only judicial decision ever rendered covering the point holds that such preference extends only to a quarter of the failed institution's capital, because if failure occurs there is in fact no actual surplus. Under this construction it would be possible that, convinced of a bank's solvency and believing that it had all the surplus which it claimed, a Savings bank should lawfully have a deposit of fifty thousand dollars with, say, a bank capitalized at a hundred thousand dollars and reporting a surplus of an equal amount, and yet if the bank should fail the preference in favor of the Savings bank would extend only to one-half of the amount of its claim. Either the amount which a Savings bank may carry with any single institution should be further restricted, or, as would better harmonize with what I can but think was intended when the present law was passed, it should be put beyond dispute that the preference reaches to a quarter of the *reported* surplus as well as to a quarter of the capital.

While I am not prepared to contend that examinations such as the ordinary director of a bank could be expected to make would be likely to discover defalcations which are ingeniously covered, the knowledge that such scrutiny must be faced might prove in some degree a restraint upon an officer or employee tempted to use his opportunities dishonestly. To this end, but more because a close familiarity by directors with the affairs of a bank contributes to a successful management and avoidance of poor loans, I renew the recommendation that the law make it compulsory upon the part of every board of bank directors to make periodical examinations, as often at least as once in every six months, of the assets and liabilities of their respective institutions, and report the result under oath to the Superintendent of Banks.

#### PRIVATE BANKING.

The year has been comparatively free from any startling scandal arising from the transactions of irresponsible private bankers, but unless statutory safeguards are supplied to minimize the opportunities of swindlers in this field, continued immunity is not to be assumed as probable. Besides the schemes of only occasional appearance which attract wide attention because of their magnitude and the degree of popular credulity which they disclose, operations of like character, but on a petty scale, go forward continually in our great cities, where unauthorized bankers open offices in the foreign quarters, and steal away after having induced deposits with them to the extent of their ability. Fraud of both these characters could, I believe, be materially decreased by the enactment of such a measure as I suggested a year ago, and without imposing any special inconvenience or hardship upon the reputable and responsible men and firms who are legitimately engaged in the business of private banking. The requirement proposed is that every private banker, or any person, firm or association receiving deposits, shall deposit with the Comptroller of the State or with the Superintendent of Banks bonds of the United States, of the State of New York, or of some subdivision of the State, to the amount of ten thousand dollars, to be held in trust for the benefit of the depositors with and creditors of the depositing banker, and to be surrendered only upon an order of court. Obligation to comply with such a requirement would effectually shut out from starting in business those who contemplated robbery of their customers, while it could not seriously embarrass interests which mean to be honest, and which are strong enough financially to be permitted to solicit and receive deposits as bankers.

#### SAVINGS BANKS.

All precedents will be broken if the attempt to make the deposits in Savings banks taxable does not reappear in the Legislature of 1901. There can be little hope of appreciably reducing the State expenditures, for the public needs are ever growing greater; and consequently the only practicable method for making tax burdens less onerous lies in the creation of new sources of revenue. In the search for these the Savings banks will hardly be overlooked. The aggregate of the holdings of the Savings banks comprises widely scattered and comparatively small individual interests, so that concentration of effort by them to oppose tax measures can not be easily organized and made effective, whereas opposition by other corporations to any proposed tax bills affecting them adversely is sure to be formidable and forceful. Moreover, it is seen that if a law were to be passed taxing Savings banks the tax would lie where it might be sworn off or evaded by individuals and institutions having larger stakes involved. Yet further, the contention is made that the deposits in the Savings banks consist largely of moneys put there by men of means to escape taxation, and which, if taxed, would be withdrawn for employment in business or industry. The fact that in some other States it has been the practice for years to tax Savings banks has its influence also, and prompts the query why those in New York should be longer exempted.

But notwithstanding all this it has always seemed to me that the deposits in Savings banks ought not to be singled out for subjection to tax burdens, and I have repeatedly submitted recommendations to the Legislature to that effect. By that judgment I must stand while the condition continues that only an insignificant part, not, I believe, to exceed five per centum, of all the personalty in the State is reached effectively by the assessors, whereas an act levying upon the deposits in Savings banks would yield every dollar that it should be designed to produce. No such discrimination should be written into the statutes, first, because the State must not do injustice, and, second, because it would burn in upon the minds of a great body of men and women a stinging conviction that wrong had been done them, from which spring discontent and resentment that might be pregnant of public evils and dangers.

If the Legislature is to consider this question of taxing the deposits in the Savings banks it should approach it with the amplest and most reliable information obtainable, and particularly in regard to the mistaken assumption that the moneys held by these institutions consist largely of deposits by people of means. A more searching examination and analysis of

accounts than has ever been attempted, or than is practicable, would be required to ascertain with precision the percentage of deposits which belong properly in that class, but from my knowledge of the policy which governs the management of most Savings banks, and from such inspection as I have made of individual accounts, which almost uniformly show deposits in small sums only, indicating that they are actually savings and not investment funds, I am entirely satisfied that it is inconsiderable. In many institutions the rule prevails to accept no single deposit exceeding \$500 or \$1,000, and that when one such deposit shall have been made there can be no addition to it until after six months or a year; and the purpose is steadily and systematically growing in most Savings banks to avoid giving warrant for the representation that the institutions are used as a convenience or for investment by capitalists or men of affairs. The Superintendent of Banks co-operates to the extent of his opportunities to enforce this condition, and wherever an excessive account is discovered he orders it reduced, or where the limit is overstepped by the subterfuge of the same individual carrying a second account as agent or in trust, when the agency or trust is not genuine, one of the accounts is directed to be withdrawn. This effort to confine accounts in Savings banks to the classes which may legitimately claim to be entitled to their service is, to my mind, a better treatment of the evil under discussion than to attempt to cure it by taxing such deposits out of the banks. With a simple additional restriction in the law it can, I think, be made thoroughly effective. There is at present no legal obstacle to prevent a single depositor from having accounts to the legal limit in each of two or twenty or a hundred banks. I do not believe the practice thus suggested is common, but it should not be permitted at all. In the attempt to stamp it out altogether I am ready to join with the officers of the banks and the Legislature in instituting and enforcing almost any measure of elimination or restriction. It might even be required that no bank shall accept a deposit exceeding some sum to be fixed by law unless the person offering it shall make and subscribe an affidavit declaring that such deposit would not make the aggregate of his credits in all Savings banks more than three thousand dollars, or such other limit as it may be thought best to establish.

For every concession of immunity that is granted to the Savings banks they return benefits manifold. They inculcate thrift and diminish poverty. The fact of a wage-earner being a depositor in them tends to interest him in public questions, and to enroll him in the ranks of those who stand for honest money and for the preservation of the public faith inviolate. It contributes to make him independent and self-respecting, and therefore a better citizen. As to the system as a whole, who will venture to deny that it has a part in diminishing tax burdens, even though it does not actually pay taxes? But for the Savings banks it may well be questioned if the State or any of its subdivisions could float their bonds at the rates of interest at which they are now eagerly absorbed. Experience proves that the day that any new class of securities is made available for investment by the Savings banks, the market price thereof advances. Were it not for the influence of the demand by Savings banks for bonds, it is doubtful if premiums would not fall away, and higher interest rates be necessitated on new issues, making public debt obligations more onerous. So low, indeed, have interest rates on high-class securities fallen that many banks were compelled a year ago to reduce their dividends to depositors to three and a half per cent., and, with an almost impossibility of finding safe investments which will net more than three and a quarter per cent. upon their cost, men intrusted with the management of these institutions are apprehensive lest the time be not distant when three per cent. will be all that can be paid. Surely in such a situation it will not be decreed that the tax-gatherer shall take tithe from the poor unless exaction is to be laid also upon larger individual accumulations generally, and the principle of equality thus observed. To this latter point it seems to me that great importance attaches, as the influence of an adverse discrimination against depositors in Savings banks would be only little less unfortunate than that which excessive taxation would cause.

Respectfully submitted,

FREDERICK D. KILBURN,

*Superintendent of Banks.*

**Applications to Organize National Banks and National Banks Organized from  
March 14 to December 31, 1900.**

APPLICATIONS APPROVED.		No.	Capital.
Capital less than \$50,000.....	428		\$11,015,000
Capital \$50,000 or over.....	164		16,685,000
Total.....	582		\$27,650,000
NATIONAL BANKS ORGANIZED.		No.	Capital.
Capital less than \$50,000.....	282		\$7,427,000
Capital \$50,000 or over.....	116		12,700,000
Total.....	398		\$20,127,000

## BANK AUDITORS HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR FALSE STATEMENTS.

---

For almost, if not quite, the first time in this country the auditors of a public company have been tried on a criminal charge connected with their professional duties, and have been found guilty. The local auditor—Mr. Rogers—of Dumbell's Banking Company in the Isle of Man, and the English auditors, Mr. William Aldred and Mr. Harold Vincent Aldred, members of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, who practice in Manchester, have been convicted, along with others, on the charge "that they jointly did make, circulate and publish, and concur in making, circulating and publishing three balance-sheets, dated June and December, 1898, and June, 1899, which they knew to be false in material particulars, with intent to deceive and defraud the members, shareholders and creditors of Dumbell's Banking Company." They have been sentenced respectively to eighteen months', twelve months', and six months' imprisonment, with hard labor.

These gentlemen, up to within the last few months, occupied good social positions, and were trusted members of their professions. No one would have dreamed of associating them with crime. In the case of the Aldreds, it was not suggested that they profited in any way by their misdeeds. They came to the island twice a year for a few days to carry out the audit, and having signed a report upon the balance-sheet in the usual terms, they returned to Manchester, where they appear to have had a good reputation as accountants. It is evident they had not the slightest idea that they were parties to a felony. But the bolt has fallen—their eyes have been opened—and they now occupy a convict's cell.

One can but pity them—the old man, whose hitherto creditable business career is so miserably ended, and the young son, whose character is blighted at the outset. If they had done their work either better or worse than they did, they would have escaped the punishment meted out to them. As was stated by their counsel, if they had simply accepted the statements made to them, and "signed the balance-sheets over a glass of whiskey and a cigar," they could not have been charged with the guilty knowledge imputed to them. But they knew enough to know that the balance-sheets were false. Their own letters to the manager begging him to have matters put to rights were brought up in evidence against them.

The facts brought out at the trial disclose, in truth, a gross neglect of duty on the part of the auditors. Vouchers for bankers' balances were not asked for, overdrawn accounts were not examined, the branch returns were barely looked at. The manager's assurances that everything was satisfactory were accepted without question, although accounts, manifestly bad, to a large and rapidly increasing amount, were included in the balance-sheet as good assets. Unissued notes of the bank were taken in as cash, and a credit with a London bank was also so treated, with the effect that cash on hand, really amounting to £45,000, appeared in the balance-sheet as £125,000. These things were too patent not to be known to the auditors. It was argued for them that they were only guilty of failure of duty and errors of judgment, which could not render them liable under a criminal charge; but it was shown that they knew the balance-sheets to be wrong in material particulars while they continued to sign certificates that they truly represented the position of the bank.

They wanted the moral courage required to oppose the fraudulent courses of the managers, and thus they became parties to them. Their motives may have been innocent; but, as the judge pointed out, the jury had no concern with motives.

Auditors must not only have the skill to discover error and deception, they must also have the courage and resolution to expose them. They must not be deterred from their duty by the fear of consequences, or allow their judgment to be clouded by specious explanations. Weakness, as we have seen, may very easily become crime.

Accountants need not regret the verdict in this notable case. It will strengthen their hands in dealing with difficult situations. It will surely dispel once and for all the too prevalent idea, to which we fear some encouragement has been given in certain professional quarters, that an audit is little more than a test of arithmetical accuracy. And it will help to give the public a truer sense of the responsibility an auditor undertakes, and to convince them that only men of unswerving rectitude and long and careful training are fit for the position.—*Accountants' Magazine* (Edinburgh).

## OPEN LETTERS FROM BANKERS.

AN INTERCHANGE OF OPINION BY THE MAGAZINE'S READERS.

### THE RESERVES OF NATIONAL BANKS.

There is considerable opposition among bankers to the proposed changes in the law in relation to keeping bank reserves on deposit with banks in certain cities (see *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* for December, 1900, page 926). George M. Coffin, former Deputy Comptroller of the Currency, and now Vice-President of the Phenix National Bank, New York city, writes on the subject as follows:

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

SIR: The Comptroller of the Currency in his report recently sent to Congress recommends a change in the law regarding lawful money reserve held against deposits of National banks, which has already excited much interest on the part of these banks. In effect the change proposed means that on the basis of National bank reports for September 5, 1900, the "country" banks outside of "reserve" cities must accumulate about \$23,000,000 more lawful money than they then held in their vaults. This cash must be obtained from National banks in reserve cities, indebted to them as reserve agents, about \$17,000,000 from New York, Chicago and St. Louis, and the balance from National banks in the other reserve cities.

Next, the banks in reserve cities (other than New York, Chicago and St. Louis) must accumulate about \$119,000,000 in lawful money more than now held by them, and this must come from the National banks in New York, Chicago and St. Louis, now indebted to them as reserve agents.

To this \$119,000,000 adding the \$17,000,000 withdrawn by the country banks we have an aggregate of \$136,000,000 in actual money to be withdrawn from National banks in New York, Chicago and St. Louis. But, as New York banks on September 5 held seventy-seven per cent. of deposits in the three central reserve cities, about \$105,000,000 of this great volume of money must be furnished by National banks in New York city.

Enormous as this sum is, it does not measure the loss of business which will fall upon the New York banks if we apply the rule laid down by Comptroller Dawes himself in his little book on the "Banking System of the United States." In this he maintains that if \$150,000 in currency is withdrawn from a New York bank by a bank outside that city the effect on the New York bank will be to shrink its deposits by \$600,000, or four times the amount of currency withdrawn, and its loans by \$450,000, or three times the currency withdrawn.

If this be true in practice the withdrawal of \$105,000,000 of lawful money from the National banks in New York would mean a shrinkage in their deposits of \$420,000,000 and a contraction of their lending capacity by the sum of \$315,000,000.

Such results would be a fatal blow to the National banks of New York city, and through them to the banking system of the entire country, for these National banks practically occupy toward the other banks and trust companies of the United States in the matter of reserves the position and relation of the Bank of England toward the banks of England, Scotland and Ireland.

One argument for this proposed change in the law is the strain put upon the New York banks in time of panic. The record of 1893, the worst panic of recent years, is that during that year only one National bank in New York succumbed to the strain, and that bank, a small one, within a year from its failure had paid its depositors in full, principal and interest, without the need of an assessment on its shareholders.

In enumerating the causes for the stringency in the New York money market in the fall and winter of 1894 the Comptroller omits two which had a potent effect. First, the commencement of the South African war, which cut off the liberal supplies of gold coming from that region and created a demand for large sums to carry on this war; second, the locking up of a large amount of currency in the United States Treasury through the operation of our revenue laws.

While low rates for money usually stimulate speculation, this does not seem to have been the case during the spring and summer of 1900, for while interest rates in New York on call money were very low, sales on the Stock Exchange were very moderate in amount.

As to the panic of 1893, it took on the peculiar phase of a currency famine, even the despised silver dollar selling at a premium, and this currency the reserve city banks were called upon to furnish, although statistics show that only ten to fifteen per cent. of the deposits received by them consisted of gold, silver or other kinds of currency. In spite of this fact, however, the banks of New York city rendered very able and effective service in meeting the demands of out-of-town banks and sustaining them until the panic had passed.

In conclusion, the cash reserve of National banks in New York has now come to be a kind of weather-gauge of credit and nothing else, which twenty-five per cent. represents as normal. Above this financial navigation is comfortable and easy, but below the indications are for stormy weather requiring close reefing and careful sailing.

GEO. M. COFFIN.

NEW YORK, January 3, 1901.

## BANKING AND FINANCIAL NEWS.

This Department includes a complete list of **NEW NATIONAL BANKS** (furnished by the Comptroller of the Currency), **STATE AND PRIVATE BANKS**, **CHANGES IN OFFICERS**, **DISSOLUTIONS AND FAILURES**, etc., under their proper State heads for easy reference.

### NEW YORK CITY.

—Charles W. Morse has purchased of Frank Tilford a controlling interest in the Bank of New Amsterdam, and has been elected a director.

—About May 1 the Standard Trust Co. will remove from its present location, 40 Wall street, to the new Broad-Exchange Building, corner of Broad street and Exchange place. In addition to having extensive quarters for its banking and trust business, the company will have thoroughly equipped safe deposit vaults in the basement.

The officers of the Standard Trust Company are; President, William C. Lane; Vice-President, Frank K. Sturgis; Second Vice-President, Louis L. Stanton; Treasurer, Edward M. F. Miller; Secretary, William C. Cox. Its board of directors comprise some of the best-known capitalists and business men of the city.

—It is said that interests connected with the National City Bank are negotiating for a controlling interest in the Columbia Bank.

—Plans have been approved for the new building for the Stock Exchange, and work will begin about May 1. The structure will be approximately of the same height as a nine-story office building.

—Gilbert R. Thorne, formerly Cashier of the Northwestern National Bank, Minneapolis, Minn., but who was recently elected a Vice-President of the National Park Bank, of this city, was introduced to the bankers of New York at a dinner given at the Union League Club on the evening of December 12 by Richard Delafield, President of the National Park. The guests included the officers of a number of the leading banks and other well-known business men.

—The Bowery Savings Bank, which has been paying a dividend on deposits at the rate of  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. since July, 1898, declared a dividend at the rate of four per cent. for the last half of 1900. This is the largest Savings bank in the United States, having deposits of over \$67,000,000 divided among 123,000 depositors.

—The Domestic Exchange National Bank, which opened December 23, 1899, for the purpose of making a specialty of receiving out-of-town checks on deposit and for collection, has published a statement of its condition on the same date for 1900, showing its growth after being one year in business. It reports loans and discounts, \$355,491; United States bonds, \$300,000; due from banks, and cash, \$787,180; capital, \$300,000; circulation, \$360,000; bank and individual deposits, \$1,016,172.

—The property at Fifth avenue and Thirty-fourth street, known as the Stewart Mansion, the home of the late A. T. Stewart, has been purchased by the Knickerbocker Trust Co. A building for the use of the company will be put up on the site.

—Everton R. Chapman has withdrawn from the firm of Moore & Schley and has formed a new copartnership under the firm name of E. R. Chapman & Co. with his son, Melville D. Chapman, as his partner. The new brokerage firm will have its offices at 80 Broadway.

—James Stillman, President of the National City Bank, and Wm. Rockefeller have been elected directors of the Lincoln National Bank.

—At an auction sale of securities at the New York Real Estate Salesroom by Adrian H. Muller & Son, December 19, the following sales of bank and trust company shares were reported:

One hundred shares Produce Exchange Trust Company, 150 $\frac{1}{4}$ ; 50 shares Southern National Bank (extra dividend of ninety per cent.) 525; 6 shares Bank of the State of New York, 141; 30 shares National Bank of North America, 206 $\frac{1}{4}$ ; 4 shares Bank of New York, N. B. A., 328; 5 shares National Bank of Commerce, 304; 10 shares Hamilton Bank of New York, 155; 34 shares National Bank of Commerce, 308 $\frac{1}{4}$ ; 15 shares City Trust Company, 335; 10 shares

Mount Morris Bank, 196; 10 shares Market and Fulton National Bank, 244; 20 shares Union Trust Company, 1,377; 7 shares Fourth National Bank, 184; 1 share Bank of New York, N.B.A., 361; 12 shares Holland Trust Company, 50; 24 shares Ninth National Bank, 95; 10 shares Kings County Trust Company, 406.

—Group VIII of the New York State Bankers' Association held its annual banquet at the Waldorf-Astoria on the evening of December 19, Gen. A. C. Barnes, Chairman of the group, presiding.

Addresses were made by Gen. Barnes, Secretary Gage, St. Clair McKelway, Rev. Dr. Geo. R. Van de Water, Col. Geo. B. Davis and Simeon Ford.

Secretary Gage's address is printed in full in another part of this issue of the *MAGAZINE*.

—Wm. H. Baldwin, Jr., President of the Long Island Railroad Co., was recently elected a director of the Corn Exchange Bank.

—James Brown has been admitted as a member of the firm of Brown Brothers & Co.

—Andrew V. Stout and J. Augustus Barnard have been admitted as members of the firm of Dominick & Dominick.

—The resignation of J. Preston McAnerney, Assistant Cashier of the Seventh National Bank, is announced.

### NEW ENGLAND STATES.

**Taunton, Mass.**—The Taunton Safe Deposit and Trust Co. has been organized here with \$200,000 capital. Its officers are: President, Edward H. Temple; Vice-President and Treasurer, Albert M. Gleason; Secretary, Herbert O. Morse.

Mr. Gleason was formerly Treasurer of the Greenfield (Mass.) Savings Bank and during his connection with the bank its assets increased from \$1,000,000 to about \$3,000,000.

This city has 31,000 population and is growing steadily. It has no trust company, and the field for such an institution is believed to be a good one.

**Taxes on Maine Savings Banks.**—For the six months ending October 31, 1900, the taxes on the Maine Savings banks amount to \$229,746, being at the rate of 7-16 of one per cent.

**Providence, R. I.**—There are reports here of prospective consolidation of a number of National banks. Trust companies have already absorbed a number of local banks, and from these reports the movement in this direction is not yet ended.

**New Hampshire Banks.**—The fifty-ninth annual report of the Board of Bank Commissioners contains statistics of the eighty Savings banks and twelve State banks and trust companies under the supervision of the commission. The Savings banks show a total of assets of \$62,098,071, against \$58,636,781 in 1899. The amount due depositors is \$53,896,710. Loans on local collateral security show an increase of \$1,377,638; railroad stock an increase of \$1,100,832, and railroad bonds an increase of \$1,025,612. In Western mortgages there is a decrease of \$621,302, and in real estate by foreclosure a decrease of \$233,968.

The commissioners recommend a reasonable limitation on the amount which can be invested in notes secured by first mortgages of real estate in New Hampshire; a clearer definition of the amount of personal paper which can be held, and the authorization of the purchase of the public loans of other countries.

Two new banks have been opened during the year and four have closed.

**Maine Bank Report.**—The annual report of State Bank Examiner Fremont E. Timberlake shows there are fifty-one Savings banks in the State, whose assets amount to \$71,076,211; seventeen trust and banking companies, whose assets are \$13,295,402.

There is a gain of 11,428 in the number of depositors in Savings banks, trust companies and shareholders in loan and building associations during the year, as against a corresponding gain of 9,827 in 1899.

Mr. Timberlake believes that the future welfare and the good of the State generally call for a reduction of the State tax on Savings banks. He also says, in speaking of the trust companies, that some legislation in that direction is necessary as they are of recent establishment in this State, and the laws touching upon them are but few.

### MIDDLE STATES.

**Pittsburg.**—Col. Hugh Young, who has been National bank examiner for this district for many years, has gone on a leave of absence on account of ill-health, and has been succeeded by Jesse A. Doolittle, of Illinois.

—The Union Trust company makes the following statement of its condition at the close of business December 31, 1900:

Loans and investments, \$6,968,771; real estate and vault, \$272,996; cash and other assets,

\$1,770,880; total resources, \$9,012,109. Capital stock, \$500,000; surplus and profits, \$881,972; due depositors, \$7,630,137.

These figures not only show a strong condition, but they indicate a very substantial addition to the company's business—a gain which is largely due to the wise management under which the company operates.

—The year just closed showed a wonderful expansion in the banking business. There were two new institutions to enter the local field, while in the county there were nine. The surplus and undivided profits of the Pittsburgh banks and trust companies increased over \$3,600,000, the loans over \$13,000,000, the deposits \$24,342,000, and the total resources \$32,075,800. The county banks and trust companies increased their surplus and undivided profits by \$5,580,000, their loans by \$17,000,000, their deposits by \$30,700,000 and their total resources by \$41,491,000.

Bank clearings show a gain of \$87,162,939 over 1899, although in the latter year there were many big combinations which swelled the clearing-house figures.

—A recent number of the "Pittsburgh Banker," published by R. J. Stoney, contains a statement showing the profits of the National banks of Pittsburgh for the year ending with October, 1900, with comparisons for the past ten years. With one exception, all the banks paid dividends during the year, the total disbursements amounting to \$1,074,000 on a capital of \$13,350,000. Within the same period all save two added to their surplus and undivided profits, the aggregate of these additions being \$1,598,837. The total surplus and profits amounted to \$14,350,062, or about a million dollars in excess of the total capital.

Within the past ten years the surplus and profits have increased from \$7,739,718 to \$14,350,062, an increase of \$6,610,344. About \$1,000,000 of this surplus did not come directly from earnings, but from the sale of stock at a premium, the latter being added to surplus fund. But with this deduction the remaining increase is very large, and reflects the prosperity enjoyed by the banks during the past ten years. From 1890 to 1899 the amount paid in dividends was \$9,276,258.

While the capital of the banks is only \$13,350,000, the market value of their shares is many times that amount, and within the past year there has been a remarkable appreciation in this market value, the average of which is the highest in the history of the banking business in this city.

**Albany, N. Y.**—The National Commercial Bank of this city is one of the exceptionally strong banks of the country. As shown by its statement on December 13, the capital is \$300,000, surplus \$700,000 and profits \$162,447. Its deposits are \$4,360,657.

Edward A. Groesbeck, Cashier of this bank, was elected Chairman of Group V of the New York State Bankers' Association at the recent annual meeting, held at Troy.

**Philadelphia.**—The Fourth Street National Bank reports deposits of \$29,506,000—the largest in its history.

**Baltimore.**—The Canton National Bank has moved into its new building, corner of Elliott street and East avenue.

—It is reported that the Equitable Bank Building on South street has been bought by the Safe Deposit and Trust Co.

**Banker's Long Service.**—On January 3, Dr. Henry Ridgely was elected for the fifty-third year as President of the Farmers' Bank of Dover, Del.

Dr. Ridgely had notified the board of directors that he intended to relinquish his office, but the directors insisted on re-electing him.

Dr. Ridgely succeeded his father, Henry M. Ridgely, as President, the father having served since the organization of the institution in 1807.

## SOUTHERN STATES.

**Atlanta, Ga.**—The Lowry National Bank recently declared its regular semi-annual dividend of four per cent. out of its net earnings for the past six months.

This is the twenty-fifth semi-annual dividend paid by this institution since its organization as the Lowry Banking Company in 1888. It has paid its stockholders eight per cent. per annum regularly, besides accumulating undivided profits of upwards of \$100,000.

**Richmond, Va.**—The banking interests of Richmond closed the century with a satisfactory showing. Within the past ten years the resources of the banks in this city have increased from \$13,597,170 to \$24,117,696. The banking facilities, including the three trust companies organized in the past three years, amount to \$27,152,474, making an increase in the total banking facilities of the city of \$13,555,304.

During the past ten years the banks have added to their surplus funds \$846,912, and have paid in dividends to their stockholders about \$3,000,000. In addition there will be distributed to the stockholders of the banks and trust companies \$130,810.

During the period of ten years, the total deposits, including the accounts of banks and bankers, has increased from \$8,749,802 in 1890 to \$16,188,278, a net gain of \$7,438,476.



The following figures show the clearings: 1868, \$133,618,376; 1869, \$165,901,087; 1870, \$175,653,845. This shows an increase during the year just closed of \$9,762,757, and an increase for the two years of \$42,035,469. The liabilities in the business failures for the past year, as reported by "Bradstreet's," were \$96,000, against \$940,300 for 1867 and \$148,500 for 1868.

**Wheeling, W. Va.**—The "Wheeling Daily Intelligencer," of December 20, contained extensive and valuable statistics relating to the banks of this city. In the past year deposits increased over \$1,000,000, and from 1867 to the close of 1870 they rose from \$6,093,000 to \$9,957,000.

#### WESTERN STATES.

**Chicago.**—The stock of the Chicago National Bank is to be increased by an additional issue to present shareholders of 5,000 shares at \$300 per share. Of this money \$500,000 will be added to the capital, making it \$1,000,000; and \$500,000 to surplus, making that \$1,000,000, and \$500,000 to profit and loss account, making it a little over \$700,000. Out of this profit and loss account the cost of the new building will be provided for, which will be carried on the books at \$100,000 only, the remainder being charged off at once. The building will be ready about the first of May, and from all descriptions it will be one of the finest banking houses in the country. Of course it cost much more than \$100,000, but in placing it on its books at this figure the Chicago National is following its usual conservative policy.

—The First National Bank made a net profit of \$739,832 for the year 1870. Statements were mailed to stockholders showing the results of the twelve months' operation. The account itemizes the earnings, and states that "all bad and doubtful debts have been provided for." The bank's capital was \$3,000,000 until just before the Union National was taken over on Sept 1, when it was increased to \$5,000,000.

—The Continental National Bank has reason to feel gratified because of the progress made in the past year, as well as for the two previous years. During the last year the gain in deposits is \$6,716,000, or 29 per cent.; gain in deposits for last two years, \$10,700,000, or 55 per cent., and gain for the last three years, \$15,000,000, or 100 per cent. The total gains in deposits of all the National banks of Chicago for the same period were as follows: Gain for last year, \$97,000,000, or 19 per cent.; gain for last two years, \$44,000,000, or 23 per cent.; gain for last three years, \$82,000,000, or 54 per cent.

**Detroit, Mich.**—A controlling interest in the Preston National Bank has been bought by Henry Stephens and the Palmes estate. Charles L. Palmes succeeds F. W. Hayes as President of the bank.

—Owing to advanced age and ill-health, Mr. Emory Wendell, President *pro tem.* of the First National Bank, has sold his stock in the bank and retired. He has been a director of the bank for thirty-six years, and was President from 1882 to 1891, when he was stricken with paralysis and resigned his office. When he partially recovered in 1893 he was made President *pro tem.* His management was always successful, the bank regularly paying ten per cent. annual dividends and adding to its surplus.

—The State Savings Bank presents its usual reports of the banks of this city at the date of the last official call, December 13. State banks report: Savings deposits, \$36,807,244; commercial deposits, \$9,502,692; due banks and bankers, \$3,992,324; total, \$49,902,260. National banks: Commercial deposits, \$13,732,114; due banks and bankers, \$8,725,287; United States deposits, \$678,223; total, \$23,135,625.

**Minneapolis, Minn.**—The Nicollet National Bank has been consolidated with the First National Bank. J. F. R. Foss, President of the Nicollet, and Ernest C. Brown, Cashier, will both become officers of the First National.

—E. W. Decker, former Cashier of the Metropolitan Bank, has been elected Cashier of the Northwestern National, to succeed Gilbert G. Thorne, chosen Vice-President of the National Park Bank, New York. Frank E. Holton, for eight years paying teller in the Northwestern National, succeeds Mr. Decker as Cashier of the Metropolitan.

**St. Louis.**—The Mercantile Trust Co. has decided to increase the capital stock from \$750,000 to \$1,000,000, the entire increase being underwritten by the directors before subscriptions were invited from present shareholders. It is one of the youngest trust companies in the city, but its stock is already selling for \$284.50 per share.

—The St. Louis Trust Company now occupies its new building at Fourth and Locust streets. New stock is to be issued at a premium, \$500,000 being added to capital and \$750,000 to surplus.

**Trust Companies in Indiana.**—An interesting feature of the recent report of the Auditor of the State of Indiana relates to the organization of trust companies of that State. In the past year thirteen new companies were formed. On October 31, 1899, there were twelve

companies operating with total resources amounting to \$7,183,000, and on October 31, 1900, the number had increased to twenty-eight and the total resources to \$10,543,044.

**Bank Commissioner Resigns.**—W. S. Search, territorial bank commissioner of Oklahoma, tendered his resignation on January 4.

### PACIFIC SLOPE.

**Seattle Assay Office.**—At the close of the Nineteenth Century and the year 1900, Assayer Wing, of the United States Assay Office at Seattle, said that in the past twelve months his receipts at the office have been forty-six and one-eighth tons of gold and silver.

The total quantity of gold for the year was 1,345,123.41 troy ounces, with an assayed value of \$22,083,755.12, and it represented the individual deposits of 7,106 persons. Over \$16,900,000 came from the Klondike, and the remainder from other parts of Alaska, British Columbia, Washington and other States. The highest mark was reached in July last, when over fourteen tons of the yellow metal was deposited in the Assay Office in twenty-six working days. Nome's output was \$3,723,272.14.

### CANADA.

**Change in Bank's Name.**—The Merchants' Bank of Halifax, which was organized at Halifax, N. S., in 1869 as a local institution, taking a local name, has received authority from the Dominion Parliament to change its name to The Royal Bank of Canada. The bank now has a capital and surplus of \$3,700,000, with forty branches located at principal points throughout the Dominion of Canada, and also has agencies at Havana and in New York city.

**Bank of Montreal.**—Plans have been completed for extensive and important improvements in the building occupied by the head office of this bank in Montreal.

**Bank Sale Ratified.**—At a special meeting of the shareholders of the Canadian Bank of Commerce, December 11, the agreement for the purchase of the Bank of British Columbia was ratified. Under the terms of the agreement the Canadian Bank of Commerce acquires all the assets of the Bank of British Columbia, assumes all liabilities, and for the capital and surplus in the business gives the Bank of British Columbia \$2,000,000 paid-up stock in the Canadian Bank of Commerce and \$312,000 cash. Employees of the absorbed bank are retained at the same salaries as heretofore paid.

---

### NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

---

**CLEARING-HOUSES—Their History, Methods and Administration.** By JAMES G. CANNON. New York: D. Appleton & Co. Price \$2.50.

Outside of those connected with the management of clearing-houses, the details of their operations have not been generally understood, and as information on the subject was much scattered, where it existed at all, Mr. Cannon believed that a book on the subject would be of interest to bankers, financial and economic students and others. His work has been done thoroughly, the scope of the volume including the clearing systems of the principal cities of the United States, of Canada, Japan and London—the methods in vogue at the world's financial center being shown to be somewhat antiquated. One of the most interesting chapters is that devoted to a full description of the daily routine at the New York Clearing-House. The practical value of the work is greatly enhanced by the minuteness of its description of the various methods in effecting bank clearings, illustrated with many *facsimile* forms.

Mr. Cannon has made a most substantial contribution to financial literature, and it is fortunate that a work involving so much labor and research has been done by one whose experience and taste exceptionally qualify him for the task.

---

**POOR'S MANUAL OF RAILROADS.** New York: H. V. & H. W. Poor.

The edition of this well-known manual for 1900 contains, as usual, complete statistical and other information in regard to the railways of the United States, as also in respect to State and municipal bonds and industrial securities. An interesting and valuable feature is the descriptive matter relating to the construction, consolidation and financial history of the railways of the country.

## NEW BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, ETC.

### NEW NATIONAL BANKS.

The Comptroller of the Currency furnishes the following statement of new National banks organized since our last report. Names of officers and other particulars regarding these new National banks will be found under the different State headings.

#### NATIONAL BANKS ORGANIZED.

- 5534—Citizens' National Bank, Chillicothe, Ohio. Capital, \$100,000.
- 5535—First National Bank, Waverly, Ohio. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5536—First National Bank, New Boston, Texas. Capital, \$30,000.
- 5537—First National Bank, Swea City, Iowa. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5538—First National Bank, Dundee, Illinois. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5539—First National Bank, New Carlisle, Indiana. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5540—First National Bank, Fredericktown, Ohio. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5541—First National Bank, Byesville, Ohio. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5542—First National Bank, Cottage Grove, Oregon. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5543—First National Bank, Bancroft, Iowa. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5544—First National Bank, Forsyth, Georgia. Capital, \$30,000.
- 5545—Lampasas National Bank, Lampasas, Texas. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5546—First National Bank, Fayette City, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5547—First National Bank, Coalgate, Indian Territory. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5548—First National Bank, Caledonia, New York. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5549—Commercial National Bank, New Orleans, Louisiana. Capital, \$300,000.
- 5550—City National Bank, Marion, Ohio. Capital, \$100,000.
- 5551—First National Bank, Laurinburg, North Carolina. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5552—Olympia National Bank, Olympia, Washington. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5553—Metropolitan National Bank, Cleveland, Ohio. Capital, \$500,000.
- 5554—First National Bank, Fullerton, California. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5555—Citizens' National Bank, Eureka, Kansas. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5556—First National Bank, Mountain View, Oklahoma. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5557—Alliance National Bank, Alliance, Nebraska. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5558—Peshtigo National Bank, Peshtigo, Wisconsin. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5559—First National Bank, Hudson, Iowa. Capital, \$25,000.

#### APPLICATIONS TO ORGANIZE NATIONAL BANKS APPROVED.

The following notices of intention to organize National banks have been approved by the Comptroller of the Currency since last advice:

- First National Bank, Natrona, Pa.; by O. C. Camp, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Havre, Mont.; by W. E. Hauser, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Clayton, New Mexico; by H. J. Hammond, *et al.*
- National Bank of Fayetteville, Fayetteville, N. C.; by W. J. Edwards, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Alvord, Texas; by Wm. R. Thompson, *et al.*
- Bernards National Bank, Bernardsville, N. J.; by Jesse L. Hedden, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Thomasville, Ala.; by E. J. Buck, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Italy, Texas; by S. M. Dunlap, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Hoxie, Kansas; by Grover Walker, *et al.*
- Gold Standard National Bank, Marionville, Pa.; by I. M. Shannon, *et al.*
- Miners' National Bank, Ishpeming, Mich.; by H. O. Young, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Jackson, Ga.; by J. R. Carmichael, *et al.*
- Ocean County National Bank, Point Pleasant, N. J.; by Robert V. Mathews, *et al.*
- Farmers and Merchants' National Bank, Plano, Texas; by O. Davis, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Knox, Ind.; by O. D. Fuller, *et al.*
- Federal Hill National Bank, Baltimore, Md.; by Geo. B. Skinner, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Tully, N. Y.; by Elliot Norton, *et al.*
- Fishkill National Bank, Fishkill, N. Y.; by James E. Dean, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Fairbank, Iowa; by J. I. Minkler, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Granite, Okla.; by C. D. Rorer, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Apollo, Pa.; by W. S. Beamer, *et al.*

Citizens' National Bank, Somerset, Ky.; by J. C. Ogden, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Merkel, Texas; by Geo. S. Berry, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Stoyestown, Pa.; by Frank Taylor, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Lake Park, Iowa; by F. H. Daly, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Perkaspie, Pa.; by Milton C. Pyle, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Burt, Iowa; by C. D. Smith, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Cody, Wyo.; by W. F. Cody, *et al.*  
 People's National Bank, Latrobe, Pa.; by Charles R. Smith, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Pitcairn, Pa.; by H. L. Castle, *et al.*  
 City National Bank, Decatur, Texas; by S. A. Lillard, *et al.*  
 City National Bank, Tulsa, Ind. Ter.; by L. D. Marr, *et al.*  
 Montgomery National Bank, Montgomery, West Va.; by S. H. Montgomery, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Hibbing, Minn.; by A. D. Davidson, *et al.*  
 Citizens' National Bank, Lebanon, Ind.; by Wm. H. Higgins, *et al.*  
 Tempe National Bank, Tempe, Arizona; by A. C. Ozanne, *et al.*  
 Citizens' National Bank, Great Bend, Kansas; by E. R. Moses, *et al.*  
 Punxsutawney National Bank, Punxsutawney, Pa.; by S. A. Rinn, *et al.*

#### APPLICATION FOR CONVERSION TO NATIONAL BANKS APPROVED.

Bank of Montclair, Montclair, N. J.; into Montclair National Bank.  
 Redwood County Bank, Redwood Falls, Minn.; into First National Bank.  
 Commercial Savings Bank, Oelwein, Iowa; into First National Bank.  
 Morris County State Bank, Council Grove, Kansas; into Council Grove National Bank.

### NEW BANKS, BANKERS, ETC.

#### ALABAMA.

ENTERPRISE—Bank of Enterprise; capital, \$50,000.  
 EVERGREEN—People's Bank; capital, \$20,000; Pres., C. P. Deming; Vice-Pres., W. B. Ney; Cas., A. Cunningham.  
 GOODWATER—Farmers and Merchants' Bank; capital, \$50,000.  
 RUSHVILLE—Merchants' Bank.

#### ARIZONA.

YUMA—Bank of Yuma.

#### ARKANSAS.

NASHVILLE—Planters' Bank; capital, \$15,000; Pres., D. P. Wallace; Cas., E. W. Hutchinson.

#### CALIFORNIA.

FULLERTON—First National Bank (successor to Fruit Growers' Bank); capital, \$50,000; Pres., B. G. Balcom; Cas., C. E. Holcomb.  
 LOS ANGELES—Mercantile Loan and Investment Company; capital, \$250,000.  
 SAN PEDRO—San Pedro Bank of Savings; capital, \$25,000.

#### GEORGIA.

AUGUSTA—Equitable Trust Co.  
 AILEY—Montgomery County Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., James McNatt; Vice-Pres., J. A. Oeterson; Cas., J. M. D. McGregor.  
 BUFORD—Shadburn Banking Co.  
 CARLTON—Carlton Bank.  
 FORSYTH—First National Bank; capital, \$30,000; Pres., J. M. Ponder; Cas., Paul A. Bowden.  
 MADISON—Jefferson County Bank; capital, \$25,000.  
 STATESBORO—Bulloch Bank.  
 SYLVANIA—Sylvania Banking Co.; Pres., L. H. Hilton.  
 WILLACOOCHIE—Bank of Willacoochie.

#### ILLINOIS.

CHICAGO—C. A. Denham & Co., Safety Deposit Vaults; capital, \$5,000; Pres., C. A. Denham; Vice-Pres., Frank N. Derby; Cas., A. T. Cowen.  
 DUNDEE—First National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., Delos Dunton; Cas., F. B. Wright.  
 MOUNT VERNON—Evans & Gee Banking Co. —Mount Vernon State Bank.  
 SWAN CREEK—Swan Creek Bank; capital, \$13,000.

#### INDIANA.

NEW CARLISLE—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Haven Hubbard; Vice-Pres., Dickson S. Scoffern; Cas., Arthur R. Brummitt.  
 THORNTOWN—Home Bank; Cas., L. H. Jordan.  
 VINCENNES—Vincennes Trust Co.; capital, \$50,000; Pres., W. J. Nicholson; Sec'y, W. L. Te Walt.

#### INDIAN TERRITORY.

COALGATE—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., J. H. Carson; Cas., Frank Cheatham Garner.  
 ROFF—Farmers' Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., Randolph Lawrence; Vice-Pres., T. A. Laporte; Cas., John G. James.

#### IOWA.

BANCROFT—First National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., R. N. Bruer; Cas., Tom Sherman.  
 HUDSON—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., John H. Leavitt; Cas., C. W. Bedford.  
 LE CLAIRE—Le Claire Savings Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., C. S. Simpson; Cas., J. E. Park.

**LENOX**—Lenox Bank; Pres., Joseph Allen; Cas., F. Wilkin.

**SAINT ANSGAR**—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$12,700; Pres., J. F. Koch; Cas., C. H. Miller; Asst. Cas., O. H. Koch.

**SOMERS**—Somers Security Bank; Pres., A. R. Daughenbaugh; Cas., C. F. Sperry.

**STANWOOD**—Stanwood Savings Bank (successor to J. H. Coutts); capital, \$20,000; Pres., J. H. Coutts; Cas., M. L. Simmons; Asst. Cas., C. H. Haesemeyer.

**SWKA City**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., C. J. Lenander; Vice-Pres., Geo. C. Call; Cas., G. F. Thomas; Asst. Cas., P. E. Benson.

### KANSAS.

**DODGE CITY**—State Bank of Commerce; capital, \$10,000; Pres., C. Q. Chandler; Cas., H. A. Burnett.

**DUREKA**—Citizens' National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Edward Crebo; Cas., Gilbert Bittler.

**GOODLAND**—Charles F. Weber.

**NEFAWAKA**—Citizens' State Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., C. S. Cummings; Cas., C. E. Cummings.

**SENECA**—Seneca State Savings Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., J. E. Stillwell; Cas., D. O. Taylor.

### KENTUCKY.

**CADIZ**—Cadiz Bank; Pres., E. E. Wash; Vice-Pres., K. R. McKee; Cas., J. D. Shaw.

**LOUISVILLE**—Louisville Title Co.; Pres., Geo. A. Newman; Vice-Pres., Arthur G. Langham; Sec. and Manager, C. M. Phillips; Treas., Geo. W. Hutchison.

**NEWPORT**—Security Savings Co.; capital, \$10,000.

**SHEPHERDSVILLE**—People's Bank; capital, \$15,000.

### LOUISIANA.

**NEW ORLEANS**—Commercial National Bank; capital, \$300,000; Pres., Wm. Mason Smith; Cas., John Hamilton Fulton.

### MARYLAND.

**BALTIMORE**—Dime Savings Bank; capital, \$100,000.—Federal Savings Bank.

### MASSACHUSETTS.

**BOSTON**—Matthews & Co.

### MICHIGAN.

**DETROIT**—United States Savings and Security Co.; capital, \$50,000.

**KALAMAZOO**—Ideal Trust Co.; capital, \$4,000.

**ZEELAND**—State Bank of Zeeland (successor to Den Herder's Bank); Pres., J. Den Herder; Vice-Pres., Frank; Broomstra; Cas., Christopher Den Herder.

### MINNESOTA.

**FRANKLIN**—State Bank; capital, \$15,000.

**LIEMORE**—State Bank; capital, \$15,000; Pres., A. Graf; Cas., A. J. Rice.

**THIEF RIVER FALLS**—Scandia Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., Sven Swanson.

### MISSISSIPPI.

**BROOKHAVEN**—Bank of Brookhaven (successor to Sherman & Davis); capital, \$25,000; Pres., Z. D. Davis; Cas., O. Newton, Jr.

### MISSOURI.

**JOPLIN**—Citizens' State Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., C. M. DeGraff; Cas., F. T. Snapp.

**NOVINGER**—Novinger Bank; capital, \$12,000.

**SOUTH ST. JOSEPH**—Bank of Commerce of St. Joseph; Pres., A. H. Penfield.

**WEBSTER GROVES**—Bank of Webster Groves; capital, \$25,000.

### MONTANA.

**BUTTE**—Monidah Trust Co.; capital, \$50,000.

### NEBRASKA.

**ALLIANCE**—Alliance Nat. Bank (successor to Bank of Alliance); capital, \$50,000; Pres., F. M. Knight; Cas., H. A. Lotspeich.

### NEW JERSEY.

**CRANFORD**—Cranford Savings Bank.

**NEWARK**—Essex Trust Co.; capital, \$500,000.

### NEW YORK.

**CALEDONIA**—First Nat. Bank (successor to McDonald Bros.); capital, \$25,000; Cas., S. W. McDonald.

### NORTH CAROLINA.

**LAURINBURG**—First Nat. Bank (successor to Bank of Laurinburg); capital, \$25,000; Pres., A. L. James; Cas., T. J. Gill.

**RALEIGH**—Raleigh Loan & Trust Co.

### NORTH DAKOTA.

**LITCHVILLE**—State Bank of Litchville.

### OHIO.

**BYESVILLE**—First Nat. Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Geo. S. Trenner; Cas., R. H. Mills.

**CLEVELAND**—Metropolitan Nat. Bank; capital, \$500,000; Pres., John J. Phillips; Cas., Frank S. Bauder.—People's Trust Co.; capital stock, \$500,000.

**CHILLICOTHE**—Citizens' Nat. Bank; capital, \$100,000; Pres., Geo. A. Vaughters; Cas., Herbert E. Holland.

**COLUMBUS**—Franklin County Savings Bank Co.; capital, \$50,000.

**CONNEAUT**—Conneaut Banking Co.; capital, \$50,000.

**FREDERICKTOWN**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., J. N. Braddock; Cas., J. H. Dickey.

**MARION**—City National Bank; capital, \$100,000; Pres., Isaac A. Merchant; Cas., D. H. Lincoln.

**NEW LONDON**—Savings and Loan Bank Co.; capital, \$30,000; Pres., W. S. Weston; Vice-Pres., Charles McClave; Cas., George E. Prosser.

**WAVERLY**—First National Bank (successor to Hays, Jones & Co.); capital, \$50,000;

Wells S. Jones, Jr.; Vice-Pres., W. B. Lee; Cas., W. F. Taylor.

#### OKLAHOMA.

BELLEMONT—Bank of Bellemont; capital, \$5,000.

BILLINGS—Farmers' Exchange Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., Fred. S. Gum; Cas., C. B. Winsborough.

MARSHALL—Farmers' State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., O. E. Helton; Vice-Pres., J. L. Hearn; Cas., W. L. Helton.

MOUNTAIN VIEW—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Andrew J. Dunlap.

#### OREGON.

COTTAGE GROVE—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Darwin Bristow; Cas., Herbert Eakin.

#### PENNSYLVANIA.

BRADDOCK—People's Trust Co.; capital, \$75,000.

CORAOOLIS—Ohio Valley Trust Co.; capital, \$125,000.

FAYETTE CITY—First National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., Andrew Brown; Vice-Pres., Louis Cope; Cas., Wm. E. Shope; Asst. Cas., James G. Binns.

SAYRE—First National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., E. P. Wilbur; Cas., R. F. Page; Asst. Cas., L. D. Atwater.

SCRANTON—North Scranton Savings Bank; capital, \$50,000.—People's Bank; capital, \$100,000.

SOMERSET—Somerset Trust Co.; capital, \$1,000.

### CHANGES IN OFFICERS, CAPITAL, ETC.

#### ALABAMA.

EVERGREEN—Bank of Evergreen; sold to Vinson Bros.

GADSDEN—First National Bank; no Cas. in place of W. G. Brockway; R. J. White, Asst. Cas.

MONTGOMERY—Capital City Insurance Co.; William Berney, Pres. in place of E. B. Joseph, resigned.

SELMA—City Nat. Bank; W. P. Armstrong, Pres., deceased.

TALLADEGA—Isbell Nat. Bank; W. P. Armstrong, Pres., deceased.

#### ARKANSAS.

MONTICELLO—Monticello Bank; R. W. Finn, Cas. in place of R. F. Hyatt, deceased.

#### CALIFORNIA.

ALAMEDA—Bank of Alameda; J. E. Baker, Pres. in place of Henry Sevensing; E. R. Tabor, Cas.—Alameda Savings Bank; J. E. Baker, Pres. in place of Henry Sevensing; E. R. Tabor, Cas.

LODI—Bank of Lodi; Francis Cogswell, Vice-Pres., deceased.

SAN FRANCISCO—Crocker-Woolworth National Bank; Wm. E. Brown, Vice-Pres., deceased.

#### SOUTH DAKOTA.

BRANDT—State Bank; capital, \$15,000.

#### TENNESSEE.

ASHLAND CITY—Ashland City Bank and Trust Co.; Pres., J. C. Chambliss; Cas., P. P. Pickard.

WHITEVILLE—Whiteville Savings Bank of Hardeman & Co.; capital, \$20,000.

#### TEXAS.

GALVESTON—J. W. Riddell; Cas., G. T. Austin. IREDELL—J. A. Rushing & Son.

LAMPASAS—Lampasas National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., S. H. Brown; Vice-Pres., Walter Acker; Cas., Ford Brandenburg.

NEW BOSTON—First Nat. Bank (successor to Bowie County Bank); capital, \$30,000; Pres., T. H. Leeves; Cas., W. E. Stewart.

PARIS—Paris Loan and Trust Co.; Pres., Hudson P. Ellis; Vice-Pres., Fred Fleming; Sec. and Treas., A. Templeton.

#### VIRGINIA.

ROANOKE—C. R. Fishburn & Co.

#### WASHINGTON.

OLYMPIA—Olympia National Bank (successor to Olympia State Bank); capital, \$50,000; Pres., Charles H. Kegley; Asst. Cas., D. E. Crandall.

#### WEST VIRGINIA.

WHEELING—Centre Wheeling Savings Bank.

#### WISCONSIN.

PESHTIGO—Peshtigo National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Wm. Ellis, Jr.

#### COLORADO.

STERLING—First National Bank; L. M. Judd, Vice-Pres.; D. A. Bartholow, Asst. Cas.

#### CONNECTICUT.

DEEP RIVER—Deep River Savings Bank; James E. Pratt, Treas.

NEW HAVEN—Tradesmen's National Bank; Andrew W. De Forest, director, deceased.

#### DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

WASHINGTON—National Metropolitan Bank; J. Gales Moore, Cas.; W. W. W. Parker, Asst. Cas. in place of J. Gales Moore.

#### FLORIDA.

JACKSONVILLE—Commercial Bank; H. Gailard, Aotg. Cas.; W. B. Coffin, elected director.

PENSACOLA—American National Bank; F. C. Horton, Cas. in place of A. M. Moses; M. E. Clark, Asst. Cas. in place of F. C. Horton.

ST. AUGUSTINE—First National Bank; Walter Bloomfield, Asst. Cas.

#### GEORGIA.

AMERICUS—Planters' Bank; Geo. W. Council, President, deceased.—Bank of Commerce; Edward Sheffield, Asst. Cas. in place of Lott Warren.

## ILLINOIS.

CORDEN—First National Bank; R. E. Gillespie, Asst. Cas.  
EMDEN—Bank of Emden; purchased by Farmers' Bank.

## INDIANA.

MONTPELIER—Farmers' Deposit Bank; Jos. H. Shoemaker, Cas., deceased.  
ROCHDALE—Rochdale Bank; capital increased \$5,000.

## IOWA.

BELLE PLAINE—First National Bank; L. T. Sweet, Cas., deceased.  
DES MOINES—Valley National Bank; N. W. Johnson, Pres., deceased.  
LOVILLIA—Lovillia Exchange Bank; T. B. McDonald, Pres.; O. L. Wright, Vice-Pres.; Jerry Wilcox, Cas.  
NORWAY—Benton County Savings Bank; Wm. Schloeman, Pres. in place of Frank Pickart, deceased.  
SUMNER—Citizens' State Bank; Chauncey Carpenter, Pres., deceased.

## KANSAS.

CHEROKEE—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of W. C. Payne.  
LARNED—Rush State Bank and First State Bank; consolidated under latter title.  
LEAVENWORTH—Manufacturers' National Bank; capital reduced to \$200,000; Otto Wulfekuhler, Cas., resigned.

## KENTUCKY.

FRANKFORT—Farmers' Bank of Kentucky; Thos. Rodman, Pres., deceased.  
MADISONVILLE—John G. Morton; Hop Holman, Vice-Pres.  
VINE GROVE—Farmers' Bank; John Hibbs, Pres., deceased.

## LOUISIANA.

NATCHITOCHES—Exchange Bank; capital, \$25,000.  
NEW ORLEANS—People's Bank; Louis Cucullu, Pres., in place of N. Landry.

## MAINE.

AUBURN—First Nat. Bank; Hiram C. Briggs, Vice-Pres., deceased.  
SKOWHEGAN—Second Nat. Bank; Russell B. Shepherd, Pres., deceased.

## MARYLAND.

ABERDEEN—First Nat. Bank; John A. Evans, Acting Cas., in place of Donald K. Pritchard, Cas., resigned.  
BALTIMORE—Safe Deposit & Trust Co.; C. C. Homer, Vice-Pres., resigned.—Nat. Bank of Commerce; Harry Fahnestock, elected director in place of Wm. M. Powell, de'd.—Merchants' Nat. Bank; J. C. Wanda, Asst. Cas.  
FREDERICK—Citizens' Nat. Bank; W. G. Baker, Vice-Pres., in place of W. Irving Parsons, deceased; Samuel G. Duvall, Asst. Cas.

## MASSACHUSETTS.

ARLINGTON—Arlington Five Cent Savings Bank; Howard D. Hawkins, Asst. Cas., in place of Annie L. Proctor.  
BOSTON—Bank of Nova Scotia; John A. McLeod, Mgr., in place of W. E. Stavert, resigned.—Washington Nat. Bank; John D. Williams, elected director.—E. H. Gay, & Co.; Walter H. Trumbull, admitted to firm.  
GREENFIELD—Greenfield Savings Bank; S. D. Conant, Sec'y.  
LAWRENCE—Pacific Nat. Bank; Wm. H. Jaquith, Cas., deceased.  
NORTHAMPTON—Northampton Inst'n for Savings; T. G. Spaulding, Sec'y.  
SOMERVILLE—Somerville National Bank; Joseph E. Gendron, Cas. in place of James F. Beard.  
SHELburne FALLS—Shelburne Falls Savings Bank; A. K. Hawks, Treas.  
TURNERS FALLS—Crocker Institution for Savings; W. H. P. Gilmore, Sec.  
WORCESTER—Worcester Mechanics' Savings Bank; A. B. R. Sprague, Pres.

## MICHIGAN.

DETROIT—Preston National Bank; Charles L. Palmer, Pres. in place of F. W. Hayes.—First National Bank; Emory Wendell, Pres. *pro tem*, resigned.  
THREE RIVERS—First National Bank; N. W. Garrison, Cas. in place of Charles W. Cox; no Asst. Cas. in place of N. W. Garrison.

## MINNESOTA.

MINNEAPOLIS—First National Bank and Nicollet National Bank; consolidated under former title.—Metropolitan Bank; Frank E. Holton, Cas. in place of E. W. Decker.—Northwestern National Bank; Edward W. Decker, Cas. in place of Gilbert G. Thorne; Wm. Collins, no longer Asst. Cas.

## MISSOURI.

CHARLESTON—Charleston Bank; A. H. Danforth, Pres., deceased.  
RICHMOND—Ray County Bank; John W. Shotwell, Jr., no longer Cas.  
ST. LOUIS—St. Louis Trust Co.; capital increased to \$3,000,000.—Mercantile Trust Co.; will increase capital to \$1,500,000.

## MONTANA.

HAMILTON—Ravalli County Bank; W. W. McCracken, Pres. in place of Marcus Daly, deceased.  
HELENA—Union Bank and Trust Co.; Conrad Kohrs, Pres. in place of Henry Elling, deceased.  
VIRGINIA CITY—Elling State Bank; S. R. Buford, Pres. in place of Henry Elling, deceased.

## NEW HAMPSHIRE.

NEWMARKET—Newmarket National Bank; Ella Tuttle, Asst. Cas.

**NEW JERSEY.**

**ELIZABETH**—Elizabethport Banking Co.; Charles D. Doctor, Cas.

**MOUNT HOLLY**—Farmers' National Bank; Alfred L. Black, Pres., deceased.

**WASHINGTON**—First National Bank; surplus increased to \$100,000.

**NEW YORK.**

**GREENWICH**—First National Bank; Horace Cottrell, Asst. Cas. in place of John C. Sherman.

**NEW YORK**—L. Levy & Co.; Harry A. Levy and A. G. Levy admitted to firm; David U. Herman, deceased.—Lincoln National Bank; James Stillman and Wm. Rockefeller, elected directors.—Corn Exchange Bank; Wm. H. Baldwin, Jr., elected director.—New York Security and Trust Co.; Geo. W. Perkins and Abram M. Hyatt, elected trustees.—J. Kennedy Tod & Co.; Frederick Harbach Herrick, Cas., deceased.—Dominick & Dominick; Andrew V. Stout and J. Augustus Barnard admitted to firm.—Brown Brothers & Co.; James Brown, admitted to firm.—Albert Loeb & Co.; Louis M. Josephthal, admitted to firm. F. J. Lisman & Co.; Wm. Goodman, admitted to firm.—Moore & Schley; Elverton R. Chapman, retired from firm.—J. H. Sulzbacher & Co.; Albert Ulman, admitted to firm.—Vernam & Co.; Jos. B. Bourne, admitted to firm.—Atlantic Trust Co. and Bankers' Trust Co.; merged under former title.—Seventh National Bank; J. Preston McAnerney, Asst. Cas., resigned.—German American Bank; Hugo Wesdendonck, director, deceased.—Mercantile Trust Co.; E. H. Harriman, director, in place of H. B. Ely.—Continental Trust Co.; O. D. Ashley, elected director.—City Trust Co.; James Roosevelt, director, deceased; also trustee Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.—Bank of New Amsterdam; Charles W. Morse, elected director.

**POTSDAM**—Citizens' National Bank; William Pert, Pres., deceased.

**SYRACUSE**—National Bank of Syracuse; Theodore L. Poole, director, deceased.—First National Bank; Charles M. Crouse, elected director in place of Jacob Crouse.

**NORTH CAROLINA.**

**WILMINGTON**—Atlantic National Bank; Andrew Moreland, Cas.

**NORTH DAKOTA.**

**ELLENDALE**—Citizens' Bank and F. B. Gannon Banking Co.; consolidated under former title.

**OHIO.**

**CINCINNATI**—Fourth National Bank; Hiram De Camp, Asst. Cas., resigned.—First National Bank; John P. Clark, Asst. Cas., resigned.

**CLEVELAND**—Forest City Savings Bank; John C. Weideman, Pres., dec'd; also di-

rector Union National Bank and Savings and Trust Co.—Union Nat. Bank; S. T. Everett, director, resigned.

**DELTA**—Farmers' National Bank; Andrew J. Fraker, First Vice-Pres.; John W. Crisman, Second Vice-Pres.

**LANCASTER**—Lancaster Bank; C. P. Cole, Pres.; Charles H. Towson, Vice-Pres.

**ST. MARYS**—First National Bank; Leroy R. Piper no longer Cash.

**TOLEDO**—Second National Bank; J. A. Moore, Vice-Pres., dec'd; also director Union Savings Bank.

**OKLAHOMA.**

**GARBER**—Farmers' State Bank; Howard Watkins, Pres.

**MANGUM**—First National Bank; J. A. Henry, Pres., in place of R. C. Neal; G. W. Boyd, Vice-Pres.

**STILLWATER**—National Bank of Commerce; C. A. Houston, Asst. Cas.

**PENNSYLVANIA.**

**ASHLAND**—Ashland National Bank; George Fluehr, Vice-Pres.; Geo. F. Rentz, Cas.

**ELIZABETHVILLE**—First National Bank; C. W. Enders, Vice-Pres.; H. H. Hassinger, Cas., in place of H. H. Weaver.

**HYNDMAN**—National Bank of South Pennsylvania; J. J. Hoblitzell, Pres., in place of John S. Weller; no Vice-Pres. in place of J. J. Hoblitzell.

**IRWIN**—First National Bank; T. Frank Wolf, Vice-Pres. in place of John F. Wolf.

**LINESVILLE**—Linesville Savings Bank; S. H. Wilson, Pres.; D. L. Bunnell, Cas.; Ernest H. Collins, Asst. Cas.

**PHILADELPHIA**—National Bank of Northern Liberties; John C. W. Frismuth and Geo. Fales Baker, elected directors.—Northwestern National Bank; Charles McCaul, director, dec'd.—Ninth National Bank; James E. Mitchell, Pres. in place of John Dickey; Robert Pilling, Vice-Pres. in place of James E. Mitchell.

**PITTSBURG**—Citizens' Nat. Bank; Geo. W. Dilworth, director, deceased; also trustee Dollar Savings Bank.

**POTTSTOWN**—Nat. Iron Bank; John W. Storb, Pres., in place of Jacob Fegely, dec'd.

**ROCHESTER**—John Conway & Co.; Chas. B. Conway, Cas., deceased.

**RHODE ISLAND.**

**PAWTUCKET**—Providence County Savings Bank; Benj. F. Smith, Pres., in place of Henry B. Metcalf.

**PROVIDENCE**—Nat. Eagle Bank; John Waterman, director, deceased.

**WARREN**—First Nat. Bank and Warren Inst'n for Savings; John Waterman, Pres., deceased.

**SOUTH CAROLINA.**

**HONEAPATH**—Citizens' Bank and Bank of Honeapath; consolidated under latter title.



**SOUTH DAKOTA.**

**ABERDEEN**—First Nat. Bank; J. H. Suttle, Cas., in place of J. A. Schlueter.

**BOWDLE**—Bank of Bowdle; C. F. Drewry, Pres.

**TENNESSEE.**

**GALLATIN**—People's Nat. Bank; Thos. H. King, Cas., resigned.

**TEXAS.**

**AUSTIN**—First Nat. Bank; W. B. Wortham, Pres., in place of Jas. R. Johnson, dec'd; J. S. Myrick, Vice-Pres.; Herman Pfaeßlin, Cas.

**CORSICANA**—City Nat. Bank; F. N. Drom, Pres., in place of R. E. Prince.

**GREENVILLE**—First. Nat. Bank; J. M. Clymer, Pres.; Sam'l L. McFarland, Cas.

**LADONIA**—First Nat. Bank; Sam'l Primm, Cas., in place of D. J. McFarland.

**VIRGINIA.**

**ALEXANDRIA**—First. Nat. Bank; Noble Lindsey, Pres., deceased.

**RICHMOND**—American Nat. Bank; O. B. Hill, Cas.; Walter Halladay, Asst. Cas.—Security Bank; Geo. W. Warren, Cas., in place of A. B. Blair, resigned.

**WASHINGTON.**

**WENATCHEE**—Columbia Valley Bank; Guy Browne, Cas.

**WISCONSIN.**

**KENOSHA**—Merchants and Savings Bank; H. B. Robinson, Cas. in place of Max. W. Denninger, resigned.

**CANADA.****NEW BRUNSWICK.**

**ST. JOHN**—Bank of New Brunswick; W. E. Stavert, Mgr.

**NOVA SCOTIA.**

**HALIFAX**—Merchants' Bank of Halifax; title changed to Royal Bank of Canada.

**ONTARIO.**

**BARRIE**—J. H. McKeggle & Co.; J. H. McKeggle, deceased.

**TORONTO**—Bank of Montreal; Angus Kirkland, Manager.

**QUEBEC.**

**MONTREAL**—Union Bank of Canada; G. H. Balfour, Manager.

**BRITISH COLUMBIA.**

**GRAND FORKS**—Eastern Townships Bank; Wm. Spier, Mgr.

**BANKS REPORTED CLOSED OR IN LIQUIDATION.****INDIANA.**

**MANILLA**—Citizens' Bank; temporarily suspended.

**MARYLAND.**

**BALTIMORE**—American National Bank; in hands of J. Frank Aldrich, Receiver, December 21.—Old Town Bank; in hands of Roger T. Gill, Receiver.—Economy Savings Bank; in hands of Daniel L. Brinton, Receiver.—Atlantic Trust and Deposit Co.; Receiver applied for.

**MICHIGAN.**

**WHITE PIGEON**—First National Bank; in hands of Receiver.

**NEW YORK.**

**FAYETTEVILLE**—Platt H. Smith.

**NEW YORK**—Currier & Bunker.

**OKLAHOMA.**

**CLOUD CHIEF**—Valley State Bank; in voluntary liquidation.

**RHODE ISLAND.**

**BRISTOL**—First National Bank; in voluntary liquidation December 17.

**VIRGINIA.**

**Berkley**—Bank of Berkley.

**WISCONSIN.**

**BRILLION**—Bank of Brillion.

**MEXICO.**

**MEXICO**—Francisco Martinez Negrete.

**Failures, Suspensions and Liquidations.**

**Indiana.**—The Manilla Bank was closed December 24, owing to the fact that the owner has been declared to be of unsound mind.

**Maryland.**—**BALTIMORE.**—On December 21 the Comptroller of the Currency appointed J. Frank Aldrich temporary Receiver of the American National Bank. Proposals have been made looking to a reorganization of the bank.

The Economy Savings Bank was placed in the hands of a Receiver on December 21. Deposits are said to be about \$343,000.

The old Town Bank went into a Receiver's hands December 23. Its deposit liabilities are about \$1,000,000. It is thought the bank may resume shortly.

**Michigan.**—On December 27 the First National Bank, of White Pigeon, was closed by the Comptroller of the Currency. Deposits were only about \$50,000. Joseph W. Selden has been appointed Receiver.

**New York.**—Platt H. Smith, a private banker at Fayetteville, has gone into voluntary liquidation, paying all deposits in full.

# MONEY, TRADE AND INVESTMENTS.

---

## *A REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SITUATION.*

---

NEW YORK, January 2, 1901.

ONE OF THE MOST PROSPEROUS YEARS in the history of the American people has just come to a close without any mishap in the final hours to awaken apprehension as to the future. Even the convening of Congress, which too often is the signal for hesitation and distrust, this time has had no troubling influence in financial or business circles. The Senate has been mainly engaged with the Hay-Pauncefote treaty relative to the Nicaragua Canal, and finally amended it so that it is a question whether there will be a treaty at all. As to currency legislation it is improbable that there will be any during the present session of Congress. The Secretary of the Treasury in his annual report has spoken plainly of the need of a change in the basis of bank circulation. Whether the vexing problem will be solved satisfactorily in the near future it is difficult to predict.

Congress is considering the question of reducing the revenues of the Government by revising the war taxes. Of that there is need, both to prevent further accumulation of an excessive surplus in the Treasury and also to remove the stimulus to extravagant expenditures which seems to be operating upon the liberal emotions of the national lawmakers even now. The Secretary estimates the surplus for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901, at \$80,000,000. He estimates the revenues for the following year, with no change in taxation at \$30,000,000 more than during the current year. This would indicate a surplus next year of \$110,000,000 but for the fact that department estimates of future needs have been so increased as to eat a large hole in the surplus should Congress make the required appropriations. There is little doubt, however, that the revenues will be reduced \$80,000,000 or \$40,000,000 if not more, and that will enforce economy in appropriations to some extent.

While the Government is rejoicing in a full Treasury, there is evidence of prosperity also among the people. Business activity generally prevails and the year closes without any of those "squeezes" in the money market which frequently have brought dismay and loss to optimistic operators in securities and to overzealous hustlers in business.

The stock market has been an agreeable surprise to all but the chronic bears, if there are any after the last few weeks' experience. A December slump is the usual thing when the market has had a long sustained upward movement. It is usually attended by a sharp advance in money, but this year the money market has remained comparatively easy, and there was no slump in the stock market; on the contrary the closing prices are generally near the highest of the year, and for a large number of stocks and also of bonds the highest in several years.

Since August, 1896, the stock market has had almost a continuous advance, and while there have been reactions in some stocks, particularly among the industrials, the general market is upon a higher level of value than it has previously reached in many years. Compared with four years ago the advance is almost without parallel in the history of the New York Stock Exchange. A suggestion of the extent of the advance will be found in the following comparative table of prices for fifty stocks dealt in at the Exchange :

	Lowest 1896.	Highest 1897.	Highest 1898.	Highest 1899.	Highest 1900.
Atchison.....	8½	17	19½	24¾	48¾
Atchison pref.....	14½	35½	52¾	68¾	89¾
Canada Southern.....	40¾	62¾	58	70	61¼
Canadian Pacific.....	52	82	90¾	99¾	99¾
Central of New Jersey.....	87½	103¼	99	120¾	150¾
Chesapeake & Ohio.....	11	27½	26¾	31¾	42¾
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy.....	53	102¼	125¼	149¼	144
Chicago & Eastern Illinois.....	37½	61	66	100¼	109
Chic. Mil. & St. Paul.....	50¾	102	120¾	136¾	148¼
Chic. & Northwestern.....	85¾	132¾	143¼	173	172¾
Chic., Rock Island & Pacific.....	49¼	97¼	114¾	122¼	122¾
Chic., St. Paul, Minn. & Omaha.....	30¼	89¾	94	120¼	126
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. Louis.....	19½	41½	47½	64¾	76
Consolidated Gas.....	133	241½	205½	223¼	201
Delaware & Hudson.....	114¼	123	114¾	125¾	134¼
Del., Lackawanna & Western.....	138	164	159	194¼	194¾
Denver & Rio Grande pref.....	37	50½	71¾	80	87½
Erie 1st preferred.....	27	40¾	43¾	42	63¾
Evansville & Terre Haute.....	24	34	41¾	40¼	54¾
General Electric.....	20	41¾	97	132	200
Great Northern preferred.....	108¼	141	180	195	191¼
Illinois Central.....	84½	110¾	115¾	122	133
Lake Erie & Western pref.....	55½	79¾	83	85	115
Lake Shore.....	134¾	181	215	208	230
Long Island.....	40¼	55	59½	85	89
Louisville & Nashville.....	37½	63¾	65¼	88¾	89½
Manhattan Consolidated.....	73¼	113	120¾	133¾	117
Minneapolis & St. Louis.....	12	31½	38¼	78	71½
Missouri, Kansas & Texas pref.....	16	42	41	45¼	47½
Missouri Pacific.....	15	40¼	46¼	52¾	72¼
Mobile & Ohio.....	14	32	32¾	52	49
National Lead pref.....	75	109¾	114¾	115	106¼
New York Central.....	88	115½	124¾	144¾	145¾
N. Y., Chic. & St. Louis 1st pref.....	67½	81½	76	85	110
Norfolk & West. pref.....	13	48½	63¾	74¼	83
North American.....	3½	6¼	7¾	17¾	22¾
Northern Pacific.....	12¼	22¾	44¼	57¾	86¼
Pacific Mail.....	15¼	39¼	46	55	57
Pitts., Cin., Chic. & St. Louis.....	11	39½	63¾	88	80¼
Rio Grande Western.....	16	25½	32	44	65
St. Louis & San Fran. 1st pref.....	34¼	59¾	69½	75¼	78¼
St. Louis Southwestern pref.....	6¼	14¾	18	40¾	45¼
Southern Pacific.....	14	23¾	35	44¼	45¾
Southern Railway pref.....	15½	38¾	43¾	59¾	73¾
Tennessee Coal & Iron.....	13	35¾	34¾	126	104
Texas & Pacific.....	5	15	20¾	25¾	26¾
Union Pacific.....	3½	27¾	44¾	51¾	81¾
U. S. Leather pref.....	41½	72	75½	84½	79¼
U. S. Rubber pref.....	65	76¾	113¼	121	104¾
Wabash pref.....	11	24¾	24¼	25¼	27
Western Union.....	72¾	96¾	95¾	98¼	83¼
Average.....	44¾	79¾	78¾	94¼	100¾

Some allowance should be made for reorganizations, assessments paid, etc., but the table gives a fair idea of the sweeping character of the advance that has occurred since the summer of 1896 when prices generally were about the lowest reached in a number of years. The average of the low prices in 1896 was 44¾ per cent. of the highest in 1900 100¾ per cent, a gain of 56¾ per cent. This gain was distributed over the four years as follows: 1897, 26 per cent.; 1898, 8¾ per cent.; 1899, 15½ per cent.; 1900, 6½ per cent. The upward movement has been at a slower pace during the past year than during either of the previous three years.

Another comparison going back to the time when there was another historical bull movement will give a further idea of the extent of the advance in values since 1896. We have selected twenty stocks which were traded in as far back as 1878, and are still dealt in, although in the case of a few there have been new issues to take the place of the old. We give the closing prices of those stocks in 1878 and 1890, thus showing the net advance in two years. We give also the closing prices of the same stocks in each of the last six years:

## CLOSING PRICES AT NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE.

	1878.	1880.	1895.	1896.	1897.	1898.	1899.	1900.
Canada Southern.....	45	74	48½	46	51½	55½	48½	58
Central of New Jersey.....	33½	84½	49½	100	96	97½	118½	146½
Chicago, Bur. & Quincy.....	111	170½	77½	69½	99½	126	121½	142½
Chicago, Mil. & St. Paul.....	37	114½	68½	73½	94½	120½	117½	146½
Chicago, Mil. & St. P., pref..	76½	124	127	181	142½	166	172	188
Chicago & Northwestern.....	50½	127½	99½	102	121½	142½	160½	171½
Chicago & North., pref.....	78½	141	145	152	163½	188½	203	218
Chicago, R. I. & Pacific.....	120½	188½	67½	65½	89½	115½	106½	120½
Delaware & Hudson.....	98	92½	124½	116	111½	107½	118½	133
Delaware, Lack. & West.....	42½	109½	159½	158	155	157	178	194½
Erie.....	22½	50½	14½	15	14½	14½	11½	26½
Illinois Central.....	79½	127½	98	92½	103½	114½	112½	132
Lake Shore.....	68½	184½	141	154	171	201	205	220
Michigan Central.....	73½	125	95	90½	108½	118	112	105
Missouri, Kansas & Tex.....	6½	44½	11½	13½	18	187½	10½	16½
New York Central.....	114	154½	96½	93½	106½	123½	181	144½
Pacific Mail.....	13½	51	26½	24½	29½	45½	46	44
Union Pacific.....	66½	112½	4	9	25½	43½	48½	80½
Wabash.....	22½	45½	6½	6½	7½	7½	7½	12½
Western Union.....	96½	81½	85½	89½	91½	93½	85	84½
Average 20 stocks.....	59½	105½	79½	79½	89½	102½	105½	119½

The advance in these stocks from 1878 to 1880 carried the average of prices from 59½ to 105½. The more recent advance started from a level twenty per cent. higher than in 1878, but it has carried prices 13½ per cent. higher than the closing quotations in 1880, the average at the close of 1900 being 119½. One-half of the stocks in the list are, however, selling lower than they did in 1880.

The sales of securities at the New York Stock Exchange in 1900 failed to reach the high record made in 1899, but the aggregates were exceptionally large. The sales of stocks amounted to 140,350,237 shares, as compared with 172,968,454 shares in the previous year. The sales of Government bonds fell off from \$10,458,230 to \$6,680,800, and of State and railroad bonds from \$823,723,400 to \$562,871,300. The stock market was most active during the months of November and December, the dealings in stocks aggregating over 22,000,000 shares in each of those months, a record exceeded only in the month of January, 1899.

The official report of sales at the New York Stock Exchange during the year is as follows:

## TRANSACTIONS AT THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE.

	Listed stocks.	Unlisted department.	Government bonds.	State and railroad bonds.	Unlisted bonds.
January.....	5,857,532	3,841,104	\$605,800	\$42,219,100	\$1,305,000
February.....	12,123,270	3,081,797	567,300	42,450,000	1,535,000
March.....	10,109,708	3,794,792	1,733,960	64,208,500	1,826,300
April.....	10,565,827	4,092,805	654,400	56,578,200	1,370,000
May.....	6,613,239	2,850,080	829,840	38,154,000	208,500
June.....	4,987,787	1,695,035	960,000	26,547,700	10,000
July.....	4,374,937	1,890,451	278,700	23,341,500	49,000
August.....	2,722,010	1,305,609	126,700	19,808,500	83,000
September.....	3,804,523	1,403,232	142,200	18,163,700	.....
October.....	8,037,795	2,803,447	103,000	36,802,900	4,403,000
November.....	17,239,093	5,055,476	492,200	74,796,100	4,560,700
December.....	18,914,040	3,246,597	736,720	103,434,500	1,118,200
Total.....	105,400,812	34,949,425	\$4,630,800	\$546,504,800	\$16,366,700
Total 1899.....	120,622,492	52,345,962	10,458,230	741,357,900	82,365,500

The Presidential election is largely responsible for the falling off in business during the summer months, and the result of the election inspired the great activity in the last two months of the year. Excepting 1899 the year's operations in stocks greatly exceeded those of any year in the decade, but bond transactions were smaller than in either 1898 or 1899. The yearly record since 1889 is as follows:

	<i>Shares of stock</i>	<i>State and rail- road bonds.</i>	<i>Government bonds.</i>
1889.....	61,183,161	\$304,151,406	\$4,287,060
1890.....	59,441,301	374,842,120	2,891,060
1891.....	72,725,864	389,906,700	1,539,900
1892.....	86,850,980	501,398,200	1,662,400
1893.....	77,984,965	299,372,287	2,021,451
1894.....	49,275,736	363,741,950	4,293,300
1895.....	66,440,576	495,904,950	7,045,250
1896.....	54,440,043	352,815,850	27,121,550
1897.....	77,248,347	529,343,000	10,134,080
1898.....	113,466,383	847,654,000	24,129,210
1899.....	172,968,454	823,728,400	10,458,280
1900.....	140,350,237	562,871,300	6,630,800

The past three years have worked a complete change in the aspect and sentiment of Wall Street. The evidence that stock brokers are making money is overwhelming. The fact that nearly 427,000,000 shares of stock have been sold in three years as compared with only 412,000,000 shares in six years prior to 1898, is significant. Add to this \$2,275,000,000 of bonds traded in during the three years as compared with only \$2,081,000,000 in the five years prior to 1898, and Stock Exchange houses have good reason to rejoice in the present era of prosperity.

It is not surprising, therefore, that there has been an extraordinary advance in the value of Stock Exchange seats. On December 18 \$50,000 was paid for a seat, the highest price ever recorded. A few years ago a seat could be obtained for \$25,000, and within twenty years the price was as low as \$14,000.

While the Stock Exchange has been the center of remarkable activity, it has been only the index of a prosperity that has involved all branches of business and is apparent in all trade and financial conditions.

The year 1900 will be memorable in the financial history of the country by reason of the new position taken by the United States as a lender abroad. A large amount of money has been loaned on foreign securities during the year. Loans were placed here by Great Britain, Germany, Russia and Sweden. Two important influences have been at work to raise this country to the dignity of banker of the world: our enormously expanded export trade, and our extraordinary inflation of currency.

The exports of merchandise for five years past have been increasing at a rate never before equalled. From less than \$825,000,000 in 1895 they increased to nearly \$1,132,000,000 in eleven months in 1900. With one month yet to be reported the exports have exceeded the imports by \$572,000,000. In the five years, December, 1900, excluded, the balance of exports has aggregated \$2,350,000,000. The following table shows the merchandise and specie movement during the five years since 1895:

	MERCHANDISE.			<i>Gold Imports.</i>	<i>Silver Exports.</i>	<i>Mdse &amp; specie net exports.</i>
	<i>Imports.</i>	<i>Exports.</i>	<i>Net exports.</i>			
1895....	\$681,579,556	\$1,006,837,241	\$324,257,685	\$48,474,369	\$33,777,001	\$311,560,817
1896....	742,565,229	1,099,709,045	357,113,816	*253,589	25,578,990	382,946,295
1897....	634,964,448	1,255,546,296	620,581,818	141,968,498	24,685,724	503,278,544
1898....	798,997,410	1,275,487,971	476,500,561	5,955,553	22,617,408	493,162,816
1899....	759,944,885	1,331,971,997	572,027,012	2,794,111	22,117,389	591,350,290
	\$3,618,061,528	\$5,968,532,420	\$2,350,480,892	\$196,939,442	\$128,766,912	\$2,282,298,362

\* Exports.

† Eleven months ended November 30.

When the figures for December are added to the total for the previous eleven months it will be found that the exports have been more than \$1,400,000,000, and the excess of exports over imports of merchandise has been more than even the large total of 1898. Net exports of merchandise and specie will probably amount to \$650,-

000,000 or more. The net balance for the five years will be more than \$2,300,000,000. It is rather an astounding fact that in the past two years, while we have exported net nearly \$1,200,000,000 of merchandise and silver, less than \$9,000,000 of gold has been imported.

From the sympathy shown in the sterling exchange market with every advance in our local money market it has long been evident that gold may be drawn from abroad whenever the exigency of tight money arises here.

One point of interest in connection with our foreign trade has been a subject of investigation by the Bureau of Statistics. This is the relative growth of exports of domestic merchandise from the United States and Great Britain. In 1898 the United States first led the United Kingdom in exports, but the following year this country fell somewhat behind. In 1900 for the eleven months reported the United States is again first. The exports of domestic merchandise yearly since 1875 for each of the two countries have been:

YEAR.	United States.	United Kingdom.	YEAR.	United States.	United Kingdom.
1875.....	\$497,263,737	\$1,087,497,000	1888.....	\$879,597,477	\$1,141,365,000
1876.....	575,735,804	976,410,000	1889.....	814,154,864	1,211,442,000
1877.....	607,566,495	967,913,000	1890.....	845,999,008	1,282,474,000
1878.....	723,286,821	988,500,000	1891.....	957,393,551	1,203,169,000
1879.....	754,656,755	932,090,000	1892.....	923,237,315	1,105,747,000
1880.....	875,554,075	1,085,521,000	1893.....	854,729,454	1,062,162,000
1881.....	814,162,951	1,138,873,000	1894.....	807,312,116	1,051,198,000
1882.....	749,911,309	1,175,099,000	1895.....	807,742,415	1,100,452,000
1883.....	777,523,718	1,166,982,000	1896.....	986,830,080	1,168,671,000
1884.....	733,768,784	1,184,016,000	1897.....	1,079,534,296	1,139,882,000
1885.....	673,593,506	1,087,124,000	1898.....	1,233,564,828	1,135,642,000
1886.....	699,519,430	1,035,226,000	1899.....	1,253,486,000	1,287,971,089
1887.....	708,319,692	1,079,944,000	*1900.....	1,308,913,789	1,303,440,000

\* Eleven months.

While our large foreign trade has not in some time caused any increase in our money supply, the unparalleled domestic production of gold and the extension of our National banking system have caused an extraordinary increase in the volume of money in circulation. On January 1, 1901, the total circulation amounted to \$2,173,251,879, equal to \$28.19 per capita, an increase of \$193,000,000 in amount and of \$2.46 per capita since January 1, 1900.

The following table shows the amounts of the various kinds of money in circulation on January 1 of each of the last five years:

MONEY IN CIRCULATION.

JANUARY.	1897.	1898.	1899.	1900.	1901.
Gold coin.....	\$517,743,229	\$547,568,360	\$667,706,579	\$617,977,890	\$629,192,578
Gold certificates.....	37,887,438	30,557,649	35,200,259	161,122,797	232,787,829
Silver dollars.....	58,581,818	61,481,073	65,183,553	70,420,047	78,182,826
Silver certificates.....	356,655,800	376,065,592	362,331,985	495,040,816	432,309,408
Subsidiary silver.....	62,101,996	65,720,308	70,627,818	76,651,321	83,123,463
Treasury notes.....	84,171,221	103,443,936	94,942,741	96,934,351	81,230,159
United States notes.....	261,367,758	262,480,827	312,415,768	318,289,365	334,597,496
Currency certificates.....	50,330,000	43,815,000	20,465,000	11,980,000	1,590,000
National bank notes.....	221,384,143	223,827,755	238,587,729	242,001,643	332,188,526
Total.....	\$1,650,223,400	\$1,721,100,640	\$1,897,301,412	\$1,980,398,170	\$2,173,251,879

Since 1895 the increase in money has been very rapid indeed. In 1896 it was \$71,000,000, in 1897 \$71,000,000, in 1898 \$176,000,000, in 1899 \$83,000,000 and in 1900 \$193,000,000, a total of \$594,000,000, or nearly 40 per cent., in five years.

Since the suspension of Government purchases of silver the only sources of supply for the increase in money circulation have been gold imports and production and the issue of National bank notes aside from the seigniorage on silver bullion in the Treasury coined. These sources have been extremely prolific in recent years with the result as mentioned above of a very great expansion in currency. In the

following table is shown the increase in the total gold supply of the country and in gold, silver and paper in circulation since 1899 :

JANUARY 1.	Total supply of gold.	MONEY IN CIRCULATION.			
		Gold and gold certificates.	Silver and silver certificates.	Notes and currency certificates.	Total.
1899.....	\$704,006,179	\$500,732,000	\$300,233,845	\$545,291,302	\$1,406,248,107
1900.....	689,524,363	498,601,811	306,964,977	532,504,121	1,430,270,909
1901.....	704,100,811	555,127,876	434,487,640	539,120,752	1,528,736,268
1899.....	686,845,930	556,106,299	445,020,589	586,755,841	1,588,781,729
1899.....	651,230,762	530,064,099	452,185,214	623,434,561	1,610,683,874
1899.....	606,906,590	586,014,990	453,269,070	669,733,297	1,729,018,266
1895.....	625,107,730	538,863,285	451,638,980	636,096,877	1,662,568,622
1896.....	597,927,254	534,664,986	450,700,280	584,841,478	1,579,206,724
1897.....	602,947,212	555,630,668	477,339,606	617,253,127	1,650,223,400
1898.....	745,037,596	584,128,049	503,906,973	638,067,618	1,721,100,640
1899.....	949,526,013	702,906,888	528,143,306	666,161,208	1,897,301,412
1900.....	1,018,009,857	779,100,627	542,112,184	659,185,359	1,980,398,170
1901.....	1,108,541,829	851,980,507	581,706,192	729,560,180	2,173,251,879

Since January 1, 1896, the total supply of gold has increased \$510,000,000 and \$317,000,000 of that amount has gone into circulation either in the shape of coin or of gold certificates. The circulation of silver and silver certificates increased in the same time \$122,000,000 and of notes \$145,000,000. The total coin in actual use for circulation amounts to about \$788,500,000, or to about 36 per cent. of the total currency.

As shown above the country has gained practically no gold by import during the last two years, yet our supply of gold has increased in that time nearly \$180,000,000. For most of this increase the production of our mines is responsible, for the domestic yield of gold has gone beyond all precedent. The final estimate of the Director of the Mint for 1899 makes the gold production of the United States in that year \$71,053,400, and the production in 1900 will probably equal \$75,000,000.

The gold production of the world has also reached record-breaking figures, the total yield in 1899 being estimated at \$306,584,900, the principal gold producing countries other than the United States being Australasia, which produced \$79,321,600; Africa, \$73,227,100; Russia, \$23,167,100, and Canada, \$21,324,300. The silver output of the world in 1899 is estimated at \$100,331,100, of which Mexico produced \$33,367,300 and the United States \$32,858,700.

An interesting investigation made by the Director of the Mint shows that there has been a very great increase in the world's stock of gold in use as money. The total on January 1, 1900, is estimated at \$4,841,000,000, as compared with \$4,614,000,000 on January 1, 1899, and \$1,209,800,000 on January 1, 1873. The supply of gold, silver and uncovered paper money at different dates is estimated as follows :

DATE.	Gold.	Silver.	Uncovered paper.
1873.....	\$1,209,800,000	\$1,057,685,000	\$2,322,545,000
1893.....	3,901,900,000	3,931,100,000	2,700,000,000
1896.....	4,143,700,000	4,296,900,000	2,556,000,000
1899.....	4,614,600,000	3,835,800,000	2,846,500,000
1900.....	3,841,000,000	3,818,900,000	2,960,100,000

The United States leads the world in the use of gold as money, and also has more silver in use than any other country excepting China. The principal gold and silver-using countries are shown in the table on the following page.

The large increase in the supply of gold in the United States has greatly strengthened the financial position of the Government. The gold holdings of the Treasury have become greater than at any previous time in its history. The accumulation of money in the Treasury is one of the phenomenal conditions of recent times. At

JANUARY 1, 1900.	Gold.	Silver.	PER CAPITA.		
			Gold.	Silver.	Paper.
United States.....	\$1,020,200,000	\$643,300,000	\$13.37	\$8.43	\$4.41
France.....	810,600,000	421,200,000	21.05	10.94	5.04
Russia.....	791,700,000	104,500,000	6.05	.79	.....
Germany.....	697,900,000	208,400,000	13.35	8.98	3.32
Great Britain.....	486,700,000	111,900,000	11.96	2.75	2.75
Austria-Hungary.....	244,300,000	96,300,000	5.27	2.08	2.01
Australasia.....	123,600,000	6,100,000	28.58	1.35	.....
Italy.....	98,000,000	43,900,000	3.07	1.38	5.48
Spain.....	77,200,000	245,700,000	4.36	13.77	8.39
China.....	.....	750,000,000	.....	1.96	.....
India.....	22,200,000	389,300,000	.07	1.31	.11

the close of 1900 the Treasury held \$1,131,271,552 of assets and had a surplus of \$290,107,336. It held \$479,349,251 gold, of which it owned net \$246,561,322. The changes in the condition of the Treasury in the last eight years are indicated in the following table:

JANUARY 1.	Total Assets.	Cash Balance.	GOLD IN THE U. S. TREASURY.	
			Gross.	Net.
1894.....	\$737,614,701	\$80,375,555	\$158,303,779	\$80,991,600
1895.....	782,754,289	153,337,590	139,606,354	86,244,445
1896.....	787,578,447	178,027,201	113,198,708	63,262,209
1897.....	853,463,554	228,320,380	175,203,983	187,316,544
1898.....	861,391,370	235,474,789	197,466,236	160,911,547
1899.....	930,431,351	294,764,635	281,729,435	246,529,176
1900.....	1,048,006,042	283,545,453	398,082,027	236,909,230
1901.....	1,131,271,552	290,107,336	479,349,251	246,561,322

Since 1894 the assets of the Treasury have increased nearly \$400,000,000 and the cash balance \$200,000,000. The Treasury holds \$321,000,000 more gold than it did seven years ago and \$366,000,000 more than in 1896, while the net gold increased \$166,000,000 since 1894 and \$183,000,000 since 1896.

Early in the year, on March 14, an important financial bill was enacted by Congress which had two very important effects—one the refunding of a large part of the public debt, the other a large increase in the volume of bank circulation. The measure provided for the exchange of three classes of bonds bearing three, four and five per cent. respectively into two per cent. bonds to run thirty years. At the time there were \$339,182,220 of these bonds outstanding, of which \$280,769,100 were held by the National banks to secure circulation and public deposits. Up to December 31 there were \$419,679,750 of the bonds retired and there were outstanding at that date \$419,504,620, an apparent discrepancy of \$2,150 being shown, due to the exchange of refunding certificates with accrued interest into four per cent. bonds.

	MARCH 1, 1900.		JANUARY 1, 1900.	
	Principal.	Annual interest charge.	Principal.	Annual interest charge.
Loan of 1892 2 per cent.....	\$25,364,500	\$507,290	.....	.....
Loan of 1925 4 per cent.....	162,315,400	6,492,616	\$162,315,400	\$6,492,616
Loan of 1908-1918 3 per cent.....	198,791,440	5,963,743	104,900,040	3,267,001
Loan of 1937 4 per cent.....	545,381,080	21,815,243	287,612,480	11,504,499
Loan of 1904 5 per cent.....	95,009,700	4,750,485	20,892,100	1,549,005
Loan of 1890 2 per cent.....	.....	.....	419,679,750	8,393,595
	\$1,026,862,120	\$39,529,377	\$1,001,499,770	\$31,007,316



The Government also called in the old funded bonds, continued at two per cent., amounting to \$25,364,500, all but \$1,496,100 of which have been paid off. Interest on these bonds ceased August 18, 1900.

As the result of these operations the interest-bearing debt and annual interest charge have been changed since March 1 as shown in the comparative table at the bottom of the preceding page.

The principal of the debt has been reduced \$25,862,350 while the annual interest charge has been reduced \$8,522,061. None of the existing bonded debt is redeemable during the coming three years, and if the Government desires to pay off any of the bonds it will have to buy them on sellers' terms. To comply with the sinking fund requirements the Treasury should purchase \$50,000,000 bonds per annum. On February 1, 1904, about \$27,000,000 five per cent. bonds mature, and on July 1, 1907, \$287,000,000 four per cents. In August, 1908, nearly \$105,000,000 three per cent. bonds fall due, after which none mature until February 1, 1925, when the \$162,000,000 fours become redeemable, and following them are the \$419,000,000 new twos, which run until April 1, 1930. More than one-half of the debt, therefore, will not be redeemable for twenty-four years to come.

The greater portion of the new two per cent. bonds have gone into the hands of the National banks. Those institutions surrendered \$148,678,750 fours of 1907, \$29,008,200 fives of 1904 and \$70,856,100 threes of 1908—a total of \$248,043,050. But they have taken \$362,298,000 of the new bonds, or \$114,254,950 in excess of the old bonds surrendered. The following table shows the changes in the holdings of these classes of bonds by the National banks between March 1, 1900 and January 1, 1901:

CLASS OF BONDS OUTSTANDING MARCH 1, 1900.	Amounts outstanding.	HELD BY NATIONAL BANKS.		
		To secure notes.	To secure public deposits.	Total.
4 per cents due July 1, 1907.....	*\$545,281,080	\$129,861,750	\$38,690,150	\$168,551,900
5 " " " Feb. 1, 1904.....	36,000,700	18,845,100	11,642,000	30,487,100
3 " " " Aug. 1, 1908.....	196,791,440	54,786,420	26,943,680	81,730,100
	\$839,182,220	\$208,493,270	\$77,275,830	\$280,769,100
CLASS OF BONDS OUTSTANDING JANUARY 1, 1901.				
4 per cents due July 1, 1907.....	†\$287,612,480	\$7,407,650	\$12,465,590	\$19,873,150
5 " " " Feb. 1, 1904.....	26,992,100	545,900	983,000	1,478,900
3 " " " Aug. 1, 1908.....	104,900,040	4,518,180	6,855,820	11,374,000
	\$419,504,620	\$12,471,730	\$20,254,320	\$32,726,050
2 " " " April 1, 1930.....	419,679,750	296,562,550	66,735,450	362,298,000

\* Includes \$25,880 refunding certificates.

† Includes \$34,880 refunding certificates.

Under the stimulus of the currency act of March 14, 1900, there has been a very important expansion of National bank circulation, as well as in the number of National banks. More than 300 banks have been organized since the law took effect, and there is now a larger number in existence than ever before in operation at one time. The amount of National bank notes outstanding has been increased nearly \$100,000,000, and is now nearly up to the maximum record. On July 1, 1891, bank circulation had fallen to its lowest point, \$167,927,574; it increased to \$209,311,998 on November 1, 1893, under the influence of the new issues of Government bonds, but declined to \$205,048,651 on March 1, 1895. It again increased, reaching \$235,673,117 on January 1, 1897, falling again to \$224,888,019 on April 1, 1898. Since the last-named date it has increased almost steadily until on January 1, 1901, it was \$340,061,410.

The total circulation of the National banks on January 1 in each of the last six years is shown as follows:

JANUARY 1.	U. S. bonds on deposit to secure circulation.	Circulation based on U. S. bonds.	Circulation based on deposit of lawful money.	Total circulation.
1896.....	\$212,495,100	\$190,616,160	\$23,100,818	\$213,716,968
1897.....	240,236,150	215,850,307	19,812,811	235,663,118
1898.....	218,992,950	196,146,060	82,784,190	228,980,280
1899.....	229,943,050	214,016,088	29,719,017	243,735,105
1900.....	234,484,570	209,759,985	36,438,538	246,195,523
1901.....	312,832,830	308,294,673	31,766,737	340,061,410

The bonds deposited to secure circulation increased during the past year \$78,000,000 and the circulation based on bonds increased \$98,000,000. A year ago this circulation was only 89½ per cent. of the value of the bonds, now it is 98½ per cent. This change has followed the authorization contained in the currency act permitting circulation to be taken out up to the par value of the new two per cent. bonds deposited. There was a decrease of about \$4,700,000 in lawful money on deposit to retire circulation, leaving an increase in total circulation of nearly \$94,000,000.

The records of the New York Clearing-House banks show the remarkable growth of the city as a financial center. While with the exception of loans the highest records of some previous years have not been equalled, still the banks have shown exceptional strength, and their operations have been unusually extensive. The close of 1900 finds their condition as compared with previous years as follows :

DECEMBER 31.	1896.	1897.	1898.	1899.	1900.
Loans.....	\$491,875,900	\$607,781,600	\$718,808,700	\$673,689,400	\$796,457,200
Deposits.....	530,875,000	675,064,200	823,037,700	740,048,900	854,189,200
Specie.....	76,342,800	104,730,700	169,756,800	143,496,900	161,719,700
Legal tenders.....	89,640,900	79,324,100	55,184,100	52,682,900	63,353,500
Total reserve.....	165,983,200	184,554,800	224,940,400	196,179,800	225,073,200
Surplus reserve.....	33,286,950	15,788,750	19,180,975	11,168,075	11,525,900
Circulation.....	19,600,100	15,507,200	16,270,800	16,042,700	31,040,800

The notable changes for the year are increases of \$123,000,000 in loans, \$114,000,000 in deposits, \$18,000,000 in specie, \$11,000,000 in legal tenders, \$29,000,000 in total reserve, and \$15,000,000 in circulation.

We now make a similar comparison by decades since 1860 :

DECEMBER 31.	1860.	1870.	1880.	1890.	1900.
Loans.....	\$131,316,000	\$263,417,418	\$297,756,700	\$385,678,500	\$796,457,200
Deposits.....	87,165,000	188,238,965	272,466,900	386,632,100	854,189,200
Specie.....	25,497,100	20,023,848	58,047,900	78,663,200	161,719,700
Legal tenders.....		45,245,358	12,796,000	26,571,700	63,353,500
Total reserve.....	25,497,100	65,274,204	70,844,500	105,234,900	225,073,200
Surplus reserve.....	3,705,850	18,214,455	2,727,775	8,576,875	11,525,900
Circulation.....	8,237,000	32,158,514	18,408,200	3,569,900	31,040,800

The past ten years have witnessed a growth in New York banking interests surpassing that of the previous thirty years. In the following table this growth may be traced from year to year since 1878 ; it shows the largest amount of loans, deposits, specie, legal tenders, reserve, surplus and circulation reported each year.

While the total clearings of the New York banks in 1900 were smaller than in 1899, twice was the record for a single day's total broken last year. On April 11, 1899, the highest record up to that time was made : \$352,882,566 ; but on November 20, 1900, the total exchanges were \$353,505,626, and this was surpassed on December 27, when the total rose to \$364,018,290.

	Loans.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal tenders.	Reserve.	Surplus.	Circulation.
1878.....	\$248,634,300	\$223,432,700	\$30,687,500	\$58,610,100	\$79,545,500	\$24,232,475	\$20,141,600
1879.....	278,098,100	254,770,700	54,771,000	57,655,100	77,307,500	17,877,300	23,732,900
1880.....	324,970,000	307,796,700	70,822,100	22,547,400	91,530,900	18,471,275	23,812,900
1881.....	352,856,800	352,658,800	81,946,900	18,633,800	99,005,600	16,738,575	20,236,400
1882.....	338,415,400	322,863,200	68,764,100	26,905,500	90,960,900	10,805,600	20,200,000
1883.....	331,701,900	327,326,700	64,817,200	27,337,500	91,140,600	10,007,575	17,537,600
1884.....	351,087,200	363,544,400	88,170,500	38,948,400	124,991,000	42,297,450	14,706,700
1885.....	344,360,800	361,864,900	116,346,200	45,198,100	161,544,300	64,724,100	11,388,800
1886.....	359,685,300	396,080,800	100,212,700	45,069,000	133,645,100	36,156,425	9,970,800
1887.....	370,917,500	392,771,200	98,531,800	28,417,800	118,038,900	22,298,450	8,388,700
1888.....	397,243,200	421,884,300	94,281,300	39,743,200	132,292,900	28,463,700	8,089,900
1889.....	423,405,000	445,797,500	90,536,000	46,184,300	133,306,600	24,089,775	4,863,100
1890.....	414,574,000	431,509,600	90,056,200	32,726,100	121,565,600	15,031,650	3,781,600
1891.....	429,255,400	455,306,300	96,392,500	54,145,800	133,306,600	24,089,775	5,631,700
1892.....	496,564,000	543,663,100	113,192,600	64,795,900	164,046,800	36,020,900	5,794,100
1893.....	464,910,200	506,437,800	106,316,400	101,108,200	207,424,600	80,815,150	14,956,800
1894.....	507,733,500	595,104,900	129,558,900	130,487,500	249,575,100	111,623,000	13,044,400
1895.....	522,698,900	577,223,300	82,263,900	119,883,500	186,040,800	45,880,450	14,452,600
1896.....	487,673,300	525,837,200	77,500,900	92,727,400	164,172,200	40,182,425	20,521,100
1897.....	610,606,300	675,169,900	104,730,700	120,296,600	202,993,000	59,148,250	19,600,100
1898.....	718,308,700	823,037,700	186,070,200	104,150,300	249,532,200	62,206,250	16,430,200
1899.....	910,574,900	910,573,600	202,658,300	61,156,500	258,666,900	39,232,025	15,858,200
1900.....	825,830,600	907,344,900	179,291,900	76,179,100	252,950,200	36,871,275	31,040,800

The total exchanges at New York for the year were \$52,634,000,000, as compared with \$60,761,000,000 in 1899, a decrease of \$8,127,000,000, or more than thirteen per cent. Outside of New York the exchanges aggregated \$33,526,000,000, as compared with \$33,416,000,000 in 1899, an increase of \$110,000,000. The losses were nearly all in the Eastern and New England cities, Chicago, Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Kansas City, St. Louis, Minneapolis, New Orleans and San Francisco all reporting gains.

Railroad construction has been fairly active, approximating in results closely to the figures of the previous year. The "Railway Age" estimates the new mileage in 1900 at 4,822 miles, as compared with 4,588 miles in 1899, with a possibility of a small increase in the total for 1900. The "Railroad Gazette" estimates are 4,804 miles in 1900 and 4,569 miles in 1899. The record of railway building compiled by the "Railway Age" for the last fourteen years is as follows:

YEAR.	Miles.	YEAR.	Miles.	YEAR.	Miles.
1887.....	12,983	1892.....	4,192	1897.....	1,880
1888.....	7,104	1893.....	2,635	1898.....	3,063
1889.....	6,230	1894.....	1,949	1899.....	4,588
1890.....	5,670	1895.....	1,803	1900.....	4,822
1891.....	4,281	1896.....	1,848		

During the past two years a greater extent of mileage has been constructed than in any similar period since 1891. The years 1887 and 1882 are the great record years, nearly 13,000 miles having been built in the former year and 12,000 miles in the latter. The largest mileage was laid in Texas last year, 319 miles. Pennsylvania is next with 277 miles; Iowa third, with 268 miles; Minnesota fourth with 252 miles, and West Virginia fifth with 225 miles. In the last two years 843 miles have been constructed in Iowa, 629 miles in Minnesota, 447 miles in Pennsylvania, 427 miles in Arkansas and 415 miles in Texas.

YEAR.	Miles in operation.	Annual increase in miles.	YEAR.	Miles in operation.	Annual increase in miles.
1880.....	93,262	6,706	1891.....	170,729	4,075
1881.....	103,108	9,846	1892.....	175,170	4,441
1882.....	114,677	11,569	1893.....	177,516	2,346
1883.....	121,422	6,745	1894.....	179,415	1,899
1884.....	125,345	3,923	1895.....	181,065	1,650
1885.....	128,320	2,975	1896.....	182,769	1,704
1886.....	136,338	8,018	1897.....	184,591	1,822
1887.....	149,214	12,876	1898.....	186,810	2,219
1888.....	156,114	6,900	1899.....	190,833	4,023
1889.....	161,276	5,162	1900.....	195,155	4,322
1890.....	166,654	5,378			

There are now more than 195,000 miles of railroad in operation in the United States, an increase in ten years of 28,500 miles, and since 1880 of nearly 102,000 miles. In twenty years the railroad mileage has more than doubled. The mileage in operation and the annual increase since 1880 is shown in the preceding table.

There has been a considerable growth in the manufacture of railroad equipment, the "Railroad Gazette" reporting a total of 124,106 cars built in 1900 by the car building works in the United States exclusive of the cars built by the railroads in their shops. In 1899 the total was 123,893 cars. There were also built 3,153 locomotives, the largest for any year, and an increase over 1899 of 680, or 27.5 per cent. The total number of locomotives built each year during the past twelve years is shown as follows:

1889.....	1,800	1893.....	2,011	1897.....	1,251
1890.....	2,240	1894.....	695	1898.....	1,875
1891.....	2,165	1895.....	1,101	1899.....	2,473
1892.....	2,012	1896.....	1,175	1900.....	3,153

There were 505 locomotives built for export as compared with 514 in 1899, 554 in 1898, 386 in 1897 and 309 in 1896.

The railroads have had a prosperous year, both gross and net earnings having increased largely. We give the net earnings as compiled by the "Financial Chronicle" from January 1 to the latest date obtainable at this time, with comparisons for similar periods in previous years:

#### GROSS EARNINGS JANUARY 1 TO NOVEMBER 30.

	Roads.	MILEAGE.		Earnings.	Increase.
		Year given.	Year preceding.		
1896.....	121	92,787	92,065	\$430,939,499	\$8,356,137
1897.....	124	99,404	98,032	484,009,170	30,854,232
1898.....	119	93,621	92,489	486,819,995	39,464,378
1899.....	115	101,246	99,504	588,603,315	52,038,856
1900.....	109	101,533	97,971	628,094,533	55,443,742

#### NET EARNINGS JANUARY 1 TO OCTOBER 31.

	Roads.	EARNINGS.		Increase.
		Year given.	Year preceding.	
1896.....	119	\$162,851,272	\$162,242,791	\$608,481
1897.....	118	187,491,577	168,773,293	18,758,314
1898.....	119	214,870,390	197,168,665	17,501,715
1899.....	121	244,032,967	216,574,705	27,458,262
1900.....	129	277,262,270	256,162,959	21,099,311

#### WEEKLY OUTPUT OF PIG IRON.

FIRST DAY OF	1896.	1897.	1898.	1899.	1900.
	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.
January.....	207,491	159,720	226,608	243,516	294,186
February.....	198,599	162,959	224,338	237,639	296,014
March.....	189,583	169,998	234,430	228,195	302,643
April.....	187,451	173,270	233,339	245,746	289,482
May.....	189,398	170,528	234,163	250,065	293,850
June.....	182,220	168,380	225,398	254,062	296,376
July.....	180,532	164,064	216,311	263,368	293,413
August.....	157,678	165,378	206,777	267,872	244,426
September.....	126,500	185,506	213,043	267,335	291,778
October.....	112,783	200,128	215,635	278,650	223,160
November.....	124,077	213,159	228,935	288,522	215,304
December.....	142,278	226,124	235,528	293,959	228,846

The iron trade has been prosperous during the year although there was a reaction from the large advance in prices which occurred during 1899. The production of pig iron in 1900 will closely approximate the maximum record made in 1899, but the last half of the year witnessed a decline. The weekly capacity of furnaces in blast reached the highest point on February 1, when it amounted to 298,014 tons. On November 1 it had fallen to 215,304 tons, the smallest since September, 1898, but on December 1 there was an increase to 228,846 tons. The weekly output of pig iron on the first day of each month during the last five years is shown above.

In spite of the large production in 1899 the furnace stocks of pig iron fell to a very low point, the amount reported on November 1, 1899, being only 111,543 tons. Then they began to increase until on October 1, 1900, they were 670,531 tons, but in the two months following they declined, and on December 1 were 556,636 tons. The changes in the furnace supplies since November 1, 1899, were :

	Tons.		Tons.		Tons.
November 1, 1899.....	111,543	April 1, 1900.....	197,532	September 1, 1900.....	625,157
December 1, 1899.....	113,693	May 1, 1900.....	241,077	October 1, 1900.....	670,531
January 1, 1900.....	127,346	June 1, 1900.....	334,680	November 1, 1900.....	641,466
February 1, 1900.....	148,336	July 1, 1900.....	421,038	December 1, 1900.....	556,636
March 1, 1900.....	185,152	August 1, 1900.....	504,341		

The stocks on December 1 of the last five years compare as follows: 1895, 404,395 tons; 1896, 870,622 tons; 1897, 723,885 tons; 1898, 544,023 tons; 1899, 113,693 tons; 1900, 556,636 tons. The present stocks are about the same as they were two years ago.

The complete figures of production of pig iron for the last half of 1900 have not yet been compiled, but the total will probably be about 6,200,000 tons. This would make the year's total about 13,800,000 tons, or slightly larger than for 1899. We show the yearly production since 1890 as follows :

#### PIG IRON PRODUCTION.

CALENDAR YEARS.	First six months.	Second six months.	Total.
	Gross tons.	Gross tons.	Gross tons.
1890.....	4,560,513	4,642,190	9,202,703
1891.....	3,368,107	4,911,763	8,279,870
1892.....	4,769,683	4,387,317	9,157,000
1893.....	4,562,918	2,561,584	7,124,502
1894.....	2,717,963	3,989,405	6,657,368
1895.....	4,087,558	5,358,750	9,446,306
1896.....	4,976,236	3,646,891	8,623,127
1897.....	4,403,476	5,247,204	9,652,680
1898.....	5,869,708	5,904,231	11,773,939
1899.....	6,299,167	7,331,536	13,630,703
1900.....	7,642,569	*6,200,000	13,842,569

\*Estimated.

The final estimates of the yield of cereals in 1900 were made by the Department of Agriculture last month. They show a large yield of corn and oats and a decrease in wheat and barley. The production of the five principal crops in the last five years compares as follows :

	Wheat.	Corn.	Oats.	Barley.	Rye.
	Bushels.	Bushels.	Bushels.	Bushels.	Bushels.
1896.....	427,684,817	2,283,875,165	707,346,404	69,095,223	24,369,047
1897.....	530,149,168	1,902,967,933	698,767,809	66,685,127	27,363,324
1898.....	675,148,705	1,624,184,660	730,906,643	55,732,257	25,657,522
1899.....	547,303,846	2,078,148,933	796,177,713	73,381,563	23,961,741
1900.....	522,229,505	2,106,102,516	809,125,989	58,925,833	23,995,927

Prices for grain have generally been favorable while cotton has had an exceptional advance.

**THE MONEY MARKET.**—Money ruled dearer during the month under the influence of a considerable flow of currency from New York and the decrease in reserves of the banks. Toward the end of the month the market became easier and greater ease is anticipated after the disbursement of January dividends and interest, which this year are exceptionally large.

At the close of the month call money ruled at  $4\frac{1}{2}\%$  @ 6 per cent., averaging about 5 per cent. Banks and trust companies quoted 5 per cent. as the minimum rate. Time money on Stock Exchange collateral is quoted at 5 per cent. for 30 days,  $4\frac{1}{2}\%$  @ 5 per cent. for 60 days to 6 months on good mixed collateral. For commercial paper the rates are  $4\frac{3}{4}\%$  @ 5 per cent. for sixty to ninety days endorsed bills receivable, 5 @  $5\frac{1}{2}\%$  per cent. for first-class four to six months single names, and  $5\frac{1}{2}\%$  @ 6 per cent. for good paper having the same length of time to run.

#### MONEY RATES IN NEW YORK CITY.

	Aug. 1.	Sept. 1.	Oct. 1.	Nov. 1.	Dec. 1.	Jan. 1.
	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.
Call loans, bankers' balances.....	$1\frac{1}{4}$ — $1\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{1}{4}$ — $1\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{1}{4}$ —2	3—4	3—4	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —6
Call loans, banks and trust companies.....	$1\frac{1}{4}$ —	$1\frac{1}{4}$ —2	2—3	4—	4—	5—
Brokers' loans on collateral, 30 to 60 days.....	3—	3— $3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$ — $4\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —	4—	5—
Brokers' loans on collateral, 90 days to 4 months.....	$3\frac{1}{4}$ —4	$3\frac{1}{4}$ —4	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —	5—	4— $4\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —5
Brokers' loans on collateral, 5 to 7 months.....	4— $4\frac{1}{2}$	4— $4\frac{1}{2}$	5—	5—	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —5	5—
Commercial paper, endorsed bills receivable, 60 to 90 days.....	4— $4\frac{1}{2}$	4— $4\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —5	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —5	4— $4\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —5
Commercial paper prime single names, 4 to 6 months.....	$4\frac{1}{4}$ — $4\frac{3}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$ — $5\frac{1}{4}$	5— $5\frac{1}{2}$	5— $5\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$ — $4\frac{3}{4}$	5— $5\frac{1}{2}$
Commercial paper, good single names, 4 to 6 months.....	5— $5\frac{1}{2}$	5—6	$5\frac{1}{2}$ —6	6—	5— $5\frac{1}{2}$	$5\frac{1}{2}$ —6

**NEW YORK CITY BANKS.**—There was a decrease of nearly \$26,000,000 in deposits in the clearing-house banks during the first three weeks of the month, but a re-

#### NEW YORK CITY BANKS—CONDITION AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

	Loans.	Specie.	Legal tenders.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Dec. 1....	\$804,498,100	\$166,865,000	\$80,073,400	\$884,410,900	\$10,865,675	\$30,670,000	\$1,160,856,800
" 8....	806,442,500	162,804,400	58,157,900	861,444,700	5,701,125	30,607,900	1,419,986,300
" 15....	792,760,000	157,855,300	59,887,100	842,688,100	6,325,375	30,724,000	1,300,727,400
" 22....	787,098,700	159,041,000	60,157,100	838,804,400	9,497,000	30,902,500	1,574,168,200
" 29....	796,457,200	161,719,700	63,353,500	854,189,200	11,525,900	31,040,800	1,268,044,000

#### DEPOSITS AND SURPLUS RESERVE ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

MONTH.	1899.		1900.		1901.	
	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.
January.....	\$823,037,700	\$19,180,975	\$740,046,900	\$11,168,075	\$854,189,200	\$11,525,900
February.....	861,637,500	39,232,025	795,917,300	30,871,275	.....	.....
March.....	910,573,600	30,334,900	829,917,000	13,641,550	.....	.....
April.....	898,917,000	15,494,850	807,816,600	9,836,150	.....	.....
May.....	883,565,300	25,524,675	852,062,500	21,128,300	.....	.....
June.....	890,061,600	42,710,600	887,954,500	20,122,275	.....	.....
July.....	905,127,800	14,274,550	888,249,300	16,859,375	.....	.....
August.....	862,142,700	10,811,125	887,841,700	27,535,975	.....	.....
September.....	849,708,800	9,191,250	903,486,900	27,078,475	.....	.....
October.....	785,364,200	1,724,450	884,706,800	12,942,600	.....	.....
November.....	761,635,500	2,038,525	841,775,200	5,950,400	.....	.....
December.....	748,078,000	8,536,700	864,410,900	10,865,675	.....	.....

Deposits reached the highest amount, \$914,810,300, on March 4, 1899, loans, \$825,830,600 on September 15, 1900, and the surplus reserve \$111,623,000 on February 8, 1894.

turn of currency from interior points and large disbursements by the sub-Treasury caused an increase during the last week, the gain being more than \$15,000,000. Loans were reduced \$17,000,000 between December 1st and 22d, but were increased \$9,000,000 in the last week. The surplus reserve was down to \$5,701,000 on December 8, but at the close of the year it was \$11,525,000, which is slightly larger than that of a year ago, but the deposits are \$114,000,000 greater than at that time.

## NON-MEMBER BANKS—NEW YORK CLEARING-HOUSE.

DATES.	Loans and Investments.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal tender and bank notes.	Deposit with Clearing-House agents.	Deposit in other N. Y. banks.	Surplus.
Dec. 1.....	\$53,231,800	\$68,722,500	\$2,974,600	\$3,735,400	\$7,230,900	\$2,236,500	*\$953,225
" 8.....	62,887,700	67,879,300	2,961,900	4,009,500	6,959,000	1,942,900	*1,096,525
" 15.....	62,949,200	68,432,200	3,043,100	4,061,700	7,742,200	1,649,300	*621,750
" 22.....	62,654,700	67,843,900	3,056,800	3,854,000	7,581,400	1,619,300	*769,475
" 29.....	62,508,300	68,741,000	3,109,200	4,230,600	7,825,400	1,738,300	*233,750

\* Deficit.

## BOSTON BANKS.

DATES.	Loans.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Dec. 1.....	\$187,563,000	\$206,411,000	\$12,008,000	\$9,272,000	\$5,868,000	\$116,817,300
" 8.....	184,297,000	201,597,000	13,179,000	9,806,000	5,898,000	143,488,900
" 15.....	182,214,000	200,814,000	13,079,000	9,676,000	5,885,000	151,096,900
" 22.....	181,980,000	198,506,000	12,780,000	9,858,000	5,950,000	189,201,100
" 29.....	181,406,000	199,651,000	12,666,000	10,204,000	5,949,000	116,906,500

## PHILADELPHIA BANKS.

DATES.	Loans.	Deposits.	Lawful Money Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Dec. 1.....	\$180,874,000	\$191,094,000	\$53,230,000	\$8,735,000	\$90,087,800
" 8.....	161,674,000	187,777,000	51,214,000	8,729,000	99,308,700
" 15.....	162,319,000	187,417,000	49,104,000	9,174,000	98,574,800
" 22.....	162,249,000	187,278,000	49,518,000	9,381,000	119,327,800
" 29.....	161,796,000	188,687,000	50,987,000	9,362,000	88,854,300

**MONEY RATES ABROAD.**—None of the European banks advanced their rate of discount during the month although both in London and Berlin there was considerable stringency in money. The Bank of Bengal, at Calcutta, advanced its rate from 4 to 5 per cent. on December 6, to 6 per cent. on December 13, and to 7 per cent. on the 20th. The Bank of Bombay advanced its rate from 4 to 5 and 7 per cent. on December 13 and 20 respectively. Discounts of sixty to ninety day bills in London

## MONEY RATES IN FOREIGN MARKETS.

	July 20.	Aug. 10.	Sept. 29.	Oct. 20.	Nov. 16.	Dec. 14.
London—Bank rate of discount.....	4	4	4	4	4	4
Market rates of discount:						
60 days bankers' drafts.....	4½	4½	4	3¾—¾	3½	3½—4
6 months bankers' drafts.....	4¼—¾	4¼	4½	3¾—¾	3½	3½—4
Loans—Day to day.....	2½	2½	2½	2½	2½	3
Paris, open market rates.....	2½	2½	2½	3	2¾	3
Berlin.....	4	4½	4½	4½	4½	4½
Hamburg.....	4	4½	4½	4½	4½	4½
Frankfort.....	4	4½	4½	4½	4½	4½
Amsterdam.....	3¾	3¾	3¾	3¾	3¾	3¾
Vienna.....	4	4½	4½	4½	4½	4½
St. Petersburg.....	6½	...	...	7½	...	...
Madrid.....	3½	3½	3½	3½	3½	3½
Copenhagen.....	6	6	6	6	6	6

at the close of the month, were  $4\frac{1}{8}$  per cent., as against 4 per cent. a month ago. The open rate at Paris was  $2\frac{3}{8}$  @ 3 as against 3 per cent. a month ago, and at Berlin and Frankfurt  $4\frac{3}{4}$  @  $4\frac{7}{8}$  against  $4\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. a month ago.

**EUROPEAN BANKS.**—The Bank of England lost \$16,000,000 in gold during the month, partly because of the inland movement of currency usual at this season of the year. It holds about \$4,000,000 less than a year ago. The other banks generally gained a small amount in December. The Bank of France holds \$90,000,000 more than it did last year, Germany \$17,000,000 and Austro-Hungary \$35,000,000. Russia lost \$65,000,000.

•

## GOLD AND SILVER IN THE EUROPEAN BANKS.

	November 1, 1900.		December 1, 1900.		January 1, 1901.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
England.....	£32,424,886	.....	£31,852,021	.....	£28,541,263	.....
France.....	91,713,936	£44,513,517	92,993,077	£44,487,621	93,582,213	£44,307,366
Germany.....	26,133,000	13,461,000	26,553,000	13,678,000	26,582,000	13,693,000
Austro-Hungary...	37,902,000	9,765,000	38,298,000	9,814,000	38,325,000	9,905,000
Spain.....	13,699,000	16,685,000	13,874,000	16,390,000	13,988,000	16,374,000
Netherlands.....	4,871,000	5,578,000	4,878,000	5,551,000	4,878,000	5,602,000
Nat. Belgium.....	2,778,000	1,899,000	2,875,000	1,437,000	2,943,000	1,472,000
Totals.....	£209,521,822	£91,891,517	£211,321,098	£91,327,621	£208,817,476	£91,353,366

**FOREIGN EXCHANGE.**—The sterling market moved in sympathy with our local market here. As money grew dearer rates for sterling declined, and as it became easier sterling advanced. The fact is significant of the ability of the United States to draw gold from abroad should there be necessity for it. The supply of commercial bills has been only moderate. There have been reports of large purchases of securities for foreign account, but no evidence of it appears in the quotations for foreign exchange.

## RATES FOR STERLING AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

WEEK ENDED.	BANKERS' STERLING.		Cable transfers.	Prime commercial, Long.	Documentary Sterling 60 days.
	60 days.	Sight.			
Dec. 1.....	4.81½ @ 4.82	4.85½ @ 4.85½	4.86 @ 4.86½	4.81½ @ 4.81½	4.80½ @ 4.82½
" 8.....	4.81½ @ 4.81½	4.85 @ 4.85½	4.85½ @ 4.86	4.81 @ 4.81½	4.80½ @ 4.82
" 15.....	4.80½ @ 4.81	4.84½ @ 4.84½	4.85½ @ 4.85½	4.80½ @ 4.80½	4.79½ @ 4.81½
" 22.....	4.80½ @ 4.80½	4.84½ @ 4.84½	4.85 @ 4.85½	4.80 @ 4.80½	4.79½ @ 4.81
" 29.....	4.81½ @ 4.81½	4.85 @ 4.85½	4.85½ @ 4.86	4.80½ @ 4.81	4.80 @ 4.81½

## FOREIGN EXCHANGE—ACTUAL RATES ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

	Sept. 1.	October 1.	Nov. 1.	Dec. 1.	January 1.
Sterling Bankers—60 days.....	4.84½ — ½	4.82 — ½	4.80½ — ½	4.81½ — 2	4.81½ — ½
" " Sight.....	4.87½ — ½	4.85½ — 86	4.84 — ½	4.85½ — ½	4.85½ — ½
" " Cables.....	4.86½ — ½	4.86½ — ½	4.84½ — ½	4.86 — ½	4.86½ — ½
" " Commercial long.....	4.87½ — 4	4.81½ — 82	4.79½ — 80	4.81½ — ½	4.80½ — 1½
" " Documentary for paym't.	4.83½ — ½	4.81½ — ½	4.79½ — 80½	4.80½ — 2½	4.80½ — 82
Paris—Cable transfers.....	5.15½ — 1-16	5.16½ — ½	5.17½ —	5.16½ — ½	5.16½ —
" Bankers' 60 days.....	5.18½ —	5.20½ —	5.21½ — ½	5.20½ —	5.20 — 16½
" Bankers' sight.....	5.16½ — 15½	5.17½ — 16½	5.18½ — ½	5.17½ — 16½	5.16½ — 16½
Swiss—Bankers' sight.....	5.18½ — ½	5.18½ —	5.20 — 19½	5.19½ — 18½	5.19½ — 18½
Berlin—Bankers' 60 days.....	94½ — ½	94½ — ½	94 —	94½ — ½	94½ — ½
" Bankers' sight.....	95½ — ½	94½ — 95	94½ — ½	94½ — ½	95 — ½
Belgium—Bankers' sight.....	5.16½ —	5.18½ — ½	5.19½ —	5.19½ — 18½	5.17½ —
Amsterdam—Bankers' sight....	40½ —	40½ — ½	40 — ½	40 — ½	40½ — ½
Kroners—Bankers' sight.....	26½ — ½	26½ — ½	26½ — ½	26½ — ½	26½ — ½
Italian lire—sight.....	5.47½ — 45	5.51½ — 48½	5.48½ — 46½	5.45 — 42½	5.43½ — 41½



## BANK OF ENGLAND STATEMENT AND LONDON MARKETS.

	Sept. 5, 1900.	Oct. 17, 1900.	Nov. 14, 1900.	Dec. 12, 1900.
Circulation (exc. b'k post bills).....	£30,072,995	£29,769,980	£29,444,385	£29,243,870
Public deposits.....	6,847,409	8,562,701	6,704,212	7,969,866
Other deposits.....	39,693,299	40,964,805	39,344,436	38,984,069
Government securities.....	15,826,854	20,191,034	18,945,174	18,187,060
Other securities.....	25,308,011	25,754,069	24,812,112	27,146,784
Reserve of notes and coin.....	23,761,756	21,478,581	20,248,665	19,634,863
Coin and bullion.....	36,066,751	33,473,491	31,918,050	31,103,333
Reserve to liabilities.....	50 <sup>7</sup> / <sub>16</sub> %	43 <sup>7</sup> / <sub>16</sub> %	43 <sup>7</sup> / <sub>16</sub> %	41 <sup>7</sup> / <sub>16</sub> %
Bank rate of discount.....	4 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> %	4 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> %	4 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> %	4 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> %
Price of Consols (2 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub> per cents.).....	98 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	98 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	98 <sup>5</sup> / <sub>8</sub>	97 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>
Price of silver per ounce.....	29 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>16</sub> d.	29 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>16</sub> d.	29 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>16</sub> d.	29 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>16</sub> d.
Average price of wheat.....	28s. 8d.	28s. 9d.	27s. 3d.	26s. 10d.

SILVER.—The price of silver in London was fractionally lower during the month, ranging from 29 15-16 to 29<sup>1</sup>/<sub>16</sub>d per ounce, the final quotation being 29 9-16d, a decline for the month of <sup>1</sup>/<sub>16</sub>d.

## MONTHLY RANGE OF SILVER IN LONDON—1898, 1899, 1900.

MONTH.	1898.		1899.		1900.		MONTH.	1898.		1899.		1900.	
	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.		High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.
January..	26 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	26 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27	July.....	27 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27	27 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	28 <sup>5</sup> / <sub>8</sub>	27 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>
February..	26 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	25 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	August..	27 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	28 <sup>5</sup> / <sub>8</sub>	27 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>
March....	26 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	25	27 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	Septemb'r	28 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	26 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	28 <sup>5</sup> / <sub>8</sub>	29 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>
April.....	26 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	25 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	28 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	October..	28 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	26 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	28 <sup>5</sup> / <sub>8</sub>	30 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>8</sub>	29 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>
May.....	26 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	25 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	28 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	28	27 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	Novemb'r	28 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	28 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	29 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	29 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>
June.....	27 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	26 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	28	27 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	28 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	Decemb'r	27 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	27 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	26 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	29 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	29 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>

GOLD AND SILVER COINAGE.—The mints coined in December \$4,576,697.50 gold, \$2,880,555 silver and \$301,328 minor coin, a total of \$7,758,580.50. The total coinage for the calendar year was \$99,272,942.50 gold, \$36,295,321.45 silver, of which \$24,960,912 was in dollars and \$2,031,137.89 minor coin, a total of \$137,699,401.34.

## COINAGE OF THE UNITED STATES.

	1898.		1899.		1900.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
January.....	\$3,420,000	\$1,624,000	\$18,082,000	\$1,642,000	\$11,515,000	\$2,364,161
February.....	4,085,302	1,167,564	14,848,800	1,508,000	13,401,900	1,940,000
March.....	5,385,463	1,488,139	12,176,715	2,346,557	12,506,240	4,341,376
April.....	8,211,400	948,000	7,894,475	2,159,449	12,022,000	3,930,000
May.....	7,717,500	1,433,000	4,803,400	2,879,416	8,252,000	3,171,000
June.....	6,903,682	1,432,185	8,159,030	2,155,019	8,820,770	2,004,217
July.....	5,853,900	1,027,834	5,981,500	794,000	6,540,000	1,827,827
August.....	9,344,200	2,350,000	10,253,100	2,233,636	5,050,000	2,536,000
September.....	7,385,315	2,178,389	6,860,047	2,441,268	2,263,335	3,062,185
October.....	5,180,000	3,354,191	8,220,000	3,313,569	5,120,000	4,148,000
November.....	5,006,700	2,755,251	6,643,700	2,612,000	13,185,000	3,130,000
December.....	9,492,045	3,275,481	7,469,952	1,880,605	4,576,697	2,880,555
Year.....	\$77,985,757	\$23,034,034	\$111,344,220	\$26,061,519	\$99,272,942	\$36,295,321

## FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COIN AND BULLION—QUOTATIONS IN NEW YORK.

	Bid.	Asked.		Bid.	Asked.
Trade dollars.....	\$ .80	\$ .70	Twenty marks.....	\$4.73	\$4.78
Mexican dollars.....	.50	.51 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	Spanish doubloons.....	15.50	15.60
Peruvian soles, Chilian pesos..	.46	.47 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	Spanish 25 pesos.....	4.78	4.80
English silver.....	4.81	4.84	Mexican doubloons.....	15.50	15.70
Victoria sovereigns.....	4.85	4.87	Mexican 20 pesos.....	19.50	19.60
Five francs.....	.94	.96	Ten guilders.....	3.96	4.01
Twenty francs.....	3.83	3.85			

Fine gold bars on the first of this month were at par to <sup>1</sup>/<sub>4</sub> per cent. premium on the Mint value. Bar silver in London, 29<sup>1</sup>/<sub>16</sub>d. per ounce. New York market for large commercial silver bars, 64 @ 65c. Fine silver (Government assay), 64<sup>1</sup>/<sub>4</sub> @ 65<sup>1</sup>/<sub>4</sub>c. Official price, 63<sup>3</sup>/<sub>4</sub>c.



The latter were smaller than in any month since June excepting September. The surplus for the month is \$6,641,886, making a total for the last six months of \$18,747,705 as compared with \$21,000,000 for the last half of 1899.

## UNITED STATES TREASURY RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES.

RECEIPTS.			EXPENDITURES.		
Source.	December, 1900.	Since July 1, 1900.	Source.	December, 1900.	Since July 1, 1900.
Customs.....	\$18,426,634	\$118,497,382	Civil and mis.....	\$9,004,811	\$61,747,869
Internal revenue...	25,280,694	157,120,160	War.....	10,940,100	84,341,829
Miscellaneous.....	3,089,180	16,224,319	Navy.....	4,487,515	29,753,232
			Indians.....	1,045,995	5,859,971
Total.....	\$46,846,508	\$291,841,861	Pensions.....	10,803,055	71,950,531
			Interest.....	3,233,146	19,431,724
Excess of receipts...	6,641,886	18,747,705	Total.....	\$40,204,622	\$273,094,156

FOREIGN TRADE.—The exports of merchandise in November were valued at \$136,678,594, an amount never equalled in any other month with the exception of October, 1900, when the total exceeded \$168,000,000, and December, 1898, when it was nearly \$138,000,000. The imports of merchandise aggregated \$64,846,418, nearly \$6,000,000 less than in October and \$5,000,000 less than in November, 1899. The excess of exports over imports is nearly \$12,000,000, an amount rarely exceeded in any month in our history. For the eleven months ended November 30, the total exports were nearly \$1,332,000,000, which is far in excess of the record for any previous full year. The maximum record made last year during the eleven months is exceeded by nearly \$180,000,000. The imports in the eleven months were about \$700,000,000 an increase of nearly \$32,000,000 over 1899. The net exports amount to \$572,000,000 an increase over 1899 of \$148,000,000 and over 1898 of \$34,000,000.

## EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

MONTH OF NOVEMBER.	MERCHANDISE.			Gold Balance.	Silver Balance.
	Exports.	Imports.	Balance.		
1895.....	\$87,312,581	\$63,344,817	Exp., \$23,967,764	Exp., \$13,255,640	Exp., \$3,364,454
1896.....	109,072,839	50,043,288	" 59,029,551	Imp., 7,019,200	" 2,907,611
1897.....	116,672,325	52,354,651	" 64,317,674	" 2,354,576	" 1,829,815
1898.....	127,797,965	52,096,828	" 77,701,137	" 4,411,134	" 1,753,820
1899.....	123,755,911	70,068,931	" 53,686,980	" 2,629,733	" 1,567,246
1900.....	136,678,594	64,846,418	" 71,832,176	" 9,904,509	" 1,850,848
ELEVEN MONTHS.					
1895.....	732,331,019	739,468,300	Imp., 7,137,281	Exp., 56,503,172	Exp., 27,143,363
1896.....	888,651,315	622,508,896	Exp., 266,052,419	Imp., 44,105,151	" 29,841,864
1897.....	974,655,084	691,080,266	" 283,565,818	Exp., 2,257,098	" 22,497,246
1898.....	1,117,695,672	579,825,309	" 537,870,363	Imp., 134,431,454	" 22,047,479
1899.....	1,152,199,938	728,233,567	" 423,966,371	" 12,192,818	" 19,943,113
1900.....	1,331,971,897	750,944,885	" 572,027,012	" 2,794,111	" 22,117,389

MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.—There was an increase in the amount of money in circulation during December of \$14,000,000, making an increase

## MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

	Oct. 1, 1900.	Nov. 1, 1900.	Dec. 1, 1900.	Jan. 1, 1901.
Gold coin.....	\$620,047,809	\$621,761,263	\$624,702,913	\$629,192,578
Silver dollars.....	71,178,265	73,479,469	73,811,334	76,182,326
Subsidiary silver.....	79,432,198	81,035,187	81,717,505	83,123,463
Gold certificates.....	208,110,349	215,505,969	231,246,349	232,787,929
Silver certificates.....	420,265,735	421,890,745	421,613,407	422,369,403
Treasury notes, Act July 14, 1890.....	67,600,188	65,478,400	63,861,590	61,250,159
United States notes.....	824,506,814	833,235,061	833,669,359	834,567,495
Currency certificates, Act June 8, 1872..	1,820,000	1,780,000	1,690,000	1,560,000
National bank notes.....	319,336,690	325,375,258	326,949,170	332,188,526
Total.....	\$2,112,294,983	\$2,139,181,412	\$2,158,761,367	\$2,173,251,879
Population of United States.....	78,237,000	76,961,000	76,975,000	77,080,000
Circulation per capita.....	\$27.01	\$27.82	\$28.04	\$28.19

for the year of \$198,000,000. About \$6,000,000 of the increase of the month and \$78,000,000 of the increase for the year was gold.

**NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.**—There was a further increase in National bank circulation in December of \$7,849,005, making the increase for the calendar year \$98,865,887 and bringing the total above \$340,000,000. More than \$9,500,000 of bonds were deposited to secure circulation during the month. The banks deposited nearly \$19,000,000 of the new two per cent. bonds and withdrew \$9,500,000 of old bonds. All but about \$17,000,000 of the bonds securing circulation now consist of the new issue.

#### NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.

	Sept. 30, 1900.	Oct. 31, 1900.	Nov. 30, 1900.	Dec. 31, 1900.
Total amount outstanding.....	\$328,835,973	\$331,613,508	\$332,212,406	\$340,061,410
Circulation based on U. S. bonds.....	294,222,979	298,859,900	299,816,629	303,214,672
Circulation secured by lawful money....	34,112,994	32,754,203	32,395,776	31,766,737
U. S. bonds to secure circulation:				
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	1,850,950	1,019,950	939,450	809,950
"    "    1907, 4 per cent.....	13,842,950	13,544,100	12,142,950	7,407,650
Five per cents. of 1894.....	1,373,000	1,293,000	843,000	545,900
Four per cents. of 1895.....	8,810,350	7,503,350	5,778,350	4,183,000
Three per cents. of 1896.....	7,857,880	7,755,590	6,920,480	4,513,180
Two per cents. of 1900.....	262,937,500	270,006,800	276,656,500	295,562,550
Total.....	\$296,672,630	\$301,123,580	\$303,280,730	\$312,832,580

The National banks have also on deposit the following bonds to secure public deposits: 2 per cents of 1891, \$483,030; 4 per cents of 1907, \$12,465,500; 5 per cents. of 1894, \$933,000; 4 per cents. of 1895, \$11,958,900; 3 per cents. of 1898, \$6,855,820; 2 per cents. of 1900, \$66,785,450; District of Columbia 3.65's, 1894, \$515,000; a total of \$99,946,670.

The circulation of National gold banks, not included in the above statement, is \$79,785.

**MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.**—The net cash in the Treasury increased \$5,300,000 in December, making the total nearly \$275,800,000. The aggregate money in the Treasury is \$998,700,000 against which are about \$718,000,000 of certificates and notes outstanding.

#### MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.

	Oct. 1, 1900.	Nov. 1, 1900.	Dec. 1, 1900.	Jan. 1, 1901.
Gold coin and bullion.....	\$439,241,511	\$458,266,144	\$474,482,084	\$479,349,251
Silver Dollars.....	430,125,060	430,309,821	432,439,956	432,967,264
Silver bullion.....	64,762,028	61,854,872	57,600,251	56,937,918
Subsidiary silver.....	6,568,555	5,641,098	5,482,866	4,446,010
United States notes.....	22,174,702	13,385,955	13,011,657	12,093,621
National bank notes.....	9,079,798	6,318,390	5,343,130	7,952,649
Total.....	\$971,951,644	\$975,776,280	\$968,359,944	\$968,746,613
Certificates and Treasury notes, 1890, outstanding.....	698,796,272	704,235,174	717,911,088	717,977,491
Net cash in Treasury.....	\$273,155,372	\$271,541,106	\$270,448,856	\$275,769,122

#### SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES.

	Oct. 1, 1900.	Nov. 1, 1900.	Dec. 1, 1900.	Jan. 1, 1901.
Gold coin and bullion.....	\$1,059,288,820	\$1,080,027,407	\$1,099,184,907	\$1,108,541,829
Silver dollars.....	501,301,315	503,789,290	506,251,290	509,149,590
Silver bullion.....	64,762,028	61,854,872	57,600,251	56,937,918
Subsidiary silver.....	86,009,748	86,676,285	87,200,371	87,569,473
United States notes.....	346,681,016	346,681,016	346,681,016	346,681,016
National bank notes.....	323,416,428	331,693,648	332,262,300	340,141,175
Total.....	\$2,386,450,355	\$2,410,722,518	\$2,429,210,225	\$2,449,021,001

Certificates and Treasury notes represented by coin, bullion, or currency in Treasury are not included in the above statement.

# ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.

The following table shows the highest, lowest and closing prices of the most active stocks at the New York Stock Exchange in the month of December, and the highest and lowest during the year 1900, by dates, and also, for comparison, the range of prices in 1899:

	YEAR 1899.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1900.				DECEMBER, 1900.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.		Lowest.		High.	Low.	Closing.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe.	24 1/2	17	48 1/2—Dec. 26	26	15 1/2—Jan. 8	8	48 1/2	37 1/2	47 1/2
"    preferred.....	68 1/2	50 1/2	80 1/2—Dec. 31	31	58 1/2—Jan. 11	11	80 1/2	82 1/2	80 1/2
Baltimore & Ohio.....	61 1/4	43 3/4	80 1/2—Apr. 19	19	55 1/4—Jan. 8	8	84 1/2	78 1/2	83 1/2
Baltimore & Ohio, pref.....	85 1/2	67 1/2	90 —Apr. 16	16	72 3/4—Jan. 9	9	86 1/2	84 1/2	85 1/2
Brooklyn Rapid Transit.....	137	61	88 1/2—Dec. 26	26	47 1/2—Sept. 25	25	88 1/2	80 1/2	86 1/2
Canadian Pacific.....	90 1/4	84 1/2	90 1/4—Feb. 13	13	84 1/4—Sept. 26	26	92 1/2	85 1/2	91 1/2
Canada Southern.....	70	46 1/4	61 1/2—Dec. 18	18	47 1/2—Feb. 27	27	61 1/2	57 1/2	58
Central of New Jersey.....	128 1/2	97	150 1/4—Dec. 1	1	115 —Jan. 6	6	150 1/2	144	144 1/2
Chea. & Ohio vtg. cts.....	81 1/2	22 1/2	42 1/2—Dec. 31	31	24 —June 25	25	42 1/2	36 1/2	42 1/2
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy.....	149 1/4	144 1/4	144 —Dec. 28	28	119 1/2—Jan. 10	10	144	134 1/4	142 1/2
Chicago & E. Illinois.....	100 1/4	56 1/2	109 —Mar. 27	27	88 —Jan. 31	31	96	82	92
"    preferred.....	182 1/2	112 1/2	125 —Aug. 15	15	119 1/2—Dec. 28	28	122 1/2	119 1/2	120
Chicago, Great Western.....	20 1/2	10 1/2	18 —Dec. 28	28	9 1/2—Sept. 25	25	18	14 1/2	16 1/2
Chic. Indianapolis & Lou'ville	19	7 1/2	29 —Apr. 16	16	14 —Jan. 15	15	28 1/2	23	25
"    preferred.....	52 1/4	31	64 —Dec. 14	14	45 1/4—Jan. 24	24	64	57	62
Chic. Milwaukee & St. Paul.....	136 1/4	112 1/4	148 1/4—Dec. 31	31	108 1/2—June 25	25	148 1/4	125 1/4	146 1/2
"    preferred.....	179	165	188 —Dec. 31	31	180 1/2—Jan. 18	18	188	176	186
Chicago & Northwestern.....	173	141 1/4	173 1/2—Dec. 31	31	150 1/4—June 25	25	173 1/2	166 1/2	171 1/2
"    preferred.....	210 1/4	188	220 —Dec. 29	29	195 1/2—May 9	9	220	210	218
Chicago, Rock I. & Pacific.....	122 1/2	100	122 1/2—Dec. 28	28	102 —June 25	25	122 1/2	113 1/2	120 1/2
Chic. St. Paul, Minn. & Om.....	126 1/2	91	126 —Nov. 17	17	110 —Oct. 9	9	126	121	126
"    preferred.....	185	170	175 —Mar. 8	8	172 —Feb. 8	8	175	172	175
Chicago Terminal Transfer.....	25 1/4	7 1/2	14 1/2—Dec. 19	19	8 1/2—Oct. 18	18	14 1/2	10	12
"    preferred.....	56 1/4	31 1/2	30 1/4—Apr. 27	27	20 1/4—Oct. 18	18	30 1/4	29	33
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. Louis.....	64 1/2	42 1/2	76 —Dec. 31	31	55 —June 19	19	76	65 1/2	75 1/2
"    preferred.....	106	94	118 —Dec. 20	20	103 1/2—Jan. 11	11	118	113	114 1/2
Cleveland Lorain & Wheeling.....	16 1/2	9	80 —Nov. 15	15	14 1/2—Jan. 10	10	28	25	28
Col. Fuel & Iron Co.....	64	30 1/4	56 1/4—Dec. 26	26	20 1/4—Sept. 24	24	56 1/2	49 1/2	55
Consolidated Gas Co.....	223 1/4	163	201 —Nov. 17	17	164 —Sept. 21	21	197 1/2	186 1/2	195 1/2
Delaware & Hud. Canal Co.....	125 1/2	106 1/4	134 1/4—Dec. 31	31	106 1/4—Sept. 20	20	134 1/4	115 1/4	133
Delaware, Lack. & Western.....	194 1/4	157	194 1/2—Dec. 29	29	171 1/2—Sept. 19	19	194 1/2	182	194 1/2
Denver & Rio Grande.....	25 1/2	15 1/2	34 1/2—Dec. 28	28	16 1/2—June 22	22	34 1/2	24 1/2	32 1/2
"    preferred.....	80	63	87 1/2—Dec. 31	31	64 1/2—June 18	18	87 1/2	78 1/2	87 1/2
Erie.....	16 1/2	10	27 1/2—Dec. 20	20	10 1/2—Sept. 26	26	27 1/2	14	20 1/2
"    1st pref.....	42	27 1/2	63 1/2—Dec. 31	31	30 1/2—Sept. 22	22	63 1/2	40 1/2	62 1/2
"    2d pref.....	22 1/2	15 1/2	43 1/2—Dec. 31	31	15 —Sept. 24	24	43 1/2	20 1/2	43 1/2
Evansville & Terre Haute.....	46 1/2	36	54 1/2—Mar. 15	15	38 1/2—Oct. 9	9	44 1/2	40	43
Express Adams.....	119	108 1/2	150 —Nov. 16	16	111 —Jan. 8	8	150	139	150
"    American.....	160	139	191 —Dec. 31	31	142 —Mar. 6	6	191	164	191
"    United States.....	60	45	59 —Dec. 21	21	45 —Mar. 12	12	59	49 1/2	57
"    Wells, Fargo.....	135 1/4	124	140 —Dec. 27	27	120 —June 1	1	140	133 1/2	140
Great Northern, preferred.....	195	142 1/4	191 1/4—Dec. 31	31	144 1/4—June 22	22	191 1/4	177 1/2	190 1/4
Hocking Valley.....	87 1/2	21	42 1/2—Dec. 17	17	30 —Sept. 21	21	42 1/2	38 1/2	42 1/2
"    preferred.....	66 1/2	53 1/4	74 1/2—Dec. 17	17	58 —Jan. 8	8	74 1/2	70 1/2	73
Illinois Central.....	122	105 1/4	133 —Dec. 31	31	110 —June 25	25	133	123 1/2	132
Iowa Central.....	15 1/2	10 1/4	27 1/2—Dec. 31	31	11 1/2—Jan. 12	12	27 1/2	19 1/2	26 1/2
"    preferred.....	62 1/4	40	58 —Mar. 30	30	39 —Sept. 27	27	51 1/2	44 1/2	50 1/2
Kansas City, Pitts. & Gulf.....	18	7	21 1/4—Jan. 27	27	7 1/2—Jan. 31	31	.....	.....	.....
Laclede Gas.....	85	51	80 —Jan. 5	5	65 —May 10	10	76	70	76
Lake Erie & Western.....	24	14 1/2	52 —Dec. 19	19	20 1/4—Mar. 16	16	52	35	46
"    preferred.....	85	60	115 —Dec. 18	18	83 1/2—Feb. 2	2	115	106	114
Long Island.....	85	45	89 —May 5	5	47 1/2—Jan. 4	4	70 1/4	65	65
Louisville & Nashville.....	88 1/2	63	89 1/2—Dec. 31	31	68 1/2—Sept. 22	22	89 1/2	81 1/2	88 1/2
Manhattan consol.....	138 1/2	85 1/4	117 —Dec. 31	31	84 —June 25	25	117	107 1/2	115 1/2
Metropolitan Street.....	280	147	182 —Feb. 18	18	143 1/2—Sept. 26	26	176	163 1/2	171 1/2
Mexican Central.....	17 1/2	6	17 1/2—Dec. 27	27	10 1/2—Jan. 8	8	17 1/2	13	17 1/2
Minneapolis & St. Louis.....	78	35 1/4	71 1/2—Dec. 28	28	45 1/2—June 18	18	104	64	70
"    preferred.....	90 1/2	73 1/2	104 1/2—Nov. 10	10	87 1/2—June 18	18	104	99 1/2	103 1/2
Missouri, Kan. & Tex.....	15	9 1/4	17 1/2—Dec. 27	27	9 —Sept. 19	19	17 1/2	12 1/2	19 1/2
"    preferred.....	45 1/4	28 1/2	47 1/2—Dec. 28	28	25 1/2—Sept. 22	22	47 1/2	37	45 1/2
Missouri Pacific.....	52 1/2	33	72 1/2—Dec. 28	28	36 1/2—Jan. 11	11	72 1/2	59	71
Mobile & Ohio.....	52	32	49 —Dec. 31	31	35 —June 25	25	49	40	48
N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River.....	144 1/4	120	145 1/2—Dec. 29	29	125 1/2—June 25	25	145 1/2	140 1/2	144 1/4

## ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.—Continued.

	YEAR 1899.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1900.				DECEMBER, 1900.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.	Lowest.			High.	Low.	Closing.
N. Y. Chicago & St. Louis....	199½	111½	241½—Dec. 26	11—June 20	241½	155½	241½		241½
2d preferred.....	41	29	58½—Dec. 19	29—June 20	58½	41	58½		58½
N. Y., New Haven & Hartf'd.	222	199	215½—Jan. 3	207½—Sept. 26	218	211	211		211
N. Y., Ontario & Western....	287½	189½	321½—Dec. 27	181½—June 20	321½	245½	81½		81½
Norfolk & Western.....	289½	179½	45½—Dec. 27	22½—Jan. 10	45½	41	45		45
preferred.....	74½	61½	83—Dec. 27	67—Jan. 8	83	81½	82½		82½
North American Co.....	179½	6½	239½—Dec. 28	13½—Jan. 23	229½	189½	20½		20½
Northern Pacific tr. receipts.	57½	42½	86½—Dec. 31	45½—Sept. 29	86½	69½	85		85
pref tr. receipts.....	81½	68	91½—Dec. 20	67—Sept. 27	91½	81½	87½		87½
Pacific Mail.....	55	35	57—Nov. 10	25½—June 11	49½	40½	44		44
Pennsylvania R. R.....	142	122½	149½—Dec. 31	124½—Sept. 22	149½	141½	149½		149½
People's Gas & Coke of Chic.	129½	90½	111½—Apr. 2	81½—Oct. 11	110	99½	105		105
Pitts., Cin. Chic. & St. Louis....	88	43	80½—Jan. 2	49½—Sept. 29	59½	55½	55½		55½
preferred.....	99	80	94—Jan. 6	78—June 25	90	85	90		90
Pullman Palace Car Co.....	207½	158	204—Dec. 3	175—June 25	204	180½	201		201
Reading.....	25	15½	28—Dec. 19	15—Sept. 22	28	19½	25		25
1st preferred.....	68½	42½	71½—Dec. 31	49—Jan. 9	71½	62½	71		71
2d preferred.....	39½	22½	39½—Dec. 31	23½—Sept. 24	39½	30½	39½		39½
St. Louis & San Francisco....	147½	8½	241½—Dec. 26	8½—June 25	241½	179½	23½		23½
1st preferred.....	75½	64	78½—Dec. 27	64—Sept. 25	78½	75	79½		79½
2d preferred.....	44½	28½	55—Dec. 20	31½—June 23	55	45½	53½		53½
St. Louis & Southwestern....	181½	6½	181½—Dec. 27	6½—June 20	181½	13	181½		181½
preferred.....	40½	17	45½—Dec. 27	21½—June 23	45½	36½	44½		44½
Southern Pacific Co.....	44½	27	45½—Dec. 26	30½—June 18	45½	40½	45½		45½
Southern Railway.....	141½	10½	239½—Dec. 26	10½—June 25	239½	179½	21½		21½
preferred.....	58½	40½	73½—Dec. 22	49½—June 25	73½	66½	72		72
Tennessee Coal & Iron Co....	126	86	104—Feb. 3	49—Oct. 3	72½	59½	64½		64½
Texas & Pacific.....	259½	12½	269½—Dec. 31	13½—June 25	269½	199½	261½		261½
Union Pacific.....	51½	38½	81½—Dec. 31	44½—Jan. 10	81½	70½	80½		80½
preferred.....	84½	66½	85½—Dec. 31	70½—June 23	85½	80½	84½		84½
Wabash R. R.....	87½	6½	14—Dec. 14	6½—Mar. 13	14	8	12½		12½
preferred.....	25½	19	27—Dec. 14	19—Sept. 20	27	20½	25½		25½
Western Union.....	96½	82	88½—Jan. 5	77½—June 22	86½	81½	84½		84½
Wheeling & Lake Erie.....	13	7½	13½—Dec. 21	8—June 18	13½	10½	12½		12½
second preferred.....	32½	21½	33½—Mar. 26	21½—June 18	32	26½	29½		29½
Wisconsin Central.....	21	13½	20½—Mar. 31	10—Sept. 26	18½	10½	16½		16½
preferred.....	59	54	57—Apr. 2	30—Sept. 24	44½	33	43		43
"INDUSTRIAL"									
American Co. Oil Co.....	46	30	37½—Apr. 7	30—June 25	32½	30½	31½		31½
Am. Smelting & Refining Co.	59	30	56½—Dec. 11	34½—June 18	56½	50½	54½		54½
preferred.....	94½	77½	99—Nov. 17	85—June 25	98½	95	99½		99½
American Steel Hoop Co.....	459½	24	50½—Feb. 6	17—June 25	32½	27	32		32
preferred.....	86½	70	86—Feb. 6	64½—Sept. 28	79	75	78		78
American Steel & Wire Co....	72	32	59½—Apr. 12	28½—June 25	47½	40½	46		46
preferred.....	123	84	95—Feb. 1	60½—June 25	89	84	89½		89½
American Sugar Ref. Co.....	182	114½	149—Dec. 31	95½—Mar. 3	149	125½	149½		149½
American Tin Plate Co.....	52½	20	57½—Dec. 27	18—June 23	57½	41½	56½		56½
American Tobacco Co.....	229½	78½	114½—Dec. 26	84½—June 25	114½	104½	118½		118½
Continental Tobacco Co.....	65½	20	40½—Dec. 19	21½—May 21	40½	32½	39		39
preferred.....	103½	71	95—Nov. 20	70—May 12	94	88	92½		92½
Federal Steel Co.....	75	39½	58½—Dec. 26	28½—June 25	58½	48	57		57
preferred.....	98½	67	79½—Dec. 22	60½—June 26	79½	75	77½		77½
General Electric Co.....	132	95½	200—Dec. 26	120—Jan. 10	200	166½	192½		192½
Glucose Sugar Refining Co....	76½	37	60—Nov. 12	44—May 15	54	47	53		53
International Paper Co.....	69½	17	26½—Nov. 12	14½—Mar. 6	26½	22½	25½		25½
preferred.....	95	62½	75—Nov. 12	58—Mar. 6	74½	72½	74½		74½
National Lead Co.....	40½	22½	28½—Feb. 5	15½—Aug. 11	21½	18½	19½		19½
National Steel Co.....	63	31½	53½—Feb. 6	20—June 23	43	38	42½		42½
preferred.....	99½	35	97—Feb. 6	70½—June 26	93½	91½	92½		92½
Pressed Steel Car Co.....	61	44½	58½—Jan. 17	32½—Sept. 26	52½	48½	51		51
preferred.....	91	75	80½—Nov. 10	70½—Sept. 26	85½	81	83		83
Republic Iron & Steel Co.....	83½	16½	27½—Feb. 6	8½—June 25	17	15	16½		16½
preferred.....	79	60½	70½—Feb. 6	49—Aug. 1	65½	62½	64½		64½
Standard Rope & Twine Co..	15½	6½	10½—Jan. 4	4½—Mar. 6	6	5	5½		5½
U. S. Leather Co.....	40½	5½	19—Jan. 3	7½—June 25	15½	12½	14½		14½
preferred.....	84½	64½	79½—Nov. 12	65—June 25	78½	74½	78		78
U. S. Rubber Co.....	57	37½	44—Jan. 2	21—July 6	30½	24½	28½		28½
preferred.....	121	99½	104½—Jan. 3	74½—Dec. 27	88½	74½	79		79

# RAILWAY, INDUSTRIAL AND GOVERNMENT BONDS.

LAST SALE, PRICE AND DATE AND HIGHEST AND LOWEST PRICES AND TOTAL SALES FOR THE MONTH.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		DECEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ann Arbor 1st g 4's.....1905		7,000,000	Q J	96½	Dec. 31, '19	97	94½	153,000
Atch. Top. & S. F.								
{ Atch Top & Santa Fe gen g 4's.....1905		133,062,500	A & O	102¾	Dec. 31, '19	103	101¾	1,828,000
" registered.....			A & O	98½	Oct. 8, '19			
" adjustment, g. 4's.....1905		50,518,500	NOV	88¾	Dec. 31, '19	90	88	2,256,500
" stamped.....1906		1,214,500	NOV	79¾	Dec. 11, '99			
" Equip. tr. ser. A. g. 5's.....1902		500,000	M & N	84½	Nov. 22, '19			
" Chic. & St. L. 1st g 5's.....1915		1,500,000	J & J					
Atl. Knox & Nor. Ry. 1st g. 5s.....1946		1,000,000	M & S					
			J & D	105	Dec. 4, '19	105	105	5,000
Balt. & Ohio prior lien g. 3½s.....1925		60,798,000	J & J	97½	Dec. 31, '19	98½	96¾	855,000
" registered.....			J & J					
" g. 4s.....1948		65,963,000	A & O	101¼	Dec. 31, '19	101¾	100%	908,500
" g. 4s. registered.....			A & O	99¾	Nov. 21, '19			
" Southw'n div. 1st g. 3½s.....1925		41,900,000	J & J	92	Dec. 31, '19	92	90%	1,026,500
" registered.....			Q J					
Pitt Jun. & M. div. 1st g. 3½s.....1925		11,298,000	M & N	90	Dec. 29, '19	90	87¾	126,500
" registered.....			Q Feb					
Monongahela River 1st g. 5's.....1919		700,000	F & A	104½	July 1, '92			
Cen. Ohio. Georg. 1st c. g. 4½s.....1930		1,018,000	M & S	111	Feb. 23, '99			
Buffalo, Roch. & Pitta. g. g. 5's.....1937		4,407,000	M & S	115½	Dec. 31, '19	115½	11½	16,000
" deb. 6's.....1947		1,000,000	J & J					
Alleghany & Wn. 1st g. gtd 4's.....1906		2,000,000	A & O					
Clearfield & Mah. 1st g. g. 5's.....1943		650,000	J & J	132	Dec. 19, '19	132	132	3,000
Rochester & Pittsburg. 1st g 5's.....1921		1,300,000	F & A	130¼	Dec. 11, '19	130¼	130¼	3,000
" cons. 1st g 5's.....1922		3,920,000	J & D	127½	Dec. 21, '19	127½	127½	6,000
Buffalo & Susquehanna 1st g. 5's. 1918		1,056,500	A & O	100	Nov. 18, '99			
" registered.....			A & O					
Burlington, Cedar R. & N. 1st 5's. 1906		6,500,000	J & D	106¾	Dec. 21, '19	106¾	106¾	33,500
" con. 1st & col. 1st 5's.....1934		7,250,000	A & O	113	Nov. 27, '19			
" registered.....			A & O	117	Nov. 20, '19			
Ced. Rap. & Falls & Nor. 1st 5's.....1921		1,905,000	A & O	113¾	Dec. 6, '19	113¾	113¾	2,000
Minneapolis & St. Louis 1st 7's, g. 1927		150,000	J & D	140	Aug. 24, '95			
Canada Southern 1st int. gtd 5's. 1906		13,920,000	J & J	109	Dec. 26, '19	109½	108½	44,000
" 2d mortg. 5's.....1918		5,100,000	M & S	109½	Dec. 31, '19	109½	108¾	18,000
" registered.....			M & S	104	Apr. 24, '06			
Central Branch U. Pac. 1st g. 4's.....1948		2,500,000	J & D	91	Dec. 28, '19	91	91	3,000
Cent. R. & Bkg. Co. of Ga. c. g. 5's. 1937		4,880,000	M & N	96¾	Dec. 11, '19	96¾	94	20,000
Central R'y of Georgia. 1st g. 5's.....1945		7,000,000	F & A	120	Nov. 20, '19			
" registered \$1,000 & \$5,000.....			F & A					
" con. g. 5's.....1945		16,700,800	M & N	99¾	Dec. 31, '19	100	98¾	2,446,000
" con. g. 5's. reg. \$1,000 & \$5,000.....		4,000,000	M & N	96	Oct. 30, '99			
" 1st. pref. inc. g. 5's.....1945		7,000,000	OCT 1	62	Dec. 31, '19	62	51¾	768,000
" 2d pref. inc. g. 5's.....1945		7,000,000	OCT 1	20¼	Dec. 31, '19	20¼	15¾	801,000
" 3d pref. inc. g. 5's.....1945		4,000,000	OCT 1	9¼	Dec. 27, '19	9¾	7	323,000
" Macon & Nor. Div. 1st g. 5's.....1946		840,000	J & J	95	Dec. 27, '99			
" Mid. Ga. & Atl. div. g. 5s.....1947		413,000	J & J	102	June 29, '99			
" Mobile div. 1st g. 5's.....1946		1,000,000	J & J	108	Oct. 24, '19			
Central Railroad of New Jersey.								
" 1st convertible 7's. 1902		1,187,000	M & N	106¾	Dec. 4, '19	106¾	106¾	16,000
" gen. g. 5's.....1937		43,924,000	J & J	129¼	Dec. 26, '19	129¼	127¾	98,000
" registered.....			Q J	127½	Dec. 26, '19	127½	125	42,000
" conv. deb. 6's.....1906		346,800	M & N	130	July 25, '19			

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		DECEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Am. Dock & Improvm't Co. 5's. 1921		4,987,000	J & J	115½	Dec. 20, 19'	117	115½	6,000
Lehigh & H. R. gen. gtd. 5's. 1920		1,082,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Lehigh & W.-B. Coal con. 5's. 1912		2,891,000	Q M	105	Aug. 30, 19'	.....	.....	.....
con. extended gtd. 4½'s. 1910		12,175,000	Q M	108¾	Dec. 31, 19'	108¾	102¾	148,000
Charleston & Sav. 1st g. 7's. 1898		1,500,000	J & J	108¾	Dec. 18, '99	.....	.....	.....
Ches. & Ohio 6's, g. Series A. 1908		2,000,000	A & O	117	Dec. 20, 19'	117½	116	34,000
Mortgage gold 6's. 1911		2,000,000	A & O	117½	Dec. 7, 19'	117½	117½	5,000
1st con. g. 6's. 1909		25,858,000	M & N	120½	Dec. 31, 19'	121	120	98,000
registered.			M & N	117	June 11, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Gen. m. g. 4½'s. 1902		28,809,000	M & S	104½	Dec. 31, 19'	104½	102½	1,090,000
registered.			M & S	94½	Aug. 23, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Craig Val. 1st g. 5's. 1940		650,000	J & J	103	Nov. 26, 19'	.....	.....	.....
(R. & A. d.) 1st c. g. 4's. 1909		6,000,000	J & J	107¾	Dec. 26, 19'	107¾	106½	38,000
2d con. g. 4's. 1909		1,000,000	J & J	98	July 23, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Warm S. Val. 1st g. 5's. 1941		400,000	M & S	101¾	Apr. 29, '99	.....	.....	.....
Eliz. Lex. & B. S. g. g. 5's. 1902		3,007,000	M & S	102	Dec. 21, 19'	102	101¾	49,000
Chic. & Alton R. R. s. fund. g. 6's. 1903		1,671,000	M & N	104½	Dec. 7, 19'	104½	104½	1,000
refunding g. 6's. 1903		17,483,000	A & O	91½	Dec. 28, 19'	93	91½	1,797,000
registered.			A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Miss. Riv. Bdge 1st s. f'd g. 6's. 1912		449,000	A & O	105½	Oct. 30, '95	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & Alton Ry 1st lien g. 3½'s. 1950		22,000,000	J & J	85½	Dec. 31, 19'	86	84½	3,813,000
registered.			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy con. 7's. 1903		24,358,000	J & J	111½	Dec. 28, 19'	111½	111½	7,000
5's, sinking fund. 1901		2,291,000	A & O	101	Dec. 3, 19'	101	101	1,000
Chic. & Iowa div. 5's. 1905		2,320,000	F & A	104¾	Apr. 11, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Denver div. 4's. 1922		5,565,000	F & A	102½	Dec. 10, 19'	102½	102½	4,000
Illinois div. 3½'s. 1949		26,214,000	J & J	105½	Dec. 29, 19'	105½	105½	58,000
registered.			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
(Iowa div.) sink. f'd 5's. 1919		2,709,000	A & O	113¾	Nov. 30, 19'	.....	.....	.....
4's. 1919		8,704,000	A & O	104½	Dec. 7, 19'	104½	104½	2,000
Nebraska extensi'n 4's. 1927		26,077,000	M & N	111½	Dec. 27, 19'	111½	111½	53,000
registered.			M & N	111½	June 2, '99	.....	.....	.....
Southwestern div. 4's. 1921		2,950,000	M & S	100½	Oct. 15, 19'	.....	.....	.....
convertible 5's. 1903		2,635,300	M & S	140½	Dec. 27, 19'	140½	140½	2,000
5's, debentures. 1913		9,000,000	M & N	110½	Dec. 8, 19'	111½	109¾	18,000
Han. & St. Jos. con. 6's. 1911		8,000,000	M & S	121	Dec. 28, 19'	121	121	2,000
Chicago & E. Ill. 1st s. f'd c'y. 6's. 1907		2,989,000	J & D	114½	Sept. 18, 19'	.....	.....	.....
small bonds. 1907		2,653,000	J & D	112	Apr. 2, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st con. 6's, gold. 1904		11,986,000	A & O	134	Nov. 15, 19'	.....	.....	.....
gen. con. 1st 5's. 1907			M & N	115	Dec. 31, 19'	116	114½	26,000
registered.			M & N	115	Aug. 23, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Chicago & Ind. Coal 1st 5's. 1896		4,628,000	J & J	115½	Dec. 19, 19'	115½	114	70,000
Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville.								
refunding g. 6's. 1947		4,700,000	J & J	120	Dec. 27, 19'	120	117½	23,000
ref. g. 5's. 1947		3,542,000	J & J	107	Dec. 12, 19'	107	107	5,000
Louisv. N. Alb. & Chic. 1st 6's. 1910		3,060,000	J & J	116½	Dec. 12, 19'	117	116	22,000
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul.								
Mil. & St. Paul 1st 7's & g. R. d. 1902		1,469,000	J & J	179	Dec. 12, 19'	179	179	1,000
1st 7's & g. 1902			J & J	172½	Apr. 10, 19'	.....	.....	.....
1st C. & M. 7's. 1903		1,157,000	J & J	181	Dec. 18, 19'	181	175½	40,000
Chicago Mil. & St. Paul con. 7's. 1905		5,072,000	J & J	185¾	Dec. 29, 19'	187¾	175	92,000
terminal g. 5's. 1914		4,748,000	J & J	116¾	Dec. 27, 19'	116¾	115¾	25,000
gen. g. 4's, series A. 1909		23,676,000	J & J	114½	Dec. 27, 19'	114½	114½	78,000
registered.			Q J	105½	Feb. 19, '98	.....	.....	.....
gen. g. 3½'s, series B. 1909		2,500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered.			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & Lake Sup. 5's. 1921		1,360,000	J & J	120½	Nov. 28, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & M. R. div. 5's. 1926		3,083,000	J & J	124	Dec. 11, 19'	124	124	4,000
Chic. & Pac. div. 6's. 1910		3,000,000	J & J	119½	Dec. 4, 19'	119½	119½	11,000
1st Chic. & P. W. g. 5's. 1921		26,340,000	J & J	122	Dec. 26, 19'	122	121½	50,000
Dakota & Gt. S. g. 5's. 1916		2,859,000	J & J	117½	Dec. 21, 19'	117½	115	10,000
Far. & So. g. 6's assu. 1924		1,250,000	J & J	137½	July 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st H't & Dk. div. 7's. 1910		5,680,000	J & J	128½	Nov. 13, 19'	.....	.....	.....
1st 5's. 1910		990,000	J & J	109½	Aug. 9, 19'	.....	.....	.....
1st 7's, Iowa & D. ex. 1908		2,230,000	J & J	174½	Nov. 26, 19'	.....	.....	.....
1st 5's, La. C. & Dav. 1919		2,500,000	J & J	118¾	Nov. 12, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Mineral Point div. 5's. 1910		2,840,000	J & J	110¾	Sept. 10, 19'	.....	.....	.....
1st So. Min. div. 6's. 1910		7,432,000	J & J	120½	Dec. 23, 19'	120½	120½	6,000
1st 6's, Southw'n div. 1909		4,000,000	J & J	120½	Dec. 10, 19'	120½	120½	4,000
Wis. & Min. div. g. 5's. 1921		4,755,000	J & J	119	Oct. 18, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Mil. & N. 1st M. L. 6's. 1910		2,155,000	J & D	118½	Dec. 3, 19'	118½	118½	5,000
1st con. 6's. 1913		5,062,000	J & D	120	Aug. 9, 19'	.....	.....	.....



## BOND SALES.

163

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		DECEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Chic. & Northwestern con. 7's. 1915		12,832,000	Q F	137½	Nov. 3, 19'			
gold 7's. 1902		8,551,000	J & D	108½	Dec. 29, 19'	106¾	106½	22,000
registered gold 7's. 1902			J & D	108½	Dec. 17, 19'	106¾	106½	41,000
extension 4's. 1896-1926		18,632,000	F A 15	108½	Sept. 21, 19'			
registered.			F A 15	107½	Mar. 7, 19'			
gen. g. 3½'s. 1907		9,986,000	M & N	110	Dec. 21, 19'	110	109¾	37,000
registered.			Q F	103	Nov. 19, '98			
sinking fund 6's. 1879-1929		5,940,000	A & O	118½	Dec. 3, 19'	116½	116½	7,000
registered.			A & O	111	Oct. 13, 19'			
sinking fund 5's. 1879-1929		7,055,000	A & O	108½	Nov. 23, 19'			
registered.			A & O	107	Dec. 18, 19'	107	107	1,000
deben. 5's. 1909		5,900,000	M & N	108	Nov. 27, 19'			
registered.			M & N	105	Dec. 26, '99			
deben. 5's. 1921		10,080,000	A & O	118½	Nov. 3, 19'			
registered.			A & O	107	Nov. 20, '95			
sinking f'd deben. 5's. 1903		9,800,000	M & N	125	Dec. 31, 19'	125	121½	18,000
registered.			M & N	120	Nov. 30, 19'			
Des Moines & Minn. 1st 7's. 1907		600,000	F & A	127	Apr. 8, '94			
Escanaba & L. Superior 1st 6's. 1901		351,000	J & J	109½	Feb. 23, 19'			
Milwaukee & Madison 1st 6's. 1906		1,600,000	M & S	112½	Apr. 24, 19'			
Northern Illinois 1st 5's. 1910		1,500,000	M & S	112½	Apr. 24, 19'			
Ottumwa C. F. & St. P. 1st 5's. 1908		1,800,000	M & S	113½	Apr. 24, 19'			
Winona & St. Peters 2d 7's. 1907		1,562,000	M & N	120½	Nov. 10, 19'			
Mill, L. Shore & We'n 1st g. 6's. 1921		5,030,000	M & S	138½	Dec. 12, 19'	136	135½	4,000
ext. & Impt. s.f'd g. 5's. 1923		4,148,000	F & A	126	Dec. 19, 19'	126½	125½	21,000
Ashland div. 1st g. 6's. 1925		1,000,000	M & S	139½	Apr. 17, 19'			
Michigan div. 1st g. 6's. 1924		1,281,000	J & J	137½	Aug. 13, 19'			
con. deb. 5's. 1907		436,000	F & A	107½	Nov. 16, 19'			
incomes. 1911		500,000	M & N	112	Nov. 13, '99			
Chic., Rock Is. & Pac. 6's coup. 1917		12,100,000	J & J	131	Dec. 17, 19'	133	131	25,000
registered. 1917			J & J	130	Nov. 7, 19'			
gen. g. 4's. 1908		54,581,000	J & J	109½	Dec. 31, 19'	109¾	109	270,000
registered.			J & J	107½	Nov. 8, 19'			
Des Moines & Ft. Dodge 1st 4's. 1906		1,200,000	J & J	96	May 26, 19'			
1st 2½'s. 1906		1,200,000	J & J	89½	Aug. 25, 19'			
extension 4's. 1906		672,000	J & J	96	Dec. 19, 19'	96	96	2,000
Keokuk & Des M. 1st mor. 5's. 1923		2,750,000	A & O	112	Dec. 4, 19'	112	112	2,000
small bond. 1923			A & O	100	Apr. 15, '97			
Chic., St. P., Minn. & Oma. con. 6's. 1930		14,284,000	J & D	134½	Dec. 26, 19'	134½	133½	46,000
Chic., St. Paul & Minn. 1st 6's. 1918		2,129,000	M & N	133	Nov. 27, 19'			
North Wisconsin 1st mort. 6's. 1930		800,000	J & J	140	May 31, 19'			
St. Paul & Sioux City 1st 6's. 1919		6,070,000	A & O	130	Dec. 31, 19'	130½	129½	19,000
Chic., Term. Trans. R. R. g. 4's. 1947		18,400,000	J & J	95	Dec. 31, 19'	95½	92½	367,000
Chic. & Wn. Ind. 1st s.k. f'd g. 6's. 1919		478,000	M & N	108	Oct. 4, '99			
gen'l mortg. g. 6's. 1932		9,868,000	Q M	120	Dec. 14, 19'	120	120	5,000
Chic. & West Michigan R'y 5's. 1921		5,753,000	J & D	100	Oct. 28, '93			
Choc., Oklahoma & Gif. gen. g. 5s. 1919		4,800,000	J & J	108	Jan. 17, 19'			
Cin., Ham. & Day. con. s.k. f'd 7's. 1905		996,000	A & O	115	Dec. 14, 19'	115	115	5,000
2d g. 4½'s. 1907		2,000,000	J & J	113	Oct. 10, 19'			
Cin., Day. & Ir'n 1st gt. dg. 5's. 1941		3,500,000	M & N	112	Dec. 23, 19'	112	112	2,000
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. L. gen. g. 4's. 1903		12,634,000	J & D	101½	Dec. 31, 19'	102	101	129,000
do Cairo div. 1st g. 4's. 1939		5,000,000	J & J	98	Sept. 27, 19'			
Cin., Wab. & Mich. div. 1st g. 4's. 1991		4,000,000	J & J	100½	Dec. 12, 19'	100½	100½	1,000
St. Louis div. 1st col. trust g. 4's. 1990		9,750,000	M & N	103½	Dec. 26, 19'	104	103½	20,000
registered.				99	May 4, '99			
Sp'gfield & Col. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		1,035,000	M & S	94	Oct. 12, 19'			
White W. Val. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		650,000	J & J	83	Nov. 22, '99			
Cin., Ind., St. L. & Chic. 1st g. 4's. 1936		7,685,000	Q F	105½	Apr. 5, 19'			
registered.				95	Nov. 15, '94			
con. 6's. 1920		699,000	M & N	107½	June 30, '93			
Cin., S'dusky & Clev. con. 1st g. 5's. 1928		2,571,000	J & J	114	Aug. 17, 19'			
Clev., C. & Ind. con. 7's. 1914		3,991,000	J & D	134	Dec. 18, 19'	134	134	7,000
sinking fund 7's. 1914			J & D	119½	Nov. 19, '89			
gen. consol 6's. 1934		3,205,000	J & J	137	Dec. 23, 19'	137	136	6,000
registered.			J & J					
Cin., Sp. 1st m. C. C. C. & Ind. 7's. 1901		1,000,000	A & O	101½	Dec. 7, 19'	101½	101½	3,000
Ohio, Ind. & W., 1st pf'd. 5's. 1938		500,000	Q J					
Peoria & Eastern 1st con. 4's. 1940		8,103,000	A & O	95	Dec. 29, 19'	95	92½	272,000
income 4's. 1990		4,000,000	A	47½	Dec. 27, 19'	50	84	1,382,000

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		DECEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Clev., Lorain & Wheel'g con. 1st 5's. 1933		5,000,000	A & O	111	Sept. 5, 19'	....	....	.....
Clev., & Mahoning Val. gold 5's. 1938		2,968,000	J & J	130	May 8, 19'	....	....	.....
" registered.....			Q J	.....	.....	....	....	.....
Col. Middl Ry. 1st g. 2-3-4's.....1947		7,500,000	J & J	80½	Dec. 29, 19'	80½	78¼	643,000
" 1st g. 4's.....1947		1,011,000	J & J	81	Dec. 27, 19'	81	79	51,000
Colorado & Southern 1st g. 4's...1929		17,500,000	F & A	84¾	Dec. 31, 19'	85¼	83¼	779,000
Conn., Passumpsic Riv's 1st g. 4's. 1943		1,900,000	A & O	102	Dec. 27, '93	.....	.....	.....
Delaware, Lack. & W. mtge 7's...1907		3,067,000	M & S	122½	Nov. 10, 19'	.....	.....	.....
{ Morris & Essex 1st m 7's.....1914		5,000,000	M & N	137½	Dec. 27, 19'	137½	137	3,000
" 7's.....1871-1901		4,991,000	A & O	103¾	Dec. 28, 19'	103¼	103	12,000
" 1st c. gtd 7's.....1915		12,151,000	J & D	138¾	Dec. 28, 19'	138¾	138	6,000
" registered.....			J & D	140	Oct. 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
{ N. Y., Lack. & West'n. 1st 6's...1921		12,000,000	J & J	138	Dec. 27, 19'	138	137½	11,000
" const. 5's.....1923		5,000,000	F & A	121½	Dec. 27, 19'	122	121½	9,000
" term. imp. 4's.....1923		5,000,000	M & N	103½	Oct. 15, 19'	.....	.....	.....
{ Syracuse, Bing. & N. Y. 1st 7's. 1906		1,966,000	A & O	118¾	Nov. 15, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Delaware & Hudson Canal.								
{ 1st Penn. Div. c. 7's...1917		5,000,000	M & S	140½	May 2, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" reg.....1917			M & S	141	Oct. 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ Albany & Susq. 1st c. g. 7's.....1906		3,000,000	A & O	116¾	Dec. 5, 19'	116¾	116¾	2,000
" registered.....			A & O	122	June 6, '99	.....	.....	.....
" 6's.....1906		7,000,000	A & O	112	Dec. 4, 19'	112	112	2,000
" registered.....			A & O	113½	Aug. 27, 19'	.....	.....	.....
{ Rens. & Saratoga 1st c. 7's.....1921		2,000,000	M & N	147	Dec. 4, 19'	147	147	3,000
" 1st r 7's.....1921			M & N	148¾	July 16, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Denver & Rio G. 1st con. g. 4's...1936		28,650,000	J & J	102½	Dec. 31, 19'	102¾	100¼	221,000
" con. g. 4½'s.....1936		6,382,000	J & J	109½	Dec. 20, 19'	109½	109	28,000
" impt. m. g. 5's.....1928		8,103,500	J & D	108	Dec. 28, 19'	108	105	96,500
Des Moines Union Ry 1st g. 5's. 1917		628,000	M & N	108¾	May 7, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Detroit & Mack. 1st lien g. 4s.....1995		900,000	J & D	98½	Nov. 20, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" g. 4s.....1995		1,250,000	J & D	87	Dec. 28, 19'	88	87	25,000
Duluth & Iron Range 1st 5's.....1937		6,734,000	A & O	111	Dec. 27, 19'	111	110	92,000
" registered.....			A & O	101½	July 23, '89	.....	.....	.....
" 2d 1 m 6s.....1916		2,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Duluth, Red Wing & S'n 1st g. 5's. 1928		500,000	J & J	92¼	Feb. 11, '98	.....	.....	.....
Duluth So. Shore & At. gold 5's...1937		4,000,000	J & J	115	Nov. 1, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Elgin Joliet & Eastern 1st g 5's...1941		7,852,000	M & N	109¾	Dec. 6, 19'	109¾	109¼	1,000
Erie 1st ext. g. 4's.....1947		2,482,000	M & N	119	Dec. 28, 19'	119	119	1,600
" 2d extended g. 5's.....1919		2,149,000	M & S	119½	Jan. 4, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" 3d extended g. 4½'s.....1923		4,618,000	M & S	116	Nov. 22, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" 4th extended g. 5's.....1920		2,926,000	A & O	123½	Mar. 30, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" 5th extended g. 4's.....1928		709,500	J & D	106¼	Feb. 24, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" 1st cons. gold 7's.....1920		10,890,000	M & S	140¼	Dec. 15, 19'	140¼	140¼	5,000
" 1st cons. fund g. 7's...1920		3,099,500	M & S	134½	Oct. 9, 19'	.....	.....	.....
{ Erie R. R. 1st con. g. 4s prior bds. 1906		39,452,000	J & J	99	Dec. 31, 19'	99	91¾	5,394,000
" registered.....			J & J	93¼	May 25, '99	.....	.....	.....
" 1st con. gen. lien g. 4s. 1906		31,954,000	J & J	86	Dec. 31, 19'	80½	75	7,063,000
" registered.....			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ Buffalo, N. Y. & Erie 1st 7's.....1916		2,380,000	J & D	140	Feb. 6, '99	.....	.....	.....
" Buffalo & Southwestern g. 6's. 1908		1,500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" small.....			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ Chicago & Erie 1st gold 5's.....1982		12,000,000	M & N	121½	Dec. 19, 19'	123	116	88,000
{ Jefferson R. R. 1st gtd g. 5's...1909		2,800,000	A & O	104½	Oct. 22, 19'	.....	.....	.....
{ Long Dock consol. g. 6's.....1935		7,500,000	A & O	138¾	Dec. 17, 19'	138¾	137¾	19,000
{ N. Y. L. E. & W. Coal & R. R. Co.								
" 1st gtd. currency 6's.....1922		1,100,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ N. Y. L. E. & W. Dock & Imp.								
" Co. 1st currency 6's.....1913		3,396,000	J & J	118	Sept. 27, 19'	.....	.....	.....
{ N. Y. & Greenw'd Lake gt g 5's. 1946		1,452,000	M & N	109	Oct. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
" small.....								
{ Midland R. of N. J. 1st g. 6's...1910		3,500,000	A & O	118	Dec. 21, 19'	118	117	3,500
{ N. Y., Sus. & W. 1st retdg. g. 5's. 1937		3,750,000	J & J	111	Dec. 11, 19'	111	110½	3,000
" 2d g. 4½'s.....1937		453,000	F & A	99½	June 12, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" gen. g. 5's.....1940		2,546,000	F & A	105½	Dec. 31, 19'	105½	96	499,000
" term. 1st g. 5's.....1943		2,000,000	M & N	113	Apr. 27, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....\$5,000 each			M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Wilkesb. & East. 1st gtd g. 5's...1942		3,000,000	J & D	106¾	Nov. 5, 19'	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		DECEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Eureka Springs R'y 1st 6's, g. .... 1933		500,000	F & A	85	Nov. 10, '97			
Evans, & Terre Haute 1st con. 6's. 1921		8,000,000	J & J	124	Dec. 4, '19	124	124	3,000
1st General g 5's. .... 1942		2,223,000	A & O	108	Dec. 28, '19	108	107½	27,000
Mount Vernon 1st 6's. .... 1923		875,000	A & O	110	May 10, '98			
Sul. Co. Beh. 1st g 5's. .... 1930		450,000	A & O	95	Sept. 15, '91			
Evans, & Ind'p. 1st con. g 6's. .... 1923		1,581,000	J & J	105	Sept. 25, '19			
Flint & Pere Marquette m 6's. .... 1920		3,999,000	A & O	125	Dec. 3, '19	125	125	5,000
1st con. gold 5's. .... 1939		2,850,000	M & N	107	Dec. 27, '19	107	107	3,000
Port Huron d 1st g 5's. .... 1939		3,325,000	A & O	107	Dec. 8, '19	107	107	3,000
Florida Cen. & Penins. 1st g 5's. .... 1918		8,000,000	J & J	100	Sept. 6, '99			
1st land grant ex. g 5's. .... 1930		423,000	J & J					
1st con. g 5's. .... 1943		4,370,000	J & J	89½	May 14, '98			
Ft. Smith U'n Dep. Co. 1st g 4½'s. 1941		1,000,000	J & J	105	Mar. 11, '98			
Ft. Worth & D. C. ctfs. dep. 1st 6's. 1921		8,176,000		82½	Dec. 28, '19	84	75	585,000
Ft. Worth & Rio Grande 1st g 5's. 1923		2,863,000	J & J	99½	Dec. 31, '19	99½	98	340,000
Galveston H. & H. of 1882 1st 5s. 1913		2,000,000	A & O	102	Nov. 10, '19			
Geo. & Ala. Ry. 1st pref. g. 5's. .... 1945		2,280,000	A & O	108	Dec. 12, '88			
1st con. g 5s. .... 1945		2,922,000	J & J	98½	Nov. 27, '19			
Ga. Car. & N. Ry. 1st gtd. g. 5's. .... 1927		5,360,000	J & J	99½	Jan. 22, '19			
Hock, Val. Ry. 1st con. g. 4½'s. .... 1999		9,108,000	J & J	108	Dec. 31, '19	108½	104½	380,000
registered			J & J					
Col. Hock's Val. 1st ext. g. 4's. 1848		1,401,000	A & O	105½	Nov. 5, '19			
Illinois Central, 1st g. 4's. .... 1894-1951		1,500,000	J & J	116	Dec. 13, '19	116	116	12,000
registered			J & J	113½	Mar. 12, '19			
1st gold 3½'s. .... 1951		2,499,000	J & J	106½	Dec. 14, '19	106½	106½	5,000
registered			J & J	102½	Apr. 15, '98			
1st g 3s sterl. 2500,000. .... 1951		2,500,000	M & S	92½	July 18, '96			
registered			M & S					
total outstg. .... \$18,950,000								
collat. trust gold 4's. .... 1952		15,000,000	A & O	104	Dec. 15, '19	104	104	5,000
regist'd			A & O	104½	Jan. 30, '99			
col. t. g. 4s L. N. O. & Tex. 1953		24,679,000	M & N	104½	Dec. 29, '19	104½	103½	21,000
registered			M & N	109½	Dec. 18, '99			
Cairo Bridge g 4's. .... 1950		3,000,000	J & D	123	May 24, '99			
registered			J & D	101½	Oct. 23, '19			
Louisville div. g. 3½'s. 1953		14,320,000	J & J	88½	Dec. 8, '99			
registered			F & A	95	Dec. 21, '99			
Middle div. reg. 5's. .... 1921		600,000	J & J	92	Dec. 15, '19	92	92	1,000
St. Louis div. g. 3's. .... 1951		4,989,000	J & J	101½	Jan. 31, '19			
registered			J & J	103	Dec. 11, '19	103	103	5,000
g. 3½'s. .... 1951		6,821,000	J & J	101½	Sept. 10, '95			
registered			J & J	100	Nov. 7, '19			
Sp'gfield div 1st g 3½'s. 1951		2,000,000	J & J	124	Dec. 11, '99			
registered			F & A	114½	Dec. 12, '19	114½	114½	2,000
West'n Line 1st g. 4's. 1951		5,425,000	F & A	101½	Jan. 31, '19			
registered			J & D	121	Aug. 3, '19			
Belleville & Carott 1st 6's. .... 1923		470,000	M & S	105	Jan. 22, '19			
Carbondale & Shawt'n 1st g. 4's. 1932		241,000	J & D	125½	Dec. 22, '19	127	125½	3,000
Chic. St. L. & N. O. gold 5's. .... 1951		16,555,000	J & D	122	Sept. 26, '19			
gold 5's. registered. .... 1951		1,352,000	J & D	100½	Nov. 14, '19			
g. 3½'s. .... 1951		1,352,000	J & D	100½	Aug. 17, '99			
registered			J & D	105½	Sept. 10, '19			
Memph. div. 1st g. 4's. 1951		8,500,000	J & D	121	Feb. 24, '99			
registered			M & S	102½	Nov. 16, '19			
St. Louis, South. 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1931		538,000						
Ind., Dec. & West. 1st g. 5's. .... 1935		1,824,000	J & J	103½	Aug. 8, '19			
1st gtd. g. 5's. .... 1935		933,000	J & J					
Indiana, Ill. & Iowa 1st reldg. 5's. 1948		3,000,000	A & O	108½	Dec. 4, '19	108½	108½	1,000
Internat. & Gt. N'n 1st 6's. gold. 1919		7,954,000	M & N	125½	Dec. 31, '19	125½	123	27,000
2d g. 5's. .... 1909		6,593,000	M & S	98½	Dec. 27, '19	98½	91½	407,000
3d g. 4's. .... 1921		2,725,000	M & S	86	Dec. 31, '19	86	87	50,500
Iowa Central 1st gold 5's. .... 1933		7,650,000	J & D	115½	Dec. 12, '19	115½	114	31,000
Kansas C. & M. R. & B. Co. 1st								
gtd g. 5's. .... 1920		3,000,000	A & O					
Kansas City Southern 1st g. 3's. .... 1939		26,197,000	A & O	67½	Dec. 31, '19	68½	67½	377,000
registered			A & O	63½	Oct. 16, '19			
Lake Erie & Western 1st g. 5's. .... 1937		7,250,000	J & J	125	Dec. 27, '19	125	124½	13,000
2d mtge. g. 5's. .... 1941		8,825,000	J & J	120	Dec. 20, '19	120	118½	18,000
Northern Ohio 1st gtd g 5's. .... 1945		2,500,000	A & O	111	Nov. 14, '19			

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		DECEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Lehigh Val. (Pa.) coll. g. 5's. .... 1907		5,000,000	M & N	104	Aug. 8, '98	....	....	....
" registered. ....			M & N	....	....	....	....	....
Lehigh Val. N. Y. 1st m. g. 4½'s. 1940		15,000,000	J & J	111½	Dec. 15, 19'	111½	110½	16,000
" registered. ....			J & J	109	Dec. 15, 19'	111	109	25,000
Lehigh Val. Ter. R. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1941		10,000,000	A & O	112	July 9, '19	....	....	....
" registered. ....			A & O	109½	Oct. 18, '99	....	....	....
Lehigh V. Coal Co. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1933		10,280,000	J & J	103¾	Nov. 21, '99	....	....	....
" registered. .... 1933			J & J	....	....	....	....	....
Lehigh & N. Y., 1st gtd g. 4's. .... 1945		2,000,000	M & S	92	Sept. 4, 19'	....	....	....
" registered. ....			M & S	....	....	....	....	....
{ Elm., Cort. & N. 1st g. 1st pfd 6's 1914		750,000	A & O	....	....	....	....	....
{ " " g. gtd 5's. .... 1914		1,250,000	A & O	101½	Sept. 1, '99	....	....	....
Long Island 1st cons. 5's. .... 1931		3,610,000	Q J	122¾	Dec. 7, 19'	122¾	122¾	1,000
1st con. g. 4's. .... 1931		1,121,000	Q J	101	Nov. 22, '99	....	....	....
Long Island gen. m. 4's. .... 1938		3,000,000	J & D	104	Dec. 20, 19'	104	101¾	29,000
Ferry 1st g. 4½'s. .... 1922		1,500,000	M & S	104	Dec. 31, 19'	104½	103½	16,000
" g. 4's. .... 1932		325,000	J & D	102¾	May 5, '97	....	....	....
" unified g. 4's. .... 1949		5,685,000	M & S	99	Dec. 29, 19'	99	98¾	347,000
" deb. g. 5's. .... 1934		1,135,000	J & D	100	May 25, '97	....	....	....
Brooklyn & Montauk 1st 6's. .... 1911		250,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
1st 5's. .... 1911		750,000	M & S	110	Aug. 3, '98	....	....	....
N. Y. B'kin & M. B. 1st c. g. 5's. .... 1935		1,601,000	A & O	107	Jan. 31, '99	....	....	....
N. Y. & Rock'y Beach 1st g. 5's. .... 1927		883,000	M & S	105	May 4, 19'	....	....	....
Long Isl. R. R. Nor. Shore Branch								
1st Con. gold garnt'd 5's. .... 1932		1,425,000	Q JAN	113	Dec. 23, 19'	113	113	2,000
Louis. & Nash, gen. g. 6's. .... 1930		9,515,000	J & D	119	Dec. 21, 19'	119	117	30,000
" gold 5's. .... 1937		1,764,000	M & N	110¾	Nov. 7, 19'	....	....	....
" Unified gold 4's. .... 1940		17,994,000	J & J	102	Dec. 31, 19'	102	100½	125,000
" registered. .... 1940			J & J	83	Feb. 27, '03	....	....	....
" collateral trust g. 5's. .... 1931		5,129,000	M & N	111	Dec. 23, 19'	111	109½	10,000
" coll. tr 5-20 g. 4's. .... 1903-1918		11,500,000	A & O	98¾	Dec. 21, 19'	99¾	98¾	165,000
" Cecilian branch. 7's. .... 1907		380,000	M & S	108	Dec. 31, 19'	106	106	4,000
" E. Hend. & N. 1st 6's. .... 1919		1,895,000	J & D	115	Nov. 15, 19'	....	....	....
" L. Clin. & Lex. g. 4½'s. .... 1931		3,258,000	M & N	103	Jan. 18, '98	....	....	....
" N. O. & Mobile 1st g. 6's. .... 1930		5,000,000	J & J	130	Nov. 5, 19'	....	....	....
" 2d g. 6's. .... 1930		1,000,000	J & J	117	Oct. 1, 19'	....	....	....
" Pensacola div. g. 6's. .... 1920		580,000	M & S	115	Dec. 5, 19'	115	115	1,000
" St. Louis div. 1st g. 6's. .... 1921		3,500,000	M & S	126¾	Sept. 24, 19'	....	....	....
" 2d g. 3's. .... 1930		3,000,000	M & S	63¼	Oct. 1, 19'	....	....	....
" Ken. Cent. g. 4's. .... 1937		6,742,000	J & J	99½	Dec. 10, 19'	99¾	99	8,000
" L. & N. & Mob. & Montg								
" 1st g. 4½'s. .... 1945		4,000,000	M & S	111	Dec. 10, 19'	111	111	1,000
" N. Fla. & S. 1st g. g. 5's. .... 1937		2,066,000	F & A	111½	Dec. 7, 19'	111½	111½	2,000
" Pen. & At. 1st g. g. 6's. .... 1921		2,708,000	F & A	111½	Nov. 12, 19'	....	....	....
" S. & N. A. con. gtd. g. 5's. .... 1936		3,673,000	F & A	109	Oct. 14, 19'	....	....	....
" So. & N. Ala. si'rd. g. 6's. .... 1910		1,942,000	A & O	92¾	Sept. 30, '96	....	....	....
Lo. & Jefferson Bdg. Co. gtd. g. 4's. 1945		3,000,000	M & S	96¾	Nov. 17, '99	....	....	....
Manhattan Railway Con. 4's. .... 1930		28,065,000	A & O	105	Dec. 31, 19'	105	104¼	180,000
Metropolitan Elevated 1st 6's. .... 1908		10,818,000	J & J	118	Dec. 10, 19'	118	117½	7,000
Manitoba Sw. Coloniza'n g. 5's. 1934		2,544,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	....
Mexican Central.								
" con. mtge. 4's. .... 1911		62,643,000	J & J	81¾	Nov. 19, 19'	....	....	....
" 1st con. inc. 3's. .... 1939		17,072,000	JULY	28¾	Dec. 31, 19'	29¾	28½	2,639,000
" 2d 3's. .... 1939		11,310,000	JULY	14½	Dec. 31, 19'	15¼	13	1,499,000
" equip. & collat. g. 5's. .... 1917		850,000	A & O	....	....	....	....	....
" 2d series g. 5's. .... 1919		915,000	A & O	....	....	....	....	....
" Mexican Internat'l 1st con g. 4's. .... 1942		4,635,000	M & S	84½	Dec. 27, 19'	84½	84½	61,000
Mexican Nat. 1st gold 6's. .... 1927		10,955,000	J & D	103½	Apr. 19, 19'	....	....	....
" 2d inc. 6's "A" 1917 coup. due		12,265,000	M & S	81	Apr. 10, 19'	....	....	....
" Sept. 1, 1899, stamped 1½% paid		12,265,000	A	17	Apr. 25, 19'	....	....	....
" 2d inc. 6's "B" .... 1917		12,265,000	J & D	105	May 2, 19'	....	....	....
" Northern 1st g. 6's. .... 1910		1,182,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	....
" registered. ....			J & D	....	....	....	....	....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		DECEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Minneapolis & St. Louis 1st g. 7's. 1927		950,000	J & D	149	May 9, 19'	....	....	.....
• Iowa ext. 1st g. 7's. 1909		1,015,000	J & D	122½	May 25, 19'	....	....	.....
• Pacific ext. 1st g. 8's. 1921		1,382,000	J & A	124½	Nov. 14, 19'	....	....	.....
• Southw. ext. 1st g. 7's. 1910		1,386,000	J & D	123	Dec. 5, 19'	123	123	10,000
• 1st con. g. 5's. 1934		5,000,000	M & N	116½	Dec. 19, 19'	117½	116½	11,000
• 1st & refunding g. 4's. 1949		7,800,000	M & S	98	Dec. 28, 19'	98½	97	141,000
Minneapolis & Pacific 1st m. 5's. 1936		3,208,000	J & J	102	Mar. 26, '87	....	....	.....
• stamped 4's pay. of int. gtd.				94	Apr. 2, '96	....	....	.....
Min., S. S. M. & Atlan. 1st g. 4's. 1926		8,280,000	J & J	99½	June 18, '91	....	....	.....
• stamped pay. of int. gtd.				....	....	....	....	.....
Min., S. P. & S. S. M. 1st c. g. 4's. 1938		6,710,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
• stamped pay. of int. gtd.				....	....	....	....	.....
Missouri, K. & T. 1st mtge g. 4's. 1900		39,718,000	J & D	98½	Dec. 31, 19'	98½	93½	1,085,000
• 2d mtge. g. 4's. 1900		20,000,000	F & A	77½	Dec. 31, 19'	77½	71	2,427,500
• 1st ext gold 5's. 1944		1,498,000	M & N	98	Dec. 29, 19'	98	92	446,000
Booneville Bdg. Co. gtd. g. 7's. 1906		510,000	M & N	100½	Nov. 22, '99	....	....	.....
Dallas & Waco 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1940		1,340,000	M & N	90	Sept. 3, 19'	....	....	.....
Mo. K. & T. of Tex 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1942		2,685,000	M & S	97½	Dec. 31, 19'	97½	95	31,000
Sher. Shreveport & Solist gtd. g. 5's. 1943		1,689,000	J & D	99½	Dec. 29, 19'	99½	97½	57,000
Kan. City & Pacific 1st g. 4's. 1900		2,500,000	F & A	87	Dec. 31, 19'	87	85	55,000
Teco. & Neosho 1st 7's. 1906		187,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	.....
Mo. Kan. & East'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1942		4,000,000	A & O	107	Dec. 5, 19'	107	106	9,000
Missouri, Pacific 1st con. g. 6's. 1920		14,904,000	M & N	120	Dec. 31, 19'	120	118½	226,000
• 3d mortgage 7's. 1906		3,828,000	M & N	115½	Dec. 19, 19'	115½	114½	45,000
• trustee gold 5's stamp'd 1917		14,376,000	M & S	102½	Dec. 31, 19'	103½	98½	2,154,000
• registered			M & S	....	....	....	....	.....
• 1st collateral gold 5's. 1920		7,000,000	F & A	104	Dec. 31, 19'	104	99½	253,000
• registered			F & A	....	....	....	....	.....
Leroy & Caney Val. A. L. 1st 5's. 1926		520,000	J & J	94	June 7, 19'	....	....	.....
Pacific R. of Mo. 1st m. ex. 4's. 1938		7,000,000	M & S	107½	Dec. 20, 19'	107½	107½	15,000
• 2d extended g. 5's. 1938		2,573,000	F & A	115½	Sept. 3, 19'	....	....	.....
St. L. & I. g. con. R. R. & I. gr. 5's. 1931		35,716,000	A & O	114	Dec. 31, 19'	114½	112½	319,000
• stamped gtd gold 5's. 1931		6,945,000	A & O	112½	Dec. 22, 19'	112½	112½	2,000
• unify'g & rfd'g g. 4's. 1929		23,090,000	J & J	88	Dec. 31, 19'	88	82½	2,004,000
• registered			J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Verdigris V'y Ind. & W. 1st 5's. 1936		750,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	.....
Mob. & Birm., prior lien, g. 5's. 1945		374,000	J & J	109	Aug. 31, 19'	....	....	.....
• small		226,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
• inc. g. 4's. 1945		700,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
• small		500,000	....	....	....	....	....	.....
Mob. Jackson & Kan. City 1st g. 5's. 1946		1,000,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	.....
Mobile & Ohio new mort. g. 6's. 1927		7,000,000	J & J	127½	Dec. 15, 19'	127½	126½	13,000
• 1st extension 6's. 1927		974,000	J & D	120½	July 31, 19'	....	....	.....
• gen. g. 4's. 1938		9,472,000	Q & J	87½	Dec. 28, 19'	87½	86½	212,000
• Montg'y div. 1st g. 5's. 1947		4,000,000	F & A	110	Dec. 21, 19'	110	109	115,000
St. Louis & Cairo gtd g. 4's. 1931		4,000,000	M & S	96½	Dec. 3, 19'	96½	96½	1,000
Nashville, Chat. & St. L. 1st 7's. 1913		6,300,000	J & J	130½	Dec. 19, 19'	130½	130½	5,000
• 2d 6's. 1901		1,000,000	J & J	100½	July 11, 19'	....	....	.....
• 1st cons. g. 5's. 1928		6,253,000	A & O	110½	Dec. 31, 19'	110½	107½	89,000
• 1st g. 6's Jasper Branch. 1923		371,000	J & J	113	Dec. 1, '99	....	....	.....
• 1st 6's McM. M.W. & Al. 1917		750,000	J & J	108	Mar. 24, '96	....	....	.....
• 1st 6's T. & Pb. 1917		300,000	J & J	110	Dec. 20, '99	....	....	.....
N. O. & N. East. prior lien g. 6's. 1915		1,320,000	A & O	108½	Aug. 13, '94	....	....	.....
N. Y. Cent. & Hud. R. 1st c. 7's. 1903		18,481,000	J & J	110	Dec. 19, 19'	110	110½	34,000
• 1st registered			J & J	109½	Dec. 20, 19'	109½	109½	5,000
• g. mortgage 3½'s. 1997		87,108,000	J & J	110½	Dec. 21, 19'	111	110½	35,000
• registered			J & J	110	Aug. 27, 19'	....	....	.....
• debenture 5's. 1894-1904		4,768,000	M & S	105	Dec. 28, 19'	105½	105	4,000
• debenture 5's reg.			M & S	105½	Nov. 23, 19'	....	....	.....
• reg. debent. 5's. 1899-1904		657,000	M & S	108½	Feb. 21, '98	....	....	.....
• debenture g. 4's. 1890-1906		5,647,000	J & D	103	Nov. 7, 19'	....	....	.....
• registered			J & D	104½	Feb. 5, '98	....	....	.....
• deb. cert. ext. g. 4's. 1906		3,771,000	M & N	101	Dec. 6, 19'	101½	101	3,500
• registered			M & N	109½	Sept. 28, '99	....	....	.....
Lake Shore col. g. 3½'s. 1938		90,578,000	F & A	98½	Dec. 31, 19'	98½	96½	1,036,000
• registered			F & A	96½	Dec. 29, 19'	98	95½	77,000
Michigan Central col. g. 3½'s. 1938		18,900,000	F & A	97	Dec. 20, 19'	97½	96	147,000
• registered			F & A	96½	Dec. 10, 19'	96½	96½	10,000
Beech Creek 1st gtd. 4's. 1936		5,000,000	J & J	109½	Aug. 9, 19'	....	....	.....
• registered			J & J	106	June 17, '98	....	....	.....
• 2d gtd. g. 5's. 1936		500,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
• registered			J & J	....	....	....	....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		DECEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Carthage & Adiron. 1st gtd g. 4's 1891		1,100,000	J & D					
Clearfield Bit. Coal Corporation, { 1st s. f. int. gtd. g. 4's ser. A. 1940 }		770,000	J & J	95	July 28, '98			
" small bonds series B. ....		33,100	J & J					
Gouv. & Oswego. 1st gtd g. 5's 1942		300,000	J & D					
Mohawk & Malone 1st gtd g. 4's 1991		2,600,000	M & S	107½	July 6, 19'			
" inc. 5's. .... 1992		3,900,000	Sept.					
N. Jersey Junc. R. R. 1st 4's 1966		1,650,000	F & A	102	Feb. 3, '97			
" reg. certificates. ....			F & A					
N. Y. & Putnam 1st con. gtd g. 4's 1993		4,000,000	A & O	103	May 22, '96			
Nor. & Montreal 1st g. gtd 5's. 1916		130,000	A & O					
West Shore 1st guaranteed 4's 2361		50,000,000	J & J	118½	Dec. 31, 19'	118½	114	113,000
" registered. ....			J & J	118½	Dec. 29, 19'	114½	111½	179,500
Lake Shore con. 2d 7's. .... 1903		8,428,000	J & D	110½	Dec. 28, 19'	110½	109½	5,000
" con. 2d registered. .... 1903			J & D	112½	Nov. 7, 19'			
" g 3½'s. .... 1997		30,542,000	J & D	109½	Dec. 19, 19'	109½	109	71,000
" registered. ....			J & D	110½	Mar. 17, 19'			
Cin. Sp. 1st gtd L. S. & M. 8's 1901		1,000,000	A & O	108½	Dec. 1, '97			
Detroit, Mon. & Toledo 1st 7's 1906		824,000	F & A	119	Dec. 7, 19'	119	119	1,000
Kal., A. & G. R. 1st gtd c. 5's. 1908		840,000	J & J					
Mahoning Coal R. R. 1st 5's. .... 1984		1,500,000	J & J	130	Dec. 17, 19'	130	130	1,000
Pitt McK'port & Y. 1st gtd 6's. 1982		2,250,000	J & J	117	May 31, '89			
" 2d gtd 6's. .... 1984		900,000	J & J					
" McK'port & Bell. V. 1st g. 6's. 1918		800,000	J & J					
Michigan Cent. 1st con. 7's. .... 1902		8,000,000	M & N	105	Dec. 27, 19'	105½	105	10,000
" 1st con. 5's. .... 1902		2,000,000	M & N	102	Dec. 27, 19'	102	102	10,000
" 6's. .... 1909		1,500,000	M & S	121	Aug. 1, 19'			
" coup. 5's. .... 1931		3,578,000	M & S	128	Oct. 30, 19'			
" reg. 5's. .... 1931			Q M	127½	Nov. 8, 19'			
" mort. 4's. .... 1940		2,600,000	J & J	105	Jan. 4, 19'			
" mtge. 4's reg. ....			J & J	108½	Nov. 26, 19'			
Battle C. Sturgis 1st g. g. 8's. .... 1989		478,000	J & D					
N. Y. & Harlem 1st mort. 7's c. 1900		11,444,000	M & N	102½	Mar. 13, 19'			
" 7's registered. .... 1900			M & N	102½	Apr. 6, 19'			
N. Y. & Northern 1st g. 5's. .... 1927		1,200,000	A & O	121	Oct. 25, 19'			
R. W. & Og. con. 1st ext. 5's. .... 1922		9,061,000	A & O	129½	Dec. 18, 19'	129½	129½	17,000
" coup. g. bond currency. ....			A & O					
Oswego & Rome 2d gtd gold 5's 1915		400,000	F & A	118	Apr. 13, '94			
R. W. & O. Ter. R. 1st g. gtd 5's 1918		875,000	M & N					
Utica & Black River gtd g. 4's. 1922		1,800,000	J & J	110	Oct. 15, 19'	108½	107½	31,000
N. Y., Chic. & St. Louis 1st g. 4's. .... 1937		19,425,000	A & O	108	Dec. 29, 19'	108½	107½	2,000
" registered. ....			A & O	109½	Dec. 2, 19'	109½	106½	
N. Y., N. Haven & H. 1st reg. 4's 1903		2,000,000	J & D	187	Nov. 17, '99			
" con. deb. receipts. .... \$1,000		15,007,500	A & O	195½	Dec. 31, 19'	195½	195	3,000
" small certifs. .... \$100		1,430,000		189	Aug. 4, 19'			
Housatonic R. con. g. 5's. .... 1937		2,838,000	M & N	135½	Dec. 12, 19'	135½	135	11,000
New Haven and Derby con. 5's. 1918		575,000	M & N	115½	Oct. 15, '94			
N. Y. & New England 1st 7's. .... 1905		6,000,000	J & J	114	Jan. 5, 19'			
" 1st 6's. .... 1905		4,000,000	J & J	113	July 29, '99			
N. Y., Ont. & W'n. ref'ding 1st g. 4's 1992		15,437,000	M & S	107½	Dec. 28, 19'	107½	106½	55,000
" registered. .... \$5,000 only.			M & S	101½	Nov. 30, '98			
Norfolk & Southern 1st g. 5's. .... 1941		1,350,000	M & N	110½	Dec. 14, 19'	110½	110½	10,000
Norfolk & Western gen. mtg. 6's 1931		7,233,000	M & N	133	Dec. 13, 19'	133	133	1,000
" imp'ment and ext. 6's. .... 1934		5,000,000	F & A	131½	Dec. 13, 19'	131½	131½	10,000
" New River 1st 6's. .... 1932		2,000,000	A & O	131½	Dec. 26, 19'	131½	131½	10,000
Norfolk & West. Ry 1st con. g. 4s 1996			A & O	100	Dec. 31, 19'	100	99	538,500
" registered. ....		28,704,800	A & O	97½	July 18, '99			
" small bonds. ....			A & O					
" C. C. & T. 1st g. t. g. 5's 1922		600,000	J & J	107	Nov. 26, 19'			
" Sci'o Val & N. E. 1st g. 4's 1989		5,000,000	J & N	101½	Dec. 21, 19'	102	101½	59,000
N. P. Ry prior 1st ry. & 1d. gtd. g. 4's. .... 1997		89,889,000	Q J	106	Dec. 29, 19'	108½	104½	920,500
" registered. ....			Q J	105½	Dec. 14, 19'	105½	105½	10,000
" gen. lien g. 3's. .... 2047		56,000,000	Q F	71½	Dec. 31, 19'	72½	70	4,588,500
" registered. ....			Q F	70½	Dec. 10, 19'	70½	70½	7,500
St. Paul & N. Pacific gen g. 6's 1923		7,985,000	F & A	131½	Nov. 23, 19'			
" registered certificates. ....			Q F	132	July 28, '98			
St. Paul & Duluth 1st 5's. .... 1931		1,000,000	F & A	130	Dec. 28, 19'	130	125	3,000
" 2d 5's. .... 1917		2,000,000	A & O	116½	Dec. 28, 19'	116½	112	22,000
" 1st con. g. 4's. .... 1968		1,000,000	J & D	105	Dec. 27, 19'	105	101	14,000
Washington Cen. Ry 1st g. 4's 1948		1,538,000	Q MCH	88½	May 31, 19'			
Nor. Pacific Term. Co. 1st g. 6's. .... 1933		3,809,000	J & J	117½	Dec. 29, 19'	117½	117½	5,000

# BOND SALES.

169

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		DECEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High	Low.	Total.
Ohio River Railroad 1st 5's.....1936		2,000,000	J & D	110	July 24, 19'	....	....	.....
"    gen. mortg. g 6's.....1937		2,428,000	A & O	95	Dec. 12, 19'	95	95	10,000
Omaha & St. L. 1st g 4's.....1901		2,376,000	J & J	75	Apr. 4, 19'	....	....	.....
Pacific Coast Co. 1st g. 5's.....1946		4,446,600	J & D	110	Dec. 28, 19'	111	109	20,000
Panama 1st sink fund g. 4½'s....1917		1,636,000	A & O	104	Dec. 29, 19'	104½	103½	25,000
"    s. f. subsidy g 6's.....1910		1,346,000	M & N	101	Dec. 15, '99	101	101	5,000
Pennsylvania Railroad Co.								
Penn. Co.'s gtd. 4½'s, 1st.....1921		19,467,000	J & J	116½	Dec. 18, 19'	117	116½	17,000
"    reg.....1921		5,000,000	J & J	116	Oct. 19, 19'	....	....	.....
"    gtd. 3½ coi. tr. reg. cts. 1937		1,500,000	M & S	114½	Feb. 15, '99	....	....	.....
Chic., St. Louis, & P. 1st c. 5's...1932		1,500,000	A & O	124	Dec. 5, 19'	124	124	6,000
"    registered.....1932		3,000,000	A & O	110	May 3, '92	....	....	.....
Clev. & P. gen. gtd. g. 4½'s Ser. A. 1942		2,000,000	J & J	121	Oct. 22, 19'	....	....	.....
"    Series B.....1942		3,000,000	A & O	....	....	....	....	.....
"    Series C 3½'s.....1948		2,250,000	M & N	....	....	....	....	.....
E. & Pitts. gen. gtd. g. 3½'s Ser. B. 1940		1,508,000	J & J	102	Nov. 7, 19'	....	....	.....
"    C. 1940		1,400,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Newp. & Cin. Bge Co. gtd. g. 4's. 1945		10,000,000	A & O	116½	Dec. 7, 19'	116½	116½	10,000
Pitts., C. C. & St. L. con. g 4½'s...1940		8,786,000	A & O	116½	Dec. 19, 19'	116½	116½	11,000
"    Series B gtd. ....1942		1,379,000	M & N	113	Nov. 23, '98	....	....	.....
"    Series C gtd. ....1942		4,983,000	M & N	109	Apr. 12, 19'	....	....	.....
"    Series D gtd. 4's....1945		5,859,000	F & A	99	Dec. 21, 19'	100½	99	23,000
"    Series E gtd. g. 3½'s...1949		2,917,000	J & J	137½	Dec. 6, 19'	137½	137½	1,000
Pitts., Ft. Wayne & C. 1st 7's. 1912		2,546,000	J & J	137¾	Nov. 27, 19'	....	....	.....
"    2d 7's.....1912		2,000,000	A & O	131	July 9, 19'	....	....	.....
"    3d 7's.....1912								
Penn. RR. Co. 1st Rl Est. g 4's...1923		1,675,000	M & N	108	May 12, '97	....	....	.....
con. sterling gold 6 per cent....1905		22,762,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
con. currency, 6's registered...1905		4,718,000	Q M 15	....	....	....	....	.....
con. gold 5 per cent.....1919		4,098,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	.....
"    registered.....1919		3,000,000	Q M	....	....	....	....	.....
con. gold 4 per cent.....1943		5,389,000	M & S	110	Aug. 28, 19'	....	....	.....
Allegh. Valley gen. gtd. g. 4's...1942		1,250,000	M & N	112¾	Mar. 7, 19'	....	....	.....
Clev. & Mar. 1st gtd g. 4½'s....1935		1,300,000	F & A	....	....	....	....	.....
Del. R. RR. & Bge Co 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1936		4,455,000	J & J	112¾	Dec. 11, 19'	112¾	112¾	1,000
G. R. & Ind. Ex. 1st gtd. g. 4½'s 1941		500,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Sunbury & Lewistown 1st g. 4's. 1936		5,646,000	M & S	117	May 1, 19'	....	....	.....
U'd N. J. RR. & Can Co. g 4's...1944								
Peoria & Pekin Union 1st 6's...1921		1,495,000	Q F	132½	Dec. 28, 19'	132½	132½	10,000
"    2d m 4½'s.....1921		1,499,000	M & N	101	Oct. 31, 19'	....	....	.....
Pine Creek Railway 6's.....1932		3,500,000	J & D	137	Nov. 17, '93	....	....	.....
Pittsburg, Clev. & Toledo 1st 6's. 1922		2,400,000	A & O	107½	Oct. 26, '93	....	....	.....
Pittsburg, Junction 1st 6's....1922		478,000	J & J	121	Nov. 23, '96	....	....	.....
Pittsburg & L. E. 2d g. 5's ser. A. 1928		2,000,000	A & O	112	Mar. 25, '93	....	....	.....
Pittsburg, Pains, & Fpt. 1st g. 5's. 1916		1,000,000	J & J	90	June 24, '99	....	....	.....
Pitts., Shena'go & L. E. 1st g. 5's. 1940		3,000,000	A & O	116½	July 28, 19'	....	....	.....
"    1st cons. 5's.....1943		408,000	J & J	87¾	Jan. 12, 19'	....	....	.....
Pittsburg & West'n 1st gold 4's. 1917		1,589,000	J & J	100½	Dec. 11, 19'	100½	100½	6,000
"    J. P. M. & Co., cts. ....		8,111,000	....	100½	Dec. 12, 19'	100¾	100½	3,000
Pittsburg, Y & Ash. 1st cons. 5's. 1927		1,562,000	M & N	....	....	....	....	.....
Reading Co. gen. g. 4's.....1997		63,537,000	J & J	96	Dec. 31, 19'	96½	90¾	4,733,000
"    registered.....1997			J & J	88	Nov. 15, 19'	....	....	.....
Rio Grande West'n 1st g. 4's....1939		15,200,000	J & J	101	Dec. 31, 19'	101	100	144,000
"    Utah Cen. 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1917		550,000	A & O	88¾	Sept. 27, 19'	....	....	.....

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		DECEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Rio Grande June'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1939		1,850,000	J & D	105	Nov. 10, '99	.....	.....	.....
Rio Grande Southern 1st g. 4's. 1940		2,233,000	J & J	78	Dec. 3, 19'	78	77	31,000
" guaranteed.....		2,277,000	.....	94	Nov. 12, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Salt Lake City 1st g. sink fu'd 6's. 1913		297,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Jo. & Gr. Isl. 1st g. 2,342. .... 1947		3,500,000	J & J	92	Dec. 29, 19'	92	90	33,000
St. Louis & San F. 2d 6's. Class A. 1906		500,000	M & N	110	Nov. 15, '99	.....	.....	.....
" 2d g. 6's. Class B. .... 1906		2,083,000	M & N	111½	Dec. 21, 19'	111½	111½	25,000
" 2d g. 6's. Class C. .... 1906		2,399,000	M & N	111½	Dec. 7, 19'	111½	111½	8,000
" gen. g. 6's. .... 1931		7,807,000	J & J	120½	Dec. 26, 19'	130	128¾	27,000
" gen. g. 5's. .... 1931		12,232,000	J & J	115½	Dec. 29, 19'	115½	114½	40,000
" 1st g. 6's P. C. & O. .... 1937		1,099,000	A & O	102½	Oct. 17, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" 1st g. 6's P. C. & O. .... 1919		1,020,000	F & A	118	May 23, '92	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis & San F. R. R. g. 4's. 1926		6,388,000	J & D	92½	Dec. 29, 19'	92½	88½	336,000
" Central div. 1st g. 4's. 1920		1,062,000	A & O	90¾	Dec. 11, 19'	90¾	90¾	4,000
" N. W. div. 1st g. 4's. .... 1930		1,100,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" S. W. div. g. 5's. .... 1947		1,500,000	A & O	100	June 19, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Ft. Smith & Van B. Bdg. 1st 6's. 1910		275,000	A & O	105	Oct. 4, '96	.....	.....	.....
Kansas, Midland 1st g. 4's. .... 1937		1,608,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis S. W. 1st g. 4's Bd. ctf's. 1939		20,000,000	M & N	96¾	Dec. 31, 19'	96¾	93¾	1,780,000
" 2d g. 4's inc. Bd. ctf's. .... 1939		9,000,000	J & J	74¾	Dec. 31, 19'	75	70¾	2,434,000
Gray's Point, Term. 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1947		339,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul, Minn. & Manito'a 2d 6's. .... 1909		8,000,000	A & O	118½	Dec. 8, 19'	118½	118½	5,000
" 1st con. 6's. .... 1933		13,344,000	J & J	143½	Dec. 14, 19'	143½	143	10,000
" 1st con. 6's. registered. ....		.....	J & J	137¾	Feb. 23, '99	.....	.....	.....
" 1st c. 6's. red'd to g. 4½'s. ....		21,027,000	J & J	117½	Dec. 27, 19'	117½	116½	10,000
" 1st cons. 6's registered. ....		.....	J & J	115½	Nov. 30, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" Dakota ext'n g. 6's. .... 1910		5,676,000	M & N	119½	Dec. 29, 19'	119½	119½	12,000
" Mont. ext'n 1st g. 4's. .... 1937		7,907,000	J & D	103¾	Dec. 26, 19'	104	103¾	13,000
" registered. ....		.....	J & D	104	Jan. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....
Eastern Ry' Minn. 1st d. 1st g. 5's. .... 1908		4,700,900	A & O	100½	Dec. 31, 19'	100½	100½	1,000
" registered. ....		.....	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Minn. N. div. 1st g. 4's. .... 1940		5,000,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" registered. ....		.....	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Minneapolis Union 1st g. 6's. .... 1922		2,150,000	J & J	128	Apr. 4, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Montana Cent. 1st 6's int. gtd. .... 1937		6,000,000	J & J	135½	Dec. 23, 19'	135½	135	15,000
" 1st 6's. registered. ....		.....	J & J	115	Apr. 24, '97	.....	.....	.....
" 1st g. g. 5's. .... 1937		2,700,000	J & J	118	Dec. 7, 19'	118	118	1,000
" registered. ....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Willmar & Sioux Falls 1st g. 5's. 1938		3,625,000	J & D	120	Apr. 11, '99	.....	.....	.....
" registered. ....		.....	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
San Fe Pres. & Phoe. Ry. 1st g. 5's. 1942		4,940,000	M & S	106¾	Dec. 19, '99	106¾	106¾	3,000
San Fran. & N. Pac. 1st s. f. g. 5's. 1919		3,872,000	J & J	112	June 9, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Sav. Florida & Wn. 1st c. g. 6's. .... 1934		4,056,000	A & O	126½	Jan. 13, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" 1st g. 5's. .... 1934		2,444,000	A & O	112	Mar. 17, '99	.....	.....	.....
" St. John's div. 1st g. 4's. 1934		1,350,000	J & J	94½	Dec. 12, 19'	94½	94½	1,000
Alabama Midland 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1928		2,800,000	M & N	106	Dec. 31, 19'	106	105½	10,000
Brunsw. & West. 1st gtd. g. 4's. .... 1938		3,000,000	J & J	83	Sept. 17, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Sil. S. Oc. & G. R. R. & Ig. gtd. g. 4's. 1918		1,107,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Seaboard & Roanoke 1st 5's. .... 1926		2,500,000	J & J	104¾	Feb. 5, '98	.....	.....	.....
Carolina Central 1st con. g. 4's. 1949		2,847,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Sodus Bay & Sout'n 1st 5's. gold. 1924		500,000	J & J	105	Sept. 4, '86	.....	.....	.....
Southern Pacific Co.								
" g. 4's Central Pac. coll. .... 1949		28,818,500	J & D	83¾	Dec. 31, 19'	83¾	81¾	2,134,500
" registered. ....		.....	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Cent. Pac. 1st refund. gtd. g. 4's. 1949		54,743,300	F & A	101½	Dec. 31, 19'	101½	100	1,080,000
" registered. ....		.....	F & A	99¾	June 1, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" mtge. gtd. g. 3½'s. .... 1929		19,877,000	J & D	84¾	Dec. 31, 19'	84¾	83¾	608,500
" registered. ....		.....	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Gal. Harrisb'gh & S. A. 1st g. 6's. .... 1910		4,766,000	F & A	110	May 28, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" 2d g. 7's. .... 1905		1,000,000	J & D	105	Aug. 15, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" Mex. & P. div. 1st g. 6's. .... 1931		13,418,000	M & N	100%	Dec. 31, 19'	100½	99½	294,000
Houst. E. & W. Tex. 1st g. 5's. .... 1933		522,000	M & N	105	Aug. 20, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" 1st gtd. g. 5's. .... 1933		2,178,000	M & N	104½	July 13, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Houst. & T. C. 1st g. 5's int. gtd. .... 1937		6,736,000	J & J	114	Dec. 31, 19'	114	112½	5,000
" con. g. 9's int. gtd. .... 1912		8,311,000	A & O	110½	Nov. 28, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" gen. g. 4's int. gtd. .... 1921		4,287,000	A & O	85½	Dec. 14, 19'	85½	83½	48,000



### **BOND SALES.**

171

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		DECEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Morgan's La & Tex. 1st g 6's....	1920	1,494,000	J & J	120½	Feb. 28, 19'			
1st 7's.....	1918	5,000,000	A & O	134	Nov. 22, '90			
N. Y. Tex. & Mex. gtd. 1st g 4's....	1912	1,465,000	A & O					
Nib'n Ry of Cal. 1st gtd. g. 6's....	1907	3,964,000	J & J	94	Nov. 30, '97			
gtd. g. 5's.....		4,751,000	A & O					
Oreg. & Cal. 1st gtd. g 5's.....	1927	19,531,000	J & J	101½	Dec. 27, 19'	101½	101½	1,000
San Ant. & Aran Passist gtd g 4's....	1943	18,900,000	J & J	81	Dec. 31, 19'	81½	79	276,000
Tex. & New Orleans 1st 7's.....	1905	1,347,000	F & A	114½	Dec. 12, 19'	114½	114½	4,000
Sabine div. 1st g 6's.....	1912	2,575,000	M & S	106½	Nov. 17, '97			
con. g 5's.....	1943	1,620,000	J & J	106½	Dec. 31, 19'	106½	104½	317,000
South'n Pac. of Ariz. 1st 6's 1909-1910		10,000,000	J & J	110	Oct. 1, 19'			
of Cal. 1st g 6's ser. A. 1905			APR.	109½	Dec. 17, 19'	109½	109½	18,000
ser. B. 1905			OCT.	110½	Aug. 24, 19'			
C. & D. 1906		30,217,500	A & O	110½	Nov. 24, 19'			
E. & F. 1902			A & O	114½	Nov. 3, '90			
1st con. gtd. g 5's.....	1937	6,576,000	A & O	119	July 27, 19'			
stamped.....	1905-1937	19,168,000	M & N	107	Nov. 27, 19'			
Austin & Northw'n 1st g 5's.....	1941	1,920,000	J & J	94½	Nov. 15, 19'			
So. Pacific Coast 1st gtd. g. 4's....	1937	5,500,000	J & J	107	Dec. 31, 19'	107	106½	78,000
of N. Mex. c. 1st 6's....	1911	4,180,000	J & J	116	Aug. 3, 19'			
Gila Val. G. & N'n 1st gtd g 5's....	1924	1,514,000	M & N	104½	Dec. 26, 19'	105½	104½	42,000
Southern Railway 1st con. g 5's....	1904	33,223,000	J & J	114½	Dec. 31, 19'	114½	112½	1,106,000
registered.....			J & J	108	Aug. 3, 19'			
Memph. div. 1st g. 4-4½-5's....	1906	5,083,000	J & J	108	Nov. 26, 19'			
registered.....			J & J					
Alabama Central, 1st 6's.....	1918	1,000,000	J & J	112½	Aug. 17, '97			
Atlantic & Danville 1st g. 4's....	1948	3,175,000	J & J	94½	Dec. 20, 19'	94½	94½	71,000
Atlantic & Yadkin, 1st gtd g 4s....	1949	1,500,000	A & O					
Col. & Greenville, 1st 5-6's.....	1916	2,000,000	J & J	115	Jan. 31, 19'			
East Tenn., Va. & Ga. div. g 5's....	1930	3,106,000	J & J	119	Dec. 20, 19'	119	119	3,000
con. 1st g 5's.....	1936	12,770,000	M & N	119	Dec. 20, 19'	119	117½	170,000
reorg. lien g 4's.....	1938	4,500,000	M & S	111½	Dec. 13, 19'	112	111½	13,000
registered.....			M & S					
Ga. Pacific Ry. 1st g 5-6's.....	1922	5,600,000	J & J	125	Nov. 27, 19'			
Knoxville & Ohio, 1st g 6's.....	1925	2,000,000	J & J	124	Nov. 24, 19'			
Rich. & Danville, con. g 6's.....	1915	5,597,000	J & J	124	Dec. 31, 19'	124½	124	32,000
equip. sink. Pd g 5's....	1909	818,000	M & S	101½	July 20, 19'			
deb. 5's stamped.....	1927	3,398,000	A & O	109½	Dec. 7, 19'	109½	109½	2,000
Rich. & Mecklenburg 1st g. 4's....	1948	15,000	M & N	83	Dec. 10, 19'	83½	83	18,000
South Caro'a & Ga. 1st g. 5's.....	1919	5,250,000	M & S	105½	Nov. 30, 19'			
Vir. Midland serial ser. A 6's.....	1906	600,000	M & S					
small.....			M & S					
ser. B 6's.....	1911	1,900,000	M & S					
small.....			M & S					
ser. C 6's.....	1916	1,100,000	M & S					
small.....			M & S					
ser. D 4-5's.....	1921	950,000	M & S	102	Oct. 13, '99			
small.....			M & S					
ser. E 5's.....	1926	1,775,000	M & S	109	Jan. 12, '99			
small.....			M & S					
ser. F 5's.....	1931	1,310,000	M & S					
Virginia Midland gen. 5's.....	1936	2,302,000	M & N	113½	Dec. 26, 19'	113½	112½	8,000
gen. 5's gtd. stamped 1926		2,496,000	M & N	113½	Dec. 14, 19'	113½	113½	3,000
W. O. & W. 1st cy. gtd. 4's.....	1924	1,025,000	F & A	91½	Sept. 14, '99			
W. Nor. C. 1st con. g 6's.....	1914	2,531,000	J & J	119	Nov. 17, 19'			
Spokane Falls & North. 1st g. 6's....	1939	2,812,000	J & J	117	July 25, 19'			
Staten Isl. Ry. N.Y. 1st gtd. g. 4½'s....	1943	500,000	J & D					
Ter. R. R. Assn. St. Louis 1g 4½'s....	1939	7,000,000	A & O	112½	June 15, '99			
1st con. g. 5's.....	1894-1944	4,500,000	F & A	115½	Dec. 27, 19'	115½	115½	5,000
St. L. Mers. bdg. Ter. gtd g. 5's....	1930	3,500,000	A & O	111	Jan. 19, 19'			
Tex. & Pacific, East div. 1st 6's....	1905	3,241,000	M & S	104½	Oct. 4, 19'			
fm. Texarkana to Ft. W'th								
1st gold 5's.....	2000	21,745,000	J & D	115½	Dec. 29, 19'	115½	113½	239,000
2d gold income, 5's.....	2000	997,000	MAR.	90	Dec. 27, 19'	90	80	28,000
Toledo & Ohio Cent. 1st g 5's.....	1935	3,000,000	J & J	115	Dec. 27, 19'	115	115	19,000
1st M. C. 5's West. div.....	1935	2,500,000	A & O	114	Nov. 27, 19'			
gen. g. 5's.....	1935	2,000,000	J & D	106	Dec. 19, 19'	106	104½	38,000
Kanaw & M. 1st g. g. 4's....	1990	2,469,000	A & O	92	Dec. 5, 19'	92	92	1,000

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME. Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		DECEMBER SALES.		
			Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Toledo, Peoria & W. 1st g 4's....1917	4,400,000	J & D	86	Dec. 20, 19'	86	85	13,000
Tol., St. L. & K. C. Tr. Rec. 1st g 6's. 1916	8,814,000	M & N	130¼	June 25, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Toronto, Hamilton & Buff 1st g 4s. 1946	3,280,000	J & D	98¼	Dec. 20, 19'	99	97¾	111,000
Ulster & Delaware 1st c. g 5's....1928	1,862,000	J & D	105¼	Dec. 18, 19'	105½	105	11,000
Union Pacific R. R. & 1d gt g 4s....1947	96,527,000	J & J	107½	Dec. 31, 19'	108	106¾	1,237,000
" registered.....		J & J	108½	Nov. 20, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Oreg. Ry. & Nav. 1st s. f. g. 6's. 1909	691,000	J & J	111	Dec. 19, 19'	111	111	4,000
Oreg. R. R. & Nav. Co. con. g 4's. 1946	19,634,000	J & D	104½	Dec. 31, 19'	104½	102	241,000
Oreg. Short Line Ry. 1st g. 6's. 1922	13,661,000	F & A	129½	Dec. 31, 19'	130	129½	97,000
Oreg. Short Line 1st con. g. 5's. 1946	10,337,000	J & J	118¼	Dec. 31, 19'	118¼	116	180,000
" non-cum. inc. A 5's.....1946	658,000	SEPT.	106	Dec. 7, 19'	106	106	1,000
Utah & Northern 1st 7's.....1908	4,963,000	J & J	121	June 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
" g. 5's.....1926	1,577,000	J & J	102½	Oct. 8, '94	.....	.....	.....
Wabash R.R. Co., 1st gold 5's....1939	31,664,000	M & N	117½	Dec. 31, 19'	118	116	254,000
" 2d mortgage gold 5's....1939	14,000,000	F & A	108¼	Dec. 31, 19'	108¼	105	135,000
" debent. mtg series A....1939	3,500,000	J & J	99	Dec. 17, 19'	99¼	90	170,000
" series B.....1939	26,740,000	J & J	42¼	Dec. 31, 19'	42¾	37¾	9,454,000
" 1st g. 5's Det. & Chl. ex. 1940	3,411,000	J & J	112½	Dec. 21, 19'	112½	109½	3,000
" Des Moines div. 1st g. 4s. 1939	1,000,000	J & J	96	Dec. 15, 19'	96	96	5,000
St. L., Kan. C. & N. St. Chas. B.							
" 1st 6's.....1908	1,000,000	A & O	111	May 29, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Western N. Y. & Penn. 1st g. 5's. 1937	10,000,000	J & J	122½	Dec. 31, 19'	123	121¾	148,000
" gen g. 3-4's.....1943	9,789,000	A & O	96½	Dec. 31, 19'	96½	94	217,000
" inc. 5's.....1943	10,000,000	Nov.	32¼	Sept. 20, 19'	.....	.....	.....
West Va. Cent'l & Pitts. 1st g. 6's. 1911	3,250,000	J & J	118	Jan. 6, '99	.....	.....	.....
Wheeling & Lake Erie 1st g. 5's. 1926	2,000,000	A & O	116	Dec. 29, 19'	116	115¼	23,000
" Wheeling div. 1st g. 5's. 1928	905,000	J & J	114¼	Dec. 31, 19'	114¼	112½	33,000
" exten. and imp. g. 5's....1930	349,000	F & A	108	Sept. 12, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Wheel. & L. E. R.R. 1st con. g. 4's. 1949	8,682,000	M & S	91	Dec. 31, 19'	91	89¼	401,000
Wisconsin Cen. R'y 1st gen. g. 4s. 1949	23,727,600	J & J	88¼	Dec. 31, 19'	90¼	85¼	1,231,000
<b>STREET RAILWAY BONDS.</b>							
Brooklyn Rapid Transit g. 5's....1945	6,625,000	A & O	107¼	Dec. 31, 19'	108	106	98,000
" Atl. av. Bkn. Imp. g. 5's. 1934	1,500,000	J & J	110	Jan. 20, '99	.....	.....	.....
" City R. R. 1st c. 5's 1916. 1941	4,373,000	J & J	115	Dec. 18, '99	115	113	4,000
" Qu. Co. & Sur. con. gtd. g. 5's.....1941	2,255,000	M & N	100½	Dec. 14, 19'	101½	99¼	64,500
" Union Elev. 1st g. 4-5s. 1950	12,890,000	F & A	99½	Dec. 31, 19'	100	98½	335,000
Kings Co. Elev. R. R. 1st g. 4's. 1949	7,000,000	F & A	89½	Dec. 31, 19'	90	84½	857,000
City & Sub. R'y, Balt. 1st g. 5's....1922	2,430,000	J & D	105½	Apr. 17, '95	.....	.....	.....
Denver Con. T'way Co. 1st g. 5's. 1933	730,000	A & O	97½	June 13, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" Denver T'way Co. con. g. 6's....1910	1,219,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Metropol'n Ry Co. 1st g. 6's. 1911	913,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Louisville Railw'y Co. 1st c. g. 5's. 1930	4,600,000	J & J	109	Mar. 19, '98	.....	.....	.....
Market St. Cable Railway 1st 6's. 1913	3,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Metro. St. Ry N. Y. g. col. tr. g. 5's. 1907	12,500,000	F & A	122¼	Dec. 29, 19'	122¼	119¼	171,000
" B'way & 7th ave. 1st con. g. 5's. 1943	7,650,000	J & D	123	Dec. 20, 19'	123	122	24,000
" registered.....		J & D	119½	Dec. 3, 19'	119½	119¼	5,000
" Columb. & 9th ave. 1st gtd g 5's. 1903	3,000,000	M & S	125	Dec. 31, 19'	125	123	14,000
" registered.....		M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Lex ave & Pav Fer 1st gtd g 5's. 1903	5,000,000	M & S	123	Dec. 4, 19'	123	123	1,000
" registered.....		M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Met. West Side Elev. Chic. 1st g. 4's. 1938	10,000,000	F & A	99	Dec. 31, 19'	99	98¾	17,000
" registered.....		F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
MU. Elec. R. & Light con. 30 yr. g. 5's. 1926	6,103,000	F & A	106	Oct. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....
Minn. St. R'y (M. L. & M.) 1st con. g. 5's.....1919	4,050,000	J & J	109	Oct. 30, '99	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul City Ry. Cable con. g. 5's. 1937	2,480,000	J & J	113¼	Dec. 8, 19'	114¼	113¼	18,000
" gtd. gold 5's.....1937	1,138,000	J & J	112	Nov. 28, '99	.....	.....	.....
Third Avenue R'y N. Y. 1st g. 5's. 1937	5,000,000	J & J	127	Dec. 28, 19'	127	123¾	25,000
Union Elevated (Chic.) 1st g. 5's. 1945	4,387,000	A & O	109½	Dec. 14, '99	.....	.....	.....
West Chic. St. 40 yr. 1st cur. 5's. 1928	3,969,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" 40 years con. g. 5's.....1936	6,031,000	M & N	99	Dec. 28, '97	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

## MISCELLANEOUS BONDS.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		DECEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Adams Express Co. col. tr. g. 4's. 1948		12,000,000	M & S	105	Dec. 28, 19'	105	104	78,000
B'klyn Ferry Co. of N. Y. 1st c. g. 5's. 1948		6,500,000	F & A	88	Dec. 31, 19'	88½	85	68,000
B'klyn W. & W. Co. 1st g. tr. cts. 5's. 1945		17,064,000	F & A	70	Dec. 27, 19'	72½	70	66,000
Chic. Junc. & St'k Y'ds col. g. 5's. 1915		10,000,000	J & J	110	Aug. 21, 19'	.....	.....	.....
non-cum. inc. 5's. .... 1907		2,538,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Det. Mack. & Mar. ld. gt. 3½ S. A. .... 1911		3,021,000	A & O	80½	Dec. 31, 19'	80½	28½	118,000
Hackensack Wtr Reorg. 1st g. 5's. 1928		1,060,000	J & J	107½	June 3, '92	.....	.....	.....
Hend'n Bdg Co. 1st s'k. f'd g. 6's. 1981		1,681,000	M & S	113	Nov. 14, '99	.....	.....	.....
Hoboken Land & Imp. g. 5's. .... 1910		1,440,000	M & N	102	Jan. 19, '94	.....	.....	.....
Iron Steamboat Co. 6's. .... 1901		500,000	J & J	75½	Dec. 4, '95	.....	.....	.....
Madison Sq. Garden 1st g. 5's. .... 1919		1,250,000	M & N	102	July 8, '97	.....	.....	.....
Manh. Beh H. & L. lim. gen. g. 4's. 1940		1,300,000	M & N	55	Aug. 27, '95	.....	.....	.....
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock 5's. .... 1890-1900		2,000,000	J & J	94	May 21, '94	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Ontario Land 1st g. 6's. .... 1910		443,000	F & A	90	Oct. 2, '99	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis Term. Station Cupples & Property Co. 1st g. 4½ 5-30. .... 1917		3,000,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
So. Y. Water Co. N. Y. con. g. 6's. 1923		478,000	J & J	101	Feb. 19, '97	.....	.....	.....
Spring Valley W. Wks. 1st 6's. .... 1906		4,975,000	M & S	113½	Dec. 18, 19'	113½	113½	3,000
U. S. Mortgage and Trust Co. Real Estate 1st g. col. tr. bonds.								
Series D 4½'s. .... 1901-1916		1,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" E 4's. .... 1907-1917		1,000,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" F 4's. .... 1908-1918		1,000,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" G 4's. .... 1908-1918		1,000,000	F & A	100	Mar. 15, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" H 4's. .... 1908-1918		1,000,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" I 4's. .... 1904-1919		1,000,000	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" J 4's. .... 1904-1919		1,000,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Small bonds. ....		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Vermont Marble, 1st s. fund 5's. 1910		400,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
BONDS OF MANUFACTURING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS.								
Am. Cotton Oil deb. ext. 4½'s. .... 1915		2,919,000	.....	99½	Dec. 31, 19'	100	98½	177,000
Am. Spirit Mfg. Co. 1st g. 6's. .... 1915		1,899,000	M & S	81	Dec. 29, 19'	82	71	76,000
Am. Thread Co., 1st coll. trust 4's. 1919		5,798,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Barney & Smith Car Co. 1st g. 6's. 1942		1,000,000	J & J	105	Jan. 10, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Gramercy Sugar Co., 1st g. 6's. .... 1923		1,100,000	A & O	89½	Feb. 2, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Illinois Steel Co. debenture 5's. .... 1910		6,200,000	J & J	99	Jan. 17, '99	.....	.....	.....
non. conv. deb. 5's. .... 1910		7,000,000	A & O	70	Apr. 23, '97	.....	.....	.....
Internat'l Paper Co. 1st con. g. 6's. 1918		9,229,000	F & A	108	Dec. 23, 19'	108½	107	65,000
Knick'r'ker Ice Co. (Chic) 1st g. 5's. 1928		2,000,000	A & O	98	Aug. 25, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Nat. Starch Mfg. Co., 1st g. 6's. .... 1920		3,069,000	J & J	107	Dec. 23, 19'	107	105	18,000
Procter & Gamble, 1st g. 6's. .... 1940		2,000,000	J & J	113½	July 24, '99	.....	.....	.....
Standard Rope & Twine 1st g. 6's. 1946		2,885,000	F & A	72	Dec. 22, 19'	72	70	86,000
inc. g. 5's. 1946		7,500,000	.....	12	Dec. 23, 19'	12½	11	144,000
U. S. Env. Co. 1st sk. fd. g. 6's. .... 1918		2,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
U. S. Leather Co. 6% g. s. fd. deb. .... 1915		5,280,000	M & N	118½	Dec. 27, 19'	118½	112	17,000
BONDS OF COAL AND IRON COMPANIES.								
Colo. Coal & Iron 1st con. g. 6's. .... 1900		2,786,000	F & A	102½	Dec. 18, 19'	102½	102½	8,000
Colo. C'l & I'n Devel. Co. gtd g. 5's. 1909		700,000	J & J	55	Nov. 2, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" Coupon off. ....		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Colo. Fuel Co. gen. g. 6's. .... 1919		1,043,000	M & N	102½	Nov. 7, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Col. Fuel & Iron Co. gen. sf g. 5's. 1943		2,308,000	F & A	97½	Dec. 31, 19'	98	96½	295,000
Grand Riv. Coal & Coke 1st g. 6's. 1919		949,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

## MISCELLANEOUS BONDS—Continued.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		DECEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Jefferson & Clearfield Coal & Ir.								
1st g. 5's.....	1924	1,777,000	J & D	105½	Oct. 10, '98	....	....	.....
2d g. 5's.....	1928	1,000,000	J & D	80	May 4, '97	....	....	.....
Pleasant Valley Coal 1st g. s. f. 5's.....	1922	1,069,000	J & J	105	Oct. 24, '19	....	....	.....
Rooh & Pitts. Cl & Ir. Co. pur my 5's.....	1944	1,062,000	M & N	....	....	....	....	.....
Sun. Creek Coal 1st sk. fund 5's.....	1912	379,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	.....
Ten. Coal, I. & R. T. d. 1st g 5's.....	1917	1,244,000	A & O	112	Dec. 13, '19	108	108	5,000
Bir. div. 1st con. 5's.....	1917	3,368,000	J & J	112	Dec. 21, '19	112½	110	31,000
Cah. Coal M. Co. 1st gtd. g 5's.....	1922	1,000,000	J & J	105	Feb. 10, '19	....	....	.....
De Bard. C & I Co. gtd. g 5's.....	1910	2,771,000	F & A	105	Dec. 3, '19	105	105	5,000
Wheel L. E. & P. Cl Co. 1st g 5's.....	1919	843,000	J & J	82	Jan. 15, '19	....	....	.....
GAS & ELECTRIC LIGHT CO. BONDS.								
Atlanta Gas Light Co. 1st g. 5's.....	1947	1,150,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	.....
Bost. Un. Gas 1st cdfs s'k f'dg. 5's.....	1939	7,000,000	J & J	79½	Nov. 30, '19	....	....	.....
B'klyn Union Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's.....	1945	14,210,000	M & N	116½	Dec. 31, '19	116½	115½	68,000
Columbus Gas Co., 1st g. 5's.....	1932	1,215,000	J & J	104½	Jan. 28, '98	....	....	.....
Detroit City Gas Co. g. 5's.....	1923	4,598,000	J & J	98	Dec. 28, '19	99	97½	70,000
Detroit Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's.....	1918	886,000	F & A	99½	Nov. 16, '99	....	....	.....
Equitable Gas Light Co. of N. Y.								
1st con. g. 5's.....	1932	3,500,000	M & S	118½	Sept. 4, '19	....	....	.....
Gas. & Elec. of Bergen Co. c. g. 5's.....	1949	1,148,000	J & D	102½	Nov. 8, '19	....	....	.....
General Electric Co. deb. g. 5's.....	1922	2,887,000	J & D	160	Dec. 31, '19	165	158	73,000
Grand Rapids G. L. Co. 1st g. 5's.....	1915	1,225,000	F & A	107½	Dec. 17, '19	107½	107½	3,000
Kansas City Mo. Gas Co. 1st g 5's.....	1922	3,750,000	A & O	....	....	....	....	.....
Kings Co. Elec. L. & Power g. 5's.....	1937	2,500,000	A & O	....	....	....	....	.....
purchase money 5's.....	1967	5,000,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Edison El. Ill. Bkln 1st con. g. 4's.....	1939	4,275,000	J & J	98½	Dec. 4, '19	98½	98½	1,000
Lac. Gas L't Co. of St. L. 1st g. 5's.....	1919	10,000,000	Q F	107	Dec. 31, '19	108½	107	72,000
small bonds.....				97½	Nov. 1, '95	....	....	.....
N. Y. Gas EL. H. & P. Colstcol tr g 5's.....	1948	11,500,000	J & D	108½	Dec. 31, '19	109½	108	64,000
registered.....			J & D	....	....	....	....	.....
purchase money col tr g 4's.....	1949	20,389,000	F & A	95½	Dec. 31, '19	95½	93½	562,000
Edison El. Illu. 1st conv. g. 5's.....	1910	4,312,000	M & S	109	Dec. 27, '19	109	109	74,000
1st con. g. 5's.....	1905	2,156,000	J & J	120	Nov. 13, '19	....	....	.....
Paterson & Pas. G. & E. con. g. 5's.....	1949	3,317,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	.....
Peop's Gas & C. Co. C. 1st g. g 5's.....	1904	2,100,000	M & N	107	July 13, '19	....	....	.....
2d gtd. g. 5's.....	1904	2,500,000	J & D	102½	Dec. 31, '19	104	102½	8,000
1st con. g 5's.....	1943	4,900,000	A & O	118½	Dec. 13, '19	118½	118½	5,000
refunding g. 5's.....	1947	2,500,000	M & S	106	Dec. 16, '98	....	....	.....
refunding registered.....			M & S	....	....	....	....	.....
Chic. Gas Lt & Coke 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1937	10,000,000	J & J	109	Dec. 21, '19	109½	109	6,000
Con. Gas Co. Chic. 1st gtd. g. 5's.....	1936	4,348,000	J & D	108	Dec. 12, '19	106½	106	16,000
Eq. Gas & Fuel, Chic. 1st gtd. g. 5's.....	1905	2,000,000	J & J	103	May 4, '19	....	....	.....
Mutual Fuel Gas Co. 1st gtd. g. 5's.....	1947	5,000,000	M & N	102	Dec. 31, '19	102	102	78,000
Trenton Gas & Electric 1st g. 5's.....	1949	1,500,000	M & S	107	Dec. 5, '19	107	107	5,000
Utica Elec. L. & P. 1st s. f'dg. 5's.....	1950	500,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Western Gas Co. col. tr. g. 5's.....	1933	3,805,500	M & N	105½	June 16, '98	....	....	.....
TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CO. BONDS.								
Commercial Cable Co. 1st g. 4's.....	2397	9,665,800	Q & J	101	Nov. 8, '19	....	....	.....
registered.....			Q & J	104½	Oct. 3, '19	....	....	.....
Total amount of lien, \$13,000,000.								
Erie Teleg. & Tel. col. tr. s'k f'dg. 5's.....	1928	3,905,000	J & J	109	Oct. 7, '99	....	....	.....
Metrop. Tel & Tel. 1st s'k f'dg. 5's.....	1918	2,000,000	M & N	103	Feb. 17, '99	....	....	.....
registered.....			M & N	....	....	....	....	.....
N. Y. & N. J. Tel. gen. g 5's.....	1920	1,361,000	M & N	112	Nov. 27, '95	....	....	.....
Western Union col. tr. cur. 5's.....	1938	8,502,000	J & J	116	Dec. 31, '19	116	113½	75,000
fundg. & real estate g. 4½'s.....	1950	10,000,000	M & N	105½	Dec. 31, '19	106	105½	93,000
Mutual Union Tel. s. fd. 5's.....	1911	1,957,000	M & N	112½	Dec. 20, '19	112½	112½	5,000
Northwestern Telegraph 7's.....	1904	1,250,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....

## UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	YEAR 1900.		DECEMBER SALES.		
				High.	Low.	High.	Low.	Total.
United States con. 2's registered...1980			Q J	107	104	107	104½	84,000
• con. 2's coupon.....1980		364,364,750	Q J	106	104	106	104½	178,500
• con. 2's reg. small bonds.1980			Q J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
• con. 2's coupon small bds.1980			Q J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
• 3's registered.....1908-18			Q F	112	108¾	110¼	108¾	49,000
• 3's coupon.....1908-18		116,700,940	Q F	112¾	108¾	112	108¾	129,000
• 3's small bonds reg.....1908-18			Q F	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
• 3's small bonds coupon.1908-18			Q F	111¾	108¾	110	108¾	920
• 4's registered.....1907		325,567,650	J A J&O	117½	114	116¾	114½	114,150
• 4's coupon.....1907			J A J&O	118½	114	116¾	115¼	90,200
• 4's registered.....1925		162,315,400	Q F	139	132¾	139	138¾	56,000
• 4's coupon.....1925			Q F	138½	131¾	138½	138	16,000
• 5's registered.....1904		81,937,600	Q F	116½	112¾	115	115	20,000
• 5's coupon.....1904			Q F	116¾	112½	113¾	113	17,000
District of Columbia 3-6's.....1924			F & A	121	121	.....	.....	.....
• small bonds.....		14,224,100	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
• registered.....			F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.								
Quebec 5's.....1908		3,000,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
U. S. of Mexico External Gold Loan of 1890 sinking fund 5's.....			Q J	98	96	97½	97½	1,500
Regular delivery in denominations of £100 and £200.....		£22,628,920	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Small bonds denominations of £20.....			.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Large bonds denominations of £500 and £1,000.....			.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

## BANKERS' OBITUARY RECORD.

**Black.**—Alfred L. Black, President of the Farmers' National Bank, Mount Holly, N. J., died January 4, at the age of seventy-one.

**Brown.**—Wm. E. Brown, Vice-President of the Crocker-Woolworth National Bank, and manager of the Crocker estate, San Francisco, died December 11. Mr. Brown was a native of Boston, but had long resided in California. He was in his seventy-sixth year when he died.

**Carpenter.**—Chauncey Carpenter, founder of the town of Sumner, Iowa, and President of the Citizens' State Bank of that place, died December 20, at the age of seventy.

**Council.**—George W. Council, President of the Planters' Bank, Americus, Ga., died December 17. He was born in North Carolina, but for the past sixty years had resided in Sumter county, Ga., where by his own efforts he built up a comfortable fortune.

**Danforth.**—A. H. Danforth, President of the Charleston (Mo.) Bank, died December 24, aged fifty-eight years.

**Hibbs.**—John O. Hibbs, President of the Farmers' Bank, Elizabethtown, Ky., died December 15.

**Ives.**—S. H. Ives, who in 1847 started a private bank at Detroit, Mich., continuing in the business until 1856, died December 19.

**Jaquith.**—Wm. H. Jacquith, Cashier of the Pacific National Bank, Lawrence, Mass., died December 27, aged sixty-four years. He had long been identified with banking at Lowell and Lawrence.

**Johnson.**—James R. Johnson, President of the First National Bank, Austin, Tex., died December 15. He was born in Austin in 1848 and had resided there continuously. In 1866 he entered a private bank as a clerk, later becoming a partner in the firm and continued in that connection until he became President of the First National.

**Johnson.**—Capt. N. W. Johnson, President of the Valley National Bank, Des Moines, Ia., and one of the well-known and successful men of the State, died December 10, aged seventy-one.

**Lindsey.**—Noble Lindsey, President of the First National Bank, Alexandria, Va., died December 25.

**Moore.**—John A. Moore, Vice-President of the Second National Bank, Toledo, O., died December 27.

**Pert.**—Wm. L. Pert, President of the Citizens' National Bank, Potsdam, N. Y., and one of the organizers of the bank, died December 23, aged thirty-six years.

**Rodman.**—Col. Thomas Rodman, for many years President of the Farmers' Bank of Kentucky, Frankfort, died December 21, aged seventy-six.

**Shepherd.**—Gen. Russell B. Shepherd, President of the Second National Bank, Skowhegan, Me., and prominently connected with other business and benevolent enterprises, died January 1. He served in the Eighteenth Maine Volunteers during the Civil War, winning the rank of brevet brigadier general.

**Smith.**—Thomas C. Smith, one of the organizers of the Seventeenth Ward Bank, Brooklyn, N. Y., and President from its organization until four years ago, died January 3, aged eighty-five.

**Sweet.**—L. T. Sweet, Cashier of the First National Bank, Belle Plaine, Ia., died December 10, aged forty-five years.

**Shelbley.**—Hon. John H. Shibley, a director and secretary of the board of the First National Bank, New Bloomfield, Pa., and a director in the Duncannon (Pa.) National Bank, died December 1, aged seventy-three years. He represented Perry county, Pennsylvania, in the Legislature in 1873, and was active in politics. At the time of his death he was proprietor and editor of the "Advocate and Press," a leading Republican paper.

**Waterman.**—John Waterman, President of the First National Bank, Warren, R. I., and of the Warren Institution for Savings, and a prominent manufacturer, died December 21.

**Wooster.**—Brief mention was made in the November issue of the *MAGAZINE* of the death of Henry R. Wooster, Treasurer of the Deep River (Ct.) Savings Bank and Vice-President of the Deep River National Bank. Mr. Wooster died suddenly of an apoplectic stroke on Saturday, November 3. He was born at Deep River July 23, 1848, and after being educated there and in New Haven, and at Northampton, Mass., he entered the employ of Nickerson & Co., Boston, remaining there until 1869, when he returned to his native place and accepted a position with the Deep River Lumber Company. In 1875 he was elected Secretary and Treasurer of the Deep River Savings Bank. During his connection with the bank the deposits rose from \$400,000 to over \$1,500,000.

About six years ago he was chosen Vice-President of the Deep River National Bank, having been a director for some years longer. He was an active and efficient director and officer, and was highly respected in business and social life.

Mr. Wooster was a member of the Union League and other clubs, of New York, and of the Sons of the American Revolution. He was offered the position of Bank Commissioner, but declined, and beyond some local positions of trust had not held or sought to hold public office.

**Weideman.**—John C. Weideman, President of the Forest City Savings Bank, Cleveland, Ohio, and also a director of the Union National Bank and the Savings and Trust Co., died December 9. He was born in Germany seventy-two years ago, and came to this country in 1833. Mr. Weideman was one of Cleveland's most successful business men, a leading member of the Chamber of Commerce and a thirty-third degree Mason.

**Exchangeability of Coins.**—Representative Overstreet, of Indiana, has introduced the following bill in Congress:

"Section 1. That all gold and silver coins of the United States, except subsidiary coins, shall be exchangeable for each other at par at the Treasury of the United States, at the demand of the holder.

Sec. 2. That for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this act the Secretary of the Treasury may employ any part of the reserve fund of gold coin and bullion established by section 2 of the act of March 14, 1900, entitled, 'An act to define and fix the standard of value, to maintain the parity of all forms of money issued or coined by the United States, to refund the public debt, and for other purposes,' and money received in exchange for gold coin or bullion under the provisions of this act shall be held in said reserve fund and not paid out, except in the manner provided in regard to United States notes in said section 2 of the act of March 14, 1900.

Sec. 3. This act shall take effect upon its passage."

**GOOD OPENING FOR BANK.**—A growing western city of 35,000 inhabitants. Deposits in banks now established range from \$600,000 to \$1,500,000, rate eight per cent. Only one small Savings bank of \$50,000 capital but large deposits, and another needed. The city is modern, with large established industries, and no large city within a hundred miles to compete. Capitalists with idle money and some one competent to manage a bank will find representative local men willing to become identified with a new bank. Correspondence solicited.

Address NEW BANK, care of *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*, 87 Maiden Lane, New York, N. Y.

# THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE

*RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING and THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE Consolidated.*

---

FIFTY-FIFTH YEAR.

FEBRUARY, 1901.

VOLUME LXII, No. 2.

---

THE PERFECTION OF OUR MONETARY SYSTEM in the near future seems to be reasonably certain. The financial law of 1900 was a long step in this direction, but it has recognized imperfections that yet have to be corrected.

A bill has been introduced in the House by Hon. E. J. HILL, of Connecticut, which if it becomes a law will have the effect of curing the defect in that portion of the present law affecting the maintenance of gold as a standard of value. Mr. HILL's proposed amendment of the law, and the report of the Committee on Coinage, Weights and Measures accompanying the bill, will be found elsewhere in this issue of the MAGAZINE.

While the law now makes the gold dollar the standard, and provides that all other forms of money shall be kept at a parity with the gold dollar, and also provides the means of maintaining this parity in the case of legal-tender and Treasury notes, and as a corollary of this of National bank notes also, the law does not point out any particular way in which the parity of the silver dollars is to be insured. Mr. HILL seeks to remedy this omission. The bill he has introduced and which has been favorably reported by the Committee on Coinage, Weights and Measures, provides that the Secretary of the Treasury shall give gold in exchange for silver dollars when presented in sums of five dollars or any multiple thereof. The gold reserve also, under his bill, becomes a reserve for the silver dollars as well as for legal-tender and Treasury notes, and when depleted by the redemption of silver dollars it is to be replenished just the same as if it had been depleted by the redemption of legal-tender or Treasury notes. The addition to the burden already imposed on the redemption fund of \$150,000,000, of the redemption of nearly 500,000,000 of silver dollars, at first sight might raise some apprehension as to the adequacy of the redemption fund.

It must be remembered, however, that since the passage of the law of March 14, 1900, parity has been maintained without apparent difficulty, although silver dollars were not redeemable in gold at the Treasury. The fact that they have passed from hand to hand, and have been recognized in all the transactions of life as equal for every purpose to money of other kinds, shows that it has been in fact possible for holders of silver dollars to obtain other forms of money payable in gold in exchange for their silver dollars, whenever they found it necessary to have these other forms of money. Of course the silver dollars were mostly held in the form of silver certificates and these as well as silver dollars themselves are received on deposit by all banks and financial institutions, as a basis of a bank account, exactly as legal-tender notes, Treasury notes, National bank notes and gold coin are received.

The bank credits in the United States, according to the last report of the Comptroller of the Currency, which can be drawn on by check exceed seven billions of dollars. When these are used in effecting payments by means of checks, a very small proportion of actual money is required in effecting the settlement of the checks. The clearings of the country represent the checks that are presented to be settled by exchange, and the balances the amount of cash required. All these bank accounts practically represent gold, and the checks drawn against them represent gold, so that in reality all money deposited with a bank, whether silver dollars, silver certificates, legal-tender notes, Treasury notes or National bank notes, is alike credited to the depositor as gold.

It is this action on the part of the financial institutions of the United States in treating all deposits as equivalent to gold that maintains the parity of the silver dollar. This being so now it is not likely, even if the silver dollars become directly redeemable in gold by the enactment of the measure introduced by Mr. HILL, that there will be any greater pressure put on the Treasury redemption fund than there is now. Gold is required for certain purposes, chiefly for export to meet foreign balances, and no more will be required at a given time simply because silver dollars are made redeemable in that metal. Moreover, this bill does not propose to make the silver certificates redeemable, but only the silver dollars themselves. The proportion of silver dollars in circulation is never very large. Of course silver certificates can be exchanged for silver dollars, and the latter exchanged for gold; but except in unusual circumstances all the gold ordinarily required could be obtained without taking the trouble to resort to silver certificates. In other words, while this bill will make the redemption of silver certificates and dollars sure, yet for securing ordinary amounts of gold this form of money would be resorted to



last, as it would be so much easier to use legal-tender notes and Treasury notes.

Some will say what, then, is the necessity of making silver dollars redeemable in gold at all, if under the present law parity can be maintained. In fact, it would be easier to show that the law is necessary if the present condition of the Treasury and the financial prospects of the country were not so favorable. But the recollection of the condition of the Treasury in 1893, and on one or two previous occasions, has demonstrated that circumstances may so shape themselves as to destroy the confidence of the public and the banks in the capacity of the Treasury to maintain parity, in the absence of the power of actual redemption of silver dollars in gold when demand is made.

The difficulty in passing Mr. HILL's measure will arise from opposition based on the present favorable condition of monetary affairs.

---

A COMBINATION OF BANKS WITHOUT MONOPOLY was referred to as a possibility by Secretary GAGE in his address at the December meeting of Group VIII of the New York State Bankers' Association. That there would be serious opposition to a system of central banks with branches is apparent to any one who is familiar with public opinion in this country, and not the least part of this hostility would come from those who are now conducting the smaller banking institutions. Discussing the subject of a closer union among banks for mutual protection, Secretary GAGE said :

"As to the system of a few larger banks, with a multiplicity of branches, which my friend from the South so thoroughly endorsed, and which the experience of France, Great Britain and Canada commends to your approval, can a similar system be inaugurated with us? Probably not. While recognizing the value of it as to strength, we are too afraid of centralized power and authority. It antagonizes the spirit of our institutions. But it may be possible to secure to a degree its advantages while avoiding the apprehended danger. Our political system is representative. It begins in small units. The townships, associated by representation, constitute the county, the counties in like manner the States, and from the States that indissoluble federation, the general Government. With no powers not specifically extended to it or clearly implied, the Federal authority nevertheless stands for the general defence and the general welfare.

Something like this is vaguely defined in my thought as possible in our banking system. No consolidation of interests, no absolute sovereignty, no powerful head, with authority to create and control, but association with reference to a common defence against common dangers; the individual bank an independent unit; the district clear-

ing-house a center of association, where the surplus strength of the strong could be made available to support with entire safety, and with proper reward, the exposed position of the momentarily weak.

The district clearing-houses, associated in a similar way, might be made to constitute the national clearing-house, and thus, in lines almost parallel to our political institutions, we might secure in the field of banking what we enjoy in our national life, namely, individual freedom with an associated strength, which in the nation has been found equal to all emergencies.

The operation of your own clearing-house in times of peculiar stress and peril typifies what may be realized along the broader lines to which I refer.

By the aid of the strong in support of the imperilled, you have saved from disaster those that were not unworthy, and aided in times of crises exposed interests in the fields of trade and industry. Without specific warrant of law, your action in these respects has everywhere been approved as judicious and wise. Is it not possible under the sanction of law to perfect and extend for the general good of the country a similar plan and one which has been so well demonstrated?"

Mr. GAGE did not wish his hearers to understand that this idea was original with him. Mr. WALKER, of Massachusetts, and Mr. GILMAN, of New York, and doubtless others, have suggested something on the same line. Mr. GILMAN's plan was fully explained in the *MAGAZINE* for April, 1899, pp. 515, 594.

To utilize the clearing-houses in generally supervising the issue of currency by the banks, or for other purposes, it would probably be necessary to incorporate them under Federal authority, as has been done in the case of the Bankers' Association in Canada, and also to enlarge the powers which they now possess.

There is of course under our present system considerable co-operation among banks, either as individuals or as member of organizations; but still greater benefits in this direction could be secured by closer affiliation. If the banks are ever to be permitted to issue their own notes (which they do not do now except nominally), it will be essential that the notes put out by an obscure country bank shall be practically as good as those of a bank in any of the financial centers. This can perhaps best be assured by some plan such as Mr. GAGE outlined.

Any feasible proposition looking to a union of banks for the purpose of further strengthening them, without destroying their independence or creating a monopoly, is certainly worthy of careful consideration. Local co-operation seems to be less objectionable, in principle, than a general safety fund contributed by all the banks for guaranteeing either notes or deposits.

WHAT TO DO WITH THE SILVER coin and bullion purchased by the Government, is a question now attracting considerable attention. In the hearing before the House Committee on Coinage, Weights and Measures Mr. HORACE WHITE, of New York, who had been called as a witness in regard to the effect of the bill for the redemption of silver dollars in gold, was asked what he would do with the silver in the Treasury, and by this was meant all the silver whether in the shape of silver dollars or bullion. The reply was that he would sell it, although he realized that this might prove politically impossible.

It would be much better for the Government and the people of the United States if the situation could be simplified by the sale of all the silver which has been injected into the circulation of the country by unwise legislation, except such supply as might be required for subsidiary coinage.

It was asked whether the sale of this silver and its withdrawal from circulation would not cause a contraction of the currency. The reply was that the ease with which the country can now procure gold if it wants it would insure that the vacuum would at once be filled. But the withdrawal of the silver and its sale does not necessarily involve any great contraction. On January 1, there were 509,149,590 silver dollars coined of which \$432,967,264 were in the Treasury, and \$76,182,326 in circulation. There was also in the Treasury silver bullion valued at \$56,937,918. If the sale were made the only necessary contraction would be that of the \$76,182,326 withdrawn from circulation. At the present price of silver, if it could be maintained under the sale of so large an amount, the sale of silver would produce gold sufficient to provide a reserve of forty-five per cent. upon the silver certificates deposited. Instead of a silver reserve of 100 per cent. there would be a gold reserve of forty-five per cent., but it would be immediately available.

There would probably be no difficulty in disposing of this silver by degrees, if this course were resolved upon, but as suggested by Mr. WHITE the difficulty would be a political one. The silver producers of the country would bitterly oppose the exposure of the market to this mass of silver. In this they are perhaps short-sighted. As it is now, although the probability of the sale of this silver may now appear small, yet the possibility of it is more or less taken into account by all those who deal in the metal. The existence of this large mass, with its constant threat to the market, must have some effect on prices. That is, the price of silver is lower than it would be if the five hundred millions of dollars stored up in the form of silver dollars were distributed in the channels of trade throughout the world in the form of bullion. Therefore it is probable that were this silver sold,

and disposed of, although for a time the price of silver might fall, it would eventually rise again and maintain a higher level than ever before.

Although since 1875 the price of silver has experienced a great revulsion from its former usual standard, a period of twenty-five years is hardly long enough to fix the permanency of this change. In the past there have been wide fluctuations in the value of silver as compared with gold. If it should regain the price it sold for in 1873, silver dollars would disappear from the Treasury vaults and from circulation just as they did during the first seventy years of the century. In that case no one would want to redeem them in gold. At present, however, there seem to be no indications of any marked rise in the price of silver.

---

A BANK-NOTE CURRENCY is provided for to some extent by a bill introduced in the House by Mr. LOVERING of Massachusetts. The expansion of bank-note circulation based on bonds under the act of March 14, 1900, has very nearly reached its maximum, and it is evident that in the future as in the past there will come occasions when the banks will be unable to meet the demand for additional currency. There will also in the future as in the past come times when the banks will find it more profitable to sell bonds to secure premium and retire their circulation, than to increase the issues of their notes. In fact, periods when the demands of business and the favorable price of bonds have combined to induce the banks to make large issues are followed sooner or later by periods when business no longer requires these large issues. The redundant notes accumulate in the money centres, and cause the prices of all securities to rise. Banks are then tempted to sell their bonds, and retire circulation. There is thus brought about a slow and awkward redemption of bank notes, which does not respond to business demands with any true elasticity.

In view of the traditional faith in a bank circulation secured by bonds and the extent to which United States bonds are held by the banks, as well as the chance that the demand for bonds by the banks may in the future as heretofore be really necessary to the credit of the Government, it would perhaps be unwise to abolish the principle of bonded security. It has long been recognized by experts that the bonded security may well be retained for what may be called the permanent National bank circulation. Outside of this permanent nucleus there might be an amount of circulation not based on bonds, which would give elasticity to the whole combined aggregate in the same way as the pneumatic tire gives elasticity to the solid wheel.

Mr. LOVERING's bill provides that each bank having already issued circulating notes based on bonds may issue additional notes not based on bonds to the amount of one-fifth of the bond-secured circulation. Thus a bank deposits \$90,000 in bonds and issues \$90,000 in circulation under present law. Under the LOVERING bill, this bank could issue \$18,000, or one-fifth of \$90,000, additional. This \$18,000 would be redeemed when presented at the redemption agency or the bank, just as any of the secured notes, and their ultimate payment would be guaranteed by a safety fund of five per cent. in gold made up of annual payments of one-half of one per cent. of the guaranteed notes. These notes would also be secured by the general assets of the bank, being like the bond-secured notes a first lien thereon.

The bill also provides for future increases of bank circulation on the same plan. After three years the amount of safety-fund notes may be increased to two-fifths and after six years to four-fifths, but not to exceed forty per cent. of the capital stock.

The principle of issuing notes based to a certain extent on general assets and protected by a safety fund is carried out in this measure, but the notes are really in addition protected in some degree by the bonds. As a general rule the bonds deposited to secure circulation bear a premium. In the case of two per cents, even, this premium is five per cent. All that is realized in premiums on the sale of bonds would be applied to the payment of notes not specifically secured by bonds. This measure will tend to restrain banks from selling bonds merely to secure the premium and will remove one objection which has always been urged against National bank currency. Inasmuch as the circulation based on bonds is the basis and measure of the amount of free circulation the bank may obtain, the bank will not so easily be tempted to retire its circulation because the bonds command a premium. In effect the bank receives one hundred and twenty per cent. of the par value of the bonds deposited.

This bill, however, like all measures relating to National bank currency, contains no effective provision to insure the redemption of notes and their return to the issuing bank, whenever the aggregate of the notes outstanding becomes redundant. This is extremely difficult to accomplish when no discount is allowed for redemption. Of course the machinery of redemption is already provided for, and it works to the extent of keeping the bank-note circulation in good condition, and in cancelling the notes of banks that have retired their circulation, and under some circumstances, when the demand for legal-tender notes for reserves is active, it does even more. If the volume of legal-tender notes outstanding should be reduced by the operation of the new law, and gold should take the place now occupied by these notes in bank reserves, it is possible that the redemption

of bank notes may become fairly automatic, without any further legislation. In fact, it will take some time to evolve all the consequences of the financial law of 1900.

Mr. LOVERING'S bill seems to introduce the features of what has been known as the Baltimore plan for reforming the bank currency, in a gradual and conservative manner which will allow a fair test of its merits without running any risk of increasing the paper circulation beyond the requirements of business. It probably is calculated to give to the bank-note currency a degree of elasticity which it so much needs.

---

THE COMMERCIAL AND MANUFACTURING INTERESTS of Great Britain are becoming apprehensive that they will sooner or later be outstripped in the markets of the world by American competitors. It is a particularly gloomy time for the people of England. The expenses of the unfinished war in South Africa have increased the taxes. The balance of trade is more unfavorable than before. For the first time in its history the Government has sold its exchequer notes abroad. The London money market is sustained by borrowing. The death of a beloved sovereign, and the succession of a king the effect of whose reign cannot be foretold, add to the combination of circumstances that are calculated to give rise to apprehensions.

Lord ROSEBURY, in a recent speech, voiced this feeling when he declared that the industrial and commercial outlook was dark. He professed to foresee a great trade war, inevitably coming, which would be the greatest and most serious in which Great Britain had yet been involved.

The rise and fall of the nations that have been the great leaders of commerce in the past must necessarily be always before the minds of merchants and manufacturers of Great Britain. The decay of Carthage, of Alexandria, of Venice, Genoa and Holland, prove what seems to be the inevitable law of the rise, progress and decline of commercial leadership. But these examples occurred in days of imperfect knowledge of the world's geography and products, and imperfect means of communication and transportation. The world to-day has been so explored that comparatively little in the way of undeveloped natural resource remains to be unveiled. In the realm of communication and transportation, there is no doubt still room for new discoveries, for new inventions, and for improvement generally. The conditions of modern life are different. All nations are more equally trained in those qualities and pursuits that lead to commercial success, and it is hardly probable that in the future any one nation will hold a position of such commercial suprem-

acy as has been held by Venice in her day or by Great Britain more recently. The lack of this supremacy does not necessarily imply serious loss.

Although, therefore, it is possible that some competitor of Great Britain may surpass her in certain lines of trade, this will result not from any diminution of British commerce, but will be due to the increase of that of her rivals.

The United States since the panic of 1893 has advanced her commerce with foreign nations beyond all precedent. The low prices which prevailed at home, and the large stocks on hand, forced American products and manufactures into foreign markets. The natural resources of the United States are perhaps as great and under much better control than those of any other country in the world. Lord ROSEBERRY expressed the opinion that it was a great advantage to Americans in this competition, that great individual fortunes were not employed to enable their possessors to enjoy social pleasures, but were kept in the service of the business that created them. But this observation does not seem to exactly express the real situation. Great fortunes, at the present time, whether in the United States or Great Britain, must be invested in some way to produce income, and usually in both countries they are invested to some extent in enterprises of all kinds. The difference is more in those who control large private fortunes than in the manner in which they are invested. In the United States many of the largest fortunes are still in the hands of the men who have accumulated them, and are used for further gains, with the same energy that secured the original fortune. The American business man who has secured a moderate fortune may possibly retire, but those who become the kings of any line of industry are as little inclined to abdicate their power as is the ordinary political king. In fact, there are men to-day in America who, without armies or navies, exercise more power over their fellow men than many political potentates. In England through the institution of caste, there is a desire for rank which to some extent influences the desire for wealth. When an Englishman accumulates enough to entitle him to the honor of founding a family, he enters on what is there considered the higher life. When one who already possesses rank goes into trade it is to get wealth to sustain the rank. The motive to secure wealth and use it to satisfy the ambition to become a commercial and industrial king, looking on such a position as the highest possible, is not so strong in Great Britain as in the United States. In the latter country political eminence is attained by the exercise of popular arts, which imply considerable personal sacrifice to the caprices of the multitude. The ambitious and able men, who dislike to gain eminence by soliciting the favor of their fellow men, find they can reach eminence by the

accumulation of a fortune. Such men as HUNTINGTON and VANDERBILT prefer to die in harness. There are men of the same type and class at the head of all the great producing and manufacturing industries. They could retire if they chose and the bulk of their fortunes would still remain invested in the business which produced them. For them to retire is to be reduced to comparative insignificance. Some few who feel special gifts that way may go into the United States Senate, but even the office of Senator is only a kind of ornament to their real position as industrial leaders. The men who build up great businesses in the United States generally direct them until they die. Therefore, it is the difference in men growing out of the difference of institutions, that gives the preponderating force which Lord ROSEBURY notices in the use of private fortunes in trade.

---

THE AMERICAN SUBSCRIBERS TO THE BRITISH LOAN are being taxed on the income of the same, just exactly as if they were citizens of Great Britain. The fact that they might be taxed on the income of these exchequer bills appears to have been overlooked by the American investors.

The income tax in Great Britain is increased or decreased according to the exigency or the prosperity of the Treasury. At present the income rate is five per cent. on incomes over £700, and less on incomes down to £160. On incomes of this last-mentioned amount or less, no tax is required. The rule seems to be to deduct the tax from the interest in all cases, and where the right to exemption is proved to pay it back.

It seems hardly possible that anyone would invest in foreign securities without an investigation of their liability to taxation, although United States bonds being always exempt from taxation, citizens of this country might, without having their attention called to the matter, infer that all foreign securities were similarly free from tax liability. The syndicate that placed the exchequer notes did not call attention to the custom of the British Government to deduct the income tax from the interest, and no one appears to have asked any questions. At the time the loan was made none of the calculations, comparing the exchequer notes as an investment with the United States bonds, mentioned the tax as a factor in the problem, although it is an important one.

It is also not very easy to tell what the tax in any year will be so as to make an exact calculation, although five per cent. is the highest it has yet been. The chances are that in the future it will be less rather than more. The investment, even with the tax deducted, realized, at the time the bonds were placed on the market, more



than most classes of United States bonds, and the securities have gone to a premium.

The experience of American investors with exchequer bonds, and the unpleasant discovery that they were liable to tax, will of course cause investigation as to the taxability of all classes of foreign government bonds which may be offered in this market. It is said that the German loan placed in the United States may be taxed in a similar manner by the German Government. Although there was no misrepresentation or concealment in placing the British loan, yet some of those who invested in it seem to feel that there ought to have been more explanation of the tax feature.

The liability to taxation which seems to attend most foreign government securities may become a handicap upon borrowing abroad, when such loans become necessary. A government anxious to secure a foreign loan would probably waive the right to tax. It is probably better in the long run for the credit of government securities in the markets of the world that the government issuing them should adopt the policy of the United States and make them non-taxable. The Russian Government has already relieved American holders of Russian bonds from the payment of an income tax.

---

THE DEATH OF WILLIAM L. TRENHOLM, who was Comptroller of the Currency during the first Administration of President CLEVELAND, occurred on January 11. The TRENHOLM family was a distinguished one in South Carolina, the father of the ex-Comptroller having been Secretary of the Treasury of the Confederacy during the Civil War.

Mr. TRENHOLM was called to public life by President CLEVELAND, being first appointed a Civil Service Commissioner, and in 1886 was made Comptroller of the Currency. He filled this office creditably, and made many recommendations for the amendment of the National Banking Law, proposing a thorough revision of the law. At that period it was very difficult to secure a hearing for any measures having reference to banking. Mr. TRENHOLM was also the author of a plan for the substitution of National bank notes for legal-tender notes, in which the practical retirement of the latter by the issue of two and a half per cent. bonds was provided for. This was one of the tentative plans for currency reform which served to keep the subject before the public mind but which never received any legislative support. After Mr. TRENHOLM's retirement from public life he entered on a successful business career in New York city. There are four ex-Comptrollers of the Currency still surviving: A. B. HEPBURN, HENRY W. CANNON, EDWARD S. LACEY, and JAMES H. ECKELS.

WHEN SOME GREAT EMBEZZLEMENT is brought to light and exposed to public scrutiny, there is almost a certainty that a number of similar revelations will ensue. In the case of suicides it has been remarked that the publication of one event is apt to be followed by others; but the increase in the number of suicides is said to be due to imitation.

It is easy to see that the explanation of the discovery of numerous embezzlements, following closely on the discovery of one, is due to the greater pressure of suspicion that is engendered in regard to those who hold positions of trust. Those who have yielded to the temptation of appropriating to their own use the money or valuables entrusted to their keeping may be more or less numerous at any given time. They are, however, unsuspected and they may go on for an indefinite period without any apparent risk of being called to account. Many cases might never come to light at all, the funds which had been treasured upon being made good, if it were not that some startling discovery is made in a totally different quarter. When such an event takes place every trustee is at once put on the defensive, and the investigations aroused are almost sure to reveal the cases in which there has been embezzlement.

When after an alarm of this kind everything has been done to test the soundness of officers and employees by financial institutions, and the delinquents are detected and punished, there will ensue the inevitable period of rest, during which suspicion will be disarmed, and a new crop be prepared for the periodical harvesting. It is only those institutions which bear this law of periodicity in mind and take precautions to maintain at all times an even pressure of suspicion, that will avoid the danger of losses from embezzlement.

---

AN INCREASE OF SUBSIDIARY COIN is provided for in a bill before the House Committee on Coinage, Weights and Measures. This increase is to be effected by amending the financial law of 1900 so as to permit the recoinage of the silver dollars into halves and quarters.

Of course, subsidiary coins are now redeemable in gold, and if all the silver dollars were recoinage into subsidiary coin this would indirectly make the dollars redeemable. But the large volume of these dollars seems to make any scheme of this kind difficult of putting into immediate operation. The amount of subsidiary coin that can be kept outstanding increases with the growth of the country, but even with the withdrawal of one and two-dollar bills a long period must elapse before anything like \$500,000,000 of subsidiary coin could be kept out of the Treasury.

## BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

---

The great advance during the last century in commerce and manufactures, in all forms of production, in inventions, and in means of transportation and communication, would perhaps have been impossible if it had not been for the invention and development of banking. Other discoveries and devices have opened up new fields of industry and augmented the growth of those already known. The various branches of human enterprise are mutually interdependent, but of all varieties of business, finding a place in modern civilization, banking is probably the most stimulating in influencing the growth of all the rest. Railroads as now existing could not be operated without the electric telegraph or telephone. All modern designs and enterprises are on a much larger scale than ever before, and require an amount of capital that could not be obtained without the assistance of banking science.

This of course is only to say that as the whole body grows each limb and organ necessary to its existence must experience a corresponding increase. Some limbs and some organs may perhaps be dispensed with and the body may still retain a degree of vitality and efficiency, but if the circulation fails then weakness and death must ensue. Banking is the science which furnishes the machinery to keep up the circulation of money in a degree commensurate with the demands of the various forms of industry that make up the modern economic system. As these last have developed banking has developed not only in degree but in kind. Thus as all forms of business have during the century shown a tendency to specialization, so the banking business manifests the same tendency. As other forms of enterprise exhibit a disposition to consolidation and concentration, so banking throughout the world displays the same tendency. In the United States, however, although there has been some consolidation, yet for reasons not difficult to discover, it has not been as great as in other countries. Perhaps this lagging behind the rest of the world in this respect has been attended by some disadvantages.

The system of free banking which has grown up in this country has resulted in a multiplicity of banks of moderate capital each independent of the others, and has prevented to a great degree the formation of institutions similar to the great State banks of foreign nations. While in the development of industrial trusts and in great combinations for the control of railroads and other enterprises and productions, the people of the United States have been in advance of those of other civilized nations, they have not until within a very few years made any strong effort for the greater consolidation of the banking business. Such consolidations as have been made, while they show the effect of the spirit of the age on banking, have not been extensive enough to overcome the opposing influence of existing systems. In proportion to the aggregate banking capital of the country the consolidations have been comparatively insignificant. There is no doubt, however, that the evils of competition which in other lines of business have led to consolidation exist to a very con-

siderable extent in the banking business, and they may become so much enhanced as time goes on as to compel the adoption of the same remedy.

During the last century the business of banking has been very much specialized. In 1800 many of the so-called banks and banking firms did not only what would now be characterized as proper banking business, but they also did a mercantile and commercial business. In most cases this last has been given up, but what may be considered the appropriate business of banks has been divided up, and separate parts are carried on by commercial banks, by Savings banks, by trust companies, and by bankers who make a specialty of particular kinds of securities.

In 1800 there were in the United States very few banks in the modern sense of the word. There was not very much banking capital in the country, and the institution of the first Bank of the United States by Hamilton rather repressed than encouraged any forced schemes for creating fictitious resources by the unprincipled use of the devices of credit. In 1800, including the Bank of the United States, there were in existence twenty-eight banks with a capital of twenty-one millions of dollars of which ten millions was the capital of the Bank of the United States. The charter of the latter bank expired in 1811. By that time there were only eighty-eight banks in existence with a capital of over eighty-two millions of dollars. The disappearance of the Bank of the United States from the field was followed by a great increase in the State banks, which by 1815 had jumped in number to 208. The impulse given to the organization of State banks by this opportunity was not greatly checked by the institution of the second Bank of the United States, and the State banks continued to increase in numbers, until with the expiration of the charter of the second Bank of the United States, they secured the whole field, and retained it until the establishment of the National banking system in 1863.

The organization of State banks during the first half of the century, especially during the second, third and fourth decades, was attended with great losses to the general public, and also to the Government. These banks were organized very often upon the value their credit enabled them to give to the circulating notes they issued.

The stock was often issued to favored subscribers who paid in little if any cash, giving generally their notes for the stock. The issue of circulating notes furnished such institutions with the greater part of their resources. According to the ideas of modern bankers there was a great disproportion between the deposits entrusted to these banks and their capital. The Bank of the United States, with a capital of \$35,000,000, had in 1830 deposits amounting to about \$16,000,000 only, or less than fifty per cent. of the capital. The capital of the State banks in the same year was about \$145,000,000, while their deposits were only about \$55,000,000, or not much more than thirty per cent. As a rule the proportions are entirely reversed in modern banks, the capital being seldom over fifty per cent. of deposits, and often bearing a much smaller ratio. This fact merely shows the increasing wealth of the country and the extent to which the banks are trusted by the people. The tendency of the times has been to allow banks to more and more dispense with their own capital and do business with the money entrusted to them. In the case of a large number of Savings banks no capital at all is required.

In the first half of the century the precious metals were produced in very small quantities in the United States, and specie was extremely scarce. The free issue of the bills of State banks, based chiefly on credit, by their occupying the field tended to further deplete the stock of specie in circulation, and when recurring periods of liquidation arrived the banks were often unable to meet the payment of their notes and had to suspend specie payments. The banking of this period, while it no doubt aided to develop the resources of the country, was yet very imperfect and often detrimental. Probably the country would have thriven more and many losses and disappointments would have been avoided if a better system of banks could have been maintained.

The fifth decade of the century was ushered in with the discovery of gold in California and the effect was at once felt in the greater prosperity of the whole country. In 1850 there were 824 banks, and by 1857 there were 1,416. These banks used their credit to a large extent in the issue of circulation, and their specie reserves in proportion to their liabilities for deposits and circulating notes were what would at the present time be considered small. In 1857 the over-speculation in previous years resulted in a panic and a suspension of specie payments.

Up to 1862 the banks of the country had the whole paper money field to themselves. The Government issued no demand notes to compete with the bank notes. There was no agitation about the standard of value. After 1837 gold formed practically the chief part of the specie circulation. The clearing-house, as an aid to banking operations, belongs in the period since 1860. The first clearing-house was, however, organized in New York city in 1853. In 1854 the average daily exchanges were about \$19,000,000. But this will be adverted to again further on.

The establishment of the National banking system in 1863-64 entirely changed the character of banking in the United States, by changing the manner of note issues. In 1862 the Civil War had made necessary, in the opinion of the statesmen of that day, the issue of legal-tender notes. Coincident with the war period, and succeeding it, the United States began to advance in wealth with remarkable rapidity. This was due partly to the enlargement of ideas consequent on the great efforts made during the war. The men who had formed the armies immediately applied the energy, discipline and experience gained to civil life. The Pacific railroads were built and the whole West was thrown open for development. The legal-tender note received credit for a great deal of this prosperity, and paved the way for the issue of other Government notes of analogous character.

The National bank notes, secured by United States bonds and by the guaranty of the Government, were different from the State bank notes. They were at par with legal-tender notes in all parts of the United States, and afforded a safe and homogeneous currency. While they excelled the State bank notes in this respect, they were inferior to them in elasticity. They were seldom sent in for redemption, and the volume outstanding remained almost constant whatever the demand for money. This defect was not so much felt when National banks began to be organized, though it was early pointed out. The organization of new banks for several years had the effect of a continued expansion of the currency. The State banks mostly became National banks in order to secure the profit that then existed in issuing circulating notes. For two or three years after 1865 there were very few

State banks in the country. But when the profit on circulation became small, State banks began to be organized again. They were banks of loan and deposit merely. Not being able to use their credit in the issue of circulating notes, they were forced to obtain actual cash capital in every case before commencing business. The rigid exactions of the National Banking Law in regard to paid-in capital were copied by the States whose banking laws were weak. The restrictions imposed on National banks and the consequent high standard of management had its effect on the State banks in competition with them, and consequently the standard of State bank management since the war has, as a rule, been as high as that of the National banks.

Practically, the great success of National banks has been as banks of loan and deposit rather than as banks for the issue of circulating notes. They have, however, as the holders and depositors of United States bonds held a considerable proportion of the national debt, and the demand for bonds on their part has greatly aided the Treasury in its management of the debt. They have also, by becoming depositories of public moneys, acted as a counterpoise to the action of the independent Treasury in causing scarcity of money by locking up the surplus revenues.

The capital of the 3,732 National banks in 1900 was \$632,502,395 and their individual deposits amounted to \$2,508,248,557, nearly four times the amount of their capital. In addition they held \$87,000,000 of United States deposits. There were, according to the last report of the Comptroller of the Currency, 6,650 other banks with a capital of \$403,192,124 and deposits amounting to \$4,780,893,692. The last-mentioned banks include State banks, private banks, trust companies and Savings banks. These are all the banks from which the Comptroller has been able to obtain reports, a total of 10,382 banks in the country in 1900 against twenty-eight in 1800. But there are some three or four thousand institutions in the country which do not make reports to the Comptroller, but which appear in the Bankers' Directory, so that the total number of institutions doing a banking business in 1900 in the United States was in the neighborhood of 14,000.

The loans of the reporting institutions in 1900 were \$5,657,687,020, and the cash held was \$749,939,932. According to the last report of the Comptroller of the Currency, the banking power of the United States in 1900 was nearly equal to that of all the rest of the world put together.

As has already been stated, the first clearing-house was organized in New York city in 1853. There are now eighty-four clearing-house cities and towns in the United States. In one week ending December 20, 1900, the clearings effected amounted to \$2,276,197,173. These combinations of banks in clearing-houses are only one indication of the spirit of association for mutual support that has been growing up during the century. There was very little if any of this spirit among the banks of the first seven decades. Each bank was prone to look on all others as business rivals to be treated with the extreme rigor of the game. Banks often instigated runs on rivals, and put each other to all the inconvenience that they could. And when there was no overt act there was usually an underhanded hostility. There is still much competition, but banks do not seek to create unnecessary animosities and they know the benefits of mutual support. The formation of the American Bankers' Association and the State associations, bankers' clubs, etc., has given an impetus

to personal acquaintance and interchange of views. The preponderance of New York city as the banking centre of the country, makes possible the application of the banking force of the entire country at that one point should any occasion of sufficient importance arise. New York city is not only the banking centre of the United States, but it is now in close rivalry with London for the banking supremacy of the world. In 1800 Philadelphia, the location of the Bank of the United States, was the financial centre of the country.

The most noticeable characteristic of banking in the United States during the first half of the nineteenth century was the unwise use of the power to issue circulating notes. This was the most conspicuous feature in the business and the one by which it was most ordinarily identified in the minds of the public; the loan and deposit features were more in the background. To the average voter, a bank was a machine for issuing paper money. By the frequent abuse of the circulation privilege banking was discredited in the popular mind. During the last half-century, or at least since the Civil War, the tendency has been to so restrict bank circulation as to deprive it of most of its utility.

The indications for the future point to greater consolidation of management. Although there has at times been much competition in banking, yet the growth of the country has as yet been great enough to give employment with fair profit to all banking capital that offers itself. When, however, competition begins to make profits difficult, banking will take the course followed by other lines of business, and consolidation will go on to the extent that is demanded by the nature and scope of the business requiring banking facilities.

With the material furnished by the existing banking systems there is the possibility of the gradual evolution of a banking structure far surpassing in efficiency and safety any yet in operation.

**STAMPING OUT HERESY.**—During the discussion of a resolution offered by Mr. Parker, of Illinois, at the last convention of the American Bankers' Association, Col. Robert J. Lowry, of Atlanta, Ga., said:

"I think the resolution should be passed unanimously by this body. We can do it, as this body, I think, is greater than the executive council. They are our creatures —"

To what further lengths Col. Lowry might have gone had he not been suppressed just here by a timely ruling of the Chair, can only be conjectured. It is, of course, impossible that the convention is greater than the executive council, and such heretical notions must be stamped out. Col. Lowry is a man of a generous and impulsive nature, and doubtless the desire to help Mr. Parker to get his resolution through caused him to speak as he did. Upon mature reflection he must conclude that under the present constitution and by-laws of the American Bankers' Association the convention is inferior to the executive council and to the nominating committee as well.

Under the constitution no subject can be discussed by the convention without asking permission of the executive council, and in practice no candidate can be voted for without the consent of the nominating committee. These autocratic rules make it impossible for those attending the conventions to have a proper voice in the proceedings.

## BANKING AND FINANCIAL NOTES.

### REVIEW OF THE WORLD'S MONETARY PROGRESS.

#### PROGRESS OF BANKING IN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND IN 1900.

During 1894, 1896 and 1897, according to the London "Bankers' Magazine" a diminution in the amount of the capital employed in Great Britain and Ireland was recorded, but in 1900, as well as in the two preceding years, there was an increase. In the seventeen years between 1877 and 1892, both included, the rate of increase recorded in the paid-up capital of the banks of England and Wales was, on an average, not less than £1,400,000 a year, notwithstanding among these years 1878 occurred, in which a loss of nearly £947,000 was shown. In the United Kingdom the years 1878, 1894, 1896 and 1897, taken together, showed a net diminution of more than £2,000,000, but this was more than made up by the gain from 1898 to 1900. The figures for recent years show the following changes in the banking capital and reserve funds: 1897, decrease, £625,717; 1898, increase, £2,076,432; 1899, increase, £2,830,000; 1900, increase, £1,263,390. Net increase for the period, £5,544,105.

The diminution in 1897, as in the previous year, partly arose through amalgamation among banks. On these occasions the capital of the bank taken over has sometimes been paid off, as it has not been thought necessary to maintain the capital on as large a scale as before. But it is the opinion of so distinguished an authority as Mr. R. H. Inglis Palgrave that this arrangement is not generally advisable. The capitals of the banks of the country he regards as being hardly ever as large as is desirable for the support of the business which is transacted across their counters, and in view of the increased reserves which it is desirable should be held.

The increase in the reserve funds of the banks of England and Wales from 1895 to 1900 is more than £6,000,000, and £1,580,362, or about three per cent. in 1900—the largest noted for many years. There has been an addition of about £27,000,000 to the capital and reserve funds of these banks in the last quarter of a century.

The following table shows the distribution of the banking capital in Great Britain and Ireland for the years 1899 and 1900:

	1899.		1900.	
	Capital.	Reserve funds.	Capital.	Reserve funds.
Bank of England.....	£14,553,000	£3,000,000	£14,553,000	£3,000,000
Other banks, England.....	54,415,200	30,590,800	53,732,400	32,171,300
Banks, Isle of Man.....	105,000	108,800	55,000	55,200
Banks, Scotland.....	9,313,000	6,506,700	9,316,000	6,681,000
Banks, Ireland.....	7,141,000	3,482,300	7,209,200	3,701,300
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>£85,527,400</b>	<b>£43,668,500</b>	<b>£84,865,600</b>	<b>£45,608,600</b>



The total capital and reserve in 1899 was £129,210,900, and in 1900, £130,474,200.

For the year 1900 the gain in the capital and reserve funds of the Irish banks was £287,030, and those of Scotland increased \$177,428 in the same time, the gain being almost entirely in reserve funds.

#### SPECIE RESERVE OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND.

Discussing the necessity of providing a stronger specie reserve for the Bank of England, the London "Bankers' Magazine" in its January issue says: "We have to repeat, and with sincere regret, that again another year has passed and no steps have been taken to establish a stronger specie reserve fund for the country generally. Ten years have now passed since, in the autumn of 1890, owing to the difficulties into which the firm of Messrs. Baring had fallen, the Bank of England was compelled to borrow some three millions sterling in gold from the Bank of France, and to collect gold from other quarters to strengthen its reserve. This is now matter of ancient history, and is treated as ancient history usually is, as something with which we need not concern ourselves in practical life. Thus, the need of strengthening our reserves is disregarded. It becomes continually more difficult to draw attention to anything which is not actually part of the ordinary routine. Year by year the stress of daily occupation grows and accumulates, and there seems no opportunity for considering anything else. The rapidity with which even striking and important events are forgotten is wonderful. Even at the present time a large proportion of the men actively engaged in business have no personal remembrance of what occurred so recently as the year of the Baring difficulties. But when any business man reflects on the past, he must be perfectly aware that, though the arrangement made in 1890 was successfully carried through then, it would have been impossible to repeat the operation in 1900, however needful it might have been to do so. We are apt to dwell with so much satisfaction on our financial standing, that we forget the great alterations which the twenty-five years over which this statement extends have witnessed. Our position, so far as it depends on the reserves held, is literally weaker now than it was then.

To bring this clearly before our readers, we repeat here a comparison which we have carried on for a considerable period, of the position of the Bank of England and of the great banks of the world, at the present time, and in 1876. The year 1876 is taken as being that in which this statement of the position of the banks of the country was commenced, and over which our examination can be carried on with accuracy. Can it be prudent or safe that the Bank of England—the central point of the financial system of the country which is the clearing-house of the world—should not maintain a sufficient reserve of specie to meet the requirements of the country? So far is this from being the case, that the reserve of the Bank is actually weaker this year than it was twenty-five years since, though the demands on it are continually much larger.

The banking institutions of the other countries of the world stand now in a totally different position from that which they occupied when we commenced this annual survey twenty-five years since. The position of the Bank of England was far stronger relatively then to that of the other great banks of Europe than it is now, while, owing to the development of banking in this country in the interval, and the totally different conditions of business, the

demand likely to be made on it was far smaller than may be the case at the present time. Compared with twenty-five years since, there is no doubt that the deposits of the banks of the United Kingdom have increased something like £310,000,000 or £320,000,000, if not more, within that time. In this statement the deposits of the Colonial and Foreign Banks having offices in London are not included. These are very large at the present date. In times of difficulty these banks, as well as all the banks of the United Kingdom, would look to the Bank of England for assistance. The Bank of France, the Imperial Bank of Germany, and the National banks of the United States, now all possess far stronger specie reserves than they did twenty-five years since, while the position of the Bank of England is actually weaker than it was at that time. A comparison between the amounts of specie held in those four centres now and at that period shows this point very clearly. The figures are as follows:

*Position of the Reserves of the Banks of England, France, Germany and of the New York Associated Banks on the Earliest Returns in the Month of November, 1876 and 1900.*

BANK OF ENGLAND.			
<i>Reserve of Notes and Coin.</i>			
1876.....	£19,300,000	1900 .....	£19,800,000
BANK OF FRANCE.			
<i>Coin and Bullion.</i>			
1876.....	£86,600,000	1900 (Gold).....	£91,700,000
		1900 (Silver).....	44,500,000
		Total.....	\$136,200,000
IMPERIAL BANK OF GERMANY.			
<i>Coin and Bullion.</i>			
1876.....	£24,500,000	1900.....	*£38,400,000
NEW YORK ASSOCIATED BANKS.			
<i>Specie and Legal Tenders.</i>			
1876 (Specie) .....	£3,600,000	1900 (Specie).....	£31,600,000
1876 (Legal tenders).....	8,500,000	1900 (Legal tenders).....	11,700,000
Total.....	£12,100,000	Total.....	£43,300,000

We have again to draw attention to the contrast between the course taken since 1876 in England and in the other countries of the world, the position of whose leading banks is thus shown. Compared with 1876, the reserve of the Bank of England is weaker now than it was then. The New York banks are fully thirty millions stronger. The Bank of France is fifty-one millions stronger. The gold alone held by the Bank of France in 1900 is fully six millions more than the whole of the specie—gold and silver combined—in their safes in 1876. The particulars of the specie, as divided between gold and silver, were not published so far back as 1876; but there is no reason to doubt that the gold held is fully twice as large now as it was a quarter of a century

\*The specie held by the Imperial Bank of Germany is not separated in the weekly statements, but it may be assumed, taking the proportions of the gold and silver held by that Bank on December 31, 1899, that of the amount of £38,400,000 shown above, £25,000,000 was in gold, that is to say, a larger amount in gold than the reserve at the corresponding time in 1900 of the Bank of England. Besides this, the Bank of Germany held December 31, 1899, more than £1,400,000 in bills of exchange on England, which meant the power of drawing gold from us, if this were necessary.

since. The Imperial Bank of Germany holds, in round figures, fourteen millions more in coin and bullion, and of this a considerably larger part is in gold than was the case then. An adequate specie reserve is the first requirement of business security; but in proportion to the banking liabilities of the country the reserve held by the Bank of England is far smaller now than it was twenty-four or twenty-five years since. While the banking deposits of the country, as just mentioned, have increased about £310,000,000 or £320,000,000, the reserve of the Bank of England is distinctly weaker now than it was then. This is clear when we examine the accounts of the Bank of England, and the proportion of the note issue allowed to be made against securities. The Bank Act of 1844 allows that part of the issue to be increased in proportion to the diminution in the English country note circulation. The amount of securities allowed in 1844 was £14,000,000. This had been increased in 1876 to £15,000,000. But since that date the decrease in the English country note issue has gone on so rapidly that an addition of £2,775,000 has been made to the issue against securities between 1876 and the present time. The securities in the issue department now stand at £17,775,000. Hence, though the reserve of the Bank of England appears by the figures we have given to be more than half-a-million stronger than it was in 1876, it is actually more than two millions weaker.

This becomes clear when we compare the amount of gold coin and bullion in the issue department, and of notes issued in the returns for November 1, 1876, and November 7, 1900.

The gold held was—	
November 1, 1876.....	£32,190,735
November 7, 1900.....	29,968,945
November 7, 1900, <i>less</i> .....	£2,221,790
The notes issued were—	
November 1, 1876.....	£47,190,735
November 7, 1900.....	47,743,945
November 7, 1900, <i>more</i> .....	£553,210
Add to the <i>increase</i> of notes issued.....	£553,210
The <i>diminution</i> of the gold held.....	2,221,790
The total amount.....	£2,775,000

shows clearly what the effect of the addition of £2,775,000 to the note issue against securities has been. The specie held by the Bank of England is weakened by that sum. Thus, instead of an addition to our specie reserves, there is a distinct diminution.

This question deserves the most grave consideration. There is, after all, only one way to form a large and sufficient specie reserve, and that is to build it up by slow and gradual accumulation. But the policy which has been followed is the exact reverse of this.

Again we have to ask, Is it not necessary to provide, while matters are quiet, against such an emergency as occurred in 1890? It is inevitable that some such demand should recur again, and perhaps before long, though the exact moment is hid from us. To keep money unemployed means, of course, a loss of profit for the time, but the strengthening the reserve to such an amount as would be adequate to meet the demands which may be made on us would in the long run certainly prove a great economy—for the monetary loss which would follow any grave weakening of our financial position would

be almost incalculable. We are scarcely aware of the extreme delicacy of the mechanism through which we act as the clearing-house of the world. That position it is essential to us to maintain."

#### SAVINGS BANKS OF VICTORIA.

Through the courtesy of the Commissioners of Savings Banks of Victoria, Australia, the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* has received the report of the Inspector-General of Savings Banks, showing the conditions of the institutions at the close of June 30, 1900.

The system under which the Post Office Savings Bank was amalgamated with the Commissioners' Savings Banks by act of Parliament on December 24, 1896, continues to operate successfully. There are now forty-five central offices in the cities and large boroughs and towns where deposits may be made and money withdrawn on demand, and there are 326 post-office agencies in other localities where deposits may be made, and also withdrawn after sufficient notice to allow of communication by post with the central office of the district for the purpose of verifying the signatures and credit balance.

During the year the interest allowed to Savings banks depositors was computed at two and one-half per cent. on sums up to £100 (\$500) and two per cent. on excess over £100 up to £250, no interest being allowed on excess over £250.

Loans are made to farmers in the advances department of the Victoria Savings banks, the funds for this purpose being raised by the sale of mortgage bonds, the total amount of such bonds issued to June 30, 1900, being £990,475, bearing three per cent. interest.

The number of loan applications received from farmers during the year ended June 30, 1900, was 899, as compared with 1,277 in the previous twelve months. The total amount actually advanced under the new act during the year was £182,490, making with amounts previously advanced a total of £973,435; but the repayments on account of principal were £45,843 5s. 1d. during the year, making total of such repayments £77,108 16s. 1d., and leaving the net amount of advances June 30, 1900, £896,326 3s. 11d. The number of loans outstanding on June 30, 1900, was 2,033, and the average balance of each loan was £440 17s. 9d.

This system has been in operation for over three years and a half and appears to be successful. The interest and installments of principal in arrears amount to only \$410 (£82). For the year the profit in this department was £6,743.

The total number of depositors' accounts in the Savings banks remaining open June 30, 1900, was 375,070, being 18,996 more than on June 30, 1899.

The average amount of depositors' balances June 30, 1900, was £24 5s. 9d., being 7s. 4d. more than on June 30, 1899.

The number and average amount of cash transactions during the year (transfers from one Savings bank to another being omitted) were: 806,210 deposits averaging £6 13s. 5d. each; 604,843 payments averaging £8 4s. 5d. each.

From June 30, 1879, to June 30, 1900, the number of banks and branches has increased from twelve to forty-five, and the total number of accounts from 33,708 to 375,070, while the total amount of depositors' balances rose from £870,194 to £9,110,792. There was a slight falling off in the average amount

of depositors' balances, the figures being £25 16s. 4d. in 1879 and £24 5s. 6d. in 1900.

#### EUROPEAN COMBINATION AGAINST AMERICA.

The proposal of Count Goluchowski, the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, that Continental Europe should stand together in a common commercial union against the trade encroachments of the United States, is pronounced as "peculiarly absurd and impossible" by the London "Economist" in its issue of December 29. It points out that there is no community of interests between different parts of Europe, and that there is as great a rivalry between the iron industries and coal mines of France and those of Germany as there is with those of Pennsylvania. What common interests, it is asked, have French and German vine-growers against those of California, six thousand miles away? "How can the German and Russian agriculturists, who hate each other, be combined against the farmers of Minnesota and Kansas? What does it matter to the Russian railway administration whether its locomotives are made in Philadelphia or Munich. Presumably, they will be ordered from the place where they will be made with the greatest efficiency and economy."

Concluding its article, "The Economist" says:

"We may dismiss, therefore, from our minds this chimerical notion of a European commercial alliance against America. It will never be, for its materials are lacking, and the assumption on which it could rest is the baseless fabric of a vision. Like it or not, we must recognize the fact that great world changes are impending which will alter the present economic balance. Europe, the most interesting of the continents, and still the political pulse of the world, is, after all, the poorest of the continents. The potential, agricultural and mineral wealth of North America is vastly greater than that of Europe; and even were Europe a moral unit, her statesmen would have to reckon with that natural fact. But when Europe, so far from being a moral unit, has spent the main part of her energies during the century now ending in creating separate and rival interests, mighty rival armaments and formidable rival tariffs, it is surely absurd to imagine that out of these naturally hostile factors you can evolve a common Europe to face a rival America. The European problem is serious, but it is not to be solved by such means."

#### NEW CAPITAL APPLICATIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN IN 1900.

During 1900 the applications for new capital, for public loans and for various enterprises, amounted to £165,499,000, against £133,169,000 in 1899. British Government loans added £47,213,700 to the total for 1900, which is the highest ever recorded, exceeding the previous high point in 1897 by £8,000,000.

#### CLEARINGS AT NEW YORK AND LONDON.

The growing importance of New York as a financial center lends an interest to the following figures representing the clearing-house transactions of the two cities for a series of years:

YEAR.	New York.	London.	YEAR.	New York.	London.
1885.....	\$28,152,201,000	\$27,755,355,000	1898.....	\$31,261,087,000	\$32,390,065,000
1886.....	23,676,829,000	29,509,625,000	1894.....	24,387,807,000	31,659,110,000
1887.....	33,474,556,000	30,385,435,000	1895.....	29,841,793,000	37,964,480,000
1888.....	31,100,027,000	34,710,860,000	1896.....	28,870,775,000	37,874,285,000
1889.....	35,895,104,000	38,063,830,000	1897.....	33,427,027,000	37,456,405,000
1890.....	37,458,607,000	39,005,240,000	1898.....	41,971,782,000	40,486,455,000
1891.....	33,749,822,000	34,237,530,000	1899.....	60,761,791,000	45,761,345,000
1892*.....	36,662,469,000	32,407,810,000	1900.....	52,684,201,000	44,800,850,000

\* The Stock Exchange Clearing-House was established at New York in May, 1882, thereby greatly reducing the clearings effected through the banks.

# THE EDUCATION OF A BANKER.

---

## PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL TRAINING OF BANK CLERKS AND OFFICERS.

---

### I.

#### THE BANK MESSENGER.

##### GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS.

The requirements for a bank messenger are the same as for all bank employees—a sound and alert mind and body, at least a common school education, a well-controlled temper, instinctive politeness and a spirit of industry.

##### HIS SELECTION.

He should be selected with as great care as other employees, and put upon probation for a period of say three months; at the end of this time the one having him in training, if properly experienced, can tell to a certainty whether or not he will make a good bank clerk, and if not, he should be dismissed, both because business principles demand it and because keeping him would prove a mistaken kindness.

##### POSITION NOT AN EASY ONE.

Outside of banking circles the notion that a bank position is a sinecure is so prevalent that it is almost impossible to impress upon the would-be messenger that he is applying for one of the hardest places the business world offers to beginners. He may be told this, but he does not believe it. He thinks it is being said merely that the banker may determine whether or not he is properly anxious to get the position. He soon learns, however, that he must be the first one on hand in the morning, and the last to leave at night; he is at the beck and call of every one from the President down, and often given imperative orders to do several different things at the same time; his brother messengers will endeavor to shift upon him the more disagreeable portions of their own work. Then, too, he discovers that there is so much, so very much more, that a competent messenger must know than he imagined.

##### GETTING DOWN TO BUSINESS.

When he fully realizes that a long period of hard work, with many disagreeable features, lies before him, he is disappointed, sometimes disagreeable and always convinced that he is abused and underpaid. This period is apt to be as unpleasant for those who are in charge as for the messenger himself, but he gradually settles into the harness and though for a time somewhat unruly, pulls his load willingly, and on the whole with pleasure.

##### FIRST DUTIES.

The messenger's first duties usually consist in copying and filing letters, keeping desks in order, and running unimportant errands.

To copy letters neatly and swiftly is an art. A mussy letter is intolerable

to a banker, and a poor copy may result in great annoyance and perhaps serious loss.

In filing letters the messenger must exert eternal vigilance. A mis-filed letter may bring down upon his head no end of wrath, and perhaps lead to serious consequences to his bank. The letters must be kept filed to date that they may be found instantly when needed, and as he will be held responsible for proper filing, he should be permitted to return all letters to the files himself.

#### PRESENTING COLLECTIONS.

As soon as he learns the difference between notes, drafts and checks, he will probably be assigned to a collection route under the direction of the collection teller. Here he must obey instructions to the letter, and until he has shown that his judgment and caution entitle him to some little discretion, he must keep in closest touch with the collection teller, and when in doubt, get instructions. He should look over his collections carefully before leaving the bank, arrange them so as to cover his route in the least possible time, and anticipate so far as possible questions which may arise, and get instructions in advance.

When payment of a draft is refused, he should note the reason for refusal carefully on the back in pencil together with the date. In case of notes he will do better to make a memorandum elsewhere than on the note, and report to the collection teller. He should never leave collections to be picked up on his return unless he has special permission to do so. Forgetting them would cause much annoyance and loss of time, and during his absence dishonest parties might detach bills of lading or other documents, or substitute, and loss result. He should always note refusals with great care and accuracy. Carelessness in this might result seriously to the business man, and perhaps involve the bank in a lawsuit.

#### VALUABLE EXPERIENCE.

The importance of the collection route is usually underestimated by the messenger. If he does this work conscientiously, and keeps his eyes open, he will learn more of business men and business methods than he possibly can from clerical work inside.

Messengers usually think that if they can be relieved of street duty, and put upon even the simplest clerical work, that they are gainers, but for experience and development of judgment, the route is of greater value.

#### USING THE TELEPHONE.

It falls to the messenger's lot to use the telephone more or less, and here his politeness will show itself if anywhere. For some reason a clerk will be as courageous and impertinent as can be at the telephone, when if brought face to face with people he is meek and mild as you please. Nothing is more disagreeable to a business man than to call up his bank and get a snappish, irritable response from some clerk. *If there is any place in the business world where courtesy pays it is in banking, and employees should be polite as a matter of business if from no better motive.*

#### A DANGEROUS PERIOD.

Often after the messenger has obtained a little proficiency, he concludes that he knows a great deal about the banking business, and he then becomes

dangerous from his over-confidence, and requires the closest watching to prevent serious blunders.

#### DISCLOSING THE BANK'S BUSINESS AFFAIRS.

The messenger must always refrain from telling outsiders what he may learn in the bank about people and affairs. Banks are intrusted with a vast deal of information which should never go out save through the officers, and it sometimes happens that the messenger incidentally obtains information, which, if given out, would cause serious and needless trouble. "Keep your eyes and ears open, and your mouth shut" is a motto bank employees should never forget.

#### UTILIZING OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROMOTION.

The beginner should not neglect opportunities to assist those above him when his duties will permit. By doing this he will familiarize himself with advance work, and increase his chances for promotion. But his own work must never be neglected. He should remember that a bank clerk who learns nothing of his business except during business hours need never expect to become a banker. There are books to be studied and periodicals to be read, and as he reads he should make note of questions which arise, and if he cannot find the answers in his reading, bring his questions at a proper time to some older clerk or officer, and he will always find them glad to render him assistance.

A good bank messenger is welcomed by all connected with the bank from the President down, and if he is efficient and has the welfare of his bank always at heart he may be sure of appreciation and in due time of promotion and increased salary. In no field of business is there greater demand for capable service than in banking, and if the messenger proves himself to be of the right sort his promotion will be certain and often rapid.

SEYMOUR S. COOK.

---

## II.

### ROUTINE WORK OF BANK EMPLOYEES.

Speaking in a large sense, the bank is the pivot of the world. Its business should work as accurately and harmoniously as a well-regulated clock. The smoothness of action of this commercial machine depends to a certain extent upon the clerks who conduct the smaller details of the institution. They should be men of decision, intelligent, honorable, broad-minded, and ready at all times to advance the best interests of their employers.

The chief duties of the bank clerk are involved in the summons which calls him to his work, and those duties are to be fulfilled in a special line or sphere. The duties of the clerks in the different departments vary, but the responsibility in each case is to be found where the assigned work is found.

The clerk is a man in the midst of a force of men, who are to work with him and near him for a considerable period. By reason of his experience as compared with that of some of these men, their knowledge is measurably greater than his. Because of the arrangements and conditions of the banking life the opportunities of meeting his older associates and forming a somewhat familiar acquaintance with their methods and transactions are considerable. He has a sphere of knowledge which is outside the limits of his duty,



or of which his duty is only a part. By labor and thought it is within his power to acquire a fair share of ability. He should devise a system of self-culture, learn well his duties, and fit himself so that when promotion calls him to a more difficult position, he need not retrace his steps in search of information that slipped by in former days.

The bank clerk's advancement depends entirely upon his understanding of the details of his business. His daily experience deals with duties seemingly unimportant, but in reality necessary to the knowledge of banking. The duties of the minor clerkships are important inasmuch as they are auxiliary to other bank work, and the neglect of them destroys the perfection of the clerical mechanism. A messenger, therefore, should be prompt and obedient. Important communications and dispatches are given to him for proper disposal, and carelessness would cause the greatest inconvenience and embarrassment. Having acquired some knowledge of responsibility, other duties are assigned to him, such as balancing pass-books, rendering statements and posting records of more or less importance. Thus he gradually learns banking methods, fitting himself for a higher position.

#### THE COLLECTION DEPARTMENT.

An important feature of any bank is the collection department. Collections of all kinds come to the care of the collection teller, including bills of exchange, both foreign and domestic, deeds, mortgages, bonds and coupons. In order to dispose of them intelligently, he should have some knowledge of the laws governing banking. A careful perusal of the journals of banking will assist him in gaining this knowledge, as they publish in each issue decisions of the supreme courts affecting all transactions in banking. The clerk who is well informed as to these rulings can always use his knowledge successfully.

#### DUTIES OF THE BOOKKEEPERS.

The place of bookkeeper demands above all else absolute accuracy. The bookkeeper keeps the minutes of the day's proceedings, the records of what his associates have done. He records all debits and credits, and compiles accounts of the depositor's business with the bank, and of the bank's business with other institutions. He should adopt such methods of checking his work as will avoid mixing of accounts. Every possible expedient should be resorted to for the purpose of facilitating his work, and guarding against errors. His books should be balanced at such intervals as will keep them in harmony with other records of the bank. Precision should be the first duty of the bookkeeper. Proof of certainty should be made manifest; the officers depend on his statements in basing a line of credit or rediscount, in buying and selling exchange, in declaring dividends, and in charging off doubtful assets. They should be made to rely upon his work unhesitatingly.

#### QUALIFICATIONS OF THE SUCCESSFUL TELLER.

The position of teller demands a man who has been tried and not found wanting, who has devoted his energies to less important positions, and in course of time stepped upward. The teller in his official capacity meets more customers and has more dealings with them than any other employee of the bank. He should, as far as possible, have a full knowledge of accounts to govern his actions. It is his duty to post himself thoroughly on all tech-

nicalities of indorsements and signatures, authorizations from corporations, individuals and their agents; all legal points requisite in carrying out his assigned work. Besides his intrinsic faculties, he must be cautious, vigilant, discreet; above all things he must be reticent, patient, polite. He should be ready to supply the reasonable demands of all depositors. He is intrusted with the cash of the bank, and the disposal thereof on proper authority, and if he is recreant to his trust, loss and confusion will result. He should conduct affairs in such a methodical manner that no complaint or complications can arise from delays or negligence. The depositor's efforts to accomplish a day's work should not be frustrated by unnecessary delays. Nothing is more appreciated both by the employer and depositor than promptness.

The teller should acquire information on the financial topics of the day, so that when questions are asked on such matters, he can reply with reasonable intelligence. He holds a position which not all men can fill, and his future depends on his good judgment. The degree to which he succeeds in doing his duty marks with very great accuracy the human worth that is in him, the degree of success or real ultimate victory he can expect to achieve in the financial world.

#### DEPARTMENT OUTSIDE THE BANK.

I have spoken of the duties of the bank clerk to his employer. There are duties which he owes himself, and which play a leading role in his career. A bank employee demands the esteem and respect of the people whose money he has in charge, and, in order to hold their confidence, he should be careful not to destroy it by his actions in private life. His habits should not be such as to cause derogatory comment. His behavior when absent from bank duties should conform with the dignity of his position. In private matters his integrity should be unquestionable, and his financial affairs beyond criticism. His expenditures, of course, should not exceed his income.

A bank clerk owes his best efforts to his employer. There is no need to be nervous about industry. Devoted in the proper direction, it always bears good fruit. Indolent and shiftless clerks have a short business life, and when a man has served a bank for years, it is a tacit admission of his worth and ability. Good work always wins good reputation—nothing is more certain than this. The science of banking is not intuitive. There is no golden road to it: each clerk must do his part and do it well. Let each one apply his shoulder to the wheel, with all energies exerted, overcoming such obstacles as may come across the path of duty, and pushing the work he has in charge to success. It rests with the bank clerk himself to elevate or degrade his profession in the public mind, according as he conducts himself and his business. In proportion as he applies himself diligently to his work, and recognizes the obligations and dignity of his calling, so shall we hear more of the successful financier who has gradually learned how to use wisely and well his power of finance, the advantage to himself and the good to his profession no longer requiring argument, "the need of argument having ceased in the light of demonstration."

LOUIS SIEMENS.

---

NOTE.—The above is the second of a series of papers designed to be helpful to bank clerks and officers. Successful bankers and other expert contributors have been secured who will treat thoroughly of the requisite qualifications to win success as a bank clerk and officer.

## \* MODERN BANKING METHODS.

---

A NEW SERIES ON PRACTICAL BANKING—HELPFUL HINTS DERIVED  
FROM EXPERIENCE.

---

The question has been often asked, "What is a bank?" This would seem to many a strange question, for the bank has become such a familiar institution in our cities and towns that to be without it would indeed be strange, yet the peculiar ideas regarding the objects and functions of a bank, as exhibited by some, would seem to indicate a lack of information on the subject. Some seem to consider a bank to be a purely philanthropic institution. Such was evidently the idea of an old farmer who came to a bank in his neighboring town and requested a loan of \$500 (he had no account there). Upon being asked for security he became very angry and went away remarking that "he didn't see what a bank was good for if you couldn't get money out of it when you wanted to."

Some seem to feel that banks are robbers, organized for the purpose of accumulating the deposits of the people and then misusing or stealing them. Those who have had sad experiences with some banks cannot be blamed for feeling in this way.

### THE ORIGIN OF BANKING.

To arrive at an understanding of what a bank is let us look at the origin of banking.

The word bank is supposed by some writers to be derived from the Italian word *banc* or *banco*, which signified a bench or counter, such as was used by the Lombardy Jews or money changers, for convenience in counting their coin. In those early days money was carried in coin, and it was necessary to exchange these moneys before passing from one country to another. Other authorities say the Italian word *banco* is derived from *banck*, signifying a heap, or common fund.

The first known bank, such as we understand it, was the Bank of Venice, which was organized in 1171. This was, however, purely a bank of deposit, for the safe keeping of money, jewelry, or other valuables. This bank made loans to the Government, and was eminently successful, but was finally destroyed by the French in 1797.

For more than two hundred years this bank stood alone, then the Banks of Barcelona and Genoa were organized.

In 1609 came into existence the Bank of Amsterdam; in 1694 the Bank of England; in 1695 the Bank of Scotland; and in 1783 the Bank of Ireland.

These were all banks of deposit and discount or loan, similar to what we know them to-day.

The first bank in the United States was organized in 1781 in Philadelphia, and called "The Bank of North America." This bank is still in existence,

---

\* Continued from the January number, page 53. This series of articles commenced in the MAGAZINE for August, 1896, page 249.

and flourishing, an example of careful conservative management. From that day to the present the growth of the banking business has kept pace with the other various interests, in fact it has become so intimately interwoven with all the other varied interests of the country that they have become interdependent.

Gilbart says "a banker is a dealer in capital, or, more properly, a dealer in money. He is an intermediary between the borrower and lender. By this means he draws into active operations those small sums of money which were previously unproductive in the hands of private individuals, and at the same time furnishes accommodation to those who have need of additional capital to carry on their business."

A bank of the present day is defined to be "an institution authorized to receive deposits of money, to lend money, and to issue promissory notes, or to perform some one or more of these functions."\*

The business of banking in its broadest sense includes the receiving of deposits, paying of checks, the loaning of money, dealing in bills of exchange and the issuing of paper money.

In looking back over the history of banking it is seen that the bank was the natural outgrowth of man's necessities.

In the earliest ages barter was simply carried on by the exchange of commodities. As this increased beyond the point of convenience various mediums of exchange were adopted, such as pieces of metal, flint, or shells. As the trade and barter between individuals in a community increased and extended to other communities the necessity began to be felt for some recognized medium of exchange that would be acceptable in communities outside their own, and have more recognized value.

The governments of various countries or communities then issued certain mediums of exchange, putting their stamp upon them, and passed laws regarding their value. As the values varied in the different countries or communities, it necessitated the money changer, who was to be found in the market places of the various cities on the borders of the Mediterranean, where the earliest trade seemed to appear.

The increase in trade and the natural increase in the volume of these mediums of exchange (coin) began to make it very inconvenient and unsafe, in the then condition of society, to carry this coin on the person except in limited quantities. At first the bulk was kept in strong chests in the houses of the merchants or traders, but this became dangerous as robbers infested the countries. Then arose a demand for a strong and safe place of deposit, and upon this was organized the first bank. A building suitable to the business was erected and vaults built and here the traders deposited their surplus mediums of exchange daily for safe keeping. As I have before stated, the banks at this period received for safe keeping various articles of value, and a fee was charged for their care.

At first there was no common general fund, each depositor leaving his coin in a bag or bags upon which he had inscribed his private mark, a similar method being adopted with regard to other valuables left for safe keeping.

As the business increased, the responsibilities of the banks grew, and for their own protection, as well as for the protection of their customers, they

---

\* Bouv. Dict., Vol. I, Tit. Bank.

adopted a simple system of giving and receiving a form of receipt or acknowledgment when a deposit was made or withdrawn.

#### INTRODUCTION OF BANK NOTES AND DRAFTS.

As time went on, and the business of trade and barter increased apace, so that from the Mediterranean ports it extended to Spain, France, Germany and the British Isles, it was found extremely inconvenient and cumbersome to carry the large sums of coin necessary to meet all demands. Then came, to meet the demand, the introduction of bank notes.

Still later a closer interchange among the banks of those countries was called for by the mercantile community, consequently they adopted the plan of depositing sums of money with each other, and then selling orders or drafts against these, this being a more safe and convenient method of carrying money from one country to another.

These deposits could only be made in coin, and they had to be sent by a special armed messenger, sometimes accompanied by an armed guard, consequently the rate of exchange, or cost of a draft, was necessarily high.

Still later came the individual check, or order upon the bank, it being the natural outgrowth of the personal receipt to the bank when withdrawing any sums just as the pass-book has been the outgrowth of the simple receipt given by the bank for the deposit of any sums or valuables.

The original checks were simply an order, and had to be presented at the bank by the drawer for the withdrawal of any sum. As the demands of business increased these were made negotiable, consequently transferable, and thus we have the check of the present day, by which over ninety per cent. of the immense business of our country is transacted.

With the increase of trade came naturally the great increase in volume of the negotiable checks, and as it became necessary for each check to find its home bank, the system of exchanging between the banks in the cities by messengers soon grew too cumbersome, so the clearing-house system was organized, as has been shown in previous chapters.

The deposit between banks at a distance is now safely conducted by the mails and by the use of drafts and checks, in place of coin and the armed messenger, thus greatly reducing the expense.

#### THE PEOPLE BENEFITED BY BANKS.

I have given this little account of the growth of the banking business to show its intimate connection with the commercial world. The banks are the outcome of the demands of trade and they have increased with the natural growth of trade. The various convenient methods in use to-day are, as I have shown, the gradual outcome of the demands of business for convenience and safety.

The banks may be said to be an excellent system of combination, by which the best results may be obtained. By means of the combined amounts of numerous depositors the banks have at their command an amount for loaning to business interests, to the benefit of the community, consequently for the benefit of the people of the country, such as few individuals could possibly have. One writer has very aptly compared the bank to a river into which flow numerous small streams each too small to do more than to water or fertilize its own immediate territory, while the river has power to move the wheels of myriads of mills, and float the ships from all parts of the world.

Another position a bank fills in a community, and by no means the least, and that is as a sort of trustee of the funds of its depositors. These funds are deposited with the confidence that they will be repaid whenever called for. The banks therefore hold them in trust, and are bound by the law to use all due diligence in their care and safety. They are permitted by the law to loan out a certain proportion of these deposits under certain restrictions, and these restrictions are made for the protection of the depositors.

I speak particularly of this position for it is an important one, and I feel it is sometimes overlooked. A bank may thus hold an influential position in a community, none more so, and if carefully managed can wield it for the benefit of all.

Nothing has it in its power to encourage thrift in a community like a bank, particularly a bank for savings. Such an institution comes near to the lives of the people; it helps them to save, and by such savings to elevate the otherwise poor to a better position. The immense increase in savings deposits in our country in the last twenty-five years well attests the growth of thrift among the working people.

With all the benefits that the banks are to a community they are *not* philanthropic institutions. They must exist, and to be enabled to do so must make money, as there are running expenses to be paid always, besides, if possible, a fair rate of interest upon the invested capital in the case of discount and deposit banks, and interest to the depositors in the case of savings banks.

These profits are made from the loaning of money and from careful investments, and from selling exchange, and in some sections of the country from collection fees.

Banks may be classified into two kinds, private and public or chartered. The private banks are like any other private business, owned and run by private individuals or firms. The chartered banks are corporations, and obtain their authority from either the United States Government (National banks), or from their State governments.

A. R. BARRETT.

(To be continued.)

**SECRET BANK RESERVES.**—When it was stated that the loss of nearly \$700,000 occasioned by the defalcation of a note teller in the First National Bank, of New York, some time ago would be made good without any reduction of the surplus or undivided profits, considerable surprise was expressed, and some of the newspapers criticized the policy of a bank carrying a reserve fund other than that shown in its published statements.

It is, of course, very easy for a bank to have a reserve outside of that shown in its published statement. For instance, the Bank of England, owning most valuable property in the heart of London, does not report the value of this real estate in its assets at all. Another way in which banks can hold a secret reserve is by carrying bonds and other securities at par value—a conservative plan always—the premium thus forming a margin of unreported reserve. Doubtless the directors could also provide an emergency fund on short notice.

In the case of a weak bank it is very fortunate if it can make up a defalcation without reducing its published surplus. The First National, of New York, was so strong that the loss of even so large amount as \$690,000 did not cause the slightest concern to its depositors.







## A COMBINED COLLECTION REGISTER AND DIARY.

---

### A NEW AND CONDENSED FORM FOR SAVING TIME AND LABOR IN HANDLING COLLECTIONS.

---

An up-to-date banking system is built on the foundation of complete records in the most concise form.

The illustration given herewith is a reduced copy of a left-hand page from a combination register and diary for out-of-town collections, and has the completeness of the ordinary method of two books while requiring only one entry. The right-hand page is the same except that the marginal numbers run from 50 to 99 inclusive.

The number of the collection being given refers directly to the page and exact line on which the collection is entered in the diary without the necessity of first turning to the register for the due date, and then to the proper page in the diary where the item in question is found.

The book has as many pages as desired, and each double-page is ruled for one hundred collections. Should a bank's business require fifty lines for each day's collections, each page is due dated as in the ordinary diary.

If one hundred collections is an average day's business, each double-page is due dated. If any day, as the first or fifteenth of the month, requires more space, three pages or two double-pages are given to these dates.

The book being thus due dated, each double-page beginning with January 1 is numbered consecutively; thus March 15 being the seventy-fourth day of the year, this double-page is numbered 74. All collections maturing March 15 are entered on this page, and if on line 25 (all lines above being previously filled) the number of the collection becomes 7425.

This number being reported refers at once to page 74, line 25.

The page numbers run to ninety-nine and repeat. This gives room for registering ten thousand collections without repeating numbers, and prevents any collection having a number of more than four digits. Checks and demand and sight drafts are entered and numbered the same as time items, all such collections being registered on page of date of receipt.

The column headed "note, draft, check" is for the purpose of registering the kind of item recorded and may be done by using the first letter of those words only, thus n, d, c, as the case may be. The third column headed "Ins't" is for the instructions as to protest. The next three columns record the date, time and rate of interest of the item.

One thing which seems imperative in the proper handling of collections is that the advice to the bank from whom received should be made by the correspondent direct from the forwarding bank's original letter, and not from a credit slip made by the collection clerk from his records. If this advice is then checked with the ledger credit, it is almost impossible for an error to get out of the office.

For this purpose a column is provided in the book headed "Letter,"

which enables the collection clerk to refer to the original letter by its date, and to hand it properly marked to the correspondent for advice.

It is advisable to keep a record of all tracers sent regarding unpaid items and a column is inserted for this purpose directly to the right of the columns for the amount.

This book has been in use by one of the most progressive banks in the country for three years, and there has never a question arisen regarding any collection which has not been promptly answered by reference to it.

A bank collection department differs from any other in that its records have nothing to do with the bank's assets, or total footings, and for this reason a change of method can be made here without seriously involving the workings of the other departments of the bank.

It may appear at first that time would be lost searching for records where no number is reported, but banks, almost without exception nowadays, will report a number if one is given, and it has been demonstrated in the time this book has been in use, that this inconvenience is infinitesimal in comparison with the time and labor saved in having only one book for all out-of-town collections, of registering each item once only, and of being able to refer to the exact page and line from the collection number.

---

**SOUTHERN SMALL LOAN BUSINESS.**—In the cities and larger towns throughout the Southern States there are a surprisingly great number of concerns that carry on the business of making small loans on the security of personal property. These form a distinct class from the pawn-brokers; they apparently earn large net profits out of the exorbitant interest charged the customer, and altogether seem to be a good subject for the study of the social scientist as well as the financier. It chanced that the writer had a recent opportunity to gain some insight into the methods used in the business. The office of a loan concern of this kind is likely to be in a somewhat retired location, and matters are carried on in a quiet manner so as not to attract too much attention of the public, except the class to which the business caters.

The applicant for a loan is required to sign a printed application describing the furniture or other property offered as security, reciting that it is the property of the applicant and unencumbered, etc. After the property has been examined, a trust deed is executed of the property, which deed is made to an employee of the loan company. The loan is nominally granted at the legal rate of interest, but in fact no regular interest is charged at all. In the case of a concern which operates in a number of cities, and which may be taken as a type of all, the charge for a loan of \$15 would be \$5, and the borrower is obliged to repay the consequent note for \$20 at the rate of \$5 per week. This is somewhere about 700 per cent. per annum.

It is usual to take all the security possible, and generally the whole household furniture of the borrower. But it is not the policy of the lenders to foreclose hastily in case of default in payments, but rather to carry the borrower along, making a charge for this. In case of foreclosure, however, the whole property given as security is seized and the proceeds kept by the lender.

A curious feature of the matter is that the average loan amounts to only about \$5, the amounts varying from about \$3 to \$20. An instance was shown by the books of one of the petty bankers mentioned in which a steady borrower had paid in about \$240 in interest in the space of three or four years, although the amount borrowed at any one time never exceeded \$20.

The operations of these petty banks are somewhat held in check by the fear of publicity through the newspapers, and the danger of being closed up by the authorities. But it is evident that a better cure for the evils of the present system would be the establishment of larger and more responsible concerns which might operate under statutes specially designed for their control. These should, of course, not be restricted by the ordinary usury laws, but operating without the fear of legal interference they could afford to accept a fair rate of interest. They would prove a blessing to the poorer class of borrowers and, no doubt, profitable to the proprietors.

CRAWFORD DOUGLASS.

# BANKING LAW DEPARTMENT.

---

## IMPORTANT LEGAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST TO BANKERS.

---

All the latest decisions affecting bankers rendered by the United States Courts and State Court of last resort will be found in the MAGAZINE'S Law Department as early as obtainable.

Attention is also directed to the "Replies to Law and Banking Questions," included in this Department.

---

### DEFENSE OF USURY IN ACTION BY NATIONAL BANK.

Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Department, December, 1900.

#### FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF PENSACOLA *vs.* ANDERSON.

Taking usury by a National bank does not involve a forfeiture of the debt either as a penalty or otherwise, but renders the transaction void only as to the excess of interest.

The penalty imposed upon National banks for the taking of usury can be recovered only in an action of debt.

Where the defense of usury is interposed in an action by a National bank, if the question of the limitation upon the amount of interest the plaintiff is entitled to recover is not raised below, it cannot be considered on appeal.

---

PATTERSON, *J.*: Upon the trial of this action and at the close of all the proofs, a verdict was directed for the plaintiff. From the judgment entered upon that verdict and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, appeal is taken. There is also brought up for review an intermediate order, denying a motion made by the defendant (Kathleen B. Anderson) to postpone the trial. That intermediate order must be affirmed. The affidavit upon which the motion was made was insufficient. It did not show that the defendant was a material and necessary witness in her own behalf, for it was not made to appear that she had personal knowledge of any of the facts material to the issues or that she took part in any of the transactions or negotiations connected with the subject of the action, except that she was an accommodation indorser of the promissory note upon which the action was brought—a fact which was not disputed.

The plaintiff, a National bank located and doing business in the State of Florida, brought this action originally against one Woodbury, the maker of a promissory note for \$25,000, and against Kathleen B. Anderson and Malcolm C. Anderson, as indorsers of that note. The complaint contains the usual and appropriate allegations to charge each of the defendants. The action was discontinued as against Woodbury, and judgment was entered upon a stipulation against Malcolm C. Anderson. The action being severed, was continued against Kathleen B. Anderson. The case was tried upon issues framed upon her separate answer, the only substantial defenses interposed by her being that she was an accommodation indorser; that the transaction in which the plaintiff took the note was tainted with usury, and that only \$6,000 was advanced on the note by the plaintiff. The averment of her answer is that the usury was taken by the plaintiff. The issue as to usury is by the pleading limited exclusively to the plaintiff in its acquisition of the

note. The affirmative defense of Mrs. Anderson, stated more fully, is that one Woodbury made his promissory note payable to her order for \$25,000 at six per cent. interest, and delivered the same to Malcolm C. Anderson, her husband, who requested her to indorse the note, which she did for the accommodation of Mr. Anderson; that the plaintiff was aware of the said transaction in all its details, and that it received said promissory note with such knowledge, and that it is not an innocent holder for value before maturity of the note sued upon.

Considering the defense of usury under the issues as framed by the pleadings, it would be sufficient to say that that defense is not open to Mrs. Anderson by way of defeating the plaintiff's right of recovery. Under the provisions of the National Banking Act (13 U. S. Statutes at Large, 99) taking usury by a National bank does not involve a forfeiture of the debt either as a penalty or otherwise. The most that could be claimed would be that the contract would be good for what might be lawfully taken and void only as to the excess (*Farmers' Nat. Bank vs. Deering*, 91 U. S. 35). By the act of Congress referred to there is a penalty imposed for taking usury by National banks, but it can only be recovered in an action of debt. We had occasion to consider that subject in *Caponigri vs. Altieri* (29 App. Div. 306).

[The Court then discussed questions not of interest here.]

---

**BOOKS OF BANK AS EVIDENCE AGAINST BONDSMEN OF CASHIER.**

Court of Appeals of New York, January 8, 1901.

**THE STATE BANK OF PIKE vs. GEORGE M. BROWN.**

The books of a bank, and computations made therefrom, are not admissible as evidence against the bondsmen of a defaulting Cashier without preliminary proof of their accuracy or regularity; it appearing that the entries relied upon were made by persons other than such Cashier.

---

Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department, unanimously affirming a judgment entered upon the report of a referee.

This action was brought upon a bond dated January 2, 1893, signed by Earle S. White, as principal, and by the defendants and others, as sureties, to recover the sum of \$2,467.36 alleged to be due the plaintiff thereon by reason of a breach of the condition thereof.

The bond was in the penal sum of \$20,000, with the obligatory part in the usual form, and the following recital and condition underwritten: "Whereas, the above bounden Earle S. White has been elected Cashier of the State Bank of Pike, located and doing business in the Village of Pike, N. Y., by reason whereof divers sums of money, goods and chattels, the property of said bank, will come into his hands; now, therefore, the condition of the above obligation is such that if the said Earle S. White, his executors or administrators or assigns, at the expiration of his term of office upon request to him or them made, shall make or give unto the said State Bank of Pike, or its agent or attorney, a just and true account of all such sums of money, goods or chattels, and other valuable things as have come into his hands, charge or possession, as Cashier of the said bank, and shall pay over and deliver to his successor in office, or such other person as may be duly authorized to receive the same, all such sums of money, goods and chattels and other valuable

things as shall appear to be in his hands and due by him to the said bank; then the above obligation to be void, else to remain in full force and virtue.'

White was not a party to the action, but the answer of his sureties, among other defenses, set forth in substance a general denial.

The referee found that on April 12, 1892, the plaintiff, a banking association incorporated under the laws of this State, employed White as its Cashier; that on January 2, 1893, the bond in question was given; that White ceased to be Cashier on August 15, 1895, and that he had failed to pay over and deliver the following sums which came into his possession as Cashier: \$223.04 of bills and notes discounted; \$361.08 of moneys deposited in the bank by persons not doing an active business, and \$1,283 of moneys deposited for which certificates of deposit were issued. Judgment was directed and entered for the sum of \$1,867.12, and after affirmance by the Appellate Division the defendants appealed to this court.

VANN, J.: The burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to show that the condition of the bond was broken by the failure of White, "at the expiration of his term of office," and "upon request to him" made, either to render the just and true account required, or to pay over and deliver the moneys and other valuable things which had come into his possession as Cashier. In order to meet the burden of proof the plaintiff read in evidence, under objection and exception, its by-laws, which, in specifying the duties of the Cashier, among other things, provided that he should "keep a full and complete set of books of the association, showing a systematic and accurate exhibit of the affairs of the association, such as are usually kept in well-conducted banking institutions." They also provided that he should have "personal supervision \* \* \* of the taking and discounting of commercial paper."

Next, without any preliminary proof, it offered in evidence the books of the bank or such parts thereof as were applicable. The books were separately received subject to the objection that each was immaterial and incompetent as against the defendants, who duly excepted to the various rulings admitting them. Under exceptions founded on similar objections certain computations made by a witness from these books were received, which tended to show the different items of shortage precisely as found by the referee. The following questions, rulings and answers illustrate the nature of this evidence and the method of introducing it: "Q. State what you have done with reference to the items, bills discounted, in the same manner. State the computation you have made and the statement as contained of that item of bills discounted, and the result of your computation." This was objected to by the defendant "as immaterial and incompetent; that the entries upon the books from which the computation is made are not evidence as against the defendants," and "that it does not appear that the defendants' principal made those entries or was in any way responsible for them." The objection was overruled, the defendants excepted and the witness answered: "I took the accounts themselves representing notes and bills discounted, listed them and footed them. I found there was \$90,813.33. The daily statement register shows \$91,036.37, a difference of \$223.04. That was a shortage in the bills discounted. I proved up the certificates of deposit and made the computation of them. Q. State what you found with reference to that." This was objected to as before and upon the further ground that the certificates of deposit should be produced as they were the best evidence, but the objection was overruled and

the defendants again excepted. The witness then stated his computations as before, and testified that they showed a shortage in certificates of deposit of \$1,283. Subsequently the certificates were produced, but as to the other accounts there was no evidence to establish a breach of the condition of the bond, except the bare fact that the books showed a shortage. The expert who made the computations testified: "The question as to whether there was this discrepancy of \$223.04 is determined by me from the examination of the entries in the books made prior to January, 1893, and my examination of books and bills receivable, as I found them on August 15, 1895." This necessarily included entries made before the bond was given.

After the books and computations were thus received it appeared that the journal and ledger were kept principally by White, but that the auxiliary books were kept by other persons, one of whom was living within the State at the time of the trial. It did not appear whether White was then within reach of a subpoena or not, but it was shown that he disappeared about August 15, 1895, and no further evidence was given on the subject.

The entries made by White after the bond was given were admissible against his sureties, because they were the acts of their principal relating to the money and property in his custody which they had promised he should account for and pay over. The entries read in evidence, however, did not appear to have been made by him. The defendants were not responsible for the way in which he discharged his general duties as Cashier, but only for his failure to render a just account of what came into his hands in that capacity and to pay over and deliver accordingly. They were strangers to the books of the bank. They had no right of access to them, and the entries made therein by persons other than White were no more binding upon them than upon the public generally. Neither the books nor the by-laws are referred to in the bond. The duties imposed upon White by the bond were not those imposed upon him by the by-laws, and the former were not to be performed until after the latter had ceased through the expiration of his term of office as Cashier. The bond did not make the books evidence, and, aside from the entries made by White after the date of the bond, they could be lawfully received against the defendants to the extent only that they were admissible against strangers generally, according to the principles of the common law governing the subject.

Without any preparatory proof the books were admitted *in solido* as evidence *per se* against the sureties. They were received upon the mere statement that they were the books of the bank made by a witness who never saw them until after White had ceased to be Cashier. There was no proof of original entries by the persons who made them and none even of their handwriting, custom or duties. The testimony subsequently given did not relieve the situation, for, while it appeared that the journal and ledger were mainly kept by White, it did not appear that the entries in question were made by him, and the auxiliary books were kept by other persons, one of whom at least could have been produced as a witness. The computations were not admissible unless the books were admissible, because they were made solely from the books and were of no importance except as summary statements of the contents of the books. They were made in part from entries of an earlier date than the bond.

All the entries, except those made by White after the execution of the

bond, were hearsay evidence as against the defendants. They were the written statements of third persons, made without the sanction of an oath, with no proof as to who made them or that the person making them was dead, or without the jurisdiction of the court, or that they were made in the usual course of business in accordance with a uniform practice to make them when the transactions occurred and to make them precisely as they occurred. For aught that appears they may have been false when made, to the knowledge of the person making them. Neither the books nor the computations made, therefore, were admissible against the defendants, because the necessary conditions precedent were not complied with by the plaintiff (*Ocean Nat. Bank vs. Carll*, 55 N. Y. 440; *White vs. Ambler*, 8 N. Y. 170; *Bank of Monroe vs. Culver*, 2 Hill, 531; *Brewster vs. Doane*, 2 Hill, 537).

This case should not be confounded with those which authorize books to be read in evidence after a proper foundation has been laid (*Smith vs. Smith*, 163 N. Y. 168; *McGoldrick vs. Traphagan*, 88 N. Y. 334; *First Nat. Bank of Whitehall vs. Tisdale*, 84 N. Y. 655; *Vosburgh vs. Thayer*, 12 Johns. 461; 1 Greenl. Ev., 14th ed., sec. 115; 2 Wharton on Ev., 3d ed., sec. 681; 2 Rice on Ev., 815), nor with those which sanction as competent entries made upon the books of a copartnership in the regular course of business as against the copartners having access thereto (*Hotopp vs. Huber*, 160 N. Y. 524; *Flour City Nat. Bank vs. Widener*, 163 N. Y. 276).

We do not hold that the pertinent entries in the books were not admissible under any circumstances, but simply that they were not admissible when offered, and were not made admissible by any evidence subsequently received.

As the books were the foundation of the judgment rendered by the referee as to all of the recovery, at least, except the part relating to certificates of deposit, the incompetent evidence necessarily affected the result and requires a reversal.

The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.

O'Brien, Bartlett, Haight, Martin, Landon and Cullen, JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed, etc.

#### USURY—NATIONAL BANKS—STATE STATUTES.

Supreme Court of Georgia, November 27, 1900.

#### FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF DALTON vs. McENTIRE.

The penalty imposed by Section 5198 Rev. Stat. U. S. upon National banks for charging usury is exclusive.

The law of Georgia that a waiver of homestead, when part of a usurious contract, is void, is not applicable to National banks.

A surety who signs a promissory note containing a waiver of homestead, and secretly tainted with usury, is not discharged from liability when the note is payable to a National bank.

Action by the First National Bank of Dalton against J. C. McEntire and others. Verdict for plaintiff as to all the defendants except McEntire. From an order directing a verdict in his favor, the bank brought error. Reversed.

FISH, J.: The First National Bank of Dalton sued four parties as makers and J. C. McEntire as indorser upon a promissory note payable to the bank. McEntire alone made any defense. The uncontroverted facts upon the trial were that McEntire signed the note as a mere accommodation indorser, that

the note contained a waiver of the benefit of the homestead and exemption laws, and that it was secretly tainted with usury, which fact was unknown to McEntire at the time he signed it. Upon these facts the court directed a verdict for the bank against the makers and in favor of McEntire, the indorser, against the bank. The bank excepted to the direction of a verdict releasing McEntire.

The question made is whether the usury rendered void the waiver of homestead and exemption. If the note had been payable otherwise than to a National bank, there would be no difficulty in deciding the question, as this court has frequently held that a waiver of the right of homestead and exemption made as part of a usurious contract is void, and, this being true, that "a surety upon a promissory note secretly tainted with usury, of which fact he had no knowledge, is discharged from liability if it contained a waiver of homestead." (*Denton vs. Butler* [99 Ga. 264] and cases cited.)

The reason is that the usury made the waiver void, and thus rendered the surety's risk greater than it would otherwise have been. Does this doctrine apply where the note is payable to a National bank? Section 5198 of the Revised Statutes of the United States provides that the knowingly taking, receiving, reserving, or charging usury by a National bank shall be deemed a forfeiture of the entire interest, and, in case usury has been paid, the bank shall be liable for twice the amount of the interest paid, provided suit is brought for the same within two years from the time the usurious transaction occurred. It has been held that this statute supersedes the State laws on the subject of usury, so far as they might otherwise be applicable to National banks. In *Bank vs. Dearing* (91 U. S. 29), the plaintiff, a National banking association, organized under the National Banking Act, and located and doing business in the State of New York, knowingly discounted the note in suit at a greater rate of interest than was allowed by the laws of that State, and the question was whether that made the note void, as provided by the State statute. The Court of Appeals of New York, following its decision in *Bank vs. Lamb* (55 N. Y. 95), held that it did, but the Supreme Court of the United States reversed that judgment, and held that it did not, and said that banking associations organized under said act are instruments designed to be used to aid the Government in the administration of an important branch of the public service; that they are means appropriate to that end; that Congress was the sole judge of the necessity of their creation; that, being such means, and created and intended to be employed for such purpose, the States can exercise no control over them, nor in any way affect their operation, except in so far as Congress may see fit to permit; that, in any view that can be taken of the thirtieth section of said act—section 5198, Rev. St. U. S.—the power to supplement it by State legislation is conferred neither expressly nor even impliedly; and that when a statute creates a new offense, and denounces the penalty, or gives a new right, and provides the remedy, the punishment or the remedy can be only that provided by the statute.

In *Oates vs. Bank* (100 U. S. 239), it appeared that the First National Bank of Montgomery had several times extended an indebtedness due it by the Tallassee Manufacturing Company, upon each occasion receiving in advance usurious interest for the extension. Finally the bank granted a further extension to the manufacturing company upon collateral security being furnished, and upon the payment, in advance, of interest at a usurious



rate. Among the collaterals placed with the bank under this arrangement was the note of Oates, payable to the order of the manufacturing company, and by it indorsed in blank. Oates, when sued by the bank upon the note, sought to set up certain defenses which he had against the manufacturing company, contending that the bank, although it might have taken the note as collateral before its maturity, and without notice of such defenses, should not be considered a *bona fide* holder for value, because the contract under which it received the note involved in its execution a direct violation of the State statutes against usury; and to sustain his contention relied upon several decisions of the Supreme Court of Alabama, holding that one "who has become the indorsee of a bill by violating the provisions of a statute cannot, with any degree of propriety, be said to be a *bona fide* holder in the usual course of trade." The indorsement was held not to be void. Mr. Justice Harlan, delivering the opinion of the court, said:

"The statute under which the bank was organized, known as the 'National Banking Act,' does not declare the contract under which the usurious interest is paid to be void. It denounces no penalty other than a forfeiture of the interest which the note or bill carries, giving to the debtor the right to sue for and recover twice the amount of interest so paid. If we should declare the contract of indorsement void, and, consequently, that no right of action passed to the bank on the note transferred as collateral security, an additional penalty would thus be added beyond those imposed by the law itself. On what principle could this court add another to the penalties declared by the law itself? (*De Wolf vs. Johnson*, 10 Wheat. 367; *Bank vs. Dearing*, 91 U. S. 29; *Barnet vs. Bank*, 98 U. S. 555.)"

It has been held by the courts of last resort in a number of States that the penalties imposed by the National Banking Act upon National banks for taking or charging usury are exclusive. (*Bank vs. Pratt*, 115 Mass. 539; *Davis vs. Randall*, 115 Mass. 547; *Brown vs. Bank*, 72 Pa. St. 209; *Bank vs. Garlinghouse*, 22 Ohio St. 492; *Wiley vs. Starbuck*, 44 Ind. 298; *Bank vs. Childs*, 133 Mass. 248; *Bank vs. Myers*, 74 N. C. 514; *Oldham vs. Bank*, 85 N. C. 240; *Higley vs. Bank*, 26 Ohio St. 75; *Barker vs. Bank*, 59 N. H. 310; *Bank vs. Littell*, 46 N. J. Law, 506; *Bank vs. Schwenk* [Neb.] 64 N. W. 1073; *Florence R. & Imp. Co. vs. Chase Nat. Bank*, 106 Ala. 364, 11 South. 720; *Slaughter vs. Bank*, 109 Ala. 157, 19 South. 430; *Hill vs. Bank*, 56 Vt. 582; *Rockwell vs. Bank* [Colo. App.] 36 Pac. 905.)

If the law of this State declaring a waiver of homestead and exemption to be void when it is part of a usurious contract imposes a penalty or forfeiture for taking or charging usury, then, under the numerous authorities above cited, it cannot be applied when the creditor taking or charging the usury is a National bank. Under our State law the creditor forfeits all right of enforcing the waiver as a punishment for taking or charging usury. Why is it not, therefore, a penalty imposed upon him for so doing? It is a loss of a valuable right, which he is made to forego by reason of the usury. It is a burden which the law places upon him, and it seems to be as much a penalty as the forfeiture of the whole interest imposed by the National Banking Act upon National banks for charging usury. Jackson, C. J., characterized it as a penalty in *Cleghorn vs. Gresson* (77 Ga. 343).

On page 349 of the opinion, after saying that a waiver of homestead is in the nature of a quitclaim, as had been held in *Tribble vs. Anderson* (63 Ga. 55),

he declared that: "This waiver of homestead and exemption—this quitclaim title—is also forfeited whenever the creditor seeks to set it up in order to collect any part of the debt, because the penalty of usury is the forfeiture of all interest over legal interest when sought to be collected anywhere out of any property of the debtor; and the penalty of usury is also the forfeiture of any sort of title, warranty, or quitclaim in any contract where usury is also discovered."

It is so denominated by Simmons, J., now Chief Justice, in *Zellner vs. Mobley* (84 Ga. 748) where, speaking of the section of the Code which declares that "all titles to property made as part of a usurious contract, or to evade the laws against usury, are void," he says, "This statute was enacted as a penalty against usury, and for the protection of the borrower, or his privies in blood or estate." If it be said that a waiver of homestead which forms a part of a usurious contract is rendered void, not as a statutory penalty for charging usury, but simply because it is based upon an illegal consideration, the reply is that, if this were true, every mortgage or other security not involving title to property, given to secure a debt infected with usury, would be for the same reason void, which is not true. (*Hodge vs. Brown*, 81 Ga. 276.)

Besides, it would be anomalous if the waiver were void because based upon an illegal consideration, while the main contract, to which the waiver is a mere incident, is not void. The reason why a security deed infected with usury is void is because the statute has declared that "all titles to property made as a part of a usurious contract, or to evade the laws against usury, are void" (Civ. Code, § 2892); and the reason why a waiver of homestead and exemption, which forms a part of a usurious contract, is void is because "it is enough in the nature of a quitclaim title to be subject to the general rule ordered by statute against passing any kind of title to property for a usurious purpose or as part of a usurious contract." (*Tribble vs. Anderson*, 63 Ga. 54, 55.)

That it is the force of the statute alone, and not the illegality in the consideration, which renders a security dead, or a waiver of homestead tainted with usury void, is shown by the reasoning of the court in *Hodge vs. Brown* (*supra*), where Bleckley, C. J., delivering the opinion, says:

"Section 2057f of the Code provides that 'all titles made as part of a usurious contract, or to evade the laws against usury, are void.' Section 1954 declares that 'a mortgage in this State is only a security for a debt, and passes no title.' Tried by statute law, the result is that any security for a debt which, when pure, affords the security by passing title, is, when contaminated by usury, void, and of no effect. But a security by mortgage, as it passes no title, is not rendered void by the statute. And we know of no law not statutory which requires or authorizes us to hold that a mere ordinary mortgage to secure a debt has less vitality than the debt itself."

As the law of usury applicable to National banks is found in the National Banking Act, and the penalties therein prescribed are exclusive, we are of opinion that a waiver of homestead and exemption in a promissory note infected with usury is not void when the note is payable to a National bank. This being true, a surety who signs a note containing a waiver of homestead and exemption which is secretly tainted with usury, of which fact he has no knowledge at the time of signing, is not discharged from liability thereon if the note is payable to a National bank, because the risk of the surety has not been increased.

It follows that the direction of the verdict for the surety in this case was erroneous. All the justices concurring.

### BANKER'S LIEN—EFFECT OF ASSIGNMENT OF DEPOSITOR.

Supreme Court of the United States, November 7, 1900.

JOHN JOYCE vs. H. F. AUTEN, AS RECEIVER, ETC.

A bank receiving notes for collection is entitled, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, expressed or implied, to retain them as security for the debt of the party depositing them. This lien is not lost though the depositor makes an assignment, with the bank as a preferred creditor, and the bank accepts the assignment.

In error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to review a decision affirming a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an action on a note.

On March 20, 1893, the plaintiff in error, as a surety, executed with his principal the following note:

"Three years after date, we, or either of us, promise to pay to the order of C. H. Whittemore, as Receiver of the McCarthy & Joyce Company, the sum of nine thousand (\$9,000) dollars, with interest at six per cent. per annum from date till paid. This is one of the three notes executed for purchase money of the assets of the McCarthy-Joyce Company, this day sold to James E. Joyce & Company.

JAMES E. JOYCE & CO.

LITTLE ROCK, Arkansas, March 20, 1893.

JOHN JOYCE."

This note was transferred before due for value to the First National Bank of Little Rock, which afterwards went into the hands of a Receiver. Such receivership was changed, and the defendant in error is the present Receiver. The note not having been paid at maturity, this action was brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio. The defendant answered, pleading two defenses.

Mr. Justice BREWER (omitting part of the opinion): The second defense is substantially that the bank was a creditor of the insolvent firm; that it was a preferred creditor; that it had certain notes for collection; that those notes were included in the sale but were not turned over to the purchaser, and that they were of sufficient value to offset the amount due on this note. It is not alleged that the debt due from the insolvent to the bank had been paid by collection of the notes or otherwise, but the defense is rested on the averment that notes thus deposited and unpaid were of sufficient value to pay the unpaid purchase money. It is familiar law that a bank receiving notes for collection is entitled, in the absence of a contract, expressed or implied, to the contrary, to retain them as security for the debt of the party depositing the notes. (1 Jones, Liens, 2d ed. § 244; *Bank of the Metropolis vs. New England Bank*, 1 How. 234, 239, 11 L. ed. 115, 116; *Reynes vs. Dumont*, 130 U. S. 354, 391, 392, 32 L. ed. 934, 944, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 486.)

But if such banker's lien existed the sale transferred nothing but the equity in those notes after the payment of the debt secured by their deposit.

The fact, as alleged, that the bank, although a preferred creditor, accepted the assignment, cannot be construed as an admission that the bank waived its lien on the notes deposited with it for collection. Nowhere is there a suggestion that the bank either directly or indirectly consented that the assignment should operate to divest itself of its lien and transfer the notes in its hands to the Receiver discharged from such lien. While the amount of the

indebtedness of the insolvent to the bank is not in this answer disclosed, counsel refer us to the case of *Cockrill vs. Joyce*, 62 Ark. 216, 35 S. W. 221, a case decided before the commencement of this action, in which the purchaser, the principal debtor, sought to defeat the title of the bank to these notes, and compel an inclusion of them *in solido* in the sale to the purchaser discharged of any lien of the bank thereon. And in that case it appeared that prior to the insolvency the company was indebted to the bank in the sum of nearly \$100,000, and that these notes were placed in its hands for collection. The court sustained the title of the bank to the notes, and their proceeds as security for its indebtedness, notwithstanding the assignment. While we may not refer to that case for matters of fact, yet the facts therein disclosed add weight to the conclusion to which, irrespective thereof, we have come, that an assignment in insolvency does not disturb liens created prior thereto expressly or by implication in favor of a creditor. We conclude, therefore, that the demurrer to the second defense was properly sustained. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is affirmed.

#### TAXATION OF NATIONAL BANKS—KENTUCKY STATUTE.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky, November 20, 1900.

OWEN COUNTY COURT *vs.* FARMERS' NATIONAL BANK OF OWENTON.

The Supreme Court of the United States having declared the Kentucky revenue law of 1892 void, there was no statute in force in the State prior to March 21, 1900, under which National banks could be taxed.

This was a proceeding by the Owen county court against the Farmers' National Bank of Owenton, Ky., to have property assessed. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appealed.

BURNAM, J.: On October 16, 1897, the sheriff of Owen county reported as unassessed for county taxes for the year 1896 the capital stock, surplus, and undivided profits of the appellee bank, and asked that it should be assessed. Appellee, in response thereto, says that on the — of June, 1883, it was organized under the National banking laws, and that on July 30, 1887, it accepted the provisions of what is commonly called the "Hewitt Bill," found in the General Statutes under the title of "Revenue and Taxation" (sections 1-4 of article 2), and that in accordance with said law it did on June 1, 1896, pay to the State of Kentucky the sum of \$519.40, which was accepted by the State in full of all taxes due by said bank for the year 1896; that said payment was made in conformity to and in accordance with the laws of the State as declared by the court of appeals in the opinion rendered by Chief Justice Pryor in the suit of *Com. vs. Farmers' Bank of Kentucky* (31 S. W. Rep. 1013) and pleads and relies on the same by way of defense. The county court sustained a general demurrer to the response, and directed that the appellee bank be assessed for the year 1896 for county purposes. An appeal was prosecuted to the circuit court from this judgment, where it was held that appellee's response to the rule was sufficient, to which judgment appellant excepted, and prosecutes this appeal.

In the spring of 1895 this court decided that banks which had accepted the provisions of the Hewitt Law could not be required to pay county taxes. In 1897 it overruled its former decisions, and held that banks were liable for taxes for county purposes. Subsequently by the Supreme Court of the United

States it was decided that article 3, c. 103, of the Acts of 1891-93, was void and of no effect, in so far as the same provides for the taxation of the franchises of National banks, in consequence of which decision there was at the date of the institution of this proceeding in the county court, and of the judgment in the circuit court, no mode of taxation of National banks. To meet this decision the Legislature passed an act which was approved on March 21, 1900, which is found on page 65 of the Acts of 1900; but as this law was not in operation at the date of the judgment complained of, it follows that the circuit judge did not err in his judgment dismissing the motion of appellant. For reasons indicated, the judgment is affirmed.

**TRANSFER OF DEPOSIT—AUTHORITY OF CASHIER.**

Supreme Court of California, November 24, 1900.

NICHOLSON vs. RANDALL BANKING COMPANY.

Where the directors of a bank permit its Cashier to transfer accounts from a bank which it succeeded, and render statements showing accounts to have been transferred, and lead depositors to believe their accounts to have been transferred, such bank is liable for such accounts.

VAN DYKE, J. (omitting part of the opinion): The action was for the recovery of the sum of \$4,000; the complaint containing two counts,—one for money deposited, and the other upon an account stated. The contention on the part of the defendant is that the \$4,000 alleged to have been deposited by Archibald Nicholson in his lifetime with the defendant bank never was in fact so deposited, and the bank never owed that sum to said Nicholson; that the transfer of the balance due said Nicholson as a depositor in the private bank of A. W. Randall to the account of said Nicholson in the defendant bank was without any consideration moving to the defendant, and was done by the Cashier of said defendant bank without its authority.

\* \* \* \* \*

It appears from the testimony that the business of Randall's private bank was turned over to the defendant bank, and the directors of said defendant bank permitted Murray, as Cashier, to transfer accounts from Randall's private bank, and render statements thereon showing that their accounts had been transferred to the Randall Banking Company. Whether they were so transferred on the books of said defendant bank or not, such customers, including Nicholson, were led to believe that their accounts had been properly transferred, and continued to deal with defendant bank accordingly.

As stated in *Carpv vs. Dowdell* (115 Cal. 683), in a similar case: "Under these circumstances, it is not necessary to determine what power the Cashier had merely by virtue of his position as Cashier; for when a corporation, by a long course of acquiescence, holds out an officer or agent as having authority to do certain things, it cannot, after he has acted, repudiate his acts."

This rule is supported by many authorities. (Morse, Banks [3d Ed.] § 171g, and cases there cited; *Martin vs. Webb*, 110 U. S. 7; *Merchants' Bank vs. State Bank*, 10 Wall. 604, 19 L. Ed. 1008; *Carey vs. Petroleum Co.* 33 Cal. 694.)

Under the circumstances, we think the defendant bank was in this case estopped from questioning its liability. "Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any

litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it." (Code Civ. Proc. § 1962, subd. 3.) To the same effect, see *Scott vs. Jackson* (89 Cal. 258); *Dolbeer vs. Livingston* (100 Cal. 621); *Bigelow, Estop.* (4th Ed.) 445.

---

**FALSE REPORT OF BANK'S CONDITION—LIABILITY OF OFFICERS MAKING SAME.**

Supreme Court of Nebraska, December 4, 1900.

GERNER vs. YATES, et al.

- A published report of the financial condition of a bank, in which the resources and liabilities are equally inflated, is not such a material misrepresentation as will support an action for deceit, unless by such report the condition of the bank is made to appear to be better than it actually is.
  - A published statement of the financial condition of a National bank in which a portion of its overdrafts is described as "loans and discounts" is materially false.
  - A report of a National bank to the Comptroller of the Currency which complies with the law and the regulations of the Comptroller can not be made the basis of an action for deceit because the item of interest on rediscounts was deducted from undivided profits instead of being made to appear specifically in such report.
  - In an action of deceit against the officers of a National bank who published a false report as to its financial condition, upon which plaintiff relied, one of the directors can not escape liability on the ground that there was no special reliance upon him, if it appear that the plaintiff relied on the report and the entire directorate.
  - A discharge in bankruptcy is no defense to an action based upon the defendant's fraud or other misconduct while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity.
- (Syllabus by the Court.)
- 

SULLIVAN, J.: This was an action brought by Henry Gerner against Charles E. Yates, Charles W. Mosher and Richard C. Outcalt in the district court of Lancaster county. On the first trial the defendants were successful but the judgment in their favor was reversed by this court, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. (*Gerner vs. Mosher*, 58 Neb. 135.) A second trial of the issues resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of Yates and against Mosher and Outcalt.

Gerner brings the record here for review, complaining of the decision in favor of Yates; and Mosher and Outcalt have filed a petition in error, asking for a reversal of the judgment against them.

The verdict is an anomaly. It is in irreconcilable conflict with itself. It is in effect a declaration by the jury that the material allegations of the petition are both true and false. It is such an evident absurdity that it cannot, if based upon conflicting evidence, support the judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or Yates. The contention of defendants is that one of the material averments of the petition is not sustained by any proof, and that therefore the judgment should be affirmed as to Yates and reversed as to Mosher and Outcalt.

Comprehension of the questions raised will be aided by reproducing here a portion of the opinion of Commissioner Irvine, reversing the first judgment: "The petition alleges that Mosher was the President of the Capital National Bank, Walsh its Vice-President, and Outcalt its Cashier; and the other defendants named, together with Mosher, constituted its board of directors. The petition is in two counts, the first alleging that on May 18, 1887, a report was

made by the defendants to the Comptroller of the Currency of the resources and liabilities of said bank as they existed May 13, 1887; that said report was sworn to by Outcalt, as Cashier, and attested as correct by Mosher, Holmes and Yates, as directors; that defendants caused said report to be published in the "State Journal," a newspaper published in Lincoln, 'for the purpose of inducing others, and particularly this plaintiff, to deal with said corporation, and to repose in it and them, its directors and managing officers, and to induce others, and particularly this plaintiff, to purchase its capital stock and make investments therein, and represented and held out said statement to be a true statement of the financial condition of said corporation.' The report is then set out in terms, and it is alleged that said report was false, in that it overstated the mortgages, stocks and bonds held by the bank to the amount of \$30,000, the amount due the bank from reserve agents, about \$76,000, and its loans and discounts, \$50,000; that said report and false representations were made by said four defendants with the knowledge, assent and coöperation of all the other defendants, and the same were, as they and each of them well knew, wholly false and untrue; that the plaintiff believed said representations to be true, and on the faith thereof purchased from Charles Hammond on July 11, 1887, fifty shares of the capital of said corporation for the sum of \$6,250; that it would have been worth said sum had said report been correct, but in fact the bank was insolvent and the stock worthless; that January 22, 1893, the bank failed; that the stockholders have been assessed one hundred cents on the dollar on their stock, and judgment rendered against the plaintiff for said assessment; that, notwithstanding that the bank had no net earnings, dividends were from time to time declared, and suit has been brought against the plaintiff to recover dividends by him received. The second cause of action is substantially pleaded in the same manner, charging a false report of the condition of the bank September 30, 1889, and the purchase by the plaintiff, in reliance on that report, in November, 1889, of fifty shares of stock from Henry E. Lewis for the price of \$7,250."

The plaintiff alleged that the first report was false in three particulars, and the second in two. The defendants insist that the evidence neither shows nor tends to show that any material fact stated in either report was false. We shall consider in their order the several averments of the petition charging the defendants with having made false representations, and determine whether any of them is supported by competent proof.

The first is as follows: "That instead of said bank having \$44,018.84 of mortgages, stocks and bonds, other than United States bonds to secure circulation, it had no more than \$14,018.84 of such securities as assets." The jury might have found that this allegation was established by the evidence, but they could not have done so without at the same time finding that the liabilities of the bank were less than they appeared to be by the published report. In other words, if the statement was false, the resources and liabilities were equally inflated, and thus the actual condition of the bank—the net worth of the property—was truly disclosed. Whether there was or was not an inflation of the resources and liabilities in the published reports is not material. According to the undisputed testimony of the witness Boggs, the actual and apparent value of the stock and assets of the bank was the same in either case. The representation was not actionable, because it was not false in any material respect.

It is charged that the report was also false because, "instead of having the sum of \$119,280.88 due it from approved reserve agents, it had no more than \$43,344.52 due from said source." The evidence, however, conclusively shows that the latter sum was due the bank from two reserve agents—the Chemical National Bank of New York and the Commercial National Bank of Chicago—and that there was due from other reserve banks \$86,926.82, or altogether \$130,271.34.

It is further alleged in the first count of the petition that the Capital National Bank, "instead of having \$771,972.87 of loans and discounts, had no more than \$721,972.87 of such assets." It is indisputably established by the admission of Gerner and other evidence that the bank's overdrafts, at the time the first report was made out, amounted to \$58,071.35, and that \$50,000 of this sum appeared in the report under the head "Loans and Discounts." Counsel for plaintiff contends that it should not have appeared under that head, and that the report was, therefore, false. That overdrafts are loans is, of course, too obvious to admit of dispute; and that they are regarded by bankers as first-class loans, and frequently reported to the Comptroller of the Currency under the caption "Loans and Discounts," is shown by the evidence of Charles T. Boggs and Oscar Callahan, who were the only witnesses who testified on that point. These witnesses also testified (and their testimony is not contradicted) that the value of the assets and stock of the bank was not in any way affected by the fact that \$50,000 of the amount reported as loans and discounts was made up of overdrafts. The argument of defendants upon this branch of the case is that the representation with respect to the amount of loans and discounts was neither false nor material.

This view of the matter does not commend itself to our judgment. The report conveyed to the plaintiff and to the public generally a false impression. It, in effect, declared that the loans and discounts made in the usual way at the bank counter amounted to \$771,972.87, and that the entire amount due from customers who had been permitted to overdraw their accounts was only \$8,071.35. It may be that loans in the form of overdrafts were as safe and profitable as any others, but of this plaintiff was entitled to judge for himself. He might be of opinion that a bank whose volume of business was no greater than that of the Capital National Bank, and which permitted its patrons to overdraw their accounts to the extent of \$58,071.35, was recklessly managed. It is reasonable to infer that, had he known the true character of the bank's loans, the contract with Hammond would not have been made. It is not always easy to determine when a representation is material, but the general rule seems to be that it is to be regarded as material if the complaining party would not have done the act by which he was injured, had he known that the representation was false. (*Graves vs. U. S.* 165 U. S. 323), is cited in support of the contention that it was proper for the bank to report overdrafts as loans and discounts. We have examined that case with care, but are not able to see that it is in point. So far as it has any bearing at all upon the question now under consideration, its implication is plainly against the defendants. We cannot escape the conclusion that the statement of the report in regard to overdrafts and loans and discounts was a false representation of material facts.


In the second count of the petition it is alleged that, "instead of said bank having due to it from approved reserve agents \$76,238.34, it had n



# ORK—Statement of Conditio

## LIABILITIES.

<i>Capital in.</i>	<i>Surplus fund.</i>	<i>Undivided profits.</i>	<i>Deposits in trust.</i>	<i>Gross assets less liabilities other than deposits.</i>	<i>Deposits on which interest is allowed.</i>	<i>Bonds and mortgages purchased.</i>	<i>Rate of interest on deposits.</i>
------------------------	--------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------	---	---	---	--



more than \$36,238.34, and the amount of said bank's reserve funds was in said statement falsified more than \$46,958."

The books of the bank show conclusively that this allegation is not true. While there was not due from the reserve agents named in the schedule on the back of the report sent to the Comptroller the amount appearing in the published report, there was more than that amount due from those agents and other approved reserve agents. Counting clearing-house receipts, which were entitled, under the National Banking Act (section 5192, Rev. St. U. S.), to be considered as reserve funds, the bank had at the time in question reserve funds amounting to \$93,923.95, which was \$2,008.60 in excess of the reserve required by law.

It is also alleged in the second count that the published statement of September 30, 1889, "failed to show payment of interest on funds by said bank borrowed during the preceding month which aggregated \$2,895.64; said item being wholly omitted, and the item of undivided profits being falsified, raised and increased in the sum of \$2,895.64." The item omitted from the report appears on the bank's books as a resource, while undivided profits, discount, interest and exchange, amounting to \$17,107.37, appear on the books as liabilities. Instead of entering on the report to the Comptroller the item of interest paid as a resource, it was deducted from the aggregate of the items of liability just mentioned, and the balance, being \$14,211.73, was entered on the report as undivided profits. The result was precisely the same as though all the items had been set out. We know of no law or regulation established by the Comptroller of the Currency which required the item of interest on rediscunts to appear specifically in the report.

The contention that Yates is not liable because Gerner did not specially rely upon him in purchasing stock of Hammond and Lewis is, we think, without merit. The evidence tended to show that the plaintiff relied on the reports and the entire bank directorate. How he could have done this without relying in some measure upon Yates, we are not able to understand.

---

## REPLIES TO LAW AND BANKING QUESTIONS.

---

Questions in Banking Law—submitted by subscribers—which may be of sufficient general interest to warrant publication will be answered in this department.

A reasonable charge is made for Special Replies asked for by correspondents—to be sent promptly by mail. See advertisement in back part of this number.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

NEW YORK, Jan. 20, 1901.

SIR: If a check is sent to A and is lost in the mail or elsewhere, and the finder indorses it and puts it through a bank and receives payment, to whom could A look for his money? Would the indorsement of the finder be valid, as the banks cannot tell A's indorsement from another?

A. D.

*Answer.*—Where a check is drawn payable to the order of a payee, the bank is bound to ascertain the genuineness of the payee's indorsement; and if it pays upon a forged indorsement, it can not discharge itself in account with the customer; for the only authority which the customer has conferred upon it is to pay on the order of the person whom he has named. (*Crawford vs. West Side Bank*, 100 N. Y. 50; *Shipman vs. Bank of the State of New York*, 126 N. Y. 318; *Robarts vs. Tucker*, 16 Q. B. 500.) But the drawee bank,

unless itself guilty of negligence in the matter, may recover the amount of the bank through which the collection was made. (*Canal Bank vs. Bank of Albany*, 1 Hill [N. Y.] 287.) As to A, he would have to look to the drawer of the check, whom he would have to suitably indemnify if there was any question as to whether the check was indorsed by A before it was lost.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

ORANGE, Mass., Jan. 11, 1901.

SIR: A, B, C and D present check for \$1,000 as beneficiaries of a life insurance policy. Check is made to the order of A, B, C and D, and is left for collection, money to be paid them when check is advised as paid. A owes a man who tries to collect the amount due him by trusteeing A's share (the man to whom he owes the money presuming A's share to be one-fourth the amount of the draft or check). Can A be trustee on a check or draft made payable in this way?

Also, can a certificate of deposit be trusteeed? Also, can a note, check or draft left for collection be trusteeed; in the same way can an amount standing to credit of depositor be trusteeed?

CASHER.

*Answer.*—(1) A joint interest of a debtor may be reached by attachment or trustee process, as well as an interest which is several and exclusive (*Drake on Attachment*, Sec. 248); and, therefore, there seems to be no reason why A's interest in the check may not be subject to such process unless, being the proceeds of a life insurance policy, it is exempt from seizure for debt. (2) A certificate of deposit is subject to trustee process. (3) So, also, is paper left with a bank for collection. (4) And so is the balance standing on the books of a bank to the credit of a depositor. But the service of such process can not injuriously affect any lien or other interest of the bank.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

TOPKA, Kans., Jan. 23, 1901.

SIR: What is the proper course to pursue in case a court orders a bank to bring in its books for the purpose of showing that a depositor has at that time, or any prior time, had money on deposit. Was there not a decision in the courts of Indiana on this issue?

CASHER.

*Answer.*—We see no way but for the bank to obey the order of the court. The dealings between a bank and its depositors are not privileged, and where the state of a depositor's account is relevant to the issues in the case there is no rule of law to relieve the officers of the bank from the duty of testifying as to the account, and from producing the evidence furnished by the books of the bank.

The Indiana case to which our correspondent refers was probably one where the question was as to the power of a board of assessors to require the bank to produce its books before them. But that is a very different case, and is scarcely an authority in the case stated.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

HEALDSBURG, Cal., Jan. 22, 1901.

SIR: A check payable to M. M. Haigh was endorsed "Mrs. M. M. Haigh," turned in to her grocer and from the grocer, with his endorsement, into his bank. Will the bank's correspondent refuse check and return same on account of "Mrs." being added to the endorsement?

BOOKKEEPER.

*Answer.*—The prefix "Mrs." would not in any way impair the validity of the endorsement. It is merely surplusage, and has no effect whatever; and there is no reason why the check should be returned for further endorsement.

## REPORT ON THE POST-BELLUM FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION IN JAPAN.

---

One of the results of the Chino-Japanese war of 1894-95 was to make it necessary for the Government of Japan to undertake so many new enterprises that the annual expenditure, which had been formerly about 80,000,000 yen (\$40,000,000) rose suddenly to 200,000,000 in the budget of 1896-97, and kept on increasing until for 1900-01 it stood at about 250,000,000 yen—an increase so sudden and so large that it completely revolutionized the financial situation of the country. How this difficult situation was met is told most interestingly and fully in the Report on the Post-Bellum Financial Administration of Japan, by Count Matsukata Masayoshi, His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Minister of Finance.

In drawing up the post-bellum financial measures, it has been the policy of the Government to aim at bringing about the economic growth of the country along with the financial, as the only policy destined to produce a lasting result.

Among the more important of the enterprises undertaken by the Government between 1896 and 1900 may be mentioned the expansion of the military and naval armament, the establishment of the iron foundry, the improvement and extension of railways, the extension of telephone service, of telegraph and navigation lines, the founding of Kyoto Imperial University, of various normal, commercial, higher and polytechnic schools, the higher agriculture and forestry school, the establishment of the Industrial Bank of Japan, of local industrial banks, of the Bank of Formosa, of the Hokkaido Colonial Bank, as well as the measures taken for the settlement of affairs in Formosa, and a scheme for the river works at home and other measures for the encouragement of agriculture, industry and commerce.

This is certainly an elaborate programme, calculated to tax even the ingenuity of such a resourceful Financial Minister as Count Matsukata. How skillfully he has met these enormous requirements, by borrowing, by a reform of the revenue system and by using part of the Chinese indemnity, we have not space to relate, but pass at once to the consideration of matters affecting the coinage, banks and currency of the Empire.

### DEVELOPMENT OF THE COINAGE SYSTEM.

From the establishment of the coinage system in A. D. 1600 till the overthrow of the Shogunate Government in 1868, there had been no change in the system for more than 260 years. But owing to debasement of the coins, and to other causes, the currency of the country became greatly disordered. After the Restoration the Imperial Government established a Mint at Osaka and introduced a new system of gold coinage by the promulgation of the new coinage regulations in May, 1871. Business in the Far East was then, even more than now, conducted on a silver basis, and in order to promote foreign trade the one yen or trade dollar was issued, equal in size and quality to the Mexican dollar, and made a legal tender within the limits of the treaty ports. But the finances were disordered, chiefly on account of the inflation in the amount of inconvertible paper, and the coins were exported with enormous rapidity. It was found practically impossible to maintain the gold standard, and the one-yen coins were made a legal tender throughout the country at large—the currency system being, legally at least, bimetallic. Pressing necessities compelled the Government to issue large amounts of paper, and in 1878 this began to depreciate.

In August, 1876, the Government revised the National Bank Regulations, making the establishment of National banks very much easier, which led to a corresponding expansion in the volume of bank notes. This greatly accelerated the depreciation of paper money, leading to a rise in prices, the exodus of specie, an excess of imports over exports, the growth of habits of luxury among the agricultural population and of the spirit of speculation among merchants and manufacturers.

#### SPECIE PAYMENTS RESUMED AND THE BANK OF JAPAN ESTABLISHED.

Matters grew steadily worse, culminating in a crisis in 1880-81, and finally after trying various other expedients the redemption of the paper money was begun. When in October, 1881, Count Matsukata became Minister of Finance, he saw that the mere redemption of a part of the paper money would not stop its depreciation but that it would be necessary to increase the specie reserve of the Government preparatory to the resumption of specie payments, and to establish a central bank with the power to issue convertible notes in order to relieve the financial distress and to perfect the monetary system of the country.

In June, 1882, the Bank of Japan was established, and in May, 1884, it was granted the privilege of issuing convertible notes. Financial reforms were instituted, and by decreasing the Government paper and building up the specie reserve, the paper money was brought up to about par at the close of 1885. The Government therefore gave notice in June, 1885, that specie payment would be resumed on January 1, 1886.

Previous to this, in May, 1883, the National Bank Regulations were revised and a method of conjoined redemption of the notes of all National banks was adopted. By laws passed in 1896 and 1898 both the Government paper and National bank notes were prohibited from circulating after December, 1899.

#### ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GOLD STANDARD.

Although the reforms described restored the specie basis, they left Japan a *de facto* silver-standard country. It was recognized that the adoption of the gold standard would be necessary ultimately, but the time for it was not yet deemed opportune. The instability in exchange, rise of prices, over speculation and other unfavorable conditions led to the appointment of a Commission in October, 1893, to investigate the coinage system of the country. The report of a majority of this Commission favored the adoption of the gold standard. Means for carrying this recommendation into effect were furnished by the indemnity received from China as a result of the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-95. This amounted to 230,000,000 Kuping taels, and it was arranged to receive the equivalent in pounds sterling at London—£37,836,000, which sum was increased by about £110,000 derived from profits in employing the indemnity moneys.

#### THE COINAGE REFORM AND ITS EFFECT ON THE COUNTRY.

On Count Matsukata's resuming the post of Finance Minister in September, 1896, he had every preparation made for the inauguration of the gold standard, and in March, 1897, a bill on the coinage law was presented to the Imperial Diet, which was passed and promulgated as law on the 29th day of the same month. The new system went into force October 1, 1897. Before the law became effective there had been turned out from the Mint 49,587,160 yen of the new gold coins, and by April, 1898, an additional amount sufficient to make the total 74,455,735 yen.

It is somewhat difficult, at present, to estimate accurately the effects of the coinage reform. Following the victorious war with China and the receipt of a large money indemnity, there was a wide and rapid expansion of industrial enterprise. Poor crops and a change in the customs regulations have also complicated the eco-

conomic situation. It is certain, however, that the basis of permanent prosperity has been laid by a more stable standard of value, the fluctuations in exchange have been reduced to a minimum and the country's foreign trade has begun to make a healthy growth and the industrial enterprises are developing in an orderly manner. Fears had existed that this change in the monetary policy of Japan might interfere with silver using countries, but results thus far do not appear to justify such fears. The exports to such countries increased from about 54,200,000 yen in 1897 to about 85,200,000 yen in 1899. The imports from the silver-standard countries rose from 65,450,000 yen in 1897 to 77,170,000 in 1898, though there was a considerable decline in 1899, which is attributed to causes not connected with the coinage reform.

One result of the reform has been to establish a closer connection with the world's money markets, and a tendency is noticed on the part of foreign capital to invest in Japan. It is noted that recently a foreign loan of £10,000,000 was placed in London at four per cent. interest.

#### WITHDRAWAL OF THE ONE-YEN COINS.

The 74,435,735 yen of gold coins minted from the time the law went into effect up to Aprii, 1898, were devoted entirely to making the exchange of the one-yen silver coins. This exchange was commenced in October, 1897, and concluded on July 31, 1898. The amount of one-yen silver coins exchanged on demand for gold coins, as well as those exchanged at the Treasury after one-yen coins had been received for taxes and other public payments, amounted altogether to 45,588,369 yen. Besides this amount of one-yen silver coins withdrawn from circulation, the amount of the promissory notes of the Mint, to pay coins, which had been issued in exchange for silver bullion deposited at the Mint to be coined into one-yen coins, stood at 29,505,443 yen, which were also exchanged for gold coin. The total of silver one-yen coins and bullion, corresponding to the amount of the promissory notes of the Mint now withdrawn from circulation, amounted to the gross sum of 75,093,822 yen.

The account of the entire amount of one-yen coins issued from the beginning is as follows:

	Yen.
Total amount of one-yen silver coins issued.....	165,133,710
	Yen.
Melted at the Mint.....	460,904
Net export abroad.....	99,508,740
Transferred to Korea, China, etc., in connection with the war of 1894-95.....	11,028,633
Disbursed in Formosa.....	5,732,027
Withdrawn from circulation by being exchanged for gold coins.....	45,588,369
	162,318,673
Balance existing at home and not brought in for exchange.....	2,815,037

Besides the above there were, as already stated, promissory notes of the Mint to pay coins in exchange, March 31, 1897, and withdrawn from circulation 29,505,453 yen.

About 100,000,000 yen of the silver coins had been exported, and some fears were expressed that a large amount would come back for redemption. But Count Matsukata, after careful investigation, concluded that such redemptions would probably be about 10,000,000 yen, and the actual amounts sent back from abroad exceeded this estimate by only 846,465 yen.

#### DISPOSAL OF THE ONE-YEN COINS AND INCREASE IN THE ISSUE OF SUBSIDIARY SILVER COINS.

The disposal of the one-yen silver coins and of the silver bullion in the Mint corresponding to the promissory notes of the Mint now withdrawn from circulation—

amounting altogether to 75,093,822 yen—was finally completed in December, 1898, one year and three months after the Coinage Law went into effect. The coins were disposed of as follows: 27,567,012 yen were set apart as material for minting subsidiary silver coins in the years between 1897-98 and 1899-1900 inclusive; 40,786,662 yen were sold at Shanghai, Hongkong, etc.; 6,740,148 yen were transferred to Formosa, Korea, etc., and placed in circulation at current valuation.

The loss sustained by the Treasury on account of the disposal of the retired silver yen amounted to 5,397,581, which added to the expense incurred, made a total of 5,553,112 yen. This latter sum was more than made good by the profits of minting, amounting to 5,651,961 yen.

As a further means of strengthening the monetary system the one-yen convertible notes of the Bank of Japan and other smaller denominations of paper were replaced by subsidiary silver, the total amount of such coins being brought up to 81,820,000 yen—about two yen per capita.

#### THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF JAPAN AFTER THE WAR OF 1894-95.

By 1899 the National banks not previously liquidated or converted into other institutions were all changed into private banks, and the notes issued by them were forbidden to circulate after December 9, 1899. Attention was now directed to the formation of other monetary institutions. As a special means of supplying capital on long periods, and loans to the industrial and agricultural classes, the Industrial Bank of Japan and the local industrial banks were established. The Bank of Formosa and the Colonial Bank of Hokkaido were also created, and the note-issue limit of the Bank of Japan on its security reserve was expanded. The capital of both the Bank of Japan and the Yokohama Specie Bank were greatly increased.

#### THE INDUSTRIAL BANK OF JAPAN AND LOCAL INDUSTRIAL BANKS.

In June, 1897, the Industrial Bank of Japan was established with 10,000,000 yen subscribed capital, one-fourth of which was paid in. By December, 1899, its debentures had been issued to the amount of 7,497,100 yen, while the loans amounted to 8,774,842 yen, classified as follows: to public bodies, 1,559,397 yen; agriculturists, 2,828,762 yen; manufacturers, 4,886,682 yen. To aid the bank in paying sufficient dividends the Government granted a subsidy of 115,985 yen up till the last half of 1898. But in the first half of 1899 the bank was able to pay a dividend of 6.6 per cent. and the Government subsidy was stopped.

By December, 1899, local industrial banks were established in each of the forty-five prefectures. The total subscribed capital of these banks was 27,920,000 yen, of which 8,028,620 yen represented the Government subsidy. At the close of 1899 there had been paid in on the subscribed capital 15,936,983 yen. Loans made by the local banks up to this time amounted to 12,083,145 yen, distributed as follows:

#### *Loans by Annual Installment.*

	Yen.	
Agriculturists.....	7,144,397	
Manufactures.....	2,563,319	
Public bodies.....	783,464	10,491,180

#### *Loans for Fixed Periods.*

Agriculturists.....	151,205	
Manufacturers.....	285,712	
Public bodies.....	252,076	
Upon joint liability of twenty or more agriculturists.....	684,634	
Upon joint liability of twenty or more manufacturers.....	168,226	1,541,965
Total.....		12,083,145



## ESTABLISHMENT OF OTHER BANKS.

In March, 1899, a law was promulgated for establishing the Bank of Formosa, the Government loaning the bank 2,000,000 yen in one-yen silver coins without interest and subscribing for 1,000,000 yen of the bank's shares. The bank was established in June, 1899, with a capital of 5,000,000 yen and commenced business in September of that year, one-fourth of the capital being paid in, and having in addition the 2,000,000 Government loan.

The Colonial Bank of Hokkaido was established in December, 1899, but had not commenced business at the date of the Report under review.

## THE BANK OF JAPAN AND THE YOKOHAMA SPECIE BANK.

Owing to the increased demands made upon it by the general expansion in business following the War of 1894-95, the Bank of Japan increased its capital in August, 1895, from 20,000,000 yen to 30,000,000 yen, the increase all being paid in by February, 1896. Its business operations were also expanded by the opening of new branch offices and sub-agencies.

In March, 1896, the Yokohama Specie Bank increased its capital from 6,000,000 to 12,000,000 yen, the increase being paid in by June, 1899. At a general meeting of shareholders in September of the same year the capital was increased to 24,000,000 yen, half of which was required to be paid in by March, 1900. Sub-agencies were opened at Tokio and Nagasaki, and also in Hongkong and Tien-tsin. Preparations were made to open other sub-agencies in China.

The total receipts of the Bank of Japan increased steadily and rapidly after 1893, rising from 906,834,703 yen in that year to 4,509,474,049 in 1898. The receipts at the Yokohama Specie Bank also rose from 713,663,548 yen in 1893 to 3,597,367,324 in 1898.

## INCREASE IN THE NOTE ISSUE OF THE BANK OF JAPAN.

The continued activity in business necessitated an increase in the currency, and Count Matsukata decided to extend the note-issuing limit of the Bank of Japan from 85,000,000 yen to 120,000,000. A law to this effect was promulgated in March, 1899. At the same time the law taxing the notes was amended. According to the instruction of the Minister of Finance the increased amount of convertible notes was to be employed as follows: 15,000,000 yen for facilitating the monetary circulation at home by the Bank becoming the central organ of exchange operations among the banks, and making second discount of bills and also by establishing new branch offices, etc.; 20,000,000 yen was to be employed for supplying facilities for monetary circulation abroad in aid of Japanese commerce with Europe and America and the countries of the Far East, while the Bank was to take the necessary steps to induce the Yokohama Specie Bank to supply all necessary financial facilities for carrying on trade with China. The Bank of Japan was required to take every pains to absorb gold in order to maintain the convertibility of its notes.

## FINAL SETTLEMENT OF BUSINESS CONNECTED WITH THE NATIONAL BANKS.

The National Bank Regulations were revised in May, 1883, and their term of business was fixed at twenty years from the time of receiving their charters, and in no case was any of them to be allowed to continue business after the expiration of this term. The notes of the banks were to be redeemed conjointly. At one time the total notes issued by the National banks of the country amounted to 34,396,880 yen, but they had been reduced by successive redemptions to 20,796,786 yen at the end of 1895. Laws were passed in March, 1896, providing for the final settlement of the affairs of the National banks, and in the same year the circulation of notes was pro-

hibited after December 9, 1899, and a period of five years after the latter date was fixed as the time for the exchange of the notes.

In accordance with these laws many of the National banks changed into private banks, and by February, 1899, there were none left in the country. The notes were redeemed rapidly, and on the last day of December, 1899, only 974, 999 yen were outstanding.

#### PRESENT CONDITION OF PRIVATE AND SAVINGS BANKS.

Besides the conversion of many National banks into private banks, numerous other banks were started in accordance with the Bank Regulations and the Savings Bank Regulations, so that by the end of 1899 there were in the country no less than 2,025 banks of all kinds (foreign banks being excepted), and the capital invested amounted to 433,975,019 yen.

Savings banks are required to consign as security for the proper conduct of their business securities corresponding in value to one-fourth of the deposits received, and the responsible officials of the banks bear unlimited responsibility. On June 30, 1899, there were in existence 459 banks established under the Savings Bank Regulations, and the capital subscribed amounted to 29,489,300 yen of which 16,903,619 yen had been paid in, while the deposits received stood at 55,835,732 yen, of which the savings deposits amounted to about 37,000,000 yen, the depositors numbering nearly 3,000,000. Measures for improving the Savings Bank Regulations had been prepared by Count Matsukata at the time the Report was issued.

The entire amount of loans advanced by the private banks of the country stood at 197,545,824 yen in November, 1898. Compared with December, 1898, an increase of 89,615,733 yen is shown—almost five-fold. Bills discounted amounted on December 31, 1898, to 139,311,447 yen, an increase of 85,764,714 yen. The amount of loans advanced by the Savings banks stood at 17,018,507 yen on December 31, 1898, an increase of 984,263 yen over December 31, 1898, or a gain of over seventeen-fold; while the entire amount of bills discounted stood at 7,909,422 yen on December 31, 1898, compared with 2,356,356 yen on December 31, 1898.

### KNOX'S HISTORY OF BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES.

#### OPINIONS AS TO THE MERITS OF THE WORK.

**DES MOINES (Iowa.) STATE REGISTER:** In its 900 pages the book goes into the history of banking in a painstaking manner, and for years to come this volume will be treasured.

**BOSTON TRAVELER:** Of special interest just now, when the United States commands the attention of the world as the coming great financial power of two hemispheres, is the History of Banking by the late John Jay Knox, for seventeen years Deputy Comptroller and Comptroller of the Currency.

Such a work from such an authority practically speaks for itself. It has been carefully revised and brought up to date by the editors of the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*, making it the one authority upon United States finance, and therefore invaluable to every banker and student of finance.

**MINNEAPOLIS (Minn.) JOURNAL:** To the student of finance Mr. Knox's History will be very valuable. The book gives the solid facts and is authoritative.

**THE DIAL (Chicago):** As a storehouse of information it is a welcome addition to banking literature. Much pains appears to have been taken to secure accuracy of statement.

**TOLEDO (Ohio) BLADE:** Every phase of banking and its history finds a place in the volume.

## TO MAINTAIN THE LEGAL-TENDER SILVER DOLLAR AT PARITY WITH GOLD.

On January 3 Hon. E. J. Hill, of Connecticut, Chairman of the Committee on Coinage, Weights and Measures, introduced a bill to maintain the legal-tender silver dollar at parity with gold. It was reported from the committee to the House on January 24 and ordered printed. Some amendments were made to the bill as introduced by Mr. Hill. In its amended form the measure is as follows :

A BILL to maintain the legal-tender silver dollar at parity with gold.

*Be it enacted, etc.,* That the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized to coin the silver bullion in the Treasury, purchased under the act of July fourteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety, into such denominations of subsidiary silver coin as he may deem necessary to meet public requirements, and thereafter, as public necessities may demand, to recoin silver dollars into subsidiary coin, and so much of any act as fixes a limit to the aggregate of subsidiary silver coin outstanding, and so much of any act as directs the coinage of any portion of the bullion purchased under the act of July fourteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety, into standard silver dollars, is hereby repealed.

The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby directed to maintain at all times at parity with gold the legal-tender silver dollars remaining outstanding ; and to that end he is hereby directed to exchange gold for legal tender silver dollars when presented to the Treasury in the sum of five dollars or any multiple thereof, and all provisions of law for the use or maintenance of the reserve fund in the Treasury relating to United States notes are, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, hereby made applicable to the exchange of legal-tender silver dollars.

### REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COINAGE, WEIGHTS AND MEASURES TO ACCOMPANY THE BILL.

The Committee on Coinage, Weights and Measures, to whom was referred House bill 13099, respectfully report that they have considered the same and recommend its adoption with the following amendments : \*

The purpose of the act of March 14, 1900, was to establish the gold standard in the United States, and to that end it made the dollar consisting of 25.8 grains of gold nine-tenths fine the standard unit of value, and declared it to be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to maintain all forms of money at parity therewith, but it did not, aside from providing for the redemption of United States notes in gold, prescribe any method by which such parity should be maintained. The purpose of this measure is to remedy that defect so far as the legal tender silver dollar is concerned.

It aims to do this in two ways—first by a gradual reduction of the quantity by coinage into limited tender subsidiary coin, and second by exchangeability of the remainder, at the will of the holder, with gold.

Under the provisions of the act of March 14, when the bullion in the Treasury is all coined we shall have outstanding in subsidiary coin \$100,000,000 and legal-tender silver dollars about \$573,000,000.

It is the opinion of many that prudence dictates the melting down into bullion of much of this excessive volume of legal-tender silver and disposing of it by sale in the world's market, thus following the example set by Germany shortly after adopting the gold standard ; but it should be remembered that Germany only pursued this course until, by the fall of silver to ninety-five cents an ounce, she became

\*The amendments referred to are incorporated in the bill as printed above.

unwilling to accept any further loss, and is now, under recent legislation, recoining her entire remaining stock gradually in subsidiary coin, as is herein proposed.

There is no question but that the convenience of the people of this country would be served by materially increasing the volume of subsidiary coin, and considering the requirements of those parts of the country where the use of the silver dollar is preferred to its paper representative, your committee are of the opinion that if the policy of coining the bullion into subsidiary coin is followed by the recoinage of silver dollars into subsidiary coin, not many years would pass before the entire volume would be disposed of, so that it would cease to be a source of danger to the Treasury and become firmly fastened in circulation as change money among the people.

There would be little question about this if the issue of bank notes was limited to the denominations of \$10 and over, thus giving the entire field of change money to coin and coin certificates.

Something of an idea of the comparative use of legal-tender and subsidiary silver coin among the gold-standard nations is given by the following table :

January 1, 1900.

	Population.	Subsidiary.	Legal tender.	Per capita of subsidi- ary coin.	Per capita of legal- tender silver.
United States.....	76,000,000	\$80,000,000	\$563,000,000	\$1.05	\$7.38
Great Britain.....	40,700,000	111,800,000	.....	2.75	.....
Germany.....	52,300,000	122,800,000	85,000,000	2.35	1.63
France.....	38,500,000	59,300,000	361,900,000	1.54	9.40
Austria-Hungary.....	46,300,000	46,300,000	50,000,000	1.00	1.08
Australasia.....	4,500,000	6,100,000	.....	1.35	.....
Canada.....	5,500,000	5,000,000	.....	.90	.....
Denmark.....	2,300,000	5,600,000	.....	2.43	.....
Sweden.....	5,100,000	6,800,000	.....	1.33	.....
Switzerland.....	3,100,000	10,700,000	.....	3.45	.....

The recent legislation of Germany provides for about \$3.50 per capita. Great Britain already has \$2.75. It was the opinion of Mr. Horace White, given at the hearing on this bill, that the United States could easily carry more than either, and that \$4 per capita would be absorbed by our people and held in circulation. Under the law as it has been the Treasury Department has frequently been unable to supply the demand, and unless the stock on hand is used it this way purchases of more bullion for subsidiary coin will become necessary in the near future. Your committee believe that an ample supply of small change money is not only necessary for the convenience of the people, but that it will be helpful to general business and at the same time tend to economical habits of expenditure.

With this policy entered upon now and judiciously followed, with the rapid growth of our population, it can be easily seen that two decades hence the silver problem will have solved itself.

In view of the enormous increase of gold production, it becomes wholly unnecessary to consider the effect of the proposed gradual change of full tender silver into limited tender.

So far as practical use is concerned, gold and greenbacks are the only legal tender now, only one in ten of the silver dollars being in circulation and the balance being represented by silver certificates, which are not of themselves a legal tender.

Long before the lessening of silver certificates would be felt in their use as lawful money in bank reserves the increased supply of gold and gold certificates will make them wholly unnecessary.

This increase in our gold stock for the past decade is as follows :

JANUARY 1,		JANUARY 1,	
1891.....	\$646,582,852	1896.....	\$599,597,964
1892.....	664,275,885	1897.....	666,270,542
1893.....	597,697,685	1898.....	925,100,000
1894.....	627,298,201	1899.....	945,800,000
1895.....	636,229,825	1900.....	1,020,200,000

And on January 1, 1901, the amount had increased to \$1,099,184,997.

The second proposition included in this bill is to make the legal-tender silver dollars remaining outstanding from time to time exchangeable at the will of the holder for gold, when presented at the Treasury in sums of \$5 or multiples thereof. The purpose is to thereby hold them at parity with gold under any and all circumstances. They have been issued by the Government as the equivalent of gold. They have paid debts due in gold and contracted on a gold basis. This maintenance of parity is not only a moral obligation resting upon the nation, but it is one which the Government can not evade, for whether exchangeable or not they must be accepted by the Treasury for all Government dues in lieu of gold.

To show how helpless the Government is, attention is called to the percentage of silver certificates received at the New York Clearing-House for the past ten years, and, to still further emphasize it, each year is divided into two periods, the first column showing the first eight months and the second the last four months or crop-moving period :

YEAR.	PER CENT. OF ALL MONEY.		YEAR.	PER CENT. OF ALL MONEY.	
	First eight months.	Last four months.		First eight months.	Last four months.
1891.....	12.5	3.7	1896.....	43.3	35.4
1892.....	10.1	8.2	1897.....	38.9	27.0
1893.....	17.8	36.4	1898.....	20.2	11.4
1894.....	62.3	30.3	1899.....	10.7	4.5
1895.....	33.4	24.9	1900.....	15.9	8.3

Two things will be noticed : First, that in every year but one the average payment of silver certificates for customs was much less in the last four months than in the preceding eight, and the one exception only emphasizes the showing, as that period was controlled by the same causes which brought about the large inflow of 62.3 per cent. of all moneys in silver certificates in 1894. The second noticeable fact is the excessive volume of silver payment in 1894, 1895, 1896, and 1897.

Another inference which may be fairly drawn from the table is that a failure of crops here, coupled with a demand for gold abroad, would send silver certificates and silver dollars in excessive amounts into the Treasury, and thus either imperil the maintenance of parity or compel the purchase of gold at a premium or an unnecessary issue of bonds at an inopportune time.

The conclusion is almost irresistible that the Government has no control of the question, and that it is far better to meet and prepare for it when all conditions are favorable rather than be overwhelmed by it when reverses come, as they surely will.

Under the act of March 14 we have two kinds of money—gold, with paper payable in gold, and silver, with paper payable in silver. Your committee are firmly of the opinion that as there is under that bill but one standard unit of value, no legal-tender dollar of the United States should be issued which is not exchangeable by the Government in accordance with that standard.

The nation has either had the benefit of the silver coinage and should not shirk the responsibility incurred therein, or it has made mistakes in legislation which it must now correct. In either case, and whichever way viewed, your committee believe that the honest, prudent, and, indeed, the safest course, is to meet the situa-

tion squarely and put the silver dollar on an equal footing with the gold dollar and make it exchangeable therefor.

Your committee quote with pleasure the clear and courageous statement of the Secretary of the Treasury, Hon. Lyman J. Gage, as given in the hearing on this bill:

STATEMENT OF THE HON. LYMAN J. GAGE, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

It seems to me that the question which is involved in this bill is comparatively simple. The law now provides by declaration for the maintenance of the parity between the silver money and the gold money. And there is also an avenue provided which tends to maintain that parity through Governmental action. That avenue is one provided by the law, too, namely, that silver on the same basis as gold shall be receivable by the Government in the payment of all taxes and customs dues. Therefore there is a method through which the silver dollars may be kept equivalent in value to the gold dollars.

Now, because of the present stock of silver money, a large portion of which is absorbed in circulating among the people, the probabilities are that any returning volume of silver toward the centers, which will certainly set in, as Mr. White has described, in the time of dull trade, will find an avenue for practical redemption in this way. Bankers, finding themselves embarrassed, if they do find themselves embarrassed, at the centers with a surplus of silver as compared with gold, will cause it to be paid into the Treasury for excess taxes and customs dues and will retain their gold.

Now, why will they do that instead of paying gold or silver indiscriminately at such a time? I think that the reason that they will make that discrimination is that the Government itself in its legislation seems to avoid the direct responsibility that rests upon it to maintain the parity. All discussions and all statements and all expressions of desire by those who represent the Government to shuffle off upon the community the responsibility for silver affects the public mind with distrust.

We ought not to be squeamish about meeting the parity in a square, straightforward manner. It is thus discredited more than the facts warrant, and if you ask the people of the United States to have perfect faith in the parity of these two metals and to treat one with all the respect and confidence accorded to the other, then the Government of the United States, that is responsible for the situation as it is, itself must set the example.

Now, here is an illustration. The act of March 14 was passed. The House bill proposed to make the two metals exchangeable with each other at the Treasury. The Senate amended it. Why? That is the question that every financial man in the United States asks. Why? If you, the Government, are afraid, can you expect us to have more courage than you possess? Do you ask us to have confidence when you yourself will not lay down the basis of confidence? You complain all the time about the wicked money sharks and their discriminations against silver. They can and will answer: Cease to discriminate against it yourselves, and we will no longer discriminate.

Nothing can rise higher than its source, and if your confidence is not good and you will not take all the responsibilities of the parity between silver and gold, do not expect the public to take the risk. They will decline to do it. Therefore, as long as these conditions exist silver, when it accumulates at the money centers, will not be held for a time when it may be used and distributed again. The bankers will send it into the avenues of present redemption. The Government might just as well face that redemption at the front door as to delay until it must take it under the revenue laws at the back door.

If you increase confidence by the kind of an act here proposed you will show the country that it is the purpose of Congress and the Government to maintain an absolute parity and to take all risks, responsibilities and burdens involved in so doing. When it appears to be the purpose, as I have said before, to avoid the burdens, it will be unfavorably interpreted every time naturally and I think properly so.

It will be noticed that it is not the intent of the bill to compel the exchange of silver for gold, but only of gold for silver. Neither does it provide for the exchange of gold for silver except under certain conditions, namely, when presented in the sum of five dollars or any multiple thereof. The exchange contemplated is to insure the maintenance of parity of silver with the standard and not to compel the Treasury to exercise the functions of a bank and change denominations only. While this is now done as a convenience to the public, it should not be required by law.

Indeed, it would oftentimes be impossible for the Treasury to maintain at every sub-Treasury in the country each form of money in sufficient supply to do this. There is no law requiring the Treasury to exchange greenbacks for gold and should be

none compelling the Treasury to exchange silver for gold. The Treasury carries too many of the burdens which properly belong to banks now, without forcing it to comply with this additional requirement.

To enable the Secretary to maintain parity by exchanging gold for silver the use of the reserve fund in the Treasury and any and all provisions of law for its use or maintenance, are placed at his disposal. That fund consists of \$150,000,000 in gold, and it is maintained by transfer of gold from the current funds of the Treasury by purchase of gold, or by the issue of bonds.

Under the wording of the bill exchangeability could be maintained by direct exchange from current funds or by use of the fund and from gold procured by purchase or bond issues. It does not provide that silver dollars when exchanged shall be held and treated in the same manner as United States notes are when redeemed under the act of March 14, 1900, but when placed in the current funds of the Treasury they may be used for any lawful purpose.

Your committee believe that the adoption of this bill will tend greatly to strengthening the act of March 14, 1900, and make more sure and certain the maintenance of the gold standard. They therefore recommend its passage with the amendments.

E. J. HILL.	FRANCIS W. CUSHMAN.
J. H. SOUTHARD.	THOMAS HEDGE.
E. S. MINOR.	J. D. BOWERSOCK.
R. J. WATERS.	H. S. BOUTELL.

I have some doubt as to the wisdom of that part of the bill authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to coin the silver dollars into subsidiary coin. It is my judgment that it is best to leave this question to future legislation as may seem expedient. In all other respects I fully concur in bill and report.

THEO. OTJEN.

#### Branches of National Banks.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine :*

SIR: It may be of interest to your readers to know that, contrary to the general understanding, National banks may, under certain conditions, maintain branches in their domiciles. These conditions are provided for in Chapter 2, Section 39 of the National Banking Act, Section 5155 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which provides "that State banks maintaining branches may retain same if changing to the National system."

To my understanding this question has never heretofore come up, because there was no provision under any of the State laws for branch banks until the enactment a few years since of an amendment to that effect by the Legislature of this State, and under which the Corn Exchange, Colonial, Hamilton and New Amsterdam banks, in this city, are operating branches—presumably with profit, as evidenced by their increase in deposit liabilities. To avoid any misunderstanding, I wrote to the Comptroller of the Currency, and received a reply, signed by Mr. Kane, Acting Comptroller, which confirms my contention and understanding of the law referred to.

The ruling on this question affords opportunities for developments which will doubtless prove interesting to note.

ALBERT H. LAWRENCE.

NEW YORK, Jan. 31.

The section of the National Bank Act above referred to says :

"It shall be lawful for any bank or banking association, organized under State laws and having branches, the capital being joint and assigned to and used by the mother bank and branches in definite proportions, to become a National banking association in conformity with existing laws and to retain and keep in operation its branches, or such one or more of them as it may elect to retain, the amount of the circulation redeemable at the mother bank and each branch to be regulated by the amount of capital assigned to and used by each."

Probably this provision would not admit into the National system the branch banks established in this city, as it is not believed that they have a definite capital assigned to them, but depend upon the parent bank. To set aside a certain fixed capital for each branch would perhaps more than offset the advantage of operating under the National law.

## NEW YORK STATE BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

---

### ANNUAL MEETING OF GROUP VII.

---

Group VII of the New York State Bankers' Association, comprising the banks of Long Island, held its annual meeting at the Montauk Club, in Brooklyn, on the evening of January 16. Former Senator Stephen M. Griswold, President of the Union Bank, of Brooklyn, presided.

At the table of honor were the president of the association, former Senator Stephen M. Griswold, of the Union Bank, of Brooklyn; at his left Controller Bird S. Coler, former Assemblyman Bradford Rhodes, President of the First National Bank, of Mamaroneck, and John T. Jenkins, President of the First National Bank, of Brooklyn; on his right, Superintendent of Banks of the State of New York Frederick D. Kilburn, William Cullen Bryant, Herbert L. Bridgman, and Hiram R. Smith, secretary and treasurer of the association, of the Bank of Rockville Center. The executive committee of the association, Walter E. Frew, of the Queens County Bank; H. J. Oldring, of the Mechanics' and Traders' Bank, Brooklyn; Joseph Dykes, of the Flushing Bank, Flushing; C. H. Roberts, of the Schermerhorn Bank, Brooklyn, and H. E. Hutchinson, of the Brooklyn Bank, Brooklyn, sat together.

In welcoming the guests of the evening President Griswold spoke of the great work done by the banks in promoting the business prosperity of the country. He concluded by introducing Hon. Bird S. Coler, City Comptroller, who spoke on the city's finances. He said that of the \$100,000,000 required annually for municipal expenses, the expenditure of eighty per cent. is mandatory under existing laws.

President Griswold announced that the next annual convention of the New York State Bankers' Association would be held at Buffalo, June 20, 21 and 22, giving the members of the association an opportunity of visiting the Pan-American Exposition while attending the convention.

The secretary read the resolution passed by the council of administration on January 12, asking Congress to remove the war tax on the capital and surplus of banks.

Hon. F. D. Kilburn, Superintendent of the State Banking Department, spoke of the great service the banks were rendering to the commerce and industries of the State. He said that there is not a class of men who are doing more good to the communities in which they labor than the bankers. There are now about 550 banks in this State, and they are doing a work in helping the business prosperity of the State that is greater than any other force, with the exception of manual labor.

Superintendent Kilburn deprecated the fact that some banks pay out too great a part of their earnings in dividends instead of building up their surplus, and also spoke against the practice of paying interest on deposits.

Bradford Rhodes, Editor of the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*, was introduced and spoke in part as follows:

"In 1899 the clearings of the associated banks of New York were over \$60,000,000,000, or more than \$15, 00,000,000 greater than those reported by the London Clearing-House. Though there was a decrease of about \$8,000,000,000 at New York in 1900, we are still far ahead of London. The rate for money has for some time ruled lower here than in most of the foreign financial centers. We have loaned money to several of the leading European countries, and the Government of Great Britain has called upon us to restore the depleted reserve of the Bank of England. Gold exports following an enormous favorable trade balance extending



over several years show that we have established credits abroad, and the amount is probably much greater than generally supposed. Whether permanent financial supremacy is gradually passing from London to New York it is yet too early to determine. That such a readjustment is to take place in the near future seems to be reasonably certain.

But probably we are more directly interested in the growth of the banking institutions of the city than in any contest with the cities of the old world for financial leadership. A comparison of some of the more important figures reported by the National and State banks of the city, including all the boroughs, shows the following result:

	NATIONAL BANKS.		STATE BANKS.	
	Oct. 6, 1896.	Dec. 13, 1900.	July 12, 1895.	Dec. 4, 1900.
Capital.....	\$52,102,000	\$64,300,000	\$19,489,000	\$17,007,000
Surplus and profits.....	62,800,000	78,896,000	17,232,000	19,662,000
Total deposits.....	462,907,000	901,496,000	*136,655,000	*202,017,000
Total resources.....	589,112,000	1,094,821,000	202,741,000	271,600,000

\* Demand deposits.

These figures show that from October 6, 1896, to December 13, 1900, the National banks of the city increased their deposits from \$462,907,000 to \$901,496,000, while their total resources rose from \$589,112,000 to \$1,094,821,000.

From July 12, 1895, to December 4, 1900, the demand deposits of the State banks increased from \$136,655,000 to \$202,017,000, and their total resources from \$202,741,000 to \$271,600,000.

That the National banks have gained more rapidly than the State institutions is due to causes which need not be explained to this audience.

Altogether the banks of New York are growing most satisfactorily. The magnitude of their resources and the strength of their management constitute one of the sure reliances for the future commercial and financial greatness of the city."

Other speakers were Wm. Cullen Bryant, J. H. DeRidder, John G. Jenkins, Herbert L. Bridgman and H. F. Sammis. Letters of regret were read from Henry C. Brewster, ex-President Cleveland and Wu Ting-fang.

**The Finances and the Future.**—The greatest work done for the establishment of national unity, and for the peace, strength, and order which flowed from national unity, was done by the first Secretary of the Treasury of the United States. A work of like kind, on a broader field, with possible consequences even more important to the nation and to the world, remains to be done in the finances of the country.

To-day a noble structure of national power, prestige and prosperity rests on the firm foundations which Hamilton laid. Noble as that structure is, it is but the beginning of what may exist in the future, if we have the wisdom and the courage to deal with present conditions in the spirit in which the foundations were laid. If Hamilton were living we believe that the one thing that would be clearest and most impressive to his mind would be the fact that the United States has not yet established on an absolutely solid basis the gold standard, on which depends our ability to take our full part in the commerce of the world. He would see that without that the public credit, and the far greater fabric of private credit intimately interwoven with it, is exposed to disastrous and utterly needless disturbance. He would understand also that the defect in our system is due to that tendency, which he abhorred above all things, to pander to the prejudice of the ignorant. One can imagine the scorn with which he would treat the action of the Senate in emasculating the gold standard bill sent to it by the House, making the sure maintenance of the standard dependent on the discretion of a possible hostile or weak head of the Treasury. And he would never give a moment's rest to that indomitable energy of his until the shameful step had been retraced and the standard of currency and credit had been put beyond the risk of any conceivable accident of politics.

To some doubtless this will seem, in this period of prosperity and apparently complete security, language of unnecessary seriousness. But it is, we are convinced, the language of simple, sober sense applied to well-known facts. The present Secretary of the Treasury has over and again avowed the same view of the actual law and of its possible consequences. The President has submitted to Congress his urgent recommendation for amendment in the line of this view. Large numbers of bankers and business men throughout the country have advocated the policy of the President and the Secretary. The situation was only recently set forth with the utmost clearness and force by the Hon. E. J. Hill, of Connecticut, in an admirable speech in the House of Representatives.

It is, however, to the bearing of our defective legislation on our interests at home that most of the discussion has related. Its bearing on the interests opening before us all over the world in the immediate future is of still greater importance. Purely commercial disturbance will affect these and cannot be wholly avoided. But when such disturbance comes we shall be heavily and uselessly handicapped if through the condition or the policy of the Treasury the perfect maintenance of the gold standard is in the least put in jeopardy or in doubt. And now, while the Treasury is so strong and the country in the full tide of prosperity, is the time to make the needed improvement. It cannot be done—the more's the pity—at this session of Congress, but not a day should be lost in the next.—*The New York Times*.

## REVIEW OF THE CANADIAN BANK RETURNS.

The last quarter of the year 1900 and the second under the Canadian Bank Amendment Act is quite as encouraging as the former quarter. In fact the results of the past three months surpass all former records in relation to the volume of business. October, the banner month of the year as to note circulation and general activity in trade being included in the quarter under review, places this period in the front rank as to volume of business, as shown in the abstract appended.

Specie and Dominion notes in the bankers' hands were \$1,248,918 greater than at the end of the preceding quarter and \$4,063,566 over what they were on December 31, 1899; notes of and checks on other banks increased during the quarter under review \$6,356,346, though the increase over the figures of a year ago was only \$4,089,827. Loans between banks and deposits with, and balances due from other banks in Canada, show only slight alteration. The amount due from banks and agencies in the United Kingdom shows a reduction for the quarter of \$1,235,994 and a reduction during the year of \$6,829,075. The amount due from banks and agencies elsewhere than in Canada and the United Kingdom shows a reduction for the year of \$10,614,150 and a decrease for the quarter of \$343,247. Railway and other bonds, debentures and stocks increased for the quarter \$259,848, and \$10,843,974 over the same date a year ago. Call and short loans on stocks and bonds in Canada have also been active, the increase during the quarter being \$3,194,525 and for the year \$1,546,033. Call and short loans elsewhere than in Canada have been reduced \$2,515,160. Current loans in Canada increased during the quarter \$3,626,501 and during the year \$8,968,291 and for the same item elsewhere than in Canada the increase was \$1,429,112. Overdue debts decreased during the quarter \$467,527 but a very slight increase is noted over what was given in last year's statement.

The total assets of the banks were \$501,542,015 at the close of the year—the highest reached in the banking records.

Bank notes in circulation make also a good showing for the quarter, being \$371,176 more than at the end of September and \$4,758,493 more than on December 31, 1899.

In order to justify the increased issue of note circulation it may be noticed that the banks' paid-up capital increased during the quarter \$1,302,339 and for the year \$3,503,089. This widens the field for bank-note circulation, as the banks are permitted to issue notes to the extent of their unimpaired paid-up capital. The reserve fund also has made a gratifying gain, the increase for the quarter being \$731,993 and for the year \$4,533,625.

The bank note circulation for the month of October last was the highest reached in Canadian banking history, viz., \$53,193,777. This was the record for the thirty-first of that month, but the highest reached of any time during that month was \$54,558,416.

Deposits of the people, which head does not include deposits between banks nor those by the Governments, is another item that has shown healthy and fairly rapid growth. Deposits payable on demand increased during the quarter \$7,524,486 and during the year \$9,972,137, while those payable after notice show an increase of \$5,417,487 for the quarter and \$14,709,532 over what they were a year ago. The other items are not of so great importance in relation to the trade and commerce of the country and need therefore hardly be referred to in that regard. It may be interesting to give the deposits of the people in the institutions under certain Government control, which were as follows at the close of the year:

In chartered banks.....	\$318,357,920
Government Saving banks.....	54,159,456
Deposits in Savings banks in Prov. of Quebec.....	18,353,287
Deposits in loan companies.....	19,466,676
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$410,337,299</b>

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF CANADIAN CHARTERED BANKS—COMPARISON OF THE IMPORTANT ITEMS.

Assets.	Increase and decrease for quarter.			Increase and decrease for year.		
	Dec. 31, 1900.	Sept. 30, 1900.	Dec. 31, 1899.	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,
Specie and Dominion notes.....	\$31,558,509	\$30,809,598	\$27,494,948	Inc.,	\$1,248,918	Inc., \$4,088,566
Notes of and checks on other banks.....	16,401,559	10,045,218	12,361,782	Inc.,	6,356,346	Inc., 4,030,827
Loans to other banks in Canada secured, including bills rediscounted.....	1,007,186	1,540,748	.....	Inc.,	57,448	.....
Deposits made with and balances due from other banks in Canada.....	4,402,865	4,513,917	.....	Dec.,	110,052	.....
Due from banks and agencies in the United Kingdom.....	5,249,293	6,495,296	12,073,307	Dec.,	1,233,994	Dec., 6,839,075
Due from banks and agencies elsewhere than in Canada and United Kingdom.....	11,677,099	12,080,346	22,291,249	Dec.,	843,247	Dec., 10,614,150
Canadian municipal securities and British, foreign and colonial public securities other than Canadian.....	12,290,984	11,914,149	16,753,397	Inc.,	379,235	Dec., 4,462,913
Railway and other bonds, debentures and stocks.....	25,507,849	25,247,994	14,663,868	Inc.,	289,848	Inc., 10,843,974
Call and short loans on stocks and bonds in Canada.....	88,981,478	30,768,993	82,138,415	Inc.,	3,194,525	Inc., 1,546,083
Call and short loans elsewhere than in Canada.....	27,294,799	29,749,949	.....	Dec.,	2,515,160	.....
Current loans in Canada.....	275,648,898	272,080,391	266,673,601	Inc.,	3,668,501	Inc., 8,986,291
Current loans elsewhere than in Canada.....	20,079,290	18,650,178	.....	Inc.,	1,429,112	.....
Overdue debts.....	1,924,422	2,391,949	1,899,801	Dec.,	497,527	Inc., 24,621
Total assets.....	\$501,542,015	\$487,670,752	\$431,718,845	Inc.,	\$13,871,268	Inc., \$69,823,670
CAPITAL.						
Capital paid up.....	\$67,087,111	\$65,794,772	\$63,534,023	Inc.,	\$1,202,339	Inc., \$3,553,099
Reserve fund.....	84,501,849	53,709,356	29,667,724	Inc.,	731,998	Inc., 4,583,625
LIABILITIES.						
Bank notes in circulation.....	\$50,753,246	\$50,397,070	\$45,999,753	Inc.,	\$371,176	Inc., \$4,753,496
Due to Dominion Government.....	4,549,906	3,095,600	4,627,062	Inc.,	1,454,309	Dec., 77,786
Due to Provincial governments.....	2,918,097	2,421,272	2,459,499	Inc.,	499,225	Inc., 438,638
Deposits in Canada payable on demand.....	109,436,085	101,911,549	99,463,868	Inc.,	7,524,486	Inc., 9,972,187
Deposits in Canada payable after notice.....	186,479,510	183,062,618	173,786,968	Inc.,	6,417,467	Inc., 14,709,582
Deposits elsewhere than in Canada.....	20,442,395	21,213,758	.....	Dec.,	771,373	.....
Loans from other banks in Canada secured, including bills rediscounted.....	1,642,187	1,491,568	.....	Inc.,	150,624	.....
Deposits made by balances due to other banks in Canada.....	2,823,710	3,462,114	2,998,874	Dec.,	683,404	Dec., 174,964
Due to banks and agencies in the United Kingdom.....	4,190,638	4,993,675	4,390,301	Dec.,	803,087	Dec., 192,063
Due to banks and agencies elsewhere than in Canada and United Kingdom.....	526,104	667,283	908,901	Dec.,	841,179	Dec., 382,797
Total liabilities.....	\$392,150,481	\$378,603,318	\$336,015,630	Inc.,	\$13,547,163	Inc., \$56,131,861
MISCELLANEOUS.						
Directors' liabilities.....	\$12,186,948	\$12,061,728	\$3,015,066	Inc.,	\$107,215	Inc., \$4,178,860
Greatest amount of notes in circulation at any time during month.....	64,460,813	51,188,066	49,572,066	Inc.,	8,273,718	Inc., 4,898,728

## KNOX'S HISTORY OF BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES.

## OPINIONS AS TO THE MERITS OF THE WORK.

TORONTO (Ont.) *GLOBE*: The history of banking in the United States is of special interest to the general public on account of the obvious inadequacy of the existing monetary system and the recent popular upheaval against a disastrous currency experiment. The late John Jay Knox, for seventeen years Deputy Comptroller and Comptroller of the Currency at Washington, was exceptionally qualified for the compilation of such a history, and the work to which he devoted a great amount of labor in research and arrangement has been published by Bradford Rhodes & Co., New York. The author and editors were assisted by a corps of financial writers in the various States, and the whole work has been carefully revised and brought up to date by Mr. Bradford Rhodes, editor of the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*, and Mr. Elmer H. Youngman, associate editor. The result is a "History of Banking in the United States," which covers the entire field from the days of the first Continental Congress to the recent free silver campaign, and also reviews the experience of every State and Territory. The plan of the author in separating the history of banking under State charters from that under Federal authority is a departure from chronological order, but it serves to present more clearly and distinctly the salient features in the development of the existing system. The author aims at more than a bare narrative of events, and has happily escaped that worship of undigested facts which has made recent historical work in the economic field so repellant and so useless. He never hesitates to draw inferences from the current experience with which he is dealing, and has thus succeeded in making an otherwise dull subject both interesting and instructive. The banking laws of the United States have been affected by a democratic spirit which opposes anything savoring of special privileges or the perpetuation of corporate power. The Biblical view of the usurer is apparent, and there is also the common though unexpressed belief in the omnipotence of statutes. The belief that money can be created by acts of Congress and State Legislatures or turned out with a printing press is frequently apparent and is responsible for many disastrous entanglements.

The work contains upwards of 800 pages, about half being devoted to banks operating under State laws and private or unauthorized banks. This part of the work has entailed exhaustive research, but the great amount of interesting historical matter unearthed is an ample reward. Information regarding banks authorized by the Federal Government was readily available, especially since the establishment of the National banking system. But with State banks the work of investigation was beset with many difficulties. In some States but few laws have been passed to regulate banking, and little or no attempt has been made to collect statistics. The author, as Comptroller of the Currency, was required by law to furnish annually to Congress statistics of the business of National banks, State banks, Savings banks and trust corporations. In 1876 he began to incorporate in his reports all the available information that could serve to throw light on the various phases of banking in every State in the Union. At the time of his death that part of the work relating to banking under Federal laws was practically completed. There had been no previous attempt to compile a history of State banks, and nothing but fragmentary material to be gathered, sifted and brought into intelligible form. Through the editorial co-operation of Mr. William B. Greene, who had been associated with Mr. Knox in the Treasury Department and was familiar with his plans, that part of the work has been completed in accordance with the original design. The memoranda collected by the author is incorporated with the work of twenty-eight contributors having special knowledge and access to local sources of information. Many of the State banks have also assisted in supplying data. The design of the work has been well carried out. The multitudinous experiments which the nation has tried in fiscal legislation have extended the scope of the historical research, at the same time increasing its interests and usefulness. There is scarcely a theory in regard to banking or credit that has not been tested in the United States, and this compilation of experiments and results is a valuable addition to historical and economic literature.

The work is creditable to the publishers in printing and dress, and is embellished by many engraved portraits of Americans who have achieved prominence in the monetary world or in directing fiscal legislation. A comprehensive index adds to its value for purposes of reference.

# STATE BANKS—REPORTS OF SUPERVISING OFFICERS.

## CONNECTICUT.

HARTFORD, December 31, 1900.

To His Excellency George E. Lounsbury, Governor:

The Bank Commissioners have the honor to submit their annual report with the annual statements of the Savings banks, State banks, and trust companies, showing their condition as of October 1, 1900.

### SAVINGS BANKS.

The number of Savings banks has been increased to eighty-nine by the addition of the New Hartford Savings Bank, which commenced business May 12, 1900, under a charter granted by the General Assembly of 1899.

The following statement gives an abstract of the assets and liabilities as compared with those of October 1, 1899:

Assets.	Oct. 1, 1900.	Oct. 1, 1899.	Increase or decrease.
Loans on real estate.....	\$67,705,492	\$66,411,680	\$1,293,812
Loans on collateral security.....	7,014,530	6,686,839	327,690
Loans on personal security only.....	3,477,245	2,684,758	792,487
Invested in United States bonds.....	1,268,200	2,068,875	*825,675
Invested in State, town, city, school district, and corporation bonds and obligations.....	43,745,568	44,641,902	*896,334
Invested in railroad stocks and bonds.....	52,896,535	44,608,091	8,288,443
Invested in bank stocks. ....	7,348,212	7,079,636	268,576
Real estate owned, including banking house..	3,290,655	3,095,984	194,721
Miscellaneous assets.....	1,308,973	935,259	373,713
Cash on hand and in banks.....	6,268,513	6,242,770	25,743
Total assets.....	\$194,324,227	\$184,480,697	\$9,843,529
LIABILITIES.			
Deposits.....	\$183,781,942	\$174,135,194	\$9,646,747
Surplus.....	6,854,652	6,849,825	104,827
Interest and profit and loss.....	3,557,924	3,477,484	80,439
Other liabilities.....	29,707	18,193	11,514
Total liabilities.....	\$194,324,227	\$184,480,697	\$9,843,529

\* Decrease.

Each class of assets has increased, with the exception of the amounts invested in United States bonds and municipal bonds, which together have decreased \$1,722,009. The increase in the amount of railroad bonds is very nearly the same as that for the year ending with October 1, 1899. The increase in deposits is \$9,646,747, being \$1,005,948 less than the previous year, but much larger than in any year before that one.

By the United States census of 1900 the amount of deposits per capita is \$202.32.

### DIVIDENDS.

The rate per cent. of dividends paid the past year is shown in the following table:

NUMBER OF BANKS.	Rate per cent.	Amount of dividend.	Amount of deposits with dividends added.
73	4	\$5,489,627	\$147,084,447
13	3½	1,227,427	36,120,577
1	1½	2,145	123,758
2	...	.....	443,129
Totals.....89	...	\$6,699,200	\$183,781,942

Seventeen discriminate against large deposits.

## MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS.

ITEMS.	Oct. 1, 1900.	Oct. 1, 1899.	Increase or decrease.
Number depositors having less than \$1,000.....	356,068	341,362	14,741
Amount of such deposits.....	\$72,549,162	\$68,420,858	\$4,128,309
Depositors having \$1,000 and not over \$2,000....	36,972	35,611	1,361
Amount of such deposits.....	\$49,724,781	\$47,968,780	\$1,756,001
Depositors having \$2,000 and not over \$10,000..	16,955	15,882	1,073
Amount of such deposits.....	\$56,978,437	\$53,795,844	\$3,182,592
Depositors having over \$10,000.....	322	232	40
Amount of such deposits.....	\$4,529,561	\$3,982,716	\$546,844
Total number of depositors.....	410,243	393,137	17,205
Total amount of deposits.....	\$183,781,943	\$174,135,194	\$9,646,747
Largest amount due a single depositor.....	\$55,166	\$51,000	\$4,166
Average amount due depositors.....	\$447	\$442	\$4
Number accounts opened during the year.....	61,178	60,565	613
Number accounts closed during the year.....	43,947	42,808	1,144
Income received during the year.....	\$9,227,663	\$8,692,910	\$534,752
Dividends declared during the year.....	6,699,200	6,395,817	303,383
Amount deposited, including interest credited.	42,226,960	41,181,804	1,045,175
Amount withdrawn during the year.....	32,580,198	30,529,509	2,050,689
Amount past-due paper.....	96,479	134,164	*35,685
Amount of paper charged off during the year.	136,411	104,460	31,950
Expenses including salaries.....	482,816	467,508	15,307
Amount of assets yielding no income.....	845,915	1,080,615	*214,700
Largest amount loaned to one individual, company, society, or corporation.....	200,000	200,000	.....

\* Decrease.

The years 1899 and 1900 show an increase in the number of depositors of 34,532, a total increase of deposits for the two years of \$20,299,443—a wonderful showing for the State of Connecticut.

In September, 1899, the directors of the Willimantic Savings Institute decided that the order of the court restraining it from paying to any depositor a sum in excess of thirty per cent. of such deposit, which would expire on November 8, was no longer necessary. They therefore, with the approval of the commissioners, made application to the court for the revocation of the order, which was granted on October 12. Since that time the bank has paid out and received deposits satisfying all demands. In the opinion of the commissioners the bank is worthy of the confidence of its depositors.

Under the order of the court to the Colchester Savings Bank restraining it from paying to any depositor any sum in excess of one-tenth of such deposit, and regular dividends not to exceed four per cent., the bank declared one dividend of one and one-half per cent., payable in October, 1899. Upon the expiration of this order another was issued allowing it to pay fifteen per cent. to its depositors in addition to the ten per cent. allowed in each of the previous orders, but restraining it from declaring or paying any dividends. This order will expire March 24, 1901, when such action will be taken as seems for the best interests of the depositors.

The order to the Thompson Savings Bank will expire February 27, 1901, when an examination will be made for the purpose of deciding what action should be taken.

## STATE BANKS AND TRUST COMPANIES.

The amount of capital of the State banks remains the same, but the capital of the trust companies is increased \$457,200 by the amount of the capital of the Colonial Trust Company of Waterbury, which commenced business November 1, 1899, and further installments paid in on the stock of the Home Trust Company of Derby and the New Haven Trust Company.

Statements of the total assets and liabilities will be found below:

STATE BANKS.			
ASSETS.		LIABILITIES.	
Loans and discounts.....	\$5,683,731	Capital stock.....	\$2,240,000
Overdrafts.....	14,551	Surplus.....	399,800
Stocks, bonds, and mortgages.....	2,558,379	Undivided profits.....	532,454
Due from banks and bankers.....	1,087,965	Due to banks and bankers.....	171,512
Real estate, furniture and fixtures.	196,079	Dividends unpaid.....	5,982
Current expenses.....	17,815	Deposits.....	6,937,279
Specie and currency.....	517,156	Other liabilities.....	2,061
Checks and cash items.....	197,736		
Other assets.....	6,668		
Total assets.....	\$10,279,109	Total liabilities.....	\$10,279,109

## TRUST COMPANIES.

ASSETS.		LIABILITIES.	
Loans and discounts.....	\$4,777,712	Capital stock.....	\$1,775,000
Overdrafts.....	8,140	Surplus.....	538,557
Stocks, bonds, and mortgages.....	4,108,809	Undivided profits.....	540,369
Due from banks and bankers.....	1,345,022	Due to banks and bankers.....	68,389
Real estate, furniture and fixtures.....	430,988	Dividends unpaid.....	1,345
Current expenses.....	27,698	Deposits.....	8,484,690
Specie and currency.....	433,357	Other liabilities.....	5,331
Checks and cash items.....	167,005		
Other assets.....	109,852		
Total assets.....	\$11,408,583	Total liabilities.....	\$11,408,583

Respectfully submitted,

CHARLES H. NOBLE,  
GEORGE F. KENDALL,  
Bank Commissioners.

## KANSAS.

## OFFICE OF THE BANK COMMISSIONER, TOPEKA, KANS.

Hon. W. E. Stanley, Governor of Kansas:

SIR—In accordance with the provisions of chapter 47 of the Laws of Kansas of 1897, I transmit herewith my report showing the condition of all State and private banks, including Savings banks, doing business in the State at this date (September 1, 1900), together with banks in the hands of Receivers, and other information required by law.

There are at this date 334 banks (including four Savings banks) and fifty-five private banks under the supervision of this department. Of these, two State and three private banks are in process of liquidation.

During the period covered by this report (September 1, 1898, to September 1, 1900), fifty-nine new State banks, with a capital of \$630,000, have been organized.

Twelve private banks, with a capital of \$175,400, have reorganized as State banks.

Eleven State and private banks, with a capital of \$320,000, have reorganized as National banks.

Twelve State and five private banks, with a capital of \$262,500, having gone into voluntary liquidation.

Only five banks have been closed by this department since my last report.

The total liabilities of the five banks that have been closed during the period covered by this report to creditors amounted to \$149,328.97, of which there remains unpaid at this date \$5,299.83 due creditors of the Circleville bank, and \$14,072.47 due creditors of the Yates Center bank. Of this latter amount, only \$1,598.38 is due to creditors other than stockholders. It would thus appear that we have reached a point in the history of our State and private banks where losses by bank failures have been practically eliminated.

## INCREASE OF CAPITAL AND BUSINESS OF BANKS.

Notwithstanding the withdrawal of \$563,000 of capital and \$124,146 of surplus from our State system by voluntary liquidation, reorganization as National banks, and by bank failures, the aggregate capital of State and private banks has increased during two years \$100,023, and the surplus has increased \$468,160, making a total increase of banking capital of \$568,183. The tendency to build up a large surplus is evidenced by what I term the "Roll of Honor," which shows sixty-five banks having a surplus of fifty per cent. or over of their capital. The number of banks has increased from thirty-six, at date of my last report. Four of those shown in last report have liquidated; hence the number has doubled. Many other banks have a surplus of over twenty-five per cent. of their capital, and it appears to be the aim of a very large number to reach the fifty per cent. point as soon as possible. This is in keeping with good banking, and is quite an improvement over early-day methods, when the policy appeared to be to pay the largest possible dividends, often regardless of earnings. The business of the banks has increased in even a greater degree, the total loans having increased \$4,204,323, and deposits \$9,231,379. It is a noticeable fact that, while the total deposits have increased about forty-two per cent., time deposits, which bear interest, have increased only seven per cent., and this increase is confined to our Savings banks. Thus it would appear that our banks have ceased "buying business" by paying high rates of interest on deposits.

## SMALL INCREASE IN CASH RESERVE.

Another noticeable feature which illustrates the extent to which bank checks and bank credits have taken the place of money in transacting the business of the country is the fact that, while the deposits have increased over \$9,000,000, the actual cash held by the banks has increased only \$178,000, being less than two per cent. of the increase in deposits. The total cash held by the banks at this time is a fraction over nine per cent. of their deposits, and nearly \$100,000 less than in October, 1893, at the close of the panic, when the banks held 19.65 per cent. of their deposits in actual cash.

## NUMBER AND CLASSIFICATION OF DEPOSITORS.

At the time of making the call for the statement published in this report, I requested information with reference to the number and classification of depositors, together with an estimate of the percentage of total deposits held by each class; practically all banks furnished the desired information, with the following result:

Total number of depositors.....	111,132
Male depositors.....	89,533
Female depositors.....	16,938
Farmers and stockmen.....	60,982
Merchants.....	8,909
Public accounts.....	2,345
Accounts of corporations.....	1,516

Farmers and stockmen have deposits of \$17,868,318, or fifty-six and one-half per cent. of entire deposits; public accounts, \$2,533,005, or eight per cent.; and corporations, six and one-half per cent.

## HOUSE-CLEANING COMPLETED—LOSSES AND DIVIDENDS.

The past two years have practically completed the house-cleaning resulting from the requirements of our present banking law, and our banks now hold little else but clean assets, convertible into cash readily at the value at which they are carried upon the books. This report contains a detailed summary showing the receipts and disbursements of all banks for the years 1897, 1898 and 1899, which will be interesting to all bankers. Among other things, this summary shows that since the passage of the law of 1897 to January 1, 1900, the banks have charged off losses as follows:

Bad paper.....	\$1,058,907.98
Depreciation in real estate.....	401,926.28
Depreciation in furniture and fixtures.....	109,720.03
Loss on real estate sold.....	14,712.63
Total.....	\$1,580,266.87

or twenty-three and one-half per cent. of the average capital invested during this period.

In 1899, 247 of the 396 banks then doing business in the State paid dividends averaging 11.74 per cent. on the capital invested. Of the remaining 139 banks, only eleven failed to show net earnings; seven of these were new banks organized within ninety days of the close of the year. Hereafter, all banks will be in a position to pay dividends if they so desire, unless prevented by some unusual loss.

## BANKS IN HANDS OF RECEIVERS.

Considerable progress has been made since my last report in the matter of closing up receiverships, but there are still quite a number that have been "hanging fire" for a long time, but, with a few exceptions, the delay is caused by litigation over disputed claims. There is room for great improvement in the method of winding up the affairs of a closed bank. I am of the opinion that the banking department is the proper channel through which these reforms can be accomplished.

## EFFECT OF CHANGE IN NATIONAL BANK LAW.

At the time of the passage of the amendment to the National Banking Law, which granted additional privileges to National banks and reduced the minimum capital from \$50,000 to \$25,000, it was predicted and expected by many that a large number of State and private banks would nationalize. As a reason for this belief, it was suggested that National banks enjoy a prestige over State and private banks which, aside from other supposed advantages, would justify a change. While it is true that there was a time when National banks did enjoy such prestige, this was before any supervision of State banks had been undertaken. Prior to 1891, this State not only did not provide supervision, but there was practically no law regulating



the business of banking, and naturally there was a lack of confidence in State banks, but today, as a result of our present stringent law and State supervision, which is conceded to be more efficient than National supervision, for the simple reason that the supervising power is nearer the people and in closer touch with the supervised, our State banks have grown in favor, until now they enjoy a prestige over the National banks, as country banks—that is, as banks for our smaller cities and towns.

#### PRESTIGE OF STATE BANKS OVER NATIONALS.

It will be conceded that the prestige of a bank will be indicated by its deposits. I have therefore prepared a schedule of twenty representative National and State banks, located in the various portions of the State, showing the capital and surplus and total deposits of each. It shows the ratio of deposits to capital of each bank and in each instance the State bank has the advantage. The total for the twenty banks show that the Nationals have deposits of \$2.50 to each \$1 of capital, while the State banks have \$4.24. A comparison is also made between all State banks doing business in towns and cities where Nationals are located and between all National and all State banks, and in each comparison the State banks have the advantage. I am frequently asked what advantage the amendment to the National Banking Law has been to Kansas banking interests. I answer that I am unable to discover any, unless the increase in the circulation of the banks, to the extent of about \$2,000,000, is considered an advantage. With a reserve of fifty-one per cent. in State banks and forty-five per cent. in the Nationals, it is difficult to understand what advantage this increased circulation is to the banks. From present indications State banks will continue to be the favorites with Kansas people, and if changes which experience suggests are necessary are made in our State law from time to time, there is no reason why Kansas should not build up a system of State banks superior to any yet established.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS.

In my last report I recommended a number of changes in our law, which my experience since its passage suggested would improve its efficiency. Notwithstanding the banking committee of the House prepared and recommended for passage a bill embracing all the important recommendations, and supported their report on the floor of the House, the bill failed to pass. In view of this action I hesitate to repeat the recommendations, but believing that it should be the desire of every representative to perfect existing laws as far as possible, I take the liberty of repeating the following recommendations:

#### ASSESSMENT OF BANKS.

Our system of assessing banks is defective. Our law is indefinite and conflicting, and is construed differently by many assessors, thus resulting in unequal taxation, in many instances banks being required to pay excessive taxes, out of all proportion to their property, while in other cases they avoid paying their just portion. Our assessment law should be amended so as to provide a uniform and just basis for the assessment of banks, requiring them to bear only their just share of the burden of taxation.

#### PROVING CLAIMS AGAINST CLOSED BANKS.

Our law makes no provision for the proving of claims against closed banks, thus making it necessary for each judge who appoints a Receiver to make a rule governing this very important matter. I recommend the adoption of a uniform method by which all claims shall be proved, and the fixing of a limit of time after which claims shall be barred.

#### CLAIMS OF UNKNOWN PERSONS.

In all banks that have been in business for a long time there will be found credits to persons who are unknown to the officers of the bank. Some have died; others have moved away and have forgotten that they ever had a deposit in a Kansas bank. There should be some provision whereby such persons or their heirs can be apprised of the existence of such deposits. \* \* \* I recommend that all banks doing business in Kansas be required to publish, within ten days after the 1st day of January in each year, a list of all deposits that have not changed for a period of three years, giving the full name of the depositor and the amount to the credit of each. In cases of voluntary liquidation, the bank liquidating shall cause to be published a list of all unclaimed deposits remaining at the expiration of six months after notice of liquidation of the bank has been published, and if any such deposits remain unclaimed for a period of six months after such list is published, same shall be paid to the State Treasurer for the benefit of the State school fund. Receivers of closed banks should proceed in like manner.

## LOANS TO OFFICERS.

That the loaning of the funds of a bank to its officers is objectionable will not be disputed, but where the directors of a bank are composed of the business men of a community who occasionally require an accommodation in the form of a loan, as is often the case with directors of Kansas banks, to prohibit banks from loaning to their officers would often prevent them from securing a competent board. Yet there should be some restriction placed upon this class of loans, in order to prevent misuse of the bank's funds. I recommend that the aggregate loans of a bank to its officers and directors be limited to one-third of its capital; that no loan be made to any officer or director except on the approval of three-fourths of the directors, at a regular or special meeting of the board; that a record of such approval be made in the records of the proceedings of the board, and that violation of this provision be made a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not less than \$100 for each offense.

## EXCESS LOANS.

Our banking law limits the total indebtedness of any individual, firm or corporation, including the several members of a firm or corporation, to any bank to fifteen per cent. of the capital and surplus of the bank. This provision of law is violated to a greater extent than any other. While the commissioner has exercised the power given him under the law to require the payment of excess loans, some further provision should be made in order to remedy the evil. I am of the opinion that the officers and directors of any bank violating this provision of law should be made personally liable for any loss that may occur by reason of such excess loans. I recommend the amending of our law in this respect.

## OFFICIAL BOND.

Our law provides that the board of directors shall require the Cashier and other officers having the handling of the funds of the bank to give bond, same to be approved by the board. I have construed this provision to mean that officers and owners of private banks should also give bond. Some objections have been raised to this construction of the law. I therefore recommend that the section making this provision be amended so as to require all banks and bankers to give bond.

## UNLAWFUL BANKING.

Our law provides that any individual, firm or corporation which receives money on deposit shall be considered as doing a banking business, and shall be amenable to all its provisions. My attention has been called to a number of instances where parties were engaged in receiving deposits without complying with the banking law. When the attention of persons thus violating the law has been called to its provisions, they have as a rule discontinued receiving deposits; but complaints continue to be made to this office of violations of law in this matter, and I am satisfied that there are a number of persons engaged in receiving deposits of money who have not complied with our banking law. I have no power to investigate cases of this character; that is to say, I cannot examine into the books or accounts of any one suspected of receiving deposits. If those engaged in the banking business are to be protected from this illegitimate practice, power should be given the commissioner to examine the books and accounts of any individual, firm or corporation whom he has reason to believe is engaged in violating the law, and a suitable penalty should be provided for a refusal to submit to such examination.

## LEGAL RESERVE.

The provisions of our law relating to legal reserve should be amended so as to permit investments in United States bonds to be included as a part of banks' reserve in lieu of deposits in other banks.

## PAYMENT OF DIVIDENDS.

In addition to present requirements, all banks should be required to calculate accrued interest on outstanding certificates of deposit and other obligations of the bank, and carry a sufficient amount to undivided-profit account to cover same before paying a dividend. A number of banks evade the provision of law requiring the creation of a surplus by paying out their entire net earnings in the form of officers' salaries. I recommend that where the total salaries of the officers of any bank exceed ten per cent. of its capital and surplus such excess shall be considered as dividends, and such bank shall be required to carry to surplus the amount required by law before paying such excess salaries.

## INVESTMENTS OF BANKS.

The provision of our law limiting total investments of a bank to four times its capital and surplus continues to excite the opposition of a goodly number of bankers, and I admit

that it does work a hardship to a small number of our large banks in the larger cities, who have to meet the competition of National banks that are unrestricted in this respect, and naturally a State banker who enjoys a larger line of deposits than his competitor under the National system does not relish the idea of being compelled to cease loaning while he has ample funds available, simply because his investments have reached the four-times limit, and particularly if his customer is compelled to go to his competitor for his loan. The purpose of this provision is well understood: that of requiring the investments of a bank to bear some proper relation to its capital. I am still of the opinion that the provision, generally speaking, is a wise one, and believe it has accomplished much good, or, at least, it has prevented harm. Times like the present, when deposits are large, are the times when bad loans are made. It is a great temptation to any man to have a large sum of money under his control, and the prospect for large dividends will cause many men to assume risks that prove disastrous. Past experience has shown that there must be some restraining power in order to prevent abuses that jeopardize not only the capital of the bank but the money of depositors. True, many of our bankers will profit by past experience, which has been a dear teacher to them and to the public, and will carefully guard and protect the funds entrusted to their care. But the fact that there are now, and always will be, men engaged in the banking business who will not do so unless required by law creates the necessity for legal enactment.

There will perhaps never be enacted a law that will not work a hardship to some. Bankers should not overlook the fact that they enjoy great privileges, and that the abuse of these privileges by some bankers has created the demand for restrictions and requirements that will prevent abuses which result in loss of the funds entrusted to their care. I concede that bankers perform a great service for the public, for which, in many instances, they are poorly paid; yet, on an average, the business is fairly profitable, and few engaged in it are exerting themselves to get out, and on the contrary others are constantly seeking an opportunity to get in; so it is apparent that this provision has not caused any serious loss to the business. I believe it has strengthened the banks with the people, and am confident that its repeal would be a mistake. Yet I believe that it can be so modified as to remove the objectionable feature and retain its good features. The complaints come from our larger banks in our large cities. These banks can secure investments in bonds and a fair supply of demand loans. This class of securities, that is, bonds and demand loans, are readily convertible into cash, and it is not objectionable to have an excess over the four-times limit in this class of securities. I therefore recommend that this provision of our law be amended so as to provide that investments in State, county or municipal bonds and demand loans on warehouse receipts, or other collateral readily convertible into cash, shall not be included with the investments of the bank for the purpose of this section.

#### LOANS ON REAL ESTATE.

Believing that there is no better security than a first mortgage on good Kansas land, where reasonable judgment is exercised with reference to the amount of the loan, I have been disposed to favor this class of loans, and have urged our banks to carry a reasonable amount of same, and while the amount of real estate loans held by our banks is gradually increasing, being \$300,000 greater at this time than at the date of my last report, I find that the slow process of collecting real-estate-mortgage indebtedness prevents many bankers from making this class of loans, and while I do not believe any change in our law is necessary to induce foreign or outside capital to come here for investment—for capital goes where it can get good security, and there is no better security anywhere on earth than a properly selected Kansas farm mortgage—yet I believe that our home capital would be more extensively invested in these securities if our law relating to the collection of mortgage indebtedness were amended. I am therefore of the opinion that the passage of a trust-deed law would result in much good to our State.

#### SAVINGS BANKS.

We have at this time only four banks in the State that are transacting an exclusively Savings bank business. These are doing business under our general banking law, or our old and very defective Savings bank law, which, if it has not been repealed, is practically a dead letter, and should be repealed. We have reached a point in our development in Kansas where we should have a law defining the powers, privileges and duties of Savings banks. I therefore recommend the repeal of our present Savings bank law and the passage of a new law governing these institutions.

#### TRUST COMPANIES.

Our general corporation law names trust companies among other purposes for which corporations may be formed, but we have no statute defining the powers of such companies. I have received inquiries from a number of persons who desire to organize such companies, but hesitate to do so because of there being no law defining their powers, privileges and duties.

All of the older and many of the new States have provided for the organization of trust companies, granting certain powers to them, usually including the power to receive a certain class of deposits as trust funds, and, in many instances, empowering them to transact a general deposit business. I recommend the passage of a trust company law, and, in the event such law confers upon trust companies the power to receive deposits, I recommend that they be placed under the supervision of the Bank Commissioner.

#### RIGHTS OF MINORITY STOCKHOLDERS.

In several instances a small majority of the stockholders control the affairs of the bank and absorb all its earnings in the payment of salaries and other expenses, thus depriving the minority stockholders of any income. Under our present law there appears to be no relief for the minority. Where a bank's business is unprofitable there should be some provision whereby its affairs could be wound up. I recommend that provision be made whereby the interests of minority stockholders may be protected.

#### SURPLUS MONEY IN BANKS.

One of the greatest difficulties encountered at this time by many of our Kansas banks is their inability to safely invest the large surplus of money resulting from the great increase in deposits. Many of our small banks with a capital of \$10,000 or \$15,000 find themselves responsible for \$100,000 or more of deposits without being able to invest one-fourth of the amount. They are offered freely two classes of paper to which I have objected. First, loans on cattle, made through commission companies at Kansas City. I have objected to this class of paper, for the reason that many of the loans are made to irresponsible persons, and for the full cost of the cattle, with commission, interest and freight added, thus leaving no margin of security, and in view of the fact that these commission companies usually have a very small capital, I have considered their indorsement as absolutely worthless. Notwithstanding my protests, quite a number of our banks have invested in this class of paper, only to suffer loss often equal to or greater than all the profits derived from the investment.

Another class of paper to which I have objected is the paper of great manufacturing and mercantile establishments located in other States, which issue their notes in job lots and offer them to the banks which have surplus funds. I am informed that some of these great establishments float millions of dollars of this class of paper. No security is given; no statement of the actual condition of the company is provided; they are so big that nothing of this character is deemed necessary. When I object to our banks investing in these notes, I am told that this or that big bank in this or that city carries \$100,000 or \$200,000 of this paper and are "glad" to get it. I do not believe that the deposits of Kansas people should be loaned in this manner to any institution outside of the State, no difference how big it is, at least without proper security, and have therefore availed myself of the power given the Bank Commissioner in such cases and have refused to sanction such loans.

#### POWERS OF BANK COMMISSIONER.

In view of the fact that I will retire from the office at the close of my present term (March 1, 1901), I may be permitted to offer some suggestions with reference to the powers that should be conferred upon the Bank Commissioner without being subjected to the charge that I desire to have my own powers increased. The period during which I have held this position has afforded special opportunities to observe the workings of our State system of bank supervision. During this period we have passed through the most severe bank panic ever experienced in this country, as a result of which many banks were closed and others had a struggle for existence. Recovering from this condition, we have to-day reached a point where our banks are enjoying the highest degree of prosperity in their history, and are entrusted with the care of more funds belonging to the people of our State than ever before. Starting in at a time when the duties of the office imposed a great burden, we have reached a condition where it has become more of a pleasure than otherwise to discharge the duties of the office, yet I realize that there will again come a time when there will be a different situation. While I hope and believe that we will never again in the history of our State repeat the experience of 1893, yet it is folly to assume that we will always enjoy great prosperity.

The State has undertaken to supervise the business of banking, other than by National banks, within her limits. Every citizen of Kansas should feel proud of the success thus far attained, and will approve any action calculated to improve the efficiency of the system. I am of the opinion that, to secure the best results, the Bank Commissioner should be given as full and complete power and control over State banks as the Comptroller of the Currency is given over the National banks; that in the matter of winding up the affairs of insolvent banks he should appoint the Receiver, and should be given full power to do everything necessary to fully protect creditors. No judge of any court is more competent to select a Receiver for a bank than is the Bank Commissioner.

Our law provides that one-half of the reserve which banks are required to keep on hand "may consist of balances due from good solvent banks, located at commercial centers and at such other points as the Bank Commissioner may approve," but is silent with reference to the surplus funds above the reserve. To-day this surplus is over three times the reserve, and it is a far more important item at this time than the reserve. A considerable number of banks have made deposits in small banks located in cities or towns in other States away from commercial centers, and of the solvency of which it is impossible for the commissioner to obtain any definite information. Frequently the officers of the Kansas bank are interested as owners or stockholders in these outside banks, and not infrequently are their financial interests greater in the outside bank in which the deposit is kept than in their Kansas bank. I have objected to this practice, but have no authority of law under which I can enforce such objection. I am of the opinion that the Bank Commissioner should be given power to prevent the depositing of the surplus funds of our banks in this class of institutions, and that the surplus should be subject to the same rule as the reserve.

#### PRIVATE BANKS.

In former reports I have given many reasons why private banks should not be permitted to continue doing business in this State, and have recommended that all banks be required to incorporate. I have persistently urged all private bankers to incorporate, and at this date there are only fifty-three private banks remaining. For obvious reasons, I have heretofore refrained from giving publicity to motives for advocating this change, which would tend to create distrust in our private banks, many of which are among our most substantial institutions, hoping that the Legislature would act, or, in the event of its failure, the bankers themselves would see the importance of making the change. The danger and tendency to evil results from permitting an individual to engage in the handling of large sums of money belonging to other people, without any one connected with the business having any control over his actions, particularly when this individual is engaged in numerous other enterprises and undertakings, should be apparent to all. It is but natural that a man so situated, having large sums of money under his control, should occasionally use a portion of such funds in his outside business. Of course, he considers himself perfectly good—better than any one else, in fact—but sooner or later trouble results, and the community in which such a bank is located suffers. It is not proper, nor is it right, that any man should be permitted to use the funds entrusted to his care as a banker in the conduct of other business. I have found it absolutely impossible, under existing law, to prevent the misuse of the funds under their control by some of our private bankers, without resorting to the extreme measure of revoking the authority of such banks. I have hesitated to use such drastic measures, and now urge the Legislature to so amend our banking law as to require all those who desire to enjoy the privileges of banking under our State law to incorporate.

#### A GUARANTEE FUND.

In my last report I devoted considerable space to the presentation of the subject of creating a fund which should guarantee all depositors in State banks against loss, and outlined a plan for such fund. At the special session of the Legislature of 1898 I prepared and caused to be introduced a bill creating such fund. This bill passed the Senate by a good majority, but failed of passage in the House, lacking two votes. The opposition to the bill came largely from National bankers, some of whom spent much time in opposing it, giving as a reason, as I am informed, the fact that its passage would force them to change their banks to the State system or quit business, and that they did not care to do business under so stringent a law as our State banking law. At this time I do not care to offer any recommendations on this subject further than to state that I have discussed the matter with many Kansas people during the past two years, and have not found one, outside of a few bankers, but expressed the desire to see such a law placed upon our statute books.

Some fears were expressed as to the adequacy of the fund proposed to meet the requirements of a guarantee. It may be interesting to note what the situation would be to-day under this law, had it been adopted two years ago. The deposit with the State Treasurer to the credit of our banks, allowing nothing for the increase in deposits that every one agrees would result from the enactment of such law, and the National banks which would have changed to the State system, would amount to \$1,300,000, and there would by January 1, 1901, be \$80,000 in the guarantee fund proper, with possibly \$10,000 of this sum in use temporarily in the settlement of the affairs of closed banks, all of which would be returned to the fund in time; for there will not be a dollar of loss to depositors on account of State bank failures during the last two years. The year 1901, under this law, would add about \$40,000 to the fund. I am still of the opinion that those who deposit their money in our banks, thereby furnishing the basis for more than ninety per cent. of all the business transactions of the country, are entitled to this protection. In my opinion the time will come when such protection will be

given them. Kansas may wait to follow the lead of some other State, but in time the people will demand the passage of such a law. The proposed law may have been defective, but no attempt was made to point out its defects; the principle of a guarantee fund was opposed.

#### VIOLATION OF BANKING LAW BY BANK OFFICERS.

Our law makes it the duty of the Bank Commissioner or his deputy to report any violations of the law by officers or directors, which constitute a misdemeanor or felony, to the county attorney of the county in which the bank where the offense was committed is located. Quite a number of such violations, principally in the nature of false statements or false entries in the books, have been reported, but practically nothing has resulted in the way of prosecutions, by reason of the failure of the county attorney to act. A bank's books and the statements made to the banking department form the basis upon which its condition is determined. If a bank officer may make false statements, omitting a portion of the liabilities of his bank in some instances, and showing objectionable resources or liabilities under improper headings, thus withholding from the commissioner information necessary to determine the true condition of the bank, and when his unlawful acts are discovered he is permitted to go unpunished, the efficiency of bank supervision will be seriously impaired. All such violations should be vigorously prosecuted, and punishment should be inflicted upon all who are convicted. I recommend that, where a county attorney fails to act on the information of the Bank Commissioner within thirty days, the fact shall be reported to the Attorney-General by the Bank Commissioner, and that the Attorney-General be empowered to prosecute the offender.

JNO. W. BREIDENTHAL, *Bank Commissioner.*

#### MAINE.

BANKING DEPARTMENT, AUGUSTA, December 1, 1900.

To the Honorable Llewellyn Powers, Governor, and the Executive Council of the State of Maine:

The Bank Examiner has the honor to present the forty-fourth annual report of the State banking institutions under his supervision, for the fiscal year ending December 1, 1900.

The number, classes and assets of these institutions are as follows:

	Number.	Assets.
Savings banks.....	51	\$71,076,211
Trust and banking companies.....	17	13,295,408
Loan and building associations.....	33	2,862,178
Total.....	101	\$87,233,796

This is a gain of one in the number of institutions reported, and of \$4,934,627 in their assets. The number of depositors in Savings banks and trust companies, and shareholders in loan and building associations, has increased from 202,552 in 1899 to 213,980 in 1900, a gain of 11,428 as against a corresponding gain of 9,927 in 1899. Deducting from this total the number of depositors of demand deposits in trust companies, 6,019, the result shows that 207,961, or nearly one-third of our entire population, are directly interested in the various savings institutions of the State, and are through these agencies accumulating from their present incomes about \$5,000,000 annually.

During the period covered by this report the various kinds of State banking institutions have paid to depositors and stockholders, in interest and dividends, \$2,617,613 as against \$2,518,649 last year. It thus appears that, while there has been a material increase in the amount of funds, the income therefrom has been proportionately less than in 1899. This reduction in earnings does not result from any lack of good management in the various institutions reported, as they all show a decided improvement in the general condition for the year. It comes, rather, from the existing conditions of the money market and the consequent low rates upon investments, and must continue as long as those conditions exist.

During the year they have increased the amount of their reserve and undivided profits from \$4,294,297 to \$4,734,514, a gain of \$440,216.

The returns thus show that the favorable conditions last reported have continued through the official year just closed; that these State institutions as a whole have made a decided gain, both in deposits and assets—greater than the average gain in the past.

From a statement furnished this department by the Comptroller of the Currency it appears that there are now eighty-two National banks doing business in the State, with assets amounting to \$45,987,388, being an increase of \$2,579,152 in the assets of this class of banks. This makes the total authorized banking capital of the State \$133,221,181, an increase of \$7,513,790 during the year, as against \$3,422,781 in 1899. An equal distribution of this capital would give to each inhabitant of the State \$191.83.

## PRIVATE BANKING.

The recommendation made in 1899 is renewed, viz.: that, instead of placing private bankers under the supervision of this department it be provided by statute that no one shall receive deposits subject to check; or in the same manner as deposits are received by Savings banks; or do a general banking business; without first procuring a charter therefor, either from the State or national Government, and thus becoming subject to existing laws.

## SAVINGS BANKS.

There are fifty-one Savings banks now doing business in the State. The following table shows their aggregate liabilities and resources on October 27, 1900, and a comparison with those of October 28, 1899:

## COMPARATIVE STATEMENT.

RESOURCES.		
United States and District of Columbia bonds.....	\$3,635,750	\$4,449,750
Public funds in Maine.....	1,464,979	1,946,396
Public funds out of Maine.....	13,392,647	14,204,413
Railroad bonds in Maine.....	5,146,638	5,465,408
Railroad bonds out of Maine.....	15,429,050	20,089,028
Corporation bonds in Maine.....	3,718,306	3,710,126
Corporation bonds out of Maine.....	569,829	614,702
Railroad stock in Maine.....	744,705	784,909
Railroad stock out of Maine.....	484,874	525,609
Corporation stock in Maine.....	429,248	580,687
Corporation stock out of Maine.....	198,376	126,963
National bank stock in Maine.....	2,458,341	2,478,725
National bank stock out of Maine.....	151,245	112,500
Other bank stock in Maine.....	109,300	113,060
Loans on mortgages of real estate.....	7,854,405	7,811,047
Loans on collateral.....	3,641,271	3,129,164
Loans to municipalities.....	548,497	519,728
Loans to corporations.....	1,464,453	1,084,188
Real estate.....	1,018,142	1,029,735
Furniture and fixtures.....	84,549	86,005
Premium account.....	598,412	635,416
Expense account.....	30,102	30,567
Other resources.....	23,606	12,735
Cash.....	1,379,472	1,735,333
Total resources.....	\$67,521,197	\$71,076,211
LIABILITIES.		
	1899.	1900.
Deposits.....	\$64,009,336	\$67,240,439
Reserve fund.....	2,243,454	2,321,685
Special reserve fund.....	25,358	27,163
Profits.....	1,238,005	1,480,769
Other liabilities.....	9,392	6,154
Total liabilities.....	\$67,521,197	\$71,076,211

## STATISTICS.

Number of depositors.....	177,589	186,327
Number of depositors whose balance is less than \$2,000...	172,634	180,914
Amount of same.....	\$51,373,004	\$53,558,629
Number of depositors whose balance is \$2,000 or more...	4,955	5,413
Amount of same.....	\$12,631,381	\$13,681,809
Average rate of dividend (approximate).....	.084	.083
Amount of dividends paid.....	\$2,091,543	\$2,133,733
Municipal taxes paid.....	16,942	19,670
State tax.....	402,738	443,827

The total assets have increased \$3,555,014. The gain in the number of depositors has been 8,738, as against 7,875 in 1899; and in deposits, \$3,231,053, against \$3,156,829 last year.

The amount of deposits received during the year has been \$12,675,741. Adding to this, \$2,133,733, the total dividends declared, makes \$14,809,525, as the total amount credited to deposit account during the year. The amount of withdrawals has been \$11,578,472. The increase in deposits, therefore, has been \$1,097,299 in excess of the amount of dividends

credited. This is the excess of the deposits above withdrawals and shows the actual gain in new funds collected by the Savings banks during the year.

The average amount now standing to the credit of depositors is \$300.87; the average for each inhabitant of the State, based on the new census, is \$96.62.

The unusually large gain in the number of depositors is most satisfactory, indicating that these accumulations have come largely from those who can save only in small amounts. At no time during the history of our State have the condition and growth of Savings banks been more satisfactory than during the past two years.

#### RESOURCES.

The following table gives the different classes of assets and the amount and percentage of each class now held by the Savings banks, and a comparison with the percentages for 1899 and for 1890:

RESOURCES.	1900.	1900.	1899.	1899.
		Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.
U. S. and District of Columbia bonds....	\$4,449,750	6.23	9.83	1.66
Public funds in Maine.....	1,946,396	2.74	2.17	2.32
Public funds out of Maine.....	14,204,413	19.99	19.84	27.16
Railroad bonds in Maine.....	5,465,408	7.69	7.62	5.87
Railroad bonds out of Maine.....	20,039,028	28.19	22.85	16.78
Corporation bonds in Maine.....	3,710,126	5.22	5.50	4.89
Corporation bonds out of Maine.....	614,702	.87	.84	.78
Railroad stock in Maine.....	784,909	1.10	1.10	.65
Railroad stock out of Maine.....	525,609	.74	.72	.77
Corporation stock in Maine.....	530,687	.75	.64	.47
Corporation stock out of Maine.....	126,983	.18	.29	.04
National bank stock in Maine.....	2,478,725	3.49	3.64	4.52
National bank stock out of Maine.....	112,500	.16	.22	.77
Other bank stock in Maine.....	113,050	.16	.16	.17
Loans on mortgages of real estate.....	7,811,047	10.99	11.63	13.60
Loans on collateral.....	3,129,164	4.40	5.39	10.63
Loans to municipalities.....	519,728	.73	.81	.73
Loans to corporations.....	1,034,188	1.46	2.17	2.50
Real estate investment.....	514,857	.72	.77	.94
Real estate foreclosure.....	514,877	.72	.74	1.13
Furniture and fixtures.....	36,005	.05	.05	.05
Premium account.....	635,416	.89	.89	1.20
Expense account.....	30,567	.04	.05	.03
Other resources.....	12,735	.02	.04	.37
Cash.....	1,735,333	2.44	2.04	2.06
Total.....	\$71,076,211	100.00	100.00	100.00

The principal changes for the year are: A loss of \$2,186,000 in the holdings of Government bonds, and a gain of \$481,416 in municipal bonds in Maine, \$811,766 in municipal bonds out of Maine, \$318,780 in railroad bonds in Maine, \$4,609,978 in railroad bonds out of Maine, and \$101,439 in corporation stock in Maine.

The most noticeable of these changes is an increase of \$5,009,686 in the amount of all kinds of railroad securities. Thus the greater portion of the increase in assets for the year, together with the proceeds of the sales of Government bonds, have gone to swell this item, already large.

The investments in this class for the year, as shown by the monthly reports of the banks, have been approximately as follows: Steam railroad bonds in Maine, \$787,600, street railroad bonds in Maine, \$5,000, total in Maine, \$792,600; steam railroad bonds out of Maine, \$3,866,391, street railroad bonds out of Maine, \$1,379,700, total out of Maine, \$5,246,091; total purchases, \$6,018,691.

The present holdings of railroad bonds amount to \$25,504,487, and of railroad stock, to \$1,310,518, making a total of \$26,814,955 invested in all kinds of railroad securities combined. This is 37.72 per cent. of the entire assets of the Savings banks, as against 32.29 per cent. in 1899.

#### INVESTMENTS.

While the improved business condition of the country during the past few years has made an active demand for capital, it has not absorbed all the ever increasing funds seeking investment. This condition brings each year new cares and responsibilities for the trustees of Savings banks. To invest safely and profitably the rapidly increasing accumulation of savings, at present a more difficult problem than ever before.

In 1896 Government bonds sold on a 3.25 per cent. basis, while they now net less than two per cent. The better class of municipal bonds could at that time be obtained at a rate to pay the investor from 3.50 to four per cent., while they are now hard to find at three to 3.25 per cent. The percentage of reduction on other lines of investments is even greater. Thus there



has been a constant reduction in the income it is possible to obtain from safe investments, while the amount of deposits to be invested has constantly increased. It seems impossible, under the present economical management of the banks, for them to reduce their general expenses. The rate of taxation, too, remains the same as in former years when the income on investments was greater. It is not surprising, therefore, that trustees feel the increased responsibility of their duties. They should not, however, permit these conditions to tempt them to purchase questionable securities, but adhere strictly to the rule of safe investments and pay such dividends as that class of securities yield. It would seem advisable to reduce the rate of dividends in all the banks to not exceeding three per cent. This is all that the earnings on present investments warrant, and is all that depositors have any right to expect.

If the trend of investments for the past two years indicates the future policy of our Savings banks, and their funds are to be invested largely in *quasi* public corporation bonds, the regulation of the issue of stocks and bonds by such corporations is of vital importance to the interests represented by this department.

In 1893, the Legislature, by an amendment to the investment law, attempted to place some restriction on this class of investments. It was provided that street railroad bonds shall not be legal for Savings banks to purchase unless an amount equal to at least thirty-three and one-third per cent. of the mortgage debt had been paid in on the capital stock, in cash, and expended on the road. There is no doubt that even this provision, applying as it does to street railroads alone, has given good results, and been the means of saving the banks from unprofitable investments. Some more radical provision than this is needed, however, to protect Savings banks and investors generally against the over-capitalization of corporations.

#### TAXES.

The amount of the Savings bank tax for the year is \$448,827—an increase of \$46,080 from that paid in 1899. This is in part due to the decrease in the amount of Government bonds owned, and in part to the increase in deposits. Unless the rate be reduced, or there be some unforeseen change in condition of affairs in the banks, this amount will show a further material increase the coming year.

The law placing a State tax on Savings banks was first enacted in 1872. The rate fixed at that time was one-half of one per cent. on the average amount of deposits alone; afterward, in 1875, it was increased to one per cent.; later, in 1883, it was reduced to three-quarters of one per cent., and finally, in 1893, fixed at substantially this last rate with the average of reserve and undivided profits included. The total amount of taxes paid to the State during the time has been \$8,080,719. Since the law was first enacted nearly every bank examiner has insisted that the amount of this tax is burdensome and altogether out of proportion to that paid on other kinds of personal property.

Notwithstanding I have called attention to this matter several times before, the present conditions are so urgent I feel compelled to briefly refer to it again. I do not insist upon this recommendation because of any desire on my part to obtain a reduction in taxes for fifty-one corporations with millions of capital; neither is it altogether because 188,327 of our people, who can ill afford it, are bearing more than their fair share of the public burdens, but principally because I believe the future welfare of these institutions and the good of the State generally demand it. The rapid decrease during the past few years in the rate of dividends paid, and the certainty that this condition must continue, lead to the conclusion that some relief is necessary in this respect. If such relief is not granted satisfactory dividends cannot be paid to depositors, who will naturally withdraw a large portion of their deposits, to the great misfortune of the State at large. I am not unmindful of the fact that it is an official duty to look first after the best interests of the whole State in this as in all other matters affecting State banking institutions. I therefore urge this reduction because fully convinced that it is the only safe policy for the State to pursue.

The depositors will make no personal appeal for relief. They do not even appreciate the fact that, as these institutions are purely mutual, this tax is paid out of their own funds. They look only to the rate of dividends received on their deposits, and, when not satisfactory, withdraw the same. If this tax was assessed directly against these depositors instead of the banks, the burden would be so apparent, and the demand for relief so persistent, that it would be granted at once.

However urgent may be the need of the State for more revenue, it cannot be great enough to justify the taking from this class of our people of more than their just share of the taxes collected. The State certainly does not want to imperil the future of these institutions for the sake of the taxes received, as this is but a small part of the benefits derived from them. Nor do we believe that other property holders wish to protect themselves at the expense of the Savings banks.

#### DIVIDENDS.

The following table gives the rate and amount of dividends paid by Savings banks during the official year just closed, and a comparison with those for 1899:

RATE OF DIVIDENDS.	1899.		1900.	
	No. of banks.	Amount of dividends.	No. of banks.	Amount of dividends.
Four per cent. paid by.....	7	\$333,647	5	\$71,415
Three and three-quarters per cent. paid by.....	3	45,621	1	1,437
Three and one-half per cent. paid by.....	29	1,494,167	26	1,767,088
Three and one-quarter per cent. paid by.....	4	121,440	3	28,989
Three per cent. paid by.....	8	96,666	15	261,397
Two per cent. paid by.....	....	.....	1	5,508
3.36 average rate, 1900.				
Total.....	51	\$2,091,543	51	\$2,133,783

The average rate of dividends for the year was 3.36, while that for 1899 was 3.48.

Notwithstanding the material gain in the amount of deposits, the total of the dividends distributed is but \$42,239 in excess of that for 1899.

This reduction in the amount of dividends paid is no indication of weakness in the condition of these institutions. Their general standing is better to-day than ever before during their existence. The estimated market value of their resources above all liabilities has constantly increased from year to year until it is now \$8,916,887. While this surplus represents the amount available to pay depositors if the banks were closed at the present time, it is not available to pay dividends. Neither the statute nor the future prosperity of the banks would permit its use for that purpose. The low rate of dividends paid should, therefore, give no concern excepting as it may lead to a dissatisfaction among depositors and to a withdrawal of their funds. It should in no way affect the confidence of the public in the stability and soundness of the banks.

The following is an exhibit of this surplus for each of the past five years, together with other totals necessary to show fully their condition:

	1896.	1897.	1898.	1899.	1900.
Estimated market value of resources above liabilities.....	\$6,029,946	\$6,506,362	\$8,863,882	\$8,258,819	\$8,916,887
Reserve fund.....	2,031,042	2,080,709	2,079,261	2,243,454	2,321,685
Undivided profits.....	1,103,350	1,088,801	1,202,818	1,238,605	1,490,769
Total book surplus.....	\$3,134,398	\$3,169,510	\$3,282,079	\$3,477,059	\$3,902,455
Approximate market value above book surplus.....	\$2,895,553	\$3,336,851	\$3,581,802	\$4,781,259	\$5,114,432
Total dividend paid.....	2,096,927	2,132,369	2,145,324	2,091,543	2,133,783
Deposits.....	57,476,895	59,598,348	60,852,567	64,009,366	67,240,439

#### TRUST AND BANKING COMPANIES.

There are seventeen trust and banking companies now doing business in the State. In the following table is presented an aggregate statement of their liabilities and resources, \*October 27, 1900, and a comparison with those of October 28, 1899:

#### COMPARATIVE STATEMENT.

LIABILITIES.	1899.	1900.
Capital stock.....	\$1,598,943	\$1,601,700
Surplus.....	346,000	363,000
Undivided profits.....	327,873	427,008
Time deposits.....	4,331,536	5,403,962
Demand deposits.....	4,024,084	4,070,918
Certificates of deposit.....	302,754	437,371
Trust department.....	88,543	101,042
Unpaid dividends.....	988	581
Deposits for coupons.....	14,903	19,465
Treasurer's checks outstanding.....	11,453	7,484
Due to other banks and bankers.....	31,206	18,609
Bills payable.....	182,500	184,600
Other liabilities.....	541,423	659,638
Total liabilities.....	\$11,802,262	\$18,295,402

RESOURCES.		
Demand and time loans.....	\$7,238,978	\$5,880,327
Mortgages of real estate.....	1,057,317	1,108,365
Stocks and bonds.....	3,442,980	4,058,312
Trust investments.....	88,290	98,131
Real estate owned.....	171,968	190,047
Due from other banks and bankers.....	41,781	981
Expense account.....	23,290	25,317
Furniture and fixtures.....	128,347	114,818
Cash on hand and on deposit.....	1,208,242	1,359,587
Other resources.....	368,155	509,492
Total resources.....	\$11,802,262	\$13,795,402

This is an increase of \$1,498,150 in the total assets; \$17,000 in surplus; \$99,184 in undivided profits, and \$1,256,368 in all kinds of deposits during the year.

The total number of depositors is 19,589, as against 16,806 in 1899—a gain of 2,781. The depositors of time deposits and the holders of certificates of deposit now number 13,570, with \$5,841,354 standing to their credit—an increase of \$1,207,062 in this class of deposits during the year, while the gain in commercial or demand deposits has been only \$46,834.

The increase in assets has been principally invested in demand and time loans and stocks and bonds, there being an increase of \$591,349 and \$615,302 respectively, in these items during the year.

The amount of interest paid on all deposits was \$217,706, as against \$161,948 in 1899—a gain of \$55,758. The amount of interest paid in the savings departments alone has been \$167,890, the average rate being approximately 3.50, while that for 1899 was 3.60.

The amount of dividends paid to stockholders has been \$101,270. This is an average of 6.32 per cent. on all capital stock outstanding. Deducting the municipal taxes, this leaves the net income on the stock but little more than the rate of interest paid to depositors. This difference is but a small compensation to the stockholders for the additional liability they assume and the care and responsibility of managing the banks.

While all stock banks are established for the private gain of their stockholders, they are a necessary and important factor in the successful transaction of business in any community, and the financial prosperity of our State depends largely upon their successful management and stability.

No one now questions the value of trust companies to our State, and especially to the communities in which they are located. Their liberality in the use of their capital for local investment is a great advantage to all kinds of business enterprises. Their service is so great that the State cannot afford to endanger their future by placing any burdens or restrictions upon them that will impair their usefulness. They are in close competition with the National banks located in the State. Care should be taken, therefore, that we do not embarrass them in this competition and thus give the advantage to National rather than to State institutions.

We should not lose sight, however, of the fact that the public has an interest in their stability and perpetuity which the Legislature has the right and duty to protect by all necessary enactments. Experience has shown the value of reasonable laws restricting and regulating all kinds of banks in their business affairs. The national banking laws are the outgrowth of this experience in that system. In this and all other States we find such laws controlling the various classes of State banking institutions. Trust and banking companies are of comparatively recent origin in this State, and as yet there are but few provisions of law regulating their conduct and management, excepting such as may be found in their charters. Their success is at present almost wholly dependent upon their own individual management, and their patrons do not have the protection of law found in other classes of banks. It is claimed, however, that the double liability of the stockholders and the personal pecuniary interest of the management, are sufficient protection. If this were true of this class it would as well apply to all other stock banks. No one would advise repealing the laws controlling and restricting the affairs of banks operating under the national system, or of our Savings banks.

The efficient and successful management of trust companies in the past is undoubtedly the reason why attention has not before been called to the necessity of such legislation in this State for this class of banks as for others. No legislation is needed that will to any material extent interfere with their business as conducted under their present good management. It would be well, however, to enact such reasonable laws as may be needed, before attention is called to their importance by conditions that will entail losses upon their patrons and embarrassment upon this entire class of banks. These recommendations are made as much in the interest of the banks as of the public.

Some of the most important among the regulations that might be suggested are: Provisions for accumulating a reserve; loans to officers of the banks; loans with the stock of the

same institution as collateral; the amount that may be loaned to any one individual, firm or corporation; and the investment of savings deposits. Nearly every one of these provisions are among those regulating the affairs of other banking systems, and would commend themselves to all acquainted with banking business.

Nearly all the trust companies are accumulating a reserve without the provision of law suggested. While the increase in this fund for the present year has been but an average of \$1,000 for each institution, yet it has been a decided gain, and even this small sum set apart each year will in time be a great safeguard against losses that are sometimes met even in the best-managed institutions.

It is hardly necessary to call attention to the advisability of some law regulating the amount any bank may loan to its own officers. Such a large percentage of the failures of banks, and even the embezzlements therein, has grown out of the abuse of this privilege that the advisability of such restriction cannot now be questioned.

No banking institution should accept its own stock as collateral for a loan. The double liability of the stockholder is always held out to the public as a great protection, but if the bank should own its own stock, this protection to the public would cease. Again, a bank should never take as collateral for a loan any property it could not properly own, as an enforcement of its rights in the property pledged might at any time make it the absolute owner. It is evident that no bank should own its own stock, and for this reason, if for no other, should not hold it as collateral.

No bank should become a mere feeder to the business of any particular individual, firm, or corporation, and should never venture enough of its assets in any one undertaking to involve its own credit with that of the borrower. In doing this its success depends upon the success of the business enterprise. The solvency and permanency of a bank should be far more certain than that of any one private business undertaking, and should therefore never be dependent upon it. Usually funds are placed in a bank by the depositors who do not wish to hazard them by investing in business enterprises, and they have a right to expect the bank will be as conservative as they are themselves.

The contention that this double liability of the stockholders is a sufficient protection to depositors, without restrictions or provisions for their investment as found in Savings banks, may be true when the amount of the deposits does not exceed double the amount of capital stock, and the stockholders are all responsible and able to meet assessments thereon. But when the deposits are in excess of that amount it seems reasonable to give the depositors some additional protection. A statute requiring the excess to be invested in the same manner as deposits in Savings banks, might be all that is necessary to meet this condition. These companies at the present time are carrying enough Savings bank investments to meet nearly, if not quite, such a provision of law. If enacted it would not therefore materially affect them at present, but might be a great safeguard for the future.

#### UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW.

The Maine Bankers' Association has taken action favorable to the enactment of a statute to make uniform the laws of the various States relating to negotiable instruments. This proposed amendment is the result of the work of a commission appointed by the Governors of various States, to codify and make more uniform the commercial laws of this country. At the present time, and with our present means of communication, all kinds of commercial contracts are made without regard to State lines. A uniformity as to the rights and liabilities of parties under such contracts, would be a great convenience to the banks in handling this paper. As the proposed changes would not in this State materially affect the rights of parties to the contracts, there seems to be no reason why their request should not be granted. It would certainly be a great convenience to the banks, and apparently do no harm to the public generally.

#### BRANCHES OF TRUST COMPANIES.

It is now generally accepted that the policy of allowing banks to maintain branches is, under certain conditions, a wise one. This right should not be granted, however, to institutions to exercise in their own discretion. In ordinary business affairs competition is usually beneficial to the public. In banking this is true only within certain limits. Safety, security and confidence, are of far more importance than cheapness when we are considering banking business. The State should never authorize this competition to such an extent as to embarrass existing institutions by establishing new ones.

The expense of establishing and conducting a branch where only a receiving and paying agent is required, and the funds are transmitted to the home institution to be employed and recorded, is much less than in a bank organized in the ordinary way. No additional capital is required for the branch, and there is no additional expense in the way of taxes. For these reasons the chartered bank is placed at a great disadvantage in the competition for business that naturally follows.

There are trust companies in this State that have authority to establish branches wherever they please, in such numbers as the managers of the bank may deem expedient, and that, too, without any increase in capital stock. It has been the generally accepted policy of the Legislature to refuse a charter to any trust company with less than fifty thousand dollars capital, to be actually paid in. Yet, so far as the necessary legal conditions go it has in some instances granted the power to one trust company with fifty thousand dollars capital to maintain a branch in every town in the State if it should so elect. It is unfortunate that charters have been granted having such wide latitude.

Some legislation is recommended revoking this privilege where it has not already been exercised, and in the future allowing branches to be established only in those places especially named in the charters of the parent institutions, or under authority from the banking department. This would in some instances save existing institutions from serious competition, and operate for the best interests of the public.

As before stated, the security to the depositor in a trust company depends in some measure upon the double liability of the stockholder. It might be well, therefore, if branches are to be established, to require the parent institution to increase its capital stock in proportion to the business anticipated at the new location, and thus give the public the benefit of the same protection it would have if a new bank was established instead of the branch.

Respectfully submitted,

FREMONT E. TIMBERLAKE, *Bank Examiner.*

---

**INDEPENDENT BANK EXAMINATIONS.**—Elsewhere in this issue of the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* will be found a statement of the Merchants' National Bank, of Baltimore, at the close of business January 12, 1901, accompanied by a certificate from Messrs. Patterson, Teele & Dennis, certified public accountants, testifying to the accuracy of the report.

President Douglas H. Thomas is quoted in the newspapers as follows in reference to the matter:

"We have taken what I believe to be a new departure in banking customs, in that we have had a thorough overhauling of the affairs of the bank in order to assure ourselves beyond doubt that no irregularities or discrepancies exist in any department. There has been no suspicion on our part, nor has the examination been made because of anything tending to raise a doubt in our minds concerning anything or anybody connected with the bank. It is simply the inception of a system which we purpose to adopt in the future of making periodical examinations of a similar nature independent of those made by the board of directors and the National bank examiner.

The expediency of this system was suggested to me by many things, not the least of which has been the discovery by other banking houses of defalcations covering periods of many years upon the part of employees who were thought to be above suspicion. Under the system which we have adopted such long-continued manipulation of books and accounts will be impossible, and the consequent danger of breaches of faith upon the part of employees, in all branches, will be reduced to a minimum, if not prevented entirely."

It is becoming recognized that bank examinations are advisable for protecting the interests of shareholders as well as depositors, and there is a tendency on the part of well-managed banks to realize that such inspection should be provided for as a matter of prudence, irrespective of the legal requirements, just as a properly conducted bank would keep on hand a sufficient reserve, whether the law required it or not.

That independent bank examinations can be made with more care and thoroughness than those made under State and National authority is indisputable.

Mr. Douglas H. Thomas has long been known as a progressive bank manager, and in adopting a system of thorough examination by experts he has shown that he believes in taking every precaution necessary to safeguard the interests of the depositors and stockholders of his bank.

The statement and the certificate and letter of the accountants speak for themselves.

---

**Of Great Practical Value.**—Geo. C. Power, National bank examiner at St. Paul, writes as follows under a recent date: "I have a high appreciation of the value of the *MAGAZINE*, and consider it of great practical value to the banking fraternity."

## BANK TAXATION IN NEW YORK.

---

On January 24 bills were introduced in the New York Legislature providing for taxing banks and trust companies. The banking tax bill provides :

"An annual tax for the use of the State of one per centum of the actual value of the shares of stock of every bank and banking association having capital stock and authorized to do business in this State and incorporated, organized, or formed under, by or pursuant to a law of this State or of the United States, is hereby imposed upon such shares in the city or town where the principal place of business of such bank or banking association is located. The actual value of each share of stock of each such bank or banking association shall be ascertained and fixed by the Comptroller as of the 1st day of July in each year, by adding together the capital, surplus and undivided profits of such bank or banking association, and dividing the result by the number of outstanding shares thereof. No deduction shall be made for indebtedness of any shareholder. \* \* \*

The personal property of every corporation, company, association or partnership taxable under this article, other than for an organization tax, shall be exempt from assessment and taxation upon its personal property for State purposes, if all taxes due and payable under this article have been paid thereby, and the owners of the shares of stock of bank and bank associations liable to a tax under section 187 C of this chapter, shall not be liable to taxation for State purposes in the tax district in which such bank or banking association is located, but shall in no other respect be relieved from assessment and taxation by reason of the provisions of this article."

Trust companies are to be taxed as follows :

"Every trust company incorporated, organized, or formed under, by or pursuant to a law of this State, shall pay to the State annually for the privilege of exercising its corporate franchise or carrying on its business in such corporate or organized capacity, an annual tax which shall be equal to one per centum on the amount of its capital stock, surplus and undivided profits."

It will be noticed that the personal tax exemption of banks refers to taxes for *State* purposes only, the more burdensome local taxes remaining as heretofore. How unjust these taxes are may be shown by an example, which is one of many that might be cited. In 1897 the total amount of personal property assessed on the city tax-roll of Hornellsville, N. Y., was \$416,000, of which \$262,353 was assessed on the banks, leaving \$154,000 for all other personal property. The banks thus paid 63.01 per cent. of the city tax.

An investigation made in the same year, covering a considerable territory, showed that for the previous year (1896) the banks paid from twenty-six to 76.4 per cent. of the total personal tax of their respective towns.

It was shown by official statistics that in 1897 the banks of the State were paying taxes equal to  $1\frac{3}{4}$  per cent. on their capital, surplus and profits. Outside of New York, Brooklyn and Albany the net earnings of the National banks, according to sworn reports to the Comptroller of the Currency, were only 8.55 per cent. of capital and surplus. The country banks were paying out half their net profits for taxes—\$50 taxes for every \$100 earned for stockholders.

As the exemption proposed in the bill is small, it is practically adding almost one per cent. to the above rate. This approaches so near to confiscation that it will certainly tend to discourage the investment of capital in banking. Its effect will be injurious to every business interest in the State and will retard the financial growth of New York city.

Under present laws trust companies are exempt from taxation on one-tenth of their capital stock and on their non-taxable securities.

A committee representing the New York State Bankers' Association was before the New York Legislature last winter trying to get a reduced rate of taxation, and also asking that the taxes of banks and trust companies be equalized. Although believing the rate was too high, this committee finally agreed upon a tax of one per cent. on capital, surplus and profits, but exempting the banks and trust companies from all other State and local taxes, except the tax on real estate.

#### TAXATION OF SAVINGS BANKS.

The movement to tax Savings banks seems to be based upon a misconception of what these institutions are. In his annual message Gov. Odell said :

"The surplus of Savings banks and insurance companies, which is now held as a reserve, and which amounts to \$469,707,751, should pay its proper proportion of the taxes, because it is in effect the capital of such banks and companies, and should be so treated. I do not believe in attacking the deposit of the poor man, whether in Savings banks or in the form of life insurance. Every possible inducement should be afforded by the State to encourage saving by those who labor and desire to lay up a fund against a 'rainy day.' But this surplus which accumulates from time to time should bear its portion of the tax burden, and the enactment of a law which would tax it at the rate of one per cent., as above, would not be too great in consideration of the protection and safeguards which our State throws around Savings banks and insurance companies."

It seems to be the impression of the Governor and other advocates of the Savings bank tax that the surplus belongs to those who manage the bank, but the New York Court of Appeals has declared otherwise. The surplus is an added guarantee of the security of deposits ; being invested itself, it of course adds to the income and helps earn the meagre interest which the depositors receive. Moreover, the surplus is the margin which must be relied on in time of panic to cover the depreciation of assets.

In the case of a National or State bank the depositors are protected by the capital and by the double liability of shareholders. Savings bank depositors have no such protection, but heretofore the State has fostered these institutions by wise laws, prescribing the nature of investments, and by being watchful of their management. The market value of even the best securities fluctuates greatly, and the surplus must be maintained to meet possible depreciation. This surplus is absolutely all the protection the depositor has above the face value of the assets. To impair it even by so much as one per cent. would be an act of gross injustice to people who are ill able to bear it.

The surplus of a Savings bank can not be taxed without subtracting that much from the security and income of the depositors in those institutions.

There is in the State of New York a vast amount of untaxed property of various kinds belonging to rich corporations and individuals which it would be better policy for the State to seek out and levy upon than to impose a tax the effect of which would be to lessen the security of the hard-earned savings of a very humble part of the population.

The whole scheme of bank and trust company taxation ought to be most carefully and fully considered before any new legislation is enacted.

---

**SALARIES OF BANK OFFICERS AND CLERKS.**—The directors of the National Park Bank, of New York city, at their recent meeting increased the salary of the President of the bank, Richard Delafield, from \$25,000 to \$40,000. This is said to be the largest salary received by any bank President in the city of New York.

It is a sign of good management when banks pay their executive officers, juniors and clerks fair and liberal salaries in proportion to the responsibilities of their positions and the service actually rendered. The reverse of this policy tends towards lax management and inefficient service. Poor pay means poor work. Neither the bank officer nor the clerk can put forth his best efforts on the hope of better reward at some future day. Promotions in banks are slow at best and "waiting for dead men's shoes" is not exhilarating. It is better to introduce modern methods in a bank and get along with fewer employees than to keep a lot of ill-paid men on the pay-roll.

## KNOX'S HISTORY—A CORRECTION.

---

By an error in compiling information from the Report of the Comptroller of the Currency, it is made to appear on page 192 of "A History of Banking in the United States," that the Metropolitan National Bank, of Chicago, failed in 1888. The Metropolitan National Bank, of Cincinnati, was the institution that failed, and not the Metropolitan National Bank, of Chicago, which is now and always has been perfectly solvent.

As will be seen, this error was caused by the substitution of one word for another, and the mistake was not discovered by the readers of the manuscript, the editors or proofreaders.

Upon the attention of the publishers being called to the erroneous statement, a special letter was sent to holders of the book, pointing out the mistake. An erratum slip was also furnished, with the request that it be pasted in the book at the proper place. Correction of all copies in the publishers' hands has been made, and in subsequent editions the word "Cincinnati" will be substituted for "Chicago" in the plate.

The Metropolitan National Bank, of Chicago, is of such established reputation that an incorrect statement that it failed in 1888 can not impair its present high standing; but the error is nevertheless regrettable.

In a work containing such a large collection of facts and figures relating to banking, as will be found in Knox's History of Banking, it is practically impossible to prevent an occasional slip; but it is believed that the book is as accurate as such a publication can be made. The publishers have at least spent much time, labor and money to make it so.

---

### NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

**PRACTICAL BANK ADVERTISING.** By A. E. RICE. Fremont, Ohio: Fremont Publishing Co.; pp. 745. Price, \$10.

The book is precisely what its name indicates, and one that will interest every progressive banker. Its author, Mr. A. E. Rice, a successful banker of Fremont, Ohio, has given the question of bank advertising long and diligent study; as an outcome of his efforts and experience he has amply demonstrated the utility of bank advertising. But the chief value of his work is not simply in the telling why but rather in the showing how; here is where Mr. Rice is at his best, for he presents an almost endless variety of practical ideas which concern the city and country banker alike. The wording, style of type best suited for displays and the general arrangement of the advertisements are shown.

The book is certainly unique in character, being the first ever devoted exclusively to bank advertising. Its pages are bright, clear-cut, convincing, and withal conservative. The work is also given such wide range as to render it useful to all classes of financial institutions. It reflects great credit upon its author, and the book should have a widespread popularity among bankers.

It is probable that many banks do not give proper attention to the matter of advertising, though their competitors are alive to its importance, as may be seen by reference to the proceedings of the Trust Section of the recent convention of the American Bankers' Association. Mr. Rice's book will clearly show bankers how they may advertise in a way to produce the best results.



## COMMERCIAL EDUCATION IN SAXONY.

[From Advance Sheets U. S. Consular Reports.]

Nowhere in the world does commercial and technical education hold such a prominent place as in Germany, and of all the States which compose this Empire, Saxony takes the lead in this direction. This little Kingdom alone has about fifty *Handelschulen*, or commercial schools. These schools are in the first instance organized by the *Kaufmännischen Vereine*, or merchant unions, which exist in every little town in the country. The State exercises a supervising influence over each school. An inspector appointed by the Government visits the schools periodically. The merchant union supports the school; but if there is any deficit at the end of the year, this is made good by the State. The buildings, together with light and heat, are furnished by the town authorities. In many cities of Saxony, handsome buildings have been erected for the purpose of commercial schools alone.

The average salary of the director and teachers depends upon their age and upon the size of the town. A director in a large city will get from \$1,000 to \$1,500. In the smaller cities, however, the salaries range from \$600 to \$800 per annum. All these teachers have been prepared for work by completing either what we term a classical education or some thorough course without the classics, where more attention is paid to modern languages and business methods. It is the general belief that the latter course secures greater practical results in the schools.

Although the State regards these commercial schools with a certain benevolence, it has thus far made no solid provision for the teachers. In every common village school throughout the German Empire, the teachers know just what they have to expect. There is a staple system of promotion, together with a pension after so many years of service. This is not the case with teachers in the commercial schools, and this fact does much to deter the healthy development of the schools, inasmuch as it prevents many able teachers from entering them. However, teachers in the commercial schools of Saxony are pensioned after years of service, while in Prussia no pensions are granted.

The students who attend these schools come from families of the middle class. They are apprenticed to merchants during their whole attendance at school. Their ages vary from fifteen to eighteen. The law governing the relations between master and apprentice is very strict, and while the pupils are in attendance at school the director takes the place of the master. A number of commercial schools in Saxony take only students who devote their whole time to attendance; but the majority have apprentices who spend half the time in some business house. The latter plan has been found to be conducive to better results, owing to the opportunity of combining theory with practice.

There is some complaint made on account of the disposition of many merchants to employ clerks who have not completed the full course of two years. There is no doubt that the merchants could greatly assist these schools if they insisted on hiring only young men who had certificates or diplomas from commercial schools.

For a small city, the commercial school of Eibenstock is a model of its kind. It occupies spacious rooms in a large industrial school building and has a director and several teachers. As it is typical of all the other commercial schools in Saxony, I give the scheduled course in detail:

### FORENOON.

*Monday.*—Calculation, bookkeeping, French, English.

*Tuesday.*—English, typewriting, French, calculation, commercial correspondence.

*Wednesday.*—Stenography, calculation, bookkeeping, commercial correspondence.

*Thursday.*—English, French, calculation.

*Friday.*—Geography, correspondence, French, English.

*Saturday.*—English, calculation, French.

### AFTERNOON.

*Monday.*—German, French.

*Tuesday.*—Geography, calculation.

*Thursday.*—Writing, French.

*Friday.*—German, commercial correspondence.

This plan speaks for itself. Noticeable, however, is the time devoted to English and French. Through the courtesy of the director and board of trustees, I was permitted to

attend the exercises for several days. It is astonishing with what rapidity and precision the young students dash off sentences in English and French. During the second year, the hours devoted to these languages are taken up entirely with conversation and readings, and not a word of German is heard. During the hours devoted to calculation, the currency, together with the measures and weights, of every country in the world is taught, and the students are compelled to make rapid mental calculations in them all. Outside of school hours, the apprentice is kept busy looking after the English and French correspondence of his chief and in learning that particular trade or business of the house to which he is apprenticed. After business hours and in the evenings, he must prepare for the next day's school.

During the winter, the director of the Elbenstock commercial school delivers to his students a series of six lectures, to which the public is invited. These lectures deal entirely with questions relating to trade and the development of commerce. At each one of these meetings, a student must prepare and deliver a short talk on some given topic.

In 1898 a commercial university was established in Leipzig. Only those are eligible to entrance who have completed the gymnasium course or have passed the examination which admits to the one-year conscription service in the army. There is an attempt at present to make the diploma or certificate of the commercial school equivalent to the certificate of the one-year army service, but as yet nothing has come of it. Should this be carried through in time, the students of all the commercial schools would be eligible to the university.

Inasmuch as the Commercial University in Leipzig has excited a great deal of attention and students from all parts of the world have gathered to hear the lectures, I give for the benefit of American students and others interested the course of lectures given during the summer semester of 1900. Political economy; history of political economy, including socialism, money, banks, and the bourse; commercial law, introduction to the study of statistics, German colonial politics, insurance, development of German commerce, chemical technology, development of the foreign commerce of all nations, science of finance, international law, elementary lessons in Chinese grammar, lectures on China and Japan, lectures on the languages and customs of the people of Indo China, history of the papacy during the Middle Ages, introduction to philosophy and logic, history of German literature, history of England as a world power from 1500 to 1900; physical geography, natural philosophy, and physics; history of the development of education in Germany, state and church in the nineteenth century, comparative history of the colonies of the different European States, constitutional history, pedagogy; natural history, hygiene, etc.: lectures on travel.

In addition to these lectures, there are exercises in bookkeeping, correspondence, and office work, with commercial arithmetic. There are also *Handelsseminaren*, where professor and students meet once a week for the purpose of discussing questions relating to trade and commerce. Instruction with commercial correspondence is given in the following languages, English, French, Italian, Russian, and Spanish. In addition, arrangements are made for instruction in the German language and correspondence for foreigners.

Thus it will be seen that the student has a very broad field from which to choose those subjects which interest him most. It must be remembered that the Commercial University is connected with the university proper, and that a great many of the above-named lectures have long been established courses in the regular curriculum.

It is natural to suppose that the majority of future directors and teachers in the commercial schools will be chosen from the ranks of those who have completed a course in the Commercial University. But the practicability of this scheme is yet to be demonstrated, as most of the eligible students have had very little, if any, actual experience.

EIBENSTOCK, November 16, 1900.

ERNEST L. HARRIS, Consular Agent.

### MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

	Nov. 1, 1900.	Dec. 1, 1900.	Jan. 1, 1901.	Feb. 1, 1901.
Gold coin.....	\$621,761,263	\$624,702,913	\$629,192,578	\$615,576,805
Silver dollars.....	73,479,469	73,811,334	76,182,326	63,457,812
Subsidiary silver.....	81,035,187	81,717,505	83,123,463	81,979,691
Gold certificates.....	215,505,969	231,246,349	232,787,929	275,667,279
Silver certificates.....	421,380,745	421,613,407	422,399,403	428,597,000
Treasury notes, Act July 14, 1890.....	65,478,490	63,361,330	61,230,159	58,091,831
United States notes.....	333,295,061	343,699,359	334,587,495	333,054,494
Currency certificates, Act June 8, 1872.....	1,790,000	1,690,000	1,560,000	995,000
National bank notes.....	325,375,258	326,949,170	332,188,526	333,360,391
Total.....	\$2,139,181,412	\$2,158,761,367	\$2,173,251,879	\$2,190,780,213
Population of United States.....	76,891,000	76,975,000	77,080,000	77,195,000
Circulation per capita.....	\$27.82	\$28.04	\$28.19	\$28.38

## MINNEAPOLIS BANK CLERKS' ASSOCIATION.

### *Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

SIR: So much attention is now being given to the subject of education for bank clerks, that your readers may be interested in a review of the work done by the Minneapolis Bank Clerks' Association during the past two years.

One of our number, Joseph Chapman, Jr., was present when the subject was brought before the American Bankers' Association in 1899, and upon his return he talked the matter over with the Minneapolis bank clerks, resulting in the formation of our association with a charter membership of over one hundred.

Deciding that the plans under consideration by the committee on education of the American Bankers' Association would necessarily be slow in being put into operation, we determined to go ahead independently, and secured the services of Prof. James Paige, of the University of Minnesota, to deliver the same course on commercial paper that he was giving at the University Law School. We met every Saturday evening for a lecture and quiz. We used a text-book, and most of us spent from four to six hours a week in study. At the end of the course an examination was held, the questions for which have already been published in these pages.

We found the work of the greatest practical value, and many of us, who supposed we knew something about commercial paper, discovered for the first time how much there was to be known about it which observation in our daily experience had failed to teach us. It is safe to say that every collection teller, discount clerk, notary and messenger who took that course is handling the paper intrusted to him more intelligently and with greater caution than ever before. Moreover, it was noticed that some of the questions we brought for answer to our officers resulted in a little brushing up on their part. Some of our officers, by the way, who were honorary members took the course with us.

At the close of our season's work we had a banquet, at which was a goodly representation of officers and directors. Our principal speaker was Prof. J. Laurence Laughlin, of the University of Chicago, his subject being "Three Decades of Monetary Legislation."

This year we are meeting every Saturday evening as before. Three evenings in each month are devoted to a lecture by Prof. W. W. Folwell, of the University of Minnesota, on Political Economy. On the fourth evening we have an address by some prominent business man. So far we have had two such addresses: one by F. H. Peavey, on the grain business and one by T. B. Walker, on the lumber business.

Instead, however, of giving us details of their respective industries, they devoted most of their time to giving us the results of their life-long experiences as business men, and formulating the general principles which had determined their own courses of action, and those of other business men whom they had known, and which had led to their success or failure.

These talks, which were of great interest and value, are to be followed by others from men equally prominent along other lines.

While our active membership is limited to bank clerks, and our honorary membership to officers and directors, we have this year extended to a limited number of employees in other business the privilege of attending our lectures and at the same cost as to ourselves. Many have availed themselves of this opportunity to our mutual advantage, in our case resulting in larger income and extension of acquaintance. They of course have no voice in the affairs of the association.

Our constitution states that we are organized "primarily for the purposes of education," and we have limited our operations almost wholly to this end.

At the close of each lecture we spend some time visiting among ourselves, discussing points of interest brought up in the lecture, and occasionally someone favors us with music.

One of the pleasantest features connected with our work lies in the interest taken by our bankers and business men. They have assisted us by their counsel and their money, and encouraged us in every possible way. The standard of our daily work has been raised through an increased interest and a broader view of our duties.

The extension of acquaintance among ourselves has proved pleasant and beneficial.

Our average membership and attendance are larger than last year. Two changes have taken place on our executive committee because of promotions, only bank clerks being eligible for office: Joseph Chapman, Jr., our former president, having become Assistant Cashier of the Northwestern National Bank, and J. E. Holton, of the committee, having become Cashier of the Metropolitan Bank.

Our association was the first to be organized along the lines suggested by the American Bankers' Association, and our two years' experience has been most successful. The St. Louis Association was the second to be formed and is progressing famously.

There seems to be no reason why similar associations should not be equally successful in other cities, either conducted independently or along lines to be determined by the American Bankers' Association through its committee on education.

Respectfully,

SEYMOUR S. COOK,  
*President Minneapolis Bank Clerks' Association.*

MINNEAPOLIS, Minn., Jan. 22, 1901.

## AMERICA'S CHANGED INTERNATIONAL POSITION.

[From "The Statist," London.]

### EXPANSION OF THE COUNTRY'S EXPORTS.

During the past four years the relations of the United States to the rest of the world have changed remarkably, both politically and economically. The political aspect of the change we need not now discuss. But it may be worth while at the beginning of the New Year and a new century to call special attention to the economic alteration that is going on. Up to 1890 the United States depended to a considerable extent upon Europe, and especially upon this country, for the capital needed to develop its resources. A very large proportion of the railways, the land, the houses, and the trade was owned by Europeans; and as proof of this it will be recollected that the effect of the Baring collapse was not very much less in the United States than in Argentina itself, and was almost as great as it was here at home. The difficulties of the great houses, embarrassed by the wild finance of the period immediately preceding 1890, compelled them to go on selling American securities for some time after. Then came the breakdown of the Sherman Act, and the intermittent crises which lasted up to the election of Mr. McKinley in November, 1896. One result of the long-continued crisis was widespread distress. About one-third of the total railway mileage of the Union went into the hands of Receivers. The other railway companies found very great difficulty in borrowing. The farmers were plunged in deep distress, and over large areas seemed to be sinking under the burden of debt. Trade was exceedingly bad. Alarm spread everywhere. Failures were numerous. And the outlook to many seemed growing desperate. The election of Mr. McKinley restored political confidence. It was felt that the danger of free silver was removed, and that a reform of the currency would take place. And there followed immediately four successive years of wonderfully good crops. During the long depression from 1890 to 1896 the difficulties at home, the alarm abroad, the uncertainties of the whole situation, compelled all classes to economize. Savings gradually accumulated; the cost of production was greatly reduced; wages were lowered, and improved methods were adopted of developing the vast material resources of the country. When, therefore, confidence revived and four successive good crops enriched all classes, there was an extraordinary increase in production. It is estimated that during the three years immediately succeeding Mr. McKinley's first election the trade balance in favor of the United States averaged about 100 millions sterling, and during the year just ended, as far as it can be estimated at present, the balance in favor of the United States will probably not be very much under 180 millions sterling. Taking trade alone, therefore, the good crops in the United States, the droughts in India and Australia, the damage by locusts in Argentina, and the needs of Europe, all combined to create such a demand for American exportable goods that in four years the balance in favor of the country exceeded 400 millions sterling. And owing to the improvements in the processes of production already referred to, the American people were able to respond to the demand in an extraordinary degree. All at once the United States became a keen competitor in the markets of the world with ourselves and with our Continental rivals, and in all reasonable probability the competition will grow more eager as the years pass.

### THE UNITED STATES AS AN INVESTOR.

All careful observers had long been aware of the vast material resources of the United States, and were to some extent at all events, prepared, therefore, for the growth of the exports that has taken place. No doubt the large trade balance was much exaggerated by the protectionist policy of the Republican party. If duties had been low, there is no doubt that the United States would have bought very largely from Europeans. But the Dingley Tariff had made foreign goods artificially so dear that the imports have been very much smaller proportionately than in any preceding period of prosperity. And while the Dingley Tariff is maintained in its integrity the imports must be more or less restricted, although it is probable that as wealth grows the imports likewise will augment—to some extent at all events. But people in general were quite unprepared for the part the United States has taken in regard to the international investment market. As observed above, up to 1890 the United States was largely dependent upon Europe for the capital required to develop its resources. Recently, however, the United States has been a lender, and not a borrower: Owing to the Baring collapse, the alarm created by the silverite agitation, and the bad finance of so many railway companies, European investors have sold American securities on

a very large scale ever since 1890, and the American public have bought in the same proportion. Since confidence revived in 1897 the purchases of American securities, and especially of American railroad securities, for American account have been on a vast scale. It is said that during the period of anxiety in the summer and the autumn of the past year German capitalists practically sold the whole of their American securities. British investors have sold on an immense scale too. But, of course, it is not true that they have cleared out as completely as have the Germans. But, speaking roughly, the holdings of American securities in Europe now are immensely smaller than they were ten years ago, and the purchases have been made by the Americans out of the vast savings accumulated, first, during the anxious period from 1890 to 1896, and secondly, during the prosperous period that has followed. Many countries, however, are able to buy back their own securities without being in a position to take an important place in the international investment market. For example, Spain has bought back a very large proportion of her own securities. In the United States not only has the buying back of American securities been on the great scale indicated, but during the past year or two American capitalists have lent largely to Europe. At the end of 1890, when there was great pressure in the money markets of Europe, about four millions of gold were allowed to be shipped from New York to London; and during the past year it will be recollected that gold was sent in considerable amounts, while about five millions sterling were invested in Government funds. German Government funds were also bought amounting to about four millions sterling. Russia was able to borrow in order to purchase railway material. And it is understood that the United States was willing to lend likewise to Switzerland and to other Governments. This is the most dramatic change that has occurred for a very long time. It does not follow, of course, that the United States has altogether ceased to be a borrowing country, and has at once become a creditor country on a great scale. The position, so far as it can be judged at present, rather resembles that of Germany. Germany for years past has invested very largely in Mexico, South America, China, Russia, the Scandinavian countries, and so on, and yet Germany has been dependent to a considerable extent upon other countries for the financing of her trade, notably upon this country, France, and the United States. By the way, it will be remembered that the United States has invested very large sums in Germany during the period of great business activity that has just come to an end. The United States, then, has not completely ceased to be a borrowing country. But it is obvious that every year that passes will increase the accumulated capital and will strengthen the new position the country has assumed.

#### INAUGURATION OF NEW ENTERPRISE.

The question of most interest at the moment, perhaps, is What will the American people do with the immense capital that they have accumulated, and now have at their disposal? Unless something entirely unforeseen happens, the prosperity that has been strengthened by four such prosperous years must continue for a long time to come. And as the American people have bought back so very large a proportion of their own securities, the new capital accumulated cannot be fully employed in the same way in the future. Moreover, while the Dingley Tariff continues, it is improbable that the purchases of commodities from abroad will be on anything like such a scale as would materially lessen the trade balance in favor of the United States. And lastly, it is difficult to believe that the United States will be able to employ advantageously the whole of its new savings in foreign investments. Therefore the reasonable probability is that we are about to witness a great outburst of new enterprise in the United States. Industrial companies will be created, new industries will be founded, new railways, or continuations and branches of existing railways, will be constructed, and thus there will be a vast outflow of capital at home; while it is not improbable that the new colonies may be developed on a larger scale than hitherto. If the United States spends immense sums at home, and does not buy commodities on a great scale, and does not, likewise, invest in foreign securities on an equivalent scale, it is obvious that the more the trade balance turns in favor of the United States the greater will be its ability to take gold from Europe. Therefore the likelihood is that money rates will rule high in Europe, because there will always be the danger that American capital may be withdrawn not only from London, but also from Germany. During the past year America was able not only to avoid taking gold from Europe but to furnish Europe with capital and to invest on a considerable scale, because of the extraordinary increase that went on in the bank-note circulation and the gold certificates. During the crisis that preceded the first election of Mr. McKinley the issuing of gold certificates was suspended. But of late Mr. Gage wisely decided to resume their issue; and the gold raised at home and received from abroad enabled him in the past year to issue about seventeen and a half millions sterling in gold certificates, while the increase in the bank-note circulation exceeded sixteen millions sterling; so that in round figures the new issues of gold certificates and bank notes amounted to about thirty-four millions sterling, and so maintained that ease in the money market which enabled the development to go on at the rate we have witnessed, and also permitted of the extraordinary rise in American securities. There will, of course, be fresh issues of gold certificates in the new year, for the gold production on the American continent is very large. But will the bank-note circulation also be augmented on anything like such a scale as will enable the United States to dispense with the calling home of gold? It is a matter of general congratulation that Mr. Gage has consented to retain the Secretaryship of the Treasury for a further period. The four years during which he has held the office have proved him to be a man of singular ability; and he will no doubt do everything requisite to prevent any serious stringency. But the existing Congress will come to an end at noon on March 4, and it is highly unlikely that anything can be done to amend the banking laws in the short intervening period. Of course it is possible to call a new Congress together in special session, but it is not probable. And if there is not a summons of Congress it will not meet until December. Therefore it looks at present as if there would be no new legislation in the year upon which we have just entered; and consequently it will be well for all who are engaged in the money market to watch closely the course of events in the United States.

# CONDITION OF THE NATIONAL BANKS.

Abstract of reports of condition of National banks in the United States on June 29, Sept. 5, and Dec. 13, 1900. Total number of banks June 29, 3,732; Sept. 5, 3,871; Dec. 13, 3,942.

RESOURCES.	June 29, 1900.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 13, 1900.
Loans and discounts.....	\$2,623,512,360	\$2,666,759,642	\$2,706,534,643
Overdrafts.....	20,724,962	23,130,598	41,662,539
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	282,424,040	294,660,130	306,622,180
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	107,348,780	102,811,380	101,414,830
U. S. bonds on hand.....	17,019,180	11,047,870	10,024,920
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	10,875,434	9,951,815	8,488,398
Stocks, securities, etc.....	356,868,695	367,255,545	373,479,621
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	80,223,848	81,209,233	82,375,258
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	27,180,350	26,002,369	26,006,326
Due from National banks.....	215,078,918	220,673,962	244,577,101
Due from State banks and bankers.....	62,882,655	64,972,431	73,668,532
Due from approved reserve agents.....	412,781,260	450,714,269	417,722,713
Internal-revenue stamps.....	1,425,146	1,470,910	1,448,469
Checks and other cash items.....	21,136,118	19,749,066	19,343,532
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	159,189,425	124,517,116	183,475,508
Bills of other National banks.....	25,078,170	25,416,666	24,708,730
Fractional currency, nickels and cents.....	1,230,421	1,241,387	1,257,946
Specie.....	356,013,709	373,328,410	369,672,224
Legal-tender notes.....	143,756,522	145,046,466	141,294,945
U. S. certificates of deposit.....	8,194,000	2,085,000	860,000
Five per cent. redemption fund.....	13,335,594	14,244,066	14,682,543
Due from Treasurer U. S.....	2,881,160	1,620,066	2,610,680
Total.....	\$4,944,165,623	\$5,048,138,499	\$5,142,069,662
LIABILITIES.			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$621,536,461	\$630,399,080	\$632,368,405
Surplus fund.....	256,249,448	261,874,067	262,287,647
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes.....	135,298,386	127,594,908	141,506,613
National bank notes outstanding.....	265,308,018	263,948,631	268,917,320
State bank notes outstanding.....	53,094	52,231	52,231
Due to other National banks.....	572,901,820	609,652,961	581,694,228
Due to State banks and bankers.....	227,647,423	243,806,378	244,141,379
Due to trust companies and Savings banks.....	232,428,056	215,898,530	179,997,908
Due to approved reserve agents.....	29,927,000	27,309,179	38,901,889
Dividends unpaid.....	1,672,863	1,171,963	975,675
Individual deposits.....	2,458,082,757	2,506,248,557	2,633,997,521
U. S. deposits.....	92,593,799	87,598,246	87,992,732
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	6,305,110	6,221,742	6,285,362
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	4,239,300	6,000,740	4,424,761
Bills payable.....	12,682,568	10,645,714	10,847,991
Liabilities other than those above.....	27,311,510	27,918,566	27,073,930
Total.....	\$4,944,165,623	\$5,048,138,499	\$5,142,069,662

Changes in the principal items of resources and liabilities of National banks as shown by the returns on Dec. 13, 1900, as compared with the returns on Sept. 5, 1900, and Dec. 2, 1899.

ITEMS.	SINCE SEPT. 5, 1900.		SINCE DEC. 2, 1899.	
	Increase.	Decrease.	Increase.	Decrease.
Loans and discounts.....	\$19,775,000	.....	\$226,715,148	.....
U. S. bonds.....	9,312,540	.....	84,674,680	.....
Due from National banks, State banks and bankers and reserve agents.....	.....	\$378,347	181,660,196	.....
Specie.....	.....	13,656,186	44,348,647	.....
Legal tenders.....	.....	3,761,543	39,809,150	.....
U. S. certificates for legal tenders.....	.....	1,235,000	.....	\$12,305,000
Capital stock.....	2,064,374	.....	25,623,140	.....
Surplus and other profits.....	14,424,284	.....	39,596,712	.....
Circulation.....	14,968,688	.....	93,991,932	.....
Due to National and State banks and bankers.....	.....	51,930,562	248,817,968	.....
Individual deposits.....	115,748,964	.....	243,287,190	.....
United States Government deposits.....	560,156	.....	14,352,646	.....
Bills payable and rediscounts.....	.....	833,701	.....	2,736,462
Total resources.....	96,951,168	.....	666,745,768	.....

## BANKING AND FINANCIAL NEWS.

This Department includes a complete list of **NEW NATIONAL BANKS** (furnished by the Comptroller of the Currency), **STATE AND PRIVATE BANKS**, **CHANGES IN OFFICERS**, **DISSOLUTIONS AND FAILURES**, etc., under their proper State heads for easy reference.

### NEW YORK CITY.

—On January 16 Cornelius L. Alvord, Jr., was sentenced to thirteen years in prison for the embezzlement of a large sum of money from the First National Bank, of which he was formerly note teller.

—The Clearing-House Building Company, the corporation in which is vested the title to the clearing-house, held its annual meeting January 31 and elected the following directors for the ensuing year: George G. Williams, J. Edward Simmons, Frederick D. Tappen, E. H. Perkins, Jr., and Dumont Clarke. The corporation, which has a capital of \$640,000, has as president Mr. Williams and as secretary and treasurer, Manager Sherer of the clearing-house.

—The following facts and speculations about the salaries of some New York bank Presidents are taken from a recent issue of a city newspaper:

"Forty thousand dollars a year is the salary which has been fixed by the National Park Bank for its President, Richard Delafield. As far as public information goes, this is the highest salary paid to any bank President in the country.

James Stillman, of the National City Bank, and Joseph C. Hendrix, of the National Bank of Commerce, probably receive as much, if not more, than does Mr. Delafield, but exact information of the sums they draw as salaries each year is not obtainable. The salary of W. H. Perkins, the President of the Bank of America, is reported at \$25,000. Until the era of banks with capitals of \$5,000,000 to \$10,000,000 his salary was regarded as one of the largest among financial institutions.

Mr. Delafield was elected President of the National Park Bank only last June. Prior to then he was a merchant, although he had been a bank director for many years. He succeeded E. E. Poor, who in turn followed E. K. Wright, both of whom died, apparently, from overwork in taking care of the bank's big business."

—A bill has been introduced in the Legislature providing for the organization of the German-American Trust Co. in Brooklyn.

—On January 10 Edward B. Wesley, the sole survivor of the original incorporators in 1864 of the Union Trust Company of this city, of which he has been a trustee ever since, attained his ninetieth birthday. The members of the executive committee of the board of trustees passed appropriate resolutions tendering him their congratulations and their sincere wishes for his continued health and happiness. A gift was also made to Mr. Wesley of a gold-headed cane as a mark of friendly esteem and respect.

—The Varick Bank is a new State institution, located in the quarters formerly occupied by the Tradesmen's National Bank in the Wool Exchange Building. Its capital is \$100,000 and the paid-in surplus \$50,000. Valentine P. Snyder, President of the Western National Bank, will be a director of the new institution.

—Announcement was made on February 1 that the capital stock of the Lawyers' Title Insurance Co. will be increased from \$1,000,000 to \$2,000,000. Seventy per cent. of the new stock will be taken by the Central Realty Bond and Trust Co., the Equitable Life Assurance Society, James Stillman, President of the National City Bank, and other capitalists, at its book value, \$174 per share, the remainder to be allotted to present shareholders of the Lawyers' Title Insurance Co. It is stated that hereafter the interests of the two companies will be allied, but that there will be no consolidation.

—Wm. B. Reed, Cashier of the First National Bank, recently resigned to become President of the Bankers' Safe Deposit Co. He was succeeded by C. D. Backus, Assistant Cashier.

—Horace E. Garth, President of the Mechanics' National Bank, resigned at the recent annual meeting, and was succeeded by his son, Granville W. Garth, who has been Cashier of the bank for some years.

—At the annual meeting of the shareholders of the National City Bank, Gilson S. Whit-

son, Cashier, and Wm. Simonson, Assistant Cashier, were elected Vice-Presidents, and H. M. Kilborn, an Assistant Cashier, was elected Cashier.

—Frank Tilford retired from the Presidency of the Bank of New Amsterdam on January 10, and R. R. Moore was elected to succeed him. Mr. Tilford remains a director. Charles W. Morse, who recently purchased a controlling interest in the bank, was elected Vice-President, and both he and Mr. Moore, together with H. F. Morse, were elected directors.

—Wm. M. Woods, Cashier of the National Citizens' Bank, has been appointed Vice-President of the Central National Bank. Formerly Mr. Woods was in the credit department of the Importers and Traders' National.

—At a meeting of the shareholders of the Union Trust Co., on January 15, James J. Hill, President of the Great Northern Railroad, was elected a trustee to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Cornelius Vanderbilt.

—Herbert L. Griggs, formerly of the banking firm of Baring, Magoun & Co., was recently elected President of the Bank of New York, to succeed the late Ebenezer S. Mason.

—The East River National Bank, which has done business for forty years in the location at the Southeast corner of Broadway and Third street, has removed to the adjoining building, 680 Broadway.

—Edwin S. Schenck, President of the Hamilton Bank, was recently elected a director and Vice-President of the National Citizens' Bank.

—The Standard Trust Company and the Bank of New York were constituted additional city depositories on February 1.

—Geo. W. Spence, formerly Acting Cashier of the People's Bank, of Brooklyn, was recently appointed Cashier.

—Francis M. Breese, Cashier of the New York County National Bank, recently resigned on account of ill health and was succeeded by Chas. G. Dale. A new office, that of Second Vice-President, was created and W. Carpenter elected to the position.

—Henry H. Bizzillon, formerly Assistant Cashier of the Riverside Bank, was recently appointed Cashier.

—There is to be an increase in the capital of the Seventh National Bank from \$300,000 to \$500,000.

—At a recent regular meeting of the board of directors of the Gansevoort Bank Mr. T. Albus Adams was unanimously elected President. Mr. Adams was connected with Swift & Co., of Chicago, for twelve years, and had full charge of their financial interests in New York and vicinity. He also is connected at present with other important business enterprises.

—W. A. Simonson, one of the Vice-Presidents of the National City Bank, has been elected a Vice-President of the Lincoln National Bank. R. A. Parker, head of the credit department of the National City Bank, has been appointed a Vice-President of the Second National Bank, which institution is controlled by the City National.

—The Seventh National Bank was recently appointed clearing-house agent for the Twelfth Ward Bank.

—Frederick D. Ives, for many years loan clerk of the Mercantile National Bank, has been elected Vice-President of the Hamilton Bank.

### NEW ENGLAND STATES.

**Portsmouth, N. H.**—The New Hampshire National Bank—the oldest bank in the State—was recently designated a depository of public moneys by the Secretary of the Treasury. It was already a depository of the State, county and city.

The New Hampshire National has \$100,000 capital, \$30,000 surplus and deposits of nearly \$500,000. Hon. Calvin Page is President and Wm. C. Walton, Cashier.

**Bank's Capital Reduced.**—At the recent annual meeting of the shareholders of the Agawam National Bank, of Springfield, Mass., it was voted to reduce the capital from \$500,000 to \$300,000. Harry W. McGregory was elected President to succeed H. S. Hyde, resigned.

**Boston.**—The annual report of the Savings Bank Commissioners, issued January 23, says that dividends declared aggregated \$18,687,327, an increase of \$500,944 over 1899. The average rate was 3.81 per cent., as compared with 3.89 per cent. the preceding year. Total deposits were \$93,099,624, an average of \$62.93 to each individual. The amount withdrawn was \$90,524,599, an average of \$76.23 to each depositor.

—An interesting event in connection with the recent bank elections was the re-election of T. T. Sawyer to serve his fiftieth year in the board of the Bunker Hill National Bank. Mr. Sawyer is President of the Warren Institution for Savings, Charlestown. When the election was over he told his fellow members that it was his fiftieth time to be elected. He is eighty-four years old.



—Three years ago there were fifty-nine National banking institutions in this city, but this number has been reduced a little over thirty per cent. by reason of consolidations, liquidations and failures. In 1898 most of the changes in the local banking situation occurred. During that year the following nine banks were placed in liquidation by the Kidder, Peabody & Co. syndicate: North, North American, Hamilton, Revere, Eagle, Columbian, Howard, Boston and Market. The Lincoln Bank was placed in liquidation and its business absorbed by the Central; the Elliot absorbed the business of the Tremont and the City banks, the Shoe and Leather absorbed the business of the Everett and Blackstone banks, and the Colonial National Bank resulted from a consolidation of the Continental and Manufacturers'. A little over a year ago the Broadway and Globe banks failed. These changes have reduced the total number of Boston National banks to forty-three.

#### MIDDLE STATES.

**Taxable Property in New York.**—On January 21 the State Comptroller completed his tabulation of the assessed value of real and personal property in the State as returned by county boards of supervisors. Upon these valuations the annual State tax rate fixed by the present Legislature to meet the expenses of the State government for the fiscal year commencing next October will be levied. The State Comptroller's tabulation shows that the total assessed value of real and personal property is \$5,671,697,220, an increase of \$208,171,068, compared with the preceding year. The total assessed valuation of real estate is \$5,076,460,796, an increase of \$262,681,538; and of personal property, \$676,051,218, a reduction of \$72,873,720. The amount of personal property not locally taxable for State purposes is \$80,909,796, a decrease of \$12,768,240. In the cities of the State real property to the value of \$723,844,441 is exempt from taxation.

The property exempted is classed as follows: Federal Government, \$55,647,055; State government, \$39,104,060; county, \$4,150,300; city, \$344,354,887; school property, \$35,352,590; churches, parsonages and cemeteries, \$129,000,055; charitable and reformatory institutions, \$68,554,326; property purchased with pension money, \$2,009,173; miscellaneous property, \$2,770,795.

**Savings Banks Investments.**—On January 30 Senator Humphrey introduced a bill in the New York Legislature amending the State Banking law by providing that the fund kept by Savings banks to meet current payments may be loaned upon first mortgage bonds of the Chicago and Northwestern; Chicago, Burlington and Quincy; Michigan Central; Illinois Central; Pennsylvania Railroad; Delaware and Hudson; Delaware, Lackawanna and Western; New York, New Haven and Hartford; Boston and Maine; Maine Central; Chicago and Alton, and Fonda, Johnstown and Gloversville railroads.

**Baltimore, Md.**—It is announced that the First National and the National Marine have been added to the list of city depositories. There is about \$500,000 of city money in the various depositories, and the rate heretofore paid has been two per cent., but the banks have been asked to pay two and one-half per cent. hereafter.

—Resolutions were recently adopted by the directors of the Union Trust Co. declaring that it was not to the interests of the stockholders to go into liquidation.

—Deposits in the Savings banks show an increase of \$2,925,497 in the past year and an increase of 4,360 in the number of depositors.

**Little Falls, N. Y.**—At the annual meeting of the shareholders of the National Herkimer County Bank, Little Falls, N. Y., Wm. G. Milligan, the President, requested the board of directors not to re-elect him. His services in the bank have extended over a period of fifty-one years, divided as follows: 1850, May 14, bookkeeper, four years; 1854, May 16, teller, thirteen years; 1867, June 18, Cashier, twenty-one years; 1888, January 14, President, thirteen years. In presenting his declination, President Milligan said:

"Your institution is strong and in a healthy condition, and my advancing years impel me to retire from the presidency. I have been kindly treated, and part with you entertaining high respect for each and all."

The following was adopted by the board:

"Resolved, That while we appreciate the force and propriety of the reasons assigned by Mr. Milligan in his letter retiring from the presidency, we hereby appoint him Secretary of the board of directors, with all the privileges of the bank which he may wish to enjoy; and we hereby declare that he has been uniformly courteous to each of us, industrious and faithful to the institution, with monumental integrity; and we each hope that he may enjoy many years of life."

The following officers were elected: President, George A. Hardin; Vice-President, D. H. Burrell; Cashier, George D. Smith.

**Binghamton, N. Y.**—It is reported that a movement is under way here to consolidate the First National, Strong State and Susquehanna Valley Bank under a National bank charter.

**Atlantic City, N. J.**—The new fire-proof building of the Atlantic City National Bank has just been completed. It represents an investment of about \$100,000 the steel vaults costing \$30,000 and the heating and lighting fixtures about \$8,000. As the bank pays big annual dividends, in addition to making proper additions to surplus, it can well afford the expense of the new structure.

**A Prosperous New Bank.**—The Bellevue National Bank, of Bellevue, Pa. (a part of Allegheny) opened for business August 1, 1900, and since that time it has built up a very comfortable line of deposits. It will be much better equipped for doing business from now on, having just occupied its new building.

The new home of the bank is a handsome three-story pressed brick building. The first floor is devoted to banking business, with front on Lincoln avenue, and one store room in the rear, fronting on Hawley avenue. The second floor contains six offices, all rented. The third floor is a lodge room, also rented. The bank department contains a handsome and complete banking department, together with safe deposit boxes, a private parlor and a separate department for women. The total cost of the building was \$15,000.

**Moorestown, N. J.**—An attractive and substantial building was recently completed for the Burlington County Safe Deposit and Trust Co., and the Moorestown National Bank. The building for the trust company is new, and that for the bank has been remodelled to harmonize with the new structure. The two buildings communicate with each other, both institutions having the same officers. The combined structure was built of Pompeian brick, with Indiana limestone trimmings and granite base. Burglar-proof vaults of the most modern construction are a feature of the new equipment.

**Buffalo, N. Y.**—Pascal P. Pratt, who has been President of the Manufacturers and Traders' Bank of this city since 1885, and who has been officially connected with the bank since its organization, recently declined re-election and was succeeded by Robert L. Fryer.

Mr. Pratt is a man of very high business reputation, and much of the bank's success is due to his energy and ability. Being over eighty years of age, however, he deemed it prudent to relinquish the responsibilities of active management, but will continue to be a director of the bank. His fellow members of the board adopted suitable resolutions commending Mr. Pratt for his long years of active and faithful services.

**Philadelphia.**—The Equitable Trust Co. has decided to increase its capital from \$500,000 to \$1,000,000.

#### SOUTHERN STATES.

**Sherman, Texas.**—The Merchants and Planters' Bank of this city has reason to be well pleased with its past year's business and its present condition. It managed to pay taxes and a fifteen per cent. dividend besides. That the bank is comfortably fixed may be inferred from its capital of \$600,000, surplus \$120,000, and deposits amounting to \$1,831,379. This is a large deposit account for a moderate-sized city, and it is creditable to the bank's management that such a sum is carried without paying interest on deposits. The total resources of the Merchants and Planters' National are \$2,001,379.

**Columbia, S. C.**—At the thirty-third annual meeting of the shareholders of the Carolina National Bank, held on January 8, Col. Willie Jones, the Cashier, was promoted by having the office of Vice-President and Cashier created for him. He will still continue also as Cashier. The bank was organized in 1868, and Col. Jones has been connected with it continuously since 1870, and the promotion was in recognition of his services. The Carolina National is in a flourishing condition, having \$200,000 capital, \$80,000 surplus and over \$1,000,000 of deposits. During its existence \$538,688 has been paid in dividends.

It is the intention of the bank to erect shortly a modern five-story bank building.

**West Va. Bankers' Association.**—At a meeting of the executive council at Wheeling, January 30, it was decided to hold the next annual meeting of the West Virginia Bankers' Association at Wheeling, May 15 and 16.

**North Carolina Banks.**—The total resources of the State, Savings and private banks of North Carolina on December 13, 1900, were \$18,130,666, divided as follows: State, \$11,662,774; private, \$2,366,067; Savings, \$2,071,835.

**Atlanta, Ga.**—At a meeting of the city finance committee January 17, the Lowry National Bank, the Capital City National Bank, the Fourth National Bank and the Maddox-Rucker Bank were selected as city depositories for the year. These banks will pay two per cent. on the deposits and will lend the city money at that rate.

#### WESTERN STATES.

**Indianapolis, Ind.**—As shown by the recent census, the increase in the population of this city was far ahead of most other cities of the country, and the gain in general business and manufacturing has been equally rapid. There are few, if any, of the inland cities of the Uni-

ted States that have grown so fast and yet so substantially. In addition to being the political and commercial center of a great State, Indianapolis is an especially attractive city for residence, and the people are progressive in all respects.

The banking business, too, is flourishing, as may be inferred from the following, from a recent issue of "The Sentinel":

"Comment is being made on the excellent showing made by the Capital National Bank of this city during the last year. It has increased its surplus account to \$100,000, adding \$20,000 charged off its premium account of \$56,000, holding its \$254,000 United States bonds at par, and also charging off its furniture and fixture account so that this account, valued at \$17,500, does not appear in the assets of the bank.

In addition to this it has paid its usual annual dividend of five percent. and taxes, and has undivided profits left of \$11,000.

The Capital National Bank is to be congratulated in securing for Indianapolis a recognized place among the financial cities of the country, and the present excellent banking accommodations offered to the business interests of the city are largely due to its untiring efforts in securing the appointment of Indianapolis as a reserve city, attracting to the city since May, 1899, less than two years, more than \$8,000,000 in deposits, which through the medium of banks has been loaned through the different channels of trade, promoting and building up all our manufacturing and industrial interests."

**Spooner, Wis.**—Larson & Nelson recently opened the Bank of Spooner at this place. Mr. Larson is Cashier of the Lumbermen's Bank, of Shell Lake, Wis.

**Appointed Bank Commissioner.**—On January 14 Hon. Morton Albaugh was nominated for Bank Commissioner of Kansas, and the nomination was confirmed by the State Senate. Mr. Albaugh's appointment is for four years from March 1. He will succeed Hon. John W. Breidenthal, who has ably filled the office for several years. A portrait and sketch of Mr. Albaugh appeared in the January issue of the *MAGAZINE*.

**St. Louis**—A review of the financial business of 1900 is decidedly satisfactory, as the marked increase in all items of banking proves conclusively that the closing year of the nineteenth century was one of remarkable progress and expansion, and has broken all previous records in the financial annals of the city. Remarkable gains were made by all of the banks and trust companies in St. Louis, and in every line there has been an increase.

Bank clearings from the opening to the close of the year were larger than those of the previous year, and the total clearings for 1900 were \$1,688,849,494, exceeding by \$50,501,261 those of 1899, which was the largest previous year on record.

In the past year \$1,985,500 was paid in dividends to stockholders by the banks and trust companies of St. Louis, of which \$474,000 was paid by the fourteen State banks; \$984,000 by the six National banks, and \$577,500 by four trust companies. In 1899 the amount paid in dividends by these same institutions was \$1,478,000, making the increase for the year \$507,500.

The phenomenal increase in the banking resources in St. Louis in the last ten years, and the wonderful progress of the trust business of the city which has grown up within the past decade, is shown by the following comparative tables of the aggregate resources and liabilities of the banks and trust companies in December, 1890, and December, 1900:

	Dec., 1890.	Dec., 1900.	Increase.
Nineteen banks.....	\$70,364,685	\$156,698,398	\$86,333,713
Five trust companies.....	8,467,372	50,169,239	46,701,867
	<u>\$78,832,057</u>	<u>\$206,867,637</u>	<u>\$133,035,580</u>

**Cleveland, Ohio.**—On January 15 an organization certificate was issued to the Market National Bank, capital \$250,000. Wm. F. Sprague is President and Wm. K. Rose, Cashier.

—The Clark Avenue Savings Bank Co. was incorporated recently with \$100,000 capital.

**Minneapolis, Minn.**—It is announced that a consolidation has been effected between the Flour City National Bank and the Security Bank of Minnesota, the Flour City transferring its business to the Security Bank. Guy C. Landis, Cashier of the Flour City National, becomes an officer of the Security, and H. C. Akeley and S. T. McKnight, respectively President and Vice-President of the liquidating bank, become directors of the succeeding institution.

The Security Bank was organized in 1878, and has always done a large business, which, of course, will be materially increased by the consolidation.

**Ottawa, Ill.**—John F. Nash, who has been Cashier and practical manager of the First National Bank here for the past thirty-five years, recently resigned—the directors accepting his resignation with deep regret. Charles E. Hook, the Assistant Cashier, has been elected Cashier to succeed Mr. Nash, and O. Haeberle in turn succeeds to the post of Assistant Cashier. Mr. Hook has been connected with the bank since 1880, and has also held other important positions, having been city treasurer for several terms, and in 1897 he was elected mayor.

**Sioux City, Iowa.**—Weare & Allison have consolidated their banking business with the Iowa State National Bank, which will hereafter occupy the building in which the private bank has been located. George Weare will be President of the Iowa State National, and its former President, D. T. Gilman, will be a director, as will also John P. Allison.

Weare & Allison was one of the oldest banking firms in Iowa, dating from about 1855. They have been successful, and in order to give their business a more permanent form had taken preliminary steps looking to the formation of a National bank, but finally decided that a union of the two banks would be more judicious. The capital will remain at \$200,000, and the deposits of the combined banks will be about \$2,000,000 at the start.

**Chicago.**—F. P. Schreiber was recently elected an additional Assistant Cashier of the Union Trust Co., the other officers and directors being re-elected.

—On May 1 the Equitable Trust Company will move from its present quarters in the Hartford Building, Madison and Dearborn streets, to the new Chicago National Bank Building. Farson, Leach & Co.'s offices will be in the rooms vacated by the Equitable Trust Company. Dunlap, Smith & Co. will leave the First National Bank Building and occupy the offices left vacant by Farson, Leach & Co.

**Profit-Sharing in Banks.**—Commenting on the action of the Kent County Savings Bank, of Grand Rapids, Mich., in sharing its profits with employees, the "Grand Rapids Press" says:

"The Kent County Savings Bank, in adopting the profit-sharing plan of rewarding employees for faithful service, has placed itself as a prominent example before the financial concerns of the country. The profit-sharing idea has invaded nearly every line of trade, but its entrance into the banking field is a singular and significant achievement. Banks are noted for their conservatism, their slowness to make changes, and their aversion for schemes that are visionary or sentimental. They are at a sure-footed pace, keep in the center of the road, and make no rash dashes into tempting-looking side paths. The action of the Kent County Bank, therefore, gives the profit-sharing increased prominence in Grand Rapids.

It can readily be seen how the profit-sharing scheme can pay its own way in a bank. In the first place it makes each employee put his heart into the work. He knows that he is laboring for more than his salary, and that every customer he saves or gains for the house will benefit his personal interests. He will work faithfully, conscientiously, and continuously for the bank's welfare in office hours and out of office hours, for every good word he says means more money in his own pocket. Then, too, the profit-sharing plan furnishes a check on dishonesty. It puts more of a personal responsibility on the employee; he knows that if he should embezzle from the bank he would not only be embezzling from the wealthy stockholders and directors, but also from his fellow clerks and from himself. Profit-sharing seems to have become a recognized part of business life, and the day will come when it will be well-nigh universal. The Kent County Bank's action has brought that day nearer."

## PACIFIC SLOPE.

**San Francisco.**—The Bank of Commerce is being reorganized as the Western National Bank, with \$200,000 capital.

**Montana Banking News.**—Ex-Senator Lee Mantle is interested in the Aetna Banking and Trust Co. recently incorporated at Butte with \$100,000 capital.

—The Exchange Bank, of Wibaux, Mon., has removed to Glendive, in that State, and will be known hereafter as the Exchange Bank, of Glendive. Its capital is \$10,000, and the officers are: President, Frank Cannon; Cashier, W. E. Higman.

—The Hecla Mercantile and Banking Co. has removed from Glendale to Melrose.

—During the past eight years a large part of the capital stock of the Montana National Bank of Helena has, through the death of the original owners, passed into the hands of estates. This character of ownership has to some extent hampered the management of the bank, and as a direct purchase of these holdings was impracticable, it was decided to organize a new institution—the National Bank of Montana, which succeeds to the business of the Montana National Bank.

The new bank will start with a capital and surplus of \$312,500. Its officers will be: President, Thomas A. Marlow; Vice-President, Albert L. Smith; Cashier, Thomas C. Kurts; Assistant Cashier, W. H. Dickinson. Among the prominent shareholders are Ex-Comptroller Eckels and James J. Hill.

—Mrs. Marcus Daly has acquired the interests of Messrs. M. Donahoe and M. B. Greenwood in the banking house of Daly, Donahoe & Greenwood, at Anaconda, and will continue the business in her name. The present officers will remain in charge. This change in the firm's affairs was made necessary by the recent death of Mr. Daly. It is probable that the bank will incorporate in the near future.

**Seattle, Wash.**—A branch of the London and San Francisco Bank, Limited, was recently established here under the management of J. G. Gauld, who remains joint Manager of the Tacoma branch also.

## NEW BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, ETC.

### NEW NATIONAL BANKS.

The Comptroller of the Currency furnishes the following statement of new National banks organized since our last report. Names of officers and other particulars regarding these new National banks will be found under the different State headings.

#### NATIONAL BANKS ORGANIZED.

- 5660—First National Bank, De Leon, Texas. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5661—First National Bank, Merkel, Texas. Capital, \$30,000.
- 5662—Rye National Bank, Rye, New York. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5663—First National Bank, Italy, Texas. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5664—First National Bank, Thomasville, Alabama. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5665—City National Bank, Decatur, Texas. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5666—First National Bank, Sayre, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5667—Citizens' National Bank, Big Run, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$35,000.
- 5668—Miners' National Bank, Ishpeming, Michigan. Capital, \$100,000.
- 5669—First National Bank, Morenci, Michigan. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5670—Farmers' National Bank, Howe, Texas. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5671—National Bank of Montana, Helena, Montana. Capital, \$250,000.
- 5672—American National Bank, Indianapolis, Indiana. Capital, \$250,000.
- 5673—Elkin National Bank, Elkin, North Carolina. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5674—First National Bank, Winnsboro, Texas. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5675—Cazenovia National Bank, Cazenovia, New York. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5676—First National Bank, Havre, Montana. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5677—National Bank of Fayetteville, North Carolina. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5678—Market National Bank, Cleveland, Ohio. Capital, \$250,000.
- 5679—American National Bank, Dayton, Tennessee. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5680—Albany National Bank, Albany, Texas. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5681—First National Bank, Howe, Texas. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5682—First National Bank, Stoystown, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$35,000.
- 5683—First National Bank, Farmville, Virginia. Capital, \$30,000.
- 5684—National Bank of Sayre, Sayre, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5685—First National Bank, Burt, Iowa. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5686—Second National Bank, Nazareth, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5687—First National Bank, Hoxie, Kansas. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5688—Western National Bank, San Francisco, California. Capital, \$250,000.
- 5689—Third National Bank, Mount Vernon, Illinois. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5690—Neligh National Bank, Neligh, Nebraska. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5691—Montgomery National Bank, Montgomery, West Virginia. Capital, \$35,000.
- 5692—Farmers and Merchants' National Bank, Plano, Texas. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5693—First National Bank, Greensboro, Alabama. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5694—First National Bank, Mingo Junction, Ohio. Capital, \$25,000.

#### APPLICATIONS TO ORGANIZE NATIONAL BANKS APPROVED.

The following notices of intention to organize National banks have been approved by the Comptroller of the Currency since last advice:

- First National Bank, Cresson, Pennsylvania; by E. Empfield, *et al.*
- Burt National Bank, Burt, Iowa; by C. C. Chubb, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Rodgers, Texas; by J. Hugh Wear, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Moweaqua, Illinois; by D. P. Keller, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Brillion, Wisconsin; by F. T. Sentner, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Nevada, Texas; by M. J. Dennis, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Williamstown, West Virginia; by T. F. Barrett, *et al.*
- American National Bank, Oklakoma City, Oklahoma; by J. S. Corley, *et al.*
- Citizens' National Bank, Arlington, Texas; by W. M. Dugan, *et al.*
- Citizens' National Bank, Hope, Indiana; by Frank Stapp, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Essex, Iowa; by H. I. Foskett, *et al.*

First National Bank, Crafton, Pennsylvania; by David S. McCann, *et al.*  
 Citizens' National Bank, Mexia, Texas; by J. D. Jackson, *et al.*  
 Mississippi National Bank, Port Gibson, Mississippi; by W. R. Craig, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Cumby, Texas; by C. M. Patton, *et al.*  
 National Bank of Holdenville, Holdenville, Indian Territory; by C. S. Reed, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, De Land, Illinois; by G. R. Trenchard, *et al.*  
 National Bank of Grand Saline, Grand Saline, Texas; by T. B. Meeks, *et al.*  
 National Bank of Geneva, Geneva, Alabama; by W. C. O'Neal, *et al.*  
 Elgin National Bank, Elgin, Texas; by Dan Murphy, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Fort Sill, Oklahoma; by R. E. Huff, *et al.*

#### APPLICATION FOR CONVERSION TO NATIONAL BANKS APPROVED.

State Bank, Jackson, Minnesota; into First National Bank.  
 Webster County State Bank, Gowrie, Iowa; into First National Bank.  
 State Exchange Bank, Weatherford, Oklahoma; into National Exchange Bank.  
 State Bank, Northwood, North Dakota; into First National Bank.  
 Bank of Mondovi, Mondovi, Wisconsin; into First National Bank.  
 Corwith State Bank, Corwith, Iowa; into First National Bank.

### NEW BANKS, BANKERS, ETC.

#### ALABAMA.

EVERGREEN—H. Lee Brown; capital, \$2,000.  
 GENEVA—First National Bank (successor to Bank of Geneva); capital, \$50,000; Pres., W. E. Holloway; Vice-Pres., L. Bernheimer; Cas., H. R. Clarke; Asst. Cas., E. O. Harper.  
 GREENSBORO—First National Bank (successor to Lee M. Otts); capital, \$25,000; Pres., Lee M. Otts; Cas., J. M. P. Otts.  
 RUSSELLVILLE—Merchants' Bank (branch of Florence).  
 STEVENSON—Merchants' Bank (branch of Florence).  
 SYLACAUGA—People's Bank; capital, \$50,000.  
 THOMASVILLE—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., J. S. Hanly; Cas., J. W. Tucker.  
 WETUMPKA—Bank of Wetumpka; capital, \$25,000; Pres., B. L. Gaddis; Vice-Pres., J. M. Jenkins; Cas. and Manager, W. L. Lancaster; Asst. Cas., B. L. Gaddis, Jr.

#### ARKANSAS.

CLARKSVILLE—Johnson County Bank; Pres., C. E. Robinson; Cas., A. M. Ragan.  
 EVENING SHADE—Bank of Evening Shade; capital, \$6,000; Pres., John S. Medley; Cas., W. B. Hamm.

#### CALIFORNIA.

CONCORD—Bank of Concord.  
 SAN FRANCISCO—Western National Bank (successor to Bank of Commerce); capital, \$200,000; Pres., Wm. C. Murdoch; Cas., Robert B. Murdoch.  
 SAN PEDRO—State Bank; capital, \$25,000.  
 VENTURA—Ventura Savings Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., E. P. Foster; Vice-Pres., A. Bernheim; Cas., J. H. Chaffee; Asst. Cas., J. A. Walker.

#### GEORGIA.

CUTHBERT—McPherson & Co.; Cas., D. A. McPherson.  
 ROBERTA—Crawford County Bank; capital, \$20,000; Pres., S. H. Phelan; Vice-Pres., W. Dent; Cas., W. G. Phelan.

SYLVANIA—Screven County Bank; capital, \$15,000; Pres., L. H. Hilton; Cas., Vindex Hand.

#### ILLINOIS.

AVON—Bank of Avon (J. P. Johnson).  
 BELVIDERE—Home Savings and Trust Co.; capital, \$50,000.  
 BENSENVILLE—Bank of Frangin Bros.; capital, \$25,000.  
 CHICAGO HEIGHTS—American Exchange Bank; Pres., E. R. Davis; Asst. Cas., R. C. Isaacs.  
 HANOVER—Hanover Rural Bank; capital, \$10,000; Cas., J. Arthur Speer.  
 MAYWOOD—Maywood State Bank; capital, \$25,000.  
 MOUNT VERNON—Third National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., J. R. Allen; Cas., L. L. Emmerson.

#### INDIANA.

BUNKER HILL—Commercial Bank (Thomas F. Hoban).  
 INDIANAPOLIS—American National Bank; capital, \$250,000; Pres., John Perrin; Cas., H. A. Schlotzhauer.—Mutual Trust Co. of Del.; capital, \$1,000,000; D. Belmont Leeter, Manager.  
 LEBANON—Farmers' State Bank; capital, \$30,000; Pres., James M. Martin; Vice-Pres., Richard E. Niven; Cas., Isaac P. Horton.  
 RIDGEVILLE—Ridgeville State Bank (successor to Ridgeville Bank); capital, \$25,000; Pres., M. T. Sumption; Vice-Pres., John H. Huber; Cas., R. P. Bronson; Asst. Cas., M. A. Mastick.

#### INDIAN TERRITORY.

SPIRO—Choctaw Commercial Bank; Pres., Alfred F. Bissell; Cas., J. W. Underwood.  
 TULSA—City National Bank (successor to City Bank); capital, \$25,000; Pres., Wm. J. Trimble; Cas., L. D. Marr.

#### IOWA.

BURT—First National Bank (successor to

Farmers' Savings Bank); capital, \$25,000; Pres., Joseph W. Wadsworth; Cas., Charles D. Smith.

**CHELSEA**—Chelsea State Bank (successor to Bank of Chelsea); capital, \$25,000; Pres., John Skrabie; Cas., Wm. Benesh.

**DES MOINES**—Iowa State Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., J. R. Baxter; Vice-Pres., E. H. Hunter; Manager, Geo. A. Dissmore.

**ETHERVILLE**—Iowa Savings Bank; capital, \$20,000; Pres., E. J. Breen; Vice-Pres., Mack Groves; Cas., Frank P. Woods.

**LAKE PARK**—German Savings Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Louis Stoltenberg; Cas., Theo. Strathman.

**REDDING**—Redding Bank; President, A. M. Schancke.

**WAVERLY**—Waverly Savings Bank; capital, \$20,000; Pres., H. G. Nichols; Cas., Richard Cullinane.

#### KANSAS.

**BAXTER SPRINGS**—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$15,000; Pres., Fred S. Hall.

**DE SOTO**—De Soto State Bank; capital, \$5,000.

**HOXIE**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., M. A. Chambers; Cas., Grover Walker.

**LEAVENWORTH**—Wulfekuhler's Bank.

**SCAMMON**—Scammon State Bank; capital, \$4,000.

#### KENTUCKY.

**CENTRAL CITY**—Central City Savings Bank; capital, \$15,000; Pres., T. L. Roll; Vice-Pres., John T. May; Cas., John Allen.

**GREENVILLE**—Muhlenberg County Savings Bank; capital, \$15,000.

**LEXINGTON**—Savings Bank of Lexington; capital, \$15,000.

**MADISONVILLE**—Morton's Bank (successor to John G. Morton); capital, \$50,000; Pres., W. C. Morton; Vice-Pres., H. H. Holeman; Cas., C. O. Osburn; Asst. Cas., Clint Ruby. —Farmers and Merchants' Bank and Trust Co.; Cas., J. F. Gordon.

#### LOUISIANA.

**BUSTON**—Lincoln Parish Bank; capital, \$2,000; Pres., W. H. Lyman; Vice-Pres., A. Laurence; Cas., J. Rhode Smith.

#### MICHIGAN.

**ISHPEMING**—Miners' National Bank (successor to Ishpeming National Bank); capital, \$100,000; Pres., Frederick Braastad; Cas., Anson B. Miner.

**LUTHER**—Lake County Bank; Cas., W. A. Munger.

**METAMORA**—Bank of Metamora; capital, \$5,000; Cas., Wade Shoup.

**MORENCI**—First National Bank (successor to Bank of Morenci); capital, \$25,000; Pres., Elias B. Rorick; Cas., John P. Rorick.

**ORTONVILLE**—Bank of Ortonville; Cas., C. Hagerman.

**YALE**—Yale State Bank; capital, \$25,000;

Pres., Jas. Livingston; Vice-Pres., James McColi; Cas., William H. Learmond.

#### MINNESOTA.

**BORUP**—Bank of Borup; Pres., E. A. Amundson; Cas., E. L. Berg.

**BRECKENRIDGE**—Merchants' State Bank; capital, \$15,000.

**BUFFALO LAKE**—State Bank (successor to Bank of Buffalo Lake); capital, \$15,000; Pres., D. W. Topliff; Vice-Pres., J. C. Nagel; Cas., F. G. Nelleremoe.

**WALTERS**—Bank of Walters.

**COLLINS**—Bank of Collins; capital, \$50,000.

#### MISSOURI.

**ST. JOSEPH**—Bank of Commerce; capital, \$10,000; Pres., Arthur H. Penfield; Vice-Pres., Eugene H. Bullock; Asst. Cas., Jos. V. Fennell.

#### MONTANA.

**BUTTE**—Aetna Banking and Trust Co.; capital, \$100,000.

**GLENDIVE**—Exchange Bank (removed from Wibaux); capital, \$10,000; Pres., Frank Cannon; Cas., W. E. Higman.

**HAVRE**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., W. E. Hauser; Cas., Robert T. F. Smith.

**HELENA**—National Bank of Montana (successor to Montana National Bank); capital, \$250,000; Pres., Thomas A. Marlow; Vice-Pres., A. L. Smith; Cas., Thomas C. Kurtz; Asst. Cas., W. H. Dickinson.

**MELROSE**—Hecla Mercantile and Banking Co., removed from Hecla.

#### NEBRASKA.

**DESHLER**—State Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., J. O. Walker; Vice-Pres., J. F. Walker; Cas., R. Tweed; Asst. Cas., Roy A. Bush.

**LINCOLN**—Farmers and Merchants' Bank.

**MITCHELL**—Mitchell Valley Bank; capital, \$25,000.

**NELIGH**—Neligh National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., C. J. Anderson; Cas., C. L. Wattles.

**RUSKIN**—Ruskin State Bank; capital, \$7,500; Pres., A. G. McGrew; Cas., F. M. McGrew.

**WINNETOON**—First State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., Jerome J. Jones; Cas., Edward L. Brooks.

#### NEW YORK.

**BROOKLYN**—German-American Trust Co.; capital, \$200,000.

**CAZENOVIA**—Cazenovia National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Henry Burden, 2d; Cas., J. H. Ten Eyck Burr.

**COLLEGE POINT**—College Point Branch Bank of Jamaica; Cas., A. Bjornsen.

**NEW YORK**—Varick Bank; capital, \$100,000; Pres., J. Maus Schermerhorn; Vice-Pres., Charles P. Barney; Cas., W. R. Kurau.

**ROCHESTER**—Genesee Trust Co.

**RYE**—Rye National Bank; capital, \$50,000;

Pres., Geo. R. Read; Cas., Wilbur F. Hendrix.

#### NORTH CAROLINA.

ELKIN—Elkin National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., R. J. Thurmond; Vice-Pres., Hugh G. Chatham; Cas., Thomas J. Lillard.

FAYETTEVILLE—National Bank of Fayetteville; capital, \$50,000; Pres., W. J. Edwards; Act. Cas., C. J. Ahearn.

NASHVILLE—Merchants and Farmers' Bank; Pres., John Strickland; Vice-Pres., J. O. Capps; Cas., Samuel F. Austin.

#### OHIO.

CINCINNATI—Provident Savings Bank and Provident Trust Co.; capital, \$250,000; Pres., B. H. Kroger; Vice-Pres., George Peck; Asst. Cas., T. E. Hodge; Asst. Sec. and Treas., B. G. Blair.—Knights of Honor of the World's Savings Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., Robert D. Troy; Vice-Pres., George H. Jackson; Treas., W. P. Dabney.

CLEVELAND—Market National Bank; capital, \$250,000; Pres., Wm. F. Sprague; Cas., Wm. K. Rose.—Clark Avenue Savings Bank Co.; capital, \$100,000.

COLUMBUS—Columbus Savings and Trust Co.; capital, \$500,000.

LORAIN—Dollar Savings Co.; capital, \$35,000; Pres., T. F. Daniels; Cas., C. E. Daniels.

MINGO JUNCTION—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., John H. McKee; Cas., Latimer L. Grimes.

#### OKLAHOMA.

LEXINGTON Farmers' Bank; capital, \$5,000.

OKLAHOMA CITY—Oklahoma City Savings Bank; capital, \$15,000; Pres., S. S. Allen; Cas., C. W. Allen; Treas., F. P. Johnson.

WAUKOMIS—Western State Bank; capital, \$5,000.

#### PENNSYLVANIA.

BIG RUN—Citizens' National Bank; capital, \$35,000; Pres., G. W. Miller; Cas., John A. Miller.

CARNEGIE—Carnegie Trust Co.

HAZELWOOD—Hazelwood Savings Bank; capital, \$50,000.

HOMESTEAD—Monongahela Trust Co.; capital, \$150,000.

HONESDALE—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$50,000.

NAZARETH—Second National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., R. F. Babp; Cas., A. E. Frantz.

SAYRE—First National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., F. P. Wilbur; Cas., R. F. Page.

—National Bank of Sayre (successor to Sayre Banking Co.); capital, \$50,000; Pres., Lewis Elghmey; Cas., M. H. Sawtelle.

STOYSTOWN—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Frank Taylor; Cas., J. H. Bowman.

#### SOUTH CAROLINA.

GAFFNEY—Merchants and Planters' Bank (successor to A. N. Wood); capital, \$50,000; Pres., A. N. Wood; Vice-Pres., R. R. Brown; Cas., C. M. Smith.

ORANGEBURG—People's Bank; capital, \$30,000.

ST. GEORGE'S—Dorchester Bank; capital, \$25,000.

#### SOUTH DAKOTA.

BRANDT—State Bank; capital, \$15,000; Pres., J. G. Lund; Cas., H. P. Holen; Asst. Cas., S. J. Forbes.

DELMONT—Delmont State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., Alfred Shepard; Cas., A. M. Shaw.

DESMET—Hardy's Bank.

#### TENNESSEE.

DAYTON—American National Bank (successor to Tennessee Valley Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., W. H. Rodgers; Vice-Pres., A. P. Haggard; Cas., F. R. Rodgers.

NASHVILLE—People's Savings Bank; capital, \$12,500.

#### TEXAS.

ALBANY—Albany National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., S. Webb; Cas., T. W. Gulledge.

BLUM—First Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., D. E. Waggoner; Cas., W. A. Wells.

BRIDGEPORT—Coal City Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., H. G. Leonard; Cas., W. O. Stevens.

DECATUR—City National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., S. A. Lillard; Vice-Pres., H. S. Ward; Cas., E. L. Lillard.

DE LEON—First National Bank (successor to Bank of De Leon); capital, \$25,000; Pres., Wm. Dale.

GROSVTON—Farmers and Merchants' Bank.

HOWE—Farmers' National Bank (successor to Bank of Howe); capital, \$30,000; Pres., Wm. H. Bean; Cas., Geo. B. R. Smith.—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., J. P. Withers; Cas., S. J. Spotts.

ITALY—First National Bank (successor to Clark & Dunlap); capital, \$25,000; Pres., J. V. Clark; Vice-Pres., E. J. Dunaway; Cas., S. M. Dunlap; Asst. Cas., R. C. Mitchell.

MERKEL—First National Bank; capital, \$30,000; Pres., J. T. Warren; Cas., George S. Berry.

PLANO—Farmers and Merchants' National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., Olney Davis; Cas., H. C. Jones.

WINNSBORO—First National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., T. J. Gibson; Cas., C. H. Morris.

WOLFE CITY—J. H. McNail & Co.

#### VIRGINIA.

FARMVILLE—First National Bank; capital, \$30,000; Pres., N. B. Davidson; Cash., A. G. Clapham.



**PORTSMOUTH**—Portsmouth Dime Savings Bank.

**URBANA**—Bank of Middlesex; capital, \$100,000; Pres., A. Randolph Howard; Cas., Wm. C. Halle; Asst. Cas., V. C. Weaver.

**WASHINGTON.**

**SEATTLE**—London and San Francisco Bank, Limited; J. G. Gauld, Manager.

**WEST VIRGINIA.**

**AUBURN**—Auburn Exchange Bank; capital, \$25,000.

**MONTGOMERY**—Montgomery National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., H. S. Montgomery; Cas., J. D. Foster, Jr.

**CHANGES IN OFFICERS, CAPITAL, ETC.**

**ALABAMA.**

**BIRMINGHAM**—Alabama National Bank; J. B. Cobbs, Vice-Pres. in place of B. F. Roden.—Birmingham Trust and Savings Co.; Arthur W. Smith, Pres. in place of P. H. Earle; Tom O. Smith, Cas.—First National Bank; John H. Barr, Cas. in place of Tom O. Smith.

**CLAYTON**—Clayton Banking Co.; T. R. Parrish, Pres. in place of A. H. Alston, resigned.

**ELBA**—First Bank; capital increased to \$35,000.

**MONTGOMERY**—Farley National Bank; Louis B. Farley, Vice-Pres. and Cas.—Merchants and Planters' National Bank; M. P. Le Grand, Vice-Pres.

**SELMA**—City National Bank; A. G. Parrish, Pres. in place of W. P. Armstrong, deceased.

**ARKANSAS.**

**HOT SPRINGS**—Arkansas National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of S. A. Buchanan.

**CALIFORNIA.**

**HUENEME**—Bank of Hueneme; Thomas Gregg, Cas., deceased.

**SACRAMENTO**—Sacramento Bank; Wm. P. Coleman, Pres., deceased.

**SAN JOSE**—First National Bank; O. A. Neale, Vice-Pres. in place of J. D. Grant; Joseph D. Radford, Cas. in place of L. G. Nesmith; Paul Furst, Asst. Cas.

**STOCKTON**—First National Bank; Edward Floyd-Jones, Vice-Pres., deceased.

**COLORADO.**

**BOULDER**—First National Bank; Charles H. Cheney, Asst. Cas. in place of Charles H. Wise.

**DURANGO**—First National Bank; A. W. Ayres, Asst. Cas.

**LEADVILLE**—American National Bank; C. T. Limberg, Pres.

**TELLURIDE**—First National Bank; A. M. Wrench, Vice-Pres. in place of S. A. Bailey; R. H. Woods, Cas.

**WISCONSIN.**

**ORFORDVILLE**—Bank of Orfordville; capital, \$35,000.

**SPOONER**—Bank of Spooner (Larson & Nelson).

**SPRING GREEN**—State Bank; capital, \$15,000; Pres., F. B. Hyland; Cas., T. J. Morris.

**CANADA.**

**ONTARIO.**

**COPPER CLIFF**—Bank of Toronto; J. R. Lamb, Manager.

**QUEBEC.**

**MONTREAL**—Eastern Townships Bank.

**NORTHWEST TERRITORY.**

**MAPLE CREEK**—Merchants' Bank of Canada.

**WETASKIWIN**—Merchants' Bank of Canada.

**CONNECTICUT.**

**ANSONIA**—Ansonia National Bank; Chris. Brooker, Vice-Pres. in place of W. B. Bristol.

**DEEP RIVER**—Deep River National Bank; W. F. Wilcox, Vice-Pres. in place of H. R. Wooster, deceased.

**EAST HADDAM**—National Bank of New England; Julius Attwood, Pres., deceased.

**HARTFORD**—Hartford National Bank; Harold W. Stevens, Pres. in place of James Bolter, deceased.

**NEW BRITAIN**—Mechanics' National Bank; William E. Attwood, Vice-Pres.; H. B. Boardman, Cas. in place of William E. Attwood; no Asst. Cas. in place of H. B. Boardman.

**NEW HAVEN**—National Tradesmen's Bank; R. A. Brown, Vice-Pres. in place of A. W. De Forest, deceased.—National New Haven Bank; Frank D. Trowbridge, Asst. Cas.

**NORWICH**—Norwich Savings Society; John Mitchell, Pres., deceased.

**PAWCATUCK**—Pawcatuck National Bank; John Leslie, Vice-Pres. in place of J. Daniel Davis.

**STAFFORD SPRINGS**—First National Bank; E. C. Dennis, Pres. in place of Charles S. Dean.

**WALLINGFORD**—First National Bank; C. H. Tibbitts, Vice-Pres. in place of Leverett M. Hubbard.

**GEORGIA.**

**ATLANTA**—Capital City National Bank; Geo. A. Speer, Pres. in place of Jacob Haas; Isaac Liebemann, Vice-Pres.

**CARROLLTON**—Carrollton Bank; J. R. Adanson, Cas. in place of J. B. E. Brown, resigned.

**COLUMBUS**—Merchants and Mechanics' Bank; T. W. Bates, Pres.; John K. Hunde, Cas.

**ROME**—Exchange Bank; W. W. Berry, Cas. in place of C. L. Payne, resigned.

**THOMASVILLE**—Citizens' Banking and Trust Co.; J. T. Culppepper, Pres. and Cas.; T. M. McIntosh, Vice-Pres.

## ILLINOIS.

- AURORA**—First National Bank; J. H. Pease, Vice-Pres. in place of G. W. Tureau; W. E. Wright, Asst. Cas.
- CAMBRIDGE**—Farmers' National Bank; R. H. Hinman, Vice-Pres. in place of T. M. Robertson; E. P. Hinman, Asst. Cas.
- CHICAGO**—Union Trust Co.; F. P. Schreiber, additional Asst. Cas.—Third National Bank; David B. Lyman, Receiver in place of H. W. Jackson, deceased.—John C. King & Co.; succeeded by King, Hodenpyl & Co.
- DALLAS CITY**—First National Bank; W. H. Bliss, Cas. in place of C. F. Leinbaugh.
- DE KALB**—De Kalb National Bank; F. O. Crego, Asst. Cas. in place of E. P. Eliwood.
- FAIRBURY**—First National Bank; Isaac P. McDowell, Pres., deceased.
- FARMER CITY**—Old First National Bank; E. F. Campbell, Asst. Cas.
- GALVA**—Galva First National Bank; A. F. Deem, Asst. Cas. in place of S. V. Deem.
- LACON**—First National Bank; Jno. I. Thompson, Vice-Pres.; no Asst. Cas. in place of Jno. I. Thompson.
- LA SALLE**—La Salle National Bank; W. B. Hummer, Pres. in place of J. F. Kilduff; W. L. Parks, Cas. in place of W. B. Hummer; no Asst. Cas. in place of W. L. Parks.
- OTTAWA**—First National Bank; Charles E. Hook, Cas. in place of John F. Nash; O. Haeberle, Asst. Cas.
- PEORIA**—Peoria National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of W. M. Benton.
- SPRINGFIELD**—Springfield Marine Bank; Obed Lewis, First Vice-Pres., deceased.
- URBANA**—First National Bank; Clarence M. Richards, Cas. in place of Minnie Weber; Roy H. Griffin, Asst. Cas. in place of Clarence M. Richards.
- VIRGINIA**—Centennial National Bank; W. L. Black, Pres. in place of Wm. Epler.

## INDIANA.

- ANDERSON**—Anderson Trust Co.; capital increased from \$50,000 to \$100,000.
- CROWN POINT**—First National Bank; John E. Luther, Vice-Pres., in place of J. W. Youche, deceased.
- INDIANAPOLIS**—Fletcher National Bank; S. A. Fletcher, additional Asst. Cas.
- LA PORTE**—First National Bank; Fred M. Pitner, Vice-Pres. in place of H. D. Morrison, deceased.
- MARTINSVILLE**—First National Bank; M. Hite, Pres. in place of M. H. Parks; Karl I. Nutter, Asst. Cas.
- NEW CASTLE**—First National Bank; W. F. Byrket, Cas. in place of E. B. Phillips.
- PLYMOUTH**—First National Bank; John M. Shoemaker, Vice-Pres. in place of Jerry Blain, deceased.
- RUSHVILLE**—Rushville National Bank; Theodore Abercrombie, Pres. in place of George C. Clark, deceased.

**WORTHINGTON**—Commercial Bank; James E. Bull, Cas., deceased.

## INDIAN TERRITORY.

**BRISTOW**—Bank of Bristow; J. H. Maxey, Pres., deceased.

## IOWA.

- BELLE PLAINE**—First National Bank; F. E. Zalesky, Vice-Pres.; G. R. Ahrens, Cas., in place of L. T. Sweet, deceased; W. A. Mall, Asst. Cas.
- BURLINGTON**—National State Bank, J. W. Brooks, Cas. in place of John J. Fleming; no Asst. Cas. in place of J. W. Brooks.
- CEDAR FALLS**—Cedar Falls National Bank; C. H. Rodenbach, Pres. in place of James Miller; Henry Johnson, Vice-Pres. in place of C. H. Rodenbach.
- CENTREVILLE**—First National Bank; D. C. Bradley, Pres. in place of A. T. Bradley.
- COUNCIL BLUFFS**—First National Bank; Charles R. Hannan, Pres. in place of J. D. Edmundson; T. G. Turner, Vice-Pres. in place of Charles R. Hannan; no Cas. in place of Charles R. Hannan; F. A. Buckman, Asst. Cas. in place of Charles E. Walters.
- DES MOINES**—Iowa Loan and Trust Co.; D. F. Witter, Pres., resigned.—Des Moines National Bank; F. M. Hubbell, Vice-Pres. in place of E. A. Lynd; A. J. Zwart, Cas.; no Asst. Cas. in place of A. J. Zwart.—Valley National Bank; R. A. Crawford, Pres. in place of N. W. Johnson; W. E. Barrett, Cas. in place of R. A. Crawford; no Asst. Cas. in place of W. E. Barrett.
- INDEPENDENCE**—People's National Bank; Thomas Edwards, Vice-Pres. in place of Lyman J. Curtis.
- LYONS**—First National Bank; Wm. Holmes, Vice-Pres. in place of W. T. Joyce; J. H. Peters, Cas. in place of Wm. Holmes; A. L. Holmes, Asst. Cas. in place of J. H. Peters.
- MCGREGOR**—First National Bank; Thomas Updegraff, Vice-Pres. in place of William Larrabee.
- MASON CITY**—First National Bank; C. H. McNider, Pres. in place of H. I. Smith; F. E. Keeler, Cas. in place of C. H. McNider; W. G. C. Bagley and C. S. Parker, Asst. Cas's in place of F. E. Keeler.
- PRAIRIE CITY**—Zachary & Cochran; title changed to Zachary Bank; B. I. Wellslager, Pres.
- RED OAK**—First National Bank; W. S. Ellis, Asst. Cas.
- ROLAND**—Farmers' Savings Bank; H. C. Duca, Pres.; H. E. Myrab, Cas.; Louis Hegland, Asst. Cas.
- SIOUX CITY**—Iowa State National Bank and Weare & Allison; consolidated under former title; Geo. Weare, Pres.
- TIPTON**—First National Bank; Nellie Woods, Asst. Cas. in place of Charles P. Carl.

**VILLISCA**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of Doren Perrine.

#### KANSAS.

**COLUMBUS**—State Bank; capital increased \$7,000.

**EUREKA**—Citizens' National Bank; F. Ott, Vice-Pres.; J. W. Kenner, Asst. Cas.

**GARNETT**—Garnett Savings Bank; capital increased \$5,000.

**NEWTON**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of G. T. Kaestner.

**WHEATON**—Wheaton State Bank; capital increased from \$5,000 to \$10,000.

#### KENTUCKY.

**BOWLING GREEN**—Warren Deposit Bank; H. J. Smith, Pres. in place of C. G. Smallhouse.

**COVINGTON**—Farmers and Traders' National Bank; L. C. Stephens, Vice-Pres. in place of E. J. Hickey.

**LOUISVILLE**—Citizens' National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of W. R. Ray.

**NEWPORT**—German National Bank; reported reopened.

**OWENSBORO**—Owensboro Banking Co.; John Wandling, Cas., deceased.

**VERSAILLES**—Bank of Woodford; Samuel L. Wooldridge, Pres., deceased.

#### LOUISIANA.

**CHENEYVILLE**—Cheneyville Banking Co.; Robert H. Jackson, Pres. in place of A. D. Havard.

**JENNINGS**—Citizens' Bank; capital increased from \$20,000 to \$30,000.

#### MAINE.

**BANGOR**—Second National Bank; F. W. Ayer, Vice-Pres. in place of W. S. Dennett.

**BATH**—Bath National Bank; Wm. D. Sewall, Pres. in place of Albert Sewall, deceased; Samuel S. Sewall, Vice-Pres. in place of Wm. D. Sewall.

**BRUNSWICK**—First National Bank; O. J. Ripley, Cas. in place of J. P. Winchell.

**GARDINER**—Gardiner National Bank; J. C. Atkins, Pres. in place of I. J. Carr; A. Hopkins, Vice-Pres. in place of J. C. Atkins.

**HOULTON**—First National Bank; Clarence H. Pierce, Pres. in place of Walter Mansur, deceased.

**SKOWHEGAN**—Second National Bank; John R. McClellan, Pres. in place of R. B. Shephard, deceased.

**THOMASTON**—Georges National Bank; W. E. Vinal, Vice-Pres. in place of C. S. Smith, deceased.—Thomaston National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of Charles Singer.

**WATERVILLE**—Ticonic National Bank; Haskell S. Hall, Cas. in place of Appleton H. Palisted.

#### MARYLAND.

**ABERDEEN**—First National Bank; Charles H. Johnson, Cas. in place of D. K. Pritchard.

**BALTIMORE**—International Trust Co.; Edward H. Thomson, Vice-Pres. in place of John E. Searles; Charles T. Westcott, Vice-Pres., resigned.—Commercial National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of Frank Slingluff.—Citizens' National Bank; Albert D. Graham, Asst. Cas. in place of R. F. Holland.—Manufacturers' National Bank; Albert H. Bedford, Asst. Cas.

**PORT DEPOSIT**—Cecil National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of Thomas C. Bond, deceased.

#### MASSACHUSETTS.

**BOSTON**—Massachusetts National Bank; D. G. Wing, Vice-Pres.—Franklin Savings Bank; James E. Whitney, Pres. in place of Augustus Parker.—Suffolk National Bank; William C. Williams, Asst. Cas.—National Exchange Bank; H. W. Anderson, additional Asst. Cas.—Central National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of B. B. Perkins.—Fourth National Bank; James C. Melvin, Vice-Pres.

**BROCKTON**—Brockton National Bank; C. R. Fillebrow, Vice-Pres. and Cas.; F. C. Moore, Asst. Cas.

**CAMBRIDGE**—Cambridgeport National Bank; Walter G. Davis, Asst. Cas.

**CONCORD**—Concord National Bank; Edward C. Damon, Pres., deceased.

**EAST CAMBRIDGE**—Lechmere National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of James F. Pennell; Fred B. Wheeler, Cas. in place of George A. Lloyd.

**EASTHAMPTON**—First National Bank; John Mayher, Pres., in place of Samuel T. Seelye; no Vice-Pres. in place of John Mayher.—Easthampton Savings Bank; John Mayher, resigned.

**EDGARTON**—Martha's Vineyard National Bank; H. L. Wimpenny, second Asst. Cas.

**FALL RIVER**—Pocasset National Bank; Geo. W. Slade, Pres. in place of Joseph Healy, deceased.

**GARDNER**—Westminster National Bank; S. A. Greenwood, Second Vice-Pres.

**HOLYOKE**—Holyoke National Bank; Geo. C. Gill, Pres. in place of Geo. W. Prentiss, resigned.—Hadley Falls National Bank; H. J. Bardwell, Asst. Cas.

**LAWRENCE**—Pacific National Bank; Arthur J. Crosby, Cas. in place of Wm. H. Jaquith, deceased; no Asst. Cas. in place of Arthur J. Crosby.

**MALDEN**—Malden Trust Co.; Charles L. Dean, Pres. in place of William B. Ferguson.

**NORTH ADAMS**—Berkshire National Bank; C. H. Cutting, Pres. in place of W. H. Gaylord, deceased.

**PALMER**—Palmer National Bank; Edward Fairbanks, Pres. in place of James B. Shaw; George H. Wilkins, Vice-Pres. in place of Edward Fairbanks.

**SOMERVILLE**—Somerville National Bank; J.

E. Gendron, Cas. in place of Howard B. Chase, Act. Cas.

**SPRINGFIELD**—Agawam National Bank; capital reduced to \$300,000; Harry W. McGregory, Pres. in place of H. S. Hyde.

**WAKEFIELD**—National Bank of South Reading; Cyrus G. Beebe, Pres., deceased.

**WEBSTER**—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of Josiah Perry; C. M. Nash, Cas. in place of Edward L. Spalding; Leonard J. Spalding, Asst. Cas. in place of C. M. Nash.

#### MICHIGAN.

**COLDWATER**—Coldwater National Bank; W. H. Simond, Asst. Cas.

**CORUNNA**—First National Bank; E. T. Sidney, Asst. Cas. in place of W. F. Gallagher.

**DETROIT**—Central Savings Bank; Charles P. Collins, First Vice-Pres.; Wm. Reid, Second Vice-Pres. — German-American Bank; George K. Kirchner, Cas. in place of Chas. E. Kanter.

**OWOSSO**—M. L. Stewart & Co.; L. Irving Stewart, deceased.

**QUINCY**—Quincy State Bank; capital increased from \$20,000 to \$40,000.

**ROMEO**—Citizens' National Bank; John Smith, Jr., Pres. in place of E. W. Giddings; S. A. Reade, Vice-Pres. in place of John Smith, Jr.

**SAGINAW**—Second National Bank; George B. Morley, Pres. in place of G. W. Morley; Walter S. Eddy, Vice-Pres. in place of Waldo A. Avery; Edward W. Glynn, Cas.

#### MINNESOTA.

**ADRIAN**—Adrian Exchange Bank; A. G. Lindgren, Cas. and Manager in place of J. F. McKinney, resigned.

**JORDAN**—Scott County Bank; J. H. J. Klinkhammer, Cas. deceased.

**MINNEAPOLIS**—German-American Bank; H. Winecke, Vice-Pres., deceased. — Flour City National Bank; absorbed by Security Bank of Minnesota; Guy C. Landis, Asst. Cas. — Northwestern National Bank; E. W. Decker, Cas. in place of Gilbert G. Thorne; Joseph Chapman, Jr., Asst. Cas. in place of Wm. Collins.

**ORTONVILLE**—Citizens' Bank and Bank of Ortonville; consolidated under latter title.

**TRACY**—First National Bank; Daniel T. McArthur, Pres.; Wm. O. Gilruth, Cas.; John S. Tucker, Vice-Pres.; Ira N. Bedle, Asst. Cas.

#### MISSISSIPPI.

**BILOXI**—People's Bank; H. T. Howard, Pres., in place of C. F. Theobald.

#### MISSOURI.

**BRUNSWICK**—First National Bank; B. H. Smith, Cas. in place of M. H. Norton.

**COLUMBIA**—Exchange National Bank; E. W. Hinton, Vice-Pres. in place of Jon. S. Clarkson.

**PIERCE CITY**—Pierce City National Bank; L. A. Chapman, Cas., deceased.

**SEDALIA**—Third National Bank; R. F. Harris, Asst. Cas.

**ST. JOSEPH**—German-American Bank; Louis Siemens, Asst. Cas., resigned.

#### MONTANA.

**ANACONDA**—Daly, Donahoe & Greenwood; succeeded by Mrs. Marcus Daly.

**BOZEMAN**—Commercial National Bank; B. F. White, Pres. in place of Henry Elling.

**BUTTE**—First National Bank; J. S. Dutton, Second Asst. Cas.

**HELENA**—American National Bank; A. C. Johnson, Vice-Pres.; N. J. Gould, Cas.; E. J. Bowman, Asst. Cas.

#### NEBRASKA.

**ALLIANCE**—Alliance National Bank; W. H. Corbin, Vice-Pres.; F. E. Smith, Asst. Cas.

**CHADRON**—Citizens' State Bank; A. W. Riekman, Pres. in place of A. A. McFadon.

**DAVID CITY**—First National Bank; no Cas. in place of F. E. Schaaf; Jay Rising, Asst. Cas.

**FALLS CITY**—First National Bank; Wm. Uhlig, Asst. Cas.

**HEBRON**—First National Bank; C. H. Willard, Vice-Pres. in place of Jesse Starbuck.

**PAWNEE CITY**—First National Bank; O. H. Lock, Asst. Cas. in place of H. H. Bull.

**WAHOO**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of Ed. Lehmkuhl.

#### NEW HAMPSHIRE.

**MANCHESTER**—Amoskeag National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of Henry Chandler, deceased.

**NASHUA**—First National Bank; J. A. Spalding, Pres. in place of George A. Ramsdell, deceased; no Vice-Pres. in place of J. A. Spalding; F. W. Hatch, Asst. Cas.

**SOMERS WORTH**—Somersworth National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of E. A. Leighton.

#### NEW JERSEY.

**JERSEY CITY**—Hudson County National Bank; John D. McGill, Pres. in place of R. C. Washburn; J. Warren Hardenbergh, Vice-Pres. — Fifth Ward Savings Bank; John C. Limbeck, Pres., deceased.

**NEWTON**—Merchants' National Bank; F. M. Hough, Vice-Pres. in place of Henry W. Merriam, deceased.

**ORANGE**—Second National Bank; John O. Heald, Pres. in place of A. M. Matthews; John C. Conover, Vice-Pres. — Orange National Bank; George Spottiswood, Vice-Pres. in place of Wm. Pierson.

**PLAINFIELD**—First National Bank; J. A. Smith, Vice-Pres. in place of H. M. Estil.

#### NEW MEXICO.

**CARLSBAD**—First National Bank; John R. Royce, Pres. in place of H. J. Hammond.

**LAS VEGAS**—First National Bank; E. D. Ray-

nolds and Hallett Raynolds, Asst. Cashiers in place of L. F. Adams.

### NEW YORK.

**ALBANY**—National Savings Bank; Simon W. Rosendale, Pres. in place of John H. Van Antwerp.—First National Bank; C. Tremper, Cas. in place of C. Tremper, Jr.—New York State National Bank; W. B. Van Rensselaer, Vice-Pres. in place of John H. Van Antwerp.

**BINGHAMTON**—First National Bank; F. B. Newell, Pres. in place of W. S. Weed, deceased; A. S. Bartlett, Vice-Pres. in place of F. B. Newell.

**BROCKPORT**—First National Bank; Geo. C. Gordon, Vice-Pres. and Asst. Cas.

**BROOKLYN**—Williamsburgh Savings Bank; Horace M. Warren, Vice-Pres., deceased.—People's Bank; George W. Spence, Cas.

**BUFFALO**—Manufacturers and Traders' Bank; Robert L. Fryer, Pres. in place of Pascal P. Pratt, resigned.—Fidelity Trust and Guaranty Co.; Edward W. Wheeler, Sec. in place of Thomas S. McFarland; Edgar A. Taylor, Asst. Sec.

**CALEDONIA**—First National Bank; J. C. Tennent, Pres.; John D. Coffey, Vice-Pres.; J. Stewart, Asst. Cas.

**CANAJOHARIE**—National Spraker Bank; B. F. Spraker, Pres.; H. A. Dievendorf, Vice-Pres. in place of B. F. Spraker.

**CANDOR**—First National Bank; F. M. Humiston, Asst. Cas. in place of M. A. Beers.

**CASTLETON**—National Bank of Castleton; James R. Downer, Pres. in place of James Kingman; Osborn Earing, Cas. in place of James R. Downer.

**COOPERSTOWN**—First National Bank; C. K. McHarg, Vice-Pres. in place of D. E. Silver.

**CORTLAND**—Second National Bank; H. F. Benton, Vice-Pres. in place of E. A. Fish.

**DOBBS FERRY**—Dobbs Ferry Bank; Andrew C. Fields, Vice-Pres. in place of William Walker.

**EDMESTON**—First Nat. Bank; H. C. Brockway, Pres. in place of Caleb Clark; Delos Smith, Vice-Pres.

**FRANKLINVILLE**—Union National Bank; E. S. Scott, Asst. Cas. in place of James A. Turnbull.

**GREENWICH**—First National Bank; Horace Cathell, Cas. in place of J. C. Sherman, Act. Cas.

**KINGSTON**—National Ulster County Bank; C. M. Eckert, Cas. in place of Richard De Witt.

**LITTLE FALLS**—National Herkimer County Bank; Geo. A. Hardin, Pres. in place of W. G. Milligan.

**LOCKPORT**—Niagara County National Bank; Chas. M. Van Valkenburgh, Pres. in place of Ransom Scott; William Richmond, Vice-Pres. in place of T. E. Ellsworth.

**NEW BERLIN**—First National Bank; O. F. Matterson, Pres. in place of Charles B. Wil-

liams; A. H. Phelps, Vice-Pres. in place of O. F. Matterson.

**NEW YORK**—Bank of New York, N. B. A.; Herbert L. Griggs, Pres. in place of E. S. Mason.—National City Bank; G. S. Whitson and W. A. Simonson, additional Vice-Pres.; H. M. Kilborn, Cas. in place of G. S. Whitson; no Asst. Cas. in place of W. A. Simonson and H. M. Kilborn.—New York County National Bank; Charles G. Dale, Cas. in place of Francis M. Breece.—Mechanics' National Bank; G. W. Garth, Pres. in place of H. E. Garth; no Cas. in place of G. W. Garth.—Lincoln National Bank; W. A. Simonson, 3d Vice-Pres.—First National Bank; C. D. Backus, Cas. in place of S. B. Reed; Harris Fahnestock, Asst. Cas. in place of G. D. Backus.—American Exchange National Bank; L. L. Clarke, additional Asst. Cas.—Ninth National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of C. H. Imhoff; A. K. Chapman, Asst. Cas.—Second National Bank; R. A. Parker, 3d Vice-Pres.—Riverside Bank; Henry H. Bizallion, Cas.—National Citizens' Bank; W. M. Woods, Cas. in place of David C. Tiebout; no Asst. Cas. in place of W. M. Woods.—Central National Bank; William M. Woods, Vice-Pres.—Bank of New Amsterdam; R. R. Moore, Pres. in place of Frank Tilford.—H. Amy & Co.; Henry Amy, deceased; Ernest J. H. Amy, admitted to firm.

**NIAGARA FALLS**—Bank of Suspension Bridge; James Low, Pres. in place of Benjamin Flagler, deceased; Henry C. Howard, Vice-Pres.

**ROME**—First National Bank; Wm. R. Huntington, Pres. in place of J. G. Bissell; J. S. Haselton, Vice-Pres. in place of Wm. R. Huntington.—Farmers' National Bank; Geo. G. Clarabut, Asst. Cas.

**SYRACUSE**—First National Bank; F. W. Barker, 2d Vice-Pres.

**TROY**—National State Bank; Julius Hawley, Pres. in place of Thomas Colwell.

**WATERLOO**—First National Bank; James H. Haislet, Vice-Pres. in place of Norman H. Becker.

**WATERTOWN**—Watertown National Bank; James R. Miller, Vice-Pres. in place of Sidney Cooper; W. W. Rice, Asst. Cas.

### NORTH CAROLINA.

**SALISBURY**—First National Bank; W. C. Coughenour, Vice-Pres. in place of G. A. Bingham, deceased.

**WILMINGTON**—Atlantic National Bank; Andrew Moreland, Cas. in place of H. L. Hunt, Act. Cas.—Guardian Security, Trust and Deposit Co.; title changed to People's Savings Bank.

### NORTH DAKOTA.

**BISMARCK**—First National Bank; S. M. Pye, Cas.; J. L. Bell, Asst. Cas. in place of S. M. Pye.

## OHIO.

**AKRON**—Citizens' National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of Henry Feuchter.

**BUCYRUS**—Bucyrus City Bank; J. H. Robinson, Vice-Pres.; W. A. Blicke, Cas.; F. E. Donnenwirth, Asst. Cas.

**CINCINNATI**—National Lafayette Bank; S. R. Burton, Vice-Pres. in place of J. V. Guthrie.—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of J. P. Clark.—Fourth National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of Hiram De Camp.—Merchants' National Bank; H. S. Rodgers, Vice-Pres.

**CIRCLEVILLE**—First National Bank; G. G. Stouch, Cas. in place of W. B. Drum; no Asst. Cas. in place of G. G. Stouch.

**CLEVELAND**—Garfield Savings Bank Co.; capital increased from \$50,000 to \$100,000.—Dime Savings and Banking Co.; J. H. Kuzel, Asst. Sec.—Cleveland National Bank; Geo. E. Feller, Asst. Cas. in place of H. E. Green.

**COLUMBUS**—Bank of Commerce; capital increased from \$100,000 to \$200,000.—Merchants and Manufacturers' National Bank; capital increased from \$350,000 to \$500,000.

**DELAWARE**—First National Bank; no Pres. in place of Carey B. Paul, deceased.

**FINDLAY**—American National Bank; W. J. Burket, Asst. Cas. in place of W. J. Creighton.

**GENEVA**—First National Bank; Henry Means, Pres. in place of W. H. Munger; R. H. Munger, Vice-Pres. in place of Henry Means.

**GERMANTOWN**—First National Bank; John A. Shank, Pres. in place of Charles F. Huber; Charles F. Huber, Vice-Pres. in place of John A. Shank.

**GREENVILLE**—Second National Bank; Henry St. Clair, Vice-Pres.; no Asst. Cas. in place of John H. Martin.

**HAMILTON**—First National Bank; R. C. McKinney, Vice-Pres. in place of J. E. Hughes.

**HUBBARD**—Hubbard Banking Co.; G. M. McKelvey, Vice-Pres. in place of Samuel Kerr, deceased; E. C. Gething, Vice-Pres.

**LIMA**—Ohio National Bank; Wm. Roberts, Vice-Pres. in place of F. Ewing.

**KENTON**—Kenton National Bank; D. W. Sullivan, Pres. in place of Asber Letson; Thos. J. Cantwell, Vice-Pres.

**MCCONNELLSVILLE**—Citizens' National Bank; O. W. Gillespie, Asst. Cas. —First National Bank; Jno. D. Erwin, Asst. Cas.

**MECHANICSBURG**—Farmers' Bank; J. C. Seova, Pres. in place of John H. Clark; John Hodge, Vice-Pres.

**MOUNT PLEASANT**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of H. H. Ratcliff.

**RIPLEY**—Ripley National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of B. G. Blair.

**SALEM**—First National Bank; Richard Pow, Pres. in place of Furman Gee, deceased;

Frederick R. Pow, Cas. in place of Richard Pow.

**ST. MARYS**—First National Bank; Chas. H. Pauck, Cas. in place of L. R. Piper; no Asst. Cas. in place of Charles H. Pauck.

**TOLEDO**—Second National Bank; George A. Brown, Vice-Pres. in place of John A. Moore.—Northern National Bank; A. F. Mitchell, Cas., no Asst. Cas. in place of A. F. Mitchell.

**TORONTO**—Citizens' Bank; reported sold to Bank of Toronto.

**XENIA**—Xenia National Bank; C. C. Shearer, Pres. in place of John Little; D. M. Stewart, Vice-Pres. in place of John A. Dodds.

**YOUNGSTOWN**—Second National Bank; R. E. Corneliua, Asst. Cas. —First National Bank; W. I. Arms, Vice-Pres. in place of Wm. H. Baldwin.—Mahoning National Bank; Thomas A. Jacobs, Asst. Cas.

## OKLAHOMA.

**HENNESSY**—First National Bank; M. H. Norton, Cas. in place of M. W. Chammess; J. S. Wogan, Asst. Cas. in place of W. A. Rhodes.

**MOUNTAIN VIEW**—First National Bank; A. E. Kobs, Cas.; Herman C. Schultz, Asst. Cas.

**OKEENE**—Bank of Okeene; J. C. Fisher, Pres. in place of S. P. Richardson; Jacob Tautfest, Vice-Pres. in place of Edward Cox; Charles Clark, Cas. in place of F. E. Gilmore.

## OREGON.

**ASTORIA**—First National Bank; W. F. McGregor, Vice-Pres. in place of J. O. Hanthorn; J. R. Bennett, Asst. Cas. in place of E. G. Rogers.

**ATHENA**—First National Bank; J. J. Kirk Vice-Pres. in place of H. McArthur.

**GRANTS PASS**—First National Bank of Southern Oregon; J. C. Campbell, Vice-Pres. in place of James T. Toffs; E. E. Dunbar, Asst. Cas.

**PORTLAND**—Ainsworth National Bank; Percy T. Morgan, Vice-Pres.

**SCIO**—Bank of Scio; E. P. Cadwell, Pres. in place of A. J. Johnson.

**THE DALLES**—First National Bank; H. M. Beall, Vice Pres. in place of Geo. A. Liebe; Max F. Vogt, Cas. in place of H. M. Beall.

## PENNSYLVANIA.

**ALLEGHENY**—Third National Bank; R. H. Beggs, Pres. in place of Wm. M. McKelvy; Samuel McKnight, Vice-Pres. in place of R. H. Beggs.—German National Bank; J. W. Friend, Vice-Pres.; Albert Helm, Cas.; no Asst. Cas. in place of Albert Helm.

**BERWICK**—First National Bank; F. R. Jackson, Vice-Pres. in place of C. B. Jackson.

**BEDFORD**—First National Bank; H. C. Chamberlain, Asst. Cas.

**BERWYN**—Berwyn National Bank; John C. Acker, Cas. in place of J. Comly Hall.

**BRADFORD**—First National Bank; Geo. H.

Mills, Cas. in place of W. W. Bell; E. L. Adams, Asst. Cas. in place of Geo. H. Mills.  
**BUTLER**—Butler County National Bank; A. C. Krug, Asst. Cas.

**COATESVILLE**—National Bank of Coatesville; W. S. Harlan, Vice-Pres. in place of Joseph Beale.

**COLUMBIA**—Central National Bank; A. W. Rogers, Vice-Pres. in place of David B. Case.

**CORRY**—Citizens' National Bank; Eli Barlow, Pres. in place of A. P. Howard; W. C. Culbertson, Vice-Pres. in place of G. H. Barlow; G. H. Barlow, Cas. in place of Eli Barlow.

**DELTA**—First National Bank; H. M. Stubbs, Cas. in place of L. K. Stubbs.

**GREENSBURG**—Merchants and Farmers' Nat. Bank; R. A. Brandon, Asst. Cas.

**GROVE CITY**—First National Bank; W. S. McKay, Cas. in place of W. C. Alexander; G. B. Harshaw, Asst. Cas.

**HAZELTON**—Hazelton National Bank; A. M. Eby, Cas. in place of C. H. Linderman.

**LATROBE**—Citizens' National Bank; A. Jamison, Vice-Pres. in place of D. W. McConaughy, deceased.

**LEBANON**—People's National Bank; C. R. Lantz, Pres. in place of Joseph S. Lauser, deceased; A. H. Miller, Vice-Pres. in place of C. R. Lantz.

**LEHIGHTON**—First National Bank; A. J. Durling, Vice-Pres. in place of Dennis Bauman.

**LOCK HAVEN**—First National Bank; J. M. Peoples, Asst. Cas. in place of G. L. Morlock.

**JOHNSTOWN**—Citizens' National Bank; Chas. F. Kress, Pres. in place of John Thomas; Charles Griffith, Vice-Pres. in place of Charles F. Kress.

**MAUCH CHUNK**—Second National Bank; J. M. Dreisbach, Pres. in place of T. L. Foster; no Vice-Pres. in place of J. M. Dreisbach.

**MERCER**—Farmers and Mechanics' National Bank; John I. Gordon, Cas., deceased.

**MOUNTVILLE**—Mountville National Bank; C. C. Seitz, Vice-Pres. in place of M. G. Musser.

**PEN ARGYL**—First National Bank; William Turner, Pres. in place of Edward Werkheiser.

**PHILADELPHIA**—Independence National Bank; Louis M. Spillberger, Asst. Cas.—Northern National Bank; Herbert F. Gillingham, Vice-Pres. in place of E. T. Tyson.—Merchants' National Bank; Thomas W. Andrew, Asst. Cas.—Girard National Bank; J. Wayne, Jr., Asst. Cas.—Penn National Bank; H. C. Beitzel, Asst. Cas.—National Bank of Germantown; Romaine Keyser, Asst. Cas.—Equitable Trust Co.; reported increased capital to \$1,000,000.

**PITTSBURG**—Marine National Bank; George C. Burgwin, Vice-Pres. in place of D. W. C. Mills, Cas. in place of W. W. Bell; E. L. Bidwell, deceased.—People's National

Bank; D. E. Park, Second Vice-Pres.—Citizens' National Bank; H. C. Bughman, Pres. in place of George A. Berry; S. M. McElroy, Vice-Pres. in place of H. C. Bughman.—Duquesne National Bank; John Munhall, Vice-Pres. in place of M. Munhall.—Metropolitan National Bank; C. P. Tiers, Vice-Pres. in place of George W. Irwin.—Commercial National Bank; S. Bailey, Jr., Pres. in place of John W. Heron; John W. Herron, additional Vice-Pres.; no Asst. Cas. in place of L. L. McClelland.—National Bank of Western Pennsylvania; H. C. Burchinal, Asst. Cas.—Pittsburg National Bank of Commerce; J. H. Orr, Second Asst. Cas.—Tradesmen's National Bank; J. N. Pew, Pres. in place of J. T. Colvin; S. S. Crump, Vice-Pres. in place of J. N. Pew.

**PORT ALLEGANY**—First National Bank; W. E. Smith, Vice-Pres. in place of S. W. Smith; Samuel W. Smith, Cas. in place of W. E. Smith; J. H. Buck, Asst. Cas.

**POTTSTOWN**—National Iron Bank; E. K. Snell, Vice-Pres.; Charles M. Kurtz, Cas.; no Asst. Cas. in place of Charles M. Kurtz.

**POTTSVILLE**—Safe Deposit Bank; J. W. Fox, Sec. and Treas. in place of C. H. Hazard.

**READING**—First National Bank; capital increased to \$500,000.

**REYNOLDSVILLE**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of Scott McClelland.

**ROSCOE**—First National Bank; Herbert Ailes, Asst. Cas.

**SEWICKLEY**—First National Bank; G. A. Somerville, Asst. Cas.

**SMITHTON**—First National Bank; W. S. Van Dyke, Vice-Pres.; N. E. Rhoades, Cas.

**SOMERSET**—Somerset County National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of George S. Harrison.—First National Bank; George R. Scull, Pres. in place of Edward Scull.

**SOUDERTON**—Union National Bank; Allen G. Reiff, Pres. in place of Isaac G. Gerhart.

**TROY**—First National Bank; R. E. Van Syckel, Asst. Cas.

**UNIONTOWN**—National Bank of Fayette County; B. B. Howell, Asst. Cas.

#### RHODE ISLAND.

**PROVIDENCE**—Fourth National Bank; John D. Lewis, Pres. in place of Albert W. Smith; Arthur W. Claflin, Vice-Pres. in place of John D. Lewis.—National Eagle Bank; Charles Litton, Vice-Pres.

**WARREN**—National Hope Bank; Joseph W. Martin, Pres. in place of E. M. Martin.

#### SOUTH CAROLINA.

**COLUMBIA**—Carolina National Bank; Wille Jones, Vice-Pres. and Cas.

#### SOUTH DAKOTA.

**ABERDEEN**—Aberdeen National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of F. W. Brooks.

**HURON**—First National Bank; J. McD. Campbell, Vice-Pres. in place of F. W.

Coler; Coler Campbell, Asst. Cas. in place of U. G. Fowler.

**MITCHELL**—First National Bank; J. S. Daniels, Vice-Pres. in place of I. W. Seaman; L. J. Welch, Asst. Cas. in place of H. P. Beckwith.

**PARKER**—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of G. A. Archer.

**SIOUX FALLS**—Minnehaha National Bank; P. F. Sherman, Pres. in place of W. S. Caldwell; W. S. Caldwell, Vice-Pres. in place of P. F. Sherman.

#### TENNESSEE.

**ATHENS**—First National Bank; J. L. Emerson, Asst. Cas.

**BOLIVAR**—Bank of Bolivar; G. T. Ingram, Pres. in place of A. T. McNeal, resigned.

**FAYETTEVILLE**—Elk National Bank; Jno. H. Rees, Pres. in place of R. D. Warren; R. D. Warren, Vice-Pres. in place of Jno. H. Rees.

**GALLATIN**—People's National Bank; W. G. Harris, Cas. in place of Thomas H. King; W. G. Allen, Asst. Cas.

**JOHNSON CITY**—Banking and Trust Co.; capital increased to \$37,500.

**KENTON**—Kenton Bank; Walter Howell, Cas. in place of G. W. Reed.

**KNOXVILLE**—Holston National Bank; D. A. Rosenthal, Vice-Pres. in place of S. H. McNutt.—Third National Bank; C. M. Cooley, Cas.; no Asst. Cas. in place of C. M. Cooley.

**MEMPHIS**—Memphis National Bank; E. L. Menager, Asst. Cas.—Memphis Trust Co.; capital increased to \$300,000.

**MORRISTOWN**—First National Bank; W. D. Bushang, Asst. Cas.

**MURFREESBORO**—Stones River Nat. Bank; H. E. Palmer, Pres. in place of W. R. Hahnes.

#### TEXAS.

**AUSTIN**—First Nat. Bank; W. B. Wartham, Pres. in place of Jas. R. Johnson; J. S. Myrick, Vice-Pres. in place of R. J. Brackenridge; H. Pfafflin, Cas. in place of W. B. Wartham; no Asst. Cas. in place of H. Pfafflin.

**BONHAM**—First Nat. Bank; J. A. Abernathy, Asst. Cas. in place of Zac. Smith.

**CALDWELL**—Wm. Reeves & Co.; J. D. Howson, Cas.

**CORSICANA**—City National Bank; F. N. Drane, Pres. in place of R. E. Prince; no Vice-Pres. in place of W. F. Seale.

**GALVESTON**—First National Bank; Charles Fowler, Vice-Pres. in place of M. Lasker.

**HEMPSTEAD**—Farmers' National Bank; L. D. Amsler, Asst. Cas. in place of Thomas Johns.

**HILLSBORO**—Farmers' National Bank; W. M. Williams, Cas. in place of E. B. Hughes; W. L. Embree, Asst. Cas. in place of W. M. Williams.—Hillsboro Loan and Trust Co.; Harvey Peacock, Pres.

**LA GRANGE**—First National Bank; R. T. Bradshaw, Vice-Pres. in place of J. Lane.

**LAREDO**—Milmo National Bank; Geo. W. Derby, Asst. Cas.

**SAN MARCOS**—Glover National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of W. O. Hutchison; no Asst. Cas. in place of R. D. Joyce.—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of Hammett Hardy.

**SULPHUR SPRINGS**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of P. P. Tucker.

**WEATHERFORD**—Citizens' National Bank; J. M. Winston and J. O. Tucker, Asst. Cas. in place of C. A. Milan.

#### UTAH.

**OGDEN**—Utah National Bank; L. B. Adams, Vice-Pres. in place of A. G. Campbell.

**SALT LAKE CITY**—Commercial National Bank; A. H. Peabody, Asst. Cas.—National Bank of the Republic; W. F. Adams, Cas. in place of E. W. Duncan.—Walker Bros.; J. R. Walker, deceased.

#### VERMONT.

**PROCTORSVILLE**—National Black River Bank; Albin S. Burbank, Pres. in place of George S. Hill; George S. Hill, Vice-Pres.

**RUTLAND**—Baxter National Bank; Aruanah W. Hyde, Pres. in place of John W. Cramton.

**SPRINGFIELD**—First National Bank; C. H. Forbush, Cas. in place of G. L. Closson; no Asst. Cas. in place of C. H. Forbush.

**VERGENNES**—National Bank of Vergennes; F. A. Goss, Vice-Pres. in place of R. T. Bristol.

**WATERBURY**—Waterbury National Bank; H. A. Hodges, Vice-Pres. in place of J. H. Hastings; W. B. Clark, Asst. Cas.

**WELLS RIVER**—National Bank of Newbury; Alex. Cochran, Vice-Pres. in place of John Bailey.

#### VIRGINIA.

**ALEXANDRIA**—First National Bank; C. R. Hooff, Pres. in place of Noble Lyndsey, deceased; Thomas W. White, Cas. in place of C. R. Hooff; J. Johnston Green, Asst. Cas. in place of Thomas W. White.

**RICHMOND**—American National Bank; O. B. Hill, Cas.; Waller Holladay Asst. Cas. in place of O. B. Hill.

**ROANOKE**—First National Bank; Frank P. Hannan, Vice-Pres. in place of B. N. Hatcher, deceased.

#### WASHINGTON.

**SEATTLE**—Washington National Bank; Chas. S. Miller, Cas. in place of C. J. Lord.

**WAITSBURG**—Merchants' Bank; L. E. Johnson, Cas. in place of J. D. Laidlaw.

#### WEST VIRGINIA.

**SPENCER**—Bank of Spencer; Howard L. Robey, Cas.; will resign April 1.

#### WISCONSIN.

**HORIZON**—Horicon State Bank; D. C. Van Brunt, Pres., deceased.



**MONROE**—First National Bank; John Strahan, Asst. Cas. in place of Geo. E. Thorpe.  
**VIROQUA**—Bank of Viroqua; capital increased to \$50,000.  
**WAUKESHA**—Waukesha National Bank; Frank H. Putney, additional Vice-Pres.

**CANADA.**

**ONTARIO.**  
**BLEWHEIM**—Canadian Bank of Commerce J. L. Hubbell, Mgr.  
**HAMILTON**—Canadian Bank of Commerce William Roberts, Mgr., deceased.

**BANKS REPORTED CLOSED OR IN LIQUIDATION.****ALABAMA.**

**MONTGOMERY**—Josiah Morris & Co.

**ARKANSAS.**

**PARAGOULD**—Greene County Bank.

**GEORGIA.**

**SAVANNAH**—Hull & Lathrop; business transferred to Germania Bank.

**INDIANA.**

**HOPE**—Citizens' Bank; winding up business.

**MICHIGAN.**

**WALDRON**—Bank of Waldron; assigned to W. G. Boyd.

**MINNESOTA.**

**MINNEAPOLIS**—Nicollet National Bank; in voluntary liquidation January 10. Business consolidated with First National.

**OHIO.**

**LIMA**—Bank of Lima.

**RHODE ISLAND.**

**ASHAWAY**—Ashaway Savings Bank.  
**BRISTOL**—National Eagle Bank; in voluntary liquidation December 17, 1900.

**TENNESSEE.**

**LOUDON**—Citizens' Bank.

**WASHINGTON.**

**EVERETT**—Everett National Bank; reported will close.

**SEATTLE**—Twichell & Kelley.

**WISCONSIN.**

**STOUGHTON**—Department State Bank; closing out.

**Failures, Suspensions and Liquidations.**

**Alabama.**—Josiah Morris & Co., of Montgomery, an old and well-known private banking firm, suspended January 20. It is reported that the deposits are large, a considerable part belonging to the city and county.

**Arkansas.**—On January 8 the Greene County Bank, of Paragould, closed owing to a reported irregularity in its accounts.

**Georgia.**—Hull & Lathrop, a well-known private banking house of Savannah, went out of the banking business on January 2. They transferred their accounts to another bank.

**Indiana.**—The Citizens' Bank, of Hope, which was robbed some time since, is reported to be closing up its affairs. A new bank will be organized.

**Kansas.**—The Wathena State Bank was recently wrecked by its Cashier, J. F. Harpeter, who used a large part of the bank's money, and then committed suicide.

**Maryland.**—**BALTIMORE.**—On January 13 Michael A. Mullin was appointed Receiver of the Atlantic Trust and Deposit Co. It is alleged that some of the subscribers to the capital of the company have not paid their subscriptions, and that they are financially irresponsible.

**Michigan.**—The Bank of Waldron, owned by Charles Brandes, recently made an assignment.

**Rhode Island.**—The Ashaway Savings Bank closed January 14. Deposit liabilities are \$71,600, and it is thought the assets will realize this amount.

**Tennessee.**—On January 9 A. S. Henderson was appointed Receiver of the Citizens Bank. It is reported that the assets are more than sufficient to meet deposit liabilities.

**The American Surety Company.**—An examination of the statement of the American Surety Co., of New York, at the close of business on December 31, shows that this corporation occupies a strong position. During the past year holders of the suretyship bonds of the company received \$682,732.65 upon their claims. The company's business continued to be prosperous during the year, and it paid eight per cent. on its capital stock of \$2,500,000 and carried \$107,915.44 to undivided profits. Its capital, surplus and profits amount to \$4,453,290.16 and the total assets are \$5,354,285.87.

The company had to deal with 320 defaulters during the year, of which only seventeen were officers and employees of banks.

**American Bankers' Association.**—A member of the association from the South writes to the *MAGAZINE* under recent date as follows: "I am very much interested in the American Bankers' Association, and I think it will become a great power for good in the United States if it does not run altogether to the social features. While the social features are all right, the majority of the delegates go to the conventions for instruction and help in their line of business, and I think the business part of the programme should be predominant. This is, I believe, also the view of most of the delegates from the country districts."

## NATIONAL BANK RETURNS—RESERVE CITIES.

By the courtesy of the Comptroller of the Currency at Washington, the **BANKERS MAGAZINE** has been favored with the complete returns of the National banks in all the reserve cities, at the date of the call on December 13, 1900. These are published below in conjunction with the two preceding statements of June 29, 1900, and September 5, 1900. In this form the figures become much more valuable by reason of the comparison. In this complete shape the returns of National banks in the reserve cities are published in the **BANKERS' MAGAZINE** exclusively.

### NEW YORK CITY.

RESOURCES.	June 29, 1900.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 13, 1900.
Loans and discounts.....	\$548,724,656	\$569,578,050	\$544,871,588
Overdrafts.....	1,118,483	388,068	870,727
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	24,908,900	30,705,000	31,710,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	87,188,400	84,472,700	83,898,100
U. S. bonds on hand.....	4,098,670	507,340	532,300
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	2,764,853	2,199,157	1,858,224
Stocks, securities, etc.....	79,328,073	76,621,232	74,068,224
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	15,398,026	15,585,061	15,800,605
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	1,588,812	1,598,962	1,637,197
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	88,452,711	83,276,806	45,976,858
Due from State banks and bankers.....	5,910,212	4,775,568	6,461,171
Due from approved reserve agents.....	.....	.....	.....
Checks and other cash items.....	4,033,226	4,561,123	3,240,166
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	100,474,432	75,827,390	125,606,568
Bills of other National banks.....	1,181,320	1,074,917	835,809
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	78,519	73,736	85,923
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	6,699,399	6,322,193	8,991,881
Gold Treasury certificates.....	56,909,530	71,819,270	49,535,450
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	71,450,000	74,380,000	75,895,000
Silver dollars.....	71,736	99,523	87,898
Silver Treasury certificates.....	11,621,132	11,167,153	7,918,542
Silver fractional coin.....	682,172	688,229	699,016
Legal-tender notes.....	45,226,587	49,224,731	39,224,216
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	1,700,000	650,000	150,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	1,221,212	1,526,497	1,557,497
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	1,252,585	527,465	1,097,029
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$1,062,000,691</b>	<b>\$1,067,355,883</b>	<b>\$1,071,580,790</b>

### LIABILITIES.

Capital stock paid in.....	\$60,800,000	\$62,800,000	\$62,800,000
Surplus fund.....	44,630,000	47,390,000	47,390,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	28,622,553	26,962,781	23,957,102
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	23,369,035	29,351,015	31,055,890
State bank notes outstanding.....	16,542	16,542	16,542
Due to other National banks.....	240,185,797	260,010,232	226,148,939
Due to State banks and bankers.....	188,763,720	170,953,994	139,319,916
Dividends unpaid.....	255,542	122,470	91,366
Individual deposits.....	421,387,658	420,675,667	478,501,534
U. S. deposits.....	34,698,807	32,412,140	32,180,220
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	382,471	355,925	294,114
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	16,898,562	16,305,163	16,895,193
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$1,062,000,691</b>	<b>\$1,067,355,883</b>	<b>\$1,071,580,790</b>
Average reserve held.....	26.21 p. c.	27.94 p. c.	26.06 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$192,640,546	\$213,461,800	\$182,356,799

	ALBANY, N. Y.			BALTIMORE, MD.			BOSTON, MASS.		
	June 29, 1900.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 13, 1900.	June 29, 1900.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 13, 1900.	June 29, 1900.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 13, 1900.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$11,106,180	\$11,000,157	\$12,063,304	\$40,289,691	\$39,048,774	\$39,264,357	\$106,648,406	\$106,142,000	\$105,421,120
Overdrafts.....	3,756	12,416	4,804	28,922	28,570	53,133	95,746	97,628	45,144
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	576,000	690,000	690,000	4,000,000	4,197,000	4,297,000	5,611,500	6,232,500	6,977,500
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	285,100	282,100	282,100	2,565,500	2,494,000	2,567,000	4,476,000	4,176,000	4,181,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	.....	.....	.....	84,100	84,100	70,860	405,000	.....	68,000
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	11,000	10,000	10,000	180,218	127,991	107,228	341,897	408,740	109,574
Stocks, securities, etc.....	1,155,540	1,121,233	1,243,870	4,080,998	4,158,991	4,110,598	8,408,544	9,889,947	7,027,823
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	250,707	250,707	250,707	2,376,168	2,477,597	2,478,926	2,102,609	2,102,609	2,101,99
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	94,668	94,668	94,668	246,006	146,150	139,091	194,907	194,907	164,253
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	3,155,998	2,743,103	3,023,805	8,028,532	4,290,751	4,061,109	12,350,543	12,867,876	14,406,640
Due from State banks and bankers.....	2,003,983	1,078,126	1,011,575	856,974	642,002	620,767	2,182,249	2,096,778	1,969,624
Due from approved reserve agents.....	4,567,572	4,863,869	2,398,510	6,554,188	5,780,691	6,072,225	32,240,997	34,001,652	28,587,897
Checks and other cash items.....	39,476	46,971	45,914	600,770	165,073	106,730	904,170	485,255	427,817
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	110,442	182,762	114,067	2,478,433	1,798,377	2,525,307	8,422,122	8,422,122	12,003,944
Bills of other National banks.....	68,100	51,145	46,817	1,798,377	817,080	528,098	1,176,806	1,068,262	1,317,270
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	3,453	5,895	6,081	17,765	16,373	22,550	20,644	22,029	19,041
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	498,196	498,150	516,328	523,787	599,209	595,947	1,888,717	1,887,718	1,798,060
Gold Treasury certificates.....	443,000	870,765	897,000	1,091,890	1,091,890	1,204,930	6,297,960	6,978,180	4,984,070
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....	50,000	.....	1,990,000	1,990,000	8,715,000	3,816,000	3,816,000	3,816,000
Silver dollars.....	40,897	41,893	40,013	54,965	44,183	66,868	89,101	89,101	95,467
Silver Treasury certificates.....	44,955	41,122	43,841	1,672,017	1,299,691	1,322,937	3,233,141	3,081,298	3,149,701
Silver fractional coin.....	30,221	42,075	41,428	85,843	69,704	105,649	106,543	170,313	167,753
Legal-tender notes.....	817,966	991,164	775,942	1,822,960	1,503,170	1,598,063	7,324,869	7,967,298	8,908,066
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	.....	.....	.....	80,000	.....	210,000	370,000	270,000	160,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	35,360	31,950	.....	200,107	211,850	206,875	294,967	303,815	310,475
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	.....	1,000	.....	5	5	2,005	299,200	.....	521,255
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$25,206,751</b>	<b>\$23,890,615</b>	<b>\$22,898,407</b>	<b>\$75,113,133</b>	<b>\$72,513,299</b>	<b>\$73,552,216</b>	<b>\$272,280,799</b>	<b>\$274,123,443</b>	<b>\$267,578,476</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,550,000	\$1,550,000	\$1,550,000	\$11,104,290	\$11,104,290	\$11,508,280	\$37,400,000	\$37,400,000	\$37,400,000
Surplus fund.....	1,355,000	1,370,000	1,375,000	4,439,000	4,560,850	4,699,800	14,212,000	14,212,000	14,355,400
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	239,779	297,793	294,546	1,891,089	1,655,628	2,007,343	5,905,698	6,081,094	5,982,590
National bank notes issued, less amt. on hand.....	514,020	625,050	619,997	3,995,960	4,183,000	4,281,900	5,167,065	5,954,445	6,111,360
State bank notes outstanding.....	8,245,612	9,024,855	9,121,106	10,558,969	11,099,451	11,989,944	45,488,928	47,512,816	47,104,578
Due to other National banks.....	2,688,701	2,721,849	3,443,556	6,745,497	8,100,747	7,051,451	33,508,309	34,614,949	29,735,797
Due to State banks and bankers.....	2,439	1,247	438	100,313	78,560	59,084	15,276	15,276	16,450
Dividends unpaid.....	10,897,465	8,067,275	9,252,215	33,329,154	29,020,006	29,553,615	122,005,966	119,640,339	119,521,338
Individual deposits.....	221,264	205,849	201,359	2,588,095	2,171,299	2,203,574	3,791,524	3,847,041	3,768,846
U. S. deposits.....	.....	5,695	10,205	.....	45,500	.....	899,700	75,915	108,194
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	561,000	395,000	290,000	4,210,500	965,000	1,222,000
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	44,141	106,474	156,363	8,404,475	8,404,475	2,472,117
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$25,206,751</b>	<b>\$23,890,615</b>	<b>\$22,898,407</b>	<b>\$75,113,133</b>	<b>\$72,513,299</b>	<b>\$73,552,216</b>	<b>\$272,280,799</b>	<b>\$274,123,443</b>	<b>\$267,578,476</b>
Average reserve held.....	99,77 p. c.	40,07 p. c.	27,47 p. c.	28,80 p. c.	27,14 p. c.	28,80 p. c.	30,94 p. c.	31,49 p. c.	30,80 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$1,874,165	\$2,068,159	\$1,774,050	\$6,290,142	\$5,967,767	\$5,773,922	\$22,564,295	\$22,768,823	\$22,768,167

	BROOKLYN, N. Y.			CHICAGO, ILL.			CINCINNATI, OHIO.		
	June 29, 1900.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 1, 1900.	June 29, 1900.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 1, 1900.	June 29, 1900.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 1, 1900.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$11,728,701	\$11,145,981	\$11,589,575	\$138,759,575	\$142,087,182	\$130,473,078	\$30,198,358	\$30,390,988	\$30,098,908
Overdrafts.....	642,000	642,000	642,000	642,000	642,000	642,000	642,000	642,000	642,000
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	642,000	642,000	642,000	642,000	642,000	642,000	642,000	642,000	642,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	200,000	200,000	200,000	200,000	200,000	200,000	200,000	200,000	200,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	2,524,570	2,524,570	2,524,570	2,524,570	2,524,570	2,524,570	2,524,570	2,524,570	2,524,570
Stocks, securities, etc.....	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000
Banking houses, furniture and fixtures.....	53,507	53,507	53,507	53,507	53,507	53,507	53,507	53,507	53,507
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	80,400	80,400	80,400	80,400	80,400	80,400	80,400	80,400	80,400
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	303,383	303,383	303,383	303,383	303,383	303,383	303,383	303,383	303,383
Due from State banks and bankers.....	2,087,617	2,087,617	2,087,617	2,087,617	2,087,617	2,087,617	2,087,617	2,087,617	2,087,617
Due from approved reserve agents.....	335,966	335,966	335,966	335,966	335,966	335,966	335,966	335,966	335,966
Checks and other cash items.....	1,442,399	1,442,399	1,442,399	1,442,399	1,442,399	1,442,399	1,442,399	1,442,399	1,442,399
Exchanges for clearing-houses.....	166,739	166,739	166,739	166,739	166,739	166,739	166,739	166,739	166,739
Bills of other National Banks.....	18,068	18,068	18,068	18,068	18,068	18,068	18,068	18,068	18,068
Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	376,115	376,115	376,115	376,115	376,115	376,115	376,115	376,115	376,115
Gold Treasury certificates.....	295,000	295,000	295,000	295,000	295,000	295,000	295,000	295,000	295,000
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	200,000	200,000	200,000	200,000	200,000	200,000	200,000	200,000	200,000
Silver dollars.....	19,778	19,778	19,778	19,778	19,778	19,778	19,778	19,778	19,778
Silver Treasury certificates.....	635,166	635,166	635,166	635,166	635,166	635,166	635,166	635,166	635,166
Silver fractional coin.....	70,717	70,717	70,717	70,717	70,717	70,717	70,717	70,717	70,717
Legal-tender notes.....	835,049	835,049	835,049	835,049	835,049	835,049	835,049	835,049	835,049
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	32,100	32,100	32,100	32,100	32,100	32,100	32,100	32,100	32,100
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	32,100	32,100	32,100	32,100	32,100	32,100	32,100	32,100	32,100
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$22,898,194</b>	<b>\$21,153,324</b>	<b>\$21,423,719</b>	<b>\$383,342,063</b>	<b>\$375,749,135</b>	<b>\$355,712,613</b>	<b>\$97,975,636</b>	<b>\$97,322,881</b>	<b>\$97,843,063</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,322,000	\$1,322,000	\$1,322,000	\$18,450,000	\$19,250,000	\$17,250,000	\$7,700,000	\$7,700,000	\$7,700,000
Surplus fund.....	1,900,000	1,900,000	1,900,000	9,455,350	9,180,000	8,180,000	2,675,000	2,775,000	2,775,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	689,788	689,788	689,788	4,315,000	4,322,940	4,322,940	1,527,597	1,580,594	1,580,594
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	642,000	642,000	642,000	4,860,805	4,867,410	4,867,410	3,752,987	3,755,652	3,755,652
State bank notes outstanding.....	1,846	1,846	1,846	80,498,965	88,327,528	78,906,108	13,163,484	12,529,161	11,134,584
Due to other National banks.....	224,024	224,024	224,024	42,438,197	40,157,361	41,966,575	6,071,266	6,217,867	5,928,788
Due to State banks and bankers.....	5,088,578	5,088,578	5,088,578	62,819	6,689	14,061	2,879	2,662	4,194
Dividends unpaid.....	12,788,524	12,788,524	12,788,524	101,704,694	102,042,778	107,908,863	27,842,278	27,141,271	26,387,368
Individual deposits.....	171,918	171,918	171,918	1,472,904	1,227,123	1,198,283	3,886,408	3,778,294	3,782,083
U. S. deposits.....	15,640	15,640	15,640	116,407	116,407	180,964	.....	.....	.....
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$22,898,194</b>	<b>\$21,153,324</b>	<b>\$21,423,719</b>	<b>\$383,342,063</b>	<b>\$375,749,135</b>	<b>\$355,712,613</b>	<b>\$97,975,636</b>	<b>\$97,322,881</b>	<b>\$97,843,063</b>
<b>Average reserve held.....</b>	<b>\$2,800,000</b>	<b>\$2,800,000</b>	<b>\$2,800,000</b>	<b>\$28,311,000</b>	<b>\$27,351,000</b>	<b>\$28,356,000</b>	<b>\$27,771,000</b>	<b>\$28,000,000</b>	<b>\$28,000,000</b>
<b>Total lawful money reserve.....</b>	<b>\$2,300,244</b>	<b>\$2,300,244</b>	<b>\$2,300,244</b>	<b>\$24,776,150</b>	<b>\$24,776,150</b>	<b>\$24,776,150</b>	<b>\$24,776,150</b>	<b>\$24,776,150</b>	<b>\$24,776,150</b>

# NATIONAL BANK RETURNS—RESERVE CITIES.

291

	CLEVELAND, OHIO.			COLUMBUS, OHIO.			DENVER, COLORADO.		
	June 29, 1900.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.	June 29, 1900.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.	June 29, 1900.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$40,179,297	\$43,087,590	\$41,757,983	\$7,599,297	\$7,545,011	\$8,005,939	\$14,490,486	\$14,405,379	\$15,198,083
Overdrafts.....	37,901	38,182	74,515	11,921	7,633	12,139	159,012	145,137	105,644
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	2,883,000	3,188,000	3,000,000	440,000	500,000	500,000	1,490,000	1,490,000	1,500,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	500,000	500,000	500,000	270,000	270,000	270,000	900,000	900,000	1,000,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	40,000	21,550	800	67,710	68,800	84,310	84,310	84,310	62,550
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	41,000	41,000	41,000	80,800	80,800	80,800	111,000	111,000	87,000
Stocks, securities, etc.....	1,861,684	1,980,809	1,973,486	1,984,966	1,929,631	1,970,939	4,190,205	4,170,800	4,180,466
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	458,025	458,025	458,025	144,306	144,306	144,306	170,800	170,800	170,800
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	128,691	128,691	119,072	138,707	131,897	131,897	107,138	107,138	172,388
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	4,068,040	4,062,565	4,062,182	1,490,654	1,490,653	1,490,653	1,857,494	1,857,493	2,468,483
Due from State banks and bankers.....	7,743,940	7,743,940	7,743,940	1,084,198	1,084,198	1,084,198	2,223,497	2,223,497	2,468,483
Due from approved reserve agents.....	7,743,940	7,743,940	7,743,940	1,084,198	1,084,198	1,084,198	2,223,497	2,223,497	2,468,483
Checks and other cash items.....	186,048	186,048	186,048	121,229	121,229	121,229	8,597,418	8,597,418	9,127,000
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	316,785	316,785	316,785	176,277	176,277	176,277	485,000	485,000	485,000
Bills of other National banks.....	191,473	250,040	186,071	131,425	131,425	131,425	1,041,077	998,454	690,046
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	8,244	9,486	3,239	1,319	1,319	1,319	3,237	3,111	2,660
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	1,614,830	1,800,507	1,673,607	373,108	393,085	435,992	3,072,375	3,064,970	2,837,585
Gold Treasury certificates.....	620,510	761,380	721,000	117,500	84,400	82,000	433,000	445,000	280,000
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	107,106	184,535	104,002	50,530	48,701	73,905	134,132	134,132	65,053
Silver dollars.....	219,941	219,941	219,941	70,201	193,992	140,000	138,000	138,000	290,000
Silver fractional certificates.....	48,683	49,761	47,102	23,863	24,125	17,000	38,000	38,000	29,118
Legal-tender notes.....	2,438,486	1,963,073	2,170,386	864,781	663,786	700,323	1,063,000	1,106,000	1,023,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas. U. S. Treasurer.....	133,670	143,580	159,423	21,775	23,443	24,475	70,000	72,500	85,000
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	80,860	20,100	13,500	1,000	.....	3,000	60,084	1,434	2,884
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$68,513,087</b>	<b>\$68,300,572</b>	<b>\$65,381,468</b>	<b>\$14,000,416</b>	<b>\$15,237,986</b>	<b>\$16,138,780</b>	<b>\$38,864,377</b>	<b>\$41,307,157</b>	<b>\$41,421,750</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$10,168,750	\$10,400,000	\$10,400,000	\$2,060,000	\$2,060,000	\$2,060,000	\$1,700,000	\$1,700,000	\$1,700,000
Surplus fund.....	2,727,000	2,727,000	2,727,000	417,500	417,500	491,000	450,000	450,000	450,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	721,504	842,003	788,516	184,575	177,891	160,528	538,813	521,968	639,772
National bank notes issued, less amt't on hand.....	2,771,000	3,103,140	3,230,150	450,000	475,000	504,000	1,373,910	1,450,000	1,085,350
Due to other National banks.....	9,087,835	9,106,968	9,106,286	1,217,880	1,093,711	904,082	6,539,904	6,499,428	6,074,911
Due to State banks and bankers.....	7,987,899	7,242,870	6,944,133	1,490,072	1,511,235	1,527,807	3,061,479	3,239,133	3,463,060
Dividends unpaid.....	3,613	2,564	2,920	1,019	598	853	123	123	123
Individual deposits.....	81,242,475	82,973,322	30,184,614	8,313,916	9,183,430	10,083,727	26,237,068	26,318,454	26,812,351
U. S. deposits.....	453,438	425,809	411,735	245,291	238,812	230,148	238,643	163,064	167,408
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	20,504	20,504	24,318	4,808	7,758	13,432	643,057	517,080	437,907
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	104,401	86,948	131,680	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	28,000	.....	300,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	1,395,587	1,391,701	1,294,784	49,000	49,000	49,000	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$68,513,087</b>	<b>\$68,300,572</b>	<b>\$65,381,468</b>	<b>\$14,000,416</b>	<b>\$15,237,986</b>	<b>\$16,138,780</b>	<b>\$38,864,377</b>	<b>\$41,307,157</b>	<b>\$41,421,750</b>
<b>Average reserve held.....</b>	<b>81.10 p. c.</b>	<b>27.30 p. c.</b>	<b>25.66 p. c.</b>	<b>26.38 p. c.</b>	<b>26.36 p. c.</b>	<b>26.53 p. c.</b>	<b>43.40 p. c.</b>	<b>46.39 p. c.</b>	<b>43.47 p. c.</b>
<b>* Total lawful money reserve.....</b>	<b>\$4,085,407</b>	<b>\$4,992,599</b>	<b>\$4,903,519</b>	<b>\$1,514,116</b>	<b>\$1,375,301</b>	<b>\$1,463,688</b>	<b>\$4,770,259</b>	<b>\$5,173,473</b>	<b>\$5,017,155</b>

		DES MOINES, IOWA.		DETROIT, MICH.		HOUSTON, TEXAS.	
		June 29, 1900, Sept. 5, 1900, Dec. 15, 1900.	June 29, 1900, Sept. 5, 1900, Dec. 15, 1900.	June 29, 1900, Sept. 5, 1900, Dec. 15, 1900.	June 29, 1900, Sept. 5, 1900, Dec. 15, 1900.	June 29, 1900, Sept. 5, 1900, Dec. 15, 1900.	June 29, 1900, Sept. 5, 1900, Dec. 15, 1900.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>							
Loans and discounts.....	\$4,982,883	\$5,061,244	\$5,478,080	\$14,098,789	\$15,215,915	\$15,558,904	\$3,159,864
Overdrafts.....	22,061	30,051	33,795	17,991	6,582	147,366	276,022
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	375,000	385,000	405,000	1,450,000	1,450,000	380,000	880,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	350,000	310,000	310,000	800,000	750,000	.....	.....
U. S. bonds on hand.....	61,000	1,000	1,800	7,500	8,000	.....	.....
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	27,997	23,300	25,019	140,082	135,312	37,597	22,068
Stocks, securities, etc.....	195,527	205,049	231,427	1,573,251	1,822,168	23,946	23,946
Banking houses, furniture and fixtures.....	141,041	140,541	112,641	28,798	25,538	187,942	188,012
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	75,195	68,267	78,210	330,076	350,135	87,156	84,435
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	508,223	691,507	802,818	1,412,344	1,549,166	908,454	733,046
Due from State banks and bankers.....	48,137	45,121	75,125	458,886	475,390	1,557,798	1,006,517
Due from approved reserve agents.....	1,403,870	1,815,638	745,498	2,627,722	3,046,280	900,252	1,012,789
Checks and other cash items.....	43,337	15,024	9,814	27,819	23,503	28,582	8,877
Exchanges for clearing house.....	37,078	103,374	63,746	298,912	345,226	290,650	7,148
Bills of other National banks.....	31,129	64,056	74,851	233,234	297,222	297,635	110,067
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	2,315	2,777	2,245	7,585	8,064	2,357	8,174
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:							
Gold coin.....	146,000	141,504	123,765	922,252	1,076,522	1,157,757	332,020
Gold Treasury certificates.....	10,360	32,980	75,800	161,990	158,990	627,070	495,150
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....	.....	.....	106,000	155,000	70,000	.....
Silver dollars.....	40,319	23,644	44,847	106,847	84,678	77,547	86,244
Silver Treasury certificates.....	23,983	37,134	57,930	117,324	212,496	70,801	67,525
Silver fractional coin.....	14,929	14,219	11,753	52,001	59,003	23,987	32,004
Legal-tender notes.....	264,005	353,693	408,807	648,812	998,453	295,724	403,144
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	18,625	18,250	30,247	69,514	72,500	18,875	18,875
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	1,000	.....	3,200	23,495	15,080	5,500	.....
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$3,822,678</b>	<b>\$9,580,027</b>	<b>\$8,995,635</b>	<b>\$25,979,718</b>	<b>\$28,258,197</b>	<b>\$7,100,632</b>	<b>\$7,480,917</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>							
Capital stock paid in.....	\$800,000	\$800,000	\$800,000	\$3,300,000	\$3,300,000	\$1,100,000	\$1,100,000
Surplus fund.....	280,500	280,500	280,500	498,000	413,000	610,000	610,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	80,720	49,707	82,484	388,274	399,422	277,843	282,067
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	988,162	357,542	380,547	1,898,719	1,599,440	222,880	983,000
Due to other National banks.....	1,639,162	2,046,076	1,840,320	2,572,312	3,070,258	1,723,064	1,603,401
Due to State banks and bankers.....	2,794,246	3,178,046	2,689,074	4,943,118	5,076,618	212,386	178,193
Dividends unpaid.....	1,139	1,139	6,056	6,056	6,056	3,863	4,409
Individual deposits.....	2,301,712	2,613,773	2,613,773	11,988,686	18,751,297	4,118,494	4,364,121
U. S. deposits.....	295,454	283,713	283,840	687,478	623,373	.....	.....
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	12,558	11,756	11,869	68,678	69,317	.....	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	100,000	60,000	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	860	.....	.....	.....	.....	664	1,264
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$3,822,678</b>	<b>\$9,580,027</b>	<b>\$8,995,635</b>	<b>\$25,979,718</b>	<b>\$28,258,197</b>	<b>\$7,100,632</b>	<b>\$7,480,917</b>
<b>Average reserve held.....</b>	<b>23.61 p. c.</b>	<b>33.06 p. c.</b>	<b>22.32 p. c.</b>	<b>28.06 p. c.</b>	<b>29.53 p. c.</b>	<b>34.18 p. c.</b>	<b>40.92 p. c.</b>
<b>* Total lawful money reserve.....</b>	<b>\$499,556</b>	<b>\$602,823</b>	<b>\$730,902</b>	<b>\$3,108,344</b>	<b>\$3,741,730</b>	<b>\$1,394,814</b>	<b>\$1,408,067</b>
							<b>\$1,458,249</b>

	INDIANAPOLIS, IND.			KANSAS CITY, MO.			LINCOLN, NEB.		
	June 19, 1900.	Sept. 6, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.	June 19, 1900.	Sept. 6, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.	June 20, 1900.	Sept. 6, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$3,097,107	\$3,890,935	\$9,098,290	\$35,292,529	\$25,683,598	\$27,907,698	\$1,914,500	\$1,798,748	\$2,193,204
Overdrafts.....	669	860	707	454,862	731,681	712,042	25,662	24,424	13,913
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	290,000	290,000	380,000	1,721,000	1,745,000	1,745,000	290,700	290,700	290,700
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	1,900,000	2,087,000	2,084,000	978,000	964,000	964,000	60,000	60,000	60,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	1,976,760	2,153,890	6,140	98,000	94,000	93,000	1,040	1,000	1,000
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	124,814	124,804	64,262	22,885	22,885	17,487	17,664	13,600	13,600
Stocks, securities, etc.....	1,498,022	1,420,778	1,660,648	2,902,251	3,078,199	2,967,668	149,880	168,916	201,465
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	291,000	291,000	291,000	382,843	382,843	382,843	76,568	76,564	73,164
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	88,873	68,867	68,761	65,762	65,762	65,762	80,478	80,478	78,963
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	3,283,366	3,599,273	3,690,511	2,710,287	2,698,848	2,698,848	572,800	608,067	461,024
Due from State banks and bankers.....	1,104,005	1,081,708	1,113,862	3,698,008	3,721,223	3,721,223	178,445	186,375	186,375
Due from approved reserve agents.....	8,641,508	4,306,374	8,961,739	9,740,239	12,969,084	12,969,084	661,125	667,369	422,711
Checks and other cash items.....	32,605	40,744	32,849	69,843	69,843	69,843	19,066	34,977	65,408
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	245,138	225,612	427,029	1,265,907	1,063,049	1,063,049	19,660	19,440	19,440
Bills of other National banks.....	662,514	410,074	602,197	887,008	403,608	827,513	19,768	7,298	7,298
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	9,013	4,660	7,278	7,818	13,491	11,604	1,207	1,104	1,261
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	1,463,175	1,468,980	1,216,075	1,108,242	1,255,232	1,128,767	67,380	67,153	90,380
Gold Treasury certificates.....	700,000	708,000	1,080,000	887,920	963,120	1,060,000	25,000	25,000	14,000
Gold clearing-house certificates.....									
Silver dollars.....	66,233	54,176	99,027	147,385	153,053	197,417	14,296	13,968	7,798
Silver Treasury certificates.....	185,554	116,048	81,045	1,681,640	630,969	862,201	9,107	87	266
Silver fractional coin.....	33,662	23,621	32,568	53,603	33,623	54,238	8,997	8,004	7,580
Legal-tenders notes.....	581,200	462,000	452,900	750,069	773,685	1,213,660	108,460	78,724	87,400
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....				84,000					
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	11,497	11,497	16,497	86,660	86,775	87,290	12,586	12,586	12,086
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	4,666	4,666		20,000		25,513			
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$24,945,219</b>	<b>\$25,820,344</b>	<b>\$30,212,757</b>	<b>\$52,706,400</b>	<b>\$57,299,384</b>	<b>\$60,987,647</b>	<b>\$4,268,048</b>	<b>\$4,400,346</b>	<b>\$4,215,064</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$2,100,000	\$2,100,000	\$2,100,000	\$2,550,000	\$2,550,000	\$2,550,000	\$400,000	\$400,000	\$400,000
Surplus fund.....	1,100,000	1,180,000	1,180,000	710,000	713,500	768,500	84,000	40,000	44,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	400,382	359,179	489,421	682,708	793,220	890,480	33,108	25,924	37,734
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	224,960	224,960	1,720,000	1,720,000	1,724,050	1,744,650	250,050	250,050	250,200
Due to other National banks.....	4,400,902	4,713,996	4,580,428	14,943,040	17,039,564	18,745,927	602,159	693,196	590,988
Due to State banks and bankers.....	2,976,627	3,765,271	4,237,453	11,631,996	14,193,594	13,698,355	945,715	1,006,424	796,363
Dividends unpaid.....		423		757		423	34	66	
Individual deposits.....	12,086,991	11,780,173	11,500,341	19,532,149	21,774,480	21,774,480	1,943,475	1,939,184	2,060,297
U. S. deposits.....	1,597,782	1,601,182	1,611,022	830,452	804,265	776,201	46,500	45,500	45,500
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	74,583	166,180	290,089	55,296	37,111	63,628			
Notes and bills rediscounted.....									
Bills payable.....									
Liabilities other than those above stated.....									
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$24,945,219</b>	<b>\$25,820,344</b>	<b>\$30,212,757</b>	<b>\$52,706,400</b>	<b>\$57,299,384</b>	<b>\$60,987,647</b>	<b>\$4,268,048</b>	<b>\$4,400,346</b>	<b>\$4,215,064</b>
<b>Average reserve held.....</b>	<b>\$9,669 p. c.</b>	<b>\$2,856,880</b>	<b>\$2,901,640</b>	<b>\$62,706,400</b>	<b>\$57,299,384</b>	<b>\$60,987,647</b>	<b>\$4,268,048</b>	<b>\$4,400,346</b>	<b>\$4,215,064</b>
<b>* Total lawful money reserve.....</b>	<b>\$3,122,844</b>	<b>\$2,856,880</b>	<b>\$2,901,640</b>	<b>\$4,276,889</b>	<b>\$4,080,042</b>	<b>\$4,634,274</b>	<b>\$381,120</b>	<b>\$187,945</b>	<b>\$207,626</b>

	LOS ANGELES, CAL.			LOUISVILLE, KY.			MILWAUKEE, WIS.		
	June 29, 1900.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 13, 1900.	June 29, 1900.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 13, 1900.	June 29, 1900.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 13, 1900.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$4,254,686	\$4,339,485	\$4,708,680	\$12,757,210	\$12,752,160	\$13,618,857	\$21,084,706	\$21,085,731	\$22,110,921
Overdrafts.....	183,778	163,147	163,613	23,686	24,015	27,167	273,963	303,611	327,865
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	1,143,000	1,143,000	1,153,000	2,003,000	2,003,000	2,003,000	770,000	800,000	800,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	150,000	150,000	150,000	2,148,300	2,148,300	2,200,900	600,000	600,000	600,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	12,920	11,869	11,869	73,300	73,300	73,300	18,160	17,770	14,940
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	18,300	18,300	9,849	89,697	89,697	139,433	11,770	11,770	4,111
Stocks, securities, etc.....	321,718	330,111	357,682	2,550,310	2,455,590	2,453,767	1,390,855	1,725,222	2,004,562
Banking house, furniture and fixture.....	231,721	233,453	231,721	289,632	289,632	210,327	127,612	114,297	114,297
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	194,385	148,778	177,531	289,632	289,632	68,704	124,018	114,297	124,018
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	576,714	340,763	395,431	1,563,330	1,563,330	1,630,424	1,184,278	1,184,278	1,091,310
Due from State banks and bankers.....	183,362	41,083	68,971	1,248,741	1,248,741	940,918	1,171,528	1,171,528	1,091,310
Due from approved reserve agents.....	483,348	819,348	689,372	6,484,381	6,484,381	8,300,661	8,577,734	8,577,734	8,577,734
Cheques and other cash items.....	483,348	819,348	689,372	3,300,661	3,300,661	2,611,848	5,130,538	5,130,538	4,290,885
Exchanges for clearing house.....	63,362	194,778	138,719	184,743	184,743	153,242	388,705	590,530	590,530
Bills of other National banks.....	63,362	194,778	138,719	184,743	184,743	153,242	388,705	590,530	590,530
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	22,737	31,186	60,613	154,425	154,425	108,100	40,070	40,070	40,070
U. S. gold coin.....	1,360	1,466	1,146	5,575	6,123	4,080	1,063	1,063	8,569
Gold and money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	630,070	600,427	537,310	897,743	708,425	604,100	1,557,985	1,557,985	1,438,490
Gold Treasury certificates.....	25,000	27,500	13,500	215,000	200,100	124,000	680,000	680,000	675,000
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	10,000	60,000	10,000	164,000	164,000	124,000	680,000	680,000	675,000
Silver dollars.....	12,211	17,454	17,737	63,001	54,131	74,117	74,117	74,117	77,370
Silver Treasury certificates.....	13,729	29,262	69,813	69,630	31,072	48,414	89,173	89,600	90,000
Silver fractional coin.....	23,010	40,546	30,539	19,362	24,942	82,461	41,094	81,636	39,977
Lawyer's note.....	23,020	40,546	74,376	1,182,750	860,271	1,006,876	754,130	1,064,538	1,244,368
U. S. certificate of deposit for legal tenders.....	53,250	57,150	57,650	117,750	137,400	155,250	38,500	40,000	42,500
Five per cent redemption fund with Treas.....	3,900	.....	.....	14,000	3,400	12,400	.....	.....	14,000
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$5,642,170</b>	<b>\$5,636,360</b>	<b>\$5,108,877</b>	<b>\$29,365,831</b>	<b>\$28,423,080</b>	<b>\$29,314,706</b>	<b>\$33,724,537</b>	<b>\$33,682,597</b>	<b>\$37,451,438</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,300,000	\$1,300,000	\$1,300,000	\$4,945,000	\$4,945,000	\$4,945,000	\$2,950,000	\$2,950,000	\$3,250,000
Surplus fund.....	192,000	250,000	250,000	1,652,500	1,652,500	1,702,500	685,000	737,500	737,500
Undiv. profits less expenses and taxes paid.....	359,089	311,235	352,297	451,198	342,842	387,219	468,777	476,352	567,168
National bank notes issued, less un'f on hand.....	920,760	1,007,760	1,102,465	2,664,400	2,664,400	3,450,000	759,000	783,600	845,050
Due to other National banks.....	88,963	93,718	190,441	5,108,682	4,100,625	4,698,347	2,977,189	4,124,089	3,004,171
Due to State banks and bankers.....	409,879	275,901	422,380	3,851,029	3,851,029	3,362,135	2,770,310	2,561,767	2,769,697
Dividends unpaid.....	406	842	.....	2,809	10,680	8,417	80,267	876	840
Individual deposits.....	5,229,885	5,690,150	5,453,491	9,454,227	8,785,165	8,940,147	24,272,048	25,067,840	25,067,840
U. S. deposits.....	87,342	82,568	62,860	1,666,068	1,673,369	1,653,164	310,017	310,017	420,546
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	53,865	54,208	80,048	388,720	455,804	462,682	211,858	287,366	163,828
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	144,146	201,000	85,140	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$5,642,170</b>	<b>\$5,636,360</b>	<b>\$5,108,877</b>	<b>\$29,365,831</b>	<b>\$28,423,080</b>	<b>\$29,314,706</b>	<b>\$33,724,537</b>	<b>\$33,682,597</b>	<b>\$37,451,438</b>
Average reserve held.....	25.40 p. c.	22.35 p. c.	30.14 p. c.	83.00 p. c.	83.04 p. c.	28.46 p. c.	30.53 p. c.	30.53 p. c.	27.47 p. c.
• Total lawful money reserve.....	\$860,040	\$638,066	\$915,365	\$2,370,525	\$1,910,766	\$1,855,072	\$3,300,33	\$3,300,33	\$3,564,166



	MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.			NEW ORLEANS, LA.			OMAHA, NEB.		
	June 29, 1900.	Sept. 6, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.	June 29, 1900.	Sept. 6, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.	June 29, 1900.	Sept. 6, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$14,275,080	\$14,287,081	\$14,198,793	\$13,654,576	\$14,294,587	\$15,448,068	\$13,048,180	\$13,210,470	\$13,950,009
Overdrafts.....	10,906	1,573	9,170	587,108	444,544	1,502,988	187,188	187,466	236,433
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	772,000	772,000	772,000	1,100,000	1,410,000	1,410,000	1,675,000	1,675,000	1,850,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	300,000	300,000	300,000	450,000	450,000	450,000	900,000	900,000	900,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	600	700	600	11,600	4,440	40,040	2,880	740	300
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....				15,000	38,878	45,668	94,568	740	90,846
Stocks, securities, etc.....	1,076,179	1,117,767	1,164,384	1,718,760	1,908,148	1,878,228	1,878,228	1,878,228	1,878,228
Banking houses, furniture and fixtures.....	3,275	3,000	2,000	685,785	685,785	685,785	1,864,668	1,864,668	1,864,668
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	216,528	212,138	212,138	111,167	117,347	117,347	818,041	818,041	818,041
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	1,867,460	1,123,968	1,062,217	1,861,861	1,734,091	1,734,091	1,861,861	1,861,861	1,861,861
Due from State banks and bankers.....	681,067	2,075,280	2,075,280	1,302,741	682,902	2,062,127	1,861,861	2,062,127	1,861,861
Due from approved reserve agents.....	2,465,878	2,075,280	2,118,973	3,314,772	2,625,044	2,625,044	8,600,701	8,600,701	8,600,701
Checks and other cash items.....	41,063	63,566	42,968	22,069	35,666	29,068	294,366	294,366	294,366
Exchanges for clearing-houses.....	708,208	1,081,128	880,242	1,028,066	736,860	2,935,678	694,386	694,386	694,386
Bills of other National banks.....	121,566	87,540	103,966	32,864	140,225	48,064	267,018	267,018	267,018
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	6,617	4,887	6,971	93,864	140,225	55,261	6,864	6,864	6,864
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	778,665	778,665	698,485	142,805	182,825	144,072	987,465	987,465	1,018,210
Gold Treasury certificates.....	60,000	60,000	45,000	450,010	388,180	1,582,140	141,120	183,000	183,000
Gold clearing-house certificates.....									
Silver dollars.....	47,020	55,021	65,803	65,862	69,403	78,944	68,463	88,975	110,980
Silver Treasury certificates.....	29,280	35,760	38,560	883,689	1,023,965	1,023,965	228,610	272,001	297,149
Silver fractional coin.....	715,680	816,677	42,015	84,961	84,961	46,276	98,867	43,964	60,708
Legal-tender notes.....				1,149,186	864,061	578,286	1,868,706	988,446	988,446
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....				57,963	70,483	70,500	83,260	83,260	83,260
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas. Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	12,806	5,200	14,000	5,000	6,500	1,300	11,866	13,871	11,268
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$24,120,065</b>	<b>\$23,687,872</b>	<b>\$23,485,668</b>	<b>\$27,008,475</b>	<b>\$28,751,819</b>	<b>\$31,943,025</b>	<b>\$28,770,777</b>	<b>\$29,868,581</b>	<b>\$28,868,186</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$4,000,000	\$4,000,000	\$4,000,000	\$2,800,000	\$2,800,000	\$2,800,000	\$3,650,000	\$3,650,000	\$3,650,000
Surplus fund.....	647,000	687,000	687,000	2,640,000	2,640,000	2,640,000	411,000	411,000	410,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	297,280	265,655	328,548	580,285	581,562	715,032	214,215	148,533	242,834
National bank notes issued, less am't on hand.....	663,897	670,647	755,950	1,023,965	1,287,865	1,287,865	1,665,000	1,665,000	1,804,850
Due to other National banks.....	3,410,486	3,920,068	3,872,391	1,910,374	1,380,528	2,749,288	6,821,746	6,821,746	6,442,184
Due to State banks and bankers.....	3,183,081	3,080,122	2,772,804	1,838,534	1,584,005	1,584,005	5,069,869	5,406,546	4,549,824
Dividends unpaid.....	768	2,565	1,188	6,250	14,638	10,068	243	243	243
Individual deposits.....	11,285,765	10,507,430	10,381,637	16,981,837	16,340,228	18,884,524	10,919,755	11,439,949	11,439,949
U. S. deposits.....	255,906	287,161	288,056	388,077	312,351	313,368	622,253	717,068	651,273
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	20,867	9,224	28,015	.....	.....	.....	253,668	123,716	197,121
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	185,643	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	314,376	328,867	362,064	300,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$24,120,065</b>	<b>\$23,687,872</b>	<b>\$23,485,668</b>	<b>\$27,008,475</b>	<b>\$28,751,819</b>	<b>\$31,943,025</b>	<b>\$28,770,777</b>	<b>\$29,868,581</b>	<b>\$28,868,186</b>
Average reserve held.....	27.80 p. c.	24.52 p. c.	20.53 p. c.	83.74 p. c.	28.43 p. c.	27.98 p. c.	83.41 p. c.	87.14 p. c.	29.22 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$1,673,399	\$1,251,720	\$1,675,044	\$3,721,075	\$2,427,216	\$3,066,548	\$2,701,758	\$2,452,821	\$2,642,848

		PHILADELPHIA, PA.		PITTSBURGH, PA.		PORTLAND, ORE.	
		June 29, 1900.	Sept. 5, 1900.	June 29, 1900.	Sept. 5, 1900.	June 29, 1900.	Sept. 5, 1900.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>							
Loans and discounts.....		\$122,234,229	\$127,145,478	\$128,909,511	\$130,643,343	\$136,117	\$138,253,765
Overdrafts.....		31,037	6,862	66,903	46,317	73,064	100,560
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....		8,207,500	8,742,500	10,139,500	6,578,250	6,823,250	6,823,250
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....		5,088,000	4,488,000	1,453,000	1,453,000	600,000	600,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....		108,700	709,700	309,700	159,540	101,800	101,800
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....		510,330	543,174	310,839	306,909	120,515	908
Stocks, securities, etc.....		20,948,259	22,311,425	10,857,856	11,720,912	2,504,161	2,488,967
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....		8,797,509	8,720,635	3,676,790	3,691,544	93,507	216,549
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....		683,573	3,740,554	5,471,728	5,075,516	292,689	153,967
Due from National banks (not reservable).....		12,809,708	12,711,336	5,578,705	5,706,899	499,617	540,919
Due from State banks and bankers.....		2,331,222	2,381,703	6,433,961	6,411,715	153,778	153,778
Due from approved reserve agents.....		28,785,519	30,525,338	27,387,202	12,979,809	1,003,888	755,577
Checks and other cash items.....		1,867,785	1,218,097	1,333,208	323,977	41,475	28,552
Exchanges for clearing-house.....		18,217,658	10,062,963	12,891,781	2,949,241	43,145	55,016
Bills of other National banks.....		510,510	508,275	680,599	620,402	13,290	13,290
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....		49,478	60,141	20,555	23,324	2,104	1,133
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:							
Gold coin.....		1,629,519	1,822,757	4,102,670	4,081,417	908,815	908,785
Gold Treasury certificates.....		4,102,480	8,701,740	1,964,250	2,288,100	.....	.....
Gold clearing-house certificates.....		12,610,000	12,330,000	2,288,100	2,685,000	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....		236,285	251,462	241,880	243,571	4,776	9,100
Silver Treasury certificates.....		3,403,761	3,945,713	2,461,632	2,098,440	2,131,175	11,865
Silver fractional coin.....		277,149	280,816	116,629	144,119	128,228	18,287
Legal-tender notes.....		2,944,991	2,757,225	4,536,848	4,019,876	42,225	53,774
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....		.....	130,000	.....	.....	.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....		407,702	413,252	827,305	828,100	831,575	831,575
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....		43,120	94,080	24,889	120,905	31,250	31,250
<b>Total.....</b>		<b>\$231,874,139</b>	<b>\$231,096,797</b>	<b>\$136,853,700</b>	<b>\$136,550,289</b>	<b>\$10,271,446</b>	<b>\$10,129,084</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>							
Capital stock paid in.....		\$19,205,000	\$19,905,000	\$13,250,000	\$13,250,000	\$1,100,000	\$1,100,000
Surplus fund.....		16,710,000	17,275,000	10,142,000	10,345,000	175,000	185,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....		6,811,998	3,163,961	3,967,829	3,799,779	674,088	698,747
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....		7,922,892	8,131,022	6,443,842	6,557,162	625,000	625,000
Due to other National banks.....		52,534,434	55,590,647	17,392,614	18,065,653	953,726	997,596
Due to State banks and bankers.....		24,224,618	28,527,916	9,643,451	9,297,212	8,045,591	794,627
Dividends unpaid.....		108,086	40,613	47,259	58,986	619,704	632,408
Individual deposits.....		123,236,737	115,228,949	74,752,595	74,211,982	5,471,560	5,471,560
U. S. deposits.....		4,399,283	4,067,862	1,147,612	1,098,944	105,686	9,794
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....		.....	.....	178,378	128,614	441,807	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....		271,215	.....	50,000	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....		279,929	214,359	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>		<b>\$231,874,139</b>	<b>\$231,096,797</b>	<b>\$136,853,700</b>	<b>\$136,550,289</b>	<b>\$10,271,446</b>	<b>\$10,129,084</b>
Average reserve held.....		31.36 p. c.	29.07 p. c.	26.87 p. c.	27.38 p. c.	29.42 p. c.	27.87 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....		\$35,171,307	\$35,119,713	\$13,433,300	\$12,860,523	\$1,013,828	\$1,084,065
							\$1,705,058

	ST. JOSEPH, MO.			ST. LOUIS, MO.			ST. PAUL, MINN.		
	June 29, 1900.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 13, 1900.	June 29, 1900.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 13, 1900.	June 29, 1900.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 13, 1900.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$2,081,400	\$2,982,617	\$3,180,392	\$4,883,795	\$5,116,156	\$5,045,438	\$11,726,027	\$11,468,471	\$13,281,464
Overdrafts.....	10,141	15,270	9,397	188,024	188,024	188,024	188,024	188,024	188,024
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	214,000	164,500	164,500	7,200,000	7,200,000	8,800,000	648,000	648,000	648,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	100,000	100,000	100,000	8,828,000	8,828,000	8,828,000	812,000	794,000	777,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	85,900	25,000	29,080	115,800	15,840	270,600	18,000	17,900	.....
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	52,150	52,404	52,449	230,155	230,155	199,250	2,390,776	2,390,776	2,390,776
Stocks, securities, etc.....	72,000	72,000	72,000	4,799,286	3,812,000	4,031,780	2,494,117	2,494,117	2,494,117
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	72,000	72,000	72,000	757,000	757,000	757,000	639,543	639,543	639,543
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	350,118	853,405	605,165	190,474	185,728	180,616	204,968	204,968	204,968
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	105,953	111,946	109,086	11,762,402	12,441,708	17,660,412	994,112	1,060,450	1,060,450
Due from State banks and bankers.....	1,843,408	2,053,821	1,634,938	2,188,795	2,476,627	3,474,578	3,939,219	3,939,219	3,939,219
Due from approved reserve agents.....	85,498	87,065	59,744	157,396	135,557	145,753	81,401	81,401	81,401
Checks and other cash items.....	101,601	92,998	160,019	1,589,044	1,589,044	1,797,474	294,414	294,414	294,414
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	15,935	19,365	38,045	67,268	114,682	141,555	91,883	104,306	128,981
Bills of other National banks.....	1,398	832	775	6,785	4,842	4,062	4,084	4,284	5,245
Fractional paper, currency, nickels and cents.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	128,717	123,065	124,642	2,817,819	2,455,625	1,889,980	2,159,101	1,943,579	1,687,871
Gold Treasury certificates.....	84,700	29,150	30,020	3,218,480	3,608,250	4,907,400	45,620	40,480	40,000
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....	25,591	29,657	23,679	41,337	30,317	61,918	134,054	96,920	92,257
Silver Treasury certificates.....	208,689	221,937	223,193	1,268,156	1,613,896	1,209,288	88,722	92,658	141,518
Silver fractional coin.....	10,988	8,448	5,888	25,711	18,041	24,164	32,037	22,147	32,112
Legal-tender notes.....	184,376	176,678	215,466	5,154,242	4,317,016	4,443,177	364,138	294,015	383,960
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	.....	.....	.....	100,000	100,000	.....	.....	.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	10,725	8,225	5,700	331,162	360,000	367,101	31,100	32,900	34,540
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	1,200	2,500	5,700	1,300	19,380	22,400	22,540	20,890	20,120
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$6,473,668</b>	<b>\$7,130,397</b>	<b>\$6,794,744</b>	<b>\$38,000,198</b>	<b>\$36,625,069</b>	<b>\$104,457,561</b>	<b>\$23,961,024</b>	<b>\$24,570,008</b>	<b>\$24,900,430</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$350,000	\$350,000	\$350,000	\$11,400,000	\$11,400,000	\$11,400,000	\$3,800,000	\$3,800,000	\$3,800,000
Surplus fund.....	111,500	111,500	112,700	2,793,000	2,773,000	2,801,000	568,500	567,000	567,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	49,106	59,476	78,180	2,842,446	2,978,822	2,984,007	637,841	637,841	643,307
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	214,500	164,500	164,500	7,153,750	7,153,750	7,153,750	618,820	618,820	618,820
Due to other National banks.....	1,201,332	1,408,032	1,322,511	21,183,923	22,581,343	23,183,962	3,079,801	2,896,909	3,093,009
Due to State banks and bankers.....	1,069,711	2,061,154	1,846,418	14,552,930	16,679,141	16,667,719	2,865,462	2,604,561	2,518,890
Dividends unpaid.....	.....	.....	.....	128,171	9,895	9,111	.....	.....	.....
Individual deposits.....	2,758,323	2,689,717	2,683,043	30,254,736	30,810,866	33,891,151	11,730,723	12,875,313	13,098,449
U. S. deposits.....	88,597	85,697	85,818	2,861,600	2,782,356	2,749,800	438,753	438,753	443,753
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	807	807	807	.....	.....	.....	844,459	278,227	301,263
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$6,473,668</b>	<b>\$7,130,397</b>	<b>\$6,794,744</b>	<b>\$38,000,198</b>	<b>\$36,625,069</b>	<b>\$104,457,561</b>	<b>\$23,961,024</b>	<b>\$24,570,008</b>	<b>\$24,900,430</b>
Average reserve held.....	47.25 p. c.	49.37 p. c.	42.57 p. c.	23.20 p. c.	22.39 p. c.	23.35 p. c.	36.02 p. c.	37.06 p. c.	33.25 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$591,001	\$638,535	\$623,039	\$12,155,747	\$12,041,035	\$12,585,833	\$2,813,672	\$2,879,799	\$2,877,198

		SAVANNAH, GA.			WASHINGTON, D. C.		
		June 29, 1900.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 13, 1900.	June 29, 1900.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 13, 1900.
RESOURCES.							
Loans and discounts.....	\$18,491,882	\$18,423,782	\$1,548,509	\$1,664,090	\$11,441,997	\$11,719,479	\$11,986,618
Overdrafts.....	97,075	128,910	149,660	66	11,716	10,907	70,066
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	1,650,000	1,940,000	2,590,000	200,000	1,170,000	1,170,000	1,170,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	574,000	574,000	574,000	127,000	451,000	451,000	451,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	610,000	290,000	.....	.....	223,500	210,540	283,860
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	82,097	64,730	51,811	5,677	56,291	58,700	58,964
Stocks, securities, etc.....	1,283,556	1,263,556	1,353,842	33,356	1,060,569	1,094,408	1,087,709
Banking houses, furniture and fixtures.....	353,750	353,450	353,450	64,756	1,07,177	1,124,210	1,166,974
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	68,696	71,641	71,396	35,106	81,817	91,817	1,000,000
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	483,407	683,269	610,817	20,841	1,763,118	1,798,967	1,863,048
Due from State banks and bankers.....	3,508,946	3,657,733	4,380,348	21,835	2,707,232	2,833,361	2,924,096
Due from approved reserve agents.....	1,054,666	1,724,847	1,733,279	144,463	8,398,965	2,858,023	2,851,977
Checks and other cash items.....	849,843	291,856	89,067	413	236,945	191,110	363,034
Exchange for clearing-house.....	663,738	707,606	5,136	30,528	236,104	216,699	363,278
Bills of other National banks.....	40,885	85,285	6,000	42,540	12,869	4,565	12,623
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	1,021	1,110	2,571	816	1,452	6,865	9,466
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:							
Gold coin.....	2,991,897	3,017,895	2,900,340	19,000	58,785	178,987	98,481
Gold Treasury certificates.....	500,000	500,760	552,600	14,000	910,870	812,180	1,360,460
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	435,000	880,000	235,000	.....	.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....	44,191	53,179	52,864	9,400	5,970	9,366	10,361
Silver Treasury certificates.....	14,910	47,114	97,808	20,286	712,714	570,588	569,840
Silver fractional coin.....	44,317	38,734	62,497	26,700	32,633	19,646	4,382
Legal-tender notes.....	13,646	27,278	67,910	43,000	50,236	1,396,446	1,116,377
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	63,027	87,442	112,840	10,000	53,500	53,500	53,500
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	6,970	5,822	660	2	1,100	1,200	2,500
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....							
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$22,815,376</b>	<b>\$24,838,443</b>	<b>\$34,801,054</b>	<b>\$2,321,797</b>	<b>\$24,174,756</b>	<b>\$24,265,959</b>	<b>\$24,834,600</b>
LIABILITIES.							
Capital stock paid in.....	\$6,000,000	\$6,000,000	\$6,000,000	\$750,000	\$2,776,000	\$2,776,000	\$2,776,000
Surplus fund.....	2,400,000	2,475,000	2,475,000	225,000	1,821,700	1,821,700	1,821,700
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	925,327	763,424	1,118,022	102,018	89,225	713,862	735,442
National bank notes issued, less am't on hand.....	1,231,240	1,748,850	2,256,800	140,985	199,995	1,051,065	1,080,065
State bank notes outstanding.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Due to other National banks.....	1,218,731	1,496,055	1,114,241	183,432	866,948	296,442	858,591
Due to State banks and bankers.....	5,287,897	5,306,554	5,944,586	167,640	649,104	697,068	889,890
Dividends unpaid.....	8,482	10,610	6,725	968	3,243	4,468	3,678
Individual deposits.....	14,022,943	16,127,776	15,392,276	615,557	16,090,007	17,090,905	17,090,100
U. S. deposits.....	457,323	554,872	561,285	97,691	862,676	402,890	860,981
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	.....	.....	.....	30,475	68,788	25,805	55,211
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	43,000	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	500,000	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	388,541	323,399	22,116	47,580	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$22,815,376</b>	<b>\$24,838,443</b>	<b>\$34,801,054</b>	<b>\$2,321,797</b>	<b>\$24,174,756</b>	<b>\$24,265,959</b>	<b>\$24,834,600</b>
Average reserve held.....	29,37 P. C.	34.61 P. C.	33.32 P. C.	33.35 P. C.	34.91 P. C.	33.50 P. C.	33.50 P. C.
*Total lawful money reserve.....	\$4,043,871	\$4,564,960	\$3,690,019	\$128,746	\$3,661,866	\$3,678,108	\$3,165,870

# MONEY, TRADE AND INVESTMENTS.

## A REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SITUATION.

NEW YORK, February 2, 1901.

THE UNPRECEDENTED ACTIVITY AT THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE was the dominating feature of last month. It is difficult to realize that only a few years ago day after day the total sales of stocks were only 100,000 shares per day, while now the daily sales average 1,000,000 shares. Never in the history of the Stock Exchange was there such activity as on the three days January 4, 5 and 7. The first date was on Friday, when the transactions in stocks amounted to more than 1,800,000 shares. The next day being Saturday the Exchange was open only two hours, but in that time 1,150,000 shares changed hands. On Monday following the highest record was made—over 2,125,000.

While various rumors concerning railroad consolidations, most of which did not come off, caused the market to be strong and active at the beginning of the month, the great spurt in the market came when it was announced that Mr. J. P. Morgan had purchased the Central Railroad of New Jersey, which news reached the street on January 5.

Since the first week of the month the market has been less active, while as a rule the highest prices were recorded in the first few days of the month. This is true rather of stocks, however, than of bonds, for many of the latter were ruling at their highest prices at the close of the month.

January, 1901, unless there are to be new developments of a marvelous character, will stand forth as one of the great record-breakers at the Stock Exchange. The sales of stock during the month aggregated over 30,000,000 shares—the largest total ever made in any month. The sales of bonds reached nearly \$95,000,000, which total was exceeded in January only once before, in 1899. The January sales of stocks and bonds in the last twelve years are shown as follows:

JANUARY,	Shares of stock.	Bonds.	JANUARY,	Shares of stock.	Bonds.
1901.....	30,207,608	\$94,851,450	1895.....	3,237,077	\$29,206,900
1900.....	9,863,460	47,782,600	1894.....	4,585,064	29,128,700
1899.....	24,143,510	144,784,740	1893.....	10,557,341	48,991,500
1898.....	9,216,094	93,909,100	1892.....	9,833,228	66,616,300
1897.....	3,370,052	40,251,370	1891.....	5,495,769	43,124,800
1896.....	4,400,022	39,415,200	1890.....	6,372,075	45,083,200

The character of the stock market may be judged to some extent by the magnitude of the trading in individual stocks. We show here the stocks in which the sales last month amounted to more than 500,000 full shares:

	Shares.		Shares.
Atchison.....	567,000	Missouri Pacific.....	888,000
Baltimore and Ohio.....	505,000	New York, Ontario and Western...	923,000
Brooklyn Rapid Transit.....	1,059,000	Northern Pacific.....	1,435,000
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy...	701,000	Southern Pacific.....	1,346,000
Chic., Mil. and St. Paul.....	2,101,000	Union Pacific.....	1,709,000
Erie.....	1,332,000	American Steel and Wire.....	545,000
Erie 1st pref.....	710,000	American Sugar Refining.....	1,167,000
Manhattan.....	911,000	Federal Steel.....	862,000
Mia. Kansas and Texas pref.....	533,000		

The transactions were evidently well distributed and the preponderance of activity in railroad shares as compared with industrial stocks was most marked. In the bond market the same state of facts is disclosed. While in no industrial bond did the sales last month amount to \$1,000,000, we find transactions largely in excess of that amount in Atchison issues, Baltimore and Ohio, Central of Georgia, Chicago and Alton, Erie, Missouri, Kansas and Texas, Missouri Pacific, Northern Pacific, Reading, St. Louis Southwestern, Southern Pacific, Union Pacific, Wisconsin Central and Wabash. Of one issue of Wabash bonds there were over \$16,000,000 traded in during the month.

That industrial securities should be retired to a subordinate place in Stock Exchange dealings will not be considered a misfortune in the view of some leaders in finance. Whatever may be said of the real merit of many of the properties in what is known as the industrial list, there is a feeling that railroads are now more conservative investments than industrials, and to a large extent railroad properties are more entitled to confidence than they were back in the "eighties."

Of the general conditions affecting values the most in view the past month was the ease in money. Early in the month the Bank of England, to protect its gold reserve from a Continental drain, advanced its rate of discount from four to five per cent. This was an unusual occurrence, although there was a six per cent. rate at the beginning of January a year ago, but the Bank reduced it to five per cent. on the 11th, to 4½ on the 18th, and to four per cent. on the 25th. Five per cent. is an exceptionally high rate, higher than ruled at any time from September, 1893, to October, 1899, a period of six years.

Our own money market was not disturbed in the slightest degree, although foreign exchange began to rise, and two weeks after the advance by the Bank of England, on January 17, we began to ship gold to Paris. By the end of the month we had exported some \$8,000,000 of gold.

It is indicative of the strength of our financial institutions and of the extraordinary condition of ease in our money market that even in the face of gold exports the loaning rates for money declined, and deposits and reserves in our banks increased. Since the close of 1900 the most extraordinary changes have occurred in the condition of the clearing-house banks of this city. The following table shows the weekly increases in loans, deposits and reserves during the first five weeks of the present year:

WEEK ENDED	Loans.	Increase in Deposits.	Reserves.
January 5.....	\$7,532,400	\$16,780,900	\$6,814,400
January 12.....	4,042,800	14,386,100	11,844,500
January 19.....	22,841,000	36,451,000	13,971,300
January 26.....	10,493,900	15,635,800	7,451,800
February 2.....	30,440,900	32,494,500	2,163,000
Total 5 weeks.....	\$75,351,000	\$115,728,300	\$42,245,000

Increases of \$75,000,000 in loans, of \$115,000,000 in deposits and of \$42,000,000 in cash reserves in the short period of five weeks are exceptional, and in each case the gains have carried the aggregates to the highest figures ever recorded, loans now exceeding \$871,000,000, deposits, \$969,000,000, and cash reserves, \$267,000,000.

There were few events of any importance so far as affecting values is concerned. Several bills have been introduced in Congress looking towards the maintaining of the gold standard, but the prospect of financial legislation at this session of Congress is not particularly assuring.

Of greater interest has been the movement in the New York Legislature to apply the pruning knife of taxation to the profits and the surplus of the banks and trust companies. The Legislature seems to be following the directions of Governor Odell, and the financial institutions of this city are threatened with pretty drastic legislation

A sharp squeeze in the cotton market toward the end of the month gave speculation in that staple some excitement. The January option touched 12¾ cents a pound on January 28, but subsequently declined.

The completed returns of the foreign trade movement for the year 1900 invite a careful study, for the influence of our large export trade is far-reaching and is likely to affect the financial and commercial position of nations. Our exports of merchandise last year reached the unprecedented total of \$1,478,050,854, and in the last quarter of the year they were running at the rate of nearly \$1,800,000,000 a year. Prior to 1896 our exports never amounted to \$1,000,000,000, yet in the past year they were nearly fifty per cent. in excess of that amount.

Our import trade has also increased, the total volume of imports last year amounting in value to \$829,052,116. Except in 1892, when the imports were valued at \$830,490,141, the record of 1900 was never before equalled. In both branches of our foreign trade, therefore, the most satisfactory conditions have existed, and the result is a total foreign trade movement exceeding \$2,307,000,000 as compared with only \$1,501,000,000 as late as in 1894.

But it is the very great excess of exports over imports that is of peculiar importance. The tremendous balances which have been piled up during the last five years seem to require an explanation which is not afforded in any available data. Last year, for instance, we exported nearly \$649,000,000 more merchandise than we imported and \$26,000,000 silver, yet we imported less than \$13,000,000 of gold, leaving a balance of nearly \$663,000,000 to be accounted for. And that balance follows a balance of \$493,000,000 in 1899, of \$503,000,000 in 1898, of \$383,000,000 in 1897 and of \$311,000,000 in 1896, or a total of nearly \$2,354,000,000 in the last five years. For what have we exported such an enormous sum of merchandise and specie? That is the question which can not be answered with exactness.

A comparison of our trade balances in the last five years with those of the five years immediately preceding will show the revolution which has taken place in recent years. We show the net merchandise and specie movements for the ten years divided into two periods as follows:

YEAR.	Merchandise exports..	Silver exports.	Merchandise and silver exports.	Gold.	Merchandise and specie exports.
1891.....	\$142,188,703	*\$10,402	\$142,178,301	Exp., \$33,913,311	\$176,091,612
1892.....	97,498,705	4,825,618	102,315,223	" 58,481,079	160,776,302
1893.....	99,858,657	18,582,052	118,451,909	" 6,703,151	125,155,060
1894.....	148,786,907	29,453,259	178,272,566	" 80,628,082	258,900,648
1895.....	23,190,799	29,897,739	53,028,528	" 70,571,010	123,599,538
Five years....	\$511,518,361	\$82,728,166	\$594,246,527	Exp., \$250,276,633	\$844,523,160
1896.....	324,257,665	33,777,001	358,034,666	Imp., \$46,474,989	811,560,817
1897.....	357,113,816	25,578,990	382,692,806	Exp., 253,589	862,946,396
1898.....	620,581,818	24,955,724	645,247,542	Imp., 141,998,998	503,278,544
1899.....	476,500,561	22,617,808	499,118,369	" 5,965,553	493,162,816
1900.....	648,998,738	26,461,170	675,459,908	" 12,603,402	662,856,506
Five years....	\$2,427,452,618	\$133,100,698	\$2,560,553,311	Imp., \$206,748,733	\$2,353,804,578

\* Imports.

In the first five-year period our net exports of merchandise and silver were \$594,000,000 and our export of \$250,000,000 gold seemed to be sufficient to adjust any indebtedness that may have occurred abroad. In that period an average of less than \$170,000,000 net exports a year was apparently all that was necessary. In the last five years, however, we exported \$2,560,000,000 of merchandise and silver and received less than \$207,000,000 gold in return, leaving nearly \$2,354,000,000 unaccounted for, or an annual average of more than \$470,000,000. Compared with the

five years 1891-1895 this is an increase of \$300,000,000 a year. In the five years prior to 1891, however, the average net exports of merchandise and specie were only about \$41,000,000 and in the five years prior to 1886 only \$102,000,000. It is inconceivable that any other cause for exports of gold from this country now exists except such as arises from the ability of the United States to lend money.

An analysis of our foreign trade prepared by the Bureau of Statistics is available for estimating the future permanency of the export movement. While this country is still a large exporter of agricultural products, it has largely increased its exports of manufactured articles. Last year the exports of agricultural products were 62.2 per cent. of the total domestic exports while manufactures were 30.4 per cent. In 1890 the proportions of the two classes were 74.3 per cent. and 18.5 per cent. respectively. The following table shows the exports of domestic products by classes since 1890 :

	<i>Agricultural products.</i>	<i>Manufactures.</i>	<i>Miscellaneous products.</i>
1890.....	\$628,779,597	\$157,126,808	\$80,068,208
1891.....	730,085,335	168,000,912	58,653,458
1892.....	712,539,832	152,397,322	58,300,091
1893.....	619,050,547	177,419,288	58,267,966
1894.....	578,687,474	177,786,069	55,839,410
1895.....	545,715,881	201,153,663	60,872,871
1896.....	664,962,505	253,668,537	68,193,161
1897.....	730,294,792	279,616,896	69,922,606
1898.....	851,915,762	307,924,994	73,717,384
1899.....	782,133,405	380,787,891	90,011,048
1900.....	904,658,968	441,406,942	106,947,759

A similar analysis of our imports shows that there has been a decrease in the importation of food products and also of manufactures compared with 1890 while manufacturers' materials have increased. The following table shows the importation of foodstuffs and live animals, manufactures and luxuries and manufacturers' materials in each year from 1890 to 1900 :

CALENDAR YEAR.	<i>Food and live animals.</i>	<i>Manufactures and luxuries.</i>	<i>Manufacturers' materials.</i>
1890.....	\$259,320,704	\$290,730,040	\$282,839,094
1891.....	300,013,872	231,202,368	297,097,650
1892.....	287,388,897	251,427,254	302,115,304
1893.....	275,106,340	230,447,210	270,694,730
1894.....	263,542,858	182,740,855	230,028,391
1895.....	231,543,775	248,110,586	322,009,996
1896.....	234,183,741	196,980,754	248,411,644
1897.....	220,494,113	202,163,357	319,937,759
1898.....	187,829,802	188,751,322	258,353,333
1899.....	229,977,787	228,084,075	342,955,548
1900.....	219,329,205	244,545,532	335,144,600

## SILVER PRICES AND STATISTICS.

	PRICE OF SILVER IN LONDON.			Coined in England.	Exports to the East.	Imports.
	High.	Low.	Average.			
	Pence.	Pence.	Pence.			
1890.....	44½	41½	42½	£2,224,326	£8,575,713	£9,184,940
1891.....	54½	43½	47½	1,712,161	8,456,709	10,385,669
1892.....	48½	43½	45½	1,057,336	7,082,719	9,316,300
1893.....	43½	37½	39½	778,982	11,881,885	10,746,833
1894.....	38½	30½	35½	1,088,406	11,649,411	11,913,385
1895.....	31½	27	28½	822,492	10,041,162	11,005,507
1896.....	31½	27½	29½	1,187,000	6,484,953	10,669,652
1897.....	31½	29½	30½	1,329,570	6,897,015	14,329,116
1898.....	29½	23½	27½	941,886	7,222,397	18,082,091
1899.....	28½	25	26½	1,299,180	5,949,285	14,677,799
1900.....	28½	26½	27½	1,544,400	7,742,899	12,727,999
1900.....	30½	27	28½	2,077,020	9,985,642	13,322,300



One of the incidents of the month was the decline in the price of silver in London. During the last few years the normal range in silver has been from 25 to 30 pence per ounce. After selling slightly above the higher figure last October, silver has fallen to 27½ pence, touching the latter price late in January. Some very valuable statistics regarding silver have just been published by Messrs. Pixley & Abell, of London, from which we have selected the data given on the preceding page.

Prior to 1873 the average yearly price of silver in London was generally about 60 pence, nor until 1885 did it get below 50 pence, but in the last seven years it has been above 30 pence only once. England coins about \$5,000,000 to \$7,000,000 of silver a year, but last year coined \$10,000,000, the largest for any year excepting 1889. During the last five years England has imported an average of \$73,000,000 silver a year, and exported to the East \$37,000,000 a year.

During the year 1900 the total imports of silver into London were £13,82,300, of which £11,459,612 came from the United States. The total exports were £13,574,580, of which about three-quarters went to the East. The imports of gold into England last year aggregated £26,190,873, as compared with £32,533,497 in 1899, and the exports were £18,397,459, as against £21,536,052.

Since the January number of the *MAGAZINE* was issued the American Iron and Steel Association has given to the public the completed record of pig iron production in the United States in 1900. The result differs only slightly from the estimate which appeared in our last issue. The production in the last half of the year is now reported at 6,146,673 tons, while our estimate was 6,200,000 tons. This makes the output for the calendar year 1900 13,789,242 tons, exceeding the highest previous record made in 1899 by 168,539 tons, and the next highest record of 1898, by 2,015,308 tons.

There was a heavy falling off in production in the last half of the year, and while since November 1 the output has increased sharply, still the weekly capacity of the furnaces in blast on January 1, 1901, was nearly 44,000 tons less than a year ago. The statistics of production in the last five years are given in the following table:

	<i>Weekly output, Jan. 1.</i>	<i>Production 1st 6 months.</i>	<i>Weekly output, July 1.</i>	<i>Production 2d 6 months.</i>	<i>Production Year.</i>	<i>Stocks Dec. 31.</i>
	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.
1896.....	207,481	4,976,236	180,532	3,643,891	8,623,127	847,686
1897.....	159,720	4,408,476	164,064	5,247,204	9,652,680	874,978
1898.....	226,608	5,890,703	216,311	5,904,231	11,773,934	415,533
1899.....	243,516	6,289,167	263,363	7,331,536	13,620,703	68,909
1900.....	294,186	7,642,569	288,413	6,146,673	13,789,242	446,020
1901.....	250,351	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

**NATIONAL BANKS OF THE UNITED STATES.**—The completed returns of the National banks to the Comptroller of the Currency showing their condition on December 13, 1900, are of especial interest. There has been a most extraordinary expansion in this banking system in the past year. Compared with December 2, 1899, the number of banks has increased from 3,602 to 3,942, or 340. The banking capital has increased during the same time \$25,628,140 and the undivided profits and surplus \$39,566,712. The total capital is now \$632,353,405 and surplus and profits \$403,893,261. The total resources increased \$666,745,768, and now amount to \$5,142,089,692. Individual deposits increased over \$243,000,000 during the year and amount to nearly \$2,024,000,000, exceeding all previous records. An increase of \$248,000,000 is also shown in deposits due to other banks, more than \$1,000,009,000 now being held by National banks belonging to banking institutions. National bank circulation under the stimulus of the currency act of March 14, 1900, has increased nearly

\$94,000,000 in the past year, while the amount of Government bonds held by the National banks has increased \$84,674,680. The increased activity in the business of the country is reflected by the large expansion in loans, amounting to nearly \$27,000,000. The following table shows the changes in the principal items of the National bank statements during the past two years :

CONDITION OF THE NATIONAL BANKS OF THE UNITED STATES.

	Capital.	Surplus.	Individual deposits.	Gold.	Silver.	Legal tenders.
February 1, 1899..	\$608,301,245	\$247,522,450	\$2,232,193,156	\$321,915,796	\$49,927,699	\$137,143,066
April 5, 1899.....	607,262,570	246,169,894	2,437,222,420	317,210,532	48,952,020	130,055,423
June 30, 1899.....	604,805,327	248,146,188	2,532,157,509	306,368,008	47,464,068	134,927,905
September 7, 1899	605,772,970	248,449,235	2,450,725,565	291,612,561	46,958,802	127,754,651
December 2, 1899.	600,725,265	250,387,682	2,390,610,961	274,687,240	40,126,166	114,732,765
February 13, 1900.	631,064,465	252,899,088	2,491,847,035	289,381,232	50,196,522	136,966,468
April 26, 1900.....	617,031,455	253,724,596	2,449,212,656	267,683,828	60,367,240	146,198,063
June 29, 1900.....	621,536,461	256,249,448	2,458,682,757	295,121,378	60,892,531	146,950,522
September 5, 1900	640,299,030	261,874,068	2,508,248,537	312,158,312	61,170,088	147,131,493
December 13, 1900	632,353,405	262,387,648	2,623,997,522	301,619,990	58,062,234	142,134,945

THE MONEY MARKET.—Although about \$8,000,000 of gold was exported during the month the local money market steadily grew easier under the influence of the return movement of currency from the interior. The United States sub-Treasury has been making large disbursements also and the money situation now is very favorable.

At the close of the month call money ruled at  $1\frac{1}{2}$  @ 2 per cent., averaging about  $1\frac{1}{8}$  per cent. Banks and trust companies quoted 2 per cent. as the minimum rate. Time money on Stock Exchange collateral is quoted at 3 per cent. for 30 to 60 days, 3 @  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for 90 days to 5 months and  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for 6 months on good mixed collateral. For commercial paper the rates are 3 @  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for sixty to ninety days endorsed bills receivable,  $3\frac{1}{2}$  @ 4 per cent. for first-class four to six months single names, and 5 per cent. for good paper having the same length of time to run.

MONEY RATES IN NEW YORK CITY.

	Sept. 1.	Oct. 1.	Nov. 1.	Dec. 1.	Jan. 1.	Feb. 1.
	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.
Call loans, bankers' balances.....	$1\frac{1}{4}$ — $1\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{1}{4}$ —2	3—4	8—4	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —6	$1\frac{1}{2}$ —2
Call loans, banks and trust companies.....	$1\frac{1}{4}$ —2	2—3	4—	4—	5—	2—
Brokers' loans on collateral, 30 to 60 days.....	3— $3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$ — $4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —	4—	5—	3—
Brokers' loans on collateral, 90 days to 4 months.....	$3\frac{1}{4}$ —4	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —	5—	4— $4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —5	3— $3\frac{1}{4}$
Brokers' loans on collateral, 5 to 7 months.....	4— $4\frac{1}{4}$	5—	5—	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —5	5—	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —
Commercial paper, endorsed bills receivable, 60 to 90 days.....	4— $4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$ —5	$4\frac{1}{4}$ —5	4— $4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —5	3— $3\frac{1}{4}$
Commercial paper prime single names, 4 to 6 months.....	$4\frac{1}{4}$ — $5\frac{1}{4}$	5— $5\frac{1}{4}$	5— $5\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$ — $4\frac{3}{4}$	5— $5\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$ —4
Commercial paper, good single names, 4 to 6 months.....	5—6	$5\frac{1}{4}$ —6	6—	5— $5\frac{1}{4}$	$5\frac{1}{4}$ —6	5—

NEW YORK CITY BANKS.—Since the close of 1900 the changes reported in their condition by the New York Clearing-House banks have been without parallel in the previous history of those institutions. In the five weeks from December 29 to February 2 deposits have increased nearly \$116,000,000, loans \$76,000,000 and cash reserves \$42,000,000. Each of these items is now the largest ever recorded. The high record for deposits made on March 4, 1899, has been exceeded by \$55,000,000, the total now being nearly \$970,000,000. Loans, which reached \$825,000,000 on September 15, 1900, are now nearly \$872,000,000 and the cash reserve has reached \$267,-

000,000, exceeding all previous records. The surplus reserve steadily increased until the last week of the month when there was a decrease, but it is nearly \$25,000,000 as compared with nearly \$31,000,000 a year ago.

#### NEW YORK CITY BANKS—CONDITION AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

	Loans.	Specie.	Legal tenders.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Jan. 5....	\$803,980,600	\$164,827,800	\$67,059,800	\$870,950,100	\$14,150,075	\$30,982,500	\$1,591,518,900
" 12....	808,032,400	173,157,500	70,574,000	885,336,200	22,398,050	30,970,900	1,880,927,700
" 19....	890,873,400	184,632,800	73,050,000	921,787,200	27,256,000	30,973,200	1,730,045,400
" 26....	841,367,300	191,710,200	73,445,000	937,423,000	30,709,450	31,251,200	1,424,272,200
Feb. 2....	871,808,200	192,825,000	74,463,200	969,917,500	24,838,825	31,319,100	1,490,597,400

#### DEPOSITS AND SURPLUS RESERVE ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

MONTH.	1899.		1900.		1901.	
	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.
January.....	\$823,037,700	\$19,180,975	\$740,046,900	\$11,168,075	\$854,189,200	\$11,525,900
February.....	861,637,500	39,232,025	795,917,300	30,871,275	969,917,500	24,838,825
March.....	910,573,600	30,334,900	829,917,000	13,641,550	.....	.....
April.....	808,917,000	15,494,850	807,816,000	9,896,150	.....	.....
May.....	883,595,300	25,524,675	852,062,500	21,123,300	.....	.....
June.....	890,061,600	42,710,600	887,954,500	20,122,275	.....	.....
July.....	905,127,800	14,274,560	888,249,300	16,859,375	.....	.....
August.....	862,142,700	10,811,125	887,841,700	27,535,975	.....	.....
September.....	849,793,800	9,191,250	903,486,900	27,078,475	.....	.....
October.....	785,394,200	1,724,450	884,706,800	12,942,600	.....	.....
November.....	761,635,500	2,038,525	841,775,200	5,850,400	.....	.....
December.....	748,078,000	8,536,700	864,410,900	10,805,675	.....	.....

Deposits reached the highest amount, \$969,917,500 on Feb. 2, 1901, loans, \$871,808,200 on Feb. 2, 1901, and the surplus reserve \$111,623,000 on February 3, 1904.

#### NON-MEMBER BANKS—NEW YORK CLEARING-HOUSE.

DATE.	Loans and Investments.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal tender and bank notes.	Deposit with Clearing-House agents.	Deposit in other N. Y. banks.	Surplus.
Jan. 5....	\$32,981,700	\$70,704,900	\$3,231,200	\$3,990,300	\$3,984,500	\$2,034,200	\$543,975
" 12....	63,284,600	70,610,800	3,196,100	4,226,000	8,096,000	2,264,400	181,800
" 19....	63,080,700	70,291,400	3,123,500	3,974,500	8,172,500	2,718,500	416,160
" 26....	61,991,400	69,510,300	3,117,800	3,896,900	8,690,400	2,871,500	1,199,025
Feb. 2....	61,471,000	69,482,600	3,126,700	3,713,200	8,967,600	3,067,100	1,498,960

#### BOSTON BANKS.

DATES.	Loans.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Jan. 5.....	\$181,665,000	\$210,001,000	\$13,285,000	\$10,225,000	\$5,966,000	\$172,399,100
" 12.....	181,912,000	208,955,000	13,717,000	10,504,000	5,995,000	148,648,800
" 19.....	184,249,000	214,939,000	13,708,000	10,588,000	6,011,000	153,490,400
" 26.....	185,323,000	209,232,000	13,889,000	10,710,000	6,046,000	126,783,400
Feb. 2.....	186,046,000	208,380,000	13,671,000	10,372,000	6,111,000	123,399,792

#### PHILADELPHIA BANKS.

DATES.	Loans.	Deposits.	Lawful Money Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Jan. 5.....	\$161,218,000	\$194,667,000	\$55,920,000	\$9,432,000	\$105,999,600
" 12.....	161,942,000	196,425,000	57,562,000	9,423,000	109,860,100
" 19.....	162,770,000	200,846,000	61,438,000	9,818,000	104,702,100
" 26.....	163,932,000	199,020,000	59,841,000	9,972,000	95,148,800
Feb. 2.....	164,180,000	198,196,000	58,758,000	9,997,000	99,694,300

**MONEY RATES ABROAD.**—The Bank of England advanced its rate of discount from 4 to 5 per cent. on January 8 and the Bank of Norway about the middle of the month made a reduction from  $6\frac{1}{2}$  to 6 per cent. No other changes were reported by the banks, but open market rates generally declined. Discounts of sixty to ninety day bills in London at the close of the month were 4 @  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. as against  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. a month ago. The open rate at Paris was  $2\frac{3}{4}$  @ 8 the same as a month ago, and at Berlin and Frankfurt  $8\frac{1}{4}$  @  $3\frac{3}{4}$  against  $4\frac{1}{4}$  @  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. a month ago.

#### MONEY RATES IN FOREIGN MARKETS.

	Aug. 10.	Sept. 29.	Oct. 30.	Nov. 16.	Dec. 14.	Dec. 23.
London—Bank rate of discount.....	4	4	4	4	4	4
Market rates of discount:						
60 days bankers' drafts.....	$4\frac{1}{2}$	4	$3\frac{3}{4}$ — $\frac{3}{4}$	8 15-16	$8\frac{1}{2}$ —4	4
6 months bankers' drafts.....	$4\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{3}{4}$	8 15-16	$8\frac{1}{2}$ —4	...
Loans—Day to day.....	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$	3	3
Paris, open market rates.....	$2\frac{3}{4}$	$2\frac{3}{4}$	3	$2\frac{3}{4}$	3	3
Berlin, .....	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$
Hamburg, .....	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$
Frankfort, .....	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$
Amsterdam, .....	$3\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$
Vienna, .....	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$
St. Petersburg, .....	...	...	$7\frac{1}{2}$	...	...	...
Madrid, .....	$8\frac{1}{2}$	$8\frac{1}{2}$	$8\frac{1}{2}$	$8\frac{1}{2}$	$8\frac{1}{2}$	$8\frac{1}{2}$
Copenhagen, .....	6	6	6	6	6	6

#### BANK OF ENGLAND STATEMENT AND LONDON MARKETS.

	Oct. 17, 1900.	Nov. 14, 1900.	Dec. 12, 1900.	Jan. 16, 1901.
Circulation (exc. b'k post bills).....	£29,799,960	£29,444,385	£29,243,670	£29,119,315
Public deposits.....	8,532,701	6,764,212	7,966,866	7,033,553
Other deposits.....	40,961,805	39,344,495	38,984,069	43,714,740
Government securities.....	20,191,034	18,945,174	18,187,060	18,097,471
Other securities.....	25,764,069	24,812,112	27,146,784	31,062,744
Reserve of notes and coin.....	21,478,531	20,248,865	19,684,668	19,825,016
Coin and bullion.....	33,473,491	31,918,060	31,108,333	31,169,331
Reserve to liabilities.....	43 8-16s	43s 4s	41s 4s	38s 4s
Bank rate of discount.....	4s	4s	4s	5s
Price of Consols (2½ per cents.).....	98 18-16	96s 4	97 7-16	96 15-16
Price of silver per ounce.....	29 3-16d.	29 11-16d.	29 13-16d.	29 8-16d.
Average price of wheat.....	28s. 9d.	27s. 3d.	26s. 10d.	.....

**EUROPEAN BANKS.**—The principal banks abroad have increased their holdings of gold during the month. The Bank of England gained \$20,000,000, which about represents the amount lost during the last two months of 1900. Its gold reserve is, however, nearly \$15,000,000 less than it was a year ago. The Bank of France gained only about \$3,000,000 during the month, although the gold shipped from New York went to Paris. The Bank of Germany gained \$10,000,000 in January.

#### GOLD AND SILVER IN THE EUROPEAN BANKS.

	December 1, 1900.		January 1, 1901.		February 1, 1901.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
England.....	£31,852,021	.....	£28,541,263	.....	£32,663,378	.....
France.....	92,993,077	£44,487,621	93,532,213	£44,807,396	94,156,161	£43,620,947
Germany.....	26,5 3-0-0	13,678,400	28,532,000	13,693,000	24,520,000	14,708,000
Austro-Hungary...	38,298,000	9,814,000	38,325,000	9,905,000	38,400,000	10,156,000
Spain.....	13,374,000	16,390,000	13,983,000	16,374,000	14,101,000	16,568,000
Netherlands.....	4,378,000	5,551,000	4,373,000	5,602,000	5,023,000	5,575,000
Nat. Belgium.....	2,375,000	1,437,000	2,943,000	1,472,000	2,914,000	1,457,000
Totals.....	£211,221,096	£91,327,621	£208,817,476	£91,363,396	£215,712,439	£92,378,947

**FOREIGN EXCHANGE.**—As money became cheaper in the home market and dearer abroad the rates for sterling exchange advanced until they reached the gold shipping

point, and exports of gold from New York began on January 17. The shipments were all made to Paris, but at the close of the month there were indications that the movement was about ended.

## RATES FOR STERLING AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

WEEK ENDED.	BANKERS' STERLING.		Cable transfers.	Prime commercial, Long.	Documentary Sterling 60 days.
	60 days.	Sight.			
Jan. 5.....	4.83½ @ 4.83½	4.86½ @ 4.86½	4.87 @ 4.87½	4.81½ @ 4.83	4.81½ @ 4.82½
" 12.....	4.83½ @ 4.83½	4.87 @ 4.87½	4.88 @ 4.88½	4.82½ @ 4.83	4.82 @ 4.83
" 19.....	4.83½ @ 4.83½	4.87½ @ 4.87½	4.88 @ 4.88½	4.83 @ 4.83½	4.82½ @ 4.83½
" 26.....	4.83½ @ 4.84	4.87½ @ 4.87½	4.88½ @ 4.88½	4.83½ @ 4.83½	4.82½ @ 4.83½
Feb. 3.....	4.84½ @ 4.84½	4.88 @ 4.88½	4.88½ @ 4.89	4.83½ @ 4.84	4.83½ @ 4.84

## FOREIGN EXCHANGE—ACTUAL RATES ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

	October 1.	Nov. 1.	Dec. 1.	January 1.	Feb. 1.
Sterling Bankers—60 days.....	4.83 — ¼	4.80½ — ¼	4.81½ — 2	4.81½ — ¾	4.84½ — ¼
" " Sight.....	4.85¾ — 86	4.84 — ¼	4.85½ — ¾	4.85½ — ¾	4.88 — ¼
" " Cables.....	4.86½ — ¼	4.84½ — ¾	4.86 — ¼	4.86½ — ¾	4.88½ — 9
" " Commercial long.....	4.81½ — 82	4.79½ — 80	4.81½ — ¼	4.80½ — 1½	4.88½ — 4
" " Documentary for paym't.....	4.81½ — ¼	4.79½ — 80½	4.80½ — 2½	4.80½ — 82	4.83½ — 4
Paris—Cable transfers.....	5.16½ — ¼	5.17½ — ¼	5.16½ — ¼	5.15½ — ¼	5.14½ — ¼
" Bankers' 60 days.....	5.20 — 2-18	5.21½ — ¼	5.20½ — 1-18	5.20 — 19½	5.18½ — 17½
" Bankers' sight.....	5.17½ — 16½	5.18½ — ¼	5.17½ — 16½	5.16½ — 16½	5.15½ — 1-18
Swiss—Bankers' sight.....	5.18½ — 16½	5.20 — 19½	5.19½ — 18½	5.19½ — 18½	5.18½ — 17½
Berlin—Bankers' 60 days.....	94 — ¼	94 — 1-18	94 — ¼	94 — ¼	94½ — ¼
" Bankers' sight.....	94½ — 95	94½ — ¼	94½ — ¼	95 — ¾	95½ — ¼
Belgium—Bankers' sight.....	5.18½ — ¼	5.19½ — ¼	5.17½ — 18½	5.17½ — ¼	5.16½ — 15½
Amsterdam—Bankers' sight.....	40½ — 3-16	40 — 1-16	40½ — ¼	40½ — 3-16	40 — ¼
Kroners—Bankers' sight.....	26½ — ¾	26½ — ¾	26½ — ¾	26½ — ¾	26½ — ¾
Italian lire—sight.....	5.51½ — 48½	5.48½ — 46½	5.45 — 42½	5.43½ — 41½	5.45 — 42½

GOLD AND SILVER COINAGE.—The mints coined in January \$12,657,200 gold, and \$2,713,000 silver, of which latter \$2,198,000 was in standard silver dollars. The minor coinage amounted to \$153,480.

## COINAGE OF THE UNITED STATES.

	1899.		1900.		1901.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
January.....	\$18,032,000	\$1,642,000	\$11,515,000	\$2,364,161	\$12,657,200	\$2,713,000
February.....	14,848,800	1,508,000	13,401,900	1,940,000	.....	.....
March.....	12,176,715	2,348,557	12,596,240	4,341,376	.....	.....
April.....	7,894,475	2,159,449	12,922,000	3,930,000	.....	.....
May.....	4,803,400	2,879,416	8,252,000	3,171,000	.....	.....
June.....	8,159,630	2,155,019	3,820,770	2,004,217	.....	.....
July.....	5,981,500	794,000	6,540,000	1,827,827	.....	.....
August.....	10,253,100	2,233,636	5,050,000	2,538,200	.....	.....
September.....	6,890,947	2,441,268	2,293,335	3,932,185	.....	.....
October.....	8,220,000	3,313,569	5,120,000	4,148,000	.....	.....
November.....	6,643,730	2,612,000	13,185,000	3,130,000	.....	.....
December.....	7,469,952	1,886,605	4,576,697	2,880,555	.....	.....
Year.....	\$111,344,220	\$26,061,519	\$99,272,942	\$36,295,321	\$12,657,200	\$2,713,000

## FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COIN AND BULLION—QUOTATIONS IN NEW YORK.

	Bid.	Asked.		Bid.	Asked.
Trade dollars.....	\$ .60	\$ .70	Twenty marks.....	\$4.73	\$4.76
Mexican dollars.....	.. 47	.. 50	Spanish doubloons.....	15.50	15.70
Peruvian soles, Chilean pesos..	.. 43	.. 46½	Spanish 25 pesos.....	4.78	4.80
English silver.....	4.82	4.87	Mexican doubloons.....	15.50	15.70
Victoria sovereigns.....	4.85	4.87	Mexican 20 pesos.....	19.53	19.58
Five francs.....	.. 93	.. 98	Ten guilders.....	8.96	4.02
Twenty francs.....	3.84	3.86			

Fine gold bars on the first of this month were at par to ¼ per cent. premium on the Mint value. Bar silver in London, 37 15-16 d. per ounce. New York market for large commercial silver bars, 60½ @ 62½c. Fine silver (Government assay), 60½ @ 62½c. Official price, 60½c.

**SILVER.**—There was a considerable decline in the silver market in London last month, the price falling as low as 27½d. per ounce late in the month. The final price was 27 15-16d., a net decline for the month of 1½d. The price reached is the lowest since August, 1900.

**MONTHLY RANGE OF SILVER IN LONDON—1898, 1899, 1900.**

MONTH.	1899.		1900.		1901.		MONTH.	1899.		1900.		1901.	
	High	Low.	High	Low.	High	Low.		High	Low.	High	Low.	High	Low.
January..	27½	27¼	27½	27	26½	27½	July.....	27½	27½	28½	27½	...	...
February..	27½	27½	27½	27½	...	...	August....	27½	27½	28½	27½	...	...
March.....	27½	27½	27½	27½	...	...	Septemb'r	27½	28½	28½	28½	...	...
April.....	28½	27½	27½	27½	...	...	October...	28½	28½	30½	28½	...	...
May.....	28½	28	27½	27½	...	...	Novemb'r	27½	28½	28½	28½	...	...
June.....	28	27½	28½	27½	...	...	Decemb'r	27½	28½	29½	28½	...	...

**UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.**—The only significant feature of the public debt statement for January is the increase of \$26,000,000 in the new two per cent. bonds outstanding which take the place of \$17,000,000 four cents of 1907, of \$4,000,000 five per cents of 1904 and \$5,000,000 three per cents of 1908. The refunding has now ceased, and the further retirement of the old issues will probably be by purchase as the Treasury accumulates a surplus. The net debt decreased \$4,600,000 last month.

**UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.**

	Jan. 1, 1900.	Dec. 1, 1900.	Jan. 1, 1901.	Feb. 1, 1901.
<b>Interest bearing debt:</b>				
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	\$25,364,500			
Loan of March 14, 1900, 2 per cent.....		\$364,943,750	\$419,879,750	\$445,890,650
Funded loan of 1907, 4.....	545,886,650	325,567,650	287,578,100	270,406,100
Refunding certificates, 4 per cent.....	37,170	84,410	84,380	83,770
Loan of 1904, 5 per cent.....	95,009,700	81,937,600	26,992,100	22,999,400
1905, 4.....	162,815,400	162,815,400	162,815,400	162,815,400
Ten-Twenties of 1898, 8 per cent.....	198,679,000	116,700,940	104,900,040	99,915,940
<b>Total interest-bearing debt.....</b>	<b>\$1,026,772,320</b>	<b>\$1,001,499,750</b>	<b>\$1,001,499,770</b>	<b>\$1,001,500,290</b>
Debt on which interest has ceased.....	1,308,500	3,081,410	2,654,070	2,023,190
<b>Debt bearing no interest:</b>				
Legal tender and old demand notes.....	346,734,863	346,734,863	346,734,863	346,734,863
National bank note redemption acct.....	36,299,218	32,157,232	31,581,532	30,472,127
Fractional currency.....	6,890,558	6,878,410	6,878,410	6,878,410
<b>Total non-interest bearing debt.....</b>	<b>\$399,914,640</b>	<b>\$385,770,506</b>	<b>\$385,144,806</b>	<b>\$384,065,400</b>
<b>Total interest and non-interest debt.</b>	<b>1,417,896,460</b>	<b>1,389,261,666</b>	<b>1,389,296,646</b>	<b>1,387,606,851</b>
<b>Certificates and notes offset by cash in the Treasury:</b>				
Gold certificates.....	184,844,619	254,007,379	263,629,379	275,697,279
Silver .....	401,484,504	425,374,000	427,426,000	428,597,000
Certificates of deposit.....	12,350,000	1,600,000	1,500,000	985,000
Treasury notes of 1890.....	88,320,280	63,448,000	61,397,000	58,278,000
<b>Total certificates and notes.....</b>	<b>\$686,979,403</b>	<b>\$744,519,379</b>	<b>\$754,012,379</b>	<b>\$763,537,279</b>
<b>Aggregate debt.....</b>	<b>2,104,874,863</b>	<b>2,134,871,045</b>	<b>2,143,311,025</b>	<b>2,151,146,130</b>
<b>Cash in the Treasury:</b>				
Total cash assets.....	1,048,006,042	1,114,451,967	1,181,271,552	1,134,472,931
Demand liabilities.....	764,410,589	825,275,176	841,164,216	841,459,958
<b>Balance.....</b>	<b>\$283,595,453</b>	<b>\$289,176,791</b>	<b>\$290,107,336</b>	<b>\$298,012,973</b>
Gold reserve.....	100,000,000	150,000,000	150,000,000	150,000,000
Net cash balance.....	183,595,453	139,176,791	140,107,336	143,012,973
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$283,595,453</b>	<b>\$289,176,791</b>	<b>\$290,107,336</b>	<b>\$298,012,973</b>
<b>Total debt, less cash in the Treasury.</b>	<b>1,134,300,007</b>	<b>1,101,174,875</b>	<b>1,099,191,310</b>	<b>1,094,596,878</b>

**FOREIGN TRADE.**—The Bureau of Statistics has published the foreign trade statistics for the month of December 1900 and the calendar year. They show that the exports of merchandise in December were the largest of any month except October last and the total for the year exceeds that of every other year. The year's export movement aggregated \$1,478,050,854 while the imports were \$829,052,116

leaving a balance of net exports of nearly \$849,000,000. Besides this we exported net nearly \$26,500,000 of silver and imported less than \$18,000,000 of gold, making the net exports of merchandise and specie nearly \$668,000,000. In no other year has there been anything to compare with this remarkable record.

EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

MONTH OF DECEMBER.	MERCHANDISE.			Gold Balance.	Silver Balance.
	Exports.	Imports.	Balance.		
1895.....	\$92,529,117	\$62,201,047	Exp., \$30,328,070	Exp., \$14,067,638	Exp., \$2,694,376
1896.....	117,185,026	58,980,660	" 58,205,266	Imp., 2,369,218	" 3,935,187
1897.....	125,053,961	51,505,963	" 73,547,998	" 2,004,409	" 3,081,744
1898.....	137,850,594	55,139,139	" 82,711,455	" 7,537,544	" 2,618,245
1899.....	123,208,033	70,733,843	" 52,534,190	Exp., 6,237,265	" 2,674,695
1900.....	145,994,606	68,599,609	" 77,394,997	Imp., 2,965,519	" 4,343,781
TWELVE MONTHS.					
1895.....	824,860,136	801,609,347	Exp., 23,190,789	Exp., 70,571,010	Exp., 29,837,739
1896.....	1,005,837,241	681,579,556	" 324,257,685	Imp., 46,474,369	" 33,777,001
1897.....	1,099,709,045	742,595,229	" 357,113,816	Exp., 253,589	" 25,578,990
1898.....	1,255,546,266	634,964,448	" 620,581,818	Imp., 141,968,998	" 24,665,724
1899.....	1,275,467,971	798,967,410	" 476,500,561	" 5,955,553	" 22,617,808
1900.....	1,478,050,854	829,052,116	" 648,998,738	" 12,603,402	" 26,461,170

GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND DISBURSEMENTS.—The receipts of the Government in January were \$47,520,287, about \$700,000 more than in December, and \$500,000 less than in January, 1900. The expenditures were \$40,109,707, or about the same as in December, but \$1,000,000 less than a year ago. The surplus for the month is \$7,410,580, or \$1,400,000 less than for the corresponding month last year. For the seven months ended January 31 the revenues were \$339,381,862, an increase of \$6,500,000 over those of the previous year, while the disbursements were \$313,176,643, an increase of \$10,000,000, or almost exactly the increase in civil and miscellaneous. The surplus for the seven months is \$26,205,220, as compared with \$29,870,520 in 1900.

UNITED STATES TREASURY RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES.

RECEIPTS.			EXPENDITURES.		
Source.	January, 1901.	Since July 1, 1900.	Source.	January, 1901.	Since July 1, 1900.
Customs.....	\$21,673,916	\$140,456,020	Civil and mis.....	\$12,526,069	\$74,211,136
Internal revenue...	23,379,004	180,024,572	War.....	9,888,650	98,848,501
Miscellaneous.....	2,467,367	18,901,270	Navy.....	5,169,578	34,774,090
			Indians.....	840,908	6,700,898
			Pensions.....	10,215,353	82,174,998
Total.....	\$47,520,287	\$339,381,862	Interest.....	1,970,165	21,407,088
Excess of receipts...	7,410,580	26,205,220	Total.....	\$40,109,707	\$313,176,643

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES AND NET GOLD IN THE TREASURY.

MONTH.	1900.			1901.		
	Receipts.	Expen- ditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.	Receipts.	Expen- ditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.
January.....	\$48,012,165	\$39,199,097	\$218,613,617	\$47,520,287	\$40,109,707	\$221,188,644
February.....	45,681,265	37,738,472	232,225,396			
March.....	48,726,887	32,188,271	248,358,064			
April.....	45,039,826	40,908,927	229,461,982			
May.....	45,166,058	40,351,625	218,857,545			
June.....	51,435,832	33,540,673	220,557,185			
July.....	49,955,161	53,979,653	223,567,376			
August.....	49,848,756	50,500,000	218,263,969			
September.....	45,304,328	39,169,971	230,131,162			
October.....	51,636,087	47,968,637	242,670,174			
November.....	48,844,514	41,278,680	243,225,735			
December.....	46,846,508	40,204,622	246,561,322			

**NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.**—About \$5,500,000 of bonds were deposited during the month to secure circulation, and the total amount of notes outstanding increased \$6,680,000. Of the total \$318,000,000 bonds securing circulation \$308,000,000 are the new two per cent. bonds of 1930. The National banks also hold \$72,560,000 of these bonds as security for public deposits. The circulation based on bonds is now equal to over ninety-nine per cent. of the face of the bonds deposited.

#### NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.

	Oct. 31, 1900.	Nov. 30, 1900.	Dec. 31, 1900.	Jan. 31, 1901.
Total amount outstanding.....	\$331,613,508	\$332,212,405	\$340,061,410	\$346,742,136
Circulation based on U. S. bonds.....	298,829,940	299,816,629	308,294,673	315,731,573
Circulation secured by lawful money....	32,784,203	32,395,776	31,766,737	31,020,568
U. S. bonds to secure circulation:				
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	1,019,950	939,450	606,950	553,250
"      "      1907, 4 per cent.....	13,544,100	12,142,950	7,407,650	6,405,650
Five per cents. of 1894.....	1,298,000	843,000	545,900	286,900
Four per cents. of 1895.....	7,508,350	5,778,350	4,188,600	3,976,100
Three per cents. of 1896.....	7,756,580	6,920,480	4,518,180	4,133,180
Two per cents. of 1900.....	270,006,600	276,656,500	295,562,550	303,094,900
Total.....	\$301,123,580	\$303,280,730	\$312,532,830	\$318,422,900

The National banks have also on deposit the following bonds to secure public deposits: 2 per cents. of 1891, \$438,000; 4 per cents. of 1907, \$10,815,000; 5 per cents. of 1894, \$639,000; 4 per cents. of 1895, \$11,890,950; 3 per cents. of 1896, \$5,968,420; 2 per cents. of 1900, \$72,560,100; District of Columbia 3.65's, 1894, \$535,000; a total of \$101,868,470.

The circulation of National gold banks, not included in the above statement, is \$79,765.

**MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.**—The net cash in the Treasury shows a reduction of more than \$6,000,000 for the month, and the net gold fell off \$25,000,000, according to the Treasury statement. This seems to be due to a large degree from treating gold certificates in the Treasury as in circulation.

#### MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.

	Nov. 1, 1900.	Dec. 1, 1900.	Jan. 1, 1901.	Feb. 1, 1901.
Gold coin and bullion.....	\$458,266,144	\$474,482,084	\$479,340,251	\$496,850,923
Silver Dollars.....	430,309,621	432,439,956	432,987,264	447,889,773
Silver bullion.....	61,854,872	57,600,251	56,937,918	54,853,287
Subsidiary silver.....	5,641,098	5,482,896	4,446,010	6,505,525
United States notes.....	13,385,955	13,011,857	12,068,521	13,035,512
National bank notes.....	6,318,300	5,343,130	7,952,649	13,461,450
Total.....	\$975,776,230	\$968,359,944	\$988,746,613	\$1,032,687,906
Certificates and Treasury notes, 1890, outstanding.....	704,235,174	717,911,086	717,977,491	763,351,110
Net cash in Treasury.....	\$271,541,106	\$270,448,858	\$275,769,122	\$269,336,796

**SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES.**—The total stock of money is reported to have increased \$11,000,000 in January, about \$4,000,000 in gold and \$7,000,000 in National bank notes.

#### SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES.

	Nov. 1, 1900.	Dec. 1, 1900.	Jan. 1, 1901.	Feb. 1, 1901.
Gold coin and bullion.....	\$1,080,027,407	\$1,069,184,997	\$1,108,541,829	\$1,112,427,723
Silver dollars.....	503,786,290	506,251,290	509,149,590	510,847,500
Silver bullion.....	61,854,872	57,600,251	56,937,918	54,853,287
Subsidiary silver.....	86,676,235	87,200,371	87,569,473	88,485,517
United States notes.....	346,681,016	346,681,016	346,681,016	346,681,016
National bank notes.....	331,693,648	332,262,300	340,141,175	346,321,871
Total.....	\$2,410,722,518	\$2,429,210,225	\$2,449,021,001	\$2,460,117,009

Certificates and Treasury notes represented by coin, bullion, or currency in Treasury are not included in the above statement.



# ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.

The following table shows the highest, lowest and closing prices of the most active stocks at the New York Stock Exchange in the month of January, and the highest and lowest during the year 1901, by dates, and also, for comparison, the range of prices in 1900:

	YEAR 1900.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1901.				JANUARY, 1901.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.			Lowest.	High.	Low.	Closing.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe.	48 3/4	18 3/4	49 1/4	Jan. 9		42 1/4	49 1/4	42 1/4	49 1/4
" preferred	86 3/4	58 1/4	90 3/4	Jan. 2		82 1/4	90 3/4	82 1/4	87 1/4
Baltimore & Ohio.	89 3/4	55 1/4	94	Jan. 7		81 3/4	94	81 3/4	89 3/4
Baltimore & Ohio, pref.	90	72 3/4	90	Jan. 7		84 1/4	90	84 1/4	86
Brooklyn Rapid Transit.	88 3/4	47 3/4	87 3/4	Jan. 12		73 1/4	87 3/4	73 1/4	77
Canadian Pacific.	90 3/4	84 3/4	91 3/4	Jan. 3		86 3/4	91 3/4	86 3/4	88 3/4
Canada Southern.	61 1/4	47 3/4	59	Jan. 9		54 1/4	61 1/4	54 1/4	56 3/4
Central of New Jersey.	150 1/4	115	160	Jan. 5		145 3/4	160	145 3/4	152 3/4
Ches. & Ohio vtg. cfs.	42 3/4	24	42 3/4	Jan. 2		36 1/4	42 3/4	36 1/4	38 3/4
Chicago & Alton.	42	31	41 1/4	Jan. 9		36 3/4	41 1/4	36 3/4	38 3/4
" preferred	78 1/4	68 1/4	76 3/4	Jan. 2		72 3/4	78 1/4	73 1/4	74 1/4
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy.	144	119 3/4	148 3/4	Jan. 7		138 3/4	144	138 3/4	144 3/4
Chicago & E. Illinois.	109	86	95 3/4	Jan. 7		91	109	91	92 3/4
" preferred	125	119 1/4	124	Jan. 12		120 1/4	124	120 1/4	124 1/4
Chicago, Great Western.	18	9 3/4	19 1/4	Jan. 31		16	19 1/4	16	19
Chic., Indianapolis & Lou'ville	29	14	30	Jan. 31		23	29	23	27 1/4
" preferred	64	45 1/4	70	Jan. 31		58 3/4	64	58 3/4	65 1/4
Chic., Milwaukee & St. Paul.	148 1/4	108 1/4	162	Jan. 5		142 3/4	162	142 3/4	151 1/4
" preferred	188	169 1/4	195 1/4	Jan. 28		187 1/4	188	187 1/4	190
Chicago & Northwestern.	172 3/4	150 1/4	177	Jan. 5		168 1/4	177	168 1/4	174
" preferred	220	195 1/4	222 1/4	Jan. 5		215	222 1/4	215	218
Chicago, Rock I. & Pacific.	122 1/4	102	128 3/4	Jan. 7		117 1/4	122 1/4	117 1/4	125 3/4
Chic., St. Paul, Minn. & Om.	126	110	137	Jan. 11		126	137	126	132
" preferred	175	172	185	Jan. 11		184 3/4	185	184 3/4	185
Chicago Terminal Transfer.	14 3/4	8 1/4	15 1/4	Jan. 31		10 1/4	15 1/4	10 1/4	15
" preferred	36 3/4	26 1/4	38 3/4	Jan. 31		33	38 3/4	33	34 1/4
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. Louis.	76	55	81	Jan. 14		73 3/4	81	73 3/4	77 1/4
Col. Fuel & Iron Co.	56 1/4	29 1/4	56 1/4	Jan. 2		41 3/4	56 1/4	41 3/4	46 3/4
Consolidated Gas Co.	201	164	196 3/4	Jan. 2		187	201	187	198
Delaware & Hud. Canal Co.	134 1/4	106 1/4	162 1/4	Jan. 12		126 1/4	162 1/4	126 1/4	152 3/4
Delaware, Lack. & Western.	194 3/4	171 1/4	202	Jan. 8		188 1/4	194 3/4	188 1/4	192
Denver & Rio Grande.	84 1/4	61 1/4	83 3/4	Jan. 2		79 3/4	84 1/4	79 3/4	82
" preferred	87 1/4	64 1/4	85 3/4	Jan. 2		80	87 1/4	80	83
Erie.	27 1/4	10 1/4	31	Jan. 7		24 3/4	31	24 3/4	28 3/4
" 1st pref.	65 1/4	30 3/4	69 1/4	Jan. 5		59 3/4	65 1/4	59 3/4	64
" 2d pref.	49 1/4	15	46 1/4	Jan. 7		39 1/4	49 1/4	39 1/4	42 3/4
Evansville & Terre Haute.	54 3/4	38 3/4	44 1/4	Jan. 9		41	54 3/4	41	41
Express Adams.	150	111	155	Jan. 31		145	155	145	155
" American	191	142	189	Jan. 2		170	191	170	178
" United States	59	45	59 1/4	Jan. 5		53	59 1/4	53	58
" Wells, Fargo.	140	120	137 1/4	Jan. 16		130	140	137 1/4	138
Great Northern, preferred.	191 1/4	144 3/4	200	Jan. 9		188	191 1/4	188	190
Hocking Valley.	42 3/4	30	45 1/4	Jan. 15		41	42 3/4	41	43 1/4
" preferred	74 3/4	58	72 1/4	Jan. 9		66 1/4	74 3/4	66 1/4	71 3/4
Illinois Central.	136	110	136	Jan. 9		123 1/4	136	123 1/4	130
Iowa Central.	27 3/4	11 3/4	28	Jan. 2		21	27 3/4	21	26 3/4
" preferred	58	38	54	Jan. 48		48	58	48	53
Kansas City Southern.	17 1/4	7	17	Jan. 31		13 3/4	17 1/4	13 3/4	16 3/4
" preferred	42 3/4	27 1/4	40 3/4	Jan. 31		35	42 3/4	35	40
Lake Erie & Western.	52	20 3/4	46 1/4	Jan. 3		36 3/4	52	36 3/4	42
" preferred	115	88 1/4	112	Jan. 14		106 3/4	115	106 3/4	109 3/4
Long Island.	86	47 1/4	86	Jan. 7		70	86	70	67
Louisville & Nashville.	88 3/4	68 3/4	91 1/4	Jan. 9		84 1/4	88 3/4	84 1/4	86 3/4
Manhattan consol.	117	84	126 3/4	Jan. 12		111	117	111	117 3/4
Metropolitan Street.	182	143 3/4	174	Jan. 2		158 3/4	182	158 3/4	168
Mexican Central.	17 3/4	10 1/4	16 1/4	Jan. 2		12 3/4	17 3/4	12 3/4	18 3/4
Minneapolis & St. Louis.	71 1/4	45 1/4	71 3/4	Jan. 12		67 3/4	71 1/4	67 3/4	69 3/4
" preferred	104 3/4	87 3/4	110	Jan. 12		101 3/4	104 3/4	101 3/4	107 3/4
Missouri, Kan. & Tex.	17 3/4	6	19 3/4	Jan. 30		15	17 3/4	15	19 3/4
" preferred	47 1/4	25 3/4	57	Jan. 30		44 3/4	47 1/4	44 3/4	55 3/4
Missouri Pacific.	72 1/4	38 3/4	83	Jan. 23		69	72 1/4	69	83 3/4
Mobile & Ohio.	49	36	60 3/4	Jan. 31		44	49	44	63 3/4
N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River.	145 3/4	125 3/4	146 3/4	Jan. 12		139 3/4	145 3/4	139 3/4	148 3/4

## ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.—Continued.

	YEAR 1900.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1901.				JANUARY, 1901.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.		Lowest.		High.	Low.	Closing.
N. Y., Ontario & Western.....	32½	18½	35¼	Jan. 13	23½	Jan. 31	35¼	23½	31½
Norfolk & Western.....	45½	22½	46¾	Jan. 12	42	Jan. 10	46¾	42	44½
" preferred.....	88	67	84¼	Jan. 14	82½	Jan. 23	84¼	82½	83½
Northern American Co.....	23½	13½	21½	Jan. 6	19½	Jan. 3	21½	19½	20½
Northern Pacific.....	86½	45½	90	Jan. 6	77½	Jan. 31	90	77½	88½
" pref.....	91½	67	89	Jan. 6	84½	Jan. 21	89	84½	87
Pacific Mail.....	57	25½	47¼	Jan. 20	40	Jan. 4	47¼	40	45¼
Pennsylvania R. R.....	142½	124½	158	Jan. 6	142½	Jan. 21	153	142½	149½
People's Gas & Coke of Chic.....	111½	81½	106¾	Jan. 2	95¾	Jan. 21	106¾	95¾	99½
Pullman Palace Car Co.....	204	176	203	Jan. 2	195½	Jan. 21	203	195½	200
Heading.....	26	15	36	Jan. 7	24½	Jan. 4	36	24½	31½
" 1st preferred.....	71½	49	77	Jan. 6	66½	Jan. 4	77	66½	71½
" 2d preferred.....	36½	23½	47¾	Jan. 7	38	Jan. 3	47¾	38	43
St. Louis & San Francisco.....	24¼	6½	30¼	Jan. 31	21¼	Jan. 4	30¼	21¼	30¼
" 1st preferred.....	78¼	64	81	Jan. 9	78¼	Jan. 2	81	78¼	80¼
" 2d preferred.....	55	31¼	50¼	Jan. 16	53¼	Jan. 4	50¼	53¼	50¼
St. Louis & Southwestern.....	18½	8½	24¼	Jan. 28	17	Jan. 4	24¼	17	22¼
" preferred.....	45½	21½	52½	Jan. 28	41½	Jan. 3	52½	41½	51½
Southern Pacific Co.....	45¾	30¾	49¼	Jan. 31	40¾	Jan. 4	49¼	40¾	49
Southern Railway.....	22½	10½	23	Jan. 7	18	Jan. 21	23	18	22½
" preferred.....	73½	49½	74½	Jan. 7	67½	Jan. 21	74½	67½	70½
Tennessee Coal & Iron Co.....	104	49	66¾	Jan. 2	53	Jan. 8	66¾	53	55½
Texas & Pacific.....	26¾	13½	29½	Jan. 9	23½	Jan. 3	29½	23½	26
Union Pacific.....	81¾	44¾	88	Jan. 12	78¼	Jan. 4	88	78	84
" preferred.....	85¾	70½	86¼	Jan. 3	81¾	Jan. 21	86¼	81¾	86½
Wabash R. R.....	14	6½	14¼	Jan. 22	11¼	Jan. 3	14¼	11¼	13¼
" preferred.....	27	16	29¼	Jan. 22	23¾	Jan. 4	29¼	23¾	27½
Western Union.....	89½	77½	89¼	Jan. 11	81	Jan. 21	89¼	81	84
Wheeling & Lake Erie.....	13½	8	12½	Jan. 2	11½	Jan. 31	12½	11½	11½
" second preferred.....	32½	21½	30½	Jan. 2	27½	Jan. 21	30½	27½	28½
Wisconsin Central.....	20¾	10	18	Jan. 31	14½	Jan. 21	18	14½	17½
" preferred.....	57	30	45¾	Jan. 31	39½	Jan. 17	45¾	39½	44½
"INDUSTRIAL"									
Amalgamated Copper.....	90½	80½	94¾	Jan. 2	83¾	Jan. 21	94¾	83¾	89½
American Car & Foundry.....	25½	12½	23½	Jan. 3	19	Jan. 21	23½	19	21½
" pref.....	72	57½	73¼	Jan. 7	67	Jan. 18	73¼	67	69½
American Co. Oil Co.....	37½	30	31½	Jan. 3	25½	Jan. 18	31½	25½	30½
American Ice.....	49½	27½	41¼	Jan. 9	37¼	Jan. 21	41¼	37¼	38½
Am. Smelting & Refining Co.....	56¼	34½	65¼	Jan. 15	53¼	Jan. 3	65¼	53¼	59½
" preferred.....	90	85	100	Jan. 16	95	Jan. 3	100	95	98
American Steel Hoop Co.....	50¼	17	38¾	Jan. 3	33	Jan. 18	38¾	33	27
" preferred.....	86	64¼	78	Jan. 2	60	Jan. 18	78	60	71¼
American Steel & Wire Co.....	59¾	28½	47¼	Jan. 2	38	Jan. 14	47¼	38	44½
" preferred.....	95	69½	89¼	Jan. 2	83¾	Jan. 17	89¼	83¾	88½
American Sugar Ref. Co.....	149	95¼	147½	Jan. 2	131½	Jan. 18	147½	131½	135½
American Tin Plate Co.....	57½	18	65¼	Jan. 14	55	Jan. 4	65¼	55	57
American Tobacco Co.....	114¾	84½	117½	Jan. 14	110¼	Jan. 21	117½	110¼	115
Anaconda Copper Mining.....	54¾	37½	48¾	Jan. 2	40¾	Jan. 21	48¾	40¾	41½
Continental Tobacco Co.....	40¼	21½	45¼	Jan. 16	39¼	Jan. 4	45¼	39¼	45
" preferred.....	95	70	96¼	Jan. 10	93¼	Jan. 2	96¼	93¼	95½
Federal Steel Co.....	53¼	28¾	59	Jan. 2	41	Jan. 29	59	41	44
" preferred.....	79½	60¾	78	Jan. 2	68	Jan. 21	78	68	73½
General Electric Co.....	200	120	192¾	Jan. 2	188¼	Jan. 10	192¾	188¼	191½
Glucose Sugar Refining Co.....	60	44	58	Jan. 2	47	Jan. 21	58	47	49
International Paper Co.....	26¾	14½	25¾	Jan. 5	20	Jan. 22	25¾	20	21
" preferred.....	75	58	74¼	Jan. 3	69	Jan. 21	74¼	69	69½
National Lead Co.....	23¼	15½	20¼	Jan. 2	16¾	Jan. 23	20¼	16¾	17
National Steel Co.....	53½	20	44¾	Jan. 2	37	Jan. 21	44¾	37	40½
" preferred.....	97	79¾	93½	Jan. 2	90	Jan. 18	93½	90	91½
National Tube.....	66¾	40¾	70	Jan. 3	53¼	Jan. 14	70	53¼	59
Pressed Steel Car Co.....	53¼	32½	52	Jan. 2	35	Jan. 29	52	35	38
Republic Iron & Steel Co.....	27½	8¾	18½	Jan. 2	12½	Jan. 22	18½	12½	13½
" preferred.....	70¾	49	65¼	Jan. 2	55¼	Jan. 21	65¼	55¼	59
Standard Rope & Twine Co.....	10¼	4½	5¼	Jan. 2	3¾	Jan. 19	5¼	3¾	3½
U. S. Leather Co.....	19	7¾	14½	Jan. 2	11	Jan. 21	14½	11	13½
" preferred.....	79¼	65	79	Jan. 2	73	Jan. 15	79	73	74½
U. S. Rubber Co.....	44	21	34	Jan. 2	19	Jan. 31	34	19	19
" preferred.....	104¾	74½	85	Jan. 2	59¾	Jan. 15	85	59¾	61

# RAILWAY, INDUSTRIAL AND GOVERNMENT BONDS.

## LAST SALE, PRICE AND DATE AND HIGHEST AND LOWEST PRICES AND TOTAL SALES FOR THE MONTH.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		JANUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ann Arbor 1st g 4's.....1995		7,000,000	Q J	96½	Jan. 30, '01	96½	95	65,000
Atch., Top. & S. F.								
{ Atch Top & Santa Fe gen g 4's.1995	133,082,500	{	A & O	103¼	Jan. 31, '01	103¼	102¼	2,785,000
{ " registered.....		{	A & O	102¾	Jan. 19, '01	102¾	102¾	25,000
{ " adjustment, g. 4's.....1995	50,513,500	{	NOV	91½	Jan. 31, '01	91½	86¾	2,830,500
{ " registered.....		{	NOV	79¾	Dec. 11, '99			
{ " stamped.....1995	1,214,500	{	M & N	90	Jan. 29, '01	90	90	45,000
{ Equip. tr. ser. A. g. 5's.1902	250,000	{	J & J					
{ Chic. & St. L. 1st 6's....1915	1,500,000	{	M & S					
Atl. Knox. & Nor. Ry. 1st g. 5s....1946	1,000,000		J & D	105	Dec. 4, 19'			
Balt. & Ohio prior lien g. 3½s...1925			J & J	96¾	Jan. 31, '01	96¾	95	1,453,000
{ " registered.....	69,798,000	{	J & J					
{ " g. 4s.....1948		{	A & O	103	Jan. 31, '01	103	101	1,743,500
{ " g. 4s. registered.....	65,963,000	{	A & O	102	Jan. 19, '01	102	102	10,000
{ Southw'n div. 1st g. 3½s.1925		{	J & J	89¾	Jan. 31, '01	90¼	88½	1,234,000
{ " registered.....	41,900,000	{	Q J					
{ Pitt Jun. & M. div. 1st g. 3½s.1925		{	M & N	89¾	Jan. 30, '01	90	89	21,500
{ " registered.....	11,293,000	{	Q Feb					
{ Monongahela River 1st g. g. 5's 1919	700,000	{	F & A	104½	July 1, '92			
{ Cen. Ohio. Reorg. 1st c. g. 4½s.1930	1,018,000	{	M & S	111	Feb. 28, '99			
Buffalo, Roch. & Pitts. g. g. 5's...1937	4,407,000		M & S	116¼	Jan. 25, '01	116¼	115	25,500
{ " deb. 6's.....1947	1,000,000	{	J & J					
{ Alleghany & Wn. 1st g. gtd 4's.1908	2,000,000	{	A & O					
{ Clearfield & Mah. 1st g. g. 5's....1943	650,000	{	J & J	130	Jan. 3, '01	130	130	2,000
{ Rochester & Pittsburg. 1st 6's...1921	1,300,000	{	F & A	130	Jan. 3, '01	130	130	1,000
{ " cons. 1st 6's.....1922	3,920,000	{	J & D	127½	Dec. 21, 19'			
Buffalo & Susquehanna 1st g. 5's. 1913			A & O	100	Nov. 18, '99			
{ " registered.....	1,056,500	{	A & O					
Burlington, Cedar R. & N. 1st 5's. 1906	6,500,000		J & D	107	Jan. 29, '01	107	106½	23,500
{ " con. 1st & col. 1st 5's...1934		{	A & O	119¾	Jan. 30, '01	119¾	119½	42,000
{ " registered.....	7,250,000	{	A & O	117	Nov. 20, 19'			
{ Ced. Rap Ia. Falls & Nor. 1st 5's.1921	1,905,000	{	A & O	113½	Dec. 6, 19'			
{ Minneap's & St. Louis 1st 7's. g. 1927	150,000	{	J & D	140	Aug. 24, '95			
Canada Southern 1st int. gtd 5's. 1908	13,920,000		J & J	107	Jan. 31, '01	107½	106¾	62,000
{ " 2d mortg. 5's.....1913		{	M & S	111	Jan. 30, '01	111	109¾	36,000
{ " registered.....	5,100,000	{	M & S	104	Apr. 24, '99			
Central Branch U. Pac. 1st g. 4's.1948	2,500,000		J & D	94¼	Jan. 31, '01	94¼	92	113,000
Cent. R. & Bkg. Co. of Ga. c. g. 5's.1987	4,880,000		M & N	99½	Jan. 31, '01	99½	97	44,000
Central R'y of Georgia, 1st g. 5's.1945			F & A	120	Nov. 20, 19'			
{ " registered \$1,000 & \$5,000	7,000,000	{	F & A					
{ " con. g. 5's.....1945		{	M & N	103¼	Jan. 31, '01	103¼	97¾	1,757,000
{ " con. g. 5's. reg. \$1,000 & \$5,000	16,700,600	{	M & N	96	Oct. 30, '99			
{ " 1st pref. inc. g. 5's.....1945	4,000,000	{	OCT 1	65	Jan. 31, '01	65	60	241,000
{ " 2d pref. inc. g. 5's.....1945	7,000,000	{	OCT 1	25¼	Jan. 31, '01	25¼	20	732,000
{ " 3d pref. inc. g. 5's.....1945	4,000,000	{	OCT 1	10½	Jan. 31, '01	10½	8	325,000
{ " Macon & Nor. Div. 1st g. 5's.....1946	840,000	{	J & J	95	Dec. 27, '99			
{ " Mid. Ga. & Atl. div. g 5s.1947	413,000	{	J & J	102	June 29, '99			
{ " Mobile div. 1st g. 5's....1946	1,000,000	{	J & J	106	Oct. 24, 19'			
Central Railroad of New Jersey,								
{ " 1st convertible 7's...1902	1,167,000	{	M & N	106¾	Dec. 4, 19'			
{ " gen. g. 5's.....1987		{	J & J	128	Jan. 30, '01	128¼	127	304,000
{ " registered.....	43,024,000	{	Q J	127	Jan. 29, '01	127½	127	24,000

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		JANUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
A. m. Dock & Improv'm't Co. 5's. 1921		4,987,000	J & J	113½	Jan. 21, '01	113½	113	4,000
Lehigh & H. R. gen. gtd g. 5's. 1920		1,082,000	J & J					
Lehigh & W.-B. Coal con. 5's. 1912		2,691,000	Q M	106	Aug. 30, '19			
con. extended gtd. 4½'s. 1910		12,175,000	Q M	108¾	Jan. 30, '01	108¾	103	112,000
Charleston & Sav. 1st g. 7's. 1935		1,500,000	J & J	108¾	Dec. 18, '99			
Ches. & Ohio 6's. g. Series A. 1906		2,000,000	A & O	118¼	Jan. 31, '01	116¾	115¼	10,000
Mortgage gold 6's. 1911		2,000,000	A & O	118¼	Jan. 31, '10	118¼	118¼	1,000
1st con. g. 5's. 1939		25,858,000	M & N	121	Jan. 29, '01	121	120½	77,000
registered.			M & N	117	June 11, '19			
Gen. m. g. 4½'s. 1932		28,809,000	M & S	106¼	Jan. 28, '01	106¼	104	788,000
registered.			M & S	94¼	Aug. 23, '19			
Craig Val. 1st g. 5's. 1940		650,000	J & J	103	Nov. 26, '19			
(R. & A. d.) 1st c. g. 4's. 1939		6,000,000	J & J	106	Jan. 28, '01	106	104½	42,000
2d con. g. 4's. 1939		1,000,000	J & J	103	Jan. 11, '01	103	100	32,000
Warm S. Val. 1st g. 5's. 1941		400,000	M & S	101¼	Apr. 29, '99			
Eliz. Lex. & B. S. g. 5's. 1902		3,007,000	M & S	102¾	Jan. 14, '01	102¾	102¼	2,000
Chic. & Alton R. R. s. fund g. 6's. 1903		1,671,000	M & N	105¾	Jan. 9, '01	105¾	105¾	5,000
refunding g. 8's. 1949		17,483,000	A & O	94	Jan. 25, '01	94	93	130,000
registered.			A & O					
Miss. Riv. Bdge 1st s. f'd g. 6's. 1912		449,000	A & O	105¼	Oct. 30, '95			
Chic. & Alton Ry 1st lien g. 3½'s. 1930		22,000,000	J & J	84¾	Jan. 31, '01	85	83½	1,784,000
registered.			J & J					
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy con. 7's. 1908		24,356,000	J & J	108¾	Jan. 23, '01	108¾	108½	48,000
5's. sinking fund. 1901		2,291,000	A & O	101¼	Jan. 19, '01	101¼	101½	2,000
Chic. & Iowa div. 5's. 1905		2,320,000	F & A	104¾	Apr. 11, '19			
Denver div. 4's. 1922		5,585,000	F & A	102¼	Jan. 7, '01	102¼	102¼	3,000
Illinois div. 3½'s. 1949		26,214,000	J & J	104¼	Jan. 28, '01	104¼	103½	23,000
registered.			J & J					
Iowa div. sink. f'd 5's. 1919		2,709,000	A & O	118¾	Nov. 30, '19			
4's. 1919		3,704,000	A & O	104¾	Dec. 7, '19			
Nebraska extension 4's. 1927		26,077,000	M & N	111¾	June 2, '99			
registered.			M & S	100¼	Oct. 15, '19			
Southwestern div. 4's. 1921		2,950,000	M & S	142¾	Jan. 22, '01	145	143¾	21,000
convertible 5's. 1908		2,316,900	M & N	111	Jan. 24, '01	111¼	110	24,000
5's. debentures. 1913		9,000,000	M & S	122¼	Jan. 14, '01	122¼	123½	14,000
Han. & St. Jos. con. 6's. 1911		8,000,000						
Chicago & E. Ill. 1st s. f'd c'y. 6's. 1907		2,989,000	J & D	112	Jan. 8, '01	112	112	500
small bonds. 1934		2,653,000	A & O	118¾	Jan. 11, '01	118¾	118¾	2,000
1st con. 6's. gold. 1937		11,995,000	M & N	117¼	Jan. 29, '01	117¼	115	198,000
registered.			M & N	115	Aug. 28, '19			
Chicago & Ind. Coal 1st 5's. 1936		4,626,000	J & J	112¾	Jan. 23, '01	113½	112¾	23,000
Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville.								
refunding g. 6's. 1947		4,700,000	J & J	118	Jan. 30, '01	118	115	27,000
ref. g. 5's. 1947		3,542,000	J & J	108¾	Jan. 31, '01	108¾	106¾	6,000
Louisv. N. Alb. & Chic. 1st 6's. 1910		3,000,000	J & J	114	Jan. 20, '01	114	113	27,000
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul.								
Mil. & St. Paul 1st 7's & g. R. d. 1902		1,469,500	J & J	179	Dec. 12, '19			
1st 7's & g. 1902		1,157,000	J & J	188	Jan. 23, '01	190	188¼	23,000
1st C. & M. 7's. 1903		5,072,000	J & J	188	Jan. 18, '01	188	182½	56,000
Chicago Mil. & St. Paul con. 7's. 1905		4,748,000	J & J	116¾	Dec. 27, '19			
terminal g. 5's. 1914		23,676,000	J & J	114¾	Jan. 31, '01	114¾	112¾	45,000
gen. g. 4's. series A. 1939			J & J	106¾	Feb. 19, '98			
registered.			Q J					
gen. g. 3½'s. series B. 1939		2,500,000	J & J					
registered.			J & J					
Chic. & Lake Sup. 5's. 1921		1,380,000	J & J	119¼	Jan. 3, '01	119¼	119¼	1,000
Chic. & M. R. div. 5's. 1923		3,083,000	J & J	122¼	Jan. 23, '01	122¼	122¼	5,000
Chic. & Pac. div. 6's. 1910		3,000,000	J & J	118	Jan. 9, '01	118	118	10,000
1st Chic. & P. W. g. 5's. 1921		25,340,000	J & J	120¼	Jan. 29, '01	120¼	119¼	49,000
Dakota & Gt. S. g. 5's. 1913		2,856,000	J & J	115¾	Jan. 23, '01	115¾	115¾	1,000
Far. & So. g. 6's. assu. 1924		1,250,000	J & J	187¼	July 18, '98			
1st H't & Dk. div. 7's. 1910		5,680,000	J & J	125¾	Jan. 25, '01	125¾	125¼	19,000
1st 5's. 1910		980,000	J & J	110¼	Jan. 15, '01	110¼	110¼	1,000
1st 7's. Iowa & D. ex. 1908		2,230,000	J & J	187	Jan. 31, '01	187¾	185¼	17,000
1st 5's. La. C. & Dav. 1919		2,500,000	J & J	118¼	Jan. 23, '01	118¼	117¾	2,000
Mineral Point div. 5's. 1910		2,840,000	J & J	110¾	Jan. 9, '01	110¾	110¾	2,000
1st So. Min. div. 6's. 1910		7,432,000	J & J	119	Jan. 28, '01	119	117½	22,000
1st 6's. Southw'n div. 1909		4,000,000	J & J	117¼	Jan. 29, '01	117¼	117	4,000
Wis. & Min. div. g. 5's. 1921		4,755,000	J & J	118¾	Jan. 29, '01	118¾	119¾	5,000
Mil. & N. 1st M. L. 6's. 1910		2,155,000	J & D	118¼	Dec. 3, '19			
1st con. 6's. 1913		5,082,000	J & D	120	Aug. 9, '19			

# BOND SALES.

815

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		JANUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Chic. & Northwestern con. 7's...1915		12,832,000	Q F	139½	Jan. 15, '01	139½	139½	1,000
gold 7's.....1902		8,033,000	J & D	107½	Jan. 16, '01	107½	107½	8,000
registered gold 7's.....1902			J & D	107½	Jan. 18, '01	107½	107½	10,000
extension 4's.....1886-1926		18,632,000	F A 15	109	Jan. 3, '01	109	109	1,000
registered.....1907			F A 15	107	Mar. 7, '19			
gen. g. 3½'s.....1887		11,534,000	M & N	110	Jan. 29, '01	110	109½	56,000
registered.....1907			Q F	103	Nov. 19, '98			
sinking fund 6's.....1879-1929		5,940,000	A & O	116½	Dec. 3, '19			
registered.....1907			A & O	111	Oct. 18, '19			
sinking fund 5's.....1879-1929		7,055,000	A & O	108½	Jan. 24, '01	108½	108½	1,000
registered.....1907			A & O	107	Dec. 18, '19			
deben. 5's.....1909		5,800,000	M & N	110½	Jan. 25, '01	110½	108	93,000
registered.....1909			M & N	105	Dec. 26, '99			
deben. 5's.....1921		10,000,000	A & O	116	Jan. 26, '01	116½	116	7,000
registered.....1921			A & O	107	Nov. 20, '96			
sinking f'd deben. 5's.....1933		9,800,000	M & N	124	Jan. 24, '01	125½	124	8,000
registered.....1911			M & N	122½	Jan. 15, '01	122½	122	7,000
Des Moines & Minn. 1st 7's.....1907		600,000	F & A	127	Apr. 8, '84			
Milwaukee & Madison 1st 6's.....1905		1,600,000	M & S	113	Jan. 23, '01	113	113	5,000
Northern Illinois 1st 5's.....1910		1,500,000	M & S	112½	Apr. 24, '19			
Ottumwa C. F. & St. P. 1st 5's.....1909		1,600,000	M & S	111½	Apr. 24, '19			
Winona & St. Peters 2d 7's.....1907		1,592,000	M & N	120½	Nov. 10, '19			
Mil. L. Shore & We'n 1st g. 6's.....1921		5,000,000	M & N	138½	Jan. 28, '01	138½	136½	8,000
ext. & imp't. s.f'd g. 5's.....1929		4,148,000	F & A	126	Jan. 21, '01	127½	126	8,000
Ashland div. 1st g. 6's.....1925		1,000,000	M & S	139½	Apr. 17, '19			
Michigan div. 1st g. 6's.....1924		1,281,000	J & J	138½	Jan. 2, '10	138½	138½	4,000
con. deb. 5's.....1907		436,000	F & A	107½	Nov. 16, '19			
incomes.....1911		500,000	M & N	112	Nov. 13, '99			
Chic., Rock Is. & Pac. 6's coup...1917		12,100,000	J & J	130½	Jan. 25, '01	130½	130½	10,000
registered.....1917			J & J	130	Nov. 7, '19			
gen. g. 4's.....1988		54,581,000	J & J	109½	Jan. 31, '01	110	107½	816,000
registered.....1905			J & J	107½	Nov. 8, '19			
Des Moines & Ft. Dodge 1st 4's.....1905		1,200,000	J & J	96	May 25, '19			
1st 2½'s.....1905		1,200,000	J & J	86½	Aug. 25, '19			
extension 4's.....1923		672,000	J & J	96	Dec. 19, '19			
Keokuk & Des M. 1st mor. 5's.....1923		2,750,000	A & O	111½	Jan. 29, '01	111½	111½	10,000
small bond.....1923			A & O	100	Apr. 15, '97			
Chic., St. P., Minn. & Oma. con. 6's.....1930		14,284,000	J & D	135½	Jan. 31, '01	135½	134½	31,000
Chic., St. Paul & Minn. 1st 6's.....1918		2,129,000	M & N	133	Nov. 27, '19			
North Wisconsin 1st mort. 6's.....1930		800,000	J & J	140	Mar. 31, '19			
St. Paul & Sioux City 1st 6's.....1919		6,070,000	A & O	131	Jan. 31, '01	131	130	15,000
Chic., Term. Trans. R. R. g. 4's.....1947		13,400,000	J & J	96½	Jan. 31, '01	97½	92	387,000
Chic. & Wn. Ind. 1st s'k. f'd g. 6's.....1919		478,000	M & N	106	Oct. 4, '99			
gen'l mortg. g. 6's.....1932		1,868,000	Q M	119½	Jan. 28, '01	119½	119½	1,000
Chic. & West Michigan R'y 5's.....1921		5,753,000	J & D	100	Oct. 28, '93			
Choc., Oklahoma & Gif. gen. g. 5e.....1919		4,800,000	J & J	103	Jan. 17, '19			
Cin., Ham. & Day. con. s'k. f'd 7's.....1905		966,000	A & O	115	Dec. 14, '19			
2d g. 4½'s.....1937		2,000,000	J & J	113	Oct. 10, '19			
Cin., Day. & Ir'n 1st gt. dg. 5's.....1941		3,500,000	M & N	113½	Jan. 29, '01	113½	113½	1,000
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. L. gen. g. 4's.....1933		12,634,000	J & D	104	Jan. 31, '01	104½	101	206,000
do Cairo div. 1st g. 4's.....1939		5,000,000	J & J	99	Jan. 10, '01	99	99	2,000
Cin., Wab. & Mich. div. 1st g. 4's.....1901		4,000,000	J & J	99½	Jan. 21, '01	99½	98½	5,000
St. Louis div. 1st col. trust g. 4's.....1900		9,750,000	M & N	105	Jan. 30, '01	105	104½	19,000
registered.....1900			M & N	99	May 4, '99			
Sp'gheld & Col. div. 1st g. 4's.....1940		1,035,000	M & S	94	Oct. 12, '19			
White W. Val. div. 1st g. 4's.....1940		650,000	J & J	83	Nov. 22, '99			
Cin., Ind., St. L. & Chic. 1st g. 4's.....1933		7,685,000	Q F	105½	Apr. 5, '19			
registered.....1920			Q F	95	Nov. 15, '94			
con. 6's.....1920		689,000	M & N	107½	June 30, '93			
Cin., S'dusky & Clev. con. 1st g. 5's.....1928		2,571,000	J & J	113½	Jan. 18, '01	112½	113½	3,000
Clev., C., C. & Ind. con. 7's.....1914		3,991,000	J & D	135½	Jan. 9, '01	135½	135½	3,000
sink. fund 7's.....1914			J & D	119½	Nov. 19, '89			
gen. consol 6's.....1934		3,205,000	J & J	134	Jan. 28, '01	134	134	1,000
registered.....1901			J & J					
Cin., Sp. 1st m. C., C. & Ind. 7's.....1901		1,000,000	A & O	101½	Dec. 7, '19			
Ohio, Ind. & W., 1st p'd. 5's.....1938		500,000	Q J					
Peoria & Eastern 1st con. 4's.....1940		8,103,000	A & O	97	Jan. 31, '01	97	95½	80,000
income 4's.....1900		4,000,000	A	53½	Jan. 31, '01	53½	45½	302,000

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		JANUARY SALE.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Clev., Lorain & Wheel'g con. 1st 5's. 1988		5,000,000	A & O	111	Sept. 5, 19'	....	....	.....
Clev., & Mahoning Val. gold 5's. 1988		2,998,000	J & J	180	May 8, 19'	....	....	.....
registered.....			Q J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Col. Midld Ry. 1st g. 2-3-4's. 1947		7,500,000	J & J	79½	Jan. 31, '01	79½	78	848,000
1st g. 4's. 1947		1,011,000	J & J	79	Jan. 30, '01	79½	77	81,000
Colorado & Southern 1st g. 4's. 1920		17,500,000	F & A	83½	Jan. 31, '01	86	83	718,000
Conn., Passumpsic Riv's 1st g. 4's. 1943		1,900,000	A & O	108	Dec. 27, '93	....	....	.....
Delaware, Lack. & W. mtge 7's. 1907		3,097,000	M & S	128½	Jan. 8, '01	128½	128½	5,000
Morris & Essex 1st m 7's. 1914		5,000,000	M & N	187½	Dec. 27, 19'	....	....	.....
7's. 1871-1901		4,991,000	A & O	103½	Dec. 28, 19'	....	....	.....
1st c. gtd 7's. 1915		12,151,000	J & D	130½	Jan. 29, '01	130½	130½	1,000
registered.....			J & D	140	Oct. 26, '98	....	....	.....
N. Y., Lack. & West'n. 1st 6's. 1921		12,000,000	J & J	138	Dec. 27, 19'	....	....	.....
const. 5's. 1923		5,000,000	F & A	121½	Dec. 27, 19'	....	....	.....
term. imp. 4's. 1923		5,000,000	M & N	109½	Oct. 15, 19'	....	....	.....
Syracuse, Bing. & N. Y. 1st 7's. 1906		1,906,000	A & O	118½	Nov. 15, 19'	....	....	.....
Delaware & Hudson Canal.								
1st Penn. Div. c. 7's. 1917		5,000,000	M & S	146½	May 2, 19'	....	....	.....
reg. 1917			M & S	141	Oct. 22, '98	....	....	.....
Albany & Susq. 1st c. g. 7's. 1906		3,000,000	A & O	116½	Dec. 5, 19'	....	....	.....
registered.....			A & O	122	June 6, '99	....	....	.....
6's. 1906		7,000,000	A & O	112	Dec. 4, 19'	....	....	.....
registered.....			A & O	113½	Aug. 27, 19'	....	....	.....
Rens. & Saratoga 1st c. 7's. 1921		2,000,000	M & N	147	Dec. 4, 19'	....	....	.....
1st r 7's. 1921			M & N	151	Jan. 17, '01	151	151	3,000
Denver & Rio G. 1st con. g. 4's. 1936		28,650,000	J & J	101½	Jan. 31, '01	102½	100½	360,000
con. g. 4½'s. 1936		6,382,000	J & J	108	Jan. 10, '01	108	108	57,000
imp. m. g. 5's. 1936		8,108,500	J & D	107½	Jan. 21, '01	107½	107	82,500
Des Moines Union Ry 1st g. 5's. 1917		628,000	M & N	106½	Jan. 19, '01	106½	106½	3,000
Detroit & Mack. 1st Hen g. 4s. 1906		900,000	J & D	98½	Nov. 20, 19'	....	....	.....
g. 4s. 1906		1,260,000	J & D	87½	Jan. 31, '01	87½	86	42,000
Duluth & Iron Range 1st 5's. 1937		6,734,000	A & O	112	Jan. 31, '01	112	110½	51,000
registered.....			A & O	101½	July 23, '99	....	....	.....
2d l m 6s. 1916		2,000,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Duluth, Red Wing & S'n 1st g. 5's. 1928		500,000	J & J	93½	Feb. 11, '98	....	....	.....
Duluth So. Shore & At. gold 5's. 1937		4,000,000	J & J	112½	Jan. 12, '01	112½	112	6,000
Elgin Joliet & Eastern 1st g 5's. 1941		7,862,000	M & N	109½	Dec. 6, 19'	....	....	.....
Erie 1st ext. g. 4's. 1947		2,482,000	M & N	118½	Jan. 23, '01	119½	118½	13,000
2d extended g. 5's. 1919		2,149,000	M & S	121	Jan. 7, '01	121	121	1,000
3d extended g. 4½'s. 1923		4,618,000	M & S	116	Nov. 22, 19'	....	....	.....
4th extended g. 5's. 1920		2,928,000	A & O	118	Jan. 26, 19'	118	118	7,000
5th extended g. 4's. 1928		709,500	J & D	108½	Feb. 24, 19'	....	....	.....
1st cons. gold 7's. 1920		15,890,000	M & S	142	Jan. 17, '01	142	142	5,000
1st cons. fund g. 7's. 1920		3,699,500	M & S	184½	Oct. 9, 19'	....	....	.....
Erie R.R. 1st con. g. 4s prior bds. 1906		38,452,000	J & J	97½	Jan. 31, '01	97½	96½	2,777,000
registered.....			J & J	98½	May 25, '99	....	....	.....
1st con. gen. Hen g. 4s. 1906		38,867,000	J & J	83	Jan. 31, '01	86½	82½	4,590,000
registered.....			J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Buffalo, N. Y. & Erie 1st 7's. 1916		2,380,000	J & D	140	Feb. 6, '99	....	....	.....
Buffalo & Southwestern g. 6's. 1908		1,500,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
small.....			J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Chicago & Erie 1st gold 5's. 1933		12,000,000	M & N	121	Jan. 26, '01	121½	120	31,000
Jefferson R. R. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1909		2,900,000	A & O	106	Jan. 9, '01	106	106	30,000
Long Dock consol. g. 6's. 1935		7,500,000	A & O	138	Jan. 17, '01	139	138	11,000
N. Y., L. E. & W. Coal & R. R. Co.								
1st gtd. currency 6's. 1922		1,100,000	M & N	....	....	....	....	.....
N. Y., L. E. & W. Dock & Imp.								
Co. 1st currency 6's. 1913		3,896,000	J & J	118	Sept. 27, 19'	....	....	.....
N. Y. & Greenw'd Lake gt g 5's. 1946		1,452,000	M & N	109	Oct. 27, '98	....	....	.....
small.....								
Midland R. of N. J. 1st g. 6's. 1910		3,500,000	A & O	117½	Jan. 8, '01	117½	117½	5,000
N. Y., Sus. & W. 1st retdg. g. 5's. 1937		3,750,000	J & J	111½	Jan. 10, '01	111½	111	12,000
2d g. 4½'s. 1937		453,000	F & A	99½	June 12, 19'	....	....	.....
gen. g. 5's. 1940		2,546,000	F & A	106	Jan. 22, '01	106½	104½	27,000
term. 1st g. 5's. 1943		2,000,000	M & N	113	Apr. 27, 19'	....	....	.....
registered..... \$5,000 each			M & N	....	....	....	....	.....
Wilkesb. & East. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		3,000,000	J & D	107½	Jan. 22, '01	107½	107½	5,000

# BOND SALES.

817

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		JANUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Bureka Springs R'y 1st 6's, g.....1923		500,000	F & A	65	Nov. 10, '97	.....	.....	.....
Evans & Terre Haute 1st con. 6's.....1921		3,000,000	J & J	124	Jan. 20, '01	124	124	1,000
1st General g 5's.....1942		2,228,000	A & O	108	Dec. 20, '19	.....	.....	.....
Mount Vernon 1st 6's.....1923		375,000	A & O	110	May 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
Sul. Co. Bch. 1st g 5's.....1920		450,000	A & O	95	Sept. 15, '91	.....	.....	.....
Evans & Ind'p. 1st con. g g 6's.....1925		1,591,000	J & J	105	Sept. 25, '19	.....	.....	.....
Flint & Pere Marquette m 6's.....1920		3,999,000	A & O	126	Jan. 10, '01	126	126	12,000
1st con. gold 5's.....1920		2,850,000	M & N	108	Jan. 10, '01	108	108	1,000
Port Huron d 1st g 5's.....1920		3,225,000	A & O	112½	Jan. 31, '01	112½	109	199,000
Florida Cen. & Penins. 1st g 5's.....1918		3,000,000	J & J	100	Sept. 6, '99	.....	.....	.....
1st land grant ex. g 5's.....1920		425,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st con. g 5's.....1943		4,370,000	J & J	80½	May 14, '96	.....	.....	.....
Ft. Smith U'n Dep. Co. 1st g 4½'s.....1941		1,000,000	J & J	105	Mar. 11, '98	.....	.....	.....
Ft. Worth & D. C. ctf. dep. 1st 6's.....1921		8,176,000	.....	81¼	Jan. 31, '01	81¼	79¼	592,000
Ft. Worth & Rio Grande 1st g 5's.....1928		2,863,000	J & J	69¼	Jan. 31, '01	69¼	67	286,000
Galveston H. & H. of 1882 1st 5's.....1913		2,000,000	A & O	102½	Jan. 26, '01	108	102½	3,000
Geo. & Ala. Ry. 1st pref. g 5's.....1945		2,320,000	A & O	106	Dec. 12, '88	.....	.....	.....
1st con. g 5's.....1945		2,922,000	J & J	99¼	Nov. 27, '19	.....	.....	.....
Ga. Car. & N. Ry. 1st gtd. g 5's.....1927		5,300,000	J & J	99¼	Jan. 22, '19	.....	.....	.....
Hock, Val. Ry. 1st con. g 4½'s.....1920		9,254,000	J & J	104¼	Jan. 31, '01	104½	102½	564,000
registered.....		1,401,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Col. Hock's Val. 1st ext. g 4's.....1948		1,401,000	A & O	105¼	Nov. 5, '19	.....	.....	.....
Illinois Central, 1st g 4's.....1894-1951		1,500,000	J & J	116	Dec. 18, '19	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	J & J	112¼	Mar. 12, '19	.....	.....	.....
1st gold 8¼'s.....1951		2,499,000	J & J	106¼	Dec. 14, '19	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	J & J	102¼	Apr. 15, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st g 3s sterl. 2500,000.....1951		2,500,000	M & S	92¼	July 13, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
total outstg.....\$13,950,000		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
collat. trust gold 4's.....1952		15,000,000	A & O	104	Dec. 15, '19	.....	.....	.....
regist'd.....		.....	A & O	104½	Jan. 30, '99	.....	.....	.....
col. t. g. 4s L. N. O. & Tex.....1953		34,679,000	M & N	104	Jan. 28, '01	104½	104	35,000
registered.....		.....	M & N	109¼	Dec. 18, '99	.....	.....	.....
Cairo Bridge g 4's.....1950		3,000,000	J & D	123	May 24, '99	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	J & J	102¼	Jan. 29, '01	102¼	101½	38,500
Louisville div. g 3½'s.....1958		14,220,000	J & J	89¼	Dec. 8, '99	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	F & A	95	Dec. 21, '99	.....	.....	.....
Middle div. reg. 5's.....1921		600,000	J & J	92	Dec. 15, '19	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis div. g 3's.....1951		4,999,000	J & J	101¼	Jan. 31, '19	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	J & J	102	Jan. 28, '01	102¼	102	6,000
g 5½'s.....1951		6,321,000	J & J	101¼	Sept. 10, '95	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	J & J	100	Nov. 7, '19	.....	.....	.....
Sp'gfield div 1st g 5½'s.....1951		2,000,000	J & J	124	Dec. 11, '99	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	F & A	115¼	Jan. 29, '01	115¼	115¼	75,000
West'n Line 1st g 4's.....1951		5,425,000	F & A	101¼	Jan. 31, '19	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	J & D	121	Aug. 8, '19	.....	.....	.....
Belleville & Carott 1st 6's.....1923		470,000	J & D	105	Jan. 22, '19	.....	.....	.....
Carbondale & Shawt'n 1st g 4's.....1932		241,000	M & S	126¼	Jan. 21, '91	126¼	126	5,000
Chic., St. L. & N. O. gold 5's.....1951		16,555,000	J & D	123	Sept. 26, '19	.....	.....	.....
gold 5's, registered.....		.....	J & D	100¼	Nov. 14, '19	.....	.....	.....
g 3½'s.....1951		1,852,000	J & D	106¼	Aug. 17, '99	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	J & D	105¼	Sept. 10, '19	.....	.....	.....
Memph. div. 1st g 4's.....1951		3,500,000	J & D	121	Feb. 24, '99	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	M & S	102¼	Nov. 16, '19	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis, South. 1st gtd. g 4's.....1951		538,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ind., Dec. & West. 1st g 5's.....1935		1,824,000	J & J	109¼	Aug. 8, '19	.....	.....	.....
1st gtd. g 5's.....1935		988,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Indiana, Ill. & Iowa 1st rordg. 5's.....1948		3,000,000	A & O	106¼	Dec. 4, '19	.....	.....	.....
Internat. & Gt. N'n 1st 6's, gold.....1919		7,954,000	M & N	125	Jan. 31, '01	125½	124½	17,000
2d g 5's.....1909		6,598,000	M & S	99¼	Jan. 31, '01	100	98½	382,000
3d g 4's.....1921		2,725,000	M & S	67¼	Jan. 30, '01	67¼	67	6,500
Iowa Central 1st gold 5's.....1938		7,650,000	J & D	116¼	Jan. 31, '01	116¼	115¼	71,000
Kansas C. & M. R. & B. Co. 1st gtd. g 5's.....1929		3,000,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kansas City Southern 1st g 3's.....1950		26,197,000	A & O	69¼	Jan. 31, '01	69¼	67	882,000
registered.....		.....	A & O	63¼	Oct. 16, '19	.....	.....	.....
Lake Erie & Western 1st g 5's.....1937		7,250,000	J & J	122¼	Jan. 12, '01	122¼	122	7,000
2d mtg. g 5's.....1941		3,625,000	J & J	117	Jan. 21, '01	118	117	7,000
Northern Ohio 1st gtd. g 5's.....1945		2,500,000	A & O	115¼	Jan. 9, '01	115¼	115¼	10,000

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		JANUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Lehigh Val. (Pa.) coll. g. 5's.....1907		5,000,000	M & N	104	Aug. 8, '98	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....			M & N			.....	.....	.....
Lehigh Val. N. Y. 1st m. g. 4½'s.1940		15,000,000	J & J	110	Jan. 28, '01	110	109½	21,000
" registered.....			J & J	100½	Jan. 24, '01	100½	100½	3,000
Lehigh Val. Ter. R. 1st gtd g. 5's.1941		10,000,000	A & O	112	July 9, '19	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....			A & O	100½	Oct. 18, '99	.....	.....	.....
Lehigh V. Coal Co. 1st gtd g. 5's.1938		10,280,000	J & J	100½	Nov. 21, '99	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....			J & J			.....	.....	.....
Lehigh & N. Y., 1st gtd g. 4's.....1945		2,000,000	M & S	95	Jan. 29, '01	95	95	95,000
" registered.....			M & S			.....	.....	.....
{ Elm. Cort. & N. 1st g. 1st pd 6's 1914		750,000	A & O			.....	.....	.....
g. gtd 5's.....1914		1,350,000	A & O	101½	Sept. 1, '99	.....	.....	.....
Long Island 1st cons. 5's.....1981		3,610,000	Q J	123	Jan. 10, '01	123	123	3,000
" 1st con. g. 4's.....1981		1,121,000	Q J	101	Nov. 22, '99	.....	.....	.....
" Long Island gen. m. 4's.....1938		3,000,000	J & D	104	Jan. 30, '01	104½	103	44,000
" Ferry 1st g. 4½'s.....1922		1,500,000	M & S	105	Jan. 7, '01	105	105	13,000
" g. 4's.....1922		825,000	J & D	102½	May 5, '97	.....	.....	.....
" unified g. 4's.....1949		5,685,000	M & S	98	Jan. 21, '01	98	98	85,000
" deb. g. 5's.....1984		1,185,000	J & L	100	May 25, '97	.....	.....	.....
{ Brooklyn & Montauk 1st 6's.....1911		250,000	M & S			.....	.....	.....
" 1st 5's.....1911		750,000	M & S	110	Aug. 8, '98	.....	.....	.....
" N. Y. B'kin & M. B. 1st c. g. 5's.....1985		1,601,000	A & O	107	Jan. 31, '99	.....	.....	.....
" N. Y. & Rock'y Beach 1st g. 5's.1927		888,000	M & S	105	May 4, '99	.....	.....	.....
" Long Isl. R. R. Nor. Shore Branch						.....	.....	.....
1st con. gold garnt'd 5's.1932		1,425,000	Q J A N	118	Dec. 23, '19	.....	.....	.....
{ Louis. & Nash. gen. g. 6's.....1930		9,515,000	J & D	119	Jan. 22, '01	119	112	24,000
" gold 5's.....1937		1,764,000	M & N	111	Jan. 24, '01	111	111	1,000
" Unified gold 4's.....1940		17,994,000	J & J	101½	Jan. 30, '01	101½	99½	211,000
" registered.....1940			J & J	88	Feb. 27, '93	.....	.....	.....
" collateral trust g. 5's.1931		5,129,000	M & N	110½	Jan. 25, '01	110½	110½	20,000
" coll. tr 5-20 g. 4's.....1906-1918		11,500,000	A & O	100½	Jan. 31, '01	100½	99½	160,000
" Cecilian branch. 7's.....1947		380,000	M & S	106	Dec. 31, '19	.....	.....	.....
" E. Hend. & N. 1st 6's.....1919		1,825,000	J & D	115	Nov. 15, '19	.....	.....	.....
" L. Clin. & Lex. g. 4½'s.1931		3,258,000	M & N	103	Jan. 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
" N. O. & Mobile 1st g. 5's.....1930		5,000,000	J & J	130	Jan. 19, '01	130	130	4,000
" 2d g. 6's.....1930		1,000,000	J & J	117	Oct. 1, '19	.....	.....	.....
" Pensacola div. g. 6's.....1920		580,000	M & S	115	Dec. 5, '19	.....	.....	.....
" St. Louis div. 1st g. 6's.1921		3,500,000	M & S	126½	Jan. 22, '01	126½	126½	4,000
" 2d g. 8's.....1930		3,000,000	M & S	63½	Oct. 1, '19	.....	.....	.....
" Ken. Cent. g. 4's.....1937		6,742,000	J & J	99½	Jan. 31, '01	99½	99½	37,000
" L. & N. & Mob. & Montg						.....	.....	.....
1st g. 4½'s.....1945		4,000,000	M & S	112	Jan. 10, '01	112	112	2,000
" N. Fla. & S. 1st g. 5's.1937		2,096,000	F & A	112	Jan. 7, '01	112	112	2,000
" Pen. & At. 1st g. g. 6's.1921		2,708,000	F & A	113	Jan. 2, '01	113	113	5,000
" S. & N. A. con. gtd. g. 5's.1936		3,673,000	F & A	111½	Jan. 2, '01	111½	111½	25,000
" So. & N. Ala. st'fd. g. 6s.1910		1,942,000	A & O	92½	Sept. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
Lo. & Jefferson Bdg. Co. gtd. g. 4's.1945		3,000,000	M & S	96½	Nov. 17, '99	.....	.....	.....
Manhattan Railway Con. 4's.....1990		28,065,000	A & O	106	Jan. 31, '01	106	104½	250,000
Metropolitan Elevated 1st 6's.....1908		10,818,000	J & J	116½	Jan. 23, '01	116½	115	144,000
Manitoba Sw'n. Coloniza'n g. 5's.1934		2,544,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mexican Central.						.....	.....	.....
" con. mtge. 4's.....1911		62,643,000	J & J	80½	Jan. 10, '01	81½	80½	36,000
" 1st con. inc. 3's.....1939		17,072,000	JULY	28½	Jan. 31, '01	28½	26	864,000
" 2d 3's.....1939		11,310,000	JULY	13½	Jan. 24, '01	14½	13	522,000
" equip. & collat. g. 5's.....1917		850,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" 2d series g. 5's.....1919		915,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mexican Internat'l 1st con g. 4's.1942		4,635,000	M & S	85	Jan. 31, '01	85	84½	77,000
Mexican Nat. 1st gold 6's.....1927		10,955,000	J & D	109½	Apr. 19, '19	.....	.....	.....
" 2d inc. 6's "A" 1917 coup. due		12,265,000	M & S	81	Apr. 10, '19	.....	.....	.....
" Sept. 1, 1899, stamped 1½ paid						.....	.....	.....
" 2d inc. 6's "B".....1917		12,265,000	A	17	Apr. 25, '19	.....	.....	.....
" Northern 1st g. 6's.....1910		1,182,000	J & D	105	May 2, '19	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....			J & D			.....	.....	.....



**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		JANUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Minneapolis & St. Louis 1st g. 7's. 1927		950,000	J & D	149	May 9, 19'	....	....	.....
" Iowa ext. 1st g. 7's. .... 1909		1,015,000	J & D	122	Jan. 16, '01	122	122	5,000
" Pacific ext. 1st g. 6's. .... 1921		1,382,000	J & A	124½	Nov. 14, 19'	....	....	.....
" Southw. ext. 1st g. 7's. .... 1910		630,000	J & D	123	Dec. 5, 19'	....	....	.....
" 1st con. g. 5's. .... 1904		5,000,000	M & N	117½	Jan. 29, '01	117½	116½	13,000
" 1st & refunding g. 4's. .... 1949		7,600,000	M & S	98½	Jan. 31, '01	99	97	180,000
Minneapolis & Pacific 1st m. 5's. .... 1936		3,208,000	J & J	102	Mar. 26, '87	....	....	.....
" stamped 4's pay. of int. gtd.						....	....	.....
Minn., S. S. M. & Atlan. 1st g. 4's. 1926		8,280,000	J & J	94	Apl. 2, '95	....	....	.....
" stamped pay. of int. gtd.				89½	June 18, '91	....	....	.....
Minn., S. P. & S. S. M., 1st c. g. 4's. 1838		6,710,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
" stamped pay. of int. gtd.				....	....	....	....	.....
Missouri, K. & T. 1st mtge g. 4's. 1990		39,718,000	J & D	97½	Jan. 31, '01	99	96	656,500
" 2d mtge. g. 4's. .... 1900		20,000,000	F & A	80½	Jan. 30, '01	80½	75	3,452,000
" 1st ext gold 5's. .... 1944		1,498,000	M & N	99½	Jan. 31, '01	99½	97	738,000
Booneville Bdg. Co. gtd. g. 7's. .... 1906		510,000	M & N	100½	Nov. 22, '99	....	....	.....
Dallas & Waco 1st gtd. g. 5's. .... 1940		1,340,000	M & N	90	Sept. 6, 19'	....	....	.....
Mo. K. & T. of Tex 1st gtd. g. 5's. .... 1942		2,685,000	M & S	99	Jan. 31, '01	100½	96	342,000
Sher. Shrevept & Solst gtd. g. 5's. .... 1943		1,689,000	J & D	100½	Jan. 31, '01	100½	99½	110,000
Kan. City & Pacific 1st g. 4's. .... 1900		2,500,000	F & A	90½	Jan. 31, '01	90½	87½	84,000
Tebo. & Neosho 1st 7's. .... 1903		187,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	.....
Mo. Kan. & East'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. .... 1942		4,000,000	A & O	109	Jan. 30, '01	109½	109	17,000
Missouri, Pacific 1st con. g. 6's. .... 1920		14,904,000	M & N	121½	Jan. 29, '01	122	119½	88,000
" 3d mortgage 7's. .... 1906		3,828,000	M & N	115½	Jan. 25, '01	115½	114½	82,000
" trusts gold 5's stamp'd 1917		14,376,000	M & S	103½	Jan. 31, '01	104	100½	915,000
" registered. ....			M & S	....	....	....	....	.....
" 1st collateral gold 5's. .... 1920		7,000,000	F & A	105	Jan. 29, '01	105	103	280,000
" registered. ....			F & A	....	....	....	....	.....
Leroy & Caney Val. A. L. 1st 5's. .... 1926		520,000	J & J	94	June 7, 19'	....	....	.....
Pacific R. of Mo. 1st m. ex. 4's. .... 1938		7,000,000	M & S	107½	Dec. 20, 19'	....	....	.....
" 2d extended g. 5's. .... 1938		2,573,000	F & A	113	Jan. 8, '01	113	113	1,900
St. L. & I. g. con. R.R. & I. gr. 5's. .... 1931		35,716,000	A & O	115½	Jan. 31, '01	115½	114	328,000
" stamped gtd gold 5's. .... 1931		6,945,000	A & O	112½	Dec. 22, 19'	....	....	.....
" unify'g & rfd'g g. 4's. .... 1929		23,090,000	J & J	87½	Jan. 31, '01	88	84½	1,508,000
" registered. ....			J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Verdigris V'y Ind. & W. 1st 5's. .... 1926		750,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	.....
Mob. & Birm., prior lien, g. 5's. .... 1945		374,000	J & J	109	Aug. 31, 19'	....	....	.....
" small. ....		226,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
" inc. g. 4's. .... 1945		700,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
" small. ....		500,000	....	....	....	....	....	.....
Mob. Jackson & Kan. City 1st g. 5's. .... 1946		1,000,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	.....
Mobile & Ohio new mort. g. 6's. .... 1927		7,000,000	J & J	130½	Jan. 31, '01	130½	127½	19,000
" 1st extension 6's. .... 1927		974,000	J & D	130	Jan. 31, '01	130	130	1,000
" gen. g. 4's. .... 1938		9,472,000	Q J	96½	Jan. 31, '01	96½	87½	770,500
" Montg'yrdydiv. 1st g. 5's. .... 1947		4,000,000	F & A	113	Jan. 30, '01	113	110	63,000
" registered. ....			J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
St. Louis & Cairo gtd g. 4's. .... 1931		4,000,000	M & S	96½	Dec. 3, 19'	....	....	.....
Nashville, Chat. & St. L. 1st 7's. .... 1913		6,300,000	J & J	128	Jan. 26, '01	128½	128	36,000
" 1st cons. g. 5's. .... 1928		7,412,000	A & O	112½	Jan. 30, '01	112½	111	151,000
" 1st g. 6's Jasper Branch. .... 1923		371,000	J & J	113	Dec. 1, '99	....	....	.....
" 1st 6's McM. M.W. & Al. .... 1917		750,000	J & J	108	Mar. 24, '96	....	....	.....
" 1st 6's T. & Pb. .... 1917		300,000	J & J	110	Dec. 20, '99	....	....	.....
N. O. & N. East. prior lien g. 6's. .... 1915		1,320,000	A & O	108½	Aug. 13, '94	....	....	.....
N. Y. Cent. & Hud. R. 1st c. 7's. .... 1903		18,481,000	J & J	107	Jan. 30, '01	107	106½	19,000
" 1st registered. .... 1903			J & J	109½	Dec. 20, 19'	....	....	.....
" g. mortgage 3½'s. .... 1907		37,350,000	J & J	109½	Jan. 24, '01	109½	109	17,000
" registered. ....			J & J	110	Aug. 27, 19'	....	....	.....
" debenture 5's. .... 1884-1904		4,751,000	M & S	108½	Jan. 16, '01	108½	105½	27,000
" debenture 5's reg. .... 1903			M & S	105½	Nov. 23, 19'	....	....	.....
" reg. debent. 5's. .... 1889-1904		657,000	M & S	108½	Feb. 21, '98	....	....	.....
" debenture g. 4's. .... 1890-1905		5,485,000	J & D	102½	Jan. 23, '01	102½	102½	8,000
" registered. ....			J & D	102½	Jan. 16, '01	102½	102½	15,000
" deb. cert. ext. g. 4's. .... 1905		3,733,000	M & N	101	Dec. 6, 19'	....	....	.....
" registered. ....			M & N	106½	Sept. 23, '99	....	....	.....
Lake Shore col. g. 3½'s. .... 1908		90,578,000	F & A	99	Jan. 30, '01	99	98	429,000
" registered. ....			F & A	96½	Jan. 30, '01	97½	95½	169,000
Michigan Central col. g. 3½'s. .... 1908		18,900,000	F & A	97½	Jan. 16, '01	97½	97½	15,000
" registered. ....			F & A	97	Jan. 11, '01	97	97	10,000
Beech Creek 1st gtd. 4's. .... 1936		5,000,000	J & J	112½	Jan. 30, '01	112½	112½	1,000
" registered. ....			J & J	106	June 17, '98	....	....	.....
" 2d gtd. g. 5's. .... 1936		500,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
" registered. ....			J & J	....	....	....	....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Dus.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		JANUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Carthage & Adiron. 1st gtd g. 4's 1881		1,100,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Clearfield Bit. Coal Corporation, {		770,000	J & J	95	July 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st s. f. int. gtd. g. 4's ser. A. 1940 {		28,100	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
small bonds series B. ....		800,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Gouv. & Oswego 1st gtd g. 5's. 1842		2,500,000	M & S	107½	July 6, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Mohawk & Malone 1st gtd g. 4's. 1891		3,900,000	Sept.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
inc. 5's. ....		1,660,000	F & A	102	Feb. 3, '97	.....	.....	.....
N. Jersey Junc. R. R. g. 1st 4's. 1856 {		4,000,000	A & O	108	May 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
reg. certificates. ....		180,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Putnam 1st con. gtd g. 4's. 1868		50,000,000	J & J	115	Jan. 30, '01	115½	113½	102,800
Nor. & Montreal 1st g. gtd 5's. 1916		8,428,000	J & J	118½	Jan. 31, '01	112½	112½	118,800
West Shore 1st guaranteed 4's. 2261 {		40,700,000	J & J	110½	Dec. 28, 19'	110½	110½	4,800
registered. ....		1,000,000	J & D	110½	Jan. 17, '01	109½	108½	4,000
Lake Shore con. 2d 7's. ....		1,000,000	J & D	110½	Jan. 18, '01	.....	.....	.....
con. 2d registered. ....		1,000,000	J & D	110½	Mar. 17, 19'	.....	.....	.....
g 5's. ....		1,000,000	A & O	109½	Dec. 1, '97	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....		1,000,000	F & A	119	Dec. 7, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Cin. Sp. 1st gtd L. S. & M. S. 7's. 1901		924,000	J & J	120	Dec. 17, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Detroit, Mon. & Toledo 1st 7's. 1908		840,000	J & J	117	May 31, '89	.....	.....	.....
Kal., A. & G. H. 1st gtd c. 5's. 1888		1,500,000	J & J	117	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mahoning Coal R. R. 1st 5's. ....		2,350,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pitt McK. port & Y. 1st gtd 6's. 1882 {		600,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
2d gtd 6's. ....		8,000,000	M & N	105½	Jan. 16, '01	105½	105½	8,000
McKapt & Bell. V. 1st g. 6's. ....		2,000,000	M & N	102½	Jan. 30, '01	102½	102½	20,000
Michigan Cent. 1st con. 7's. ....		1,500,000	M & S	119	Jan. 8, '01	119	119	5,000
6's. ....		3,576,000	M & S	127½	Jan. 9, '01	127½	127½	2,000
coup. 5's. ....		2,000,000	Q & M	127½	Nov. 8, 19'	.....	.....	.....
reg. 5's. ....		476,000	J & J	105	Jan. 4, 19'	.....	.....	.....
mort. 4's. ....		11,444,000	J & J	106½	Nov. 28, 19'	.....	.....	.....
mtge. 4's reg. ....		1,200,000	J & D	102½	Mar. 18, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Battle C. Sturgis 1st g. 8's. ....		1,200,000	M & N	102½	Apr. 6, 19'	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Harlem 1st mort. 7's. 1900 {		9,061,000	A & O	122	Jan. 30, '01	122	121	9,800
7's registered. ....		400,000	A & O	127½	Jan. 18, '01	127½	126½	11,000
N. Y. & Northern 1st g. 5's. ....		375,000	F & A	118	Apr. 18, '94	.....	.....	.....
R. W. & Og. con. 1st ext. 5's. ....		1,800,000	J & J	110	Oct. 15, 19'	.....	.....	.....
coup. g. bond currency. ....		10,425,000	A & O	108½	Jan. 31, '01	106½	107½	108,000
Oswego & Rome 2d gtd gold 5's. 1915 {		2,000,000	A & O	106½	Dec. 2, 19'	.....	.....	.....
R. W. & O. Ter. R. 1st gtd 5's. 1918		15,007,500	J & D	187	Nov. 17, '99	.....	.....	.....
Utica & Black River gtd g. 4's. 1822 {		1,480,000	A & O	197½	Jan. 15, '01	198	196½	19,000
N. Y., Chic. & St. Louis 1st g. 4's. 1887 {		2,838,000	.....	197	Jan. 17, '01	197	196½	1,800
registered. ....		575,000	M & N	135½	Dec. 12, 19'	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., N. Haven & H. 1st reg. 4's. 1908 {		4,000,000	M & N	115½	Oct. 15, '94	.....	.....	.....
con. deb. receipts. ....		6,000,000	J & J	114	Jan. 5, 19'	.....	.....	.....
small certifs. ....		4,000,000	J & J	118	July 29, '99	.....	.....	.....
Housatonic R. con. g. 5's. ....		16,987,000	M & S	107	Jan. 31, '01	108	108½	116,800
New Haven and Derby con. 5's. 1918 {		1,360,000	M & S	101½	Nov. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st 6's. ....		7,288,000	M & N	110½	Dec. 14, 19'	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & New England 1st 7's. ....		5,000,000	F & A	181½	Dec. 18, 19'	.....	.....	.....
1st 6's. ....		2,000,000	A & O	183	Jan. 29, '01	183	182½	2,000
Norfolk & Southern 1st g. 5's. ....		23,704,600	A & O	100½	Jan. 31, '01	100½	99½	718,000
registered. ....		600,000	A & O	97½	July 18, '99	.....	.....	.....
small bonds. ....		5,000,000	J & J	107	Nov. 28, 19'	.....	.....	.....
C. C. & T. 1st g. t. g. 5's. 1822 {		94,007,500	J & N	102½	Jan. 31, '01	103	102½	22,000
Sci'o Val & N. E. 1st g. 4's. 1889 {		56,000,000	Q J	105½	Jan. 31, '01	105½	104½	958,000
registered. ....		7,985,000	Q J	105½	Dec. 14, 19'	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul & N. Pacific gen. g. 6's. 1823 {		1,000,000	Q F	71½	Jan. 31, '01	71½	69½	1,575,000
registered certificates. ....		2,000,000	Q F	70½	Dec. 10, 19'	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul & Duluth 1st 5's. ....		1,000,000	F & A	181½	Nov. 23, 19'	.....	.....	.....
2d 5's. ....		1,000,000	Q F	182	July 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st con. g. 4's. ....		1,000,000	F & A	180	Dec. 23, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Washington Cen. Ry 1st g. 4's. 1948 {		1,538,000	A & O	117	Jan. 9, '01	117	117	1,000
1st con. g. 4's. ....		3,809,000	J & D	103	Jan. 8, '01	103	108	2,000
Nor. Pacific Term. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1888 {		.....	QMCH	88½	May 31, 19'	.....	.....	.....
1st g. 6's. ....		.....	J & J	116	Jan. 21, '01	116	116	2,000

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	<i>Principal Due.</i>	Amount.	<i>Int't Paid.</i>	LAST SALE.		JANUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High	Low.	Total.
Ohio River Railroad 1st 5's.....	1936	2,000,000	J & D	110	July 24, '19'	....	....	.....
" gen. mortg. g 6's.....	1937	2,428,000	A & O	95	Dec. 12, '19'	....	....	.....
Omaha & St. Lo. 1st g 4's.....	1901	2,376,000	J & J	75	Apr. 4, '19'	....	....	.....
Pacific Coast Co. 1st g. 5's.....	1946	4,446,000	J & D	110	Jan. 31, '01	110	108	62,000
Panama 1st sink fund g. 4½'s.....	1917	1,638,000	A & O	105	Jan. 31, '01	105	104	10,000
" s. f. subsidy g 6's.....	1910	1,346,000	M & N	101	Dec. 15, '99	....	....	.....
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. Penn. Co.'s gtd. 4½'s, 1st.....	1921 1921	19,467,000	J & J	114%	Jan. 31, '01	115	114¾	46,000
" reg.....	1921	5,000,000	J & J	113¼	Jan. 23, '01	113¾	113¼	34,000
" gtd. 3½ col. tr. reg. cts. ....	1937	1,506,000	M & S	114¾	Feb. 15, '99	....	....	.....
Chic., St. Louis, & P. 1st c. 5's..	1932	3,000,000	A & O	124	Dec. 5, '19'	....	....	.....
" registered.....	1942	2,000,000	A & O	110	May 3, '92	....	....	.....
Clev.&P. gen.gtd.g. 4½'s Ser. A..	1942	3,000,000	J & J	121	Oct. 22, '19'	....	....	.....
" Series B.....	1942	2,000,000	A & O	....	....	....	....	.....
" Series C 3½'s.....	1948	3,000,000	M & N	....	....	....	....	.....
E.&Pitts. gen.gtd.g. 3½'s Ser.B..	1940	2,250,000	F & A	....	....	....	....	.....
" "C.....	1940	1,508,000	J & J	102	Nov. 7, '19'	....	....	.....
Newp. & Cin. Bge Co. gtd g. 4's..	1945	1,400,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
" Pitts., C.C. & St. L. con. g 4½'s	1940	10,000,000	A & O	116%	Jan. 25, '01	116%	116¾	8,000
" Series A.....	1942	8,786,000	A & O	115¾	Jan. 9, '01	115¾	115¾	15,000
" Series B gtd.....	1942	1,379,000	M & N	113	Nov. 23, '98	....	....	.....
" Series C gtd.....	1945	4,983,000	M & N	109	Apr. 12, '19'	....	....	.....
" Series E gtd. g. 3½'s.....	1949	5,859,000	F & A	99	Dec. 21, '19'	....	....	.....
Pitts., Ft. Wayne & C. 1st 7's..	1912	2,917,000	J & J	137½	Dec. 6, '19'	....	....	.....
" 2d 7's.....	1912	2,546,000	J & J	137¾	Nov. 27, '19'	....	....	.....
" 3d 7's.....	1912	2,000,000	A & O	136¾	Jan. 28, '01	136%	136¾	7,000
Penn. RR. Co. 1st Rl Est. g 4's...	1923	1,675,000	M & N	108	May 12, '97	....	....	.....
" con. sterling gold 6 per cent....	1905	22,762,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
" con. currency, 6's registered....	1905	4,718,000	Q M 15	....	....	....	....	.....
" con. gold 5 per cent.....	1919	4,998,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	.....
" registered.....	1943	3,000,000	Q M	....	....	....	....	.....
" con. gold 4 per cent.....	1943	5,380,000	M & N	....	....	....	....	.....
Allegh. Valley gen. gtd. g. 4's..	1942	1,250,000	M & S	110	Aug. 28, '19'	....	....	.....
Clev. & Mar. 1st gtd g. 4½'s.....	1935	1,300,000	M & N	112¾	Mar. 7, '19'	....	....	.....
Del.R.R. RR. & BgeCo 1stgtdg.4's,	1936	1,300,000	F & A	....	....	....	....	.....
G.R. & Ind. Ex. 1st gtd. g. 4½'s	1941	4,455,000	J & J	112	Jan. 30, '01	....	....	.....
Sunbury & Lewistown 1stg.4's	1936	500,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
U'd N.J. RR. & Can Co. g 4's....	1944	5,646,000	M & S	117	May 1, '19'	112¼	112	7,000
Peoria & Pekin Union 1st 6's....	1921	1,495,000	Q F	133¾	Jan. 26, '01	133¾	133¾	10,000
" 2d m 4½'s.....	1921	1,499,000	M & N	101	Oct. 31, '19'	....	....	.....
Pine Creek Railway 6's.....	1932	3,500,000	J & D	137	Nov. 17, '93	....	....	.....
Pittsburg, Clev. & Toledo 1st 6's.	1922	2,400,000	A & O	107¼	Oct. 26, '93	....	....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		JANUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Rio Grande June'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1899		1,850,000	J & D	105	Nov. 10, '99	.....	.....	.....
Rio Grande Southern 1st g. 4's. 1940		2,233,000	J & J	78	Dec. 8, '19	.....	.....	.....
guaranteed.....		2,277,000	.....	98½	Jan. 18, '01	98½	92½	21,000
Saginaw Tusc. & Hur. 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1881		1,000,000	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Salt Lake City 1st g. sink fu'd 6's. 1913		297,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Jo. & Gr. Isl. 1st g. 2.842..... 1947		8,500,000	J & J	91	Jan. 26, '01	91	89½	49,000
St. L. & Adirondack Ry. 1st g. 5's. 1896		800,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
2d g. 6's..... 1896		400,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis & San F. 2d 6's. Class A. 1906		500,000	M & N	110	Nov. 15, '99	.....	.....	.....
2d g. 6's. Class B..... 1906		2,638,000	M & N	112½	Jan. 31, '01	112½	111½	19,000
2d g. 6's. Class C..... 1906		2,369,000	M & N	112	Jan. 28, '01	112	111½	12,000
gen. g. 6's..... 1906		7,807,000	J & J	128	Jan. 23, '01	128½	127½	31,000
1st Trust g. 5's..... 1901		12,262,000	J & J	113½	Jan. 29, '01	114	112½	57,000
1st g. 6's P. C. & O..... 1919		1,029,000	F & A	102½	Oct. 17, '19	.....	.....	.....
1st g. 6's..... 1907		1,029,000	A & O	118	May 23, '92	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis & San F. R. R. g. 4's. 1906		1,029,000	J & D	95½	Jan. 31, '01	95½	91½	402,000
Central div. 1st g. 4's. 1929		1,982,000	A & O	90½	Dec. 11, '19	.....	.....	.....
N. W. div. 1st g. 4's. 1930		1,100,000	A & O	100	June 12, '19	.....	.....	.....
S. W. div. g. 5's..... 1947		1,530,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kansas, Midland 1st g. 4's..... 1937		1,608,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis S. W. 1st g. 4's Bd. ctf's. 1899		20,000,000	M & N	97½	Jan. 31, '01	98	95½	1,795,000
2d g. 4's Inc. Bd. ctf's. 1899		9,000,000	J & J	76	Jan. 31, '01	76½	71	4,010,500
Gray's Point, Term. 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1947		899,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul, Minn. & Manito'a 2d 6's. 1909		8,000,000	A & O	118½	Jan. 31, '01	118½	118½	19,000
1st con. 6's..... 1933		18,344,000	J & J	141½	Jan. 18, '01	141½	141	87,000
1st con. 6's, registered.....		.....	J & J	137½	Feb. 23, '99	.....	.....	.....
1st c. 6's, red'd to g. 4½'s.....		21,027,000	J & J	115½	Jan. 28, '01	115½	114½	8,000
1st cons. 6's registered.....		.....	J & J	115½	Nov. 20, '19	.....	.....	.....
Dakota ext'n g. 6's. 1910		5,676,000	M & N	120	Jan. 29, '01	120	119½	13,000
Mont. ext'n 1st g. 4's. 1937		7,907,000	J & D	103½	Jan. 18, '01	103½	102½	4,000
registered.....		.....	J & D	104	Jan. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....
Eastern Ry. Minn. 1st div. 1st g. 5's. 1908		4,700,000	A & O	109½	Jan. 25, '01	109½	109	6,000
registered.....		.....	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Minn. N. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		5,000,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Minneapolis Union 1st g. 6's. 1922		2,150,000	J & J	128	Apr. 4, '19	.....	.....	.....
Montana Cent. 1st 6's int. gtd. 1937		6,000,000	J & J	133	Jan. 21, '01	133	132	9,000
1st 6's, registered.....		.....	J & J	115	Apr. 24, '97	.....	.....	.....
1st g. g. 5's..... 1937		2,700,000	J & J	118	Dec. 7, '19	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Willmar & Sioux Falls 1st g. 5's. 1938		8,625,000	J & D	120	Apr. 11, '99	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
San Fe Pres. & Phoe. Ry. 1st g. 5's. 1942		4,940,000	M & S	104	Jan. 11, '01	104	104	7,000
San Fran. & N. Pac. 1st s. f. g. 5's. 1919		8,872,000	J & J	112	June 9, '19	.....	.....	.....
Sav. Florida & Wn. 1st c. g. 6's. 1934		4,058,000	A & O	126½	Jan. 18, '19	.....	.....	.....
1st g. 5's..... 1934		2,444,000	A & O	112	Mar. 17, '99	.....	.....	.....
St. John's div. 1st g. 4's. 1934		1,850,000	J & J	94½	Dec. 12, '19	.....	.....	.....
Alabama Midland 1st gtd. g. 5s. 1928		2,800,000	M & N	108	Dec. 31, '19	.....	.....	.....
Brunsw. & West. 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1938		3,000,000	J & J	87	Jan. 12, '01	87	87	10,000
Sil. S. Oc. & G. R. R. & Ig. gtd. g. 4's. 1918		1,107,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Seaboard & Roanoke 1st 5's..... 1928		2,500,000	J & J	104½	Feb. 5, '98	.....	.....	.....
Carolina Central 1st con. g. 4's. 1949		2,847,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Sodus Bay & Sout'n 1st 5's, gold, 1924		500,000	J & J	106	Sept. 4, '96	.....	.....	.....
Southern Pacific Co.								
2-5 year col. trust g. 4½'s. 1905		10,000,000	J & D	99½	Jan. 31, '01	99½	98½	598,000
g. 4's Central Pac. coll. 1949		28,818,500	J & D	86½	Jan. 31, '01	86½	83	2,422,000
registered.....		.....	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Cent. Pac. 1st refud. gtd. g. 4's. 1949		54,743,000	F & A	102½	Jan. 31, '01	102½	100½	820,500
registered.....		.....	F & A	99½	June 1, '19	.....	.....	.....
mtge. gtd. g. 3½'s. 1929		19,877,000	J & D	85½	Jan. 31, '01	85½	83½	662,000
registered.....		.....	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Gal. Harrisb'gh & S. A. 1st g. 6's. 1910		4,756,000	F & A	110	May 28, '19	.....	.....	.....
2d g. 7's..... 1905		1,000,000	J & D	105	Aug. 15, '19	.....	.....	.....
Mex. & P. div 1st g. 5's. 1931		13,418,000	M & N	100½	Jan. 31, '01	100½	100	344,000
Houst. E. & W. Tex. 1st g. 5's. 1933		522,000	M & N	106	Jan. 2, '01	106	106	1,000
1st gtd. g. 5's..... 1933		2,178,000	M & N	104½	July 13, '19	.....	.....	.....
Houst. & T. C. 1st g. 5's int. gtd. 1937		6,571,000	J & J	110	Jan. 2, '01	110	110	2,000
con. g. 9's int. gtd. 1912		3,311,000	A & O	110½	Nov. 23, '19	.....	.....	.....
gen. g. 4's int. gtd. 1931		4,387,000	A & O	86½	Jan. 26, '01	86½	86½	8,000

# BOND SALES.

828

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		JANUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Morgan's La & Tex. 1st g 6's....1920		1,494,000	J & J	120½	Feb. 28, 19'	.....	.....	.....
1st 7's.....1918		5,000,000	A & O	137½	Jan. 29, '01	137½	137½	5,000
N. Y. Tex. & Mex. gtd. 1st g 4's....1912		1,465,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Nth'n Ry of Cal. 1st gtd. g. 6's....1907		3,964,000	J & J	94	Nov. 30, '97	.....	.....	.....
gtd. g. 5's.....1907		4,751,000	A & O	113	Jan. 4, '01	113	113	2,000
Oreg. & Cal. 1st gtd. g 5's.....1927		19,521,000	J & J	101½	Dec. 27, 19'	.....	.....	.....
San Ant. & Aran Pass 1st gtd g 4's....1943		18,900,000	J & J	81½	Jan. 31, '01	81½	77½	582,000
Tex. & New Orleans 1st 7's.....1905		1,347,000	F & A	114½	Dec. 12, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Sabine div. 1st g 6's.....1912		2,575,000	M & S	106½	Nov. 17, '97	.....	.....	.....
con. g 5's.....1943		1,620,000	J & J	105½	Jan. 31, '01	105½	103½	320,000
South'n Pac. of Ariz. 1st 6's 1900-1910		10,000,000	J & J	112	Jan. 28, '01	112	111	21,000
of Cal. 1st g 6's ser. A. 1905		.....	APR.	108½	Jan. 21, '01	109	108½	7,500
ser. B. 1905		.....	OCT.	110½	Aug. 24, 19'	.....	.....	.....
C. & D. 1906		30,217,500	A & O	111½	Jan. 30, '01	111½	111½	1,000
E. & F. 1902		.....	A & O	114½	Nov. 3, '99	.....	.....	.....
1912		.....	A & O	119	Jan. 19, '01	119	119	15,000
1st con. gtd. g 5's.....1937		6,576,000	M & N	107	Nov. 27, 19'	.....	.....	.....
stamped.....1905-1937		19,168,000	.....	108	Jan. 30, '01	108	106½	40,000
Austin & North'n 1st g 5's.....1941		1,920,000	J & J	99½	Jan. 18, '01	99½	96	113,500
So. Pacific Coast 1st gtd. g. 4's....1937		5,500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
of N. Mex. c. 1st 6's....1911		4,180,000	J & J	116	Aug. 3, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Gila Val. G. & N'n 1st gtd g 5's....1924		1,514,000	M & N	106½	Jan. 30, '01	106½	105	59,000
Southern Railway 1st con. g 5's....1994								
registered.....		33,223,000	J & J	115	Jan. 31, '01	115	111½	935,000
Memph. div. 1st g. 4-4½ 5's....1906		5,083,000	J & J	108	Aug. 3, 19'	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	J & J	109	Jan. 21, '01	109	109	1,000
Alabama Central, 1st 6's.....1918		1,000,000	J & J	112½	Aug. 17, '97	.....	.....	.....
Atlantic & Danville 1st g. 4's....1948		3,175,000	J & J	93½	Jan. 28, '01	93½	93½	13,000
Atlantic & Yadkin, 1st gtd g 4's....1949		1,500,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Col. & Greenville, 1st 5-6's.....1916		2,000,000	J & J	115	Jan. 31, 19'	.....	.....	.....
East Tenn., Va. & Ga. div. g 5's....1930		3,106,000	J & J	117½	Jan. 29, '01	117½	117½	3,000
con. 1st g 5's.....1956		12,770,000	M & N	119½	Jan. 26, '01	119½	118	99,000
reorg. lien g 4's.....1938		4,500,000	M & S	113½	Jan. 15, '01	113½	113½	10,000
registered.....		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ga. Pacific Ry. 1st g 5-6's.....1922		5,660,000	J & J	125	Nov. 27, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Knoxville & Ohio, 1st g 6's.....1925		2,000,000	J & J	124½	Jan. 24, '01	124½	124½	1,000
Rich. & Danville, con. g 6's.....1915		5,597,000	J & J	123	Jan. 26, '01	123	122	21,000
equip. sink. f'd g 6's....1909		818,000	M & S	101½	July 20, 19'	.....	.....	.....
deb. 5's stamped.....1927		3,308,000	A & O	109½	Dec. 7, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Rich. & Mecklenburg 1st g. 4's....1948		15,000	M & N	83	Dec. 10, 19'	.....	.....	.....
South Caro'a & Ga. 1st g 5's.....1919		5,250,000	M & S	108	Jan. 28, '01	108	106	16,000
Vir. Midland serial ser. A 6's....1906		600,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
small.....		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
ser. B 6's.....1911		1,900,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
small.....		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
ser. C 6's.....1916		1,100,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
small.....		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
ser. D 4-5's.....1921		950,000	M & S	102	Oct. 13, '99	.....	.....	.....
small.....		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
ser. E 5's.....1926		1,775,000	M & S	109	Jan. 12, '99	.....	.....	.....
small.....		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
ser. F 5's.....1931		1,310,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Virginia Midland gen. 5's.....1936		2,392,000	M & N	114	Jan. 31, '01	114	114	58,000
gen. 5's gtd. stamped.....1926		2,466,000	M & N	113½	Dec. 14, 19'	.....	.....	.....
W. O. & W. 1st cy. gtd. 4's.....1924		1,025,000	F & A	91½	Sept. 14, '99	.....	.....	.....
W. Nor. C. 1st con. g 6's.....1914		2,531,000	J & J	119	Nov. 17, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Spokane Falls & North, 1st g. 6's....1939		2,812,000	J & J	117	July 25, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Staten Isl. Ry. N. Y. 1st gtd. g. 4½'s....1943		500,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ter. R. R. Assn. St. Louis 1g 4½'s....1939		7,000,000	A & O	112½	June 15, '99	.....	.....	.....
1st con. g. 5's.....1894-1944		4,500,000	F & A	115½	Jan. 2, '01	115½	115½	1,000
St. L. Mers. bdg. Ter. gtd g 5's....1930		3,500,000	A & O	111	Jan. 19, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Tex. & Pacific, East div. 1st 6's, { 1905		3,178,000	M & S	104½	Oct. 4, 19'	.....	.....	.....
fm. Texarkana to Ft. Worth		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st gold 5's.....2000		21,822,000	J & D	117	Jan. 31, '01	117	115½	144,000
2d gold income, 5's.....2000		967,000	MAR.	98	Jan. 26, '01	100	90	35,000
Toledo & Ohio Cent. 1st g 5's.....1935		3,000,000	J & J	116½	Jan. 26, '01	116½	115	31,000
1st m. g 5's West. div.....1935		2,500,000	A & O	115½	Jan. 14, '01	115½	115½	10,000
gen. g. 5's.....1935		2,000,000	J & D	106½	Jan. 30, '01	106½	105½	55,000
Kanaw & M. 1st g. g. 4's....1900		2,489,000	A & O	97	Jan. 29, '01	98	95	26,000

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		JANUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	Hgh.	Low.	Total.
Toledo, Peoria & W. 1st g 4's....1917		4,400,000	J & D	87	Jan. 20, '01	87	86	10,000
Tol., St. L. & K. C. Tr. Rec. 1st g 6's.1916		8,814,000	M & N	180½	June 25, '19	....	....	.....
Toronto, Hamilton & Buff 1st g 4s.1946		3,280,000	J & D	98½	Jan. 24, '01	99½	98	164,000
Ulster & Delaware 1st c. g 5's....1928		1,852,000	J & D	108	Jan. 28, '01	108	107	5,000
Union Pacific R. R. & 1d gt g 4s....1947		99,543,000	J & J	106½	Jan. 31, '01	106½	105	1,546,500
" registered.....			J & J	106½	Jan. 24, '01	106½	106½	5,000
Oreg. Ry. & Nav. 1st s. f. g. 6's. 1909		547,000	J & J	111	Dec. 19, '19	....	....	.....
Oreg. R. R. & Nav. Co. con. g 4's.1946		19,634,000	J & D	108½	Jan. 31, '01	104½	108	182,000
Oreg. Short Line Ry. 1st g. 6's.1922		13,651,000	F & A	180	Jan. 31, '01	180	129½	40,000
Oreg. Short Line 1st con. g. 5's.1946		10,337,000	J & J	116½	Jan. 30, '01	116½	115	83,000
" non-cum. inc. A 5's.....1946		849,000	SEPT.	109	Jan. 21, '01	108	108	4,500
Utah & Northern 1st 7's.....1908		4,983,000	J & J	116	Jan. 11, '01	119	119	10,000
" g. 5's.....1926		1,877,000	J & J	102½	Oct. 8, '94	....	....	.....
Wabash R.R. Co., 1st gold 5's....1989		31,664,000	M & N	119½	Jan. 31, '01	119½	118	361,000
" 2d mortgage gold 5's....1989		14,000,000	F & A	110	Jan. 30, '01	110	108	93,000
" debent. mtg series A....1989		3,500,000	J & J	99	Jan. 31, '01	99	96½	75,000
" series B....1989		25,740,000	J & J	46½	Jan. 31, '01	47½	40½	16,448,000
" 1st g. 5's Det. & Chic. ex. 1940		3,411,000	J & J	111	Jan. 29, '01	111	110	9,000
" Des Moines div. 1st g. 4s.1989		1,600,000	J & J	95	Jan. 30, '01	95	95	11,000
St. L., Kan. C. & N. St. Chas. B. 1st 6's.....1908		1,000,000	A & O	111	May 29, '19	....	....	.....
Western N.Y. & Penn. 1st g. 5's. 1987		10,000,000	J & J	121	Jan. 28, '01	121	120	105,000
" gen g. 3-4's.....1943		9,799,000	A & O	99½	Jan. 31, '01	99½	95	137,000
" inc. 5's.....1943		10,000,000	Nov.	32½	Sept. 30, '19	....	....	.....
West Va. Cent'l & Pitts. 1st g. 6's.1911		3,250,000	J & J	113	Jan. 6, '99	....	....	.....
Wheeling & Lake Erie 1st g. 5's.1926		2,000,000	A & O	116½	Jan. 18, '01	116½	115	24,000
" Wheeling div. 1st g. 5's.1928		905,000	J & J	111½	Jan. 15, '01	111½	111½	10,000
" exten. and imp. g. 5's....1930		849,000	F & A	108	Sept. 12, '19	....	....	.....
Wheel. & L. E. RR. 1st con. g. 4's. 1949		8,682,000	M & S	89½	Jan. 31, '01	91	89½	584,000
Wisconsin Cen. R'y 1st gen. g. 4s.1949		23,727,000	J & J	89½	Jan. 31, '01	89½	85½	811,000
<b>STREET RAILWAY BONDS.</b>								
Brooklyn Rapid Transit g. 5's....1945		6,625,000	A & O	108	Jan. 24, '01	109½	107½	17,000
" Atl. av. Bkn. imp. g. 5's.1934		1,500,000	J & J	110	Jan. 20, '99	....	....	.....
" City R. R. 1st c. 5's.1916.1941		4,373,000	J & J	112	Jan. 24, '01	112	111	2,000
" Qu. Co. & Sur. con. gtd. g. 5's.....1941		2,255,000	M & N	102	Jan. 29, '01	102½	102	31,000
" Union Elev. 1st. g. 4-5s.1950		12,860,000	F & A	101½	Jan. 31, '01	101½	99½	391,000
Kings Co. Elev. R. R. 1st g. 4's.1949		7,000,000	F & A	90½	Jan. 31, '01	90½	89	208,000
City & Sub. R'y, Balt. 1st g. 5's....1922		2,430,000	J & D	105½	Apr. 17, '95	....	....	.....
Denver Con. T'way Co. 1st g. 5's.1933		730,000	A & O	97½	June 13, '19	....	....	.....
" Denver T'way Co. con. g. 8's....1910		1,219,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
" Metropol'n Ry Co. 1st g. 6's.1911		913,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Louisville Railw'y Co. 1st c. g. 5's.1930		4,600,000	J & J	109	Mar. 19, '98	....	....	.....
Market St. Cable Railway 1st 6's.1913		3,000,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Metro. St. Ry N.Y. g. col. tr. g. 5's.1907		12,500,000	F & A	122½	Jan. 31, '01	122½	121½	55,000
" B'way & 7th ave. 1st con. g. 5's. 1943		7,650,000	J & D	123½	Jan. 7, '01	123½	123½	2,000
" registered.....			J & D	119½	Dec. 8, '19	....	....	.....
" Columb. & 9th ave. 1st gtd g 5's. 1908		3,000,000	M & S	122½	Jan. 12, '01	122½	123½	1,000
" registered.....			M & S	....	....	....	....	.....
" Lex ave & Pav Fer 1st gtd g 5's. 1908		5,000,000	M & S	123½	Jan. 3, '01	123½	123½	10,000
" registered.....			M & S	....	....	....	....	.....
Met. West Side Elev. Chic. 1st g. 4's.1908		10,000,000	F & A	100½	Jan. 25, '01	100½	100	4,000
" registered.....			F & A	....	....	....	....	.....
Mil. Elec. R. & Light con. 30yr. g. 5's.1926		6,103,000	F & A	106	Oct. 27, '99	....	....	.....
Minn. St. R'y (M. L. & M.) 1st con. g. 5's.....1919		4,050,000	J & J	109	Oct. 30, '99	....	....	.....
St. Paul City Ry. Cable con. g. 5's.1937		2,480,000	J & J	111½	Jan. 24, '01	112½	111½	7,000
" gtd. gold 5's.....1987		1,138,000	J & J	113	Nov. 28, '99	....	....	.....
Third Avenue R'y N.Y. 1st g 5's.1987		5,000,000	J & J	124½	Jan. 17, '01	124½	124	18,000
Union Elevated (Chic.) 1st g. 5's.1945		4,387,000	A & O	100½	Dec. 14, '99	....	....	.....
West Chic. St. 40 yr. 1st cur. 5's.1928		3,999,000	M & N	....	....	....	....	.....
" 40 years con. g. 5's.....1936		6,031,000	M & N	99	Dec. 23, '97	....	....	.....

# BOND SALES.

835

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

## MISCELLANEOUS BONDS.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		JANUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Adams Express Co. col. tr. g. 4's. 1948		12,000,000	M & S	106	Jan. 24, '01	106	104½	57,000
B'klyn Ferry Co. of N. Y. lsto. g. 5's. 1948		6,500,000	F & A	87½	Jan. 31, '01	88½	87½	59,000
B'klyn W. & W. Co. 1st g. tr. cts. 5's. 1945		17,084,000	F & A	69	Jan. 31, '01	71	69	65,000
Chic. June. & St'k Y'ds col. g. 5's. 1915		10,000,000	J & J	110	Aug. 31, '19	.....	.....	.....
Det. Mack. & Mar. ld. gt. 3½ S A. 1911		3,021,000	A & O	80	Jan. 30, '01	81½	79½	112,000
Hackensack Wtr Reorg. 1st g. 5's. 1926		1,080,000	J & J	107½	June 3, '92	.....	.....	.....
Hend'n Bdg Co. 1st s'k. f'd g. 6's. 1981		1,681,000	M & S	113	Nov. 14, '99	.....	.....	.....
Hoboken Land & Imp. g. 5's. .... 1910		1,440,000	M & N	102	Jan. 19, '94	.....	.....	.....
Iron Steamboat Co. 6's. .... 1901		500,000	J & J	75½	Dec. 4, '95	.....	.....	.....
Madison Sq. Garden 1st g. 5's. .... 1919		1,250,000	M & N	102	July 8, '97	.....	.....	.....
Manh. Beh H. & L. lim. gen. g. 4's. 1940		1,800,000	M & N	55	Aug. 27, '95	.....	.....	.....
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock 5's. .... 1900-1900		2,000,000	J & J	94	May 21, '94	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Ontario Land 1st g 6's. .... 1910		443,000	F & A	90	Oct. 3, '99	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis Term. Station Cupples. & Property Co. 1st g 4½'s 5-30. 1917		3,000,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
So. Y. Water Co. N. Y. con. g 6's. 1923		478,000	J & J	101	Feb. 19, '97	.....	.....	.....
Spring Valley W. Wks. 1st 6's. .... 1906		4,975,000	M & S	113½	Dec. 18, '19	.....	.....	.....
U. S. Mortgage and Trust Co. Real Estate 1st g col. tr. bonds.								
Series D 4½'s. .... 1901-1916		1,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" E 4's. .... 1907-1917		1,000,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" F 4's. .... 1908-1918		1,000,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" G 4's. .... 1908-1918		1,000,000	F & A	100	Mar. 15, '19	.....	.....	.....
" H 4's. .... 1908-1918		1,000,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" I 4's. .... 1904-1919		1,000,000	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" J 4's. .... 1904-1919		1,000,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Small bonds. ....		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Vermont Marble, 1st s. fund 5's. 1910		400,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
BONDS OF MANUFACTURING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS.								
Am. Cotton Oil deb. ext. 4½'s. .... 1915		2,919,000	.....	100½	Jan. 31, '01	100½	99½	221,000
Am. Hide & Lea. Co. 1st s. f. 6's. .... 1919		3,375,000	M & S	92½	Jan. 31, '01	92½	92½	52,000
Am. Spirit Mfg. Co. 1st g. 6's. .... 1915		1,886,000	M & S	83	Jan. 15, '01	85	85	90,000
Am. Thread Co., 1st coll. trust 4's. 1919		5,798,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Barney & Smith Car Co. 1st g. 6's. 1942		1,000,000	J & J	105	Jan. 10, '19	.....	.....	.....
Gramercy Sugar Co., 1st g. 6's. .... 1923		1,100,000	A & O	80½	Feb. 2, '19	.....	.....	.....
Illinois Steel Co. debenture 5's. .... 1910		6,200,000	J & J	99	Jan. 17, '99	.....	.....	.....
" non. conv. deb. 5's. .... 1910		7,000,000	A & O	70	Apr. 23, '97	.....	.....	.....
Internat'l Paper Co. 1st con. g 6's. 1918		3,228,000	F & A	109	Jan. 29, '01	109	108	80,000
Knick'r'ker Ice Co. (Chic) 1st g 5's. 1928		2,000,000	A & O	98	Aug. 25, '19	.....	.....	.....
Nat. Starch Mfg. Co., 1st g 6's. .... 1920		3,089,000	J & J	109	Jan. 23, '01	110	109	7,000
Standard Rope & Twine 1st g. 6's. 1946		2,835,000	F & A	64	Jan. 30, '01	72½	64	90,000
" inc. g. 5's. 1946		7,500,000	.....	8	Jan. 31, '01	12	8	150,000
U. S. Env. Co. 1st sk. fd. g. 6's. .... 1918		2,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
U. S. Leather Co. 6½ g s. fd deb. .... 1915		5,280,000	M & N	113½	Jan. 3, '01	113½	113½	8,000
BONDS OF COAL AND IRON COMPANIES.								
Colo. Coal & Iron 1st con. g. 6's. .... 1900		2,765,000	F & A	108½	Jan. 25, '01	104	108½	39,000
Colo. C'l & I'n Devel. Co. gtd g. 5's. 1909		700,000	J & J	55	Nov. 2, '19	.....	.....	.....
" Coupon on. ....		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Colo. Fuel Co. gen. g. 6's. .... 1919		1,043,000	M & N	102½	Nov. 7, '19	.....	.....	.....
Col. Fuel & Iron Co. gen. sf g 5's. 1948		2,305,000	F & A	101	Jan. 31, '01	101	99½	245,000
Grand Riv. Coal & Coke 1st g. 6's. 1919		949,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

**MISCELLANEOUS BONDS—Continued.**

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		JANUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Jefferson & Clearfield Coal & Ir.								
1st g. 5's.....1926		1,777,000	J & D	105½	Oct. 10,'98	.....	.....	.....
2d g. 5's.....1926		1,000,000	J & D	80	May 4,'97	.....	.....	.....
Pleasant Valley Coal 1st g. s.f. 5's.....1926		1,000,000	J & J	105	Oct. 24,'19	.....	.....	.....
Roch & Pitts. Cl & Ir. Co. pur mny 5's.....1946		1,092,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Sun. Creek Coal 1st sk. fund 6's.....1912		379,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ten. Coal. I. & R. T. d. 1st g. 6's.....1917		1,244,000	A & O	110	Jan. 28,'01	110	110	6,000
Blr. div. 1st con. 6's.....1917		3,360,000	J & J	109	Jan. 28,'01	110	108	27,000
Cah. Coal M. Co. 1st gtd. g. 6's.....1922		1,000,000	J & J	105	Feb. 10,'19	.....	.....	.....
De Bard. C & I Co. gtd. g. 6's.....1910		2,771,000	F & A	103	Jan. 28,'01	104½	103	8,000
Wheel L. E. & P. Cl Co. 1st g. 5's.....1919		846,000	J & J	32	Jan. 15,'19	.....	.....	.....
<b>GAS &amp; ELECTRIC LIGHT CO. BONDS.</b>								
Atlanta Gas Light Co. 1st g. 5's.....1947		1,150,000	J & D	.....	Nov. 30,'19	.....	.....	.....
Bost. Un. Gas tst cfts s'k f'd g. 5's.....1939		7,000,000	J & J	79½	Nov. 30,'19	.....	.....	.....
B'klyn Union Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's.....1945		14,210,000	M & N	117½	Jan. 31,'01	117½	116½	63,000
Columbus Gas Co., 1st g. 5's.....1932		1,215,000	J & J	104½	Jan. 28,'98	.....	.....	.....
Detroit City Gas Co. g. 5's.....1923		4,598,000	J & J	95½	Jan. 30,'01	97½	94	24,000
Detroit Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's.....1918		386,000	F & A	90½	Nov. 16,'99	.....	.....	.....
Equitable Gas Light Co. of N. Y. 1st con. g. 5's.....1932		3,500,000	M & S	118½	Sept. 4,'19	.....	.....	.....
Gas. & Elec. of Bergen Co. c. g. 5's.....1949		1,146,000	J & D	101½	Jan. 31,'01	102½	101½	55,000
General Electric Co. deb. g. 5's.....1922		1,657,000	J & D	150½	Jan. 30,'01	150½	155	128,000
Grand Rapids G. L. Co. 1st g. 5's.....1915		1,225,000	F & A	107½	Dec. 17,'19	.....	.....	.....
Kansas City Mo. Gas Co. 1st g. 5's.....1922		3,750,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kings Co. Elec. L. & Power g. 5's.....1937		2,500,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
purchase money 6's.....1967		5,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Edison El. Ill. Bkln 1st con. g. 4's.....1939		4,275,000	J & J	96½	Dec. 4,'19	.....	.....	.....
Lac. Gas L't Co. of St. L. 1st g. 5's.....1919		10,000,000	Q F	108½	Jan. 29,'01	108½	107	48,000
small bonds.....				97½	Nov. 1,'95	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. Gas EL. H. & P. Colst col tr g. 5's.....1948		11,500,000	J & D	109½	Jan. 31,'01	110	108½	228,000
registered.....			J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
purchase mny col tr g. 4's.....1949		20,389,000	F & A	97½	Jan. 31,'01	97½	94½	754,000
Edison El. Ill. 1st conv. g. 5's.....1910		4,312,000	M & S	109½	Jan. 29,'01	109½	109	54,000
1st con. g. 5's.....1935		2,156,000	J & J	120	Nov. 13,'19	.....	.....	.....
Paterson & Pas. G. & E. con. g. 5's.....1949		3,317,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Peop's Gas & C. Co. C. 1st g. g. 6's.....1904		2,100,000	M & N	107	July 13,'19	.....	.....	.....
2d gtd. g. 6's.....1904		2,500,000	J & D	103	Jan. 25,'01	103	103	8,000
1st con. g. 6's.....1943		4,900,000	A & O	120	Jan. 10,'01	120	120	2,000
refunding g. 5's.....1947		2,500,000	M & S	106	Dec. 16,'98	.....	.....	.....
refunding registered.....			M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Chic. Gas Lt & Coke 1st gtd. g. 5's.....1937		10,000,000	J & J	108½	Jan. 24,'01	108½	108½	20,000
Con. Gas Co. Chic. 1st gtd. g. 5's.....1936		4,346,000	J & D	106	Jan. 26,'01	106	104½	5,000
Bq. Gas & Fuel. Chic. 1st gtd. g. 6's.....1905		2,000,000	J & J	103½	Jan. 2,'01	103½	103½	1,000
Mutual Fuel Gas Co. 1st gtd. g. 5's.....1947		5,000,000	M & N	102	Jan. 26,'01	102	102	38,000
Trenton Gas & Electric 1st g. 5's.....1949		1,500,000	M & S	107	Dec. 5,'19	.....	.....	.....
Utica Elec. L. & P. 1st s. f'd g. 5's.....1950		500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Western Gas Co. col. tr. g. 5's.....1933		3,805,500	M & N	107½	Jan. 16,'01	107½	107½	1,000
<b>TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CO. BONDS.</b>								
Commercial Cable Co. 1st g. 4's.....2397		9,532,400	Q & J	102	Jan. 11,'01	102	102	5,000
registered.....			Q & J	100½	Oct. 3,'19	.....	.....	.....
Total amount of lien, \$13,000,000.								
Erie Teleg. & Tel. col. tr. g. sfd 5's.....1926		3,905,000	J & J	109	Oct. 7,'99	.....	.....	.....
Metrop. Tel & Tel. 1st s'k f'd g. 5's.....1918		2,000,000	M & N	103	Feb. 17,'99	.....	.....	.....
registered.....			M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & N. J. Tel. gen. g. 5's.....1920		1,261,000	M & N	112	Nov. 27,'95	.....	.....	.....
Western Union col. tr. cur. 5's.....1938		8,502,000	J & J	111½	Jan. 31,'01	112½	111½	28,000
fundg & real estate g. 4½'s.....1950		10,000,000	M & N	107	Jan. 24,'01	107	105½	331,000
Mutual Union Tel. s. fd. 6's.....1911		1,957,000	M & N	112½	Dec. 20,'19	.....	.....	.....
Northwestern Telegraph 7's.....1904		1,250,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....



## UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	YEAR 1901.		JANUARY SALES.		
				High.	Low.	High.	Low.	Total.
United States con. 2's registered... 1880			Q J	105½	105½	105½	105½	50,200
"    con. 2's coupon..... 1880			Q J	106	106½	106	106½	100,000
"    con. 2's reg. small bonds. 1880		419,609,750	Q J	105½	105½	105½	105½	100
"    con. 2's coupon small bds. 1880			Q J	105½	105½	105½	105½	30,000
"    2's registered..... 1908-18			Q F	110½	109½	110½	109½	88,000
"    2's coupon..... 1908-18		104,900,040	Q F	111	110	111	110	1,000
"    2's small bonds reg..... 1908-18			Q F	110	110	110	110	35,950
"    2's small bonds coupon. 1908-18			Q F	114½	114	114½	114	10,700
"    4's registered..... 1907		287,578,100	J A J & O	188	187½	188	187½	135,000
"    4's coupon..... 1907			J A J & O	188½	188½	188½	188½	1,000
"    4's registered..... 1925		162,315,400	Q F	112½	112½	112½	112½	1,000
"    4's coupon..... 1925			Q F	112½	112½	112½	112½	1,000
"    5's registered..... 1904		20,962,100	Q F	112½	112½	112½	112½	1,000
"    5's coupon..... 1904			Q F	112½	112½	112½	112½	1,000
District of Columbia 3-65's..... 1924			F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    small bonds.....		14,224,100	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    registered.....			F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.								
Quebec 5's..... 1908		3,000,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
U. S. of Mexico External Gold Loan of 1880 sinking fund 5's			Q J	96½	96½	96½	96½	21,000
Regular delivery in denominations of \$100 and \$200.....		222,555,700	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Small bonds denominations of \$20.....			.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Large bonds denominations of \$500 and \$1,000.....			.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

**New Photographic Counterfeit \$10 National Bank Note.**—This is a very poor direct photographic reproduction of the \$10 note of the Tompkins County National Bank of Ithaca, N.Y.; check letter B; Treasury number T5377076; charter number 1561; bank number 3904; series of 1882. It is printed on two pieces of paper between which silk fiber has been distributed. The number, bank number, charter number and seal on the face of the note have been touched up with red ink. The brown color on the back of the note fairly approximates the genuine, but the center of the note where the charter number appears has been washed with green ink that is muddy in quality, and which, in the sample examined, has soaked through and discolored the face of the note. No one familiar with money should be deceived by the counterfeit. Thus far the appearance of the notes has been confined to Central and Western New York.

**A Business Calendar.**—James S. Park, of Detroit, Mich., has compiled a convenient calendar for 1901, giving in condensed form the law in regard to days of grace, holidays, dates when paper is payable and protestable in all the States and Territories and the Dominion of Canada.

**Conscience Fund Contribution.**—A case of troubled conscience and restitution is reported by Allyn Bros., bankers, of Mt. Ayr, Iowa. Mr. Allyn is a State Senator and a reputable man. Twenty years ago when the bank was under the management of Morris & Allyn, a farmer had on deposit \$100. One day he went into the bank and drew from the deposit, which was subject to check, \$12.50. Some time later he drew out the remainder, and by mistake was paid the full amount of the check, \$100. For twenty years he had the use of the \$12.50. He stepped into the bank recently and related the incident to Mr. Allyn, and wanted to pay back the money with compound interest. It amounted to \$80. Half the money was sent to Mr. Morris' widow, at request of the repentant farmer, and the other half was retained by Allyn Bros.—*Northwestern Banker.*

**Penny Wise, Etc.**—O. T. Sutton, Cashier of the Lewisburg (Ky.) Banking Co., writes: "I might get along without your splendid MAGAZINE, but think I would be penny wise and pound foolish by stopping my subscription."

## BANKERS' OBITUARY RECORD.

**Armstrong.**—Capt. Wm. P. Armstrong, President of the City National Bank, Selma, Ala., died January 5.

**Attwood.**—Judge Julius Attwood, President of the National Bank of New England, East Haddam, Conn., died January 23, aged seventy-seven years. For thirty years he was judge of the probate court, and had twice represented his town in the Legislature.

**Beebe.**—Cyrus G. Beebe, President of the National Bank of South Reading, Wakefield, Mass., a director of the Massachusetts Loan and Trust Co., Boston, and interested in mercantile business in that city, died January 23, aged fifty years.

**Bull.**—James E. Bull, Cashier of the Commercial Bank, Worthington, Ind., died January 7. He served in the Union Army in the Civil War and was county treasurer for two terms.

**Chapman.**—L. A. Chapman, Cashier of the Pierce City (Mo.) National Bank, died January 19, aged fifty years.

**Coleman.**—W. P. Coleman, who had been President of the Sacramento (Cal.) Savings Bank for twenty years past, and who was one of the incorporators, died January 13. He was born in Hopkinsville, Ky., in 1836, and went to California in 1849, residing almost continuously at Sacramento since 1861.

**Damon.**—Edward C. Damon, President of the Concord (Mass.) National Bank, died January 13. He was born at Concord in 1836.

**Floyd-Jones.**—Edward Floyd-Jones, Vice-President of the First National Bank, Stockton, Cal., died January 23. He was born in New York State in 1823 and went to California in 1849. He was elected a member of the New York State Senate in 1892, and had resided in recent years on Long Island.

**Ford.**—Henry W. Ford, formerly President of the National Bank of the Republic, New York city, and ex-Secretary of the American Bankers' Association, died at his home in Morristown, N. J., January 20. He was born in New York seventy-three years ago, and in early life entered the National Bank of the Republic as a porter, rising gradually through the different positions until he became President.

**Gaylord.**—William H. Gaylord, President of the Berkshire National Bank, North Adams, Mass., died January 4, aged sixty-five years.

**Gee.**—Furman Gee, President of the First National Bank, Salem, Ohio, died January 1, aged seventy-seven years.

**Gordon.**—John I. Gordon, Cashier of the Farmers and Mechanics' National Bank, Mercer, Pa., died January 19.

**Limbeck.**—John C. Limbeck, President of the Fifth Ward Savings Bank, Jersey City, N. J., and local superintendent of the Wells-Fargo Express Co., died January 23, aged about sixty years.

**Lozier.**—Abram Lozier, an old and prominent citizen of Aurora, Ind., died January 13. He was a large stockholder in the First National Bank of Aurora, and had been one of its directors since its organization in 1864. He was also largely interested in various manufacturing and other industrial enterprises, and had accumulated a large fortune. He was eighty-one years of age.

**Maxey.**—J. H. Maxey, President of the Bank of Bristow, Ind. Ter., is reported to have been killed by robbers who successfully attacked the bank on January 18.

**McDowell.**—Isaac P. McDowell, who organized the First National Bank, of Fairbury, Ill., in 1872, and who has been its President ever since, died at Denver, Colo., January 9, aged seventy-six years.

**Van Brunt.**—D. C. Van Brunt, President of the Horicon (Wis.) State Bank, and extensively engaged in the manufacture of agricultural implements, died January 14, aged eighty-three years.

**Wandling.**—John Wandling, Cashier of the Owensboro (Ky.) Banking Co., died January 8. He was born at Washington, N. J., in 1836.

**Warren.**—Horace M. Warren, Vice-President of the Williamsburgh Savings Bank, Brooklyn, N. Y., died January 23. He had been a trustee of the bank since 1853, and Vice-President for the past twelve years.

**Wooldridge.**—S. L. Wooldridge, President of the Bank of Woodford, Versailles, Ky., a wealthy farmer and a first cousin of Henry Clay, died January 9, aged seventy-six years.





*John Johnston*

# THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE

WAS A JOURNAL OF BANKING AND THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE OF THE

FIFTY-FIFTH YEAR.

MARCH, 1881.

VOLUME XXXI.

THE TAXATION OF BANKS has engaged considerable attention in the New York Legislature this winter, and it is not surprising, Lang, of course, to increase the taxes which these institutions are required to pay.

There has been altogether too much feeling against the protection which banks have heretofore made against neglect to do anything of anything is to be accomplished in the future there must be more vigorous action on the part of all interested. There is a question that might properly engage the attention of the American Bankers' Association and of the various State associations. It is of more importance than the protective work, or the agitation for a uniform law in regard to negotiable instruments; and this is said with no intention to disparage the good work which has been done along these lines. Comparatively few banks lose money by the depredations of criminals, but almost every bank is an annual victim of unjust taxation.

Much of the blame for the excessive assessments on banks is due to the indifference which these institutions have shown to the matter. This indifference has, perhaps, not been due so much to the indifference as to the fear that opposition would cause a loss of business. Mr. PAUL CLIFFORD is said to have been a highwayman, and so long as his victims were not greatly injured, he often permitted them to retain even a portion of their money; but those who were too weak to resist or too timid to fight were despoiled of everything they possessed.

Banking funds are the most conspicuous funds available to the gatherers of taxes, and it is not to be wondered at that they are heavily taxed. The wealth of the banks is a subject of great interest to the popular mind.

The remedy for high taxes seems to be a reform in the system of taxation on the part of those who pay them, first by



*Chas Johnston*

# THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE

*RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING and THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE Consolidated.*

---

FIFTY-FIFTH YEAR.

MARCH, 1901.

VOLUME LXII, No. 8.

---

THE TAXATION OF BANKS has engaged considerable attention in the New York Legislature this winter, the object aimed at being, of course, to increase the taxes which those institutions are required to pay.

There has been altogether too much feebleness in the protests which banks have heretofore made against unjust taxation, and if anything is to be accomplished in the future there must be united and vigorous action on the part of all interested. This is a work that might properly engage the attention of the American Bankers' Association and of the various State associations. It is of more importance than the protective work, or the agitation for a uniform law in regard to negotiable instruments ; and this is said with no intention to disparage the good work which has been done along these lines. Comparatively few banks lose money by the depredations of criminals, but almost every bank is an annual victim of unjust taxation.

Much of the blame for the excessive assessments on banks is due to the indifference which those institutions have shown in the matter. This indifference has, perhaps, not been due so much to a lack of concern as to the fear that opposition would only provoke retaliation. Mr. PAUL CLIFFORD is said to have been a most obliging and courteous highwayman, and so long as his victims consented to be robbed quietly, he often permitted them to retain cherished keepsakes and even some portion of their money ; but those who showed any disposition to fight were despoiled of everything they had.

Banking funds are the most conspicuous forms of wealth in sight to the gatherers of taxes, and it is not to be wondered at that they are heavily taxed. The wealth of the banks is also greatly exaggerated in the popular mind.

The remedy for high taxes seems to be a more determined opposition on the part of those who pay them, first by an organized fight

against the enactment of laws designed to make banks pay more than their share of taxes, and second by contesting the matter in the courts. It is probable that many banks are now paying taxes that the courts would declare to be illegal.

As the country has grown and the commercial relations between the States have become more intimate, the varying State laws in regard to business affairs have been found to be more or less of a nuisance. It is hardly to be expected that this situation can be cured by Federal legislation, but substantially the same result may be obtained by uniform action on the part of State legislatures.

As the laws taxing banking and other capital tend toward a common basis, the inequalities in interest rates and in the general distribution of capital will tend to become less marked than at present.

In these days of increasing public expenditure, both of the Federal and of the State Governments, the obtaining of large revenues by taxation without too much complaint on the part of the people becomes the continual study of legislators. With regard to the taxation of banks the Federal Government has always been reasonably fair. Taxes on banks have been imposed with a view to the equality of the burden on all classes of banks in all localities. The State legislators have not been so fair or so reasonable. They have seemed to look upon banks as accumulations of money and capital, existing without the support of and antagonistic to the public; as if in some way the wealth of banks was segregated from the general wealth of the public, and as if in taxing banks the burdens of the public were lightened.

The States have always had the right to tax the banking business carried on within their boundaries, except when this business was done under franchises granted by the United States Government. The Supreme Court has held that the Federal Government has the power, if it should deem best, to grant the right to carry on the banking business anywhere within the National boundaries, regardless of State lines, and to exempt the business from State taxes. There has always been a conflict of Federal and State law on this point. To avoid this difficulty Congress, when establishing the National banking system, did not undertake to deprive the State governments of the privilege of taxing National bank shares, but simply prescribed in what manner and at what rate State taxes should be imposed.

In many States there has been a disposition ever since the National system was inaugurated to tax the National banks without due regard to the terms on which the privilege was granted by Congress. Much litigation has grown out of this.

For some years after the National banking system went into operation the number of State banks was very greatly reduced in all parts of the country, and in many places the National banks naturally were



the only banks that could be taxed. As State banks again increased in numbers there were at first discriminations in the burdens imposed on one class and on the other. With the growth of wealth trust companies began to come into competition with the ordinary banks, and this fact further complicated the question of taxation of the banking business.

But while the different classes of financial institutions doing a banking business, in whole or in part, offered to legislators some chance to make distinctions in the burdens of taxation imposed, the tendency now is to tax all of these institutions very heavily. Banking capital and surplus is a kind of personal property. It is manifestly unfair to tax personal property, moneyed capital of the banks belonging to their stockholders, any higher than moneyed capital belonging to individuals who are not bank stockholders, and yet this is what is done under the laws of a great number of the States.

Banks are evidently taxed out of all measure, as compared with other moneyed capital, for political reasons. It is supposed to enhance the popularity of legislators to make financial institutions furnish most of the revenues of the State. The effect of this injustice will necessarily react on the prosperity of the whole people, so intimately are the operations of the banks connected with all business transactions at the present time. Unjust taxation will result in making the public pay higher for banking facilities, or the banks will be driven out of business. But it is improbable that the legislature of any State will be so oblivious of the real public interests as to carry out such extreme projects of taxation of the banking business as have been embodied in the bill introduced in the Legislature of New York State. Such measures are apt to defeat themselves. Whenever injurious and oppressive legislation has been proposed affecting their interests the banks have generally protested with force enough to defeat the worst features.

The time will no doubt arrive when corporations, indispensable to the business prosperity of the country, will not be subject to periodical outbreaks of crude and hostile legislation. Until that time arrives, however, the banks will have to be vigilant in protecting the interests of their shareholders and depositors from undue taxation.

---

THE APPROPRIATIONS made at the last session of Congress have aroused a great deal of unfavorable criticism on account of their extravagance. Much of this criticism is no doubt purely political, caused by the natural desire of the party that is out of office to find fault with the party in power. A great deal is called out by the failure to understand the proper proportion that should exist between pub-

lic expenditure and the growth of the country in enterprise and wealth. Whatever the form of government, whether autocratic, a limited monarchy or republican, its operations and expenditures must increase with the efforts put forth by the nation, whether considered in their individual capacity as citizens exerting themselves energetically in their private affairs, or united in carrying on war. Whether effort is put forth in peace or in war, the government expenditure will be affected. A government by republican forms, whatever its advantages in other respects, has always proved and will always prove the most expensive of governments. The advantages of it are such that they encourage the increase of wealth so that the expense of the government may be more easily endured.

The past expenditures of the Federal Government authorized by Congress, notwithstanding loudly expressed contemporary apprehensions of eventual disaster, have always seemed to advance the prosperity of the country. So manifest has this been that whenever the gloom of a financial crisis comes upon the people, appeal is at once made for action by the Government to relieve the situation. This may be the result of unsound reasoning, expecting too much from direct action of the Government, but it is founded in the knowledge that expenditures for pensions and for public works have always benefited the locality in which they have been made.

The very nature of a republican government, belonging as it does to the people, leads those living under it to expect advantages from its expenditures, which would not be expected from a government of another form. The large sums paid out of the Treasury are returned to the people in many forms that stimulate endeavor and enterprise in ways that would not otherwise be encouraged. Every period of increasing Government expenditure in the United States has been, as a rule, a period of marked development in business enterprise. The immense expenditures of the Civil War were followed by a lasting development of ideas which have made the enterprises of the first half of the century appear insignificant compared with those of the last thirty years.

The greater the effort a nation puts forth the greater its ability for future efforts, may be a truth that has limits, but these limits are not likely to be reached. The exhaustion of a nation, even by excessive war, is not apt to occur, in the case of the so-called great powers.

If it were possible for some reckless and powerful ruler like Napoleon or Frederick the Great to direct the resources in wealth and population of a nation like the United States, even in an enterprise of seeming impossibility, it would take long years to exhaust the stored-up power, even if it could thus be wasted. In no national enterprise

of modern times have drafts been made upon the resources of nations at all proportionate to the demands made on Prussia in the Seven Years' War, or on France during the wars of the first Napoleon. In fact during the last century the wealth and resources of nations have grown much faster than the demands of government upon them, vast as these seem to be in many cases.

There seems to be no tendency to reduce the annual budget of any of the chief nations. In France and Germany the demands for increased expenditure are said to be caused by the necessity of maintaining the army and navy for national defense. But the same increase in expenditure is to be noted in the United States where the necessity of defense does not seem to be so pressing.

It is not difficult to conceive that were some of the governments of Europe, now groaning beneath the burdens of militarism, relieved of their standing armies, they would find it as difficult to reduce their expenditures to a lower level as they now do. The increase of industry consequent on the disbandment of armies would tend to increase the revenues and would also increase the number of those who look either to places in the government or bounty from the government in some form as a means of living.

It seems as if in this world there is a certain proportion of the citizens for whom each government is responsible, and who have to be taken care of by government jobs of various degrees, ranging from services of full value rendered to absolute sinecures.

Perhaps there is no way of accepting charity with as little loss of self-respect, as under the guise of a government position of some sort. The man whose position is a sinecure and who knows he renders no service for the pay he receives, feels that he merely has his proper share of the general fund belonging to him as to every one else.

Parties out of office may criticise the current expenditures authorized by their opponents, but when they arrive at power they are as eager to repeat the same extravagance. Every member of the Congress that controls the outgo of the Treasury is urged by his constituency to secure as large a share as possible for expenditure in his district. With the increase of Congress under the apportionment of the last census there will be new districts to provide for. There is very little hope of the reduction of Government expenditure.

In a growing country it is hard to keep down revenues. With a rate of taxation appropriate for one point of time they tend to excess at another. The surplus can be returned to the people through expenditure only. That there is unfairness and waste in the collecting of greater revenues than required, and the expenditure indulged merely to get rid of the excess, may be admitted ; but with men as they are, and with the impossibility of making exact calculations in a matter

so vast, it may be concluded that while the evils of a lavish government expenditure are great, yet they are counterbalanced by many benefits which are often lost sight of in partisan criticisms.

---

THE CUSTODY OF THE PUBLIC MONEYS has been a frequent bone of contention between political parties. The recent discussion in Congress of the apportionment of public funds among the depository banks is merely a repetition of what has often occurred before. The accusation that particular banks have been corruptly favored by the Administration in power is as old as the Constitution. Sometimes there has been just ground in the administration of the Treasury Department for such a charge, but more often it has been simply grounded on surmise and inference.

In the early history of the United States, when the laws provided that, as a rule, public moneys should be deposited with the Bank of the United States, an institution specially chartered for the purpose, some discretion was left to the Secretary of the Treasury to order deposits made in other institutions. The use of this discretionary power was the occasion of real and affected suspicion by political opponents. When, after the removal of the deposits from the second Bank of the United States by Jackson, the State banks were extensively used as the depositories of public funds, there was probably some dealings with particular banks that might have looked like favoritism. The obtaining of Government funds was much more likely to afford a profit to a bank at that period than now, as security was not then so invariably and rigidly required as it is at present. Since the establishment of the independent Treasury, banks have not been used as the depositories of any very large amount of the public funds on hand. They have been usually entrusted with funds that represented a portion of the surplus, which, by being retained in the independent Treasury, might be kept out of circulation to the detriment of the money market. The use of the banks as depositories for this purpose is being better understood by the public owing to the discussion of financial questions during the last two political campaigns, and attacks on the Administration and the banks no longer have the force as a political argument they once possessed.

The recent attack in Congress fell rather flat, particularly as it was shown from the files of the Treasury Department that the authorities who order these deposits made were solicited for favors as strenuously by representatives of one party as by the other. The conditions under which these deposits are made, the requirement of a deposit of bonds of the United States sufficient to secure all deposits, and the liability to their withdrawal, with little or no notice, do not render

the use of such public funds as are placed with the banks very profitable.

It is not to be wondered at that banks undertaking this business would resort to the methods that will secure them the most favorable treatment. A bank maintaining a large deposit of bonds, for the use of which it may have to pay, will urge that they receive an amount of deposits sufficient to make the transaction profitable. And the banks whose friends are in power will probably be listened to by the Government. But this does not go beyond fair business dealing, although it may stir the gall of a partisan politician.

---

THE EXCHANGE OF GOLD FOR SILVER DOLLARS at the United States Treasury exactly in the same manner as when legal-tender and Treasury notes are presented, would not seem to be unreasonable. The silver dollar coined by the Government in its own behalf from silver bullion purchased is as much a promise to pay a standard dollar as is the legal-tender dollar note printed on paper and issued in behalf of the Government.

If the advocates of silver had devoted half the energy they manifested in endeavoring to secure the free coinage of silver to securing the redemption in gold of the silver dollars coined on Government account, it would have been much more difficult to stop the coinage of the silver dollar and the continued purchase of silver bullion for coinage. If prior to 1893 Congress had provided a gold reserve for insuring the parity of gold coin and silver dollars, there would have been no panic in that year and the purchase of silver could have been continued indefinitely as long as the gold reserve was proportionately increased. Where such a policy might have ended it is not necessary to examine, but the producers of silver could have maintained their dealings with the Treasury for many years. It is a good thing that the silver men were not shrewd enough to foresee the advantages they might have gained, by establishing a gold reserve to maintain the parity of the silver dollars. The disasters of the panic of 1893 frightened Congress into stopping the purchase of silver and the coinage of the silver dollar.

Now that the amount of silver for which the Government is to be responsible is definitely known, and also that it will not be increased, it is just as good policy for the people of the country now, as it would have been for the silver advocates prior to 1893, to take measures to make this stock of silver coined into dollars equal to gold for all monetary purposes. It is in fact the only way to make the burden of it endurable. There seems to be no reason to hesitate to make the parity, the maintenance of which has been repeatedly declared to be the

policy of the United States, a reality by the legal authorization of the redemption of silver dollars in gold at the Treasury. It would be still better to increase the gold reserve by an amount equal to forty per cent. of the difference between the nominal value of the silver dollar and the intrinsic value of the silver bullion contained in it.

---

BRANCHES OF NATIONAL BANKS would seem to be permitted by the provision of the National banking laws contained in section 5155 of the Revised Statutes, that State banks having branches, the capital being joint and assigned to and used by the mother bank and branches in definite proportions, may convert into National banks.

The inference drawn at first sight would naturally be that if State banks could be, or were already, organized in conformity to the requirements of this section, they might become National banks, and therefore that this provision pointed out a way of starting a system of National banks with branches. If there is an advantage to be derived from the establishment of branches, the section quoted would seem to point out the method of making such advantage available.

The statute has been in existence for over thirty years, and up to this time no National bank with branches has ever been founded on the business of a State bank with branches. Apparently no State bank has ever been organized with branches for the purpose of becoming a National bank with branches by means of this section. There may be several reasons for this. Perhaps there has been no demand for National banks with branches. Perhaps, too, if there had been, State banking laws as a rule do not permit State banks with branches.

But the truth is that while the provisions of the section appear to be general, they were inserted in the original National Currency Act to meet the particular case of certain State banks which were at that time in operation, especially in West Virginia. Why the section was retained at the time of the revision of the laws of the United States, in 1873, does not appear. It may have been through inadvertence and haste or because some of the banks to which it was intended to apply were still in existence. However this may be, as it now stands the section is antagonistic to the general spirit of the National banking laws as construed by the courts. It does not in any way apply to National banks of new organization, and in fact it is very doubtful whether the Comptroller would consider the section still in force, if a State bank were organized for the purpose of becoming a National bank under this section.

To show how opposed to the general spirit of the National banking laws this section is, it is only necessary to refer to section 5134,

relative to the execution of the organization certificate of a National bank, and section 5190, relative to the place at which the business of a National bank shall be transacted. Section 5134 provides that the organization certificate, among other things, shall specifically state, "the place where its operations of discount and deposit are to be carried on, designating the State, Territory or district, and the particular county and city, town or village." Section 5190 provides further that "the usual business of each National banking association shall be transacted at an office or banking house located in the place specified in its organization certificate."

These sections seem to preclude all idea of a National bank having branches, but the question has also been passed on by the Supreme Court of the United States, which has decided in favor of this view. Even if the section relative to the conversion of State banks with branches were availed of to obtain a National bank charter permitting branches, it would only give power to work through branches located in the same State with the parent bank, and established before conversion; after becoming a National bank there would be no power to establish additional branches. As the principal advantage of the power to use branch banks consists in using the capital and credit of the bank in places where business openings occur, the restricted method under section 5155 would prevent any banker from making use of it, even if the section be not in reality obsolete.

If it were deemed advisable to add the privilege of establishing branches to the powers now possessed by the National banks, it is plain that new legislation is necessary. Inasmuch as this new power would involve changes of the most radical nature in the National banking system, and as it is one that has as yet been very little discussed, legislation of this kind should only be enacted after the most careful consideration.

---

THE PRIZE OFFER made by the publishers of the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* for the best paper on the "Practical Work of a Bank," is arousing much interest among bank officers and employees throughout the country. A number of topics have been prescribed for the competition, covering as nearly as possible the more important features of the workings of a bank, and designed to bring out new ideas and practical suggestions as to the best methods of management.

With the great diversity in our banking systems, the large number of individual banks, the varying conditions under which they operate, and the further imperfections inseparable from all human contrivances, it is remarkable that the standard of conduct is so high among the financial institutions of the United States. When we consider the vast volume of money and credits of which the banks are

daily custodians, it is wonderful how slight are the losses to the public or to the institutions themselves through the mistakes or intentionally wrongful acts of those who handle these evidences of wealth. But occasionally a defalcation occurs that might have been prevented, or a failure is caused by unwise management, and bankers are made to realize that while approximate safety has been reached, the absolute has not been attained—and nothing less should be kept in mind as an ideal, whether it is possible of realization or not.

Increased competition and a tendency toward smaller profits, due to this and other causes, make it necessary for banks to seek out the most approved expedients of transacting their business so as to secure the best results. It is essential that the best checks against fraud and error should be adopted, and that the expenditure of time and money be economized. This is a truism of which most bankers are conscious, but more specific information as to what these safeguards are is wanted. Outside of a few text-books on practical banking, the sources of such knowledge are more or less lacking, and must be supplied by a current publication that can keep its readers in touch with changing conditions and the improvements that are being constantly made.

An examination of the proceedings of most of the bankers' associations will show that they are occupied to a large extent with what may be termed theoretical banking and "high finance." This is perhaps necessarily so, as these meetings unavoidably partake of the nature of a "dress parade." The circumstances under which they are held are not, as a rule, favorable to the consideration of the minute details of banking operations. But there are always thousands in the ranks of the working forces of the banks who are eager to gain a better knowledge of the fundamentals of their work, and their situation is not always such as enables them to do this. Their experience is often obtained at a serious waste of time and effort, and not infrequently they lack the opportunity of learning how the most progressive banks are conducted. It is with a view of being helpful to such workers that the BANKERS' MAGAZINE has offered a number of prizes, aggregating \$1,050.00, for the best papers offered on a series of practical banking topics.

The *esprit de corps* of banking in the United States is already high, and is constantly advancing. There can be no more real or enduring benefits to the banks of the country than to bring their management up to the highest possible standard. It is not doubted that those responsible for the conduct of the banks are cognizant of this fact, but it does not necessarily follow that they are equally sure how such a result is to be attained. The papers to be published in the MAGAZINE's prize competition will contain many valuable suggestions looking to this end.



As stated elsewhere in this issue, bank clerks and junior officers connected with institutions now subscribers for the **BANKERS' MAGAZINE** are entitled to a six months' subscription at two dollars (\$2). Clerks and others interested in these prize articles on practical banking should receive copies of the **MAGAZINE** regularly for their own use and preserve them. These six months' subscriptions will begin with April and expire with the September number, the intention being to publish the articles submitted in the competition during this period.

If bank officers will kindly send in lists of their clerks, the publishers of the **MAGAZINE** will send them a circular giving full particulars regarding the prize articles.

---

**THE ACTION OF THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT** in placing duties on the import of American iron and steel manufactures into the Empire has caused a great sensation among those interested in the industries affected. It is alleged that this action on the part of the Russian authorities is in retaliation for the duty imposed by the Secretary of the Treasury on raw sugar imported into the United States from Russia. Mr. GAGE has therefore been made the subject of much animadversion.

During the last five or six years the manufacturers of the United States have been building up a foreign trade which promises to place this country at the head of exporting nations. The branch of manufactures which this recent action of Russia affects has been prominent for its successful enterprise in foreign markets, and has indicated its ability to compete with similar manufacturing interests in England and Germany.

The Russian Empire in developing its resources will for many years require vast quantities of finished metallic productions, and is not yet in a condition to produce them within its own borders. While the decision of the Secretary of the Treasury discriminating against Russian sugar may have been seized upon by M. DE WITTE, the Russian Finance Minister, as a fitting diplomatic pretext for imposing duties on American iron and steel products, yet considering the great disproportion in value between the Russian sugar imported into the United States and American manufactures imported into Russia, it appears probable that these duties would have been laid by Russia, even if no change in the status of Russian sugar had been made by the Secretary of the Treasury. The authorities who rule the Russian Empire are undoubtedly as solicitous to build up home manufacturing industries as are those who encourage protective duties for this same purpose in the United States. It has been by judicious protection extended to the manufacture of iron and steel in this

country that these interests have attained to the paramount position they now occupy in the commerce of the world. Those who are now directing the destinies of Russia, in extending protection to the production of iron and steel in their own country, are only acting on approved lines. As long as the Empire aspired to be a producer of raw material only for export, it was better to encourage free trade. This free trade has given the Empire already a large stock of the products of foreign manufacturing skill. At the same time a knowledge of the secrets of these manufactures has been acquired with the desire to develop them at home from the crude resources which Russia so abundantly possesses. At the same time, even with protection, time will be required to build up home manufactures. Russia will have to overcome many difficulties, but she will have the advantage of starting with the full use of all the appliances of modern scientific discovery and invention. It took long years to attain the perfection of method which now enables the United States to compete with the world in the manufacture of iron and steel. In the meantime, while Russia is learning and improving, there will be for a long time a market there for foreign manufactures which can compete with the home productions in spite of a protective tariff.

It is probable that M. DE WITTE desires to obtain revenue as well as to encourage home manufacturing industry, and that he will, without discouraging the development of Russian resources by the introduction of foreign machinery, adjust matters so as to make this development more gradual and at the same time make it yield as much as possible to Government revenues.

A properly adjusted duty on iron and steel manufactures will not necessarily destroy the market for American manufactures, as probably for some years a large share of it will have to be paid by the Russian consumer. It is therefore probable, even if the United States had not, as it is alleged, aroused the susceptibilities of the Russian authorities by discriminating against Russian sugar, that an impost would nevertheless have been laid on importations of iron and steel and also other manufactures.

The relations between Russia and the United States have always been friendly, and perhaps the Russian Minister of Finance has been waiting for some time just the opportunity that Secretary GAGE's sugar decision has afforded him, to avoid making the first move in what appears to be trade hostility. But it is almost certain, if the United States had avoided giving even the shadow of offense, that circumstances in Russia would very soon have forced the Russian authorities to take the steps necessary to the protection of their home manufactures. Whether this opinion be correct or not will soon be proved by the continued policy of the Russian Empire.

## CO-OPERATION AMONG BANKS.

---

In almost all lines of business co-operation and consolidation are employed to cheapen production and to enhance profit by avoiding competition. This tendency is one of the marked features of the last half of the nineteenth century. It is rather remarkable, however, that in the business of banking there has been less progress made in the consolidation of interests than in other lines of business controlling or employing the same amount of capital.

In other countries, where banking is conducted under laws and regulations that render it more or less of a monopoly, this neglect of the benefits of co-operation would not seem so surprising; but in the United States, where the severity of competition is felt and loudly complained of, it would be thought that so obvious, and in other lines well tried a remedy, would have been fully in process of trial in the banking business. Banking, too, naturally lends itself to the consolidating process without difficulty.

The chief reason why the banking operations of the United States are not to-day united under the management of a few great corporations, as they are in most other countries, is due to the profit of the business growing out of the high rates of interest prevailing in the greater portion of the country. Expenses and taxes may be high, and the burdens of taxation may have rested unfairly on the banks, but nevertheless the profits have been such that all have been paid, and respectable dividends are yet possible. There are loud complaints of the difficulty in making ends meet, of the competition, of business done at a loss, but sifted down the conclusion is that profits are not yet entirely unsatisfactory to the majority of banks, though all of them may no doubt justly complain that profits are not what they once were. Most of the old-established banks have surplus and undivided profits accumulated in previous years by the use of which they are enabled to maintain fair dividends at the present time. The mere examination of dividends paid by the banks may not show the real falling off in returns from the business. The capital employed, the surplus, the deposits, have all to be taken into account in arriving at a comparison of the gross profits of a given bank to-day with those of the same bank twenty years ago.

But although the banking business under existing conditions that encourage and increase competition can yet be regarded as profitable, the falling off in profit as compared with the past is very discouraging, and the more so as with the gradual lowering of the rate of interest throughout the country profits are sure to become still smaller.

While there are signs here and there that bankers are inclined to turn to consolidation and co-operation for relief, yet the steps already taken in this direction have been comparatively insignificant. Consolidation means the combination of the capital and business of some fourteen thousand or more separate banks in the United States into a comparatively small number of banking institutions. How far this process will go in reducing the number of banks cannot be foretold. If the banking business of the United States was

conducted on lines similar to those of the banking system of the Dominion of Canada, and a comparison be made of the amount of business here and there, it may be roughly said that five hundred large banks in the United States, with branches at necessary points, could do the banking business of this country, as some thirty or forty banks with branches now do the banking business of the people of the Dominion. But even if some such system ever supersedes the present system of banking, it will be brought about by different methods. The banks of Canada each possess a special charter, and by association among themselves they are able practically to prevent the granting of any new charters of the same kind. In this country there seems to be the same aversion to granting special charters for banking as there is to the revival of slavery. Both special bank charters and slavery were abolished after long and bitter political agitation, and their cases are looked upon as *res judicata*.

But the banking community, while averse to special charters, nevertheless, in these days of competition and smaller and smaller profits, craves the better conditions which too free entry into the banking field now prohibits. Conditions similar to those enjoyed by monopolistic banking can be evolved without altering the political basis of our banking system, by employing modern methods of consolidation and co-operation. There have already been numerous instances of the consolidation of banks in different localities. Co-operation has been shown by association in clearing-houses, and in agreements as to charges for banking services, the collection of checks, etc.

The co-operative efforts already made have been sporadic, although they have been very effective; the co-operation, for instance, of the banks in New York city and other places for the purpose of regulating collection charges.

There is now a movement on foot to secure co-operation among country banks on a large scale. This process will probably go on, as the banks in different localities find themselves forced to it by decline in profits. But some time must elapse before this tendency becomes universal. Banks favorably located will retain their independence of such movements as long as possible. It will be necessity only that will in the end force a general co-operation and consolidation of the banking business.

The general trend of opinion as expressed in the meetings of the State bankers' associations appears to be decidedly hostile to any movement looking toward anything in the nature of a banking trust or monopoly. Naturally the numerous smaller country banks wish to preserve their independent existence and not become the appendage of some city bank. It is not impossible, however, that many of the real advantages of consolidation may be secured by co-operation on lines not objectionable to the public or to the banks that wish to maintain their identity.

---

**CHECK TAX ABOLISHED.**—Congress has abolished the two-cent stamp tax on bank checks imposed by the War Revenue Act of 1898, the abolition to become effective on July 1. While this tax tended to restrict bank transactions somewhat, it was not particularly burdensome either to the banks or the public. The BANKERS' MAGAZINE has steadily advocated the repeal of the tax, however, but chiefly on the ground that it was a kind of petty annoyance to business and a nuisance generally, and the revenue it produced was insufficient to justify its continuance.

## RENEWAL OF THE CHARTERS OF NATIONAL BANKS.

---

Since the enactment of the National Currency Act, in 1863, many of the National banks have had time to go through two corporate existences and are now taking measures to begin a third.

It is said corporations have no souls, and it is almost equally certain that they have no visible bodies. Some corporations have fixed locations, others do not. The National banks are among those having a special location where they must carry on their business. These locations are more or less readily discovered from the signs and advertisements the corporation is pleased to place before the public. But even at these advertised places it is not easy to discover the corporation itself. There are to be found there rooms furnished with bank fixtures, desks, books and appliances of various kinds occupied and used by clerks and officials. But these, singly and collectively, do not seem to comprise or form the corporation. Notwithstanding the invisibility of its soul and body, this mysterious entity has an existence—the term of which is originally fixed by law, and it cannot die, what in the case of an ordinary individual would be considered a natural death, until the end of the term. It may, however, come to an end before this by two diseases, known as failure or voluntary liquidation, or it may die a violent death, from forfeiture of charter by judicial action. None of these extraneous causes of dissolution intervening, a corporation lives free from uncertainty as to the time of its demise. Knowing the precise date when this last will happen, it can coolly take measures for a renewal of its youth.

The first National Currency Act became a law February 25, 1863. Under it banks were permitted to take terms of existence, not to exceed twenty years from the date of the act. The average life of the banks under this act was about nineteen years. This law was amended in 1864, and this act definitely fixed the corporate existence of a National bank at twenty years from the date of the organization certificate. As there are always new banks organizing under this law, the system as a system is perpetually renewing itself, and will continue to do so until the law is repealed.

It would seem, at first sight, from this that such acts as that introduced in Congress by Mr. Brosius for the extension of National bank charters, as well as a similar law previously enacted in 1882, would not be required. It is true that a National bank which has pursued the even tenor of its way for the prescribed term of its existence can be suffered to expire, and that then the owners of the belongings of the defunct corporation can piece them together to make another corporation, that cannot in essentials be distinguished very easily from the one that has just expired. But it is not the same corporation, and this fact gives rise to inconveniences of a legal nature which make it much preferable in most cases to extend the existence of the existing corporation for another life term.

The corporate existences of the National banks organized in 1863 began to terminate in 1882, and it became necessary to secure legislation to enable

those that desired to continue their charters. The act for this purpose became a law July 12, 1882, and to it were attached a number of provisions that were not necessarily involved in the extension of the charters. The simplest form of a law for the purpose would have been a declaration by Congress to the effect that all expiring National bank charters were when they expired extended by the force of the act for another term of twenty years. There were, however, other points to be considered by the legislative authority—a controlling majority of the stockholders of any given corporation might prefer to have their charters expire. It was, therefore, necessary to give the stockholders a voice in the matter. The bank might not be in such condition as to make its continuance desirable. Therefore, some examination of its condition was required. The rights of stockholders who did not desire extension were also entitled to protection. In addition to the protection of stockholders the opportunity was given to the Government to impose new regulations and restrictions in return for the extension of the franchise. The act of July 12, 1882, contained provisions founded on the principle of protecting the stockholders, the public and the Government. If there had been no new legislation the banks whose corporate existence expired could, by the action of their stockholders, have organized new associations with the same name. One or two banks did this before the extension act of 1882 was enacted. The use of the same name was permitted by the Comptroller of the Currency under an opinion rendered by the Attorney-General of the United States in February, 1882. The name under which an association of stockholders had operated a bank for twenty years acquired a decided value in the relations of the institution with the public. In some cases, however, the management of an old bank, which owned a controlling interest of the stock, found that a portion of the stock had in the course of years fallen into the hands of people who were no longer in active business, trustees of estates and descendants generally of those who had formerly been active in the business of the bank.

From the point of view of the managers it was desirable that the stock should be owned by active business men who would by their own exertions and affiliations bring business and deposits to the bank. The undesirable stockholders had become so much dead wood to an active institution desirous of competing for and increasing its business. The object of such management was to seize the opportunity of the expiration of the charter for rejuvenating their institution and get rid of the dead wood, as they regarded it. The mere extension of charter under the same name would not accomplish their object. Their wish was to let the old bank expire, liquidate its affairs and then start under the same name a bank legally a different corporation. This would enable them to hold the whip hand in buying out or paying off the undesirable stockholders, and free them from any control except their own sense of justice. There naturally was some collision of opinion between the parties who were thus thrown out and the active management. The latter generally desired to retain the exclusive right to the good will of the bank's old title without allowing it to be of any great value in purchasing or paying off stock. Complaints were made, and to protect stockholders liable to being thus frozen out Congress provided in the extension act of July 12, 1882, that, where a new bank was organized to take the place of an expiring institution, and where the old name was retained, the shares of the new bank should be allotted to the stockholders of the old bank in the same proportion as the stock held by

them in the old. Managers who wished to take the old name for a new and active institution were thus prevented from taking undue advantage of old stockholders who otherwise might have been forced to give up their holdings at an undervaluation.

Probably, without any new enactment, the law as it has been since July 12, 1882, would enable the banks whose charters are approaching termination to renew their corporate existence. That act does not set any limitation to its operations, and seems to apply as well to a bank whose second term of twenty years is about to expire as to a bank whose first term of twenty years has run out. It would appear to apply equally well to the expiration of the third, fourth or other term of twenty years as to the first or second. It provides that any National bank organized under the acts of Congress under which such banks have been or may be organized, may, at any time within two years next previous to the date of its corporate existence under present law, extend its term, etc. Another section provides that the association which has extended for its second term is identically the same association it was before.

The only reason for a new extension act seems to be to afford an opportunity to revise National bank legislation, so that the experience of the last twenty years may be embodied in the statutes. There seems to be a feeling that the expiration of the twenty-year period affords an opportunity for Congress to take a sort of an account of obligations existing between the corporations to whom it has granted franchises, and to see on which side the balance is or may be due. In England and France the expiration of the chartered terms of the Banks of England and France, and the applications for extension, are made the occasion for the securing of new bonuses to the Government in exchange for renewed or newly granted privileges.

The National banking system, made up of banks organized at different dates, does not involve the expiration of any great number of charters at any given date. The original law of 1863 did involve such a general expiration, fixing it at twenty years from the date of the act. This, however, was abrogated by the act of June, 1864, which gives each bank succession for twenty years from the date of its organization certificate and thus, by the organization of banks from day to day, month to month and year to year, made the system virtually perpetual. Nevertheless, taking 1882 as the year when charters began to expire, it was not bad policy for Congress on that date, and again as 1902 approaches, to pass general acts for the renovation of the banking laws, dropping obsolete or unnecessary provisions and embodying new ones that the experience of twenty years points out as desirable. Such legislation being established by precedent would disarm factious opposition and enable the banking system of the country gradually to assimilate itself to business needs.

---

**ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.**—On February 27 the President nominated Milton E. Ailes, of Ohio, to be Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, to succeed Frank A. Vanderlip, who has resigned to enter the National City Bank, of New York.

---

**BRITISH EXCHEQUER LOAN.**—Tenders for £11,000,000 Exchequer bonds were closed February 12. Twenty-five millions were applied for. Applicants at £97 2s receive a pro rata allotment and applicants above that price a full allotment. The average price was £97 5s 4d.

## BANKING AND FINANCIAL NOTES.

### REVIEW OF THE WORLD'S MONETARY PROGRESS.

#### BANKING IN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND.

The very interesting review of the progress of banking in the United Kingdom is continued in the February issue of the London "Bankers' Magazine."

It is shown that the process of bank consolidation has continued during the year just closed, the number of banks absorbed in this way in England and Wales being fourteen in 1900, compared with seven in 1899, the same number in 1898, nine in 1897 and eighteen in 1896—a total of fifty-five banks that have passed out of separate existence within five years.

Scotland and Ireland are still, in the sense of the number of banking offices, more amply provided with banking accommodation than England and Wales.

From 1876 to 1900, inclusive, the total net increase in banking offices in the United Kingdom has been 2,967. There are 6,521 total banking offices, of which 5,421 are open daily and 1,100 open on stated days only.

Commenting on the restrictions on the English country banks with reference to note issues, the London "Bankers' Magazine" says :

"We have again to repeat that English and Welsh provincial banks have fair grounds for complaint that, owing to the legislation on the subject of the note circulation, they have not similar advantages in carrying on the irbusiness to those possessed by all the Scotch and most of the Irish banks. The law on this subject is much less favorable to the banks in England and Wales than the legislation regulating the note circulation in Scotland and Ireland. The possession of note issue is, in one sense, an advantage to the banks, but it is a greater advantage in fact to the public, as the economy in working which results therefrom enables more branch banks to be opened, and greater facilities to be given to the public. Much of the legislation which regulates banking, and especially private banking, in England is now altogether out of date and mischievous where it is not useless."

Attention is called to the fact that the Postal Savings Bank, operated by the Government, is paying a higher rate of interest than is warranted, and that recently a deficit has been shown—a loss that must be reimbursed from the public funds.

In the following table is given a summary of the existing banks and branches in the United Kingdom :

	<i>Head offices.</i>	<i>Branches.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
England and Wales.....	314	4,427	4,741
Ile of Man.....	2	19	21
Scotland.....	11	1,070	1,081
Ireland.....	9	669	678
Total.....	336	6,185	6,521

Twelve banks in England and Wales have more than 100 branches each, and seven banks in Scotland and two in Ireland also have more than 100 branches.

#### SILVER COINAGE IN MEXICO.

There has been such a marked decline in the coinage of silver dollars in Mexico in recent years as to be a matter of concern to the Government, and



in consequence the Mint regulations have been somewhat relaxed in order to encourage the presentation of bullion for conversion into dollars. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1874, the coinage of silver dollars in Mexico amounted to \$18,846,067, and there was an increase for most of the years up to 1894, when a maximum of \$30,185,611 was reached. For subsequent years there has been a considerable falling off from these figures, and for the year ending June 30, 1900, the coinage amounted to only \$18,102,630, which is slightly less than the amount coined for the year ending June 30, 1874, and the smallest reported in the period between the two dates.

The production of silver in the Republic of Mexico has increased in nearly every year since 1878. In the former year the production reported was of the coining value of \$24,837,000, and in 1900 it was \$67,800,000.

#### THE LONDON JOINT-STOCK BANKS.

There has been considerable comment recently on the growth of the deposits of the associated banks in New York in the last few years, the gross amount having recently for the first time reached one thousand million dollars. In the January issue of this MAGAZINE a table appeared showing the progress made by the associated banks of New York, and their condition in December, 1900. Since the first of January there has been a very large gain in deposits.

It will be interesting, in view of the prominence which the New York city banks are attaining, to give some of the principal items from the statements of the London joint-stock banks. In the following tables are given the deposits at interest and on current account for December 31, 1899, and December 31, 1900. The paid-up capital and reserve for the same dates are also shown:

BANKS.	PAID-UP CAPITAL AND RESERVE.		DEPOSITS AT INTEREST AND ON CURRENT ACCOUNT.	
	Dec. 31, 1899.	Dec. 31, 1900.	Dec. 31, 1899.	Dec. 31, 1900.
<b>I. BANKS PURELY METROPOLITAN.</b>				
London and Westminster, Limited .....	£24,400,000	£24,400,000	£28,550,000	£28,497,000
London Joint Stock, Limited.....	3,000,000	3,000,000	17,952,000	17,185,000
Union, Limited.....	2,555,000	2,555,000	15,871,000	18,090,000
Glyn, Mills, Currie & Co.....	1,500,000	1,500,000	15,298,000	13,998,000
London and Southwestern, Limited.....	1,480,000	1,480,000	11,170,000	11,840,000
Martin's, Limited.....	590,000	600,000	3,130,000	2,967,000
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>£13,505,000</b>	<b>£13,515,000</b>	<b>£89,948,000</b>	<b>£90,977,000</b>
<b>II. BANKS WITH COUNTRY BRANCHES.</b>				
National Provincial, Limited.....	£5,300,000	£5,275,000	£49,964,000	£51,084,000
London and County, Limited.....	3,675,000	3,500,000	45,125,000	45,263,000
Lloyds, Limited.....	3,675,000	4,748,000	40,822,000	51,367,000
London City and Midland, Limited.....	4,405,000	5,048,000	33,818,000	37,845,000
Barclay & Co., Limited.....	3,817,000	3,417,000	31,830,000	34,324,000
Parry & Alliance, Limited.....	2,740,000	2,927,000	23,798,000	24,512,000
Capital and Counties, Limited.....	1,750,000	1,750,000	20,294,000	21,347,000
Williams & Man. and Sal., Limited.....	1,550,000	1,575,000	12,883,000	12,342,000
London and Provincial, Limited.....	1,756,000	1,708,000	10,532,000	11,814,000
Prescott, Dimesdale, Limited.....	612,000	612,000	4,500,000	4,898,000
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>£28,880,000</b>	<b>£30,618,000</b>	<b>£272,855,000</b>	<b>£294,784,000</b>

In commenting on these figures in its issue of February 16, "The Economist" (London) says :

"The deposits continue steadily to increase, but not so much by increase of metropolitan business as by the constant absorption of country banks. \* \* \* The deposits of the

purely metropolitan banks included in Group I have increased since December, 1899, only by about one million sterling. \* \* \* In the second group the total has increased during the year by nearly twenty-two millions, mostly due, of course, to amalgamations. \* \* \* The grand total of deposits centered in the metropolis amounts now to £385,761,000."

A comparison of the combined balance-sheet for all the banks gives the following result :

Dr.	1899.	1900.
Capital and reserve.....	£41,885,000	£44,131,000
Deposits.....	362,817,000	385,761,000
Total.....	£404,702,000	£429,892,000
CR.		
Cash.....	£53,539,000	£62,490,000
Money at call.....	43,152,000	41,744,000
Investments.....	82,250,000	83,067,000
Discounts and advances.....	230,227,000	236,649,000
Premises, etc.....	5,534,000	5,933,000
Total.....	£404,702,000	£429,892,000

If to the total of £385,761,000, representing the deposits of all the London joint-stock banks, there be added the £54,733,000 representing the deposits of the Bank of England on January 2, 1901, the total deposits would be brought up to £440,494,000, or \$2,202,470,000.

It is not possible to institute a comparison between the banks of New York and London, owing to the great difference in their form of organization. American banks are operated as independent institutions, while those in London generally have numerous branches, some of them as many as 100. This, of course, enormously adds to the deposits of the banks in the latter city. The banking power of New York is only partially represented by the institutions forming the clearing-house association.

#### CRISES AND THEIR MANAGEMENT.

A valuable paper on the above topic is contributed to the February number of the "Yale Review" by Mr. Charles A. Conant. Discussing the question as to whether banks should expand or restrict their advances during the acute stage of a crisis, the author says :

"The expansive theory, as it is called by Professor MacLeod, has been too often tested during the past half-century against the restrictive theory to leave any doubt as to the wisdom of the former. The expansive theory involves loans in times of panic up to the utmost limit, upon good security, which the resources of the bank permit, in order to meet the emergency of the moment. A solvent bank need have no fear in a crisis, if it has the power to issue notes and extend credit freely, that its specie reserves will not be fully restored after the acute stage of the crisis is over. The restrictive theory assumes the necessity of bringing everything at once to a metallic basis. It is supposed to have the effect upon the congested financial body of a healthy purging. This theory is directed against the continuance of loans to sustain the inflated credit which has brought on the panic. It would be a sound theory if it were applied at the right time ; but the demands for accommodation after a panic has broken out are very different in character from those before the panic. The new demands are not usually made for the purpose of continuing inflation, but for the purpose of supplying the sudden drying up of the usual sources of credit—the temporary paralysis of the entire machinery of exchange through terror. The moment the terror is mitigated, the old machinery will resume its normal functions, with a movement modulated to the new condition of things.

It is one of the highest functions of modern banking to put an end to the period of unreasoning fear and complete paralysis which marks the acute stage of a panic, by employing all the resources due to inherited strength and legal powers in restoring the orderly functions of the machinery of exchange."

## TAXATION OF SAVINGS BANKS.

### A TAX ON THE SURPLUS WOULD BE A TAX ON DEPOSITS.

Those who are seeking to justify the imposition of a tax on the surplus of Savings banks, by claiming that such surplus is the property of the banks and not of the depositors, may get a clearer idea of what a Savings bank is, and what such a tax would mean, by reading the opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in the case of *People, ex rel. Newburgh Savings Bank, vs. Geo. W. Peck, Assessor, etc.* In that opinion, which was rendered by Justice Gray on October 18, 1898, it was said in quoting the law applicable to the case:

"By Section 113 it is provided that the sums deposited, together with the dividends or interest credited thereto, shall be repaid to the depositors, after demand, under regulations to be prescribed by the board of trustees. Section 123 provides that the trustees shall regulate the rate of interest or dividends, not to exceed five per centum upon the deposits, 'in such manner that depositors shall receive as nearly as may be all the profits of such corporation after deducting necessary expenses and reserving such amounts as the trustees may deem expedient as a surplus fund for the security of the depositors, which to the amount of fifteen per cent. of its deposits the trustees of any such corporation may gradually accumulate and hold to meet any contingency or loss in its business from the depreciation of its securities or otherwise.'

It is further therein provided that 'the trustees of any such corporation whose surplus amounts to fifteen per cent. of its deposits, at least once in three years, shall divide equitably the accumulation beyond such authorized surplus as an extra dividend to depositors, in excess of the regular dividends authorized.' Further, by other provisions, in the event of the dissolution of the corporation (Secs. 133, 134, 135) the moneys not paid to depositors must be paid to the Superintendent of Banks, to be by him distributed under direction of the Supreme Court.

These provisions seem to make it clear that every interest in the properties held by a Savings bank is vested in the depositors and that the bank can acquire no interest therein.

I think that Section 123 can only be regarded as declaratory of the ownership of all the funds of the depositors. They are to receive all the profits, except that expenses are to be deducted and that there may be accumulated a surplus for their security.

Such a corporation has neither capital nor shareholders, and its only resources are the moneys of depositors and the income which may be received from investments. The bank, necessarily from the statutory provisions, must be deemed to hold what property it has for the benefit of depositors only. It manages the same through its trustees and officers, and under no circumstances and in no event does it or do its trustees acquire any interest therein.

The assessment in this case necessarily proceeded upon the theory that the surplus fund belonged to the bank itself and that what was due to its depositors was only the aggregate of the sums credited to them on their pass-books. That is the position of the appellants and they endeavor to support it by the argument that, as the depositors' accounts can be closed at any time, and as they can only demand that which stands to their credit on the books, it must therefore follow that as to the surplus fund the bank is not their debtor.

This argument depends upon a narrow reading of the exemption clause, and fails to take into consideration the legal status of the Savings bank and of its depositors. The bank neither earns nor holds anything for itself or its trustees, out holds everything for the depositors. The fact that the surplus represents accumulations, and may not be immedi-

ately paid out, cannot affect the question of the ownership of the property. The word 'deposits' used in the statute of exemption means, by a just interpretation, the total amount received for which the bank is accountable, and not merely the identical moneys received from particular depositors.

The surplus which has accumulated is a part of a fund which represents the original deposits, and its creation is authorized in contemplation that it may be needed to be used to repay the depositors the amounts put in by them. \* \* \* It is difficult to see upon what theory the appellants' contention could be sustained, that only the actual deposits, which are returnable to depositors upon demand, are exempt from taxation.

The surplus does not belong to the bank, for it holds it for the security of depositors to whom it is due contingently upon the occurrence of circumstances requiring its payment to them. If it is an asset, it is at the same time to be treated as a liability of the bank."

In declaring that the surplus and the deposits in Savings banks are exempt from taxation, the Court of Appeals further said:

"It is to be presumed that considerations of public policy have dictated the exemption, and that the legislative body has been actuated by the motive of assuring the protection of depositors against the contingencies of losses, or of depreciation in values."

The surplus of a Savings bank is the difference between the deposit liabilities and the value of the assets. No bank can hold a surplus in excess of fifteen per cent. of its deposits, which is certainly little enough margin for security.

Depositors in National and State banks are protected not only by the surplus, but by the capital, and by the liability of shareholders in an additional amount equal to the par value of their shares. The Savings bank depositor has no other protection against panic or depreciation of the values of securities except the surplus fund, for there is no capital and the trustees are not liable as are the shareholders in other banks.

No tax can be placed upon the surplus without decreasing this protection or impairing the ability of these institutions to earn the low rate of interest now paid depositors. The tendency in recent years has been toward a lower dividend rate, and the proposed tax will add to this tendency.

A tax upon the surplus of National or State banks and trust companies would be a tax upon those who own the shares, generally persons of considerable means; but as there are no shares in Savings banks, a tax on their surplus, as plainly stated by the Court of Appeals, would be a tax upon depositors, who are as a rule people in humble circumstances.

In theory rich and poor should be taxed alike in proportion to their property; but it is a fact too familiar to require argument, that the burden of taxation already falls most heavily upon those least able to bear it.

The proposal to tax the surplus of Savings banks is unjust in principle and unwise in policy, and ought to be abandoned.

NEW YORK, March 4, 1901.

BRADFORD RHODES.

#### ADDITIONAL POINTED FACTS.

The motive for taxing the surplus of Savings banks seems to be found in the desire to make a reduction in the rate of direct taxation for State purposes. It is said that by the imposition of the taxes proposed in the measure now before the Legislature this direct State tax will be reduced about one-half, or something over \$5,000,000. This is not a large amount, and the saving of it would not justify placing a tax upon the provident poor of the State

who put their hard-earned savings in the Savings banks. Compared with the taxes assessed for local purposes, the direct State tax is insignificant.

---

Computed on the par value of securities the surplus of the Savings banks of the State is \$70,018,318.

Although the surplus of the Savings banks is growing, it is not increasing in the same proportion as deposits are. It has been found that, while the surplus of the banks has increased \$28,000,000 during the past six years, in reality it has decreased three-quarters of one per cent. when compared with the increase in the amount of money due depositors. This conclusion is based upon the market value of the securities held. Taking the par value of the securities, it is found that the decrease has been one and four-tenths per cent.

The surplus computed on par values of securities which all the Savings banks of the State held on January 1 *was only a fraction over seven per cent. of their total deposits*, and if some of the older banks were excluded, the surplus of the others would be even less. There are a number of Savings banks that have no actual surplus whatever if their investments are figured at their present marketable value, as may be seen by reference to the table on the following page. In view of the possible depreciation of securities on account of panics or other causes it would be very unwise to place a continuous annual tax on the surplus and thereby reduce the moderate protection which depositors now have.

---

There are 2,072,190 depositors in the Savings banks of the State, and the amount to their credit in these institutions is \$947,129,638, or an average of \$457.06. Are the holders of these small sums—in many cases the only barrier against misfortune—to be compelled to give up their hard-earned savings, while the bulk of personal property belonging to the wealthy is allowed to escape taxation?

It is well known that the class of people who are depositors in these semi-charitable institutions already pay more taxes in proportion to their property than any others. The Savings bank depositors are to be taxed—for that is what the taxation of their surplus means according to the Court of Appeals—but the comparatively wealthy business men who have deposits in National, State and private banks will still be able to conceal their money from the assessors.

---

Taking the records of one Savings bank in each county having such institutions (31 counties in the State have Savings banks) a careful estimate has recently been made showing that there are about 750,000 voters who are depositors in the Savings institutions. This is more than a majority of all the voters at the last general election. Out of the 2,000,000 depositors over half are women and children—many of them widows and orphans—and this is the class of people the great Empire State proposes to tax!

Deducting the women and children and also the un-naturalized foreigners and other non-voters, there remain about 750,000 voters who are depositors in the Savings institutions throughout the State and watch their interests therein with jealous care. It is unjust to these men—most of them heads of families—to impose upon them this new principle of taxation. Is it wise either from a political or economic standpoint?

TABLE SHOWING PERCENTAGE OF SURPLUS TO DEPOSITS OF  
SAVINGS BANKS, BY COUNTIES, IN THE STATE OF  
NEW YORK, JANUARY 1, 1901.

[Compiled from Official Reports to the Superintendent of the Banking Department.]

COUNTY.	Number of depositors.	No. of banks.	Amount due depositors.	Surplus on par value of stocks and bonds.	Per cent. of surplus to to- tal deposits computed on par value of securities.
ALBANY.....	85,135	9	\$55,768,810	\$2,283,587	.0409
BROOME.....	18,156	2	3,365,895	132,204	.0392
CAYUGA.....	17,856	2	5,573,805	317,857	.0570
CHEMUNG.....	1,437	1	155,098	3,260	.0210
COLUMBIA.....	7,762	1	2,980,889	276,199	.0926
CORTLAND.....	7,279	1	1,893,081	53,327	.0281
DUTCHESS.....	30,392	7	14,037,853	804,277	.0572
ERIE.....	103,400	4	48,334,842	4,821,539	.0987
GREENE.....	4,787	1	1,849,062	109,313	.0591
JEFFERSON.....	17,624	2	4,870,382	256,852	.0527
KINGS.....	335,993	16	149,609,522	11,347,089	.0758
MADISON.....	4,847	1	1,266,534	118,909	.0939
MONROE.....	81,726	4	37,263,986	2,205,949	.0391
MONTGOMERY.....	7,262	1	1,804,819	2,947	.0016
NASSAU.....	1,668	1	637,733	27,328	.0428
NEW YORK.....	1,040,668	27	506,263,600	40,198,111	.0794
NIAGARA.....	7,462	2	2,731,357	119,273	.0436
ONEIDA.....	32,753	3	11,602,920	794,297	.0684
ONONDAGA.....	67,447	3	27,632,263	1,365,504	.0493
ORANGE.....	30,166	6	11,495,531	989,635	.0860
OSWEGO.....	12,230	3	4,250,688	158,318	.0372
PUTNAM.....	1,391	1	363,175	21,603	.0595
QUEENS.....	20,025	4	5,290,130	362,052	.0684
RENSSELAER.....	20,327	1	8,571,605	735,975	.0858
RICHMOND.....	8,232	2	2,043,185	138,218	.0676
SCHENECTADY.....	11,235	1	3,075,696	77,389	.0251
SENECA.....	1,837	1	361,592	20,647	.0571
SUFFOLK.....	14,845	4	6,908,479	612,014	.0885
TOMPKINS.....	7,141	1	1,731,380	179,509	.0103
ULSTER.....	22,896	6	8,441,215	576,212	.0680
WESTCHESTER.....	48,711	10	10,438,628	951,535	.0580
TOTAL.....	2,072,190	128	\$947,129,638	*\$70,018,318	.0739

\* The correct total of the items in this column is \$70,063,875, but nine banks in the list, all of them comparatively new institutions, have a deficit on par values aggregating \$45,557, which must be deducted in order to obtain the true amount of surplus on par values for all of the banks. The reason for the deficits referred to is the premiums paid by the banks for bonds purchased.

The bill placing a tax of one per cent. on the surplus of Savings banks, estimated on the par value of securities, has already passed the Senate of the New York Legislature, and its passage by the House seems to be assured despite the protests of the Savings bank officers and depositors.

## JOHN JOHNSTON.

---

John Johnston, Vice-President of the Marine National Bank of Milwaukee, was born on the farm of Overton, Auchnagatt, Aberdeenshire, Scotland. He was educated at the Grammar School and University of Aberdeen, winning a high scholarship in the University in a public competition in Latin and Greek open to all comers.

After graduating as an A.M., he came to Milwaukee in 1856, entering the bank of his uncle, the late Alexander Mitchell—the old Wisconsin Marine and Fire Insurance Company Bank. This institution is one of the oldest banks in the Northwest, having been established in 1839, and is one of the famous banks of the country. During the era of State bank notes it issued currency which had a wide circulation and was always promptly redeemed. The old bank was recently changed into the Marine National, of which Mr. Johnston is Vice-President, having of course previously served in the various other capacities and won promotion in the right way—by ability and hard work.

When Mr. Johnston settled in Milwaukee, it had a population of less than 40,000; now it has 300,000, and Mr. Johnston has done his share in building up that now great and prosperous city. He has been a member of the Board of Aldermen, Commissioner of Public Debt, President of the Chamber of Commerce, Chairman of the Board under whose direction the magnificent Public Library and Museum Building of Milwaukee was erected, President of the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin, and President of the State Historical Society; he was one of those who discovered and developed the great cement deposits adjoining the city limits of Milwaukee on the north. He presented Milwaukee with a site for the City Emergency Hospital in a very central and valuable location. He is Vice-President of the Wisconsin Bankers' Association, and a member of the Executive and Finance Committees of the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company whose assets are \$150,000,000.

Mr. Johnston was elected a member of the Executive Council of the American Bankers' Association at its meeting last October.

His long and successful identification with banking and his experimental knowledge in regard to the country's finances have fitted him to give correct opinions on these subjects, and he has been called upon frequently to combat popular errors in regard to monetary matters. While the greenback craze was rife, he delivered an address before the iron workers of the State, and it was considered to be such a forceful presentation of the principles of sound money that the Honest Money League of Wisconsin distributed 100,000 copies of it. Although the State has sometimes been considered doubtful on some issues, there is no uncertainty now as to where it stands on the money question. Wisconsin is justly regarded as one of the strongholds of the sound money forces. Its citizens are conservative and prosperous.

Mr. Johnston has been connected with one bank for nearly forty-five years. The appearance of the striking portrait of him, engraved for the *MAGAZINE* from a recent photograph and presented herewith as a title illustration, justifies the expectation that he will yet continue in active service for many years.

## \* MODERN BANKING METHODS.

---

*A NEW SERIES ON PRACTICAL BANKING—HELPFUL HINTS DERIVED  
FROM EXPERIENCE.*

---

In our previous chapters we have seen the machinery of banking ; but, however beautiful the machine may be, unless it is set in motion, and in a direction to be of some use, it becomes like any other inanimate matter. It may be a curiosity to look upon, but will be passed by and hardly thought of again.

We see a beautiful and powerful engine. To us it represents a great deal, because we have seen it move, and we know what it can accomplish ; but if we knew nothing of it and of its power, it would mean no more to us than an inanimate piece of metal.

Until the hand of the skilled engineer takes control of the engine it is really useless. So it is in the bank ; no matter how beautiful and complete the machinery, there must be the engineer, the head and brains, to operate the machinery in the right direction.

As has been shown in early chapters, the management of a bank is divided into two departments—the legislative, or board of directors, and the executive, or President and Cashier. A full description of the necessary qualifications for these various positions, and the powers and duties of these officers, was given in the October and November, 1898, numbers, of this *MAGAZINE*, so it will be unnecessary to repeat the matter here.

In years gone by the "one-man bank" was much more common than to-day, especially in our large cities, but the business has increased so immensely in both volume and complexity that greater safety lies in a division of authority and responsibility.

Even in the small towns and the country sections, where still the governing power is often found in one man, an active President or Cashier, the officer will be wise to endeavor to secure as intelligent a board of directors as possible, and to confer with them upon all important matters, seeking thereby to obtain a consensus of opinion to aid him in his management.

It is natural that a board of directors should defer to the opinions of the executive officer, feeling that he possibly has more personal knowledge on the question before them than they, as sometimes occurs ; but the officer should give the board all the information in his possession, and let them decide as to the best course. In all such cases a very careful minute should be made of the questions at issue and the discussion, and these should be entered in full in the minute book, for the memory is a very uncertain quantity, and a record in black and white is much more satisfactory, often saving trouble.

---

\* Continued from the February number, page 208. This series of articles commenced in the *MAGAZINE* for August, 1898, page 249.



## MAKING THE BANK POPULAR.

A bank to be really successful must be in a measure popular, especially in these days of active competition.

When a bank first opens its doors for business it must have customers, that is, depositors and borrowers—one is as important as the other. Its stockholders, having a personal interest in its success, may reasonably be expected to be among its depositors. But these of course are limited. If it would succeed it must seek to build up as large a line of depositors as possible. To do this it should start from the foundation. Seek to obtain among its stockholders as many strong leading men, men of the highest standing, both financially and socially, as possible. The board of directors should be made up of men of this type, and in their selection of the officers they should choose the best, not the cheapest, as is too often done. The cheapest men often prove the dearest.

The confidence of the people must be obtained. This should be the first move towards popularizing the bank. Having obtained it, never by word or act do anything to shake it.

To obtain depositors often requires much solicitation. This more properly belongs to the stockholders and directors than to the executive officers.

In soliciting depositors the bait of increased accommodation is sometimes unwisely used.

The question of loans or accommodation is one that should be considered strictly by itself, and should depend upon many things which will be treated of later.

The bank started, its policy in popularizing it should be to treat everyone, rich or poor, with the same courtesy. Be perfectly honest and frank with the people. Let the bankers never forget that they have in their care the money and credits of the people, which have been entrusted to them, and they will be watched, particularly at first, with anxious eyes as to the conservative and careful management.

Borrowers are not so difficult to obtain, except under some extreme conditions, as depositors. The question here is as to the security. Here is another line upon which a bank can make itself popular, not by lending to everyone, but by exhibiting such care in making its loans, and if necessity compels a refusal of a loan to do it in such a manner that even the one refused will feel the justice of the act, and his confidence will be strengthened.

Men like to transact business where they know they will be treated honorably and with courtesy, and where the interests of all will be well guarded.

To be popular a bank must be broad spirited and liberal. A petty spirit soon disgusts the people, and they will not hesitate to show it at the first opportunity.

Whatever is worth doing is worth doing well, and the people seldom object to paying for a first-class article.

Consequently, if a bank makes a reputation for attending to its collections promptly, and in a business-like manner, the people will seldom object to pay for the service.

## WAYS OF ADVERTISING THE BANK.

Wise advertising is a feature in banking that is worth considering. The customary business card is, of course, put in the papers, and at regular peri-

ods statements of the condition of the bank are published. Banks desiring to increase their list of correspondents will find the banking and financial periodicals of the highest class valuable advertising mediums.

A plan frequently adopted, especially where the bank is in a healthy, growing condition, is to have a copy of a published statement printed on a neat card, and enclose one of these cards with every letter that is sent away, and place them at the disposal of depositors and others coming into the bank. The people like to watch the growth of a bank, and are pleased when they see the one in which they deposit steadily growing.

Some banks get up a nice little pamphlet in which are brief instructions regarding notes and their forms, endorsements, the proper form in which to fill up a check, the forms of drafts, a few simple rules regarding the making of deposits and the care of the pass-book, also the revenue laws and postal rates. These they send to all their depositors and place them on their counters within the reach of all.

Some have rulers and pencils made, also calendars, memorandum books, and various other little useful articles, all with the bank's card on them, to give away to their customers and others.

The paying of interest on deposits is another means to draw business, but whether this is a source of profit, except under certain circumstances, is a doubtful question. The most satisfactory way is to keep this class of accounts as purely savings fund accounts, under the usual restrictions of Savings banks, not subject to check. Many banks are doing this with success.

In the competition to secure deposits from banks and bankers some large banks employ canvassers who travel over the country visiting the banks in small towns and cities, and soliciting their accounts. Of course in these cases special arrangements are generally made regarding the paying of interest on the average balance, generally about two per cent., and for the collecting of all items on other points.

Another means of popularizing a bank is for the bank to own its building. The people certainly feel more confidence in the bank that is fortunately able to have its own building. But it would hardly be considered good business management for a bank to erect or buy a building for its use unless it is in a financial position to warrant doing so.

Will all these various means nothing succeeds so well as the points first mentioned; starting the bank on the right foundation, winning the confidence of the people and retaining it by kindly, courteous treatment and the best of service. Depend upon it, it pays, for the people are willing to pay for the best of anything.

As an instance let me tell of the success of a bank that followed the above policy. The bank started in a section of the country where it had been the custom to collect without charge. It had old competitors, but it took the position that it would transact all business promptly and give the best of attention. It pushed for business, and to-day, while only seven years old, it is the largest bank in that section of the country, and has fully demonstrated the fact that the people are willing to pay for *good service*.

A. R. BARRETT.

(To be continued.)

# THE EDUCATION OF A BANKER.

## *PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL TRAINING OF BANK CLERKS AND OFFICERS.*

### LEARNING THE ROUTINE OF BANK WORK.

#### I.

#### HINTS FOR JUNIOR AND SENIOR CLERKS, MESSENGERS, BOOKKEEPERS AND TELLERS.

There is no school like the school of experience, and there is perhaps no school of learning where this maxim is given more credence than in that for training bank clerks, which school is the bank itself. Yet we would think it a strange school of mathematics where a room full of students of all ages and grades of efficiency should be gathered together from day to day with no teacher, and with no instruction save what each student might pick up from observation of the one doing the next higher grade of work, and from the lesson of his own mistakes and ignorance. This is, practically, the ordinary method of making a trained banker of a boy just out of school with a very vague idea of the purpose and use of banks. The organization of bank clerks' associations holding meetings weekly, or bi-weekly, with instructors employed and a regular course of study prescribed, is a long step in the right direction, and this should be supplemented in the larger institutions by a clerk well versed in ordinary business methods and the actual workings of the banking office, whose partial duty should be to instruct junior clerks. This part of the work would naturally fall to the manager of the collection department.

The usual custom makes the duty of teaching a beginner rest upon the clerk next in rank, and it takes six months to obtain the information and efficiency that could be acquired in a few days from an experienced teacher.

Banking is a profession, and requires, perhaps, a longer apprenticeship than that of any other, and for this reason a boy should not choose banking as his life work unless he has a natural aptness for figures and finds pleasure in mathematical studies. It is just as possible for a young man to miss his calling by going into a bank as by going into the ministry, or law, or medicine, and having adopted banking as a profession, he should go into it with the same serious consideration, and expect the same amount of hard work and study.

It is not enough that a clerk know thoroughly the duties of his own position. A good lawyer must have a knowledge of the law in all its branches in order to be able safely to conduct cases of various kinds and under extraordinary circumstances. Just so a competent clerk will master to the best degree possible all the departments of banking and finance.

The current banking publications afford valuable instruction for bank clerks, and these may be supplemented with law books on the subject of commercial paper. The political and civil code of the State also makes interesting and profitable reading to the student of finance.

## RULES TO BE OBSERVED IN THE WORK OF A BANK.

The habit of keeping always at work during business hours is of the highest importance. It takes energy and natural ability to see where assistance is needed without having to be told. A constant alertness and willingness to do any work which suggests itself will benefit the clerk as much as the bank. There is no way where a clerk can learn the ins and outs of the business, except by going into each department and doing the actual work, and constantly doing this will prevent him from getting rusty. When a vacancy is caused by sickness or resignation, the young man who has mastered the workings of the vacant position is the one most available. The work of a model bank will be so systematized that much verbal discussion or instruction between officers and clerks or the clerks themselves becomes unnecessary.

Loud talk or bantering conversation should not be indulged in. The presence or absence of the bank officers should not be noticed by the clerks. They should not say or do anything when the manager is out that they would not if he were in. A good way to tell whether a bank is properly managed is to call in the absence of the officers and note the behavior of the clerks.

A clerk, on leaving his desk at night, should place his pens, pencils, ink-wells, paper, etc., in the drawer. It gives the bank office a very neat appearance after banking hours to find the desks perfectly clean and in order. The gathering up of all waste paper will occasionally disclose a check, or deposit slip, or note which has been mislaid. Waste paper should be kept for three or four days before being burned.

Plan the work so that each hour of the day will have its particular duties. Do not do a certain part of the work in the morning of one day and the afternoon of the next. Have each item, book and paper required in your work where you can put your hand on it the instant needed. Thinking what next to do and looking for the necessities to do it with, cause the loss of much valuable time by clerks having loose habits and no idea of system.

Envelopes should be slit on the top edge and both ends. After the mail is taken out the envelopes should be gone over again to make sure that no item or letter has stuck to the inside. They should then be tied in bundles and be kept for a few days as an extra precaution.

Every bank clerk, whether junior or senior, should at all times have the bank's financial interest uppermost in his mind, and should give serious thought to the best method of doing the work he has in hand. The most valuable bank man is the one who has the ability to think out improved ways of accomplishing satisfactory results.

## HELPFUL SUGGESTIONS FOR MESSENGERS.

As a messenger, a young man usually shows his superiors whether or not he will develop into a good banker, and indeed the position of bank messenger offers greater opportunities than most any other for obtaining an insight into business methods, and the laws governing notes, drafts, checks, and all forms of business paper. He should thoroughly post himself regarding the method and necessity of protesting paper, the rights and liabilities of endorsers and signers of notes, acceptors of drafts, etc. He should acquaint himself with the essential features of notes and bills of exchange, the value and use of bills of lading, laws governing days of grace, and the payment of obligations

maturing on Sundays and holidays. He should make a habit of noting on the back of drafts or the return slip reasons for non-payment in as neat a manner as though he were making entries on the bank's books. Do not make it necessary for the collection clerk to hunt you up and ask, "What did Mr. Jones say?" Make your notations concisely, but never return a collection to the bank without something to show what has been done with it. He must learn how and be able to figure interest, and handle money accurately, and this experience will always be valuable to him in whatever position he may be called upon to fill. When carrying money or collections on the street, a wallet should be used, and this should always be carried in the hand. A wallet slipping out of the pocket might not be missed for several minutes after being dropped. Do not do personal errands while out with collections; attend to the bank's business and make returns to the collection clerk as quickly as possible, and then if necessary attend to the personal matter. Make returns to the collection clerk in the form which best suits his convenience; make a list of all the cash as received, and leave this list with the cash and items on his desk.

Then there is a great deal a messenger may learn regarding credits among the business houses where he presents paper, and this is one of the very essential matters for even bank clerks to know.

A messenger is usually given some inside work to do for a portion of the day, usually copying and stamping letters, and even this will offer a beginner opportunities to show his ability to shorten methods and work rapidly. In the matter of filing letters, he has a great opportunity for showing his thoroughness and ideas of system. A boy who will jam letters into a pigeon-hole, as though he did his filing with his feet, will do the same quality of work in any department of the bank. Neatness and system, after all, are the two great characteristics which determine a bank clerk's actual worth.

An excellent training for a beginner is the filing of cancelled vouchers. This develops him in accurateness, and acquaints him with all the depositors' names, and the constant recurrence of the signatures produces an impression on his mind which is not easily forgotten.

The ability to add figures rapidly and accurately comes only with constant practice, and such of this work as practicable should be given the beginner to do. Legible and rapid penmanship should be cultivated in contrast to the flourish and scroll taught in most business colleges. Messengers are usually chosen from the graduates of high schools, and almost invariably have the characteristics of handwriting known as school-boy penmanship. Practice is the only way to overcome this, and constant attention to the matter will soon develop a good business hand.

Matters relating to the bank's business must be kept in strict confidence by each clerk. There is nothing more provoking, or a better excuse for discharging a bank clerk, than that he has let some matter get to the ears of the public, which they have no right to know.

#### SUGGESTIONS IN REGARD TO BANK BOOKKEEPING.

The bookkeeper's position in the bank is the one of all others where the danger of getting into the "rut of routine work" most asserts itself. There are, however, good bookkeepers and poor bookkeepers in banks, both of whom may make an equally good page of figures. A good bookkeeper will be

always on the alert to promptly report any accidental overdraft, will enter his items as quickly as possible after receiving them from the teller, will become thoroughly familiar with the signature of every account on his book, and will plan methods of checking his work so that errors will not get out of the office.

Some banks have a rule that a scratcher is not to be used on the books. This seems a pretty stiff regulation, but it is certainly very conducive to accuracy. It seems that a better plan would be to put a man who makes a constant practice of erasing figures in some position where he would not have occasion to make entries on the bank's records.

In these days, when there is so much discussion as to the best methods of preventing bank defalcations, it remains for the clerks themselves to figure out the safest way to handle a bank's funds without the possibility of loss by theft. Clerks know better than officers every detail of the workings of the bank, and it is from the ranks of clerks that most of the defaulters come. It is logical that the problem of prevention must be solved by clerks who have the happy combination of honesty and shrewdness.

While individual bookkeeping is more justly, perhaps, than any other department considered drudgery, it is not necessarily a life position, and it gives a man the training in figures which is indispensable, and which can be obtained in no other way. The work of the bookkeeper should be always supplemented to that of the teller; he may often catch errors in indorsement and signature which may have been overlooked by the teller.

#### DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF TELLERS.

The position of teller is one of the most responsible places in the office. His responsibility does not end with the accurate balancing of his cash. He must be an expert on signatures and handwriting, and to a first-class teller a written name becomes a fixture in his mind, just as a face we have seen impresses our minds. He should be an expert reader of human nature also. A rogue is often caught by a slight flinch at an unexpected question from the teller, as to how he obtained his stolen or forged check.

Even during a rush on a busy Saturday, with long pay-rolls, he must retain his cool-headedness and evenness of action. Many tellers have a way of making false motions in handling items and money, seemingly to impress the customers with their ability to move quickly, but the real expert will impress his customers with his quickness in paying and receiving money with very little effort.

A teller may, by keeping his money strapped and counted up in his leisure hours, strike a balance with very little work within a few minutes after the bank is closed for the day.

The ability to detect counterfeit money at a glance is a qualification of a good teller. This like the memory in signatures seems to be a natural gift, and for one who is thus gifted the expertness acquired is marvelous. An accurate memory as to the general run of customers' balances is indispensable to the safe handling of a bank's cash, and this also is impossible to a person not gifted with a mathematical mind.

It is usually the duty of the tellers to collect exchange on checks received which cannot be collected at par, and a thorough knowledge of the bank's par list will save a large amount of money which would otherwise be lost.

## THE SORT OF CLERK THAT WINS PROMOTION.

This is the time when the demand for first-class bank men is greater than ever before, and it is a pretty safe prediction that the opportunity will come to the young man who is not afraid of good, conscientious endeavor and who will keep his mind at work figuring on better methods and more satisfactory results. The best advice that can be given to a clerk, in whatever department of the work, is to fill his position as he would have a clerk fill it if he were an officer anxious to make a satisfactory report of earnings to the stockholders.

The prejudice so strong a few years ago of bank managers against the change of method for something more modern is being rapidly overcome. Bankers are beginning to realize that they have sacrificed safety, economy, and convenience in their anxiety to have an attractive looking library of old records.

JOHN T. WEBBER.

## II.

Banks are the power-stations of commerce. Presenting to the onlooker an unvarying, almost dignified, front, there is hidden behind the walls and counters a humming mass of machinery, working with what seems a chaotic, aimless effort. But how wrong this conception. Be the bank large or small, there is in its construction no shaft, no wheel, no cog, but that it is absolutely dependent on another, and hence harmony in operation is as essential as the existence itself of any part of the whole.

Smooth, then, must be the running-gear of a bank. And since this running-gear consists chiefly of the clerical force, the manner in which its functions are performed must determine the success of the institution as an organized body in the commercial community. Necessarily, strict coöperation in all departments is a prerequisite to proper management.

The basis of coöperation is discipline, fraternity and consideration. Discipline being essential in system of any kind; fraternity as embodying the good will and behavior of the individuals comprising the force, and consideration shown such as have served long, gained more experience, and consequently hold the positions of trust. Besides, respect to those who are entitled to it and assistance lent where it is needed are features that ease friction and make conditions agreeable.

## THE MESSENGER.

It is customary these days to enlist boys for service in the banks and to start them at the very lowest rung, which method has advantages that are apparent. Whereas he who is not gifted will make no headway in a bank or anywhere else, the young man, fairly well versed in the elements of learning, will quickly be able to assert what is in him. Should he prove apt and make a success of his work, it was an advantage for him to have commenced so early where his prospects lie.

Let us follow him through one of his busy days. In the morning he is one of the first to report for duty. Awaiting him, he finds a stack of letters often appallingly high. But bravely he attacks them, and with the aid of knife and clever fingers soon has the contents arranged for the inspection of those who dispose of the various items. Then comes the task of preparing

the clearings, by no means an insignificant one. It must be borne in mind that a fine awaits him who is tardy at the important daily function of clearing, and as the very shadow of this threat lingers the possibility of a fine in case of a mistake. Swiftly then, and correctly too, the work must be done, and there will be a feeling of relief when on comparison the footings agree.

As ordinarily arranged, the next in order is to start the messenger on his route with the various items held for collection. Here he probably performs the most important part of his work. There will be awaiting his attention coupons, drafts and other sundries that have accumulated during the previous day or were received in the mail.

With coupons the least trouble will be experienced. While they are annoying bits of paper through their smallness and bothersome arrangement of text, as a rule they are paid by banks and hence the chances of receiving counterfeit money or worthless checks are reduced to a minimum. Far more important in all its features is the collection of drafts. It is here that the beginner receives a foretaste of the responsibilities that await him later on. Good, sound sense, as well as quickness and correctness of decision are necessary qualifications for properly doing this part of the work.

In the first place the messenger must understand what he is to receive in payment of drafts. He must be able to judge whose checks he may safely take and that what money he receives is good. He should understand that drafts bearing several endorsements are valuable instruments and a mere oversight or simple neglect on his part may thrust upon the bank worthless paper, recourse on endorsers having in any way been lost. Maturities on time drafts should be correctly figured and the nature of acceptances understood. An error in leaving notice of maturity may lead to annoying complications. It may be well to add that it is always a good point to remove whatever waivers of protest accompany drafts in the shape of loose slips, without, however, losing trace of their source.

Being, as it were, the outside representative of the institution he serves, deportment and address must under all circumstances be correct, no matter what vexations or controversies may arise. Instructions regarding collections ought always to be properly carried out, but in case of doubt a telephone can ordinarily be used to communicate with the superior officers. Great care should also be taken not to display the filled wallet where someone may take notice of its contents and conceive plans to appropriate them. Such an occurrence would be nothing new.

On return to the bank the first thing to do would be to balance the cash received and to prepare the results of collections for delivery to the proper officers, canceling the bank's indorsement on unpaid paper, marking on the reverse whatever reasons were given for non-payment and bringing the list of items into proper shape for filing. All this being more or less important in case any question should ever arise regarding that day's work.

Such portion of the messenger's afternoon as is not devoted to the return of cleared checks for purposes of rectifying endorsements, refusal of payment on account of insufficient funds, post-dates, amounts and the like, will be employed in bringing the bank's mail into shape for posting. Speed and accuracy are here essential, also a good, legible handwriting. These duties finished, various other tasks demand attention, consisting mainly of aiding others. He may be called upon to finish balancing pass-books, often under-



rated work. Since these books contain the customers' receipts for their funds, they must infallibly be correct and a proof of the final figures should always be made before considering the work finished. The ruling should be neat and simple, the checks carefully strapped and the general appearance be one of attractiveness. To gain this end, better sacrifice speed to correctness.

Another duty for the messenger, as arranged in many banks, is filing the day's checks. It will be readily understood how necessary absolute precision is here. Suppose the case of a customer stopping payment on a check. Several of the same amount may have been charged to his account, so the teller refers to the filing case in search of the item in question. Not being there, the customer's duplicate is paid, when suddenly the lost check turns up in the wrong apartment. Annoyance and possibly litigation and loss ensue. Often much valuable time is lost tracing a misplaced check, which according to the books must be somewhere, and altogether it is apparent that check-filing carries its responsibilities as well as other evidently more important work.

Summarily it may be said that the messenger's work requires a strict division of time from start to finish. It must be arranged so that no interferences occur and it is a good plan to finish, whenever possible, what is at hand before attacking a new task. As he goes along, matters will adjust themselves, and where at first the new clerk felt at a loss to survey the entire scope of his position, he will soon become accustomed to it and feel at ease under most any pressure of work.

#### WORK OF THE BOOKKEEPERS.

Bookkeeping and drudgery are frequently held to be synonymous terms. But they need be no more so than any other two, because a man makes his work what it is. When we consider the endless number of figures constantly brought to paper, their importance many times being of the highest kind, and we see how they tally and what they represent, we will admit what wonderful things they are and how their endless variation breaks monotony.

Of the individual bookkeepers, each handles many hundred accounts daily, entering credits and debits, balancing them and rendering statements, requiring constant watchfulness and close attention. When at the day's close all this has been finished, the aggregate of the transactions, ranging into the hundreds of thousands of dollars, balances to the very cent (though this is not always done as easily as may appear from the above). All this despite a rapidity of figuring and a quickness of handling pen, ink and paper that to the uninitiated seem marvelous. And when an experienced man is seen working on his ledger with no figuring-pad in sight, evolving balances that were hid behind treble and quadruple amounts as fast as his pen will follow, we begin to understand that bookkeeping is not drudgery but art.

Here again it is better to sacrifice speed to correctness, so good a rule for every department in a bank. Balances of depositors are items as important as the list of loans. Errors may not only cause the loss of a valuable account, but endless trouble.

The apparent monotony of bookkeeping can be relieved and often entirely lifted in many ways by an intelligent clerk. Besides being on the lookout for overdrafts, those parasites of the modern bank, a sharp watch on the condition of the various accounts will serve well. It is a simple impossibility for

the Cashier of to-day to do this, though he may at times glance over them. To see into the life of an account, to report weaknesses and discontinuances, to stop check-kiting, done so much more than usually suspected, and to prevent checking on uncollected deposits, are all matters that need attention by some one. Suggestions on any of these contingencies will most certainly be welcome whenever made. Average balances, kept in separate books and showing the condition of accounts during every month and for the year at its close, are often looked upon as an unnecessary burden. But any one with a broader conception of banking will understand their importance. They enable the directors to determine at a glance whether a depositor is entitled to the accommodation he asks for and whether promises, so easily made, have been fulfilled.

Clearness and neatness are likewise necessary in the bookkeeper's department. Along with this, suggestions as to possible improvements and elimination of superfluous work should not be discouraged. The man who does the actual work is as a rule the one who understands his own needs best. His practical experience and the theories of superiors should not clash, but through a harmonious blending result in benefit to the bank.

#### THE DISCOUNT CLERK.

The next step would be to the discount clerk's desk. He is the one whose figures make the profits and dividends. They represent the earnings of the bank, hence for its protection must be so absolutely right as to defy challenge, however often such may occur. To accomplish this it is best to use two methods of computation, either mentally and by tables, or mentally in two different ways. All this should be at the fingers' ends, as it were, and faith in results, not to be mistaken for overconfidence, must be firm. The various systems of figuring interest are easily accessible and ought to be thoroughly understood by every discount and note clerk. As a rule one that suits the fancy best will be selected for general use. After some practice in it results of calculations will be rapidly and fluently extracted.

Maturities should likewise be familiar in all their features. Precision in this is more important even than in the foregoing. A mistake of one day may lead to confusion, loss and litigation. The question of collaterals is another delicate one. In the rush of business bonds, stocks and other securities are often handed over by the Cashier without the detailed examination which ought always to be made. Coupons or signatures may be missing, powers of attorney improperly executed or the notes themselves lacking in some feature necessary to make them valid. By doing this part of the work correctly and without much loss of time, the discount clerk may through his own efforts add many features to his position that he heard nothing of when first installed.

The duty of caring for papers left for collection falls but little short of the other work in its general importance. While the bank receives the benefit of notes paid by placing the proceeds to the credit of their owner, thus retaining control over the funds as a general deposit, frequently a good many items remain unpaid. Should it then appear that the size of an account does not warrant the labor connected with such paper, a report to the proper officer would be in order.

Work in the note department will readily make it apparent that a certain

knowledge of commercial law is essential to the correct administration of the position. Standard text-books should be consulted, current decisions of the courts watched and a general interest in legal questions be kept alive. The note clerk should understand the relations of the various parties to commercial paper to one another and be well versed in the different statutes that govern these. He should know what allowance to make for time lost in transit of notes payable elsewhere and be posted on the current rates of exchange. It would also be well for him to watch the daily papers for quotations of interest, securities and other financial matters. The many terms there used, which to many are unintelligible, should be well known.

The discount clerk has many opportunities to show what kind of stuff he is made of. In time he will be the right hand of the Cashier, and since his work also brings him into direct contact with the public, his deportment and aptness will in due course bear fruit and reward his efforts.

The general bookkeeper usually personifies experience and efficiency. His work is of a more or less delicate nature, embodying as it does the recapitulation of every day's work. He will meet the officials of the bank in a confidential way, consequently discretion and tact must be two of his chief characteristics. Despite the publication of regular statements, entries are often made that are not intended for the outside world and hence require secrecy in their treatment. Since the general bookkeeper is ordinarily well advanced in point of years and service, the prudence that comes with mature age serves well in his capacity. Junior clerks should therefore treat him with respect and his circumstances be appreciated by all.

As most likely the ladder of promotion through the different departments will have brought him to his trusted position, he will fully understand the necessity of neatness, correctness and accuracy. He needs these qualifications for computing the reserve of the bank, making abstracts for officials and directors and in a general way supervising and advising those who daily furnish him their figures for the purpose of balancing the bank's business.

#### THE TELLERS.

These are properly the bank's Cashiers and will frequently find themselves so termed. Probably the majority of customers know but them, through the nature of their business not coming in contact with the real officials.

In a large measure, then, the tellers are the real representatives of their bank. The importance of this is evident and those filling such positions should endeavor always to be courteous and attentive, never allowing their composure to be ruffled by any of the numerous happenings that are apt to have such an effect.

Speed and accuracy are paramount qualifications in this department. Very often the customers are lined up before the window, eagerly awaiting their turn. To keep cool and do things right under these circumstances is not always easy. The right man, however, will shortly master the numerous intricacies of the position.

As the tellers are the custodians of whatever funds are carried, no detail regarding currency and commercial paper should escape their attention. Their fingers must be so well trained that counting money in any form will be a mere automatic function. Counterfeits should be detected by the mere sense of touch or a passing glance. The history of advertised imitations must

be a matter of fact with them. Denominations and kinds of paper money must be indelibly photographed in their mind, so that the particular features of each, if found in the wrong place, will at once arrest their attention. Once a teller has acquired this qualification, he will never be tricked by an alteration.

The bank's funds should always be in such shape that without loss of time any desired part can be produced. Bills should be properly assorted and neatly strapped, with a certain proportion subdivided into convenient bundles separated by rubber bands; as for instance a package of one hundred one dollar bills into four sections, containing twenty-five dollars each. Five hundred dollar packages of fives and tens divided, some into bundles of \$250 in each, some into such of one hundred, will generally come in handy. On busy days particularly the arrangement will be found a great economizer of time. The tills should always contain a certain amount of loose money, so separated as to reduce to a minimum the chances of picking the wrong denomination.

Silver ought likewise be carried in convenient packages, so that no trouble will be experienced in putting up pay-rolls. Its supply must never run below a certain point. Change is universally in demand and cannot be dispensed with. When the teller purchases coin from other financial institutions, he must be sure that the bags and packages are so marked as to enable identification of their source. The same holds true of wrapped money received from depositors. Shortages may appear at any time and the bank should not be expected to bear the loss resulting from them. In all cases it is good policy to pay out such funds in preference to coin put up by the teller himself. By bringing it into circulation, defects quickly come to light, whereas money stored in the vaults may remain there such a length of time as to outlaw a claim for reimbursement in case of a shortage.

Particular care should be taken with the gold. It cannot well bear being tossed about and requires more careful scrutiny than any other form of money. On receiving it from depositors, worn pieces should be rejected, unless the size of the accounts would justify a small discount for abrasion. When received in bulk, it should be weighed and inspected as soon as possible.

The nature and condition of the bank's deposits must of course be familiar to the teller. While it will be impossible for him to know this exactly at all times, an occasional inspection of the balance book will be a great help. Should there be any doubt regarding the sufficiency of funds as to a check on which payment is demanded, inquiries ought to be made without exciting suspicion on part of the presenter. By taking the check and calling for the desired information in a loud voice, offence alone will be created and a decidedly unfavorable impression made on bystanders.

Of course the bank is bound to know its customers' signatures and pays on forgeries at its own peril. It is the teller's duty to render decisions on this point, hence the matter must be a familiar one to him. In case of doubt, it is better to refuse payment than to run risk of any kind, though the timely use of a telephone or the messenger's services may serve well to arrive at a correct solution of the bothersome question.

While a bank is not obliged to certify checks, it is frequently good policy to do so. But it must not be overlooked that certification cancels all endorsements on the check, hence great care should be exercised before taking that

step. In cases where transactions are not clear and some point of controversy is involved, a decision must be quickly given, and if none can be arrived at, appeal taken to the Cashier or some other superior officer.

The teller who receives deposits should make it a point to give his pass-book entries a clear and neat appearance. Correctness also, as in all the departments, is a necessity. The question of pass-books has been touched upon before, but it may be added that much time can be saved if the book is always demanded when a deposit is made. In case a duplicate ticket is issued in place of the regular entry, a request to have same entered at the next opportunity may well accompany its delivery.

Calculations of exchange, the rates governing same, interest to be figured at various occasions, what to do in case a note is paid and demanded without cancellation, are all propositions that arise every day and their solutions should be well mastered. Rates on foreign money, likely to be offered, ought to be familiar and quoted so as to allow a margin of profit.

Ordinarily, tellers are men of standing in their communities and next in line for promotion to official positions. Such opportunities should not be lost sight of and leisure hours used for accumulating a more general knowledge of banking and finance will always be to the purpose. It must not be forgotten that in the swift current of business to remain stationary means to fall behind, and a loss of prestige is the last thing the teller can afford.

R. M. RICHTER.

**KNOX'S HISTORY—A CRITICISM.**—In a recent number of "The American Historical Review" Prof. Davis Rich Dewey has the following to say in reviewing Knox's History of Banking in the United States :

"There are two ways in which the history of banking may be studied—one relates to the machinery of banking, the laws controlling the incorporation and the management of banks, with an account of the political relationships thus developed, and a description of the various technical processes by which the bank carries on its operations; the other relates to the social and economic influence of banks upon the general life of the people.

Most of the banking studies thus far made will be found in the first class, and this work is no exception. It is a record of annals—dates, names, events and summaries of laws—rather than an historical narrative which takes into account the forces shaping the development of banks and the consequences to the people in benefits or evils. The merit of this particular work is that it presents these annals in a more compendious and detailed form than can be found in any other volume."

The two methods of writing history here pointed out might fitly be called the *easy* and the *difficult*; and though not so intended by Prof. Dewey, he has paid the History the finest tribute it has yet received by showing that its authors chose the difficult way in preference to that which was more alluring and easy. It was evidently the purpose of Mr. Knox and his collaborators to compose a *history* of banking and not a work on the *theory* of banking. Doubtless there are examples enough in the book from which any one, even with less profound deductive powers than Sherlock Holmes, might get a pretty clear idea of the benefits and evils of the particular systems of banking which have been tried in the United States.

Few writers are able, when attempting to relate facts, to refrain from incorporating in their narrative some of their theories and opinions. One can not read a simple item of news in the daily press without having to take it encumbered with the views and inferences of the reporter who is trying to make a good story. Many works of science are rendered valueless by the preconceived notions of their authors.

It is believed that with all the facts before them, presented without bias, those interested in the study of banking history will be able to form their own conclusions.

## THE FREEDMAN'S SAVINGS AND TRUST COMPANY.

---

This Savings and Trust Company was authorized by Congress by an act approved March 3, 1865, for the benefit of the freedmen who had at the close of the Civil War become to a very great degree the wards of the Government.

Although not directly connected with the Freedman's Bureau, yet the Freedman's Bank, as it was commonly known, was the result of the same ideas of guidance and charity for the newly freed slave that caused the organization of the Bureau. It is stated that of the three millions of slaves freed at least a million had thrown themselves helplessly upon the Federal Government for support. As early as 1863 camps were formed, where under the direction of the military they were kept under oversight, supplied with rations and to some extent compelled to work.

On March 3, 1865, the Freedman's Bureau Bill became a law. It established a bureau of refugees, freedmen and abandoned lands, to continue for one year after the close of the war. In February, 1866, another bill was introduced to continue the Bureau until otherwise provided, but was vetoed by President Johnson, but a similar bill continuing the Bureau for two years was passed in July over the veto of the President. It was again continued for one year in 1868, and was finally discontinued in most all branches of its work July 1, 1870. Its work was protective and educational, and among its activities was the collection of pay and bounties for colored soldiers, which it performed as late as 1872. It also encouraged the saving of money by the freedmen, and its agents acted as the agents of the Freedman's Savings and Trust Company and led the inexperienced and ignorant colored people to regard the company as a Government institution, and to commit their earnings to its keeping. As a matter of fact the Government assumed no direct responsibility whatever, thinking apparently that sufficient was done by appointing, as the original trustees of the institution, fifty men of high character, both for business ability and of reputation for benevolence and economic experience. Among these original trustees were such men as Peter Cooper, William C. Bryant, John Jay and Edward Atkinson. Nine of these trustees formed a quorum for the transaction of business, and they were to elect from their number a President and two Vice-Presidents, and were to appoint such other officers as they saw fit. There was no provision from which it can be imagined that any of the trustees had any personal interest in the profits of the institution, except so far as they might set apart salaries or compensation for the services of the officers selected or appointed by them. The trustees as such served without emolument; the evident idea and intent was that the trustees should give their personal attention so far as it might be required, from benevolent motives entirely.

This board was self-perpetuating, vacancies by death, resignation or otherwise being filled by the remaining trustees, at least ten votes being required to elect the successor. It was not unnatural that the original fifty should soon begin to drop out for various reasons, and that it was found difficult to keep

up the high character of the original board first named by Congress. The law provided that the general business of the corporation should be to receive on deposit money offered by or on behalf of persons heretofore held in slavery in the United States, or their descendants, and to invest the same in stocks, bonds, Treasury notes or other securities of the United States. One-third of these deposits might, in the discretion of the trustees, be held to meet current payments, to be left on deposit at interest or otherwise, or in other available form. This provision seemed to give the trustees a wide latitude in dealing with at least one-third of the deposits received. There were other provisions relating to the various trusts which the company might undertake for its depositors and their descendants. If the section of the act which required the investment of deposits in the securities of the United States had been permitted to stand unamended, there would have been some bar to the exploitation of the funds of the institution, which afterwards occurred.

The main office of the company was established in Washington, D. C., and there were established in time thirty-three branch offices in as many different localities. The year 1870 was the beginning of a development of enterprise in the District of Columbia, of a more or less beneficent character, which within the next two or three years led to the improvement of the streets of the capital of the nation by extensive grading and paving operations. The local politicians, with the assistance of Congress, had a territorial form of government set up for the District, with the power to raise money by taxation and loans. There was a governor and territorial legislature. The activities resulting from the expenditure of large sums for improvement caused a boom in real estate that inflated values during the period from 1871-1874 far beyond what the immediate growth of the city warranted. It might have been simply a coincidence, or as was charged there might have been a deliberate scheme on the part of men who had by degrees insinuated themselves into the management of the Freedman's Savings and Trust Company, but nevertheless, from some unfortunate or malign influence Congress was induced to amend, on May 6, 1870, the section restricting the investments of the company to United States securities, and to allow the investment of one-half the deposits in bonds or notes secured by mortgage on real estate in double the value of the loan. It will also be noticed that at this time, although in the act of incorporation no authority to acquire real estate was given to the company, yet nevertheless real estate had been acquired, and it was necessary in this law of 1870 for Congress to embody a provision enabling the bank to hold it.

If Congress had been actuated by a proper regard for the interests of the freedmen, this irregularity should at once have attracted attention to the potential danger from the existing management. But this neglect, and the enactment lowering the character of the investments, indicates how liable Congress is to be swayed by the influences of the hour, to the detriment of its own cherished design.

It was charged after the failure of the company, that the use of the company's funds was a part of the plan of those who saw great future wealth in the development of the capital city, and that the act of 1870 was lobbied through to further their ends, as well as the greater scheme for the erection of a territorial form of government. However this may have been, within three years after this change in the law, it became known that the company was in difficulties. At first it was not understood how great these difficulties

were, and strenuous efforts were made to put a good face on the matter. Congress, with a view no doubt to shutting the barn door after the horse was stolen, passed an act on June 20, 1874, which provided either for the continuance or for the liquidation of the company, as events might show to be advisable or necessary. This bill contained a number of stringent restrictions that would have been of great value if they had been a part of the original act of incorporation, and of considerable value if the company had been solvent enough to continue business. In the event that the trustees decided to liquidate the institution, they were to select three competent men as commissioners, who were not connected with the previous management, and who were to conduct the liquidation. Any deposits received while the trustees made up their minds whether to continue or liquidate were to be treated as special deposits. After a period of hesitation during which deposits to the amount of \$35,000 were made, and marked special, the trustees turned over the establishment to three commissioners for liquidation. These commissioners had control for about seven years. There were many complaints as to the long-drawn out character of their operations, and finally Congress in February, 1881, took the liquidation from the three commissioners, and placed it in the hands of the Comptroller of the Currency, that office being then filled by the late John Jay Knox.

As to the charges of delay and unnecessary expense made against the commissioners, first and last, Mr. Knox in his report to Congress made in 1883 says: "Though the plan provided by Congress for the settlement of the affairs of the company, in the acts of June 20, 1874, and February 21, 1881, has been often and vigorously assailed and criticised, and as to some of its features justly so, the Commissioner confidently asserts that no such results, even approximately, could have been attained, had the company been allowed to drift into bankruptcy, and been settled under the provisions of the general laws governing the settlement of insolvent estates." He added that if there had been only one commissioner for the first seven years the salary and expenses of the other two might have been saved, making a gain of between \$50,000 and \$100,000 to the depositors.

The results of the liquidation showed conclusively that the character of a large part of the assets was such that only by taking time could anything be realized from them. A large portion of the loans on real estate were made in the District of Columbia. Perhaps the security was good when the loans were made, as many of them were, when the real estate market was booming during the flush times of 1871 and 1872. When the liquidation began in 1874 the bottom had dropped out of the boom in the District of Columbia. But as time elapsed prices recovered and the real estate of the bank became salable at prices which sometimes exceeded the figure at which it had been originally taken. The loans made on real estate in other parts of the country in the vicinity of the branches did not turn out so well.

The total amount of the liabilities of the company at the time of its failure was \$3,037,488. Of this a portion consisted of money borrowed on collateral and the special deposits before mentioned, which were paid in full. There remained due to depositors numbering 62,245, \$2,939,925, the accounts averaging about \$48 to each individual. Dividends were declared on these claims to the extent of about sixty per cent. Many of the claims were so small that the dividends were never claimed, and the unclaimed money was, by act of



Congress, used to swell the dividends of the claimants who could be found. The greatest pains were taken to discover parties to whom dividends became due; but with absolute failure in a large number of cases.

It is evident that if Congress had taken the same pains with the management of the bank that it did with its liquidation after irreparable mischief had been done, the institution might to-day have been one of the most flourishing and powerful of its kind in the United States. It would have proved a strong financial protection to the colored people of the South. In less than eight years from its inception it accumulated deposits, from probably the very poorest class of people in the country, amounting to nearly three millions of dollars. Over sixty thousand ex-slaves had started on the road to thrift and competence. With a competent management held to their duty by appropriate rules and precautions, the institution would have been in a situation to have aided the colored people of the South in securing the financial assistance they might require in their local enterprises. The greater prosperity of the colored people would have advanced the prospects of the whole southern population, white as well as black.

In its design the Freedman's Savings and Trust Company was no ordinary charity. It was a stimulus to self-help and consequent self-respect. Its failure was a terrible set-back, and tended to make the condition of those it was intended to benefit worse than if the bank had never been instituted.

The main fault of the failure rests with Congressional neglect in incorporating the company without the necessary safeguards. During its active career the bank was never examined as to its condition, and there was no method of determining whether those interested with its management observed the law or not. Mismanagement there certainly was and probably dishonesty, but no one was ever punished or even called to account. In the act placing the affairs of the company in the hands of the Comptroller of the Currency Congress tardily provided that it should be the duty of the new Commissioner to direct the Solicitor of the Treasury to investigate the manner in which the company had been managed by its trustees and others in control thereof, and to institute such proceedings, civil and criminal, as might seem appropriate. The Comptroller of the Currency, in his capacity as Commissioner, referred reports and evidence taken to the Solicitor, who first replied that no reasonable ground for civil or criminal action against the former commissioners seemed to him to exist. The Solicitor's attention was then called to the fact that the scope of the inquiry directed by Congress covered the action of the trustees even more than that of the commissioners. In regard to the trustees the Solicitor was doubtful whether the evidence, although showing very bad management, would warrant criminal proceedings, but claimed that whatever the facts, all proceedings were barred by the statute of limitations.

However high the standard of character of the fifty trustees originally selected by Congress, there was no precaution taken to prevent the gradual degeneration of this body. The management drifted into the hands of weak and reckless persons, and the whole fabric became the plaything of a lot of speculators who used the savings of the freedmen to advance their own personal interests. It is to be regretted that the circumstances of the period prevented including among the trustees southern men of high character, who would have been imbued with the needs of their section, and whose sympathy with the freedmen would have been of a practical type.

# BANKING LAW DEPARTMENT.

## IMPORTANT LEGAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST TO BANKERS.

All the latest decisions affecting bankers rendered by the United States Courts and State Court of last resort will be found in the MAGAZINE'S Law Department as early as obtainable.

Attention is also directed to the "Replies to Law and Banking Questions," included in this Department.

### CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT—NEGOTIABILITY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, October 30, 1900.

HATCH vs. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF DEXTER.

A certificate of deposit payable in current funds to the order of the depositor on return of the certificate properly indorsed, with interest at three per cent. per annum if on deposit six months, is negotiable.

The term "current funds," when used in commercial transactions as the expression of the medium of payment, is construed to mean current money, or funds which are current by law as money.

Making such a certificate payable on its return properly indorsed creates no such contingency as to payment as affects its negotiability. The language used expresses no more than the law implies as the duty of the holder in the absence of any such stipulation.

The amount of payment is not rendered uncertain by such an interest clause.

If payment be demanded at any time within six months, the amount payable is certain; it is the face of the certificate.

If payment be not demanded until after six months, the amount payable is equally certain; it is the face of the certificate and interest to the time of payment. The sum payable at any given time is ascertainable upon the face of the certificate, and that is sufficient.

SAVAGE, J.: This action is brought by the plaintiff as indorsee on a certificate of deposit of the following tenor:

"The First National Bank, Dexter, Maine, Jan. 6th, 1897.

Olive Hodge has deposited in this bank five hundred and sixty dollars, payable in current funds to the order of herself on return of this certificate properly indorsed.

Int. at three per cent. per annum if on deposit six months.

No. 2,236.

C. M. SAWYER, Cashier."

The defendant requested the presiding justice to rule that the action could not be maintained by the plaintiff, as indorsee, for the reason that the certificate of deposit in question was not a negotiable instrument. The presiding justice declined so to rule, and the defendant excepted.

The defendant contends that the instrument is non-negotiable for three reasons: First, because it was written payable in "current funds;" secondly, because of the clause, "Int. at three per cent. per annum if on deposit six months;" and lastly, because of the condition of payment expressed in the words, "on return of this certificate properly indorsed."

That a certificate of deposit, as such, is a negotiable instrument is held by almost unanimous authority (2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1702; Miller vs. Austen, 13 How. 218, 14 L. Ed. 119), and is not here denied by the learned counsel

for the defendant. They only contend against certain features in the certificate before us. This court, following universal authority, has recently defined a negotiable instrument to be one which runs to order or bearer, is payable in money, for a certain, definite sum, on demand, at sight, or in a certain time, or in the happening of an event which must occur, and payable absolutely and not upon a contingency (*Roads vs. Webb*, 91 Me. 406, 40 Atl. 128). If the certificate in question does not conform to these requirements, it must be held to be non-negotiable.

The first objection is that it is not made payable in "money;" that "current funds," in which it is made payable, should not be judicially interpreted to mean "money." We do not think this contention should prevail. This subject has been discussed exhaustively by many courts, and the conclusions they have reached on the one side and the other are not in harmony. But we think that the modern and better doctrine is that the term "current funds," when used in commercial transactions as the expression of the medium of payment, should be construed to mean current money, funds which are current by law as money; and that, when thus construed, a certificate of deposit payable in current funds is, in this respect, negotiable. It is well known that certificates of deposit are commonly made payable in "currency" or in "current funds," and we believe that the interpretation we have given is in accord with the universal understanding of parties giving and receiving these instruments; an understanding which we should resort to as an aid to interpretation, unless the words themselves fairly import some other meaning. Some courts hold that evidence may be received to show the meaning of the terms "currency," "current funds." But, in the absence of evidence, these courts come to opposite conclusions. For instance, in Iowa, the court holds that notes payable in currency are *prima facie* non-negotiable, but that evidence may be received to prove that the word "currency" describes that which by custom or law is money, and thus the instruments may be shown to be commercial paper (*Huse vs. Hamblin*, 29 Iowa, 501). On the other hand, in Michigan it was held that, where a certificate of deposit was made payable in currency, "*prima facie*, at least, that must be held to mean money current by law, or paper equivalent in value circulating in the business community at par." "Such, we think," said the court, "is the general signification, the fair import, and the ordinary legal effect of the term" (*Phelps vs. Town*, 14 Mich. 374; *Insurance Co. vs. Allen*, 11 Mich. 501).

Still other authorities hold that the terms "currency" or "current funds," used in commercial paper, *ex vi termini* mean money. Judge Campbell, in *Black vs. Ward* (27 Mich. 191), after a critical examination of a mass of authorities, declared that, with few exceptions, "the general course of authority is in favor of the negotiability of paper payable in currency, or in current funds; and these decisions rest upon the ground that those terms mean money, as the necessity of having negotiable paper payable in money is fully recognized."

"The term 'funds,'" say the court in *Insurance Co. vs. Kupfer* (28 Ill. 332), "as employed in commercial transactions, usually signifies money. Then the term 'current funds' means current money, par funds, or money circulating without any discount." Respecting an instrument payable in "current funds," the Maryland Court said: "The words 'current funds,' as used in the paper before us, mean nothing more or less than current money, and, so

construed, the instrument was negotiable" (*Laird vs. State*, 61 Md. 311. See, also, *Miller vs. Race*, 1 Burrows, 452; 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 808). The Supreme Court of the United States had occasion, in *Bull vs. Bank* (123 U. S. 105), to pass upon the negotiability of an instrument which had been made payable in "current funds." That Court said: "Undoubtedly it is the law that, to be negotiable, a bill, promissory note, or check must be payable in money, or whatever is current as such by the law of the country where the instrument is drawn or payable. There are numerous cases where a designation of the payment of such instruments in notes of particular banks or associations, or in paper not current as money, has been held to destroy their negotiability. But within a few years, commencing with the first issue in this country of notes declared to have the quality of legal tender, it has been a common practice of drawers of bills of exchange or checks, or makers of promissory notes, to indicate whether the same are to be paid in gold or silver or in such notes; and the term 'current funds' has been used to designate any of these, all being current, and declared by positive enactment to be legal tender. It was intended to cover whatever was receivable and current by law as money, whether in the form of notes or coin. Thus construed, we do not think the negotiability of the paper in question was impaired by the insertion of those words" (See *Chrysler vs. Renois*, 43 N. Y. 209; *Howe vs. Hartness*, 11 Ohio St. 449; *Bank vs. Brown*, 45 Ohio St. 39; *Telford vs. Patton*, 144 Ill. 611). The case of *Klauber vs. Biggerstaff* (47 Wis. 551), holding that a certificate of deposit payable in currency is negotiable, is sometimes cited as distinguishing between "currency" and "current funds," but we think the distinction is more in language than in meaning, for the Wisconsin court, after carefully defining the term "currency," add: "This construction of the term 'currency' might perhaps properly be extended to the term 'current funds.' It must extend to the latter term whenever it is used in the legal sense of money."

Another contention of the defendant is that the certificate of deposit is not negotiable because it is not payable absolutely, but only contingently, "on return of this certificate properly indorsed." We think this is not such a contingency as affects the negotiability of the certificate. The language expresses no more than the law implies as the duty of the holder in the absence of any such stipulation (2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1707; *Smilie vs. Stevens*, 39 Vt. 315).

Further, it is contended that this certificate is uncertain as to amount by reason of the interest clause, and therefore is not negotiable. No time of payment is mentioned in the certificate. It is accordingly payable on demand. If payment be demanded at any time within six months, the amount payable is certain; it is the face of the certificate. If payment be not demanded until after six months, the amount payable is equally certain; it is the face of the certificate and interest to the time of payment. In this respect, the certificate is like a note payable at a time certain with interest at a specified rate from the date of the note, or from maturity if it is not paid at maturity. Such notes are held negotiable. As in the case of a note on demand or on time, the time when it may be actually paid is uncertain, so it is uncertain when this certificate may be presented and payment demanded. But whenever that may be, the sum to become absolutely payable upon it at any given time is ascertainable upon its face, and that is sufficient (*Smith vs. Crane*, 33 Minn.

144 ; *Towne vs. Rice*, 122 Mass. 67 ; *Hope vs. Barker*, 112 Mo. 338 ; *Crump vs. Berdan*, 97 Mich. 293 ; 1 *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. § 53). This disposes of the exceptions relating to the negotiability of the certificate.

---

USURY—NEW YORK STATUTE—PRIVATE BANKER.

New York Court of Appeals, January 8, 1901.

CAPONIGRI vs. ALTERI.

The penalty prescribed by the Banking Law for taking more than the legal rate of interest, viz., a forfeiture of twice the amount paid, to be recovered by the party paying it, cannot be enforced as a counterclaim in an action brought by an individual banker upon a promissory note. Such a forfeiture can only be recovered by a penal action brought for that purpose (*Banking Law of 1892*, Chap. 689).

MARTIN, J.: This is a motion for a reargument. Its purpose is to procure an order vacating the dismissal of the appeal of this court, and to obtain a determination of the questions of law presented upon the original argument. If we improperly dismissed, then it is clearly our duty to decide the case as it was first presented, and no further argument seems necessary.

The dismissal was upon the ground that the facts, as well as the law, were before the appellate division, and that court having neither dismissed nor affirmed as to the facts, an appeal to this court would not lie. It turns out that although the general term of the city court affirmed both the order denying a new trial and the judgment, yet, when the defendants entered judgment upon the decision of that court they omitted therefrom the affirmation of the order denying a new trial. Therefore, as the appeal to the supreme court was from a judgment which simply affirmed the judgment below and not the order denying the motion for a new trial, the questions of fact presented by that motion were not before the appellate division and could not be passed upon by it (*Thurber vs. Harlem, B., M. and F. R. R.*, 60 N. Y. 326).

Under these circumstances it seems clear that the appeal to this court should not have been dismissed, that the order of dismissal should now be vacated and the case decided upon the questions presented upon the argument of the appeal.

The plaintiff was an individual banker, and brought this action upon a promissory note made by one of the defendants and indorsed by the other. As a counterclaim they set up certain transactions with which they alleged the note in suit was connected and in which they claim to have paid the plaintiff considerable amounts of usurious interest, and upon such claim sought to recover back double the sum thus paid. The defendants claimed the right of recovery was based upon the provisions of Chapter 689, Laws of 1892, which provides that every bank and individual banker may receive and charge on every loan or discount at the rate of six per cent. per annum, and that such interest may be taken in advance ; that the taking of a greater rate shall be adjudged a forfeiture of the entire interest which the debt carries or which has been agreed to be paid thereon ; that if a greater than the lawful rate of interest has been paid, the person paying it or his legal representative may recover back twice the amount of the interest thus paid from the bank or individual banker taking or receiving it, if the action is brought within two years ; and that "the true intent and meaning of this section is to place and continue banks and individual bankers on an equality in the par-

ticulars herein referred to with the National banks organized under the act of Congress, \* \* \* approved June 3, 1864."

That the plaintiff was an individual banker is admitted. If greater than lawful interest was paid him, then under the General Banking Law of 1892 (Chap. 689, Sec. 55) the defendants, in a proper action, would be entitled to recover the penalty imposed by that statute. But the question here presented is whether that penalty may be enforced by way of counterclaim in an action upon a promissory note. That question was first presented to this court in a case where a National bank was a party, and it was held that a counterclaim for the penalty might be allowed (*National Bank of Auburn vs. Lewis*, 75 N. Y. 516). After that decision, however, the United States Supreme Court, in *Barnet vs. Bank* (98 U. S. 555), adopted the opposite view, and held that such a demand could not be set up as a counterclaim in such an action, but could only be enforced in the manner stated in the act of Congress, which was by penal suit. After the decision in that case the *Lewis* case was reargued, and this court, following the decision in the *Barnet* case, then held that in an action brought to recover the amount of a promissory note discounted by a National bank, it could not be set up by way of counterclaim or set-off that the bank in discounting a series of notes took, and there was paid to it, a greater rate of interest than was allowed by law, but that the remedy was an action of debt to recover back twice the amount paid. If in the case at bar the plaintiff had been a National bank instead of an individual banker, the last decision in the *Lewis* case would be controlling. The appellants now contend : 1. That, as the counterclaim in this action is based upon the statute of 1892, the question involved is one of pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure, and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of this court in the former cases do not apply, as no question of pleading arose in those cases; and 2. That they have no application, because the plaintiff is an individual banker instead of a National bank.

The second decision of this court in the *Lewis* case does not justify the claim that no question of pleading under the practice of this State arose in that case, as the counsel for the defendant there claimed that setting up the forfeiture as a counterclaim presented a question of practice, did not involve the construction of a statute, and that the remedy by way of set-off or rebatement should be upheld. This court held otherwise, and that it by no means followed that the practice and pleadings which the Legislature had prescribed for State courts in regard to a counterclaim or recoupment of mutual demands should defeat the object and intention of the Federal enactment.

As we understand it, the substance of that decision is that, in an action in the State court, the practice and pleadings prescribed in regard to a counterclaim cannot be resorted to to defeat the object and intention of the Federal enactment, and hence, where a National bank usuriously received a greater than the lawful rate of interest, the amount so paid, although forfeited, cannot be recovered upon a counterclaim in an action upon a note, although it was connected with the transaction in which the usury was paid. Thus it is manifest that the question of practice in this State arose in the last decision of the *Lewis* case, where it was held that, notwithstanding the rules in this State in regard to set-off or counterclaim, they could not be applied to a case where the statute provided for a forfeiture, which was to be recovered by an action, and that the remedy thus given was exclusive and must be pursued.

The remaining question upon this branch of the case is whether a different rule applies to an individual banker doing business under the laws of this State. The determination of that question depends for its solution upon the intent of the Legislature in enacting section 55 of the General Banking Law. When that intent is ascertained the statute must be enforced in accordance therewith, and the court may not substitute its views as to the justice or expediency of the statute. Nor can it speculate as to the intention of the Legislature where the words of the statute are clear and plainly disclose the purpose of its enactment. In this statute the Legislature, after providing that a person paying greater than legal interest to a State bank or individual banker may recover twice the amount paid if an action is brought within two years, in clear and unmistakable terms declared the true intent and purpose of the section. Its avowed purpose was to place the banks and individual bankers of the State upon an equality in the particulars referred to with National banks organized under the act of Congress. As we have already seen, as against National banks such a forfeiture cannot be set up as a counterclaim, but can only be recovered in a penal action. If, as the Legislature declared, it was its intent to place State banks and individual bankers on an equality with National banks, it necessarily follows that the Legislature intended that the special remedy which was required in one case should be required in the other, and, hence, that under this statute, as well as under the Federal statute, the penalty imposed for taking usury must be recovered in a penal action. The method of enforcing this right is inseparable from the right itself, and must in each case be recovered in the manner pointed out by the statute.

The equality between State and National banks, for which the Legislature intended to provide, can be maintained in no other way than by confining the person seeking to enforce the penalty to the same remedy, whether the bank or individual banker be organized and doing business under the State law or under the Federal statute. We think, under the State as well as under the Federal law, a debtor claiming that usury has been paid cannot counterclaim the statutory penalty therefor, but his remedy under the Statute of 1892, like that under the Federal law, is to bring an action for the penalties thus imposed when the action may be tried untrammelled by and disconnected from any other transactions or business between such person and the bank or individual banker. If the same rule does not apply to State banks or individual bankers as applies to National banks, then the former do not receive the equality which it was the express purpose of the State Banking Law to afford them, and which by that statute was declared to be the true intent thereof. The purpose of the requirement, that the penalty should be enforced by penal action, is obvious. It is to enable the privileged banker to recover the principal of his debt irrespective of any considerations arising out of usurious transactions so far as the penalty imposed is concerned, and he is not to be interfered with nor prevented from enforcing his claim in an action brought for that purpose by being required to litigate the subject of his liability for a penalty. "While the plaintiff in such cases, upon making out the facts, has a clear right to recover, the defendant has a right to insist that the prosecution shall be by a suit brought specially and exclusively for that purpose, where the sole issue is the guilt or innocence of the accused, without the presence of any extraneous facts which might confuse the case and mislead the jury to the prejudice of either party." (*Barnet vs. National Bank*, 98 U. S. 555, 559.)

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the appellants' claim that a different rule applies, or that a distinction in this respect should be created between an action against a National bank and an action against a State bank or individual banker, cannot and ought not to be sustained in view of the clear and plain intent of the Legislature as expressed in section 55 of the General Banking Law of the State.

Nor do we think the appellants are now entitled to counterclaim \$300 which they allege was the amount charged by the plaintiff upon the discount of the note for \$3,000, which constituted the first transaction between the parties. The record discloses that the defenses or counterclaims set up in the answer are not based upon the first clause of the second paragraph of section 55, which relates to illegal interest knowingly stipulated for but not paid, where only the sum loaned without interest can be recovered. But, on the contrary, the defendants plainly alleged in their answer and on the trial recovered upon the theory that they were entitled to recover under the second clause of that paragraph a penalty equal to twice the amount of interest which had actually been paid to the plaintiffs by the defendants. In other words, it was to recover a penalty for usurious interest which had actually been paid, and not to avoid the payment of interest which had been knowingly stipulated for but not paid. Upon that theory alone the case was tried at the trial term and decided by the appellate division. As the question under consideration was not presented nor decided by the trial court or appellate division, it cannot be raised here for the first time. A party who has acquiesced in the trial of an action upon a certain theory will not be heard to assert for the first time on appeal that there was error in adopting the theory he assisted in establishing as the law of the case (*Vann vs. Rouse*, 94 N. Y. 401; *Wellington vs. Morey*, 90 N. Y. 656). This appeal must be determined upon the theory which prevailed at the trial and upon which the case was decided by the appellate division.

The order and judgment of the appellate division should be affirmed and judgment absolute ordered for the plaintiff on the stipulation, with costs.

Parker, Ch. J.; O'Brien, Haight, Vann and Landon, JJ., concur; Bartlett, J., concurs in result. Judgment affirmed.

#### *FORGED CHECKS—LIABILITY OF PAYEE BANK—INDORSEMENT.*

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, January 4, 1901.

##### DEDHAM NATIONAL BANK vs. EVERETT NATIONAL BANK.

When the holder of a check in no way contributes to the deception, the drawee bank takes the risk of paying, so far as the genuineness of the signature is concerned.

Where a check is presented through the clearing-house the indorsement of the bank making presentment is not deemed an indorsement for purposes of transfer, and contains no representation beyond what would have been imported by a presentment in person.

HOLMES, C. J.: This is an action to recover the amount of two forged checks on the plaintiff bank paid by it to the defendant. Both checks were drawn payable to cash, and were without indorsement. Both were presented for deposit to the account of Fenno, a depositor in the defendant bank, by the depositor's clerk, who is found to have been the forger, the first on July 31, the second on September 4, 1897. At the time of depositing the first, which was for \$150, the clerk asked for and received \$50 cash for Fenno, as he



said, and on depositing the second, which was for \$200, he got \$100 in the same way. The residue of the two checks was credited by the defendant to Fenno on his account. Fenno afterwards overdrew his account, but subsequently made the overdraft good, and his deposit has exceeded the amount of the credit on these checks since the defendant was notified of the forgery. Both checks were paid by the plaintiff through the clearing-house, and it is found that, if the plaintiff's servant who paid them had compared the signatures on the checks with a genuine signature of the supposed maker which it had on file, he would have discovered the forgery. Owing to an examination of Fenno's deposit the defendant was led to inquire by telephone, shortly after the second check was paid, whether the signatures were genuine, and was answered that they were all right. The plaintiff did not demand repayment until February 25, 1898. The judge found and ordered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff asked rulings in favor of its right to recover either the whole amount, or all but the sums actually paid out to the clerk, and the case is here on exceptions to the refusal to give them.

The plaintiff's argument is directed to proving that we should not adopt the rule laid down in *Price vs. Neal*, 3 Burrows, 1354, according to which a drawee paying a forged draft or check to a *bona fide* purchaser cannot recover back the money paid. We are aware that this rule has been questioned by some text writers. But it is of such universal, or nearly universal, acceptance that we shall go into no extended discussion. (*Gloucester Bank vs. Salem Bank*, 17 Mass. 42, 43; *Bank vs. Bangs*, 106 Mass. 441, 444; *Welch vs. Goodwin*, 123 Mass. 71, 77; *First Nat. Bank of Danvers vs. First Nat. Bank of Salem*, 151 Mass. 280, 283, 24 N. E. 44; *Bank of the United States vs. Bank of Georgia*, 10 Wheat. 333, 348, 6 L. Ed. 334; 2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. [3d Ed.] §§ 1359-1361.)

Probably the rule was adopted from an impression of convenience rather than for any more academic reason; or perhaps we may say that Lord Mansfield took the case out of the doctrine as to payments under a mistake of fact, by the assumption that a holder who simply presents a negotiable paper for payment makes no representation as to the signature, and that the drawee pays at his peril. (See *Wilkinson vs. Johnson*, 3 Barn. & C. 428, 436; *Bernheimer vs. Marshall*, 2 Minn. 78, 84 [Gil. 61]; *Bank of St. Albans vs. Farmers and Mechanics' Bank*, 10 Vt. 141, 145, 146; *Ellis vs. Trust Co.*, 4 Ohio St. 628, 662.)

The ground of a recovery for a payment under a mistake of fact is that the existence of the fact supposed was the conventional basis or tacit condition of the transaction. If parties are so far at arm's length that each takes the risk of what he does, of course one of them cannot recover money paid because he finds that he has made a mistake. We believe that now, at least, especially in the case of a bank, it is a matter of general understanding that, when the holder of a check in no way contributes to the deception, the bank does take the risk of paying, so far as the signature is concerned. But, if this is so, mistake disappears as a ground for recovery, and there is no other. It is vain to point out that in other cases more or less analogous there is an implied representation, *e. g.* *Railroad Co. vs. Richardson*, 135 Mass. 473. The grounds for difference in understanding may be very nice, but, even if the decisions had originated the difference without adequate ground, when once it exists its existence is a sufficient reason for continuing to decide in accordance with it.

The plaintiff attempts to make out that the defendant led the plaintiff to make the payment by requiring no indorsement of the checks, on the ground that its officer was led by that fact to suppose that they were cashed for the man who appeared to have been their maker. The attempt to prove a custom that would justify such an inference failed, and the judge may not have believed even that the officer was influenced in his conduct by the absence of an indorsement. But, if he was, the evidence did not show any duty on the part of the defendant to anticipate such a result.

The indorsement of the check by the defendant was not an indorsement by the payee. It was not an indorsement for purposes of transfer, and contained no representations beyond what would have been imported by a presentment in person. (*Bank vs. Bangs*, 106 Mass. 441, 444.)

In view of the ground on which we put the case, it does not seem to be necessary to consider further objections to the plaintiff's recovery, or to examine more precisely the position of the defendant as a purchaser for value. (*Fox vs. Bank*, 30 Kan. 441, 1 Pac. 789; *Bank vs. Hartshorne*, 3 Abb. Dec. 173.)

Judgment affirmed.

#### NATIONAL BANKS—TAXATION—KENTUCKY STATUTE.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky, December 14, 1900.

SCOBEE, SHERIFF, vs. BEAN, *et al.*

Shares of stock in National banks cannot be taxed within the various States, except as permitted by Rev. Stat. U. S. 5219.

As the Kentucky statutes intended to apply to the taxation of banks and bank stocks have been held void as to National banks, the shares of stock in such banks may be taxed in the hands of the owners under the general law providing for the taxation of real and personal estate of every kind.

The fact that National bank shares are taxed in the hands of the owners, while the mode of taxing other banking institutions is by the imposition of a franchise tax, does not necessarily result in a discrimination against National bank shares; and, before the court can hold that such is its effect, it must be averred and established as any other fact.

HAZELRIGG, C. J.: In September, 1899, the appellees, Bean and others, were the owners of certain shares of stock in the Clark County National Bank. The assessor of that county, in virtue of the general revenue laws of the State, assessed these shares for taxation at their fair cash value, in the hands of the various owners. When the sheriff, in due course, was about to collect the tax, this suit was brought to prevent him, on the ground that shares of stock in National banking associations in Kentucky are not assessable or taxable, because the Legislature has not determined and directed the manner and place of taxing such shares. The chancellor upheld the plaintiff's contention, and the sheriff has appealed.

It is to be noted at the outset that this species of property cannot be taxed within the various States except as permitted by Federal law, and the statute so permitting, and by which we are to be guided (Rev. St. U. S. § 5219), is as follows :

"Nothing herein shall prevent all the shares in any association from being included in the valuation of the personal property of the owner or holder of such shares, in assessing taxes imposed by authority of the State within which the association is located; but the Legislature of each State may determine and direct the manner and place of taxing all the shares of National banking

associations located within the State, subject only to the two restrictions, that the taxation shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed upon moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such State, and that the shares of any National banking association owned by non-residents of any State shall be taxed in the city or town where the bank is located, and not elsewhere. Nothing herein shall be construed to exempt the real property of associations from either State, county or municipal taxes, to the same extent, according to its value, as other real property is taxed."

As, admittedly, the assessor has included the shares of stock in question in the valuation of the personal property of their owners, the question is narrowed down to this : Had the Legislature in 1899 determined or directed the manner and place of taxing shares in National banking associations ? And, if we answer this question in the affirmative, then a second question is presented, namely : Does the law thus provided by the Legislature discriminate against National bank shares, by requiring them to be taxed at a greater rate than is assessed upon moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of the State ?

Touching the first question, it is admitted by appellant that our revenue statutes do not designate this character or class of property, *eo nomine*, for taxation ; but section 4020, Ky. St., thus provides : "All real and personal estate within this State and all personal estate of persons residing in this State, and of all corporations organized under the laws of this State, whether the property be in or out of this State, including intangible property, which shall be considered and estimated in fixing the value of corporate franchises as hereafter provided, shall be subject to taxation unless the same be exempt from taxation by the constitution, and shall be assessed at its fair cash value estimated at the price it would bring at a fair voluntary sale." Section 4022 further provides :

"For the purposes of taxation, real estate shall include all lands within this State and improvements thereon ; and personal estate shall include every other species and character of property—that which is tangible as well as that which is intangible."

By sections 4047 and 4052 the taxpayer is required to list, under oath, all and every species of property belonging to him or in his possession, subject to taxation, on September 15 of each year, and be bound for the tax. Section 4050 provides thus :

"Personal property of every kind shall be separately stated and valued in the appropriate column of the tax-book herein provided, and if there be no appropriate column, it shall be valued and stated in the column headed 'Miscellany.'"

Item 10 of the schedule provided by Section 4058 reads thus : "(10) Amount of stock in joint stock companies or associations of this State not paid on by the company or association."

That this language is intended to make a distinction, not between National and State corporations, but merely between resident and foreign ones, is shown by the next item (No. 11), which reads : "Amount of stock in foreign corporations." And the schedule (Section 4058), after an elaborate enumeration, provides the following as the first item under "Miscellany :—" "(74) Value of all property not mentioned above." If, as contended by the appellees, and, indeed, as seems to be settled by a number of cases,—notably, in

Owensboro Nat. Bank vs. City of Owensboro (173 U. S. 664), the association is not taxable directly or on its franchise, then our statutes, by necessary implication, require the stockholder to list his shares of stock for taxation ; for by sections 4085 and 4088 the individual owning shares of stock in corporations which are required to list property are not required to list it so long as the corporation does so. This means, necessarily, that, if the corporation does not list the property and pay the tax, the individual must do so.

We think the various statutes are sufficiently broad to constitute a legislative determination and direction of the manner and place of taxing every species of personal estate to be found in the State, and under them such estate is to be taxed, unless by more specific provisions it is to be taxed otherwise ; and as the statutes which are intended to apply to the taxation of banking associations and bank stocks, including National banks, have been held void as to National banks, it follows that there is no specific provision for the taxation of the species of personal property in question, and its taxation must be held to be regulated by general law.

It is argued by counsel for appellees, in this connection, that these general revenue laws were not intended to apply to the taxation of bank stock, and as the particular law under which it was intended such stock was to be taxed has been held to be ineffectual and void as to shares of stock in National banks, there is no law at all under which such shares can be taxed.

But it is to be noticed that the general laws are merely declaratory of the requirements of the constitution (Section 174), which declares that "all property, whether owned by natural persons or corporations, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, unless exempted ;" and while the general provisions of our statutes were not intended, perhaps, to be the particular provisions under which bank stocks were in fact to be assessed, still the general provisions, constitutional and statutory, lie at the foundation of the authority to tax, and are sufficiently specific to authorize the taxation of every species of moneyed capital in the State.

With respect to the second question, it is to be observed that there is no averment that, as matter of fact, the shares of appellees have been taxed at a greater rate than other moneyed capital. Still, if the law under which they have been assessed is of such a character as that discrimination against this kind of moneyed capital necessarily results, then the Legislature has not provided such a law for the taxation of such shares as is permitted by the act of Congress in the section of the law quoted above.

We think that here there is no serious difficulty. Admittedly, if the very terms of the Federal statutes are to be observed, the correct method of taxing these shares has been adopted. The shares of the banking association have been assessed in the names of the shareholders, and, as required by that statute, have been included in the valuation of the personal property of the various shareholders. It is not material to the matter in issue if the method of taxing other moneyed capital or other bank stocks is different from that followed in the taxation of shares of National banks.

It does not follow that a different method of taxing National bank shares will result in their taxation at a greater rate than that imposed on other bank shares. It may result in taxing them at a less rate.

We understand the law as announced by the United States Supreme Court to be that no inquiry will be made into the method a State may adopt for tax-

ing its "other moneyed capital," so long as its laws do not discriminate against the moneyed capital which is evidenced by shares in National banks. (*Mercantile Bank vs. City of New York*, 121 U. S. 138; *Davenport National Bank vs. Davenport Board of Equalization*, 123 U. S. 83.)

In this State the taxation of other banking institutions is by the imposition of a franchise tax (Section 4077 Ky. St.). The value of the franchise is fixed by the board of valuation and assessment. The data for fixing it are furnished by reports made by these institutions to the Auditor of Public Accounts. In these reports various facts are to be stated. For example: "The amount of capital stock, preferred and common; the number of shares of each; the amount of stock paid up; the par and real value thereof; the highest price at which such stock was sold at a *bona fide* sale within twelve months next before the date of the assessment; the amount of surplus fund and undivided profits and the value of all other assets; the total amount of indebtedness as principal; the amount of gross or net earnings or income, including interest on investments and income from all other sources for twelve months next before date of assessment, the amount, kind, and value of taxable property in this State," etc.

From these reports the board fix the value of the capital stock, and it is manifest that it is largely a matter in their discretion and judgment what that value shall be. From their valuation of the capital stock is to be deducted the assessed value of the tangible property, and the remainder will be the value of the franchise. It cannot be said that this method of assessment and taxation will necessarily result in a discrimination against National banks; and, if not, then if, as a matter of fact, in any given case, a discrimination results, it must be averred and established as any other fact, which, as we have seen, is not done here.

In our opinion, the assessment of the shares in question was properly made, and the taxes thereon are collectible in the manner sought in this case. Whereupon the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.

---

**RECEIVER OF NATIONAL BANK—POWER TO SUE—AUTHORITY FROM COMPTROLLER.**

Supreme Court of the United States, January 7, 1901.

SUMPTER TURNER, SYNDIC OF M. SCHWARTZ & CO. vs. F. L. RICHARDSON, RECEIVER OF THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK.

The language of the Rev. Stat. U. S., Section 5234, authorizing the appointment of a Receiver to act under the direction of the Comptroller of the Currency, imports no more than that the Receiver shall be subject to the direction of the Comptroller; it does not mean that he shall do no act without special instructions.

Special authority from the Comptroller is not necessary to authorize a Receiver to bring an action for the purpose of enforcing a claim against the estate of an insolvent, and to enforce his rights as pledgee by the sale of securities pledged with the bank.

---

In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana to review a decision affirming a judgment in favor of a Receiver of a National bank.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court:

The commercial firm of M. Schwartz & Co., of the city of New Orleans, was indebted to the American National Bank of that city on August 5, 1896, in the

sum of \$88,600.16. To secure this indebtedness certain shares of the Schwartz Foundry Company and other securities were pledged to the bank.

Schwartz & Co. became insolvent, and, after proper proceedings in the civil district court of the parish of Orleans, Sumpter Turner and Edward Weil were elected syndics of the firm and of the individual members thereof. Weil subsequently died, and Turner was elected sole syndic, and is plaintiff in error here.

The bank also failed, and F. S. Richardson was appointed Receiver by the Comptroller of the Currency. He attended the meeting of the creditors of the insolvent firm, proved the claim of the bank, voted to accept the cession, and for the appointment of the syndics. Subsequently he applied to the civil district court to have the claim recognized, and his rights as pledgee enforced by a sale of the securities pledged, and the proceeds applied to the payment of the claim. Exceptions to his petition were filed and overruled, and an answer was then filed. The case was tried and judgment rendered in favor of the Receiver for \$74,045.16, being the greater part of the claim, and the securities pledged were ordered to be sold, and the proceeds applied to the payment of the indebtedness adjudged. A suspensive appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, and judgment was affirmed. (52 La. Ann. 1613, 28 So. 158.) This writ of error was then sued out.

One of the assignments of error in the State supreme court was as follows:

"That it is not averred nor proved by plaintiff, nor does the record show the averment and proof, that the Receiver of the American National Bank was authorized to sue and stand judgment herein, nor that the Receiver was authorized to have sold the collaterals set up as pledged at public auction in the manner demanded by the Receiver or ordered by the court; that without the direction and authorization required under Section 5234 of the United States Revised Statutes the Receiver was incompetent to stand in judgment herein, and to have sold or to cause to be sold the stocks, bonds, and securities belonging to or pledged to the American National Bank, and that, therefore, his demand for a judgment for the amount claimed, with recognition of a pledge, and his demand to have the alleged pledged collaterals sold, should be rejected at his costs."

In his brief for rehearing filed in the supreme court of the State, plaintiff in error urged "that the jurisdiction over and affecting the liquidation of National banks was vested exclusively in the United States circuit courts and the Federal courts, and that the State courts were without jurisdiction, in the said cause, to grant and order the sale authorized under Section 5234 of the United States statutes and its provisions; said defendant and plaintiff in error citing paragraphs 3, 10 and 11 of Section 629 of the United States statutes, and the proviso of Section 4 of the act of Congress adopted August 13, 1888; that said paragraphs and said proviso vested the courts of the United States with exclusive jurisdiction in cases commenced by the United States by direction of any officer thereof, or cases for winding up the affairs of such (National) banks."

It is assigned as error here that the Supreme Court of Louisiana erred in holding—

"1. That the defendant and plaintiff in error was not entitled to the right and privilege, under Section 5234 of the United States statutes and its provisions, to have the direction and authority of the Comptroller of the Currency for the

application to sell such securities, the sale, and the time, manner, and terms thereof ;

2. That the defendant and plaintiff in error was not entitled to have the proceedings for the sale instituted and prosecuted by a person competent to stand in judgment, and that the Receiver was competent to make such application to sell and to prosecute the same and stand in judgment ;

3. In holding that the Supreme Court of Louisiana and the State courts had jurisdiction *ratione materia*, and in denying the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States courts ;

4. That the court further erred in not setting aside the judgment of the lower State court and rejecting the demand of the defendant in error."

The claim presented in the trial court and in the supreme court, as expressed by the latter, was "that it was necessary for the Receiver to aver and prove he was authorized by the Comptroller of the Currency, United States Treasury Department, to institute the present action and to sell at public auction the collaterals pledged to secure the indebtedness declared on, and that without this authorization the judgment recovered cannot stand."

On that contention both courts passed. It was discussed at length by the supreme court, and was held to have "no sufficient basis of fact to rest upon." This conclusion was based on the ruling in *National Bank of the Metropolis vs. Kennedy* (17 Wall. 19). We think it was correctly based on that decision.

Section 5234 of the Revised Statutes enacts :

That on becoming satisfied, as specified in this act, that any association has refused to pay its circulating notes as therein mentioned, and is in default, the Comptroller of the Currency may forthwith appoint a Receiver, and require of him such bond and security as he shall deem proper, who, under the direction of the Comptroller, shall take possession of the books, records and assets of every description, of such association, collect all debts, dues, and claims belonging to such association, and, upon the order of a court of competent jurisdiction, may sell or compound all bad or doubtful debts, and on a like order, may sell all the real and personal property of such association on such terms as the court shall direct ; and may, if necessary to pay the debts of such association, enforce the individual liability of the stockholders provided for by the twelfth section of this act ; and such Receiver shall pay over all money so made to the Treasurer of the United States, subject to the order of the Comptroller, etc.

This section was construed in *National Bank of the Metropolis vs. Kennedy*, and Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the court, after distinguishing between stockholders and ordinary debtors of the National bank, which was the ground of decision in *Kennedy vs. Gibson* (8 Wall. 506), said :

"The language of the statute authorizing the appointment of a Receiver to act under the direction of the Comptroller means no more than that the Receiver shall be subject to the direction of the Comptroller. It does not mean that he shall do no act without special instructions. His very appointment makes it his duty to collect the assets and debts of the association. With regard to ordinary assets and debts no special direction is needed ; no unusual exercise of judgment is required. They are to be collected, of course ; that is what the Receiver is appointed to do. We think there was no error in the decision of the court below on these points, and that the action was properly brought by the Receiver."

Expressing what it was necessary for the Receiver to do to collect the assets of the bank, the Supreme Court of Louisiana said:

"The Receiver here could not sell the collaterals in his hands without obtaining the order of a court of competent jurisdiction, and this order must fix the terms of the sale.

The object of this suit was to obtain such an order. The civil district court of the parish of Orleans is a court competent to grant the order. It did so."

The other point now made, to wit, that the State courts had no jurisdiction of the petition of the Receiver because under paragraphs 3, 10 and 11 of § 629, and the proviso of § 4 of the act of Congress adopted August 13, 1888, the courts of the United States had exclusive jurisdiction, was not made in the trial court nor in the supreme court at the original hearing. It was made for the first time in the brief filed for rehearing. To maintain its availability to plaintiff in error it is claimed that, "if the State courts were utterly without jurisdiction, it was their duty to dismiss the proceedings *ex proprio motu*, and such is the jurisprudence of Louisiana. Where there is a want of jurisdiction *ratione materia*, it is not too late to suggest or raise it on rehearing, or at any time."

Whether such was the duty of the State courts, and what questions could be suggested or raised on rehearing, the supreme court was undoubtedly competent and able to decide. For this court we need only say that we have decided too often to make it necessary to do more than announce the rule, that to render a Federal question available on writ of error from a State court it must have been raised in the case before judgment, and cannot be claimed for the first time in a petition for rehearing. (*Meyer vs. Richmond*, 172 U. S. 82, 92, and cases cited.)

As there is no error in the record, judgment is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Brown took no part in this decision.

## DECISIONS OF CANADIAN COURTS AFFECTING BANKERS.

[Edited by John Jennings, B. A., LL. D.; Barrister, Toronto.]

### SET-OFF—BANK DEPOSIT—PROMISSORY NOTE—RANKING ON INSOLVENT ESTATE OF DECEASED MAKER WHO IS ALSO A DEPOSITOR.

ONTARIO BANK *vs.* ROUTHIER, *et al.* (Vol. 32 Ontario Reports, p. 67).

**STATEMENT OF FACTS:** This was an action brought by the Ontario Bank against the executors of the estate of a deceased customer, who at the time of his death had a credit balance with the Ottawa branch of the plaintiff bank amounting to \$134, while the bank at the same time held the deceased's unmatured note for the sum of \$1,000. The assets of the estate were insufficient to pay liabilities in full. No demand was made, however, on the bank for the balance of \$134 until after the note for \$1,000 had matured.

The bank claimed to deduct the \$134 from the \$1,000 due on the promissory note and to rank on the deceased's estate for the balance; *i. e.*, they filed a claim with the executors for \$866, on which they claimed to receive a dividend. The executors, on the other hand, contended that the bank should receive a dividend on the sum of \$1,000, and should credit the sum of \$134 on that dividend.

**DECISION:** The question was argued before Sir William Meredith, C. J.,



who in a very short judgment upheld the bank's claim, stating that the justice of the case was with them and that he could discover no equity in the other creditors to insist that the debt due from the bank to the deceased should be treated as vested in the executors in trust for all the creditors so as to shut out the bank's right of set-off. It was conceded that the result would have been otherwise had the executors demanded the \$134 before the maturity of the promissory note.

**PROMISSORY NOTE—JOINT AND SEVERAL MAKERS—ACTION AS AGAINST JOINT MAKERS—MERGER.**

MCDONALD *vs.* GILLIS, *et al.* (Nova Scotia Reports, Part 2, Vol. 33).

**STATEMENT OF FACTS:** Gillis and N were jointly and severally liable on a promissory note on which they were sued as joint makers by the plaintiff, McDonald. Gillis entered a defence and by arrangement proceedings were stayed against N. Subsequently Gillis withdrew his defence and confessed judgment and judgment was accordingly entered against him. Some years later the same action was gone with against N, on whose behalf it was contended that the judgment against Gillis was a bar to a judgment against him.

**DECISION:** The judgment of the court in appeal was given by Ritchie, J., who held that the cause of action as against N was absorbed and merged in the judgment against Gillis, but he suggested a right to recover against N in a new action because he was a joint and several maker.

[The editor of these notes would, however, humbly submit that the merger of the cause of action was absolute, and that by this judgment in appeal the question of the liability of the defendant N became *res judicata*, and not open to be further litigated.]

**INSOLVENT ESTATE—UNLAWFUL PREFERENCE.**

BINGHAM *vs.* LA BANQUE JACQUES CARTIER (Vol. 30 S. C. R., p. 429).

This was an appeal by Bingham to the Supreme Court of Canada from a judgment of the Superior Court for Lower Canada sitting in review.

**STATEMENT OF FACTS:** The law of the Province of Quebec provides that an insolvent person or firm may abandon his or its property for the benefit of creditors, who shall then elect a curator to wind up the estate under the direction of the judge and aided by the advice of inspectors elected by the creditors from among their own number.

The firm of C. B. Wright & Co. made such an abandonment, and later five inspectors were elected, one of whom was Mr. de Martigny, the General Manager of La Banque Jacques Cartier. To the curator and inspectors Geo. C. Wright, a son of one and a brother of the other member of the insolvent firm, submitted an offer for the purchase of its assets at a sum sufficient to pay privileged creditors in full and ordinary creditors thirty cents on the dollar. This offer was accepted by all the inspectors with the exception of Mr. de Martigny, who on behalf of his institution refused to agree to it. Subsequently Geo. C. Wright, the purchaser, and Mr. de Martigny, entered into a secret agreement by which the latter undertook to withdraw his opposition to the offer made to the curator and inspectors, and the former was to pay La Banque Jacques Cartier an additional ten cents on the dollar. Wright, being unable to pay the additional ten cents on the dollar of the bank's claim,

procured the appellant, Bingham, to give a note to the Bank for the sum of \$7,676.45, being the full forty cents on the dollar of its debt. The transaction was described and was made by the Bank's solicitor to appear as a sale by the Bank of its claim on the insolvent estate to the appellant, Bingham. No notice of such assignment of its claim against the estate was, however, filed with the curator.

In pursuance of this secret agreement Mr. de Martigny withdrew his objection to the acceptance of thirty cents on the dollar, and the curator reported to the judge that this offer was unanimously accepted by the inspectors, and the judge thereupon directed that the offer be approved and the sale to Geo. C. Wright completed. On the completion of the sale La Banque Jacques Cartier, notwithstanding their contention in this action that they had sold their claim to Bingham, received from the curator \$5,685.91, being thirty cents on the dollar of their claim, which sum they credited on Bingham's note. It was for the balance of this note that this action was brought, the defence being that the transaction was a fraud on the rest of the creditors, and an abuse by de Martigny of his fiduciary position as inspector; and so the consideration for the note was illegal.

DECISION: The court (composed of Sir Henry Strong, C.J., and Gwynne, King, Sedgwick and Girouard, JJ.) were unanimously of the opinion that the pretended sale of the bank's claim to Bingham was a mere cloak to cover the secret agreement whereby the law requiring equal distribution of the assets of an insolvent estate was set at naught.

Sir Henry Strong expresses the legal principle involved in the case as follows:

"Where the law carefully provided for the equal distribution of assets among creditors, any arrangement concealed from the general body of creditors whereby the policy of the law is defeated and a particular creditor, having no legal right to preference or priority, is secured an advantage over other creditors, must, under every system of law, be void as a fraud on those to whom another is so preferred. The additional amount which, under the secret agreement, was to be paid in the present case, to the respondent, was guaranteed and to be paid in the first instance by a third person, the appellant, who was to receive no direct interest in the purchased assets, can make no difference.

For these reasons the court concurred in holding that the promissory note sued upon was absolutely void. The appeal was allowed and the bank's action was dismissed, but without costs. The appellant, Bingham, was himself an inspector and should not have been a party to the arrangement.

---

## REPLIES TO LAW AND BANKING QUESTIONS.

---

Questions in Banking Law—submitted by subscribers—which may be of sufficient general interest to warrant publication will be answered in this department.

A reasonable charge is made for Special Replies asked for by correspondents—to be sent promptly by mail. See advertisement in back part of this number.

---

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

GRAND RAPIDS, Mich., Feb. 28, 1901.

SIR: On February 21 we had presented at our paying teller's window a certified check. The drawee being known to us and the check being regularly certified by the bank on which it was drawn, our teller paid the amount therein called for. When the check was presented at the bank at three o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, our hour of clearing, payment

was refused. We thereupon protested the check. Do you know of any right a bank may have for refusing their own certified check, and particularly where such check is in the hands of an innocent holder? The day following the protest the bank in question paid the item with costs.

CASHIER.

*Answer.*—There are cases where a bank may refuse to pay a check, even though it has certified the same. Thus, where the certification has been made by mistake, the bank may recall its certificate, if the error has not been the cause of loss or injury to the other party. (Second Nat. Bank vs. Western Nat. Bank, 51 Md. 128.) So, the bank is not bound by the act of its officer in certifying his own check. (Farmers and Merchants' Bank vs. Butchers', etc., Bank, 16 N. Y. 125.) So, where the check has been raised, or the name of the payee has been changed, the certification does not estop the bank from showing the fact of the alteration, even though the check is in the hands of an innocent holder for value. (Marine Nat. Bank vs. Nat. City Bank, 59 N. Y. 67; Security Bank vs. Nat. Bank of the Republic, 67 N. Y. 458.) But the bank in certifying asserts that the signature of the drawer is genuine, and that he has on deposit funds sufficient to meet the check, and that these will be retained and paid upon the check whenever it is presented. (Merchants' Bank vs. State Bank, 10 Wall., 648; Cooke vs. State National Bank, 52 N. Y. 96.) Hence, in ordinary cases the certificate of the bank is conclusive upon it, and it may not refuse payment of the check.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

LOWELL, Mass., Jan. 30, 1901.

SIR: A customer always carrying a respectable balance, and consequently in excellent repute with his bank, stops payment, verbal notice only, on check for \$150 issued on certain date to certain payee named. No memorandum of notice is made, but estoppel is carried mentally by teller and bookkeeper, expecting customer to arrange his matter in a short time. Customer comes in later and repeats notice and asks stoppage, verbal notice again, of all checks of the day and date in question. He notifies payee that he has stopped payment at his bank, and requests settlement, and payee agrees to take fifty dollars for amount claimed and deliver the checks to him, the drawer. Contention between drawer and payee is not settled and checks are held by payee until the matter "passes from the mind" of the bank, and six months later collects through his own bank the check for \$150, and meeting with such good success two months later collects the other check of \$25 in the same manner. Thus after a period of nearly a year, by notice of overdraft by bank to customer, the fact of payment of checks is discovered.

Has the bank any standing in which to base a suit against the payee by reason of his acknowledgment that fifty dollars was due him and expressed a willingness to take so much, and by his course has unjustly taken \$125 from the bank, an innocent party, or does the bank by laches or neglect in paying the long-past dated checks have to submit? Was the drawer's notice sufficient to bind the bank to him?

CASHIER.

*Answer.*—The oral direction of the drawer not to pay the checks was undoubtedly sufficient. The bank might, perhaps, have required that the notice be given in writing, but having received the verbal notice without question, and having engaged to act thereon, the bank cannot now be heard to say that this notice was insufficient. The bank, therefore, is without recourse against the drawer. But we think that the bank may recover the amount from the payee, as money paid under a mistake of fact. The mere circumstance that forgetfulness of the fact that payment had been countermanded may have been attributable to some negligence on the part of the bank, does not necessarily preclude such recovery. (Kelly vs. Salari, 9 M. and W. 54; Kingston Bank vs. Elting, 40 N. Y. 391.) Besides, there is in this case the element of bad faith on the part of the payee. Had the check been presented promptly, in the usual course of business, it would have been returned unpaid, and the

action of the payee in holding it for such length of time would, in the absence of some satisfactory explanation, justify the inference that he knew that payment had been stopped; and if, knowing this fact, he delayed presentation intentionally, in order that such fact might be forgotten or overlooked, he was guilty of fraud. The case for the bank would be still stronger if it can be shown that the drawer notified the payee that payment had been countermanded.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

MANASSAS, Va., Jan. 30, 1901.

SIR: Will you please answer through your Magazine the following query: Can a customer's deposit be garnished in a National bank on a *fi fa*, and an officer of the bank be required to answer in a State court as to the deposit of said customer? CASHIER.

*Answer.*—It has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States in a recent case (*Earle, Receiver, vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania*, BANKERS' MAGAZINE, Vol. 61, p. 377), that an attachment sued out against a National bank as garnishee is not an attachment against the bank or its property within the meaning of Section 5242 Rev. Stat. U. S., providing that no attachment shall issue against such a bank before final judgment. The deposit is only a debt from the bank to the customer, or, in legal phraseology, a chose in action belonging to him, and where, by the State law, choses in action may be reached by *fi fa*, there is no reason why a deposit in a National bank should be exempt from such levy. But the attachment or execution cannot displace any lien the bank may have upon the deposit, or injuriously affect the rights of the bank.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

LEOMINSTER, Mass., Feb. 8, 1901.

SIR: The statute in Massachusetts provides for six per cent. interest when a note is drawn with interest, and no rate is specified. On a blank where it is printed in "and interest at the rate of — per centum per —" or "with interest at — per cent. per annum," would the note carry interest unless the blank is filled? Would the same rule apply to a time note, or to a demand note? F. J. LOTHROP, Cashier.

*Answer.*—The statute would apply in such case and the note would bear six per cent. interest. The same rule would apply to a time note or to a note payable on demand.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

STANTON, Neb., Feb. 22, 1901.

SIR: I notice in "Answers to Law Questions" in February MAGAZINE, page 228, you claim that a certificate of deposit is subject to attachment, or "trustee process." I never understood that to be the case. They are generally issued payable on demand to a payee named, or order, on return of the certificate properly endorsed, etc.; they remain outstanding sometimes for months, being negotiable, and when returned sometimes have a number of endorsements thereon, all made in good faith for value. Being due on demand, they are not due until the demand is made. How can a bank be made to pay until the certificate is returned?

J. EBERLY, Cashier.

*Answer.*—Our correspondent is correct, so far as the law of Nebraska is concerned, in which State it appears to be the rule that the maker of a negotiable instrument cannot be held as garnishee. (*Clough vs. Buck*, 6 Nebraska, 343.) But in many other States this rule does not obtain, and the negotiability of the instrument is not an insuperable objection to the garnishment. But, of course, the rights of the maker are fully protected, and the remedy is often of very little efficacy. The laws of the different States are not at all harmonious upon the subject, and the decisions present a great diversity of rulings.

## IDEAL MONEY AND BANK CURRENCY.

[Address of Hon. Marriott Brosius, Chairman of the Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, at a meeting of Group V of the Pennsylvania Bankers' Association at Lancaster, Pa., February 19, 1901.]

Gentlemen of the Pennsylvania Bankers' Association—It gives me great satisfaction to be with you to-day and to embrace the opportunity which your courtesy affords to express some views on a subject in which I am not vain enough to suppose that I can instruct you, for it is your chosen field with which you are altogether familiar. In exchange for the views I submit to you to-day I shall expect you to submit yours to me later on when my committee are wrestling with measures looking to the perfection of our banking and currency system. Fair exchange is no robbery, and we may thus be reciprocally helpful.

It has been said that next to love and religion the question of currency has produced more lunatics than any other. I am inclined to think this is true, but we must not on this account abandon our pursuit of the object which is now engaging the exertions of bankers and legislators, namely, the best banking system the wit of man can devise. Nothing short of the very best is good enough for our country.



HON. MARRIOTT BROSIOUS.

### INTEREST OF BANKERS IN THE COUNTRY'S PROSPERITY.

The banker comes as near being the pillar of the business community as any other man in it. I will not except the lawyer, as important a factor as he is to the public welfare. No class in the community is more dependent than bankers and none more useful. They cannot say, "We do not care what happens, it cannot affect us." They have too great a stake in the general welfare to be indifferent to what transpires in the business world. Whatever happens adverse to the public good affects them unfavorably. Their possessions are largely out at use in the hands of others, in the work of production and exchange. Their proper function is to facilitate the marketing of the products of industry, to aid the manufacturer in transforming raw material into manufactured goods and the merchant in the work of distribution. If any untoward event affecting the commercial or business world transpires, if crops fail or industries languish, or the general economic activity is lowered, the activities of bankers are necessarily curtailed. No man is more sensible of this than bankers themselves, and they are, therefore, interested in the common prosperity, in the thrift of every citizen. They suffer from every alarm, from all evil forebodings, every cause of depression that affects the community. They have more at stake in the general prosperity, in the investments and machinery which afford facilities for business, than any other class, and hence their interest in the soundest money and the best bank currency that can be devised, for these are the tools with which business and exchange are carried on.

### WHAT CONSTITUTES GOOD MONEY.

There are many notions about what constitutes good money, and I add but little to the general confusion of tongues on the subject by venturing upon my own defi-

nition. I do not use the term "money" in its strict scientific but in its common, popular sense. Money is good when its intrinsic or commercial value corresponds with its coinage value, and is equal in purchasing power to that used by the leading commercial nations with which we deal, or is convertible at the pleasure of the holder into such value money.

For example, every dollar coined out of the standard money metal, gold, is good money. Its value is equivalent to the debt it is commanded to pay. It stands the test of fire and hammer. It preserves its identity in the crucible as well as in the counting-room.

The standard silver dollar is within my definition as long as it is convertible into gold at the option of the holder. There is no statute authorizing its redemption in any kind of money, but the faith of the Government is pledged to maintain it at a parity with gold. It is received by the Government for all dues and taxes and is, therefore, indirectly redeemable in good money. This indirect redemption is about to be made direct by a statutory provision making it exchangeable with gold at the Treasury.

The subsidiary silver coins are also good money, though not possessing an intrinsic value equal to their coinage value, because they are redeemable in full value money.

United States notes are good money as long as they are redeemable in gold, though the theory upon which they are issued may not be scientific, and many financiers believe our monetary system would be better without them.

While the money I have described is ideal money, it may not operate always in an ideal manner in serving the public use. To do this it should be as stable in value as possible. Its power in exchange should be the same as near as may be when a debt is paid as when it is contracted. Money too much contracted in volume is too dear; too much inflated, it is too cheap. An unlimited money is worthless money. Unduly inflated, it cheats the creditor; unduly contracted, it cheats the debtor. It serves equitably all classes when it is stable in volume and purchasing power.

#### THE BEST FORM OF REPRESENTATIVE MONEY.

But having the best money, or I may say real money, it is equally desirable to have the best representative money or credit currency we are capable of devising. Real money is a very expensive tool of exchange, and communities in proportion to their civilization have devised cheaper instruments with which to conduct their exchanges in the form of checks, drafts and notes based upon the assets of banks and the business of the community, and known as bank credit currency. This kind of currency comes into being when one man trusts another in a purchase and takes a written promise to pay at a future time. The holder of that note, however, may need for the use of his business a higher form of currency, capable of a wider circulation. If so he goes to a bank and has it discounted; that is he exchanges the limited credit of his note for the larger and wider credit of the bank's note which people generally will receive. This currency is born out of the transactions of trade; its volume regulates itself, is perfectly automatic.

The bank note, then, is an essential part of our currency. Its issue under our National banking system has been under such conditions and restrictions as not to admit of that degree of elasticity desirable in such currency, though in every other respect it has been well-nigh ideal.

The influence which has controlled the issue of bank circulation is the price of bonds. The higher the premium on bonds the less profit is there on circulation, and also the higher the rate at which money can be loaned the less the profit on circulation. The state of the money market influences the price of bonds. When money accumulates in money centers the price of bonds will be higher and this will check

the issue of bank circulation. On the other hand when the market becomes stringent the price of bonds will fall and there will be an inducement to issue circulation. There is therefore some warrant for the complaint that our bank-note currency is not sufficiently related to the needs of the community, and we cannot have an ideal currency until there is some modification in the mode of issue.

#### EXPANSION OF THE NATIONAL BANK-NOTE ISSUES.

In mere matter of volume there has been no lack in bank currency the last year. From the passage of the act of March 14, 1900, to February 2, 1901, 435 new banks have been organized, of which 304 had a capital of less than \$50,000, and 131 with a capital of \$50,000 and upward. The aggregate capital of the smaller banks is \$8,002,000, and that of the larger ones \$14,259,000, a total of \$22,261,000. The bonds deposited by both classes amount to \$8,603,500, a trifle over twenty-five per cent. of capital. The circulation of National banks has increased from \$216,374,795 on March 14, 1900, to \$317,839,745 on February 11, 1901, a net increase in eleven months of \$100,964,650. The act of March 14, 1900, made five important changes affecting our National banks.

First—It authorized the issue of notes to the par of bonds deposited.

Second—It permits the establishment of banks with a capital of \$25,000 in places of a population not exceeding 3,000 inhabitants.

Third—When the new two per cent. bonds are deposited it reduces the tax on circulation from one to one half of one per cent. on the average amount of notes in circulation.

Fourth—It repealed that part of the old law which prohibited a bank from increasing its circulation within six months after retiring any portion of its notes.

Fifth—It restricts the issue of notes of the denomination of five dollars to one-third of a bank's total issue.

Notwithstanding these ameliorations in the system, the ratio of increase which characterized the last year will not continue, as the refunding process has ceased and about eighty-five per cent. of the two per cent. bonds are already in the hands of the National banks. We cannot therefore reasonably expect any great additions to our circulation hereafter on account of the provisions of the new law.

#### INCREASING BUSINESS WILL DEMAND MORE CURRENCY.

But the rapid growth of the commercial interests of the country will make necessary in the future an enlargement of the banking power of the country. It is strenuously urged by some financiers that the rental for money must be lowered in this country in the interest of the borrower, who is the producer and organizer of industry and employer of labor, in order to increase his power of competition with foreign rivals and enlarge his opportunity of selling his goods in foreign markets. Secretary Gage well observes that "Everything which tends to make easy the conversion of sound credit into a transferable form tends to lower the rate of interest and thereby to benefit American manufacturers in meeting the demands of the home market at reasonable prices to consumers, and especially in meeting upon equal terms in other markets their foreign competitors who have the benefit of the great capital and liberal note-issuing system of the great banks of Continental Europe."

Of course any legislative proposition looking to the enlargement of the volume of our currency must be treated with well-guarded discretion. It is a two-edged sword. In doing too much to help our manufacturers and exporters to enter the field of competition under advantageous conditions, due to a lower rental for the use of capital, we invite a difficulty from another direction, that is the outflow of our gold due to an inflated currency. The proposal to extend our banking power for

the betterment of business conditions is eminently wise within limitations, but those limitations cannot be exceeded without danger to the very interests we mean to promote.

#### THE GROWTH OF BANKING POWER.

The need for elasticity in a bank currency, I think, is greatly exaggerated by many financiers and publicists. The immense volume of deposits, checks and drafts known as bank credit currency expands and contracts with the demands of trade and business, and is the medium through which the great bulk of the business of the country is carried on. It is extremely elastic and varies in amount at different seasons of the year and under different conditions of business. The clearing-house reports of the principal cities show an average daily volume of \$250,000,000 of this class of currency, or a weekly volume of \$1,500,000,000. The total credit fund subject to check as represented by bank deposits amounts to \$4,500,000,000.

The ratio of increase of banking power in the commercial nations, by which I mean ability to loan represented by capital, surplus, deposits and convertible notes, is almost incredible. The banking power of Great Britain in 1840 was \$660,000,000. In 1900 it was \$5,860,000,000. The banking power of the United States in 1840 was \$45,000,000. In 1900 it was \$11,000,000,000. The banking power of the commercial nations in 1840 was \$1,540,000,000. In 1894 it was \$16,685,000,000, an increase in the total of 983 per cent., which is about three times the rate of trade expansion in the century. The banking power of the United States in the sixty years named increased over 2,000 per cent.

I allude to this marvellous growth of the banking power of the country to accentuate the enormous elasticity of the credit currency of the country. Still, I concede that discounting the magnified claims sometimes made in this behalf there remains a residue of actual necessity for greater flexibility than our present bank-note currency possesses. There are fluctuations in business which require a corresponding flexibility in the currency which constitutes the tools of exchange. There are seasons in which the moving of crops requires an increase in the circulating medium; and there are times when to lessen the effects of the liquidation of credits incident to a panic increased bank issues are desirable. The mutual protection of banks and the public in times of monetary stringency when deposits are being withdrawn, as in 1893, is a matter of so great consequence as to command the exertions of Congress to place such laws upon the statute books as will afford commensurate relief. Between May 4 and October 4, 1893, the deposits of the National banks were reduced in the sum of \$378,767,691. The banks took out \$31,265,616 of new circulation and borrowed nearly \$37,000,000 in their efforts to meet the general demands upon them. Notwithstanding the additional circulation and the amount borrowed the National banks to meet the drain in deposits were compelled to contract their loans in the sum of \$318,767,691, taking this immense sum from the productive industries of the country to the great detriment of all classes of our people.

#### HOW TO OBTAIN NEEDED ELASTICITY.

To obtain this needed elasticity is a problem which is engaging the thought of the ablest financiers. The Comptroller, whose superior knowledge in matters of finance, and ability as an administrative officer give great weight to his recommendations, has in his last two annual reports recommended an emergency currency subjected to so heavy a tax that it would not be issued in normal times for profit but would be available in times of emergency. The tax would constitute a fund which in connection with a pro rata share of the assets of insolvent banks would be sufficient to redeem the notes without resorting to a first lien to the detriment of depositors. To make this scheme effective the tax would have to be heavy



enough to force the currency into retirement as soon as the emergency passes. It was the thought of the Comptroller that this plan would gear in with the present bond-secured currency and afford a solution of the vexed problem of an elastic currency without impairing its security. This at once suggests the system now in vogue in Germany, where it seems to give satisfaction.

While there is much in this proposal to commend it, the question arises whether, in view of the monetary requirements of our oceanic possessions, the extension of trade and expansion of commerce anticipated in the near future, the gradually diminishing amount of bonds available for banking purposes under our present system, and the pre-eminence the United States are to hold, financially and industrially, a more comprehensive system suited to conditions which in the nature of things must be met in the not remote future, it is not desirable at an early day to enter tentatively at least upon that system for which our education for a long period under our present National Banking Law has fully qualified us and which promises to yield results commensurate with the needs of a growing and expanding country.

#### SAFETY AND ELASTICITY NOT INCOMPATIBLE.

Much careful study and anxious thought have brought me to a realization of the necessity of a forward step in the direction of what may not inaptly be called a more scientific system of bank-note currency. I do not mean to make any concession to the claim for elasticity as against security, and I do not agree with those who hold that absolute safety is incompatible with perfect elasticity. The two qualities may co-exist and must do so in an ideal bank note currency.

Freedom of issue within the limit of paid-up capital without investment in bonds as security will afford all the elasticity desirable. The guarantee of the Government of the ultimate redemption of the notes, as under the existing law, will render the notes absolutely safe. Under our present system the Treasury redeems all notes of insolvent banks when presented and indemnifies itself by requiring the deposit of bonds, and by a first lien upon the assets of the bank. The Government having given the notes the benefit of its guarantee, ought to make adequate provision for its own indemnity. It is thought by many experienced and thoughtful financiers, among them the Secretary of the Treasury, who has brought to the administration of his great office an experience, learning and amplitude of understanding not only in practical banking but in the whole broad field of finance which have enabled him to administer the finances of the Government with most exceptional ability, and the entire acceptability of the people, that a small safety fund made up of a tax not exceeding one per cent. of the circulation of the banks, together with a lien on the assets of the bank ratably with depositors and other creditors, would constitute an ample indemnity for the Government.

#### CALCULATIONS AS TO THE SOUNDNESS OF BANK NOTES BASED ON GENERAL ASSETS AND A SAFETY FUND.

A careful investigation has been made by the Actuary of the Treasury Department, which shows approximately what losses would have fallen upon such a safety fund on account of failed banks, since the establishment of the National banking system if either of two modes of indemnity for the Government's guarantee had been in vogue.

First, if the banks had been allowed to issue circulation to the amount of fifty per cent. of their capital and had issued the full amount and been required to pay into a safety fund one per cent. of their issues annually, and the Government had a first lien upon the assets, there would have been an aggregate loss of \$69,211 to be paid out of the safety fund.

Secondly, under the same conditions, excepting that the Government has a lien

on the assets ratably with other creditors including depositors, the loss to be paid out of the safety fund would have aggregated \$3,961,168, while under the case of having the first lien upon assets after paying all notes not paid by the assets there would have remained of the safety fund on October 1, 1900, a sum which with interest at two per cent. would amount to \$130,953,467; and in the case of having a ratable lien only with other creditors, the fund remaining after paying all notes not paid by a ratable share of the assets with interest at two per cent. added would be \$124,588,201. It may be noted in passing that this calculation is predicated upon the assumption that the losses under the system described would not have exceeded those which actually occurred under the present system.

This seems to afford absolute demonstration of safety to the Government in such a safety fund for its indemnity for guaranteeing the issues of the banks. What objection is there to the Government becoming the guarantor of the bank-note issues as it is now? I hold to the fundamental proposition that it is the duty of the Government to guarantee every note it authorizes to be issued for use as money by the people. Webster declared, "The Government is bound to take care of the currency of the country. If paper is to take the place of coin, Congress is bound to see that it is safe paper." The guarantee of the Government will give the currency a national character which will make it current in the remotest corner of the country; it will have the odor of nationality, a charm which Webster said created trust and faith not only in the great marts of trade but in every quarter of the country.

Having the safety of the circulation thus secured its elasticity is not difficult of accomplishment. Under the present law a bank with a capital of \$100,000 invested in two per cent. bonds at par can obtain \$100,000 of circulation, which not being reserve money can only be used for loaning. At six per cent. this circulation would yield at most \$6,000. The capital invested in the bonds, on the other hand, if the bank chose to use it in banking, would have been the basis of \$400,000 of loans, which at six per cent. would have yielded \$24,000. It is thus apparent that if the bank can use its capital in banking it must be the loser by investing in bonds to secure circulation. A circulation obtained by exchanging capital for it, is practically the investment of the capital of the bank in notes which are limited in the service and uses to which they may be put as compared with the capital invested in them. This reveals the reason for the inelasticity of our National bank-note currency. Dr. Joseph French Johnson, of the University of Pennsylvania, in a very lucid discussion on this subject, says:

"Under normal conditions it is unwise for a bank to issue more notes than can be kept constantly in circulation. During a time of expansion, when there is increasing demand for money, a prudent banker shrinks from taking out more notes, lest a lull may set in and the notes be returned for redemption. Hence, the total circulation of bank notes at any time never exceeds the amount which, in the opinion of bankers, can be kept afloat throughout the year, in dull times as well as in good times. The level of the bank's circulation, therefore, may be said to be fixed by the minimum demand for money in the country. If it rises above this minimum, the bankers take the risk of a loss much in excess of the possible profit accruing from a temporary increase of circulation. We have here a satisfactory explanation of the statistics of the banking circulation in this country since 1865. Its volume has never increased in response to the increasing needs of the community or fluctuated in accordance with temporary changes in the demand for money. Changes in the circulation have been infrequent and have followed lines entirely unconnected with the monetary demand."

With a circulation which requires no investment of capital the banks could afford to keep on hand a supply adequate to meet the needs of business as they arise—such needs as cannot be met by checks, but require something that has the form and ready negotiability of money. The Secretary of the Treasury with his characteristic force and clearness brings into view the distinction between the two systems of bank-note issues; "the one known as currency against assets and a safety fund, and

the other as currency secured by the deposit of bonds. The first named furnishes an instrument of credit, costing nothing, as effective in the exchange of property as real money. The second is an instrument of capital, or what to the lender of credit is as expensive as capital." If the bank secures its own notes by bonds it "has tied up in that investment an equal sum of loanable capital. If on the other hand it issues its notes without this security, it has not thereby made an investment of capital. It has put afloat for a time an instrument of credit which if properly secured is as efficient to perform all the functions of money in exchange of goods and payment of debts and wages as is money itself. Like the credit upon the banker's books availed of by checks and drafts, the bank note is an economizer in the use of capital. Indeed, the bank note is in its essence the check or draft of the banker upon himself payable on demand to the holder thereof."

This freedom of issue, even to secure so desirable an end as elasticity in our bank currency, would not be at all permissible except under such conditions and restrictions as would make it absolutely safe and be a reasonable guarantee against over issues.

Nor could such a system in its completeness be entered upon at once. It must be inaugurated by degrees so as not to release and throw upon the market the bonds held by the banks with the effect of depressing their price. The direction we should go is to my mind no longer in doubt, but the rate of speed is a matter which requires very careful consideration.

Let me then by way of recapitulation suggest as the system of bank-note currency for which we should strive as best suited to future conditions when Government bonds have ceased to be available or desirable as a basis of bank-note currency.

First—A circulation guaranteed by the Government with proper provision for its indemnity in the nature of a safety fund and a ratable lien in favor of the Government with other creditors on assets of failed banks.

Second—A circulation issued against the assets of the bank as above limited, and a safety fund provided by the banks under such conditions and restrictions as will render improbable such an excessive issue as would affect the movement of gold.

---

**Denominations of National Bank Notes.**—The amount, by denominations, of National bank circulation outstanding on October 31, 1899, and October 31, 1900, is shown in the following table:

(The issue of notes of the denominations of \$1 and \$2 was discontinued in 1879; of \$1,000 in 1884, and of \$500 in 1885.)

DENOMINATIONS.	Oct. 31, 1899.	Oct. 31, 1900.
Ones .....	\$348,278	\$347,552
Twos .....	187,468	187,056
Fives .....	75,459,705	70,368,585
Tens .....	75,980,210	123,088,290
Twenties .....	58,479,140	88,408,100
Fifties .....	11,293,200	16,186,900
One hundreds .....	23,112,200	32,899,200
Five hundreds .....	104,500	102,500
One thousands .....	23,000	27,000
Nonredeemed fractions .....	81,993	83,085
Total .....	\$242,984,694	\$331,613,288

---

**Need It in Their Business.**—A. L. Wilson, Cashier of the Merchants' Exchange Bank, Sparta, Ill., writes as follows under date of February 7:

"I enclose our draft on American Exchange National Bank for \$5, in payment of our subscription to the BANKERS' MAGAZINE for the year 1901, as per bill rendered. We need it in our business."

---

**Card-Index System.**—If you send your name on a postal card to the Neal-Clark Manufacturing Co., 30 State street, Rochester, N. Y., they will send you a model of the card-index system, together with a forty-page book describing it.

# LIFE AND FIRE INSURANCE AS RELATED TO MODERN BUSINESS ECONOMY.

## THE RATIONALE OF LIFE INSURANCE.

The history of life insurance is coeval with the history of American life insurance, and the latter, a few earlier tentative beginnings being disregarded, is hardly more than three-score years old. Yet this is too long a term to allow, for the real growth of the institution is not forty years old, and its large growth has been accomplished within twenty.

The early notion was that to take out an insurance upon life was to attempt to set up a sort of bulwark against death; hence this was pronounced a tempting of Providence and was undoubtedly among the first obstacles. Another was a doubt whether the promised payments would really be made, and so loose were the criticisms that it is not more than a quarter-century since one of the triumvirate of great daily newspapers in this city editorially made the unqualified assertion that of all money paid into life insurance companies not more than one dollar in ten is (or will be) "ever paid back." Restrictions and conditions, of which absolute forfeiture in case of non-payment of renewal premiums was worst, have gradually been dropped, this process of increased invitation having gone quite to the limit of safety. The original "plain ordinary life" policy, on which premiums were payable until death, has been supplemented by others which shorten the term of payment and bring settlement-day forward; the ingenuity of actuaries has been put to test, since the first ten years and especially the past five, to devise new forms, until there is no conceivable situation which has not a policy suitable for it. Indeed, the range for choice is almost embarrassing; but flexibility has taken one more step, for the new entrant can start upon a term of moderate length, at the end of which he may find a reasonable range of option for the future, according to the situation as he finds it then. Flexibility thus includes convertibility somewhat.

These changes, together with the general growth of the country and the law that all healthy increase tends to be cumulative, go to account for the accelerating expansion of life insurance, one company having written almost \$250,000,000 of new business in 1900, which is thus far "record" for the world. Yet there must be another cause—the growing appreciation of the fact that life insurance is an indispensable provision. It will not be pessimism to admit that the average young man starts life with conditions less favorable for successful start than existed forty years ago, for the country has been getting upon a new basis, which is always a disturbing process. We need not quote statistics of failures which dismally show that the chances of collapse within the first five years of new business are greater than formerly; assume as sufficient that making a fortune is rarer than ever. To be accredited owner of fifty millions in twenty years after manual labor occurs often enough to show that this is the country of possibilities and hopes, but the wise man will decline to wager anything. A comfortable subsistence and fair advantages of equipment of children to make the same fight their parents made—this is all one can reasonably count upon, and a vast multitude come short of it. The luxuries of one generation are the necessities of the second one following, but the increased margin above consumption does not necessarily grow with the growth in the scale of competition itself.

However that may be, recorded figures and observation come to this: life insurance is the only wager a man can make that can really be called "a sure thing." It is the positive key to something "over"—if not a competence, and the only key. When we consider the prospects of being able to bequeath anything more concrete than good works and a good example, it is for the overwhelming majority life insurance or nothing. It was once advocated as especially for the great mass to whom a thousand dollars seemed a large sum, though in those days the congestion of wealth was small as compared with the present; later, it was declared to be not for the poor only; and now the very rich, partly because they know the instability of wealth and partly because the "investment" view of it has been strongly pressed, make use of this provision. Mr. P. D. Armour did not see how he could profitably use it, but he was one of the exceptions. The man who now denies that life insurance is a sound provision, in some amount and in some form, for all persons in all circumstances, sets himself up as the only wise person in a nation of simpletons, his one dictum against the verdict of the civilized world. For the need of some provision is so general, the applications of life insurance are so varied, and the experience of it has been so ample, that we are fast coming to such recognition of it that men must insure as a thing of course, and whoever omits to do so will be put on his defense by the very omission. Lacking enough prudence and decision to guard his future so far, a man will ere long be counted unworthy of any mercantile credit and without a right to marry.

#### INSURANCE AND EXPENSE.

The so-called "natural premium" plan of insuring life, formerly called the "assessment" plan, is an entire misnomer and founded on a misconception, hence founded unstably. It was originally a strictly post-mortem assessment, arguing thus: except for incidental expenses, which need not be relatively considerable, money is required solely for death settlements; therefore when the occasion arises, and not until then, we will call for just money enough to meet it. In fire insurance, under the class name of "mutuals," the same idea has been used; small expenses having been provided for, we will assess the members after the fire occurs and let them keep their money until then. This idea is simple and it appears natural and rational; so it appears to commend itself at once. But there are practical objections to it in fire insurance, and much more seriously in life insurance, which make it unworkable, and its abandonment in the latter field has been compelled.

People were urged, a few years ago, to buy life insurance as they buy fire insurance. This is not possible, because the two are radically unlike. Fire is a "contingency uncertain"; death is a "contingency certain." That is, while some fires are certain to occur, there is no certainty as to any particular piece of property, but the chances are that any such piece will finally escape; on the other hand, the only certainty we have is that no particular life will escape, and the only uncertainty relates to the date of this contingency certain. Hence the early notion that insurance on life is a challenge to Providence was foolish, for Providence understands the nature of things better than to disapprove any prudent provision. Life insurance is exactly that—a prudent provision. It is not insurance at all, in the strict use of terms; it is an accumulation process.

The only likeness between fire insurance and life insurance is when the latter is taken for a short term of years; the chances are then largely in favor of survival of the life, as of survival of the property, and so one may for a short time insure his life "as" he insures his property.

Now the constant objection made to life insurance is that "it costs so much," and the sole claim of the assessment plan above mentioned has been its alleged cheapness.

But here also people are misled by the false comparison between fire and life insurance, for the former is expense and the latter is not. Fire insurance is useful and necessary; in the scheme of affairs it bears a sort of likeness to friction in machinery. Friction in that place is a cost and apparently a waste which we endure because unavoidable; similarly, fire insurance returns value even to the man who pays premiums as long as he lives and never files a loss claim; yet it is strictly an expense outlay, for at the end his assets are less by the amount of his premiums—they are gone without remainder. [This is correct as an arithmetical statement, although it necessarily ignores the effect on his peace of mind and on his credit had he attempted to go through a business career and save all his premiums.] On the other hand—and this is the point we wish to emphasize—life insurance is not “expense”; it is outlay, but an accumulation process. The man who dies early makes a large profit for his estate, in the comparison of outlay with return; the one who lives longer still “makes” something; and he who survives longest cannot be said to lose.

Hence life insurance ought never to be viewed as an expense. Whoever opens an account in either a check bank or a Savings bank never complains of its cost; he understands that what he deposits is his and that he has nothing and can withdraw nothing which he has not first put in. A rational analysis shows that life insurance premiums are so much put by for an emergency, hence not parted with and paid away, as other earnings are which go into current consumption. They are not like a bank deposit in being withdrawable at will, and if they were they would necessarily be the same otherwise as such a deposit; yet they are none the less a deposit, a put-by.

This is true in the mathematics of the subject and true also in the facts of experience, as may be considered hereafter more in detail. If the reader will carefully observe the distinction made above between fire and life insurance, and will always remember that the latter is not expense but accumulation, the objection of “cost” will not trouble so much.

---

### THE PLACE OF FIRE INSURANCE.

The basis of commercial paper, even of the best double-name, is not wholly the personal character of the individuals whose names it bears. This basis in part is indirectly, in case of discounts at bank, and in some cases of collateral loans more directly, the merchandise behind the loan, and it is always at least conventionally supposed that bank loans are somehow based upon merchandise—they are not evolved out of air.

If this is a correct statement of the understood fundamental character of good loaning by banks, it must follow clearly that bankers are concerned very deeply in the safety of merchandise from fire and water. Consumption is the material law of the universe, so far as man can discover; it is only through consumption (which is a general expression denoting changes in form) that material things work any service; but there is a wide difference between the slower consumption which renders service as it goes and the hasty sort which renders none. The latter unregulated sort is best known to us as fire waste, because the sort most common.

Fire insurance has in society the place of a tax collector and tax distributor. It settles with the individual loser, but (if the matter comes out as it always ought) it does not make even him quite whole, and it has absolutely no power whatever to make the community whole, even in part. If the reader will kindly take this last sentence as if it were in bold-faced type a few inches long, and will be correspondingly impressed by it and correspondingly remember it, our purpose will be favored, because this elementary and entirely obvious fact is the one which is most generally forgotten, if perceived at all. Fire insurance restores nothing and can restore nothing.

ing. Buildings or merchandise, once burned, are unprofitably consumed, and there is the end ; time and labor cannot restore them, because the loss is the loss of time itself. More buildings and merchandise are produced, but the subtraction and loss are unaltered ; the community are so much the poorer, and must remain poorer. All that insurance does is the important work of lightening the loss, as to the individual, by spreading it over some thousands of others.

This is a re-distribution of tax. But the tax must first be collected, and this is done in what are graphically termed premiums. Each company is engaged in collecting these from its mass of policy holders and redistributing them to such contributors as have property burned. This is the essence of the transaction ; the expenses are incidental to it. The insurance, and the substantiality of the insurance, depend upon the collections. The transaction is essentially and inseparably mutual. True, there is a capital stock, and there is a corporation ; but this is an indorser only, and we will not speak of it further now. Incidentally, insurance ought to, and in some measure does, serve the function of lessening the fire waste by encouraging precaution and care.

As a banking not less than an individual matter, insurance is of the highest importance. It is natural to esteem lightly what we have always had and never missed ; but a good test can be applied by just imagining that we "miss" insurance. Let us suppose that by general bankruptcy of the companies, or by the general refusal of the stockholders to continue their capital, or by any other cause, insurance policies become blank paper ; can the effect be easily measured in advance ? Where would credit be ?

Now, underwriting is not, and for some years has not been, in a sound financial condition. There is a notion, notwithstanding, that it is both profitable and extortionate. There is a general disposition to tax it and in many ways worry it. There is fault on both sides, and as the result of this fault the companies and the public are not in touch. The community of interests and position is not realized ; yet it is real. There are suspicion and incredulity where there ought to be accord.

The foregoing is necessarily a general review of the situation. But an institution so useful and indispensable as insurance is—and how indispensable it is may be proved by the suggestion that we dispense with it—ought not to be unhealthy, and the fact that it is so proves that something is wrong. Or if it is said that insurance is not unhealthy, unless from greed and plethora, and if this is admitted at present (for the sake of getting a supposition) there is still disagreement and antagonism, and so a condition of out-of-health on the subject.

#### NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

**TOKEN MONEY OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND.** By MABERLY PHILLIPS. London : Effingham Wilson.

This is a reprint of a series of articles on the above subject appearing originally in the "Bankers' Magazine" of London. It gives an interesting account of the token coins issued by the Bank of England and by other banks and private individuals from 1804 to 1817.

The silver coins in Great Britain, as well as the gold coins, are now issued by the Mint, as in the United States, the Bank of England being compelled by law, however, to purchase all gold offered at a fixed price, slightly lower than the coining value of the bullion.

**Of Interest to Tourists.**—"To travel is to live" is the text of a most attractive announcement of European and Asiatic Tours, made on another page, by the well-known and reputable tourist and guide Mr. A. De Potter. The tours include not only the places usually visited by tourists, but also many places not often visited, but which are nevertheless of very great interest, such for example as the Caucasus, the Crimea, etc. The details of the tours and many other matters of interest are given in a little booklet the "Old World Tourist Guide," sent free from the main office, 45 Broadway, New York.

## DANGERS THAT BESET BANK CLERKS AND BRANCH BANK MANAGERS.

[From the Journal of the Institute of Bankers, New South Wales.]

You have now become a branch bank manager.

The motto "Ready, aye ready," recommended for your adoption in my first paper, has given place to the words "Steady, aye steady," recommended in my second.

The clerical work—which necessarily occupied so much of your time before your promotion—is now a secondary matter; is no longer first in your thoughts.

True, you will be appealed to from time to time by your able accountant; but the conduct of the office and the balancing of the books will now devolve, principally, upon him.

Your responsibilities, however, with regard to these matters have by no means ceased; they have extended. Head office will hold you primarily responsible for errors in bookkeeping; but as your branch grows you must necessarily lean very much upon your accountant. If he be lax in his duty, careless, or inefficient, do not be weak enough to hide his faults; report truthfully to your head office, let them know there exactly how matters stand; better that your accountant should suffer a rebuff—which may do him good—than that your whole staff should be badly trained, and your reputation, and theirs, impaired. It is difficult enough to be firm in dealing with staff matters even at a branch, where there are comparatively few officers; what must it be to the officials at head office and to the general manager?

Your duties, as I have already said, have been extended, and I have touched in my last paper, to some extent, upon the attitude it is desirable you should assume towards the customers of the bank, and the frame of mind, which it seems to me, you should endeavor to acquire in order that you may successfully adapt yourself to your new environments.

We will assume that this has been done, that you have steadied down, that you are in every respect stronger, less liable to be swayed by feeling, that you talk less, think more, and begin to recognize that in the conduct of all human affairs men can only grope after truth; that unless they are to stumble and fall in doing so, they must walk with extreme wariness, and that when truth is greatly obscured, when hard and fast rules are inapplicable, when there are even no precedents to go upon, expediency must guide our footsteps.

You have now about 250 or 300 cash credit and overdrawn accounts in your books, as well as a considerable number of bills under discount, and as the snares and pitfalls in lending money are innumerable—even when every reasonable precaution has been taken beforehand—a few remarks on this subject may not come amiss.

No amount of precaution can, of course, at all times be successful in avoiding loss, but "to be forewarned is to be forearmed."

It will be impossible to take more than a very cursory glance in this short paper at a few of these perils and difficulties.

Stock may die, crops may fail, flaws may be discovered in titles to land which even the bank's solicitors have overlooked.

In the drought-stricken parts of this colony, the ablest managers cannot have escaped loss and terrible anxiety, and no amount of forethought, short of prescience, could have foreseen the shrinkage that has taken place of late years in the value of freeholds in the city and suburbs.



Parliament, too, is continually adding to the responsibilities of bankers by new laws and new taxes, thereby changing and upsetting all previous valuations, all previous reckonings; whilst the variations in banking laws between the Australian colonies must, I imagine, add immensely to the cares and responsibilities of a general manager.

Federation, now happily accomplished, should speedily help us in the matter.

These troubles are, perhaps, unavoidable; but not so those arising from mortgages rashly taken over wrong allotments, when you have neglected to insist upon a surveyor's certificate; not so your failure to ascertain how far the State's first charge extends over the land you are advancing on; not so the loss from destruction by fire of the house over which you have allowed the policy to lapse; not so the trouble you are in from having refrained, in your over-confidence, from making searches against your new client, who, to your dismay, you now find out is an uncertificated insolvent, and that your mortgage is of no avail against the official assignee and his old creditors.

Your advances are covered, in almost all cases, by bonds, promissory notes, or letters of guarantee. By far the larger number are supported by mortgages over rent-producing freeholds or leaseholds, over ships, steamers, live stock, liens over trade bills, wool, crops, bonded certificates for flour, rice, butter and such-like commodities—the latter being only accepted for advances of a temporary nature. You also hold liens over the rights of shares in old and well-established dividend-paying companies—mining and such other scrip of speculative concerns you firmly reject, knowing that not to do so would be considered by your head office as distinctly unsound practice. In the case of overdrafts to contractors, and those who anticipate the early receipt of funds, great care should be exercised. This is a pitfall many a branch bank manager has fallen into. In his desire to help a deserving client, or retain a large account for his branch, too much reliance may be placed upon such a customer's character and good record; but it is notorious that many honest contractors are very optimistic, particularly when midway in their contract they find themselves pinched for money. Such people are apt to imbue their banker with their own optimism, and mislead, without perhaps any desire to actually deceive. Better point out to your client, in such a case, the desirability of paying liberally some capitalist friend to guarantee an additional and separate sum at the bank. Why should your institution, whose net earnings perhaps are not more than two per cent. on the account, take all the risk, whilst their customer, if he succeed, may, by means of the bank's money, net thirty per cent. or forty per cent. on the contract?

It is not equitable nor should you be asked to do so much for your best customer.

Again, it behooves you to be very chary in accepting orders on the Government or private firms for sums shortly to become due. Nothing is easier than for such orders to be countermanded, and in case of insolvency they may be found to be of no avail against the official assignee.

In your desire to increase your business you may be tempted to make small advances for policy sake to men of good repute, but who have but slender security to offer. You may be quite correct in your opinion of your client's character, he may be an upright honorable man of good business ability, his account may have every promise of developing into a large and profitable one for your branch, but to make it a safe one you should at least insist upon the applicant insuring his life for a sum sufficient to cover the unsecured portion of his debt; and you should have an assignment of the life policy made over to your bank by the bank's solicitors.

The uncertainty of life has often been forcibly demonstrated, in a very disagreeable manner, to managers who have been resting principally upon the personal energy, attention and business ability, or skill, of a debtor, who may suddenly die, and, with him, the bank's best security for the debt.

Do not allow the active nature of a client's account, nor his apparently extensive transactions, to mislead you ; rely rather, I should say, upon the steadiness of the balance kept. Clients have been known to endeavor to disguise the meagerness of their business by drawing out and paying in again the same money.

When initiating a loan no trouble should be spared ; an exhaustive inquiry, with very careful valuation by personal inspection, when at all possible, should be made.

In the comparatively few instances when this cannot be done, you should satisfy yourself, thoroughly, that the valuations furnished were made recently, and by men competent in that particular line of business ; that the valuator is employed by the bank and not by your client.

You should also, I think, make it almost a *sine qua non* to have, at least, one or two interviews with your new customer, and not forget to enter up at once in your "Information Book" the purport of what has been said or arranged.

It is far easier to place an overdraft on a good, sound footing when initiating the advance, than to do so afterwards when you are—in a sense—at the mercy of your customer, who by that time, has obtained possession of the bank's money. Difficulties can be adjusted and matters insisted upon at that stage which are hard to extract from him later on.

Being conscientiously inclined, the following question often arises in your mind : "Inasmuch as I am expected to revise the value of my securities every six months and set out afresh in my returns what I believe to be their present marketable value, ought I not to make a new inspection of freeholds, leaseholds, ships and steamers, every six months ? and if not so frequently, how often should I do so ?"

Theoretically you should certainly carry out this duty twice a year, but practically it is impossible ; your advances are now so numerous, so diversified, and so far apart ; nor could you always do so without awakening disquietude in your debtor's mind—and the better class of debtors are often frightened of their banker. It will be hard to persuade such a one that your visit has not been prompted by distrust, and may not be followed by the "calling up" of the account.

Under this erroneous impression he will, just in proportion to his solvency and ability to repay the debt, promptly do so, and relieve you from the opportunity of again inspecting his property.

No hard and fast rule can be laid down in these matters ; you must be guided largely by the circumstances surrounding each case. It may be quite necessary to risk offending your customer, in which case do not hesitate.

Having thoroughly satisfied yourself, at the first, that the bank's money has been advanced to a desirable client, and that you hold good security for the loan, I think that, in the majority of cases, your chief care should be directed towards watching how the figures work in your books ; how far the favorable estimate you had formed of your client's character and business aptitude has been justified by his subsequent career, and the general trend of the values of the respective kinds of properties advanced upon.

You should not be a recluse, you should come into frequent personal contact with those to whom you have lent the bank's money ; you should cultivate the art of useful instructive conversational powers, so that you may be able to elicit, without seeming to do so, serviceable information.

To be a good interviewer, from the bank's point of view, will go a long way towards making you a good manager.

In the case of loans secured by mortgages over steamers and ships, it will be as well for you to remember that an apparent rapid progress of the debt towards extinction is not so reliable a sign as may be the case when other classes of security are held, for the lives of ships and steamers are comparatively short. Do not forget that such mortgages, though registered at the customs, become a second charge when the

boat is in dock undergoing repairs, also that the saving clauses in marine policies may some day prove a source of great surprise and disappointment to you.

But after all, it is not wise to dwell too closely and too long upon the perils and difficulties which beset us as a lender of the bank's money. To do so may engender a timidity preventing us from making any advances at all; and how then can our branch show a profit?

There is no such thing as absolute certainty in the conduct of human affairs.

We must accept "fair trade risks," although, if the critical faculty is well developed within us, latent objections may be detected in all.

Your value as a bank officer does not consist entirely in your ability to detect and make known difficulties; it embraces a capacity to accurately weigh, and appraise at their true worth all objectionable and favorable features. The ability to suggest how you think difficulties may be overcome or avoided.

The courage to say to your head officer, in no uncertain words, whether you think the advance should be made at all; and if so how with the greatest safety and profit to your institution.

The critical faculty is without doubt an extremely valuable one to you as a professional man anxious to prove worthy of your position; and you should use it freely in the bank's interests; but I venture to say that resourcefulness is even more prized at your head office, and it is certainly far rarer.

If you have been honest in reporting upon your advances—and of course you have been—the troubles at your branch are quite well known at your head office.

The question there is not as to their existence, but how they are to be got rid of. How we are to

"Control, subdue, transmute, bereave  
Of their bad influence and their good receive."

Let us but solve that problem repeatedly to the satisfaction of our superiors, then, like Wordsworth's Happy Warrior, we shall have "turned our necessity to glorious gain," and shall not have to sigh long for the promotion our ambition makes us desirous of; or for the increase in our salary which we feel would add so much to our comfort, and that of our families.

The losses our banks sustain, in spite of the fact that each loan has been submitted from our branch with painstaking care, and with every known factor making for or against its acceptance, are comparatively few, and are amply provided for at head office. It is the bad debts resulting from unsound trading, from weak management, from want of thoroughness and faithfulness, and from neglect, for which we shall be brought to book. Head offices are very judicial in their judgments; they differentiate in these cases with remarkable accuracy.

We are not gauged, as women are said to gauge men, by the standard of success or failure. Our environments are considered. The opportunities we have seized or neglected are weighed fairly, for or against us.

Reverting again to the subject of advances. Every reasonable and careful investigation and precaution having been taken in submitting and recommending a loan to the head office, and the advance having been sanctioned and made, no good can result, in the writer's opinion, from over-anxiety, funkiness, or fussiness; whilst much harm may arise, and a good debt sometimes made into a bad one, by a timid vacillating policy—one week leading our head office to consider a customer's financial position undoubted, and the next throwing discredit upon him or the security held for his advance.

Nor is it fair to our client to encourage him to extend his business and then, without good reason, hint that he should curtail it.

Having done our best, let us leave well alone, and go on our way rejoicing.

A BRANCH BANK MANAGER.

## FINANCIAL AFFAIRS IN RUSSIA.

Through the courtesy of the Minister of Finance the **BANKERS' MAGAZINE** has received the Report of the Minister of Finance to His Majesty the Emperor on the Budget of the Empire for 1901.

Following is the estimate of revenues and expenditures for 1901 :

<b>REVENUE.</b>		<i>Roubles.</i>
Ordinary.....		1,730,000,000
Extraordinary.....		1,500,000
<b>Total.....</b>		<b>1,731,500,000</b>
From free balance of Treasury.....		56,886,000
<b>Total.....</b>		<b>1,788,482,000</b>
<b>EXPENDITURE.</b>		
Ordinary.....		1,656,652,556
Extraordinary.....		131,829,450
<b>Total.....</b>		<b>1,788,482,000</b>

The details of the estimates of receipts and expenditures for 1901 are exhibited more in detail in the tables given below :

<b>ORDINARY REVENUE.</b>		<i>Roubles.</i>
Direct taxes.....		127,172,905
Indirect taxes.....		652,310,800
Duties.....		88,916,724
Royalties.....		227,999,900
Property and funds belonging to the State.....		465,395,362
Expropriation of State property.....		573,291
Payments in redemption of land.....		88,906,500
Reimbursement of Treasury expenses.....		72,917,197
Miscellaneous revenues.....		5,963,827
<b>Total ordinary revenue.....</b>		<b>1,730,000,000</b>
<b>EXTRAORDINARY RESOURCES.</b>		
Perpetual deposits in the State Bank.....		1,500,000
<b>Total.....</b>		<b>1,731,500,000</b>
From free balance of Treasury.....		56,886,000
<b>General total.....</b>		<b>1,788,482,000</b>
<b>ORDINARY EXPENDITURE.</b>		<i>Roubles.</i>
Public debt.....		274,909,743
Higher Administration of the Empire.....		8,155,401
Jurisdiction of the Holy Synod.....		23,783,909
Ministry of the Imperial Household.....		12,715,243
" of Foreign Affairs.....		5,289,074
" of War.....		324,024,871
" of Marine.....		93,597,666
" of Finance.....		306,833,626
" of Agriculture and State Domains.....		40,723,781
" of the Interior.....		87,650,199
" of Public Instruction.....		33,076,518
" of Ways of Communication.....		383,143,459
" of Justice.....		48,227,506
Department of Control.....		7,116,715
Administration of Studs.....		1,599,746
<b>Total.....</b>		<b>1,642,852,556</b>
Assignment in case of a rise in the price of provisions and forage.....		1,800,000
Unforeseen expenses, resulting from extraordinary necessities arising in the course of the year.....		12,000,000
<b>Total ordinary expenditure.....</b>		<b>1,656,652,556</b>
Surplus of ordinary revenue 73,448,450 roubles.		

## EXTRAORDINARY EXPENDITURE.

Construction of Siberian railway, without rolling stock.....	7,277,269
Auxiliary undertakings connected with the construction of the Siberian railway.....	3,078,181
Construction of other railways for general purposes.....	81,974,060
Loans to private railways, on the security of bonds guaranteed by Government.....	82,000,000
Indemnities to private persons and institutions for the repeal of the exclusive right of selling liquor in retail .....	7,500,000
Total extraordinary expenditure.....	181,829,450
General total.....	1,788,482,006

In Russia a considerable part of the revenue is derived from the railways, from the sale of spirits, and from various productive industries under Government control.

The Finance Minister calls attention to the fact that during the recent disturbances in China Russia was able, without having recourse to credit, and at a moment's notice, to put an army of 200,000 men on a war footing in the Far East, the greater part of this army having, moreover, to be transported enormous distances.

Discussing the financial policy of the Empire, the Finance Minister says:

"The very satisfactory fulfillment of the budget for 1900 and the favorable prospects of the budget for 1901 are due exclusively to the fact that for these years and for a series of preceding years the finances of the State, in spite of the rapid growth of the expenditure, have been conducted with all due caution in calculating the revenue and avoiding excess in expenditure. Undeviating adherence to this rule, however, called forth and continues to call forth objections against its very essence. Sometimes, in all sincerity, the idea is advanced that an accumulation of a reserve or surplus resources at the disposal of the State is not justifiable. According to this view the budget should be so compiled that the revenue should be adapted to the expenditure, and a considerable excess of revenue is an extra burden on the population; therefore, if there be any surplus, either it should be used for satisfying more fully the requirements of the State, or taxation should be lightened.

The Minister of Finance, however, does not hold this view of the question. In this matter it is necessary to settle definitely whether the current revenue of the State, under normal conditions, should cover only the ordinary expenditure, or likewise the extraordinary. This question cannot be answered off-hand. A State with a small national debt, or one with a large debt placed at home, can without injuring its financial position issue loans for extraordinary expenditure, especially if it be productive.

To a certain extent the following consideration is applicable (though often used too extensively); viz., that it is more just to lay the burden of productive expenditure on future generations, as those who will enjoy the fruits of such an outlay. But such a procedure would not be rational in Russia, burdened with a heavy national debt, no small part of which is in foreign hands, while a considerable part of the loans contracted in former days was not for productive expenditure, but to cover war expenses, leaving a legacy of heavy payments to the generations following. Any increase of this debt, without great necessity, would lead our State finances into dangerous paths. But even in those cases, when it appears right and proper to have recourse to State credit, there is a great difference between the position of a State with free resources at its disposal, and able to wait for offers of a loan on advantageous terms, and that of a State forced for want of means to agree to the terms dictated by the lenders.

In order to avoid being obliged to have recourse to State credit, especially in unfavorable circumstances, it is necessary to observe undeviatingly the rule laid down by Your Majesty's father, the late Emperor, and clearly expressed in the report of the late Minister of Finance, M. Vyshnegradsky, on the budget for 1899: 'One should not imagine that the financial problem is solved satisfactorily, until the ordinary budget shows such an excess of revenue, as, with the extraordinary receipts, exclusive of loans, can fully cover the annual extraordinary expenditure.' But in order to follow this maxim, it is necessary to possess a reserve, since extraordinary expenses, in their very essence, are frequently unexpected, while, however cautiously the revenue may have been calculated, the actual receipts may sometimes fall below the estimates.

Besides these arguments of a financial character, there are other more important considerations which oblige Russian finances to strive, not merely to attain an equilibrium between revenue and expenditure, but also to accumulate a certain free surplus. The area of the Russian Empire is so extensive, its territories are so various in their climatic and natural conditions, and the manners, customs and sources of subsistence of the population, that the Government must always be prepared for some misfortune in one part of the country or

another. The country as a whole may be flourishing, while separate districts may be suffering from bad harvests, epidemics and other calamities. Where are means of assistance to be found, if finances are conducted exactly, without putting by anything for a rainy day? The expenditure of up to 162,000,000 roubles in consequence of the bad harvests of 1891-1892, and of over 85,000,000 roubles in 1898 (not to speak of other numerous cases of the population requiring assistance from the State), shows us what extensive resources the State must have at its disposal in order to satisfy wants that cannot be foreseen.

But the problems of the State are not limited to home affairs. The political destiny of Russia as a world power places her life in close connection with that of other countries. Wherever any important events take place, whatever countries may be more directly interested in them, these events in most cases affect the condition of our country; sometimes such events are in direct dependence on the attitude adopted by Russia, in other cases they oblige us to take serious measures to preserve the position our country has taken in world politics.

The immediate effect of this influence of such events on the political position of Russia is, of course, the necessity of discovering means to cover the expenses entailed by these events. The most cursory calculation of the expenses of this kind only lately incurred will show that, at a time of profound peace, enjoyed by Russia owing to Your Imperial Majesty's well-known pacific policy, such expenditure has reached an exceedingly high figure. Moreover the expenses proceeding from political events are generally quite unexpected, and for the most part have to be covered without delay. Therefore, if a country has no free resources, it is obliged under such circumstances either to let its interests suffer, or have recourse to loans, whether the terms offered at the time are favorable to such operations or the reverse. But experience shows that a State, like a private person, frequently has offers of loans on advantageous terms, when it is not in want of money, and on the contrary, with all its credit, sometimes cannot find capital on easy terms, just at the very time when it is in real and pressing need of the money. Under such circumstances the absence of a reserve might be the cause of political loss to the country.

All this proves that Russian finance cannot adopt the system by which a State, in order to avoid overburdening the taxpayers, must not allow the revenue to exceed the expenditure to any considerable amount, and especially must not accumulate a reserve fund at its disposal. This system would disorganize the finances of Russia, obstruct State aid to the population in the event of any widespread calamity, and would be a step towards political weakness in our country. The considerations as to the burden on taxpayers are hardly correct; a certain excess of tax paid every year is practically like an insurance premium, paid to secure the population against the inevitable great increase of taxation in the event of any disturbance of the State finances, and to afford a source of timely assistance to the same population in case of any calamity.

Experience has fully proved the necessity for the same caution in financial affairs which, by Your Majesty's orders, has hitherto been observed. Thanks to the reserve fund, formed chiefly by the excess of ordinary receipts over ordinary expenditure, the construction of the Siberian railway has been nearly completed; the navy has been increased by new men-of-war, and the land forces re-armed; twice during the last decade have the people been assisted to tide over a time of bad harvest. The same reserve enabled us to organize our currency on a proper basis, by the payment of the non-interest-bearing debt of the Treasury to the State Bank for bank notes issued. Finally, during the current year, this reserve covered the considerable extraordinary expenditure entailed by the events in the Far East. Had there been no such resources, a loan would have been inevitable, and, in the present depressed state of the money market, the terms of such a loan would probably have been unfavorable enough.

The possibility of managing without a loan in a depressed state of the money market both at home and abroad, and of not requiring it for the budget for the coming year, must be considered as a great financial success.

#### PRESENT STATE OF THE CURRENCY.

The state of our currency in 1900 deserves special attention, as this year has been so unfavorable to our money market. The Minister of Finance therefore considers it his duty to present to Your Majesty, in this report, the data of the currency circulation at the end of 1900. The comparative figures of the metallic stock of the Treasury and State Bank, and also the amount of the principal denominations of money in circulation during the years 1899 and 1900 will be seen from the following table:

	Close of 1899.	Close of 1900.	Increase or decrease.
GOLD.	Roubles.	Roubles.	Roubles.
In State Bank and Treasury .....	827,000,000	807,800,000	*119,200,000
In circulation.....	639,400,000	684,500,000	45,100,000
Total.....	1,566,400,000	1,492,300,000	*74,100,000

	<i>Close of 1899.</i>	<i>Close of 1900.</i>	<i>Increase or decrease.</i>
<b>STANDARD SILVER.</b>	<b>Roubles.</b>	<b>Roubles.</b>	<b>Roubles.</b>
In State Bank and Treasury.....	56,800,000	58,400,000	2,100,000
In circulation.....	164,200,000	164,400,000	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>220,500,000</b>	<b>222,800,000</b>	<b>2,300,000</b>
<b>BANK NOTES.</b>			
In State Bank and Treasury.....	112,700,000	77,700,000	*85,000,000
In circulation.....	517,300,000	552,800,000	35,000,000
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>630,000,000</b>	<b>630,000,000</b>	<b>.....</b>

\* Decrease.

The above table shows that the amount of the principal denominations of money in circulation has increased during the current year by 80,300,000 roubles, and that, owing to the elasticity of a currency system founded on gold, the amount of money in circulation now adjusts itself to the requirements of industrial and commercial operations. Furthermore, the exchange of bank notes for gold is now firmly established. Although, in comparison with the preceding year, the proportion of the gold covering the bank notes in circulation is somewhat lower, in dependence on the increased amount of these notes and the diminution of the stock of gold, nevertheless, these bank notes are covered to the extent of 146.3 per cent. By law, the 552,800,000 roubles of bank notes in circulation must be covered by a stock of gold of not less than 276,200,000 roubles;\* at the present time the gold in the State Bank alone reaches the sum of 737,300,000 roubles, while together with the gold in the Treasury, it exceeds the amount of bank notes in circulation by 256,500,000 roubles. Taking into account that by our regulations the covering fund is larger than in other countries, there can be no doubt as to the stability of the exchange of notes for gold. This operation has been placed on a still firmer basis in the current year, by the final payment of the non-interest-bearing debt of the Treasury to the State Bank for bank notes issued, in consequence of Your Imperial Majesty's decree of April 28. By the payment to the State Bank of 50,000,000 roubles, the last vestige of the enormous debt of over 1,000,000,000 roubles for bank notes issued in former years without any metallic covering, the organization of the emission department has been finally placed on a correct basis. It is worthy of notice that the payment of a considerable part of this debt has been effected by means of the cash at the disposal of the Treasury, without any issue of loans for the purpose.

The figures of the table given above likewise witness to an unfavorable fact, which deserves serious attention; the general stock of gold in the country, which had been continually growing for a long series of years, and only in 1899 had diminished by 24,800,000 roubles, during 1900 has decreased by 74,100,000 roubles. Though in itself this circumstance has no decisive effect on the stability of our currency at present, yet a great outflow of gold may give rise to fears for the future. The Minister of Finance therefore considers it his duty to give an explanation of the causes of this diminution of our stock of gold.

First of all it is necessary to note the important fact that of late years capital has become very dear all over the world. So short a time ago as the end of the eighties and the early nineties, the amount of free capital often exceeded the demand for it, and as a consequence, the rate of discount and interest on loans was very low. In 1886 the bank discount rate in London was frequently two per cent., while the market rate fell to one and even three-quarters per cent.; in Paris, Berlin and Amsterdam the market rate more than once stood at two per cent. and one and one-half per cent. This cheapness of capital corresponded to the high prices of funds and other securities. The moderate interest on loans and the rise in the price of securities were noticeable in our money market likewise. For the last few years this relation between the supply and demand of capital gradually underwent a change, the demand growing, and finally exceeding the supply. There was a corresponding rise in the price of capital, and discount and loans became more difficult to negotiate. In the autumn of 1898 the scarcity of capital in Europe became very marked, and this affected the price of funds, the rate of discount and interest on loans. The stringency in the money market was not relaxed during the two years following; on the contrary, it became somewhat more marked, owing to certain new unfavorable circumstances. \* \* \*

The tightness of money in the European market had, of course, been coming on gradually, and like any other important economic phenomenon, is due to many complicated causes. The chief cause is the rapid growth of European industries, which have absorbed an enor-

\* If the issue of bank notes does not exceed 800,000,000 roubles, the gold covering fund must be not less than one-half the total amount of bank notes issued into circulation; any excess over 800,000,000 roubles is to be fully covered by gold, rouble for rouble (Imperial Ukaz of August 22, 1897).

mous amount of capital. Of late years, during which this stringency has been specially felt, the cause first mentioned has been complicated by another, no less serious factor, *viz.*, political events.

Since the China-Japan war the state of affairs in Europe has undergone a marked change: the principal powers have undertaken the solution of a whole series of great problems outside Europe itself, and this has not failed to demand increased expenditure on State requirements in distant countries. The war of China and Japan in itself affected the material interests of Europe; the whole war indemnity to Japan was paid with the help of European money markets, which for this purpose lent China over 450,000,000 roubles in 1895, 1896 and 1898; the events that followed this war had likewise an unfavorable influence on the European money market. Not to mention the disturbances in Armenia and Crete, and the Greek and Spanish-American wars, which increased the embarrassment of the European money market, the military operations begun last year in South Africa have been a heavy drag on financial operations. The effect of this war on the money market is two-fold: England's large war expenses have caused an increased drain of resources from Europe, while the stoppage of gold mining in South Africa has decreased the general output of gold in the whole world by thirty per cent. Finally, the present state of affairs in China has drawn heavily on the resources of Europe.

Together with the development of new political tasks which European governments have undertaken in southern and eastern lands, there has been a development of the enterprise of European capitalists in the same countries, which has shown itself in the foundation and organization of numerous commercial, industrial and railway companies, and has likewise caused a considerable outflow of European capital. Of course it cannot be said that the resources which have been expended in distant lands for State and industrial purposes are lost to the European money market; they will return to Europe in the shape of interest on loans, profit on undertakings, and it is possible that outlay effected may be returned with interest—that remains to be seen. In any case, the enormous amount of capital that has been drawn from Europe in a comparatively short time will return piecemeal, and moreover, this return will extend over a very long period. It is likewise evident, that not all the money required for these undertakings has been spent in distant countries: no small part of it has remained in Europe and has been spent on fitting out and transporting troops, organizing undertakings and means of communication in the East (*e. g.*, payments for the manufacture of machinery, engines, rails and railway cars), etc. This last circumstance has not, however, ameliorated the condition of the European money market; it has given a fresh impulse to the development of European industries, already very great owing to home conditions of production, and this has, in its turn, demanded fresh resources.

To the above-mentioned principal cause of the great drain of European capital must be added another cause, of a special character, which acts very strongly in the same direction, however. Of late years the position of the United States of America in the world money market has undergone a serious change. Notwithstanding the expenses entailed by the Spanish war, American capital has taken a far smaller share than European in undertakings outside the country. A series of good harvests conduced greatly in raising the economic condition of the country. Side by side with the growth of capital and the development of industry involved thereby, the export trade of the United States made great progress, which ensured a favorable balance of trade and balance of payments. Since 1897 the flow of gold into the United States has constantly been in excess of the outflow; the abundance of money in the American market has led to large investments in European loans. Although part of the debt, due to America from Europe for exchange of goods and for money invested in loans, is covered by the interest and dividends on American securities placed in Europe, and their re-importation, still, even taking this into account, there is a considerable balance in favor of America, which Europe pays in gold. Thus the trans-Atlantic republic attracts a considerable amount of resources of the Old World.

All this shows how the growth of industry and the events of late years have demanded large outlay of capital in Europe itself, while at the same time systematically causing a drain of money from Europe. In accordance with this, the resources of the European money markets have diminished. Formerly in Europe capital had to seek for lucrative investments; now people try their hardest to find free capital and to concentrate it in their own hands. It is quite natural that the Russian money market should feel the influence of the general cause of the scarcity of money in Western Europe.

Only a short while ago foreign capital, attracted by the high rate of interest on money lent, was freely invested in this country, not merely in long investments, but also in temporary ones; now this influx has decreased considerably, as the smaller difference between the rates of interest here and in Western Europe has made it less advantageous to transfer capital from western markets to Russian. For the same reason a certain part of the capital temporarily invested in this country has flowed back. Furthermore, the great expenditure



outside the Empire has been of no small importance to our money market. The outlay on the construction of the West China railway, the increased expenditure on shipbuilding and keeping a fleet in the Pacific, the expenses of the administration and defence of the Quang-tung peninsula, the Persian loan, and of late the expenses of the military operations in China—all this demanded enormous resources. The outlay abroad for the organization of our industries, which have progressed so remarkably, was likewise very great. Moreover, the poor harvests of the last few years had a very bad effect, as they caused a falling off in our exports, and a consequent deterioration in our balance of trade. Such are the causes which affected, and still influence, the Russian money market; it is also owing to them, in the opinion of the Minister of Finance, that there has been a flow of gold out of the country, comparatively greater in this year than in the preceding year. The question naturally arises, whether this unfavorable state of affairs threatens our national economy and State finances.

Considering himself bound to express an opinion on this question, the Minister of Finance must first of all remark that in the present embarrassed state of the money market, as well as in other grave circumstances retarding the proper development of the national economy of the State, it is of great importance to keep to a firm and wise financial policy. If in a normal state of economic affairs a want of caution in taking measures may unsettle a favorable position, especial prudence is needed at a time like the present. If this be observed, then the present state of affairs need not inspire any fears. Of course it is difficult to say how long this strained condition of European financial affairs will continue; it may be hoped, however, that unless some serious complications arise in international relations, at present unforeseen, and which there is no reason to expect, the money markets of Europe will gradually regain their balance, as new savings accumulate and part of the outlay is reimbursed.

With regard to our own money market, there is reason to hope that its embarrassment will be relieved. The settlement of political complications in the Far East will curtail many expenses that have caused a drain on the resources, such as, for instance, the expense of keeping a fleet and an army on a war footing. The time is not far off when the construction of the West China railway will be completed, in spite of unusual obstructions, and will require no more great sacrifices from us. Again, it is difficult to suppose that the crops will always fluctuate near a very low average. The improvement of our balance of trade may likewise be expected at no distant date; there are already some signs of it. As compared with the preceding year, during the first eleven months of which the exports over the European frontier exceeded the imports only by 9,000,000 roubles, the year 1900 gives the following results: for the same period, the excess of Russian exports over imports was 126,600,000 roubles.

Thus the embarrassments of our money market, in so far as they proceed from political and economic causes, both local and general, must be considered as having a temporary character: with the removal of the extraordinary causes of the drain of money to the East and with the improvement of the economic position at home, the pecuniary equilibrium will be restored.

There is likewise nothing specially alarming in the decrease of our stock of gold. In the autumn of 1892, when Your Majesty's late father was pleased to entrust me with the finances of the Empire, the stock of gold of the Treasury and the State Bank amounted to 906,500,000 roubles, while the amount of bank notes in circulation was 1,100,000,000 roubles; then the stock of gold gradually increased until the year 1898, at the beginning of which it reached the colossal sum of 1,323,300,000 roubles, the amount of gold in circulation being already 149,300,000 roubles, and of bank notes—901,200,000 roubles. At present the stock of gold amounts to 807,800,000, the gold in circulation has increased to 684,500,000 roubles, and the amount of bank notes has decreased to 552,300,000 roubles. Thus, for the period from the second half of 1892 to the year 1898, the stock of gold was increased by 422,800,000 roubles, and 149,300,000 roubles of gold was issued into circulation, accompanied by a decrease of 198,800,000 roubles in the notes in circulation: since 1898 the stock of gold has diminished by 520,500,000 roubles, but for that the amount of gold in circulation has increased by a larger sum, *i. e.* 535,200,000 roubles, and the notes in circulation have decreased by 348,900,000 roubles. If since 1892, with an alternation of economically favorable and unfavorable years, such an amount of gold could be accumulated and partly issued into circulation, almost one-half of the bank notes in circulation being at the same time withdrawn, then there is every reason to believe, that with the disappearance of exceptional circumstances there will be a possibility of replacing the inconsiderable diminution in the stock of gold in the country, and again bringing it to its former amount. Should there be any delay in the improvement of the international money market, and a loss of a considerable amount be imminent, even in such a case the present stock of gold would be more than sufficient to enable us to bide our time until it would gradually increase again.

Regarding the future with full confidence and calmness, the Minister of Finance feels bound to observe that it is his sincere opinion the present embarrassments would have been

felt far more, had we not taken advantage of the favorable opportunity to accomplish the currency reform within a short time. Under circumstances like the present, it would have been hardly possible to venture on any measures for reforming the currency. The crisis in the European money market would have led inevitably to the fall in the course of the paper rouble and to other undesirable circumstances, experienced by Russia in former times, and could not have failed to react very unfavorably, not only on our money market and commercial operations, but likewise on our State finances. If such is not the case at the present day, it is owing solely to a proper monetary system, founded on a stable monetary unit."

**A Growing Financial Corporation.**—The National Life and Trust Company, of Des Moines, Iowa, may be justly congratulated on the growth of its business in the past year. This increase is shown in detail in the table which follows:

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF GROWTH.

	1899.	1900.	INCREASE.	
			Amount.	Per cent.
Income .....	\$107,948.14	\$345,770.16	\$238,522.02	222
Gross assets .....	82,830.72	204,475.71	211,644.99	255
Liabilities .....	36,909.47	169,852.75	133,544.28	368
Surplus .....	44,521.25	124,621.96	78,100.71	188
Capital stock paid up .....	25,000.00	50,000.00	25,000.00	100
Net surplus per company's books .....	21,521.25	74,621.96	53,100.71	200

GAIN IN INSURANCE IN FORCE AT THE END OF THE YEAR.

	1899.	1900.	INCREASE.	
			Amount.	Per cent.
No. of endowment bonds and policies .....	1,272	4,700	3,428	269
Amount of insurance .....	\$740,800.00	\$2,831,200.00	\$2,090,400.00	296

There are some of these items to which special attention may be properly directed: The income shows a gain of \$238,522, or 222 per cent., and the gross assets have risen in the period from \$82,830 to \$204,475, or a gain of 255 per cent. With these increased responsibilities prudence required enlarged provision for meeting them, and consequently the capital has been increased 100 per cent. and the net surplus 200 per cent. This indicates the substantial nature of the management.

The amount of insurance in force in 1899 was \$740,800, and at the close of 1900 it was \$2,831,200—a gain of over \$2,000,000, or close to 300 per cent. As the company was but twenty months old on January 1, 1901, it certainly has reason to be gratified with the progress made in this comparatively short time. Evidently there was a good field for the business in which the company is engaged, and besides the management is such as to merit confidence. Some of the best-known citizens of Iowa are members of the board of directors, Hon. Leslie M. Shaw, Governor of the State, heading the list. Many bankers are included in the management.

The officers and directors are: President, G. L. Dobson; Vice-President, D. G. Edmundson; Second Vice-President, A. S. Stults; Treasurer, George E. Pearsall; Secretary, P. M. Starnes; Counsel, N. E. Coffin; Assistant Secretary, F. A. Durham; Medical Director, Lewis Schooler, M. D.; Actuary, G. A. Vandersluis.

Directors: Leslie M. Shaw, Governor of Iowa; George L. Dobson, Secretary of State; George E. Pearsall, Cashier Citizens' National Bank; D. G. Edmundson, President Security Loan and Trust Co., Des Moines, Iowa; N. E. Coffin, of Dudley & Coffin, attorneys; P. M. Starnes, Secretary, Des Moines, Iowa; Dr. S. J. Patterson, Cashier Dunlap Bank, Dunlap, Iowa; Lewis Haas, Cashier Woodbine Savings Bank, Woodbine, Iowa; J. H. Owen, Cedar Rapids, Iowa; A. S. Stults, Des Moines, Iowa; E. E. Pinney, wholesale coal, Cedar Rapids, Iowa.

This company is a regular legal reserve old line life insurance company, and in addition to selling all the popular forms of regular life insurance it makes a specialty of some attractive endowment and short-term annuity contracts. Besides the guarantee afforded by the conservative and well-known business men who constitute the management, policy holders are protected by the deposit of securities with the Auditor of the State of Iowa.

## \* EUROPEAN BANKING SYSTEMS.

### *AN OUTLINE OF THE BANKING SYSTEMS OF ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, GERMANY AND FRANCE, AND A DISCUSSION OF THEIR RELATIVE MERITS.*

#### ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND.

Banking is carried on in England by

- I. The Bank of England.
- II. The joint stock banks.
- III. The private banks.

Let us consider first the Bank of England. It is the same as any joint stock bank, issuing Bank of England notes, except that it has the Government account. Its capital is £14,553,000.

Its affairs are directed by a board consisting of a governor and deputy governor, who remain in office for two years, and twenty-four directors. By the act of 1844 the bank was divided into two distinct and separate departments, viz., the issuing department and the banking department.

By the same act the banking department was to hand over to the issuing department securities to the extent of £14,000,000, the debt due by the public to be deemed a part, and all gold coin and silver bullion not required, upon receipt of which the issue department was to give the banking department such an amount of notes as with those in circulation should equal the securities (coin and bullion) transferred to the issue department; this statute has since been maintained, keeping the note of the Bank of England at a par with gold.

By the same act any banker issuing notes in 1844 should cease to do so, and the banking department could increase its securities by two-thirds of the amount withdrawn, so that now the amount of notes issued on security has been raised from £14,000,000 to £16,200,000; the profit on this additional sum accrues to the public.

The denominations of the Bank of England notes are: †1, 5, 10, 20, 30, 50, 100, 200, 300, 500 and 1,000 pounds.

The Bank of England is also required by the act of 1844 to give notes for gold at the rate of £3 19s. 7d. per oz., to issue a weekly statement as to the liabilities: Proprietors' capital and rest, liabilities to the Government as shown by the public deposits; other deposits, which are the sum of current or drawing accounts, and liabilities of the holders of the bank's acceptances, as shown by the amount of "seven day" and other bills.

As to assets: Government securities, which show the amount of banking capital invested in Government securities; other securities, which show the amount of investments made by the Bank; and separately the cash assets, notes, and gold and silver coin, which show the amount of cash on hand for the current purposes of the banking department.

The proportion which the cash assets bear to the current liabilities (public and other deposits and bills discounted) is called "the proportion of the reserve to the liabilities," and is always a matter of great interest to the public; it is generally considered that this proportion should be about one-third.

\* Paper awarded first prize by the Canadian Bankers' Association.

† The Bank of England does not issue notes of a denomination less than £5.—Editor BANKERS' MAGAZINE.

The Bank of England does the Government business; to quote Adam Smith, "She acts not only as an ordinary bank, but as a great engine of the State. She receives and pays the greater part of the annuities which are due to the creditors of the public, she circulates Exchequer bills, and she advances to the Government the annual amount of the land and the malt taxes, which frequently are not paid till some years thereafter."

It opens current accounts, "drawing accounts" as they are called, for the receipt and payment of cash for persons who choose to keep money at a bank and draw checks against it.

It affords its customers every convenience, buys and sells or takes care of securities, receives dividends of all kinds, makes payments anywhere required, takes charge of its customers' bills of exchange, the exchange of Exchequer bills, and receives plate chests, deeds and security boxes free of charge.

Although the accounts cannot be overdrawn, the Bank will discount bills for its customers if considered safe, and will make advances upon such securities as it is in the habit of receiving; no charge is made for the keeping of these accounts, as the Bank looks to the average balance of its customers to compensate it for the expense incurred therein.

The Bank grants bills due at seven days' or sixty days' date for any amount, in various parts of England and on foreign countries, the only charge being the interest on the money.

All money collected through the country by revenue officers for customs, excise dues and taxes are paid into it; payments on account of the public service are made by orders issued on it.

The Bank of England has eleven branches, two in London and nine in the country, each of which is under the charge of an agent and sub-agent, and are subordinate to the parent establishment. They carry on the ordinary business of banking, such as receiving deposits payable on demand, transmitting money, receiving money for customers at all places, taking charge of securities, and discounting notes bearing two approved names.

Notes issued at a branch are redeemable only at that branch or in London, and the notes issued at the head office are redeemable only at that office. Besides the note issue of the branches they grant seven day bills or bills of longer date. The accounts are balanced every night exactly as in London, the balance and particulars of each day's transactions being sent to the head office duly by mail. A sum of money may be remitted between the branches. The branches remit the revenue, which is paid over by the collectors at various places, to London, where it is placed at the credit of the Exchequer account.

Joint stock banks were first incorporated under the Joint Stock Act of 1826, renewed 1833, the chief provisions being: The number of partners was unlimited; the partners were to be liable for all the debts of the company to which they belonged, contracted during their partnership. They could carry on all kinds of banking business by issuing bills and notes payable on demand, but were not allowed to come within sixty-five miles of London. Such companies might issue unstamped notes upon giving securities to the crown, to make true returns of the amount of their issues, and pay the amount of the stamps due on them. They had to keep weekly account of the amount of notes in circulation, and make a return to the commissioner of stamps of the average amount in circulation every quarter.

By the act of 1844 all existing banks of issue were to certify to the commissioners of stamps and taxes the place and name, and the firm, at and under which they issued notes during the twelve weeks preceding April 27, 1844. The commissioners were then to ascertain the average amount of each bank's issue, and it should be lawful for any such bank to continue its issue to that amount, provided that on

an average of four weeks they were not to exceed the average so ascertained. Should any banker do so he would have to forfeit the excess. By the same act if two or more banks unite, and the number of partners of the united bank exceed six, they should forfeit their right to issue. Any banking company consisting of seven or more persons legally carrying on the business of banking before the passing of the act may register under the act.

Then, banks were of unlimited liability, but on account of the terrible results of the failures of joint stock banks in 1857 the Legislature in 1858 passed an act to extend the privilege of limited liability to banks, providing that: All banks which issued promissory notes were subject to unlimited liability as regards their note issue, for which they are liable in addition to the sum for which they are liable to the general creditors; also that every existing banking company upon giving thirty days' notice to each and every one of its customers may register itself under this act; and that all companies formed or registering themselves under this act must issue a statement of liabilities and assets on the first day of February and first day of August in each year.

In very few cases did the banks adopt the principle of limited liability, till after the catastrophe of the City of Glasgow Bank in 1878, which caused such consternation among the shareholders of banks that they used all their influence with the directors to make them adopt the limited liability system, and it was to aid this movement that the act, statute 1879, was passed, which enacts that any unlimited company may increase the nominal amount of its shares; also that a limited company may declare that any portion of its uncalled capital shall not be capable of being called, and that all banks are subject to unlimited liability with regard to their notes in circulation. The privilege of note issue was confined to banks which were lawfully issuing their own notes on May 6, 1844.

The banking business done by the joint stock banks is very similar to that done by the Bank of England, with the exceptions they do not keep such large reserves and they allow interest on deposits.

Private banks are run on the same business principles as joint stock banks, the main difference being that a private bank may not have more than ten partners, while a joint stock bank may have any number; if a partner in a private bank should die his capital is withdrawn, whereas in the case of a joint stock bank his shares would be transferred, so that the capital of the bank would not alter; all the partners of a private bank attend to its administration, while a joint stock bank is governed by a board of directors. Private banks are not increasing; in 1870 forty were admitted to the clearing-house; at present the number is but thirteen. Unlike the joint stock banks they do not publish balance sheets, so the public know nothing of their business. The progress of the joint stock banks effectually prevents the formation of any new private banks.

The London Clearing-House, founded between 1850 and 1870, is the place where the representatives of the different banks meet daily for the mutual exchange of checks drawn upon and bills payable at their respective houses.

The clearing-house, as well as each banker, has an account with the Bank of England, and the balances due at the close of each day's business are settled by transfers from one account to another. A very great economy in the use of currency has resulted from these arrangements.

#### THE SCOTCH SYSTEM OF BANKING.

The growth of banking in Scotland has been very gradual. It is a system of joint stock banks with many branches. The first was founded in 1695, the second in 1727, and no new ones (with the exception of a few country ones) were formed till 1810. They expanded as the country increased in wealth, they grew as it grew,

increasing their branches as the country needed accommodation. The following is a list of the Scotch banks, with the number of their branches, the amount of their paid-up capital and the year they were founded :

BANK.	<i>Paid-up capital.</i>	<i>Number of branches.</i>	<i>Founded.</i>
Bank of Scotland.....	£1,250,000	106	1695
Royal.....	2,000,000	125	1737
British Linen.....	1,000,000	108	1746
Commercial.....	1,000,000	108	1810
National.....	1,000,000	94	1825
Union.....	1,000,000	123	1830
Town and County.....	252,000	51	1825
North of Scotland.....	400,000	64	1836
Clydesdale.....	1,000,000	99	1838
Caledonian.....	150,000	23	1838

The first three are founded by charter. The Bank of Scotland is the first instance in the world of a joint stock bank formed by private persons, for the express purpose of making a trade of banking, dependent on their own private capital and wholly unconnected with the State. By the act of Scotch Parliament, 1695, it was allowed to lend on real or personal security at not more than six per cent. ; and in case of non-payment to sell the security publicly, and to be able to transfer its stock freely. It was to be free from all taxes for twenty-one years.

Scotch banking was not interfered with till the Joint Stock Bank Act of 1845 came in force, by which act : The Commissioners of Stamps and Taxes were to ascertain the average number of bankers' notes in circulation during the year preceding May 1, 1845. Such bankers who were lawfully issuing their notes then were authorized to have in circulation an amount of notes whose average for four weeks was not to exceed the amount thus ascertained by the commissioners, together with an amount equal to the average amount of coin held by the banker during the same four weeks. Of the coin, three-fourths must be gold and one fourth silver. Should a bank exceed the legal amount it must forfeit the excess. If two or more banks united, they were authorized to have an issue of paper equal to the total amount of the issues of the separate banks, in addition to the amount of coin held by the united bank, and that the Bank of England notes were not to be legal tender.

There are some striking points of difference between the English and Scotch banks, for, while the former have a limited issue, the latter may issue to any extent, provided that, for the amount exceeding their authorized capital, they must hold an equal amount of coin. And if two or more banks were to unite they could have an issue equal to the total issues of the separate banks, but in England if the number of partners exceeds six they are not allowed to issue.

No bank notes in Scotland are legal tender.

The Scotch banks have branches in London, but are not allowed to issue their own notes there.

London is the pivot of the Scotch system, there they keep large reserves. Scotch merchants as a general rule accept all, or nearly all, their bills payable there as remittances to them from abroad come in the shape of bills drawn on London. Thus it has become a necessity for them to keep a London account. All Scotch exchanges are settled in London.

All Scotch banks are limited companies. The three chartered banks were always limited, and the others by the act of 1879 registered themselves as such.

In regard to the note issues. The Scotch banks may issue £1 notes and upwards. The circulation of these £1 notes is very large on account of the herring fishery, which employs several thousand men, whose earnings are usually below £5. The business of the Highlands is carried on by £1 notes. The products of the country,

which are cattle and sheep, grain, wool, kelp, etc., necessitate numerous transactions, in which the £1 notes are used almost altogether.

The expense of keeping current accounts is not very heavy in Scotland, on account of the customers using very few checks. If they have many bills to meet during the day they (instead of drawing a check for each amount) draw a check for the total amount and pay their bills with cash.

Besides the ordinary run of banking business the banks allow what are called "cash credits." "A cash credit is an undertaking on the part of the bank to advance to an individual such sums of money as he may from time to time require, not exceeding in the whole a certain definite amount, the individual to whom the credit is given entering into a bond with securities, generally two in number, for the repayment on demand of the sums actually advanced, with interest upon each issue from the day upon which it is made." Cash credits are somewhat similar to accommodation paper, and range from £100 to £1,000. They furnish great facility to tradesmen and others in carrying on their business. They supply capital for various branches of trade, public works, etc.

The system of modern clearing-house was begun in Edinburgh about 1752. The Edinburgh exchange is divided into two departments, the exchange for notes and the clearing-house for vouchers. "The settlements of the note exchanges are made by debiting or crediting the clearing-house department daily for balances arising. These sums are carried forward in the clearing-house department and continued until a settling day wipes all out." The final settlements are made on Monday and Thursday. "The amounts in the note exchange proper at Edinburgh are small when compared with those in the adjoining clearing-house, but it must be borne in remembrance that the volume of transactions in the latter is enormously swelled by the exchange vouchers, sent to their head office by nine hundred branches throughout the country in settlement of their provincial note exchanges."

The payments are made by the debiting bank sending instructions to its branch in London, to pay the branch of the creditor bank, four days after date, the sum required for the exchange, interest being allowed upon the exchange at the rate of two per cent. for each day.

The Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank carry through the settlements upon alternate months.

#### THE GERMAN BANKING SYSTEM.

The Bank of Prussia, founded 1765, was the first bank of issue in Germany. It was closed by liquidation in 1846, and by the Bank Act of 1847 was reorganized with the admission of private shareholders. Discount and war banks were organized in 1817 and 1819. In 1834 the Bavarian Wechsel and Hypothekenbank started as a bank of issue. It was followed by the Leipsig Bank, the Bank of Frankfort and numerous others, both private and banks of issue. "The banks were mostly founded by stock-jobbers and speculators who gave themselves little trouble in the responsible task of manning, at so short notice, so great a number of new enterprises with experienced, intelligent and honest directors."

The whole system was remodelled by the German Bank Act of 1875, when the Prussian Bank was reconstructed and carried on under the name of the imperial Bank, some of the clauses of which are as follows:

1. The authority to issue bank notes could be obtained only under imperial law.
2. There was to be no obligation to accept bank notes.
3. Bank notes were to be issued in denominations of 100, 200, 500 and 1,000 marks.
4. Every bank is required to redeem its notes upon presentation, at their full value, damaged notes are to be made good, that is if a person presents a greater portion than a half note.

5. Soiled or damaged notes may not be reissued.

6. Required the approval or direction of the Federal Council to allow a bank to call in or withdraw its notes from circulation.

7. Banks of issue are not allowed to accept bills, buy or sell merchandise or current commercial paper on credit, nor to take security for the discharge of such business.

8. Requires banks of issue to publish a statement of their assets and liabilities on the 7th, 15th, 23d and last day of each month, and to publish an exact balance of their assets and liabilities, together with statements of their profits and losses within three months at the latest before the end of their business year.

9. Should a bank's circulation exceed its coin reserve and the amount of notes prescribed in proportion to its capital, it must pay to the Imperial Exchequer a tax on the excess at the rate of five per cent. per annum.

12. The headquarters of the Imperial Bank are in Berlin ; it may have branches in any part of the Empire.

The following clauses relate to the Imperial Bank.

13. Authorizes the Imperial Bank to carry on the following business :

(a) To buy or sell gold and silver in coin or bullion.

(b) To discount, buy or sell bills of exchange (of not longer than three months maturity, requiring not less than two accredited vouchers) and bonds of the Empire, State or Municipal Corporations, of not longer than three months maturity.

(c) To grant interest-bearing loans upon movable security, such as gold and silver or interest-bearing and mortgage bonds, capital stock and shares of German railway companies, etc.

(d) Refers to buying and selling of bonds.

(e) To negotiate collections for customers upon security, to furnish payments and make orders or drafts on branch banks.

(f) Upon security to buy for outside parties precious metals and effects of all kinds, and after delivery to sell them.

(g) To receive money on deposit, with or without interest. Deposits at interest must not exceed the capital and reserve fund.

(h) To receive for custody objects of value.

14. Its notes are to be exchanged for gold at the rate of 1892 marks per pound.

15. It is required to publish its rates of discount and of interest on loans.

16. It is allowed to issue bank notes in proportion to its business needs.

17. It must keep a bullion reserve of at least one-third of its notes in circulation.

18. Requiring the bank to redeem its notes at all times in current German money.

21. The Bank and its branches are exempt from State, revenue and trade taxes.

22. Capital stock of the Bank is 120,000,000 marks ; shareholders are not personally liable for its obligations.

24. The profits are distributed as follows :

A dividend of four and one half per cent. goes to the shareholders.

Twenty per cent. of the surplus, if any, goes to the reserve, till the reserve is one-fourth of the capital ; the remaining surplus is divided equally between the shareholders (whose total dividend shall not exceed eight per cent.) and the Imperial Exchequer ; anything further is divided in proportion of one-fourth to the shareholders and three-fourths to the Imperial Exchequer. The four and one-half per cent., if need be, may be made up from the reserve.

The next two clauses refer to the management of the Bank.

25. A board of inspectors comprising the Chancellor of the Empire, President and four other members (one of the four being appointed by the Emperor and the other three by the Federal Council) watch over the affairs of the Reichsbank.



26. The Chancellor of the Empire, or his representative as appointed by the Emperor, directs the administration of the Bank, and next to him are the imperial board of directors, who are appointed by the Kaiser for life.

"The Imperial Bank has two hundred and ninety-three branch banks in Germany; they are of four classes, namely:

1. Branches in localities where bills of exchange are bought and sold, and where circulation is active.

2. Branches dealing only in loan business and negotiating bills in banking centres.

3. Branches with an exclusive business of loaning on collateral security.

4. Branches which receive in payment the notes of provincial and issuing banks of contingent circulation still extant."

As may be seen by sections 25 and 26 of the act, the Imperial Bank is essentially a State bank, even more so than the Bank of France.

Sec. 18 of the act covers the business of the Bank as carried on by it. It discounts foreign and domestic bills, collects (charging a commission) money orders and checks on domestic banking houses, and any paper payable in marks on a banking locality.

It grants short-dated loans (usually for not less than 500 marks) at a published rate of interest, requiring security in the form of merchandise, and certain specified commercial paper. Opens bank accounts for customers, giving an account book in which all transactions are entered. Cash deposits, collections, checks, bills of exchange, bills purchased and loans furnished and entered in the bank account. No charge is made for the keeping of these accounts, but moneys thus handled yield no interest.

Commercial paper is bought and sold. Valuable securities and documents of every description are taken care of, as well as sealed deposits; fee is charged for the responsibility.

The discount rate for bills varies from three to five per cent., and the rate for loans one per cent. higher.

The clearing-house business of the Imperial Bank is very large. The first establishment was opened in Berlin in 1883, and it was followed by nine others. In 1895 they turned over nineteen billion marks.

On account of the limitations and penalties prescribed by the act 1875, in relation to issuing notes, only eight banks, including the Imperial Bank, issue notes in Germany to-day.

The business of the non-issuing banks, beside current account transactions, consists in discounting bills, buying and selling securities, granting advances to customers, negotiating loans for Governments, as well as private undertakings, interest being allowed on nearly all deposits.

Besides the banks, there are joint stock mortgage banks. "They differ from mortgage associations in the matter of joint responsibility, which is replaced by the feature of joint stock, and yet they draw the greater part of their trading capital from letters of mortgage which they are enabled to put into wider circulation by reason of their handsome capital and constant lending at the stock exchange and in the money market. They do a large business in the way of discounting bills and handling safe commercial paper." They grant loans only as a first mortgage.

Then there is the Prussian Maritime Association; it does the ordinary business of a bank. Its business is done chiefly among the poorer classes, negotiates various kinds of loans on paper securities and other dead pledges, receives money on deposit with or without interest, and it manages industrial enterprises such as flour mills, etc., and numerous co-operative societies, one of which, the Industrial Bank of Frankfort-on-the-Main, Limited, had a membership of 1,811 in 1892, each member

liable to the amount of his shares at a thousand marks each. All these institutions help to carry on the vast business of the Empire.

#### THE FRENCH SYSTEM OF BANKING.

The Bank of France is by far the most important institution. It was founded in 1800. It absorbed the *Caisse d'Escompte*, which issued notes payable to bearer and made loans. Before this, banking was carried on by individuals, mostly foreigners.

The capital of the Bank of France is 182,500,000 francs. It is almost under complete control of the State. The administration of the affairs of the Bank is done by fifteen regents and three censors elected by the shareholders. They are presided over by a governor, who with two sub-governors are elected by the Chief of the State. The regents and censors exercise supervision over the detailed transactions of the Bank.

In order to pass upon the merits of paper presented for discount there is a Discount Council of twelve members selected from among the merchants of Paris.

In compliance with the act of 1857 the Bank has at least one branch in every department of France.

The business of the Bank consists mainly in discounting bills (requiring three signatures on each) of not longer than three months maturity, issuing notes, receiving deposits, taking charge of valuables for safe custody, issuing bank post bills, and making advances on bullion and on railway, Government and municipal stocks. The Bank collects dividend and interest coupons on the instruments on deposit, incomes on foreign bonds, makes payments on assessed stocks and exchanges stock certificates, etc.

The Bank keeps an account with the Treasury, the Treasury has a permanent loan of 140,000,000 francs at its disposal. Security is given the Bank in the shape of vouchers; beside this loan the Bank carries on an open account with the Treasury. The Treasury pays in and draws out money just like an ordinary account. The Bank receives State funds at its branches and transfers them to such places as the Minister of Finance may desire. All transactions are performed gratuitously.

The Bank is liable to all taxes the same as imposed on other banking houses.

The Bank has the monopoly of the note issue. It issues notes only as equivalents for commercial paper or loans on securities, or on gold or silver.

The coin in the Bank consists of both gold and silver, receiving them on exactly the same footing. Four five-franc pieces may be exchanged at any time for a twenty-franc gold piece; so it is called the double standard. It is of great benefit to the Bank, because if a demand for gold be manifested abroad, the Bank does not have to raise its discount rate like the Bank of England, for it has the option of redeeming its notes in silver, and it may exact a premium for the delivery of gold.

A maximum amount of four thousand millions is fixed by the Government to the note circulation of the Bank, but provided these limits are not exceeded the Bank is not bound by law to keep any proportion of bullion whatsoever. As a rule the bullion held is a very large amount, thus in 1894 the average circulation was 3,476,500,000 francs, and the average coin on hand was 3,083,700,000 francs.

Though the Bank of France is the most important, there are several other institutions which have attracted large deposits, and are always ready to discount paper as credit institutions. They offer a formidable resistance to the Bank.

The first joint stock bank was the *Comptoir d'Escompte*. It was founded in 1848, because the rule of the State banks required three signatures on all bills for discount, partly excluding purely trade bills, so on its commencement it acted as an intermediary between the traders and the banks, but gradually expanded into a regular bank.

The following is a list of the principal joint stock banks, with the capital and the number of their branches :

	<i>Capital in frances.</i>	<i>No. of branches.</i>
Comptoir d'Escompte.....	80,000,000	14
Credit Foncier.....	155,000,000	1
Credit Industriel, etc.....	80,000,000	8
Credit Lyonnais.....	200,000,000	108
Societe Generale.....	120,000,000	177
Societe Marseillaise.....	80,000,000	2
Banque d'Escompte de Paris.....	100,000,000	1

These are the principal factors in French banking. The French law of 1867, which governs the establishment of companies with limited liability, among other things states :

"No company can be registered until the whole of its capital has been subscribed, and one quarter paid up, and that the directors are liable to the shareholders."

Among the banks mentioned the Credit Foncier was intended to make advances on real estate, but when its monopoly ran out it was not renewed ; that class of business is now done by other establishments. Besides its capital of 155,000,000 it has power to raise money by obligations, but the law limits its right to receive deposits to eighty million francs.

The Chambre de Compensature des Banquiers de Paris (Clearing-House of the Paris Banks) was founded in 1872 on the same principles as the clearing-house of London.

Practically clearings are done through the Bank of France. The French people use so few checks that the clearings do not amount to much.

#### RELATIVE MERITS OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS.

So much for the different systems. Now let us discuss their relative merits. Starting with the English banking system we find that the Bank of England keeps the final reserves of the country. All London banks keep their reserves on deposit at the Bank of England, thus being relieved of the responsibility.

"The same reason which makes it desirable for a private person to keep a banker, makes it also desirable for every banker as respects his reserve to bank with another bank if he safely can." The London bill brokers lend most of their money and deposit the rest with the Bank of England or some London banker. Not only do the London banks keep their reserve there but so do the country banks. They only keep enough cash on hand to transact their daily business, because the less cash they keep lying idle the greater will be their profits. "They send money to London, invest a part of it in securities, and the rest with the London bankers and bill brokers." The habit of the Scotch and Irish banks is much the same ; all their spare money is in London, and is invested as all London money now is, and therefore "the reserve in the banking department of the Bank of England is the banking reserve not only of the Bank of England but of all London, and not only of all London but of all England, Ireland and Scotland, too. On the wisdom of the directors of that one joint-stock company it depends whether England shall be solvent or insolvent." The directors of the Bank are in a singular position. On the one hand a great national opinion requires them to keep a large reserve ; but on the other hand an equally strong pressure pushes them in the reverse way and inclines them to diminish the reserve. That is quite natural, as they want to make a good dividend for their shareholders ; the more money lying idle the less the dividend. The proportion of this money lying idle is very large compared to the reserve of other joint-stock banks of England. For instance, the London and Westminster

Bank has only thirteen per cent. of its liabilities lying idle, while the banking department of the Bank of England has over forty per cent. So great a difference in the management causes an equally great difference in the profits.

London is the clearing house of foreign countries. "The number of mercantile bills drawn upon London incalculably surpasses those drawn on any other European city." It receives and pays more than any other place, and is therefore the natural clearing-house. At whatever place persons make payments, there they have to keep their money, so a large deposit of foreign money in London is now necessary for the business of the world; thus London has a very heavy liability to foreign countries.

By the laws of England legal tenders are gold and silver coin and Bank of England notes. The number of attainable bank notes by the act of 1844 allowing the issue department to issue a certain amount against Government securities, for the rest bullion must be deposited.

The Bank of England cannot increase the currency in any other manner. Three times the act has been suspended because the Banking Department was reduced, in

1874 to.....	£1,994,000
1887 to.....	1,462,000
1896 to.....	3,000,000

The banking department could not have survived if the law had not been broken. The main trouble is that the issue is inelastic, and for these reasons we must consider it a weakness in the English banking system.

The system of banking in England has suffered on account of the monopoly of the Bank of England. If it had not been for this monopoly "there would have probably been thirty or forty great banks in the metropolis, with ramifications and branches all over the country. It would in fact have been the Scotch system on a much larger scale, one commensurate with the greater magnitude of the country. It would have been one great monetary system. If this had been the case they would have been acted upon immediately by the exchanges. London being the centre of the exchanges, any drain of gold would have caused immediate measures of counteraction, which would have been propagated and enforced by the parent establishments all over the country. Thus under a natural system any effect in London would have vibrated through all England, and no country banks could possibly have acted in opposition to those in London. This is the result to which the banking system of the country is slowly gravitating, and which it will ultimately assume."

Turning to Scotland we find it to be a system entirely different to that of England, being that of a small number of banks with ramifications all over the country. On account of the small number of head offices it has been easy for the banks to make arrangements among themselves to regulate their business. It would be difficult for a bank of doubtful solvency to do business amongst them. Thus check can be given to undue speculation and effectually prevent the abuses connected with the rediscount of fictitious bills. A uniformity in the practice of the business has been obtained throughout the whole of Scotland.

Branches are a great benefit in disbursement of capital; for instance, in one part of the country where there are no industries or manufactories, capital will naturally accumulate, and, on the other hand, another part of the country may be suffering from a dearth of money to carry on its numerous industries. Now, a branch bank can make it very advantageous for investors and borrowers by gathering capital in one place and disbursing it in another; for which reason a branch bank is superior to an independent bank. An independent bank if it were situated in a place where much capital is lying idle, would have to use a third party to employ the money deposited with it; or should it be in a busy manufacturing place where money is

needed to carry on the different industries, to supply these wants it must obtain money from other sources, possibly by getting its bills discounted. In either case it cannot offer such favorable terms as a bank with branches.

Greater facilities are afforded customers for receiving and paying money, especially when a bank has (as all Scotch banks have) an office in London.

The majority of bills drawn by foreign countries in the United Kingdom are made payable there, so a customer may have a credit at the London branch, and is enabled to make his checks and accept his bills payable there.

By branches the facility for depositing is brought nearer the depositor. An office in one or two of the large towns would never have brought them in contact with the mass of depositors, but by opening up branches throughout the country they gather deposits from every source. By means of "cash credits" they have helped along the new men and new industries whose labor and aptitude only required the aid of capital to render them productive and to increase in time to the amount of deposits.

"The system of branches has rendered the 'cash credits' method of making loans more feasible, because it is comparatively there where most people of any means at all keep a banking account, to find out the position of the guarantor, and as the sureties are more likely to favor the account being kept at the same bank or one of its branches the bank can always know how the guarantors stand."

All these reasons and the large number of branches possessed by Scotch banks tend beyond doubt to their stability and prosperity. So much for the advantages.

Amongst the disadvantages the most obvious is the extended liability incurred by a bank in opening a branch. A bank with branches is like a chain, only as strong as its weakest link. So a run on one of the branches is apt to extend to the others, and so a bank may be brought to the ground, and a loss may fall on the bank, through the failures in a particular trade located in districts where it has established branches. Then there is the difficulty in regulating the affairs of a branch. It is possible that a bank manager may commit his bank to transactions which may prove heavy losses.

A bank with a number of branches is required to keep a larger amount of cash on hand, lying idle. Just what the amount should be depends in a great measure on the class of business done by them, and on the wants and requirements of the district in which it carries on operations.

The Scotch system of issue is much better than the English, as the limit fixed by act 1845 may be overstepped as long as an amount of gold equal to the excess is reserved; this makes the circulation very elastic, and by the clearing-house system of exchanging notes among the different banks the circulation is kept down.

The one-pound note has been a great advantage to the Scotch banks. By its means the Scotch banks have completely adapted themselves to the wants of the greater number of their countrymen. Checks are not drawn to the same extent in Scotland as in England, notes being used instead.

In Scotland the banks take deposits from £1 and up, while in England in the majority of cases no amount is taken for less than £10; and not only is the first deposit limited, but a depositor can only increase his deposit by £10 or more at a time, so the thrifty man is virtually closed out. After discussing the advantages (which far outweigh the disadvantages) and disadvantages of the Scotch system I can only come to one conclusion, that is that it is far superior to that of England.

In Germany, unlike the English system, the circulation exceeds the deposits. The Reichsbank pays (under ordinary circumstances) its notes at its branches, but every independent bank is required to redeem its notes at an agency in Berlin or Frankfort in addition to redeeming them at its own counter. The issue is based on a fixed limit, which may be exceeded upon paying a tax for the excess.

In England the Bank of England is the banker of the State, but in Germany the Reichsbank is essentially a State bank, and is subject to Government control. This State policy largely hampers its action.

The Reichsbank in order to prevent the withdrawal of gold from its vaults raises its rate of discount, which is similar to the English method, but should this fail all they have to do is to hint to the financial houses who are desirous of exporting, that they must not persist in doing so, as it is injurious to the State. Such a hint coming from the Reichsbank is seldom lost.

The business of the Bank of Germany is similar to the Bank of England, except in the matter of issue.

The chief objections to the system of the Imperial Bank are its control by the Government, and the restrictions as to its stocks of gold.

The German banks are regulated by the same statute under which the Imperial Bank was formed, under separate clauses. The issuing banks then in existence continued to issue, but only in the State which granted the charter, unless they kept one-third covered in gold and two-thirds in bills, besides redeeming their notes at Berlin and Frankfort as well as in the place of issue. This is quite like the voluntary action of the English country banks of issue, most of which arrange to have their notes redeemed in London.

In Germany, although the banks have not thrown out branches to the same extent as in England and Scotland, yet there is an increasing tendency that way. The Imperial Bank is well secured by 240 branches of different grades which do business all over the Empire and far outnumber the independent banks of issue and their branches. "It issues five-sixths of the circulation, and in a country so little developed as Germany this fact alone shows that it absorbs a large part of the banking business of the country." It has a large share of the deposits of the country, acquired no doubt by its extensive network of branches. Its business of holding deposits after notice has lapsed, but has developed actively its current accounts, two thirds of this business being done by its branches.

Turning to France we find predominant the Bank of France; a State bank and having a monopoly of the issue. Its notes have reached the enormous amount of £120,000,000 sterling, against which it holds rather more than £100,000,000 in gold and silver. This large reserve is more of a military necessity than a banking reserve. The Bank of France holds a greater reserve than any other bank of issue, but it would be a mistake to reason that all other banks should hold the same proportion, as the gold locked up in the Bank of France is quite unavailable to commerce.

On account of the double standard (gold being equal to silver) if any demand for gold arises all the Bank of France has to do is to pay out silver and demand a premium for gold.

The blemish of the system of the Bank of France, like that of the Imperial Bank of Germany, lies in the fact of its complete control by the Government. In this point the English system excels that of Germany and France, in so far that it is under no control by the Government. It simply does the business of the Government.

The law of France relating to the establishment of companies with limited liability has a very good provision, namely: that no company can be registered until the whole of its capital has been subscribed and one-fourth paid up, and another provision making directors liable to shareholders. The defect in this law is "the facility afforded for the promotion of companies with a merely nominal responsibility on the part of the shareholders for uncalled capital." For instance, two of the largest institutions, the Societe Generale and the Credit Lyonnais, have only half their capital paid up, the remainder being only available at the option of the shareholders. So in event of liquidation the security afforded by uncalled capital might prove altogether illusory.

The Bank of France has branches in every department, "but the country is indebted principally to the societies for such banking provision as is necessary for the trade of the country," most of them having large numbers of branches.

In conclusion I might say that after considering the strong points, the advantages and disadvantages of the different systems, I find that the Scotch system is the most firmly rooted, the most natural system and the best adapted for the requirements of its country, and it is therefore to my mind the most perfect of the systems that have been discussed.

H. B. ROBINSON.

# STATE BANKS—REPORTS OF SUPERVISING OFFICERS.

## NEW YORK—SAVINGS BANKS AND TRUST COMPANIES.

BANKING DEPARTMENT, Albany, February 26, 1901.

### *To the Legislature :*

The total amount deposited in the Savings banks of the State during the year 1900 was \$268,323,513, which was about nine million dollars in excess of the deposits for the year 1899. Whether the gain gives occasion for congratulation depends upon the source from which it came. The time has passed, if, indeed, it ever obtained, when mere growth is an end for which the Savings banks should strive. It is not properly the province of these institutions to serve as depository, custodian and investor of whatever funds may be offered them, but only to carry the accounts of those whose savings are small, or of those who by reason of inexperience or misfortune are unable to invest for themselves advantageously or safely. The demand for high-class securities has carried prices so high that the premiums which must be paid reduce the average income to a very low rate, and desirable investments are becoming increasingly difficult to obtain. Every deposit accepted from capitalists or from those who use the Savings banks merely as a convenience tends to prejudice the interest of those who may legitimately claim the benefit of their care.

The amount withdrawn by depositors during the year was \$240,013,371, making the net gain in deposits, exclusive of interest credited, \$28,310,142, which is nearly thirteen and a half millions less than it had been the year before. The interest paid or credited for the year was \$31,339,820, bringing the total increase in the amount due depositors up to \$59,649,963. Of this increase about twenty-four million dollars belongs to the last half of the year, and the remainder, over thirty-five and a half millions, to the period from January to July. This discrepancy is due, in part at least, to heavy withdrawals during September and October under the apprehension excited by certain phases of the presidential campaign then pending.

The number of Savings banks doing business in the State January 1, 1901, was one hundred and twenty-eight, a reduction of one during the year. The Fulton County Savings Bank, at Johnstown, which had about seventy depositors in January, 1900, succeeded in locating all but eight of them, and paying each something more than a hundred cents on the dollar of their claims. The balance unclaimed, amounting to \$26.52, is in my hands for payment when proper claim therefor is made. The remaining institutions have generally gained in resources, and there is not one of them but that is entitled to the confidence which careful management and entire safety inspire.

The total resources of the Savings banks January 1, 1901, were \$1,068,064,217, the amount due depositors \$947,129,638, and the surplus, calculated upon the market value of stocks and bonds, \$118,339,674. The increase in surplus during the year was over six million four hundred thousand dollars, and the increase in surplus on market values since January 1, 1895, amounts to \$27,384,353. A part of it is of course due to the appreciation in securities which has occurred within that time, but even at that it is less now in proportion to the amount due depositors than it was six years, or even one year ago. In 1895 the percentage of surplus to liabilities was .1214, and at present it is .1261, a decrease of three-quarters of one per cent. Calculated upon the par value of stocks and bonds, the present surplus is \$70,018,318, or .0739 of the amount due depositors. In 1895 the percentage was .0879, or one and four-tenths more. The comparison proves that the banks are distributing to their depositors the full percentage of earnings which a wise regard for possible emergencies would sanction.

The number of open accounts in the Savings banks is 2,072,190, an increase during the year of 90,819, or 24,859 less than the gain made in 1899. The average amount to the credit of each account is \$457.06, or \$9.15 more than the average of the year before. This average has been steadily growing since 1894, having increased \$66.56 in that time. For 1894, 1895 and 1896 the increase amounted only to about seven dollars a year, but in 1897 it bounded to \$11.23 and to \$12.76 in 1898, while in 1899 it dropped to \$10.46, and in 1900 to \$9.15. Accepting as a correct index the well-known fact that managers of the Savings banks are continually extending the practice of attempting to confine the accounts in their institutions to the accumulations of wage-earners and to the funds of the unfortunate and those untrained in business, this increase in the average of deposits may be taken, I think, as evidence of an improving financial

condition of the great middle classes, and is not correctly chargeable to an increasing use of the Savings banks by persons of means.

#### RESOURCES AND LIABILITIES OF SAVINGS BANKS.

The following table, compiled from the reports made to the Banking Department as of the morning of January 1, 1901, shows the condition of the Savings banks on the date given (cents omitted):

RESOURCES.	
Bonds and mortgages .....	\$436,957,784
Stock and bond investments:	
United States .....	Par value. \$58,564,411
District of Columbia .....	5,894,850
New York State .....	1,728,000
Bonds of other States .....	56,023,080
Bonds of cities in other States .....	82,654,853
Bonds of cities in this State .....	149,531,933
Bonds of counties in this State .....	21,091,954
Bonds of towns in this State .....	8,359,899
Bonds of villages in this State .....	11,021,946
Bonds of school districts in this State .....	3,450,886
Railroad mortgage bonds .....	90,779,343
Total par value of stocks and bonds .....	\$479,203,358
Amount of stocks and bonds at cost .....	517,225,500
Estimated market value of stocks and bonds .....	\$527,524,714
Loans upon pledge of securities .....	2,052,973
Banking houses and lots, estimated market value .....	12,097,510
Other real estate at estimated market value .....	3,573,167
Cash on deposit in banks and trust companies .....	62,885,894
Cash on hand .....	9,742,349
Collectible interest .....	10,699,025
Other assets .....	610,797
Total resources .....	\$1,086,064,216
LIABILITIES.	
Amount due depositors .....	\$347,129,638
Other liabilities .....	594,908
Surplus on market value of stocks and bonds .....	118,339,674
Total liabilities .....	\$1,066,064,216
Surplus on par value of stocks and bonds .....	70,018,318
STATISTICS.	
Number of open accounts .....	2,072,190
Number of accounts opened or reopened during the year .....	415,879
Number of accounts closed during the year .....	324,987
Total number of deposits received during the year .....	3,049,885
Total number of payments to depositors during the year .....	2,388,362
Amount deposited during the year, not including interest credited ..	\$368,323,513
Amount withdrawn during the year .....	240,018,371
Amount of interest credited during the year .....	81,339,820
Salaries paid for the year .....	1,852,840
Expenses other than salaries for the year .....	875,756

The items of expenditure for salaries, rent, repairs on bank buildings, light, fuel, appraisers' fees, taxes on real estate and every charge for administration and management in the year 1900 aggregated \$2,728,596 for the 128 Savings banks in the State, which is an increase of only about ninety-eight thousand dollars over the preceding year, notwithstanding the open accounts increased ninety thousand in number, and the total resources of the banks nearly sixty-six million dollars during that time. The ratio of expenses to resources is two dollars and fifty-six cents per thousand dollars, a reduction of six cents from 1899 and of forty-one cents per thousand dollars in four years.

#### CLOSED AND FAILED SAVINGS BANKS.

The Hope Savings Bank, of Albany, and the Manufacturers' Savings Bank, of Troy, each of which closed several years ago, yet hold \$776.78 of unclaimed deposits. From time to time thirty other closed Savings banks have turned over to the Superintendent of Banks, either



by their officers or by their Receivers, the unclaimed amounts due their depositors, the undistributed part of which I hold in trust for such depositors, subject to payment to them upon their filing proof with me that they are entitled to receive the same. The sums range from a cent or two each to nearly three thousand dollars in one case. Many of them are between ten and one hundred dollars each, and a number run up to several hundred dollars each. Many of them date back thirty years or more, and doubtless a considerable number of the depositors are dead without having imparted to their heirs information regarding these claims. Many more of them have changed their residences, and any effort to locate them would involve difficulty, and in many instances failure. It is to be regretted that these funds can not be paid over to their rightful owners, and attempts to effect this course will continue to be made by me.

#### INSTITUTIONS SUBJECT TO THE SUPERVISION OF THE BANKING DEPARTMENT.

The total amount of resources of each of the classes of institutions below mentioned, subject to the supervision of this department on January 1 in each of the last ten years is shown by the following tabulation (cents omitted):

#### Total Resources.

JANUARY 1.	Savings banks.	Banks of deposit and discount.	Trust companies.	b Safe deposit companies.
1891.....	\$667,965,896	\$238,839,051	\$280,688,789	\$3,964,942
1892.....	675,967,634	271,830,699	300,765,375	4,870,117
1893.....	718,454,862	296,459,929	335,707,779	5,045,787
1894.....	704,535,118	a 271,496,822	341,466,011	5,025,769
1895.....	735,863,568	284,911,631	363,119,729	5,102,690
1896.....	783,078,580	285,477,997	362,630,045	4,517,899
1897.....	812,173,632	230,961,855	396,742,947	4,677,325
1898.....	869,751,344	324,766,619	483,739,925	5,115,862
1899.....	922,421,861	365,485,922	579,205,442	5,197,996
1900.....	1,000,200,099	366,304,182	672,190,671	5,299,271
1901.....	1,068,064,216	380,711,960	797,983,512	5,255,452

a November 28, 1893. The other reports called in December.

b The Buffalo Loan, Trust and Safe Deposit Company and Rochester Trust and Safe Deposit Company are not included, as they are given under the head of trust companies.

The total gain in resources of these four classes of institutions during the year 1900 is thus seen to have been \$206,041,887.

#### THE TRUST COMPANIES.

Whereas there had been an increase of ten in the number of trust companies during the year 1890, with certificates of organization filed by four other proposed companies, only two trust companies were authorized by me during the year 1900, and the number in business on the first day of January, 1901, was actually two less than at the corresponding date a twelve-month before. The changes in the list during that period comprise the addition of the Albany Trust Company and the Trust Company of New York, and the disappearance from the list of the Bankers' Trust Company of New York, the Delaware Loan and Trust Company of Walton, the International Banking and Trust Company of New York and the original Morton Trust Company of New York. The Bankers' has been merged into the Atlantic, which in the proceedings increased its capital half a million dollars; the Delaware Loan and Trust Company has gone into liquidation; the International Banking and Trust Company has been merged into the North American; and the Morton was merged into the State, the name of which was changed concurrently to the Morton, the capital stock of the corporation having been increased in the transaction by a million dollars and its surplus by a million and a half of dollars. The only other change in the list is the change of name of the Produce Exchange Trust Company to the Bowling Green Trust Company.

#### RESOURCES AND LIABILITIES OF TRUST COMPANIES.\*

A summary of the reports of fifty-seven trust companies on January 1, 1901, shows a decrease during the year in their aggregate capital amounting to \$900,000, an increase of \$9,430,361 in their combined surplus and undivided profits, a gain of \$114,580,200 in deposits, and of \$125,792,841 in total resources, which amount to \$797,983,512. That is to say, the fifty-seven trust companies in the State have resources equal almost to one-half of the aggregate of those of the five hundred and thirty-six State and National banks reporting in September,

\* A more detailed report of the trust companies of the State of New York was published in the February number of the MAGAZINE.

1900, or, to make the comparison yet more striking, the forty-one companies located in Greater New York have resources amounting to forty-five per cent. of the combined resources of all the State and National banks in the State. The interest, profits and commissions earned by the trust companies during the year aggregate \$33,992,377, the interest paid and credited by them to depositors to \$14,244,490, their expenses to \$5,044,794, the dividends paid to \$5,555,338, and their taxes to \$395,460. In round numbers their earnings increased nearly four hundred thousand dollars as compared with the year 1899, their expenses nearly three-quarters of a million dollars, and their taxes a hundred thousand dollars, while dividends decreased eighty thousand dollars.

RESOURCES.		1900.	1901.
Bonds and mortgages.....		\$38,143,145	\$40,730,575
Stock investments.....		168,195,641	196,852,582
Loaned on collaterals.....		328,142,588	387,911,414
Loaned on personal securities, including bills purchased.....		31,101,270	39,843,066
Overdrafts.....		49,354	39,108
Due from bankers and brokers.....		2,590,729	2,829,376
Real estate.....		9,976,262	9,456,991
Cash on deposit in banks or other moneyed institutions.....		70,555,986	96,337,244
Cash on hand.....		10,810,300	9,365,171
Other assets.....		12,624,322	14,620,981
		<b>\$672,190,871</b>	<b>\$797,983,512</b>
LIABILITIES.		1900.	1901.
Capital stock paid in, in cash.....		\$48,050,000	\$47,150,000
Surplus fund.....		71,218,915	76,123,783
Undivided profits.....		12,854,828	17,479,321
Deposits in trust.....		213,484,885	245,367,995
General deposits.....		310,956,684	392,753,774
Other liabilities.....		16,626,357	19,108,637
		<b>\$672,190,871</b>	<b>\$797,983,512</b>
SUPPLEMENTARY.			
Debts guaranteed and liability thereon.....		\$225,560	\$500
Interest, commissions and profits received during the year.....		33,613,320	33,992,377
Interest paid and credited to depositors during the year.....		12,253,058	14,244,490
Expenses for the year.....		4,301,085	5,044,794
Dividends on capital declared for the year.....		5,635,389	5,555,338
Taxes paid during the year.....		599,446	695,460
Deposits made by order of court for the year.....		3,292,217	2,851,199
Total of deposits upon which interest is allowed at this date.....		479,863,390	569,722,276
Amount invested in bonds and mortgages during the year.....		10,261,386	34,473,763
Amount received from bonds and mortgages during the year.....			31,805,509

#### SECURITIES DEPOSITED.

The securities held in trust by the Superintendent of Banks under the law for the protection of depositors with and creditors of the several trust companies on the first of January, 1901, are shown in the following table:

January 1, 1901.		January 1, 1901.	
United States 2 per cent. bonds....	\$200,000	Brooklyn city 4 per cent. bonds....	100,000
United States 3 per cent. bonds....	30,000	Rochester city 3½ per cent. bonds.	50,000
United States 4 per cent. bonds....	275,000	Rochester city 6 per cent. bonds...	30,000
United States 5 per cent. bonds....	20,000	Niagara Falls city 4 per cent. bonds	20,000
New York city 2½ per cent. bonds.	600,000	Arcadia town 3½ per cent. bonds..	20,000
New York city 3 per cent. bonds...	1,045,000	Bonds and mortgages.....	50,000
New York city 3½ per cent. bonds.	2,680,000	Cash.....	878
Brooklyn city 3 per cent. bonds....	320,000		
Brooklyn city 3½ per cent. bonds..	350,000	Total.....	<b>\$5,790,378</b>

## RECOMMENDATIONS.

Such recommendations as appear to me important were presented so fully in that part of my annual report which was transmitted to the Legislature in January that there is occasion to suggest but little here.

An amendment made in 1900 to the General Corporation Law prohibits the use, among other terms, of the word "loan" as a part of the name of any corporation not formed under the banking or insurance law. The Secretary of State has called my attention to the fact that this restriction prevents the use of the word as a part of the corporate title of associations organizing under Chapter 226 of the laws of 1885 for the loan of money upon the pledge of personal security. I am of the opinion, therefore, that section six of the General Corporation Law should be further amended so as to permit the use of the word "loan" in the corporate titles of associations formed under the statute referred to, but not by other companies not under the supervision of this department.

A measure reducing the rates of interest and the charges which these personal loan associations may make to their customers has already passed the Senate. The only reasonable criticism which in my judgment can be directed against it would be that its provisions are too generous to the associations in question, but it is so far preferable to existing law that it is earnestly to be hoped that the Assembly may give it favorable consideration, and that it may reach the statute book.

Generally speaking, the classes of institutions to which this volume of my report applies are not thought to require any legislation to add to their safety or usefulness unless it be some further restriction which would make the Savings banks yet more distinctly than they now are the depositaries of only the comparatively poor. Against the duplication of accounts in these banks, and against the practice of accepting deposits which properly belong in the banks of deposit or in the trust companies, it would be wise that the officers of the banks establish an inflexible rule, and that the law should require this from them. The immunity from taxation which deposits in the Savings banks enjoy under the law was not intended to cover investment funds, and a wrong is done to the system and to the State if that condition is permitted to obtain. This proposition is continually borne in mind, and is made controlling, by many managements, but it is feared that on the part of others—not the many, but the few—the desire to gain rank as a large bank tempts to disregard of it. There ought to be some stringent provision of law which would be effective to prevent it. The true friends of the system seek to preserve it to the service which it was designed to render, and to save it from all discredit or occasion for criticism or attack. By no course known to me can this purpose be so well fostered as by excluding capitalists and capable men of affairs from carrying considerable deposits in the Savings banks.

Respectfully submitted, F. D. KILBURN, *Superintendent of Banks.*

## MASSACHUSETTS.

OFFICE OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF SAVINGS BANKS,  
STATE HOUSE, BOSTON, Jan. 14, 1901.

*To the Honorable the Senate and House of Representatives in General Court assembled.*

In accordance with the requirements of the statutes of this Commonwealth, the Board of Commissioners of Savings Banks has the honor to present its twenty-fifth annual report, relating to the Savings banks and institutions for savings, trust companies, co-operative banks, collateral loan companies, mortgage loan and investment companies, now under the supervision of the Board.

In compliance with statutory requirements, all the institutions made up their annual returns as of the thirty-first day of October last, at which date the whole number of such institutions was 357, with aggregate assets of nearly \$770,000,000.

By the provisions of Chapter 126 of the acts of 1890, the report is made in two parts; Part I, herewith submitted, gives statistics relating to 186 Savings banks and institutions for savings, with assets of \$574,237,239; thirty-five trust companies with assets of \$165,838,917; four Savings banks in hands of the courts; one trust company in hands of Receiver.

During the year ending October 31 last, two new institutions have commenced business, viz.: the Commonwealth Savings Bank, at Lynn, and the Hampton Co-operative Bank, at Easthampton.

The Security Savings Bank, at West Boylston, has closed its business and is now distributing its assets to its depositors.

The Taunton Safe Deposit and Trust Company was organized near the close of the calendar year, and having filed the statements required by statute, was given a certificate from this board authorizing it to commence business.

The Manufacturers' Trust Company, at Holyoke, has discontinued business; this leaves the number of such companies the same as last year.

### SAVINGS BANKS—DIVIDENDS.

The following table gives the rates of dividends declared during the year, as compared with those of the previous fiscal year:

DIVIDENDS DECLARED DURING THE YEAR ENDING OCT. 31.				1900.	1899.
Banks paying at the rate of 1½ per cent.	3	"	"	1	1
" " " " 3¼ "	3	"	"	3	3
" " " " 3½ "	45	"	"	4	16
" " " " 3¾ "	18	"	"	15	15
" " " " 4 "	114	"	"	144	144
" " " " 4½ "	1	"	"	1	1
" " " " 4¾ "	..	"	"	1	1

The Commonwealth Savings Bank, at Lynn, which commenced business May 19, 1900, had not declared any dividend at the date of its report.

Those banks (71 in number) which declared dividends at other than the general rate of two per cent. semi-annually, made their dividends as follows:

1 bank paid 1	per cent. the first term,	2	per cent. the second term.
1 " " 1½	" " " "	0	" " " " "
2 " " 1½	" " " "	1½	" " " " "
1 " " 1½	" " " "	2	" " " " "
3 " " 1½	" " " "	1½	" " " " "
41 " " 1½	" " " "	1½	" " " " "
1 " " 1½	" " " "	2	" " " " "
8 " " 2	" " " "	1½	" " " " "
17 " " 2	" " " "	1½	" " " " "
1 " " 2½	" " " "	2	" " " " "

The total amount of dividends declared was \$18,667,327—an increase of \$500,944 over the amount declared for the year ending October 31, 1899, but no more than might be expected, taking into account the increase in aggregate deposits.

The average rate for the last fiscal year was 3.81 + per cent., as compared with 3.80 + the preceding year.

As an indication of the diminished earning capacity of the money on deposit in Savings banks, the following statement has been prepared:

Banks paying less than four per cent. per annum in 1890,	70; in 1899,	39
Banks paying four per cent. per annum	in 1890, 114; in 1899,	144
Banks paying more than four per cent. per annum in 1890,	1; in 1899,	2

### BUSINESS OF THE BANKS.

The annexed statement gives details of the business of the banks, as also of the increase or decrease in the several items as compared with the report of the preceding year:

	Oct. 31, 1900.	Increase.	Decrease.
Number of open accounts.....	1,585,009	57,562	.....
Average amount to the credit of each account..	\$352	\$1	.....
Number of deposits.....	1,479,405	67,613	.....
Number of withdrawals.....	1,174,358	79,348	.....
Amount deposited (not including dividends)....	\$93,099,624	.....	\$946,339
Average of deposits.....	62	.....	3
Amount withdrawn (including dividends).....	\$9,524,599	\$6,872,148	.....
Average of withdrawals.....	76	.....	.....
Amount of expenses.....	1,283,289	50,122	.....
Total earnings.....	24,469,841	1,200,852	.....
Total ordinary dividends.....	18,667,327	500,944	.....
Number of loans of an amount not exceeding \$3,000 each.....	68,671	455	.....
Number of loans upon real estate, *.....	80,614	1,412	.....
* Averaging \$2,956.51 each.			

The amount of deposits during the year, say \$93,099,624, was the aggregate of 1,479,405 deposits in number—an average of \$62.93 to each.

The amount withdrawn during the year, say \$9,524,599, was represented by 1,174,358 withdrawals—an average of \$76.23 to each.

Compared with the previous fiscal year these figures show an increase of 67,613 in number of deposits, but a decrease of \$946,339 in amount.

The withdrawals show an increase of 79,348 in number and of \$6,872,148 in amount.

The average of deposits was \$62.93 last year, as against \$66.61 the year previous; the withdrawals show an average of \$76.23 last year, as compared with \$75.48 the previous year.

This large increase in the amount of withdrawals can be accounted for in part, it is thought, by the reduced rate of dividends, and in part also by the fact that, in many of the older banks, accounts which have been accumulating for a period of years have been eliminated, the settlement of estates necessitating withdrawals of the amounts for distribution.

The magnitude of the business is exemplified by the facts shown in the table; the whole number of deposits and withdrawals in all the banks amounts to 2,633,763; the clerical labor required to do the work attendant on these transactions, and the added care of the investments and moneys of the banks, has been accomplished at an aggregate cost of \$1,283,280, or about .00237 per cent. of the deposits.

The expenses of the banks may, in some instances, seem larger than necessity requires; but the fact that the average is as small as the above statement shows, indicates that the business, as a whole, continues to be conducted on an economical basis.

#### LIABILITIES AND ASSETS.

The following classified statement of the aggregate liabilities and assets of the banks shows also a comparison with the similar items given in our previous report:

#### AGGREGATE STATEMENT OF LIABILITIES AND ASSETS.

*Showing Increase or Decrease, as compared with the Year ending October 31, 1899.*

#### LIABILITIES.

	Amount Oct. 31, 1900.	Increase.	Percentage of Increase.
Deposits.....	\$540,408,686	\$22,201,637	4.28
Guaranty fund.....	23,575,955	1,158,008	5.17
Undivided earnings.....	10,022,496	385,237	3.78
Due on incomplete mortgage loans.....	154,748	32,746	17.46 *
Sundry liabilities.....	80,353	9,772	18.85
	<b>\$574,237,239</b>	.....	.....

\* Decrease.

#### ASSETS.

	Amount Oct. 31, 1900.	Increase.	Decrease.	Percentage of investments to total assets.
Public funds.....	\$67,988,541	.....	\$3,919,650	11.84
Loans on public funds.....	1,202,700	\$319,539	.....	.21
Bank stock.....	21,467,705	.....	1,295,748	3.74
Loans on bank stock.....	1,386,501	.....	101,054	.24
Railroad bonds.....	73,820,593	6,849,163	.....	12.86
Loans on railroad bonds.....	1,086,700	165,740	.....	.19
Loans on railroad stocks.....	1,103,010	543,000	.....	.19
Railroad notes.....	100,000	.....	400,000	.02
Boston Terminal Company bonds	11,481,669	884,981	.....	.....
Loan on Boston Term'l Co. bonds	14,000	13,000	.....	2.00
Real estate (for bank'g purposes)	4,306,432	38,962	.....	.77
Real estate by foreclosure.....	3,296,305	586,457	.....	.57
Loans on real estate.....	238,336,184	9,652,953	.....	41.50
Loans on personal security.....	114,320,336	9,787,558	.....	19.91
Loans to counties, cities and towns (notes).....	14,167,376	.....	204,860	2.47
Loans on depositors' books.....	50,819	.....	2.0	.01
Sundry stocks, bonds and notes taken to secure indebtedness...	219,457	43,435	.....	.04
Expense account.....	206,069	.....	.....	.....
Premium account.....	437,571	27,814	.....	.16
Furniture and fixtures.....	70,233	.....	.....	.....
Sundry assets *.....	181,280	.....	.....	.....
Cash on hand:				
In banks, on interest... \$17,009,450				
In banks, not on int'est. 449,028				
In office..... 1,436,756	18,895,234	797,047	.....	3.29
	<b>\$574,237,239</b>	.....	.....	.....

\* Consisting of interest and suspense accounts, taxes and insurance paid, real estate, expenses, etc.

## TRUST COMPANIES.

During the past year the Manufacturers' Trust Company at Holyoke has discontinued business, and distributed its assets among its stockholders.

The Taunton Safe Deposit and Trust Company, incorporated in 1897, was organized and its capital paid in during the last month, and the certificate of this board authorizing it to commence business was issued December 29.

The number of trust companies transacting business in this Commonwealth at the date of this report was thirty-five; one other company has for a long time been in the hands of a Receiver.

The thirty-five companies which made reports to this board on October 31 held deposits in their banking departments of \$123,910,978, with other liabilities of \$28,052,238, and total assets of \$151,963,211.

Of the thirty-five companies, fourteen have established trust departments, the liabilities in which amount in the aggregate to \$13,875,705.

STARKES WHITON, WARREN E. LOCKE,  
JAMES O. OTIS,  
*Commissioners of Savings Banks.*

## MISSOURI.

*To the Honorable, the Forty-first General Assembly of the State of Missouri:*

Gentlemen—In obedience to law I have the honor of making this, my third, biennial report on bank examination and the banking laws of the State of Missouri.

On December 31, 1898—the date of my last report—there were in existence in the State of Missouri 498 incorporated, ninety private banks and six trust companies, making a total of 594 institutions subject to examination. Since that date there have been only two incorporated and one private bank closed by the State; twelve incorporated, fourteen private banks and one trust company have gone into voluntary liquidation.

Since January 1, 1899, fifty banks have been incorporated, seventeen private banks have been authorized to do business in the State, and three trust companies have been incorporated, and one savings and safe deposit bank; so there are at present 533 incorporated State banks, ninety-two private banks, nine trust companies and two savings and safe deposit companies subject to examination doing business in the State, or a total of 636. My best information is that there are now sixty-seven National banks, making a grand total of 703 banking institutions in the State.

It is a source of great satisfaction to me to be able to report that only three banks have been closed by the State within a space of two years. This state of affairs is especially gratifying when compared with the work of the department the first three years of its existence; within that time forty-one banks were closed and fifty-eight were forced into liquidation, by reason, in the majority of instances, of the rigid examination disclosing their weak points and reckless methods.

The prevailing rule of the bankers of the State now is to do business on business principles, whereas, I found this in many instances, to be otherwise five years ago. While the standard has been constantly elevated the number of banks has increased and the volume of business has also increased.

The banker that tremblingly and confusedly met the examiner five years ago, now receives him gladly with a desire to profit by his visit. An open violation of the law or a case of reckless speculation is now rare.

In this connection and through you, I desire to express my appreciation of the hearty co-operation of the bankers of the State, in bringing the banking business up to its present high standard. When the first act pertaining to bank supervision was pending in the Legislature in 1893, a prominent banker in the State said: "If that act becomes a law, I will retire from the banking business." The same banker recently said, "If our Bank Examination Law was repealed I would feel like retiring from the banking business." Every county in the State now, except Carter and Reynolds, is well provided with good, clean, safe banking institutions.

Since January 1, 1893, 1,297 examinations have been made.

The last official statement of the financial condition of the State and private banks in the State of Missouri, made on December 1, 1900, gave grand totals as follows:

*Official Statement of the Financial Condition of the State Banks in the State of Missouri at the Close of Business on the First Day of December, 1900.*

## RESOURCES.

Loans and discounts undoubtedly good on personal or collateral security.....	\$73,754,577
Loans and discounts undoubtedly good on real estate security.....	7,741,038
Overdrafts by solvent customers.....	942,422
United States bonds on hand.....	452,646
Other bonds and stocks at their present cash market price.....	7,689,093
Real estate (banking house) at present cash market value.....	2,451,414
Real estate, other than banking house, at its present cash market value.....	991,590
Furniture and fixtures.....	544,598
Due from other banks, good on sight draft.....	30,778,909
Checks and other cash items.....	1,932,234
National bank notes, legal-tender United States notes and gold and silver certificates.....	5,512,811
Gold coin.....	1,765,942
Silver coin, including pennies.....	732,901
All other resources.....	240,762
Total.....	\$135,550,933

## LIABILITIES.

Capital stock paid in.....	\$19,685,905
Surplus fund.....	6,217,279
Undivided profits less current expenses and taxes paid.....	2,066,631
Deposits subject to draft at sight by banks and bankers.....	8,916,181
Deposits subject to draft at sight by individuals and others.....	74,477,298
Demand certificates of deposit outstanding.....	1,613,765
Time certificates of deposit outstanding.....	22,078,271
Bills payable and bills re-discounted.....	530,211
Dividends unpaid.....	107,589
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	57,799
Total.....	\$135,550,933

One of the changes made in 1897 was to provide that four examiners might be appointed, as it was manifest that two could not efficiently examine nearly six hundred banks within the time which should be consumed for such purpose, as examinations to be effective in the interest of depositors and the public should be made at least three times in two years, with such additional examinations as may be required when particular banks are found to be in a bad condition. Since the passage of this law, for a short time only, on two occasions, have I had four examiners in the field, but with the present rapid increase in the number of banks and the law requiring an examination to be made of each bank before it opens, four men should be kept in the field all the time.

From time to time, as experience has suggested, improvements have been made in the practical manner of examination. In preparing papers for the execution of the laws, the rules and regulations of other States and the United States for examinations have been carefully considered, and out of all the best has been evolved, as nearly as may be, for use in this State.

The report required from the examiners is minute and voluminous. Beginning with a description of the bank, it first sets out its resources and liabilities, upon the date of the examination, the names of the directors, with the number of shares owned by each, the liability of each as payer and indorser, his occupation, what is shown as to records made by meetings of stockholders and directors; whether or not they examine and approve loans, and when and how; whether active discount and examining committees are maintained and make records; the regularity or irregularity of shareholders' and directors' meetings; number of shares represented therein; whether there are vacancies in the board of directors, and other particulars that may be developed as to the neglect of duty by shareholders or directors. Similar particulars are to be noted as to the officers of the bank, and statements are required from the examiners as to the character of the books kept, their sufficiency and general condition, how often ledgers are balanced, how often loans and discounts are verified and how often accounts with correspondent banks are reconciled. As to loans and discounts, the examiner is required to show the amount of on-demand paper, with one or more individual or firm

names, on-demand paper secured by stocks, bonds and other personal securities; time paper on mortgages or other real estate security, and where this character of security is held, a schedule must be made of the amounts of prior liens on property, actual value of the property, date when acquired; in addition to which he is required to show how much paper is six months overdue, and how much paper is more than six months overdue; to describe the general character of loans and discounts and give current rate of interest obtained on same; quality and value of collateral, and whether accommodations are well distributed; to state value of collateral or other security pledged for all excessive or large loans, and give the financial standing of makers and indorsers thereof; if loans are made to other banks, to give full information regarding the same; where loans and discounts are made to directors and officers of the bank to state what amount of the same represents direct loans to them, and what amount represents strictly commercial or business paper; describe all loans and discounts to all corporations or enterprises in which directors or officers are interested.

Particular attention is required to the provisions of Section 1202, Revised Statutes 1899, which limit loans to any individual, corporation or company to twenty-five per cent. of the capital stock of the institution. The names of excessive borrowers must be given, with full amount of loans and all particulars as to the loan and responsibility of the borrower. The examiner is enjoined to look closely into loans made to directors and officers of the bank, more especially if these are excessive under the law, and to state whether these are well secured, giving total of each class; whether habitually granted; state which items have remained unchanged for six months or longer; to personally verify the outstanding overdrafts of the date of the examination.

The evil of overestimating the real estate, furniture and fixtures is endeavored to be corrected by requiring the examiner to make a careful estimate of their value, which, if different from that charged by the bank, brings about the requirement of a reduction. The examiner is required to verify by correspondence, on blanks furnished him for that purpose, balances due from other banks and bankers, and carefully investigate as to whether or not bills payable are carried as certificates of deposit; to verify bills in transit, foreign bills and other items not in custody of the bank. He must also state whether cash items are regular, and whether overdue or dishonored paper, expense items or other irrelevant or improper things are carried as cash items, and describe them. He is required to state whether the bank's reserve is sufficient at the date of the examination; to set out the bonds and stocks of the institution, giving the amount at which they are carried on the books, and their estimated market value, to set out what real estate and mortgages are owned by the bank, amount at which carried on the books, amount of prior liens, if any, or estimated value of the property and when acquired. The capital stock of the bank is carefully scrutinized, the certificate book examined to see whether or not there have been over-issues of stock, whether cancelled certificates have been properly marked and accounted for, and the stock ledger is checked up in connection therewith; also whether or not the bank holds as collateral for loans shares of its own stock, and if so, for what purpose taken and how long held; and to ascertain whether the capital of the bank was properly paid in in money, or whether shareholders' notes were taken in payment. The matter of dividends and surplus is inquired into and an investigation made as to whether dividends when declared were warranted by the earnings of the bank; balances due to banks and bankers are verified on blanks furnished for that purpose.

The examiner is required to state whether interest is paid on deposits, and if so, at what rates and to what extent; whether a proper record of all certificates of deposit issued is regularly kept; and if banks hold city, county or municipal funds on deposit, the amount of same and interest paid; and to certify balances on individual ledgers, certificates of deposit outstanding, certified checks and Cashiers' checks outstanding, and note discrepancies, if any. As to bills payable, he must state where money is borrowed, whether it is by rediscounts or otherwise, giving list showing where or when accommodation was secured; the form of obligation; the amount of same; the rate of interest paid; date of maturity, and whether or not secured by collaterals of the bank; whether or not the bank borrows money habitually, and whether or not such liabilities have been authorized by the board of directors.

Finally, the examiner must make a recapitulation, giving his opinion as to the general condition of the bank; whether or not its business is prosperous; where losses appear to have been sustained, or will probably occur; where values have depreciated, together with estimated probable loss on same; a statement of the book value and probable loss on six months' overdue paper, other securities, claims, etc., banking house, furniture and fixtures, other real estate and mortgages, cash items. He must show the estimated value of assets not shown on books: surplus fund and undivided profits, if any, current expenses, taxes, etc., total surplus and profits, and conclude, where he declares the bank to be insolvent, with his recommendation that it shall be closed. With incorporated banks, the examiner is required to place three of the directors under oath, and to ask them a number of questions which are supplied to him in



a blank which covers all the provisions of the law: in addition to which he is expected to go over with these three directors all the bills receivable of the bank, asking them the direct question as to whether each separate piece of paper is good, bad or indifferent, and summing up with the statement as to how much and which items of the paper are uncollectible. This examination affords the department the basis upon which to demand that insolvent paper shall be charged to profit and loss. These directors are, in addition, catechised as to the value of the real estate, furniture and fixtures and other holdings of the bank. Of course the examiner's inquiry either into the value of the bills receivable or other property does not stop with this sworn statement of the directors, yet this statement is found to be of exceeding value in arriving at a conclusion upon the condition of the bank. With private banks the partners are placed under oath and catechised in the same manner. In addition to all these requirements, which are printed in the blanks furnished to the examiners, supplemental reports are made upon any point which may be especially discovered.

While the department has closed and caused to be closed a great many banks, yet it is safe to say that it has been of more service to the public by bringing weak banks into better condition. We have saved and made good banks more institutions than we have closed, either directly or indirectly. Boards of directors have been brought to realize their duty under the law; unfaithful officers have been displaced, others have been reminded of their duty; loans to officers and directors have been largely reduced; Cashiers' bonds have been carefully examined and required, where not given, and caused to be deposited in proper custody; systems of bookkeeping have been improved; overdrafts, suspended and overdue paper have been greatly reduced; assessments of stockholders have been required to make good impairments of capital; excessive loans have been eliminated; deeds of trust and other papers carelessly neglected have been caused to be perfected; undue borrowing has been discouraged and in many ways examination has bettered the condition of the banks of the State.

#### THE GENERAL BANKING LAW.

While it is true that the general banking law of the State is not perfect, comparison between it and the laws of the United States or of other States will evidence that, taken as a whole, it has been as carefully considered as any existent statute. The evident intent of the Legislature has been to be firm in protecting the depositor and the public without being so far repressive as to discourage the maintenance of State banks. Indeed, it is true that the State bank system of Missouri is now and has been for many years among the first in the country, as is shown by the statement submitted in the beginning of this report, that out of 703 banking institutions now doing business in Missouri, 636 of them are State institutions. The general excellence of the banking law of this State is best attested by the fact that when acknowledged experts, who constitute the State Bankers' Association, men of character and experience, carefully went over and considered them in an official meeting for that purpose in 1898, they found but eight or nine minor changes, which they recommended, all of them good but none of them vital.

Within the last two years there has been a modification of the National banking laws, permitting banks in the smaller towns to organize with a capital of \$25,000. It was thought that many State banks would take advantage of this and change from the State to the National system, but a careful comparison of the two systems soon convinced the trained mind of the practical bankers of the State that there was no profit to them in making a change. This is evidenced by the fact that only two such changes have been made since the passage of the act, up to this date. This is certainly a compliment to our State system.

#### BANK EXAMINATION.

The bank examination law of 1893, originally drafted by me, was passed by the General Assembly in response to a strong public sentiment. Not unnaturally the law was in many respects deficient, but actual experience in the field and office work of this department in executing the law disclosed its weak points, and the Thirty-ninth General Assembly, with great alacrity, remedied the defects of the initial statute, so that the law of 1897 works like a charm and is satisfactory alike, both to the department and the bankers of the State.

The Fortieth General Assembly responded generously to the requests of the department for legislation amendatory of the general banking laws, which requests were seconded by the bankers' association. It passed a number of excellent statutes which have made the banking laws of Missouri among the very best in the country, not excepting the National bank laws:

1. By enacting five new sections as follows, bearing numbers respectively 977, 978, 979, 980, and 981, Revised Statutes 1899, thus providing a legal means for the voluntary dissolution of a corporation, and the making of a public record of the same. The necessity for this provision has long been apparent to those who were at all familiar with the corporation law.

2. The amendment to section 2745, Revised Statutes 1899, further restricting the rights and powers of corporations by prohibiting the establishment of branch banks, thus getting rid of the practice of allowing the funds of the bank to be loosely handled outside of the banking house.

3. The enacting of the new section, 1277, Revised Statutes, 1899, requiring banks to be examined before the certificate of incorporation can be issued, or private bank can be allowed to organize. The demand for this law grew out of the experience of the department in handling some wild-cat institutions that might have caused an immense amount of trouble had they not been throttled by the department before they got a chance at the public. This law is a wise safeguard on that account, and it has otherwise proven of great benefit to the new banks by reason of the practical information obtained from the examiners concerning necessary details in starting an institution of that kind.

4. The enacting of the new section, number 1280, Revised Statutes 1899, requiring a minimum reserve of fifteen per cent. While it is seldom that a bank is found that really needs regulation in this respect, it is for these that such a law is needed in the interest of public

safety. Besides, it is proper to have on the statutes a well-defined limit below which banks can not go as a matter of safety and conservatism.

5. The amendments to section 2743, Revised Statutes 1899, have proven very wholesome, especially the one requiring the members of the board-elect to indicate a willingness to serve, by filing a written acceptance. This disposes of a knotty problem that has confronted the department several times when trying to locate the responsible party for apparent negligence, disclosed by an examination. If a person is acting now as a director in a bank, he must know his responsibility and be held accountable for his acts.

6. The enacting of the new section, number 1290, Revised Statutes 1899, providing a plain, simple method for the increase of capital stock, fills a long-felt want, and gives an elasticity to this step that is of great benefit to the banks, as they are now able to increase or decrease their capital stock as occasion demands.

7. The amendment to section 2757, Revised Statutes 1899, prohibiting banks owning and operating industrial plants, has had a very wholesome effect by stopping this nefarious business that has proven to be a detriment instead of advantage in so many instances.

8. The amendment to section 2753, Revised Statutes 1899, exempting certain first-class securities from the operation of the twenty-five per cent. limit, has also proven to be a wise provision, beneficial alike to both banker and borrower, without in the least jeopardizing the interests of public safety.

9. The enactment of new section, number 1293, Revised Statutes 1899, providing for the creation and maintenance of a permanent surplus fund, is a wise and meritorious provision. Any bank is liable to sustain loss, let the management be ever so judicious, but with a good, strong surplus standing between the capital and any ordinary loss, the business moves on smoothly without disturbing public confidence, which is always the chief asset in the banking business.

10. The amendment to section 2765, Revised Statutes 1899, is beneficial by reason of its clearing up the meaning of the section and placing private banks under the same restraints as the incorporated banks. There is no good reason why they should be otherwise. Their interests are the same and their relations to the public are the same.

11. The new section numbered 1333, Revised Statutes 1899, regulating and governing the action of Receivers, and providing for a permanent record of their transactions, both in the court having jurisdiction of the receivership, and in the department of State, where the case really originates, if properly enforced, will fill a crying need, as under the old law and the methods of executing it, when the Secretary of State secured the appointment of a Receiver, his connection with the affairs of the defunct bank ceased, and the history of it, so far as the records of his department were concerned, was a blank from that on.

This provision requiring copies of all reports of Receivers to be filed in both places, enables the Secretary of State to complete his record, which will certainly prove to be a source of great satisfaction in the future, as it will enable him to show a complete history of the bank from the day it goes into the hands of the State until a final disposition is made of its assets.

#### TRUST AND SURETY COMPANIES.

I have not heretofore made any recommendations especially concerning the trust company laws, but the unprecedented increase in this class of business and the enormous sums of money invested in it and handled by the various companies in the State, demands the attention of the careful legislator, especially to the fidelity and surety features.

The practice of giving this kind of bond for executors, administrators, guardians, curators, assignees, Receivers and trustees and persons holding public office and private trusts, is increasing daily and has now, in my opinion, gone beyond the provisions made for public safety. Our laws fix the amount of security required to be put up before a trust company organized under them can engage in this kind of business in the State; but it places no limit on the amount of business that can be done under the security. While, on the other hand, our law does not even require any special deposit as a guarantee, to be put up by the various fidelity and surety companies organized under the laws of other States and doing business in our State.

Twelve foreign corporations have an aggregate fidelity and surety liability of \$978,000.-225.18, of which \$43,874,071.45 is in force in Missouri. The special deposit as a guarantee for this enormous business is \$729,830, not one dollar of which is deposited in Missouri.

By their statements the aggregate resisted claims of these several companies is \$1,025,347.06.

It occurs to me that these foreign companies should at least be required to put up the same special deposit required of our home companies, and that the amount of the deposit in either case should be regulated by the total amount of business done in the State, and that amount to be obtained from the annual reports of the companies filed with the Superintendent of Insurance for the year previous.

My attention has been especially directed to this matter by reason of numerous bank officials of the State furnishing bonds through these companies. This, together with the protection that we naturally owe to our own home institutions, as I said in the beginning, ought to be sufficient to attract the attention of the careful legislator in the interest of fairness and of public safety. Only six of our Missouri trust companies do a fidelity and surety business.

The total fidelity and surety liability of these six companies in force in the State of Missouri on December 1, 1900, was \$21,567,376.11, each of which have a special deposit of \$250,000 with the Superintendent of the Insurance Department of the State, as guarantee for these obligations.

I feel that I am justified in the pride I take in the record made by the gentlemen chosen as examiners. Since the beginning of bank examination four of my examiners have been called to important positions in the banking world: Mr. Gordon Jones was made President of the Stock Yards Bank, at St. Joseph; Mr. C. O. Austin, Cashier of the Mechanics' Bank, St. Louis; Mr. W. O. Oldham, Cashier of the Miners' Bank, of Joplin; Mr. Emison Chanslor, Assistant Cashier of the American Exchange Bank, St. Louis; while Mr. B. M. Seward, bank clerk, has been made Cashier of the bank of Brooks, Bass & Johnston, Denison, Texas. The present examiners, Messrs. M. A. Arnold, George D. Biggs, B. F. Clark, W. L. MacDonald and Mr. B. F. Reed, bank clerks, were selected by me for their special qualifications for the work and have proven capable, trustworthy, competent and industrious. Their work has not only been satisfactory to me, but I am assured is equally so to the bankers of the State, who have been most cordial in the support they have given to my efforts to make the department of service to them and the public in general.

A. A. LESUEUR, Secretary of State.

SAVINGS BANKS IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK.—Statement of their condition by counties January 1, 1901.  
Compiled from the official reports; and, for comparison, the totals for January 1, 1900.

COUNTY.	No. of Banks.	Total Resources.	Due Depositors.	Other Liabilities.	Surplus on market value of stocks and bonds.	Open Accounts.	Accounts closed during year 1900.	Deposits during year 1900, not including interest.	Amount withdrawn during year 1900.	Amount of interest credited and paid for year 1900.	Salaries and expenses for year 1900.
Albany.....	1	\$80,825.03	\$55,763.810	\$83,650	\$4,977.573	85,135	16,749	\$13,727,956	\$14,536,370	\$1,839,257	\$153,241
Broome.....	1	3,563,684	2,395,895	.....	107,702	18,116	2,475	1,904,107	1,616,151	85,711	18,318
Cayuga.....	1	6,267,254	5,573,865	.....	673,389	17,356	2,697	2,554,093	2,148,623	178,050	23,550
Chemung.....	1	157,241	115,088	277	.....	1,437	656	129,462	62,000	4,719	1,868
Columbia.....	1	3,344,231	2,660,889	.....	363,341	7,752	1,732	1,340,631	690,514	93,241	9,382
Cortland.....	1	2,004,182	1,863,081	301	110,700	7,279	1,848	823,415	727,632	57,123	7,005
Dutchess.....	1	14,694,021	14,037,853	18,854	1,429,314	30,362	2,838	2,851,306	2,526,446	508,718	182,169
Dutchess.....	1	55,546,453	48,834,842	18,854	6,711,314	103,410	21,000	15,790,558	14,310,558	1,550,264	188,857
Greene.....	1	2,071,709	1,870,062	20	222,647	103,410	21,000	15,790,558	14,310,558	1,550,264	188,857
Greene.....	1	5,248,804	4,870,862	.....	277,924	4,737	963	5,600,048	3,801,709	58,615	4,962
Jefferson.....	1	71,832,204	140,600,522	.....	22,188,700	17,024	4,001	2,182,966	1,590,637	154,981	16,690
Kings.....	1	1,304,018	1,268,534	3,762	22,188,700	335,063	63,525	49,941	38,000,544	4,074,405	405,695
Madison.....	1	41,608,030	37,263,986	1,740	4,206,574	81,736	17,575	11,100,195	10,173,145	1,241,652	122,723
Monroe.....	1	1,400,045	1,304,018	.....	65,224	7,262	2,140	1,022,634	1,043,541	51,364	9,095
Montgomery.....	1	698,875	637,733	.....	49,142	1,688	259	172,532	130,659	22,531	2,273
Nassau.....	1	570,516,515	508,263,040	184,017	64,008,053	1,040,968	210,116	170,858	120,141,581	16,855,512	1,230,124
Nassau.....	1	2,948,353	2,731,357	31	216,669	7,462	2,75	1,581,377	1,381,784	79,102	9,017
Niagara.....	1	13,570,246	11,602,020	4,032	1,972,253	32,753	4,110	6,330,215	5,528,947	363,008	4,930
Oriskany.....	1	20,317,609	27,065,263	36,732	2,630,943	67,447	13,769	10,072,910	9,218,347	988,004	122,062
Oriskany.....	1	13,025,916	11,405,511	.....	1,620,394	20,166	4,000	2,796	2,719,827	4,0,000	152,586
Oswego.....	1	4,628,048	4,250,698	40	578,231	12,250	3,184	1,900,726	1,813,117	132,668	19,666
Putnam.....	1	404,080	363,175	.....	40,473	1,361	364	1,008,076	85,971	10,968	1,066
Queens.....	1	5,870,541	5,290,415	.....	580,110	20,025	5,401	2,973,264	1,922,260	177,015	27,773
Rensselaer.....	1	10,127,594	8,571,615	60,801	1,438,370	20,327	4,521	2,193,291	1,950,572	269,436	28,773
Richmond.....	1	2,241,677	2,073,615	2,000	108,067	1,252	3,254	1,008,163	883,519	58,436	13,945
Schenectady.....	1	3,241,553	3,013,088	.....	108,067	11,235	2,150	1,008,163	1,175,198	86,200	7,562
Saratoga.....	1	383,025	361,579	.....	28,432	1,857	324	21,298	1,175,198	86,200	7,562
Saratoga.....	1	7,753,180	6,908,479	.....	846,650	14,845	2,213	1,608,148	1,159,870	247,365	32,574
Suffolk.....	1	2,094,810	1,731,369	.....	324,421	7,141	1,868	931,018	1,008,612	47,775	10,116
Tompkins.....	1	9,118,372	8,441,215	74	757,063	22,896	2,690	2,261,549	1,986,612	271,714	32,498
Ulster.....	1	17,350,661	16,438,628	.....	1,421,032	43,711	8,717	5,371,924	4,357,797	566,304	67,106
Westchester.....	10	1,066,064,216	\$947,129,638	\$594,903	\$118,539,674	2,072,190	415,879	\$298,323,513	\$240,013,371	\$21,339,830	\$2,728,396
Totals, January 1, 1901.....	128	1,000,209,069	897,430,650	808,158	111,620,290	1,981,371	405,763	259,256,287	217,465,082	29,539,689	2,630,865
Totals, January 1, 1900.....	129										

## BANKING AND FINANCIAL NEWS.

This Department includes a complete list of NEW NATIONAL BANKS (furnished by the Comptroller of the Currency), STATE AND PRIVATE BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, DISSOLUTIONS AND FAILURES, etc., under their proper State heads for easy reference.

### NEW YORK CITY.

—The North American Trust Co. of New York has purchased the stock of the Trust Company of New York, the latter corporation having \$1,000,000 capital and the same amount of surplus. It had over \$4,000,000 deposits. Willis S. Paine, former Superintendent of the New York State Banking Department, was President, and he and several other officials of the merged company will become directors of the North American Trust Co. The sale is reported to have been made at 210 per share.

The North American Trust Company of New Jersey has absorbed a number of other companies in that State and elsewhere. Oakleigh Thorne is President of both the New York and New Jersey corporations.

—Joseph P. Ord, who recently resigned as vice-president of the General Electric Co., and who had been previously connected with the accounting department of the West Shore Railroad, has become associated with Messrs. J. P. Morgan & Co.

—James Speyer has been elected a director of the Union Trust Co.

—Messrs. Speyer & Co. recently negotiated the placing in this country of a 8½ per cent. loan to the city of Frankfort, Germany, amounting to 15,000,000 marks. Application will be made to list the securities on the New York Stock Exchange.

—On March 5 records for aggregate and individual balances were broken at the clearing-house. The general balance was \$24,170,838, as against \$20,065,033 for January 16, the biggest day formerly. The individual balance record was broken by the payment of the credit balance of the Bank of the Manhattan Company, which amounted to \$16,471,867. The largest previous individual balance was \$13,462,376, on March 9, 1899.

—Messrs. J. P. Morgan & Co., of New York, Drexel & Co., of Philadelphia, and Morgan, Harjes & Co., of Paris, announce that George W. Perkins, second vice-president of the New York Life Insurance Co., has been admitted as partner in their firms in New York, Philadelphia and Paris. He will be directly connected with the New York house.

Mr. Perkins was born in Chicago in 1862. His father was a general agent of the New York Life Insurance Co. for many years, and when Mr. Perkins was fifteen years old he entered that company's service, rising from office boy to his present place. He is a member of the board of trustees and was recently made chairman of the finance committee. He retains both of these places, notwithstanding his retirement from active service in the executive department of the company.

When President McCall reorganized the New York Life Insurance Company in 1892 the record Mr. Perkins had made in the West attracted attention, with the result that he was made vice-president. An officer of the company said regarding the work done by Mr. Perkins since 1892 in extending the field organization of the company: "It has perhaps never been equalled in life insurance. He is a man of distinctively creative powers. Above everything else, he is a man of action."

In 1897 Mr. Perkins went to Europe, where he negotiated the first loan of a foreign government ever placed in the city of New York, the Russian loan of 20,000,000 roubles. He was active in making the English loan of 1900 and the German loan of the same year successes in the New York market. Within the last two years he has been elected a director of the New York Security and Trust Co. and the National City Bank. He is chairman of the New York and New Jersey commission for preserving the Palisades.

—George H. Byrd and George L. Rives have been made additional directors of the Bank of New York N. B. A., the whole number having been raised from thirteen to fifteen.

—Horace Andrews, of Cleveland, Ohio, and Edwin Thorne, Allan McCulloh and H. S. Black, of this city, were recently elected directors of the North American Trust Co., succeeding Gen. B. F. Tracy, Stanley L. Conklin, F. R. Coudert, Jr., and Samuel M. Jarvis.

—The Nineteenth Ward Bank has increased its capital from \$100,000 to \$200,000.

—On the evening of February 26 the National Bank of North America celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of its organization, by a dinner at the Metropolitan Club. Among the prominent financiers present were the following: William F. Havemeyer, John H. Flagler, Alvah Trowbridge, M. D. Thatcher, H. H. Cook, H. F. Dimock, D. H. Houghtaling and Salem H. Wales.

At the speakers' table sat Edward D. Adams, Chancellor MacCracken, Henry Budge, John Crosby Brown, John Claflin, John J. Donaldson, H. Dowd, Charles R. Flint, Ashbel P. Fitch, Hart Lyman, Col. John J. McCook and Henry Parish.

Letters of regret were read from ex-President Grover Cleveland, Secretary of War Elihu Root, and a telegram of congratulation from Jacob H. Schiff.

In opening the speechmaking President Van Norden said in part:

"The fifty years passed since the bank was chartered have been of greater moment to the world, perhaps, than any other like period. The thought I would like to leave you, however, is that of all the banks in the world there are none more stable than those of this city. I do not say they are the largest, but they are the best managed. We have not had a failure since that of the Metropolitan Bank in 1884. All the gold and silver mined in the past year would not pay the balance of trade in our favor, and we have lent millions to foreign governments. We will not be here at the next semi-centennial anniversary of the Bank of North America, but I believe the bank will be here."

Speeches were made by ex-Comptroller of the Currency A. B. Hepburn, Vice-President of the Chase National Bank; Frederick D. Tappen, President of the Gallatin National Bank; Hon. Joseph C. Hendrix, President of the National Bank of Commerce, S. V. White and John Claflin. The latter gentleman paid a tribute to the financial genius of J. Pierpont Morgan, saying he had "done more for the commercial world than any man who ever lived." J. Nelson Cromwell was the last speaker.

The Bank of North America was chartered on February 26, 1851, and is now one of the old banks in the city. The first President was William F. Havemeyer, who on three different occasions was Mayor of the city, and a familiar figure in business and politics half a century ago. Under Mr. Havemeyer the bank greatly prospered.

Warner Van Norden is now President, and has been for ten years. Under the present administration the business of the bank has greatly increased, until now its assets amount to \$27,810,958, the deposits being \$25,269,034.

—A branch of the Corn Exchange Bank has been established at Astoria, with J. Robert Laws, manager, and Jesse Ellsworth, receiving teller.

—At a regular meeting of the New York Board of Trade and Transportation, February 13, resolutions were passed as follows in regard to bills for taxing Savings banks and trust companies:

"Resolved, That the bill proposing to tax the savings of Savings banks is an exaction of tribute from the provident, frugal and industrious, whose small savings have, in most instances, been gathered by self-imposed privations for the purpose of making provision against future want, and such tax is unnecessary, burdensome and contrary to wise public policy.

Resolved, That the proposed tax on trust companies is excessive and unjust, as calculated to render the business of such corporations unprofitable, to destroy their stability, to impair their usefulness and drive them out of business."

—The Jefferson Bank, which will have a capital of \$200,000 and a paid-in surplus of \$50,000, will begin business in its own building, at the corner of Canal and Forsyth streets, on March 15. The directors of the institution are George F. Vietor, Trenor L. Park, Rudolph Erteloh, Henry L. Cammann, E. A. Richard, H. Broesel, Samuel Strassbourger, Max Radt, Maurice Brill, Leonard Lewisoohn, Moses Valentine, S. Silberman, and Samuel Fleck, Jr. It is expected that H. Broesel will be elected President.

—It is reported that the Seventh National Bank is contemplating the removal of its offices to a new building to be erected at the southeast corner of Broadway and Maiden Lane. The bank has occupied its present quarters, at Broadway and John street, for about fifteen years. Before that time it was for many years at Pearl street and Burling Slip, in the building now occupied by the New York Metal Exchange. The capital of the institution is soon to be increased from \$300,000 to \$500,000.

—Messrs. Zimmermann & Forshay announce that they have admitted Sigmund H. Rosenblatt to partnership in their firm, and that the business of Sigmund H. Rosenblatt & Co. becomes consolidated with theirs, the whole to be conducted under the present firm name, Zimmermann & Forshay. The accession gives the firm a representation of three in the New York Stock Exchange, L. Zimmermann, L. Schafer and S. H. Rosenblatt, all having seats on the board.

—George Blumenthal, of the foreign banking house of Lazard Freres, has announced his

intention of retiring from that firm in July, and for an interval of two years at least he will withdraw entirely from active business. Mr. Blumenthal has been a member of Lazard Freres for eight years, having previously been connected with Speyer & Co. He has been a member of the Stock Exchange since 1893.

—It is understood that Frank A. Vanderlip, who resigned the office of Assistant Secretary of the Treasury recently, will become identified with the National City Bank. Mr. Vanderlip has made a high reputation during his connection with the Treasury Department, and he will be a strong addition to the already notable staff constituting the management of the City Bank.

### NEW ENGLAND STATES.

**Brattleboro, Vt.**—The Vermont National Bank has found that its business will justify the use of additional capital, and has therefore voted to transfer \$50,000 from undivided profits to capital, making the latter \$200,000.

**Bridgeport, Ct.**—It is reported that the North American Investment Co. is seeking charters for several allied institutions to carry on business here, including a National bank, Savings bank, trust and safe deposit company and fire and life insurance companies, with an aggregate capital of \$6,000,000. If the charters are obtained, it is proposed to put up a building to cost \$1,000,000.

**St. Albans, Vt.**—The Welden National Bank now occupies its new building, which is a thoroughly modern and handsome bank structure, equipped with everything necessary for the comfort, safety and convenience of its patrons and officers and employees.

**Norwich, Ct.**—At a special meeting of the trustees of the Norwich Savings Society, February 5, Charles Bard was elected President to succeed the late John Mitchell. Mr. Bard has been a resident of Norwich since 1842, and actively connected with banking and other business interests.

**Providence, R. I.**—It is reported that there is a prospect of a consolidation of several National banks here into the United States National Bank, which will have \$1,000,000 capital.

**Hartford, Ct.**—Henry A. Redfield, President of the Phoenix National Bank, has been elected President of the Hartford Clearing-House Association, to succeed the late James Bolter.

**Taunton, Mass.**—The new Taunton Safe Deposit and Trust Company is now open for business. It was recently organized under the laws of Massachusetts, with \$200,000 capital, and is authorized to engage in a general trust company and banking business.

There is in Taunton nearly \$9,000,000 in National and Savings bank deposits, besides much more that leaves the city and is deposited in trust companies in Boston and Providence, and it is believed that with such a field the Taunton Safe Deposit and Trust Co. will be a highly successful corporation.

The officers and directors are: Edward H. Temple, President; Albert M. Gleason, Vice-President and Treasurer; Bartlett C. Pierce, Secretary.

Directors: Edward H. Temple, treasurer City of Taunton, and member of the board of Investment Taunton Savings Bank; Wm. H. Fox, judge First District Court, Bristol county, and Vice-President Bristol County Savings Bank; Bartlett C. Pierce, treasurer Presbrey Stove Lining Co., Taunton; Willis K. Hodgeman, ex-Mayor city of Taunton, manufacturer printing presses; Frank A. Hubbard, M.D., Taunton; Herbert N. Pierce, superintendent of public buildings, Taunton; Charles R. Lowell, member board of Investment, Greenfield Savings Bank; Louis E. Moore, president Howard, Little & Co., Incorporated, and Massachusetts associates, Newton; Wm. H. Pitman, Treasurer Five Cent Savings Bank, New Bedford; James D. Safford, President City National Bank, Springfield, and Chapman Valve Co., Indian Orchard; Henry M. Melville, third vice-president Great Northern Railway of Canada; Otis H. Luke, President Central National Bank, Boston; J. Frederick Hill, John P. Squire & Co., Boston; Albert M. Gleason, eighteen years Treasurer Greenfield Savings Bank.

### MIDDLE STATES.

**Philadelphia.**—It is announced that the Quaker City National Bank has purchased the building formerly occupied by the Chestnut Street National Bank.

—The Investment Co., of Philadelphia, will increase its capital from \$800,000 to \$1,000,000. Some time ago the company was reorganized, having had previously \$4,000,000 capital. It now has \$1,000,000 surplus and profits.

—W. P. Sinnett, Assistant Cashier of the Market Street National Bank, was recently elected Cashier to succeed B. F. Dennison, who resigned to become treasurer of the Baptist Publication Society.

—A consolidation has been arranged between the Independence National and the Girard National Bank, the former merging into the latter.

The Girard Bank is one of the oldest in the country, having been organized by Stephen Girard in 1810. It occupies the building that was put up for the first Bank of the United States.

**Baltimore.**—The People's Trust Co. has been organized with \$2,500,000 capital. Its business will include a trust department, Savings bank, real estate, title insurance and safe deposit departments.

—It is reported that the stock of the Old Town Bank will be increased from \$150,000 to \$300,000, and that the bank will change from a State to a National institution.

**Pittsburg.**—John W. Herron, of Wm. A. Herron & Sons, L. F. Loree, Vice-President of the Pennsylvania lines west of Pittsburg, and Samuel Bailey, Jr., President of the Commercial National Bank, have bought a large interest in the Real Estate Savings Bank, paying \$175 per share. There will be no change in the officers.

—The capital stock of the Equitable Trust Co. is to be increased from \$250,000 to \$750,000, and the new stock will be sold at \$150, thus increasing the surplus by \$250,000.

—It is reported that the business of the Mercantile Bank will probably be consolidated with the Mercantile Trust Co. The bank was organized in 1894 and has prospered, having added \$100,000 to surplus, making it equal to the capital, and paying \$24,000 in dividends. The two institutions are already closely affiliated, and some recent changes in the banking laws would seem to render it desirable to merge altogether.

—Thomas A. Watkins and others have incorporated the Prudential Trust Co., with \$125,000 capital.

—It is reported that the Valley Trust Co. is being organized here.

**Meeting of Bankers.**—The annual meeting for organization of Group No. 5 of the Pennsylvania State Bankers' Association was held in the rooms of the Hamilton Club, Lancaster, Pa., Tuesday, February 19. The group was represented by bankers from Lancaster, York, Harrisburg, Chambersburg, Mechanicsburg, Dillsburg and other points, and the following specially invited guests: Hon. Marriott Brosius, M. C., Chairman of Committee on Banking and Currency, Washington; Hon. Wm. U. Hensel, ex-Attorney General State of Pennsylvania; Hon. Wm. Penn Lloyd, Mechanicsburg, and D. F. Brenneman, Lancaster.

In the absence of Chairman Grier Herish, W. L. Gorgas, of Harrisburg, was called to the chair. Minutes of the last meeting were adopted, and the report of the treasurer submitted.

Officers for the ensuing year were elected as follows: Chairman, John Hertzler, President Lancaster Trust Co., Lancaster; secretary and treasurer, F. K. Ployer, Cashier Second National Bank, Mechanicsburg.

**Executive Committee**—President, Grier Herish, York National Bank, York; W. K. Alricks, Cashier Dauphin Deposit Bank, Harrisburg; George W. Cook, Cashier Dillsburg National Bank, Dillsburg; John S. McIlvane, Cashier National Bank of Chambersburg, Chambersburg; George W. Haldeman, Cashier First National Bank, Columbia.

The meeting was then favored with an address on "Ideal Money and Bank Currency," by Hon. Marriott Brosius.

(This address is published in full in another part of this issue.)

On motion a vote of thanks was tendered Mr. Brosius for his able and instructive address, and the secretary directed to incorporate a copy of the same in the report of the meeting to the State body.

The members and invited guests then participated in a dinner excellently and well served by Caterer Payne, of the Hamilton Club, presided over by B. F. Brenneman as toastmaster, and at which interesting after-dinner speeches were made by Messrs. Hensel, Lloyd, McIlvane and others.

**Branch Banks in New Jersey.**—A bill has passed the New Jersey Senate, which it is said will authorize banks to operate branches either in the State or elsewhere, and will also permit the consolidation of trust companies.

**Tax on Trust Co. Surplus.**—By a recent decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, the surplus as well as the capital of trust companies is taxable under the laws of that State.

## SOUTHERN STATES.

**Ruston, La.**—The capital of the new Lincoln Parish Bank here was incorrectly stated at \$2,000 in the February issue of the *MAGAZINE*. The capital is \$25,000. Officers are: President, W. R. Lyman; Vice-President, M. A. Laurence; Cashier, J. Rhode Smith.

**Hampton, Va.**—The Bank of Hampton now occupies its new building, which is a very handsome and substantial structure in its exterior appearance, while its interior construction comprises the latest and best ideas of bank and vault building and furnishing. The bank was

organized in 1880 with \$24,000 capital, which was increased to \$50,000 in 1899. J. W. Rowe is President and Jos. C. Outten, Cashier.

**Birmingham, Ala.**—A consolidation has been effected between the Berney National Bank and the First National, of this city, the former bank being merged into the latter. There will be no change in the capital of the First National Bank, but the consolidation will increase its deposits to over \$3,500,000. The bank has been growing rapidly in recent years, its deposits rising from \$700,000 in December, 1895, to \$2,691,000 on December 18, 1900.

—Charters have been obtained for two new banks here—the Birmingham District Savings Bank and the State Savings Bank.

—A fine building is to be put up by the Birmingham Trust and Savings Co.

**North Carolina Banks.**—The following facts in regard to the banks of North Carolina are taken from the recent report of the Corporation Commission:

"There were twenty-six new banks organized in 1900, so that there are ninety-two State banks in operation in the State, as follows: Fifty-six under charters with general banking powers, ten Savings banks and twenty-six private banks.

These banks have a capital of \$2,686,883, against a capital for 1899 of \$2,307,297, making an increase of \$379,085. They have deposits amounting to \$8,674,655, against \$6,511,640 for 1899, an increase of \$2,163,014. The total resources of the State banks, as shown by their last report, was \$14,617,950. We have had the banks to make five reports to us during the year, and have had each of them examined by the examiners, and we have compared the reports with each other and with the reports of the bank examiners, and with pleasure can report that they seem to have had a prosperous year."

**Wheeling, W. Va.**—A clearing-house association has been formed by the banks here. Exchanges on the opening day were \$180,006.

## WESTERN STATES

**Chicago.**—There have been some recent promotions at the Chicago National Bank, F. M. Blount, Cashier, being made an additional Vice-President, and T. M. Jackson, Assistant Cashier, appointed to succeed Mr. Blount as Cashier.

—Twelve National banks in Chicago gained \$14,880,024 in deposits from December 13 to February 5. The reports show that the twelve banks have expanded their loans \$10,970,961.

—A conference of bankers from Illinois and surrounding States was held in this city February 15, the object being, it is reported, to form an association to secure co-operation among the banks in making loans and investments, and in other matters.

—The North American Mortgage Bank and Trust Co. is being organized here to do business on the plan of the German mortgage banks.

—The stock of the National Bank of the Republic is quoted at 135 bid, 140 asked.

**Indianapolis, Ind.**—On February 4 the new American National Bank opened for business with \$250,000 capital, which will be increased to \$300,000. John Perrin is President and H. A. Schlottzauer, Cashier.

—The Capital National Bank was a recent successful bidder for a temporary city loan of \$40,000, at a fraction over three per cent.

**Cleveland, Ohio.**—The Bankers' National Bank is being organized in this city with \$500,000 capital and \$100,000 paid-in surplus. Among the directors are several officers of other banks, and well-known capitalists and business men.

**Kansas City, Mo.**—A considerable interest in the First State Bank, of Argentine, Kansas, has been purchased by the National Bank of Commerce of this city. There will be no change in the management.

**Cincinnati.**—At a meeting of the stockholders of the Brighton German Bank Co., February 26, it was voted to increase the capital stock from \$100,000 to \$200,000.

**Milwaukee, Wis.**—H. H. Camp, President of the Milwaukee Trust Co., recently deeded his valuable house and several lots to the Charity Relief Association of this city. He made a gift of the property in 1894, and since that time has paid rent for his occupancy of it. The Charity Relief Association maintains a fund for the purpose of making loans to the worthy poor. It was founded by Mr. Camp and from a nucleus of \$40,000 the fund has grown to \$85,000. Mr. Camp has for many years been one of the most liberal supporters of the associated charities and the matter of loans to poor people and their protection from usury sharks has particularly interested him.

**Cleveland.**—Dudley Wick, President of the Wick Banking and Trust Co., has decided to retire from business, and has sold his stock. It has been decided to change the name of the institution to the City Trust Co., and the capital will probably be increased from \$250,000 to \$500,000.



**Iowa Banks Growing.**—From 1890 to the close of 1900 the number of State and Savings banks in Iowa increased from 164 to 464; deposits rose from \$25,773,902 to \$97,971,832. In the same time the capital increased from \$8,824,243 to \$18,531,900.

**Detroit, Mich.**—Since June 1, 1890, the State Savings Bank has increased its deposits from \$1,817,673 to \$9,671,456 (February 5, 1901). It has made a gain of 100 per cent. over the figures reported in 1897.

**National Bank Resumes.**—The German National Bank, of Newport, Ky., which suspended and was placed in the hands of a Receiver on November 10 last, has been restored to solvency and resumed business on February 4.

### PACIFIC SLOPE.

**San Francisco.**—It is the intention of the Mercantile Trust Co. to put up a fine new building on Montgomery and California streets.

—From the twenty-fifth annual report of the clearing-house association the following facts are obtained:

The clearings for the year 1900 were.....	\$1,029,582,594.78
The clearings for the year 1899 were.....	971,015,072.28
A gain of.....	\$58,567,522.55

The United States has continued to be a large purchaser at San Francisco during the year 1900 of supplies for the army and navy employed in the Philippines and China, which has fostered business in many lines of trade at San Francisco.

The balances in 1900 were 11 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the clearings, and amounted to.....	\$118,157,405.71
And were paid in U. S. gold coin, 25 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.....	80,587,405.71
And U. S. Treasury gold certificates, 74 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.....	87,570,000.00
The average daily balance for 1900 was.....	389,968.43
And for 1899.....	400,094.84
A decrease of.....	10,136.41

The clearing-house resumed the use of U. S. Treasury gold certificates in the settlement of balances on August 19, 1899, since which time to December 31, 1900, the balances have been in amount.....	\$165,517,016.25
And paid in gold coin, 25 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.....	43,387,016.25
And in certificates, 73 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.....	122,160,000.00

The certificates saved at least a fourfold handling of an equal amount of gold coin, the weight of which would be over 225 $\frac{1}{2}$  tons avoirdupois.

The clearings by half-years for 1899 and 1900 are shown in the following statement:

TIME.	1899.	1900.	Gain.
First half of year.....	\$443,406,306.51	\$482,068,439.72	\$38,662,133.21
Second half of year.....	527,606,765.72	547,494,155.06	19,885,389.34
Totals.....	\$971,015,072.28	\$1,029,582,594.78	\$58,567,522.55

### Failures, Suspensions and Liquidations.

**Illinois.**—The Bank of Desplaines, at Desplaines, Ill., and the Centennial Bank of Ashley, affiliated institutions, closed February 25. Deposits of the former bank are given at \$17,000, and the liabilities of the latter are placed at \$60,000.

**Indiana.**—The Bank of Ellettsville was closed on attachment proceedings February 7. Deposit liabilities were not large.

**Iowa.**—Harvey & Ford, operating the Harrison County Bank, of Logan, and also a department store there, failed recently.

**Michigan.**—The First National Bank of Niles, suspended March 8. Deposits are reported to be \$300,000. It is said that failure is due to lack of adequate provision for a run, and that the bank will resume shortly. The bank has paid substantial dividends for many years, and has passed safely through a number of periods of general crisis.

**Nebraska.**—On February 13, James M. Clark was appointed Receiver of the Nebraska Loan and Trust Co., of Hastings.

**New York.**—At a meeting of the shareholders of the National Bank of Castleton, February 28, the question of reducing the capital or liquidating was considered. It was decided to place the bank in liquidation.

**Texas.**—The First National Bank, of Moulton, has sold its building and paid off deposits.

## NEW BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, ETC.

### NEW NATIONAL BANKS.

The Comptroller of the Currency furnishes the following statement of new National banks organized since our last report. Names of officers and other particulars regarding these new National banks will be found under the different State headings.

#### NATIONAL BANKS ORGANIZED.

- 5695—First National Bank, Medford, Wisconsin. Capital, \$25,000.  
5696—National Bank of Grand Saline, Grand Saline, Texas. Capital, \$30,000.  
5697—Citizens' National Bank, Mexia, Texas. Capital, \$50,000.  
5698—National Bank of Lexington, Lexington, North Carolina. Capital, \$25,000.  
5699—First National Bank, DeLand, Illinois. Capital, \$25,000.  
5700—Waterloo National Bank, Waterloo, Iowa. Capital, \$100,000.  
5701—Point Pleasant National Bank, Point Pleasant, West Virginia. Capital, \$25,000.  
5702—Punxsutawney National Bank, Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$100,000.  
5703—Burt National Bank, Burt, Iowa. Capital, \$40,000.  
5704—First National Bank, Rodgers, Texas. Capital, \$25,000.  
5705—Citizens' National Bank, Great Bend, Kansas. Capital, \$50,000.  
5706—First National Bank, Lyle, Minnesota. Capital, \$25,000.  
5707—First National Bank, Gowrie, Iowa. Capital, \$25,000.  
5708—Glassport National Bank, Glassport, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$50,000.  
5709—First National Bank, Jackson, Georgia. Capital, \$30,000.  
5710—First National Bank, Roxton, Texas. Capital, \$30,000.  
5711—First National Bank, Archer City, Texas. Capital, \$25,000.  
5712—Ocean County National Bank of Point Pleasant Beach, Point Pleasant, New Jersey. Capital, \$50,000.  
5713—First National Bank, Clayton, New Mexico. Capital, \$25,000.  
5714—First National Bank, Geneva, Alabama. Capital, \$25,000.  
5715—Mississippi National Bank, Port Gibson, Mississippi. Capital, \$75,000.  
5716—American National Bank, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Capital, \$100,000.  
5717—First National Bank, Moundsville, West Virginia. Capital, \$50,000.  
5718—First National Bank, Pennington, New Jersey. Capital, \$25,000.  
5719—First National Bank, Cumby, Texas. Capital, \$50,000.  
5720—Tempe National Bank, Tempe, Arizona. Capital, \$35,000.  
5721—First National Bank, Nevada, Texas. Capital, \$25,000.  
5722—First National Bank, Grand Saline, Texas. Capital, \$25,000.  
5723—First National Bank, Apollo, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$50,000.  
5724—First National Bank, Marlow, Indian Territory. Capital, \$30,000.  
5725—Scottsville National Bank, Scottsville, Virginia. Capital, \$25,000.  
5726—Citizens' National Bank, Hope, Indiana. Capital, \$25,000.  
5727—Gold Standard National Bank, Marienville, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$50,000.  
5728—First National Bank, Dodd City, Texas. Capital, \$30,000.  
5729—First National Bank, Natrona, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$25,000.

#### APPLICATIONS TO ORGANIZE NATIONAL BANKS APPROVED.

The following notices of intention to organize National banks have been approved by the Comptroller of the Currency since last advice:

- First National Bank, Aspermont, Texas; by Wm. Harvey, *et al.*  
First National Bank, Memphis, Texas; by D. Browder, *et al.*  
First National Bank, Montgomery, Ind.; by J. M. Crawford, *et al.*  
First National Bank, Sheridanville, Pa.; by John Murphy, *et al.*  
Farmers' National Bank, Lititz, Pa.; by P. J. Roebuck, *et al.*  
First National Bank, Clarington, Ohio; by Julius Steiger, *et al.*  
First National Bank, Barnesboro, Pa.; by J. S. Miller, *et al.*  
Old Citizens' National Bank, Zanesville, Ohio; by H. A. Sharpe, *et al.*  
First National Bank, Blossom, Texas; by J. D. Norwood, *et al.*  
First National Bank, Ritzville, Wash.; by R. C. Kennedy, *et al.*

Delmont National Bank, Delmont, Pa.; by Jos. R. McQuaide, *et al.*  
 Kingfisher National Bank, Kingfisher, Okla.; by L. F. Potter, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Clifton, Ariz.; by A. G. Smith, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Trenton, Texas; by J. B. Robinson, *et al.*  
 Farmers and Merchants' National Bank, Gilmer, Texas; by W. B. Womack, *et al.*  
 Cresson National Bank, Cresson, Pa.; by John K. Powell, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Lebanon, Kans.; by J. R. Burrow, *et al.*  
 Lansdowne National Bank, Lansdowne, Pa.; by Daniel T. Mullen, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Cape May, N. J.; by Westley R. Wales, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Tlahomingo, I. T.; by A. B. Dunlap, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Flandreau, S. D.; by James T. Bigelow, *et al.*  
 American National Bank, Barberton, Ohio; by Anthony W. Blackburn, *et al.*  
 Citizens' National Bank, Jacksboro, Texas; by T. C. Phillips, *et al.*  
 Farmers' National Bank, Mangum, Okla.; by T. C. Phillips, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Harrison, Ark.; by T. H. Dunn, *et al.*  
 City National Bank, Okmulgee, I. T.; by Sam Rose, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Killeen, Texas; by J. M. Warren, *et al.*  
 Ladonia National Bank, Ladonia, Texas; by W. C. Evans, *et al.*  
 Standard National Bank, Pittsburg, Pa.; by James Kifer, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Hanford, Cal.; by S. C. Lillis, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Boyd, Texas; by B. B. Samuels, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Hondo, Texas; by W. W. Collier, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Clifton Heights, Pa.; by Nathaniel S. Keay, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Watonga, Okla.; by W. R. Kelley, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Thief River Falls, Minn.; by L. C. Simons, *et al.*  
 Citizens' National Bank, Shreveport, La.; by S. B. McCutchen, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Wetumpka, I. T.; by H. H. Holman, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Sulphur, I. T.; by C. J. Webster, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Welsh, La.; by L. E. Robinson, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Covina, Cal.; by F. M. Douglass, *et al.*  
 Lehigh National Bank, Lehigh, I. T.; by F. R. Phillips, *et al.*  
 Southern National Bank, Wynnewood, I. T.; by A. B. Dunlap, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Idaho Falls, Idaho; by Robert Anderson, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Barry, Ill.; by T. A. Retallic, *et al.*  
 Manufacturers and Merchants' National Bank, Bridgeport, Conn.; by David S. Beach, *et al.*  
 Itasca National Bank, Itasca, Texas; by W. H. Coffman, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Thorndale, Texas; by J. B. Wills, *et al.*  
 McKees Rocks National Bank, McKees Rocks, Pa.; by James M. McNeill, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Carmichaels, Pa.; by F. M. Mitchener, *et al.*

## APPLICATION FOR CONVERSION TO NATIONAL BANKS APPROVED.

Bank of Elmwood, Elmwood, Neb.; into First National Bank.  
 People's Bank, Kingfisher, Okla.; into People's National Bank.

## NEW BANKS, BANKERS, ETC.

## ALABAMA.

BIRMINGHAM—State Savings Bank; capital, \$50,000. — Birmingham District Savings Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., W. J. Dangais; Vice-Pres., J. A. Van Hooe; Cas., Geo. D. Reynolds.

## ARIZONA.

TEMPE—Tempe National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., C. G. Jones; Vice-Pres., A. C. Ozanne; Cas., W. H. Wilbur.

## ARKANSAS.

DE QUEEN—Bank of De Queen; capital, \$15,000; Pres., J. H. Jackson; Cas., Otis T. Wingo; Asst. Cas., James Clemmons.  
 JONESBORO—Jonesboro Savings and Trust Co.; capital, \$5,000; Pres., F. T. Matthews; Vice-Pres., W. T. Lane; Sec., W. T. Malone.  
 TEXARKANA—Merchants and Planters' Bank; capital, \$200,000; Pres., G. W. Foulke; Vice-Pres., B. M. Foreman; Cas., Thos. H. Sims.

## CALIFORNIA.

COVINA—Covina Valley Savings Bank.

## COLORADO.

CRESTONE—San Luis Valley Bank (G. A. Luikart & Co.); capital, \$5,000.  
 PAGOSA SPRINGS—First Bank.  
 PUEBLO—Italian-American Bank; L. Mar-dini, Pres.  
 SUGAR CITY—Citizens' Bank (Silliman, Williams & Co.)

## GEORGIA.

BARTOW—Bartow Bank; Pres., William S. Witham Cas., E. M. Clark.  
 ELLIJAY—Gilmer County Bank; Pres., John H. Carter; Cas., B. S. Holden.  
 GRAYMONT—Bank of Graymont.  
 JACKSON—First National Bank; capital, \$30,000; Pres., R. F. Maddox; Vice-Pres., J. R. Carmichael.  
 ROSWELL—Roswell Bank.

**WILLACOOCHIE**—Bank of Willacoochee; capital, \$15,000; Pres., J. B. Oberly; Cas., Geo. F. McCraime.

#### ILLINOIS.

**ASHMORE**—Corn Exchange Bank; capital, \$30,000.

**CHICAGO**—North American Mortgage Bank and Trust Co.

**DE LAND**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Thomas E. Bondurant; Cas., G. R. Trenchard.

**JOLIET**—Farmers and Merchants' Trust and Savings Bank; capital, \$100,000.

**LEMONT**—Lemont City Bank.

**LERNA**—Lerna Banking Co.

**MACOMB**—McDonough County Bank (J. O. Peasley & Co.); capital, \$50,000.

**MOWEAQUA**—Ayars Bros.

**VERMONT**—Bank of Vermont (Walter Wyne & Co.); capital, \$10,000.

#### INDIANA.

**FRANKFORT**—Frankfort Loan and Trust Co.; capital, \$25,000.

**HOPE**—Citizens' National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Joseph Burney; Cas., Frank Stapp.

**INDIANAPOLIS**—Security Trust Co., of Ind.; capital, \$50,000; Pres., Americus C. Dailey. —American Safe Deposit Co.; capital, \$50,000.

**LAFAYETTE**—Farmers and Traders' Bank; capital, \$65,000; Pres., Duane D. Jacobs; Cas., Geo. A. Jamison; Asst. Cas., Walter I. Snider.

#### INDIAN TERRITORY.

**MARLOW**—First National Bank; capital, \$30,000; Pres., Joel D. Sugg; Cas., Thomas P. Martin, Jr.

**MOUNDS**—Bank of Mounds.

**WETUMKA**—Bank of Wetumka.

#### IOWA.

**BARNES CITY**—Bank of Barnes City.

**BURT**—Burt National Bank (successor to Burt Bank); capital, \$40,000; Pres., C. C. Chubb; Vice-Pres., Thomas F. Cooke; Cas., C. H. Blossom; Asst. Cas., H. O. Buell.

**GOWRIE**—First National Bank (successor to Webster County State Bank); capital, \$25,000; Cas., N. A. Lindquist.

**GUTHRIE CENTER**—United States Loan and Trust Co.; capital, \$40,000.

**REMBRANDT**—Bank of Rembrandt.

**SUNBURY**—Sunbury Savings Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., W. F. Jones; Cas., C. J. Specht, Jr.

**SUPERIOR**—Superior Savings Bank.

**WATERLOO**—Waterloo National Bank (successor to Waterloo State Bank); capital, \$100,000; Pres., Richard Holmes; Cas., J. D. Eaton.

#### KANSAS.

**GARDEN CITY**—Stockmen's State Bank; capital, \$30,000.

**GREAT BEND**—Citizens' National Bank;

capital, \$50,000; Pres., Edward R. Moses; Cas., Reuben H. Moses.

**GREENSBURG**—Stockman's State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., Fred. W. Casner; Cas., Geo. G. Price.

**ST. JOHN**—Citizens' State Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., A. H. Ainsworth; Vice-Pres., F. B. Gillmore; Cas., S. A. D. Glasscock.

**WATHENA**—Wathena Fruit Growers' State Bank; Pres., B. N. Forbes; Vice-Pres., F. W. Drosselmeir; Cas., Pearle M. Forbes.

#### KENTUCKY.

**ARLINGTON**—Bank of Arlington.

**CROFTON**—Bank of Crofton; capital, \$15,000; Pres., J. E. Croft.

**OLIVE HILL**—Olive Hill Deposit Bank.

#### LOUISIANA.

**ALGIERS**—Algiers Savings Bank.

**NEW ORLEANS**—Morgan State Bank; Pres., J. R. Norman.

**WINNFIELD**—Bank of Winnfield; capital, \$50,000.

**RUSTON**—Lincoln Parish Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., W. R. Lyman; Vice-Pres., M. A. Laurence; Cas., J. Rhode Smith.

#### MARYLAND.

**BALTIMORE**—People's Trust Co.; capital, \$2,500,000; E. K. Legg, Pres., *pro tem.*; Harry C. McJilton, Sec., *pro tem.*—Lee & Co.

**CUMBERLAND**—Inter-State Trust and Guarantee Company.

**ST. MICHAELS**—Miller Savings and Investment Institution; organizing.

#### MASSACHUSETTS.

**CAMBRIDGE**—Cambridgeport Trust Co.; capital, \$300,000.

**WALTHAM**—Waltham Loan and Trust Co.

#### MICHIGAN.

**ARMADA**—Armada Savings Bank (successor to Burt C. Preston); capital, \$25,000.

**BIG RAPIDS**—Bank of Big Rapids; capital, \$30,000; Pres., D. H. Power; Cas., D. B. Lyons.

**CALEDONIA**—State Bank; capital, \$30,000.

**DEERFIELD**—Bank of Deerfield.

**MILLERSBURG**—Exchange Bank.

#### MINNESOTA.

**BAGLEY**—Bank of Bagley (Jacobson & Co.); capital, \$10,000.

**HENNING**—State Bank.

**LYLE**—First National Bank (successor to Exchange Bank); capital, \$25,000; Pres., A. H. Anderson; Cas., F. M. Bach.

**RUSSELL**—Bank of Russell; Cas., G. W. Cochran.

**TYLER**—First State Bank.

#### MISSISSIPPI.

**CRYSTAL SPRINGS**—Bank of Commerce; capital, \$60,000.

**MERIDIAN**—People's Savings Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Geo. W. Meyer; Vice-Pres., Frank W. Williams; Cas., W. A. Matin.

PORT GIBSON—Mississippi National Bank; capital, \$75,000; Pres., Jacob Bernheimer; Cas., A. K. Jones; Asst. Cas., E. G. Parton.

### MISSOURI.

CENTERVILLE—Reynolds County Bank.

ST. LOUIS—Title Guaranty Trust Co.

ST. MARYS—Bank of St. Marys; capital, \$10,000; Pres., E. S. Lawbaugh; Cas., Charles R. Bartels.

### NEBRASKA.

GRETA—Farmers and Merchants' Bank (successor to Spearman, Snodgrass & Co.); capital, \$18,000; Pres., H. A. Clarke; Cas., A. G. Burbank.

### NEW JERSEY.

MONTCLAIR—Montclair Trust Co.; capital, \$100,000.

PENNINGTON—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Ephraim S. Wells; Vice-Pres., John W. Hart; Cas., W. D. Hunt.

POINT PLEASANT—Ocean County National Bank of Point Pleasant Beach; capital, \$50,000; Pres., Jno. G. W. Havens; Cas., Jasper Bray.

### NEW MEXICO.

CLAYTON—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., C. Q. Chandler; Cas., H. J. Hammond.

### NEW YORK.

ASTORIA—Corn Exchange Bank (branch); J. Robert Laws, Jr., Manager.

BROOKLYN—Empire Surety Co.

JAMAICA—Queens County Title and Trust Co.; capital, \$100,000.

NEW YORK—Jefferson Bank; capital, \$200,000; surplus, \$50,000; Pres., H. Broesel.

RIVERHEAD—Riverhead State Bank (successor to Howell M. Reeve); Pres., Howell M. Reeve; Cas., Edwin D. Fishel.

### NORTH CAROLINA.

CHARLOTTE—Charlotte Savings Bank, organizing.

LEXINGTON—National Bank of Lexington; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Zeb. V. Walser; Cas., Robert L. Burkhead.

RALEIGH—Central Trust Co.

STATESVILLE—Statesville Loan and Trust Co.; capital, \$25,000; Pres., M. K. Steele; Vice-Pres., Eugene Morrison; Secretary and Treasurer, D. L. Ausley.

TROY—Bank of Montgomery; capital, \$10,000; Pres., W. J. Armfield, Jr.; Cas., J. G. Tomlinson.

### OHIO.

AKRON—Security Savings Bank Co.; capital, \$50,000.

CLEVELAND—Bankers' National Bank; capital, \$500,000; Pres., Luther Allen; Vice-Pres., Charles N. Schmick; Cas., Joseph R. Kraus.

COLLINWOOD—Collinwood Savings Bank Co.; capital, \$50,000.

ELYRIA—Elyria Savings and Banking Co.;

capital, \$50,000; Pres., Wm. A. Braman; Cas., W. C. Le Master.

HAMLER—Commercial Bank.

LOOKLAND—Cincinnati Trust Co., branch.

TOLEDO—Imperial Savings Co.

### OKLAHOMA.

BUSCH—Bank of Busch; capital, \$10,000.

OKLAHOMA—American National Bank; capital, \$100,000; Pres., W. S. Search; Cas., John S. Corley.

PARKERSBURG—Bank of Parkersburg; capital, \$10,000.

### PENNSYLVANIA.

APOLLO—First National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., Walter S. George; Cas., Charles P. Wolfe.

GLASSPORT—Glassport National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., James Evans; Vice-Pres., S. A. Bryce; Cas., J. A. Klingensmith.

HAZELWOOD—Hazelwood Savings Trust Co.; Pres., W. H. Barker; Vice-Pres., F. C. Kohne.

MARIENVILLE—Gold Standard National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., I. N. Shannon; Cas., H. S. Keck.

NATRONA—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Robert Heerlein; Cas., J. G. Campbell.

NEW CASTLE—Lawrence Savings and Trust Co.; capital, \$300,000.

PITTSBURG—American Trust Co.; capital, \$1,000,000.—Prudential Trust Co.; capital, \$125,000.—Valley Trust Co.; capital, \$125,000.

PUNXSUTAWNEY—Punxsutawney National Bank; capital, \$100,000; Pres., W. W. Winslow; Vice-Pres., S. A. Rinn; Cas., F. C. Lang.

READING—Neversink Bank; capital, \$50,000.

SCOTSDALE—Scottdale Savings and Trust Co.; capital, \$150,000.

SCRANTON—Title Guaranty and Trust Co.; capital, \$150,000; Pres., L. A. Watres; A. H. McClintock and H. A. Knapp, Vice-Presidents; Sec., Ralph S. Hull; Treas., Herman Osthaus.

### SOUTH CAROLINA.

BISHOPVILLE—Bank of Bishopville; capital, \$25,000.

LIBERTY—Liberty Bank; capital, \$25,000.

WOODRUFF—Bank of Woodruff; capital, \$50,000.

### SOUTH DAKOTA.

RAMONA—Ramona State Bank.

WHITE—Farmers' State Bank (successor to Bank of White); Pres., E. W. Davies; Vice-Pres., I. Atkinson; Cas., W. B. Denhart; Asst. Cas., R. H. Holden.

WILMOT—Farmers' State Bank; Pres., C. F. Porter; Vice-Pres., Anton Foss; Cas., L. S. Hougen.

### TENNESSEE.

GLEASON—Gleason Banking Co.; capital, \$30,000.

**KENTON**—People's Bank; capital, \$50,000.  
**MEMPHIS**—Title Guarantee and Trust Co.; capital, \$100,000.  
**NASHVILLE**—Nashville Security Co.; capital, \$7,500.—Duncan-Early Banking Co.; capital, \$10,000.  
**SPRING HILL**—Spring Hill Bank; capital, \$15,000.

**TEXAS.**

**ARCHER CITY**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., T. H. Marberry; Cas., W. H. Taylor.  
**BRECKENRIDGE**—Ward Bros.  
**CUMBY**—First National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., J. A. Brewer; Cas., C. M. Patton.  
**DODD CITY**—First National Bank; capital, \$30,000; Pres., S. D. McGee; Cas., A. W. Wilson.  
**DUNDEE**—Citizens' Bank.  
**GRAND SALINE**—National Bank of Grand Saline; capital, \$30,000; Pres., J. E. Persons; Cas., T. B. Meeks.—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., H. Rather; Cas., H. F. Archinard.  
**MEXIA**—Citizens' National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., J. D. Jackson; Cas., Tracy McKenzie.  
**NEVADA**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., T. W. Leverett; Cas., M. J. Dennis.  
**PALMER**—Citizens' Bank.  
**RODGERS**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., George C. Pendleton; Cas., J. H. Wear.

**ROXTON**—First National Bank; capital, \$30,000; Pres., A. H. Bywaters; Cas., Walter Bywaters.  
**WOLFE CITY**—J. H. Nail & Co.

**VIRGINIA.**

**NORFOLK**—Norfolk Dime Savings Bank.  
**ROANOKE**—Southwest Virginia Trust Co.  
**SCOTTSDALE**—Scottsville National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Wm. Dorrier; Cas., Walter S. Dorrier.

**WASHINGTON.**

**RITZVILLE**—Pioneer State Bank.

**WEST VIRGINIA.**

**MOUNDSVILLE**—First National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., B. F. Hodgman; Cas., R. R. Barrett.  
**POINT PLEASANT**—Point Pleasant National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., James Capehart; Cas., W. L. McCoy.

**WISCONSIN.**

**BELLEVILLE**—Belleville Bank; capital, \$4,000.  
**BRILLION**—Citizens' Bank; Cas., O. C. Behnke.  
**MEDFORD**—First National Bank (successor to Commercial State Bank); capital, \$25,000; Pres., F. D. Shaw; Cas., L. Sperbeck.

**CANADA.****QUEBEC.**

**ST. RAYMOND**—People's Bank of Halifax.

**BRITISH COLUMBIA.**

**GRAND FORKS**—Grand Forks In. and Trust Co.

**CHANGES IN OFFICERS, CAPITAL, ETC.****ALABAMA.**

**BIRMINGHAM**—First National Bank and Berney National Bank, consolidated under former title.  
**BRIDGEPORT**—Bank of Bridgeport; T. R. Patterson, Cas., deceased.  
**JACKSONVILLE**—Tredegar National Bank; H. L. Stevenson, Pres., in place of P. Rowan; J. F. Crow, Vice-Pres., in place of J. W. Burke.  
**SELMA**—City National Bank; H. I. Shelley, Cas., in place of A. G. Parrish; W. S. Menk, Asst. Cas., in place of H. I. Shelley.  
**TALLADEGA**—Isbell National Bank; W. H. Boynton, Pres., in place of Wm. P. Armstrong; F. P. McConnell, Cas., in place of W. H. Boynton; no Asst. Cas. in place of F. P. McConnell.

**ALASKA.**

**JUNEAU**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of H. H. Eddy.

**ARIZONA.**

**PHOENIX**—Phoenix National Bank; Thomas W. Pemberton, Vice-Pres., in place of C. J. Hall; C. J. Hall, Cas., in place of E. B. Knox.

**CALIFORNIA.**

**FRESNO**—Fresno National Bank; Dan Brown, Jr., Asst. Cas., in place of C. A. Murdock.

**LOS ANGELES**—Broadway Bank & Trust Co.; capital increased from \$35,000 to \$75,000.

**MONROVIA**—First National Bank; K. E. Lawrence, Asst. Cas.

**PASADENA**—Pasadena National Bank; L. Perrin, Pres., in place of J. Carvarosso Fraser; H. W. Hines, Vice-Pres., in place of M. E. Wood.—First National Bank; H. I. Stuart, Asst. Cas., in place of H. Newby.  
**REDLANDS**—First National Bank; S. R. Hemingway, Cas., in place of J. W. Wilson; no Asst. Cas.

**SALINAS**—First National Bank; C. J. Whisman, Asst. Cas., in place of O. Root.

**SAN DIEGO**—First National Bank; D. F. Garretson, Vice-Pres., in place of Heber Ingle; G. W. Fishburn, Cas., in place of D. F. Garretson.

**SAN FRANCISCO**—Crocker-Woolworth National Bank; C. E. Green, Vice-Pres., in place of Wm. E. Brown.

**SANTA BARBARA**—First National Bank; Ellwood Cooper, Vice Pres., in place of Geo. H. Gould.

**SANTA PAULA**—First National Bank; A. L. Shively, Asst. Cas.

**ST. HELENA**—Carver National Bank; Jacob Graf, Vice-Pres., in place of G. L. Pratt; Leo. H. Martin, Asst. Cas.

**WHITTIER**—First National Bank; A. Hadley, Vice-Pres.; A. C. Maple, Asst. Cas.

#### COLORADO.

**COLORADO SPRINGS**—El Paso National Bank; C. C. Hemming, Vice-Pres.; C. L. Hemming, Cas., in place of C. C. Hemming; C. H. White, Asst. Cas.—Exchange National Bank; V. C. Talbert, Asst. Cas.

**GLENWOOD SPRINGS**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of A. J. Marion.

**LEADVILLE**—American National Bank; Chas. L. Hill, Vice-Pres., in place of Charles Limberg; Geo. W. Goodell, Cas., in place of F. O. Stend; no Asst. Cas. in place of Geo. W. Goodell.

#### CONNECTICUT.

**EAST HADDAM**—National Bank of New England; W. C. Reynolds, Pres. in place of Julius Attwood, deceased.

**GUILFORD**—Guilford National Bank; Alfred R. Griswold, Asst. Cas.

**HARTFORD**—Hartford Clearing-House; H'y A. Redfield, Pres. in place of James Bolter, deceased.

**MIDDLETOWN**—First National Bank; Earle C. Butler, Asst. Cas.

**NORWICH**—First Nat. Bank; D. B. Spalding, Pres. in place of Charles Bard, resigned; F. S. Jerome, Vice-Pres. in place of Lewis A. Hyde.—Norwich Savings Society; Chas. Bard, Pres. in place of John Mitchell, deceased.

#### DELAWARE.

**WILMINGTON**—Central National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of A. A. Capelle.

#### DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

**WASHINGTON**—Lincoln National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of J. Edgar Walters.

#### FLORIDA.

**ARCADIA**—First National Bank; E. A. Houston, Asst. Cas. in place of Chas. J. Carlton.

**PALATKA**—Putnam National Bank; T. B. Merrill, Cas. in place of P. A. Smith.

#### GEORGIA.

**ATLANTA**—Bankers' Trust Co.; capital increased to \$150,000.

**CARROLLTON**—Carrollton Bank; J. T. Bradley, Pres.; C. H. Stewart, Vice-Pres.—First National Bank; E. G. Kramer, Vice-Pres.

**COLUMBUS**—Third National Bank; George C. Bates, Asst. Cas. in place of J. W. Murphy, Jr.

#### IDAHO.

**BOISE CITY**—First National Bank of Idaho; Geo. F. Redway, Cas. in place of Chas. Himrod; R. F. McAfee, Asst. Cas. in place of Geo. F. Redway.

#### ILLINOIS.

**BEARDSTOWN**—First National Bank; J. H. Coleman, Second Asst. Cas.

**BEMENT**—First National Bank; Fred H. Camp, Asst. Cas.

**BIGGSVILLE**—First National Bank; A. P. McHenry, Asst. Cas.

**CARLYLE**—First National Bank; August Schlafly, Vice-Pres.; J. F. Schlafly, Cas. in place of Aug. Schlafly; J. Matthew Krebs, Asst. Cas.

**CHICAGO**—Oakland National Bank; A. C. Tyler, Vice-Pres.; B. M. Kelly, Asst. Cas. in place of L. S. Kennicott.—Chicago National Bank; F. M. Blount, additional Vice-Pres.; T. M. Jackson, Cas. in place of F. M. Blount.—Corn Exchange National Bank; D. A. Moulton and Robert M. Orr, additional Vice-Pres.; B. C. Sammons and J. E. Maass, Asst. Cas. in place of D. A. Moulton.—First National Bank of Englewood; E. F. Olson, Asst. Cas.

**CODDEN**—First National Bank; Nathaniel Green, Vice-Pres.

**DALLAS CITY**—First National Bank; N. H. Dowd, Vice-Pres.; W. H. Bliss, Cas. in place of Chas. F. Leinbaugh.

**FLORA**—First National Bank; R. Smith, Pres. in place of Osman Pixley; H. F. Pixley, Cas. in place of Randolph Smith.

**GALESBURG**—Galesburg National Bank; W. W. Washburn, Vice-Pres. in place of Wm. Robson.

**GEORGETOWN**—First National Bank; H. J. Elliott, Asst. Cas.

**GRANITE CITY**—First National Bank; John H. Dillon, Asst. Cas.

**HARRISBURG**—City National Bank; John B. Lee, Asst. Cas. in place of P. H. Galaner.—First National Bank; O. M. Karraker, Asst. Cas.

**KANKAKEE**—First National Bank; Edward Teed, Asst. Cas.

**LAWRENCEVILLE**—First National Bank; G. M. Whittaker, Pres. in place of P. W. Barnes; Charles F. Breen, Vice-Pres. in place of G. M. Whittaker.

**LINCOLN**—Lincoln National Bank; John Jay Cassett, Asst. Cas.

**MATTOON**—Mattoon National Bank; W. T. Avery, Asst. Cas.

**MOLINE**—Moline National Bank; Sol. Hirsch, Cas. instead of Acting Cas.

**MT. VERNON**—Ham National Bank; Sidney B. Ham, Vice-Pres. in place of Alva C. Johnson.

**MURPHYSBORO**—First National Bank; J. Van Cloostere, Vice-Pres. in place of James Alexander, deceased.

**NAPERSVILLE**—First National Bank; H. H. Goodrich, Vice-Pres. in place of M. Brown.

**OREGON**—First National Bank; Joseph L. Rice, Pres. in place of George A. Mix; George A. Mix, Vice-Pres. in place of Jos. L. Rice.

**PONTIAC**—Livingston County National Bank; W. H. Priestman, Second Vice-Pres. in place of Thomas Williams.

**PEORIA**—Central National Bank; Benjamin F. Blossom, Vice-Pres. and Cas.; no Asst. Cas. in place of F. T. Blossom.

**PIPER CITY**—First National Bank; John McKinney, Vice-Pres.; R. A. Jennings, Asst. Cas.

**ROCKFORD**—Manufacturers' National Bank; W. B. Mulford, Asst. Cas. in place of C. E. Herrick.—Forest City National Bank; E. E. Brumbaugh Asst. Cas.

**SPRINGFIELD**—Illinois National Bank; Chas. G. Brown, Vice-Pres. in place of James A. Connelly.

**STONINGTON**—First National Bank; A. B. Chapman, Jr., Pres. in place of Warren Corzine.

**SYCAMORE**—Sycamore National Bank; P. M. Alden, Cas. in place of Chas. E. Walker.

**TAYLORVILLE**—Farmers' National Bank; D. W. Johnston, Vice-Pres.; R. A. Jennings, Asst. Cas.

**WATSEKA**—First National Bank; A. Honywell, Vice-Pres. in place of John L. Hamilton, deceased.

#### INDIANA.

**ANDERSON**—National Exchange Bank; no Asst. Cas.

**BEDFORD**—Bedford National Bank; Thomas J. Brooks, Vice-Pres. in place of W. H. Smith; W. A. Brown, Asst. Cas. in place of Wm. Erwin.

**BOSWELL**—First National Bank; John S. Lawson, Vice-Pres.; Samuel G. Van Natta, Asst. Cas.

**BROOKVILLE**—Franklin County National Bank; Louis Federman, Vice-Pres.; Frank Geis, Jr., Asst. Cas.

**EVANSVILLE**—Old National Bank; R. K. Dunkerson, Pres. in place of John Gilbert; John Gilbert, Vice-Pres. in place of R. K. Dunkerson.

**GREENSBURG**—Citizens' National Bank; Charles W. Woodward, Cas. in place of Louis E. Lathrop; no Asst. Cas. in place of Chas. W. Woodward.

**LA FAYETTE**—Perrin National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of John O. Perrin.

**LEWISVILLE**—First National Bank; Oliver Greenstreet, Vice-Pres.

**LOGANSPOUT**—City National Bank; W. H. Bell, Vice-Pres. in place of I. N. Crawford.

**LOWELL**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of Albert Foster.

**MONTPELIER**—First National Bank; H. B. Smith, Vice-Pres.; L. E. Maddox, Asst. Cas.

**MUNICE**—Merchants' National Bank; F. A. Brown, Asst. Cas.—Union National Bank; Theodore F. Rose, Pres. in place of Carl A. Spilker, resigned.

**ORLEANS**—National Bank of Orleans; Geo. H. Carter, Vice-Pres.

**PERU**—Citizens' National Bank; C. M. Charters, Asst. Cas.

**PRINCETON**—People's National Bank; O. P. Welborn, Asst. Cas. in place of Will Blair.

**INDIANAPOLIS**—American National Bank; capital increased to \$300,000.

**RUSHVILLE**—Rush County National Bank; Wm. A. Cullen, Vice-Pres.

**SOUTH BEND**—South Bend National Bank; William Miller, Pres., deceased; L. Hubbard, Vice-Pres. in place of D. R. Leeper.

—Citizens' National Bank; E. H. Miller, Asst. Cas.

**SULLIVAN**—National Bank of Sullivan; I. N. Snow, Asst. Cas. in place of Ben C. Crowder.

**UNION CITY**—Atlas Bank; Wm. Elstin, Pres.; S. H. Dunn, Cas.

**VINCENNES**—First National Bank; H. V. Somers, Jr., Asst. Cas.

#### INDIAN TERRITORY.

**ARDMORE**—First National Bank; B. F. Frenslly, Vice-Pres. in place of C. C. Hemming; B. M. Torbett, Asst. Cas. in place of C. L. Hemming.

**BARTLESVILLE**—First National Bank; G. B. Keeler, Vice-Pres.

**CHICKASHA**—Citizens' National Bank; Wm. Inman, Vice-Pres.; Ed. F. Johns, Cas. in place of C. T. Erwin; C. T. Erwin, Asst. Cas. in place of J. W. Des Combes.

**DUNCAN**—First National Bank; R. J. Allen, Asst. Cas.

**DURANT**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of Fred L. Davis.—Durant National Bank; Tom Hale, Vice-Pres.; C. T. Ingram, Second Vice-Pres.

**MADILL**—First National Bank (Cotton National Bank, removed from Oakland); F. R. Hedrick, Cas.; no Asst. Cas. in place of C. B. Burnham.

**MIAMI**—First National Bank; G. W. Beck, Vice-Pres.

**MUSCOGEE**—Commercial National Bank; L. A. Winston, Cas. in place of Ira B. Kirkland; R. W. Still, Asst. Cas.

**NOWATA**—First National Bank; Wm. Johnstone, Vice-Pres.; W. J. Endly, Asst. Cas.

**ROFF**—First National Bank; Lorenz Rodke, Vice-Pres. in place of H. G. Beard; L. C. Parmenter, Cas. in place of P. A. Janeway.

**SOUTH MCALISTER**—First National Bank; F. S. Genung, Pres. in place of J. H. Gordon; W. J. Wade, Vice-Pres. in place of F. S. Genung; E. J. Fanning, Second Vice-Pres.—State National Bank; L. W. Bryan, Pres. in place of J. J. McAlester; E. H. Allen, Vice-Pres. in place of L. W. Bryan.

#### IOWA.

**AMES**—Union National Bank; E. H. Stanton, Vice-Pres., in place of Daniel McCarthy; G. H. Tilden, Asst. Cas. in place of A. S. Needham.

**BUFFALO CENTER**—First National Bank; Jno. P. Young, Asst. Cas.

**BANCROFT**—First National Bank; J. B. Johnson, Vice-Pres.; W. P. Johnson, Asst. Cas.

**CEDAR FALLS**—Citizens' National Bank; Adam Boysen, Vice-Pres.; W. E. Albertson, Asst. Cas.

**CHARTER OAK**—First National Bank; P. F. Fiene, Asst. Cas., in place of F. W. Kammann.

**CLINTON**—City National Bank; A. G. Smith, Pres., in place of A. L. Stone, resigned; A. C. Smith, Cas., in place of A. G. Smith; no Asst. Cas. in place of A. C. Smith.



DAVENPORT—Davenport National Bank; Henry G. Egbert, Pres., deceased.

DECORAH—National Bank of Decorah; Wm. F. Baker, Asst. Cas.

DES MOINES—Iowa Loan and Trust Co.; W. E. Coffin, Pres.; J. H. Blair, Sec. and Treas.

DE WITT—First National Bank; Wm. Lee, Vice-Pres., in place of J. N. Arthur.

FAIRFIELD—First National Bank; S. L. Dana, Asst. Cas.

GARNER—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of Sam A. Schneider.

GLIDDEN—First National Bank; N. W. Porter, Asst. Cas.

GOWRIE—First National Bank; N. A. Lindquist, Pres.; A. R. Daughenbaugh, Vice-Pres.; G. G. Lindquist, Cas., in place of N. A. Lindquist; no Asst. Cas.

GREENFIELD—First National Bank; Lewis Linebarger, Vice-Pres.; Vern C. Littleton, Asst. Cas.

GUTHRIE CENTER—First National Bank; E. C. Lane, Pres.; F. M. Hopkins, Vice-Pres.; K. B. O'Dair, Asst. Cas.

HARTLEY—First National Bank; E. E. Hall, Pres. in place of Oliver Evans; Oliver Evans, Vice-Pres. in place of W. M. Smith; W. J. Davis, Cas. in place of E. E. Hall; H. Heese, Asst. Cas. in place of W. J. Davis.

HAWARDEN—First National Bank; A. Melrose, Vice-Pres. in place of J. A. Moody; A. D. Horton, Cas.

INDEPENDENCE—First National Bank; S. V. Tabor, Vice-Pres. in place of Ephraim Leach; R. B. Raines, Asst. Cas.

IOWA FALLS—First National Bank; C. H. Burlingame, Asst. Cas. in place of Frank D. Peet.

KEOKUK—Keokuk National Bank; Wm. A. Brownell, Vice-Pres., deceased.

LA PORTE CITY—First National Bank; W. D. Wagoner, Vice-Pres. in place of E. Simpson.

MANCHESTER—First National Bank; M. F. Le Roy, Pres. in place of J. W. Miles; A. H. Blake, Vice-Pres. in place of R. R. Robinson; H. A. Granger, Cas. in place of M. F. Le Roy; H. A. von Oven, Asst. Cas.

LEON—Exchange National Bank; Stephen Varga, Vice-Pres., in place of I. N. Clark; W. J. Edwards, Asst. Cas.

MARENGO—First National Bank; Thomas Stapleton, Vice-Pres. in place of J. J. Clements; Frank Cook, Cas. in place of Q. P. Reno.

MISSOURI VALLEY—First National Bank; Geo. A. Kellogg, Pres. in place of L. M. Kellogg; J. E. Blenkinson, Vice-Pres. in place of E. W. Hibbard; H. F. Foss, Asst. Cas. in place of Geo. A. Kellogg; no 2d Asst. Cas. in place of H. F. Foss.

NEW LONDON—First National Bank; J. E. Peterson, Vice-Pres.; V. H. Shields, Cas.

OSAGE—Osage National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of A. L. Brush.—Farmers' National Bank; James A. Smith, Vice-Pres. in place of E. S. Fonda; K. J. Johnson, Cas.

OTTUMWA—Iowa National Bank; Calvin Manning, Pres. in place of Edwin Manning; J. H. Merrill, Vice-Pres. in place of Calvin Manning.

PERRY—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of H. S. Taylor.

ROCKFORD—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of G. A. Lyon.

ROCK RAPIDS—First National Bank; Chas. Shade, Vice-Pres.

ROLFE—First National Bank; J. K. Lemon, Cas. in place of S. S. Reed; C. H. Rolston, Asst. Cas. in place of J. K. Lemon.

SPIRIT LAKE—First National Bank; L. D. Goodrich, Cas. in place of Jno. W. Cravens; no Asst. Cas. in place of L. D. Goodrich.

STORM LAKE—First National Bank; J. B. Alexander, Asst. Cas. in place of T. T. Harker.

WATERLOO—Leavitt & Johnson National Bank; Ira J. Hoover, Asst. Cas.—Waterloo National Bank; J. R. Vaughan, Vice-Pres.; R. M. Knox, Asst. Cas.

WAVERLY—First National Bank; E. H. Curtis, Vice-Pres. in place of W. D. Lashbrook; Henry Kasemeier, Cas.; W. Welditschka, Asst. Cas. in place of Henry Kasemeier.

WEBSTER CITY—First National Bank; C. L. Treat, Asst. Cas. in place of H. P. Mason.

WESLEY—First National Bank; Thomas A. Way, Vice-Pres.; Julius Kunz, Asst. Cas.

## KANSAS.

ANTHONY—First National Bank; G. W. Halbower, Vice-Pres. in place of J. F. Corrigan.

ALMA—Alma National Bank; Fred. Reuter, Vice-Pres. in place of Fred. Lutz; A. H. Meseke, Asst. Cas.

ATCHISON—First National Bank; H. H. Hackney, Asst. Cas. in place of H. H. Hackney, Jr.

BURLINGTON—Burlington National Bank; Jesse F. Foster, Asst. Cas.

CEDAR VALE—Cedar Vale National Bank; L. N. Guthrie, Vice-Pres.; H. M. Donelson, Asst. Cas.

ELLSWORTH—Central National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of D. J. Sentry.

HAYS CITY—First National Bank; J. C. Adkins, Vice-Pres. in place of I. M. Yost; no Asst. Cas. in place of J. C. Adkins.

HAVENVILLE—First National Bank; M. S. Knox, Vice-Pres.; S. H. Stockwell, Asst. Cas.

HIAWATHA—First National Bank; L. E. Chase Vice-Pres.; Wm. Knabb, Cas. in place of Chas. P. Waste; J. W. Howie, Asst. Cas. in place of Wm. Knabb.

LEAVENWORTH—Manufacturers' National Bank; no Cas. in place of Otto H. Wulfe-kuhler; O. E. Snyder, Asst. Cas.

MANHATTAN—First National Bank; C. E. Bowen, Cas. in place of Geo. H. Helder; no Asst. Cas. in place of C. E. Bowen.—Union National Bank; F. A. Floersch,

Pres. in place of J. W. Harris: S. James Pratt, Asst. Cas. in place of Joseph D. Kloersch.

**MARQUETTE**—Marquette State Bank; capital increased by \$5,000.

**MT. HOPE**—First National Bank; B. H. Royse, Vice-Pres.

**OSBORNE**—Exchange National Bank no Vice-Pres. in place of E. F. Robinson, deceased.

**ST. MARYS**—First National Bank; D. A. Mulvane, Vice-Pres.

**TOPEKA**—Merchants' National Bank; W. A. L. Thompson, Pres. in place of C. K. Holliday; W. W. Mills, Vice-Pres. in place of W. A. L. Thompson; no Second Vice-Pres. in place of W. W. Mills.—Central National Bank; C. S. Downey, Vice-Pres. in place of A. S. Johnson.

**WAMEGO**—First National Bank; C. N. Baker, Pres. in place of J. C. Rogers.

**WASHINGTON**—First National Bank; J. C. Morrow, Pres. in place of T. B. Fredenall; T. B. Fredenall, Vice-Pres. in place of O. S. Long; W. J. Swan, Cas. in place of John B. Soffield.—Washington National Bank; T. H. Eves, additional Vice-Pres.; no Asst. Cas. in place of W. J. Swan.

**WINFIELD**—Winfield National Bank; John L. Parsons, Vice-Pres. in place of H. E. Stillman.

#### KENTUCKY.

**CARROLLTON**—Carrollton National Bank; J. G. Goslee, Asst. Cas.

**FRANKFORT**—National Branch Bank; D. W. Lindsay, Vice-Pres.

**HARRODSBURG**—First National Bank; W. C. Rue, Asst. Cas. in place of W. W. Edwards.

**LOUISVILLE**—Union National Bank; Charles G. Strator, Second Vice-Pres. in place of Geo. W. Swearingin.—Southern National Bank; F. N. Lewis, Second Vice-Pres.

**MAYFIELD**—City National Bank; R. M. Mayes, Asst. Cas.

**NEWPORT**—German National Bank; authorized by Comptroller to resume business February 4; Louis K. Marty, Pres. in place of Henry Weidner; Joseph G. Feth, Vice-Pres. in place of J. M. Southgate; A. M. Larkin, Cas. in place of E. C. Remme.

**PRINCETON**—First National Bank; R. M. Pool, Asst. Cas. in place of D. H. Gardiner.

**RICHMOND**—Madison National Bank; Waller Bennett, Pres. in place of C. D. Chenault.—Farmers' National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of R. R. Burnam.

**SPRINGFIELD**—First National Bank; L. B. Cain, Asst. Cas. in place of Geo. B. Medley.

**WICKLIFFE**—First National Bank; M. H. Kane, Asst. Cas.

#### LOUISIANA.

**BASTROP**—Bastrop State Bank; L. E. Bentley, Cas.

**FRANKLIN**—First National Bank; M. Bell, Vice-Pres. in place of Philip H. Mentz; A. M. Underwood, Second Vice-Pres. in place of M. Bell.

**MONROE**—Merchants and Farmers' Bank; J. P. Parker, Vice-Pres.; W. D. Crozier, Cas.

**NEW ORLEANS**—Commercial National Bank; I. M. Lichtenstein, Vice Pres.; C. E. A. Dowler, Cas. in place of J. H. Fulton.—Louisiana National Bank; no Cas. in place of Leon F. Janin.

**SHREVEPORT**—Commercial National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of A. T. Kahn.

#### MAINE.

**CALAIS**—Calais National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of Frank V. Lee.

**KENNEBUNK**—Ocean National Bank; Geo. R. Smith, Asst. Cas. in place of E. A. Fairfield.

#### MARYLAND.

**BALTIMORE**—Citizens' National Bank; David Ambach, Vice-Pres.—Third National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of N. B. Medairy.

**CHESTERTOWN**—Chestertown National Bank; W. W. Chapman, Cas. in place of Harry Rickey, deceased.

**TOWSON**—Towson National Bank; no Vice-Pres.

**UPPER MARLBORO**—First National Bank of Southern Maryland; Jos. S. Wilson, Pres.; A. M. Coffman, Cas.

#### MASSACHUSETTS.

**BOSTON**—Shoe and Leather National Bank; C. H. Dwinell, Asst. Cas.—National Security Bank; Charles R. Batt, Vice-Pres. in place of S. K. Roberts.

**CONCORD**—Concord National Bank; Prescott Keyes, Pres. in place of Edward C. Damon, deceased; Richard F. Barrett, Vice-Pres. in place of Prescott Keyes.

**NORTHAMPTON**—Nonotuck Savings Bank; Geo. L. Loomis, Pres., deceased.

**PALMER**—Palmer Savings Bank; Charles L. Wald, Treas.

**PLYMOUTH**—Old Colony National Bank; Geo. L. Gooding, Cas. in place of James B. Brown.

**SPRINGFIELD**—Hampden Loan and Trust Co.; W. G. McIntyre, Pres. in place of William H. Halle, deceased; Henry C. Halle, Vice-Pres. in place of E. P. Kendrick; Sayward Galbraith, Treas. in place of Wm. G. McIntyre.

**WAKEFIELD**—National Bank of South Reading; Junius Beebe, Pres. in place of Cyrus G. Beebe, deceased; Fred. B. Carpenter, Vice-Pres.

**WORCESTER**—Mechanics' National Bank; no Cas. in place of Geo. E. Merrill.

#### MICHIGAN.

**CALUMET**—First National Bank; John S. Dymock, Pres. in place of Edward Ryan; John D. Cuddihy, Vice-Pres. in place of John S. Dymock.

**CHEBOYGAN**—First National Bank; E. A. Smith, Asst. Cas.

**GRAND RAPIDS**—Fifth National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of S. W. Sherman.

**ISHPEMING**—Miners' National Bank; Donald McVichie, Vice-Pres.; H. S. Thompson, Asst. Cas.

**MENOMINEE**—Lumbermen's National Bank; S. P. Gibbs, Pres. in place of A. A. Carpenter; A. A. Carpenter, Vice-Pres. in place of S. P. Gibbs.

**MUSKEGON**—Union National Bank; William Brinen, Second Vice-Pres.

**SAULT STE. MARIE**—First National Bank; E. Roy Mead, Asst. Cas.

**WHITE PIGEON**—State Bank; C. W. Hotchin, Pres., in place of S. P. Hamilton, deceased.

#### MINNESOTA.

**AUSTIN**—Austin National Bank; E. H. Davidson, Pres. in place of G. Schlender, deceased.

**ELLSWORTH**—First National Bank; James Porter, Pres.; C. A. Bird, Cas. in place of W. Z. Newell.

**LAKE BENTON**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of Chas. E. Lavesson.

**MARSHALL**—Lyon County National Bank; M. Sullivan, Pres. in place of C. B. Tyler.

**MINNEAPOLIS**—German American Bank; Chas. Gluek, Vice-Pres. in place of Henry Winecke, deceased.

**OWATONNA**—First National Bank; H. H. Herrick, Asst. Cas.

**ST. PETER**—First National Bank; Fred M. Donahower, Cas. in place of E. S. Pettijohn; no Asst. Cas. in place of Fred M. Donahower

#### MISSISSIPPI.

**ABERDEEN**—First National Bank; A. J. Brown, Vice-Pres. in place of Joe P. Benson.

**VICKSBURG**—Merchants' National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of J. A. Conway, deceased.

**WEST POINT**—First National Bank; Arthur Dugan, Cas. in place of Isham Evans; Henry Dugan, Asst. Cas.

#### MISSOURI.

**CAMERON**—First National Bank; A. J. Alt-house, Pres. in place of W. D. Coberly; E. S. Dildine, Vice-Pres. in place of A. J. Alt-house.

**HAMILTON**—First National Bank; C. A. Martin, Cas. in place of R. J. Murphy; no Asst. Cas. in place of C. A. Martin.

**JOPLIN**—First National Bank; F. B. Jenkins, Asst. Cas.

**KING CITY**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of A. G. Bonham.

**MEMPHIS**—Scotland County National Bank; no Asst. Cas.

**PIERCE CITY**—Pierce City National Bank; Ben Mills, Cas., in place of Louis A. Chapman; O. F. Helweg, Asst. Cas., in place of Ben Mills.

**SEDALIA**—Citizens' National Bank; W. H. Powell, instead of W. H. Powell, Jr., Cas.

**SPRINGFIELD**—National Exchange Bank; N. M. Rountree, Pres., in place of James E. Keet; J. L. Holland, Vice-Pres., in place of N. M. Rountree.

**STEWARTSVILLE**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of John A. Deppen.

**ST. CHARLES**—First National Bank; Edward Gut, Pres.; C. Dandt, Vice-Pres., in place of Edward Gut.

**ST. JAMES**—Bank of St. James; Vic Holt, Cas., in place of A. Brinkerhoff.

**ST. LOUIS**—Union Trust Co.; William M. Senter, director, deceased.

#### MONTANA.

**ANACONDA**—Mrs. Marcus Daly; succeeded by Daly Bank and Trust Co.; capital, \$100,000.

**BILLINGS**—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of Henry W. Rowley.

**BUTTE**—Silver Bow National Bank; M. A. White, Asst. Cas.—Daly, Donahoe & Moyer; succeeded by Daly Bank and Trust Co.; capital, \$100,000; Pres., W. Dixon; Vice-Pres., John D. Ryan; Cas., C. C. Swinborne; Asst. Cas., R. A. Kunkel.

**FORT BENTON**—Stockmen's National Bank; Louis D. Sharp, Asst. Cas.

**MISSOULA**—Western Montana National Bank; John C. Lehson, Vice-Pres. in place of Charles Otts.

#### NEBRASKA.

**ALLIANCE**—First National Bank; S. Fickell, Asst. Cas.

**ASHLAND**—National Bank of Ashland; J. J. Brown, Pres., deceased.

**BEATRICE**—Beatrice National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of John P. Cook.

**COLUMBUS**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of A. R. Miller.

**GREENWOOD**—First National Bank; F. G. Welton, Vice-Pres. in place of Henry L. Clapp; no Asst. Cas. in place of D. M. Quackenbush.

**HARTINGTON**—First National Bank; F. A. McCornack, Pres. in place of T. F. Clark; no Vice-Pres. in place of F. A. McCornack.

**LINCOLN**—Columbia National Bank; P. L. Hall, Cas. in place of E. E. Brown; N. B. Ryons, Asst. Cas. in place of John A. Ames.

**NORFOLK**—Citizens' National Bank; L. P. Pasewalk, Asst. Cas. in place of W. R. Braasch.—Norfolk National Bank; E. W. Zutz, Cas. in place of W. H. Bucholz, Acting Cas.; no Asst. Cas. in place of E. W. Zutz.

**NORTH PLATTE**—First National Bank; F. L. Mooney, Asst. Cas.

**OMAHA**—National Bank of Commerce; no Asst. Cas. in place of Lee W. Spratlen.—Omaha Loan and Trust Co.; J. J. Brown, Vice-Pres. and director, deceased.

**SCHUYLER**—Schuyler National Bank; M. L. Weaver, Cas. in place of J. S. Johnson.

**SOUTH OMAHA**—South Omaha National Bank; Truman Buck, Second Vice-Pres.

**WAYNE**—First National Bank; H. S. Ringland, Asst. Cas.

**WEST POINT**—First National Bank; Henry

Schinastock, Vice-Pres. in place of W. E. Krause.

#### NEW HAMPSHIRE.

**BERLIN**—Berlin National Bank; Daniel J. Dalley, Pres. in place of Alfred H. Evans; A. H. Eastman, Vice-Pres. in place of Chas. N. Hodgdon; John J. Bell, Cas. in place of A. H. Eastman.

#### NEW JERSEY.

**ASBURY PARK**—First National Bank; Samuel Johnson, Vice-Pres. in place of O. H. Brown; J. E. Davis, Asst. Cas.

**ATLANTIC HIGHLANDS**—Atlantic Highlands National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of F. B. Rue.

**BELVIDERE**—Warren County National Bank; no Cas. in place of A. McCammon; George P. Young, Vice-Pres. and Asst. Cas.

**FLEMINGTON**—Flemington National Bank; Henry A. Fluck, Vice-Pres., deceased.

**JERSEY CITY**—Fifth Ward Savings Bank; Carl Lampe, Act. Pres.

**KEYPORT**—People's National Bank; William E. Warn, Pres. in place of Thos. Burrowes; Horace S. Burrowes, Asst. Cas.

**MOUNT HOLLY**—Farmers' National Bank; Charles Ewan Merritt, Pres. in place of A. L. Black.

**PATERSON**—Paterson National Bank; Sam'l J. Watson, Vice-Pres. in place of H. B. Parke.

#### NEW MEXICO.

**ALAMOGORDO**—First National Bank; Chas. B. Eddy, Vice-Pres. in place of R. H. Pierce.

#### NEW YORK.

**ALBANY**—National Exchange Bank; Charles C. Bullock, Jr., Asst. Cas.—Home Savings Bank; Samuel L. Munson, 2d Vice-Pres. in place of John H. Farrell, deceased; Walter McEwan, Sec.

**BINGHAMTON**—City National Bank; W. H. Morse, Asst. Cas.

**CLAYTON**—First National Bank; F. L. Hall, Vice-Pres. in place of William Rees.

**FRANKLIN**—First National Bank; E. S. Munson, Pres. in place of F. W. Bartlett; C. S. Stewart, Vice-Pres. in place of E. S. Munson.

**KEESEVILLE**—Keeseville National Bank; Michael J. Callahan, Vice-Pres. in place of M. J. Cleaves.

**LANSINGBURG**—People's Bank; title changed to People's Bank of Troy.

**LONG ISLAND CITY**—Queens County Bank; J. Harvey Woodhall, Cas. in place of James P. Bessemer.

**MIDDLETOWN**—Merchants' National Bank; Ira M. Corwin, Vice-Pres. in place of Albert Bull.

**NEW YORK**—New York County National Bank; Wm. Carpenter, 2d Vice-Pres.—National Citizens' Bank; E. S. Schenck, additional Vice-Pres.—Chatham National Bank; Joseph B. Bowden, director, de-

ceased.—Eleventh Ward Bank; David H. McAlpin, director, deceased; also director Nat. Bank of the Republic and Union Trust Co.—Nineteenth Ward Bank; capital increased to \$200,000.—Hamilton Bank; Frederick D. Ives, Vice-Pres.—Trust Company of New York; absorbed by North American Trust Co.—James T. Smith & Co.; Geo. Whitfield Butta, deceased.—J. P. Morgan & Co.; Geo. W. Perkins admitted to firm.

**SALAMANCA**—Salamanca National Bank; no 2d Vice-Pres.; W. H. Hazard, Cas. in place of Hiram Fosdick; F. A. Rhodes, Asst. Cas.

**SENECA FALLS**—Exchange National Bank; Ajah R. Palmer, Cas. instead of Acting Cas.

**SYRACUSE**—Salt Springs National Bank; W. H. Stansfield and E. K. Butler, Vice-Pres. in place of T. J. Leach and John L. King.

—Third National Bank and Merchants' National Bank; Geo. P. Hier, director, deceased.

**TARRYTOWN**—Tarrytown National Bank; J. H. Fisher, Asst. Cas.

**TROY**—National State Bank; J. S. Hawley, Pres. in place of Thomas Colwell; Henry Colvin, Cas. in place of J. S. Hawley; no Asst. Cas. in place of Henry Colvin.

**WHITEHALL**—Old National Bank; A. C. Sawyer, Pres.; M. J. Brown, Cas. in place of A. C. Sawyer.

#### NORTH DAKOTA.

**DEVIL'S LAKE**—First National Bank; F. H. Routier, Cas. in place of J. A. Stewart.

**GRAND FORKS**—Union National Bank; W. E. Fuller, Asst. Cas.

**WAHPETON**—Citizens' National Bank; J. A. Nelson, Cas. in place of Don R. Davidson.

#### NORTH CAROLINA

**LAURINBURG**—First National Bank; Walter H. Neal, Vice-Pres.

**LEXINGTON**—National Bank of Lexington; J. B. Smith, Vice-Pres.

#### OHIO.

**ADA**—First National Bank; Frederick Maglott, Vice-Pres.; J. W. Morrow, Asst. Cas.

**ASHTABULA**—Marine National Bank; Ed. S. Henry, Pres. in place of George B. Raser; E. H. Burrill, Vice-Pres. in place of Ed. S. Henry.

**BELMONT**—First National Bank; Gussie W. Kelly, Asst. Cas.

**BLUFFTON**—First National Bank; L. S. Dukes, Vice-Pres.; Bert Mann, Asst. Cas.

**BRYAN**—First National Bank; Irvin L. Burke, Asst. Cas. in place of Henry Eaton.

**CADIZ**—Fourth National Bank; Charles E. Stewart, Asst. Cas.

**CANAL DOVER**—Exchange National Bank; Jesse D. Elliott, Asst. Cas.

**CANTON**—Central Savings Bank; Edward S. Raff, Pres., deceased;

**CARROLLTON**—First National Bank; U. C. De Ford, Vice-Pres.; W. O. De Ford, Asst. Cas.

**CELINA**—First National Bank; J. E. Hattery, Vice-Pres.; J. P. Le Blond, Asst. Cas.

**CINCINNATI**—Central Trust and Safe Deposit Co.; Nat. Henchman Davis, Pres.—Fourth National Bank; Chas. Bartlett, Asst. Cas.

**CLEVELAND**—American Exchange National Bank; E. G. Gilbert, Asst. Cas. in place of J. K. Kraus.—Wick Banking and Trust Co.; title changed to City Trust Co.; W. H. Price, Pres.; D. J. Kurtz, Sec.—Metropolitan National Bank; A. L. Moore, Pres. in place of J. J. Phillips; Ralph Gray and Isaac Levy, Vice-Pres.—Century National Bank; Thomas W. Latham, Cas. in place of D. B. Beers.

**COLUMBUS**—Merchants and Manufacturers' National Bank; W. J. Camnitz, additional Asst. Cas.

**CRESTLINE**—First National Bank; F. Paul Hayes, Asst. Cas.

**DELAWARE**—First National Bank; J. D. Van Deman, Pres.; M. Miller, Vice-Pres. in place of J. D. Van Deman; J. T. Neff, Asst. Cas.

**GREENVILLE**—Farmers' National Bank; Geo. W. Sigafos, Cas.

**LOCKLAND**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of Louis Kellner.

**MANTUA**—First National Bank; Bina Colt, Pres. in place of C. H. Thompson.

**MARIETTA**—German National Bank; H. J. Hoffer, Asst. Cas.

**MARION**—City National Bank; D. R. Crissinger, Vice-Pres.; J. H. Wetmore, Asst. Cas.

**MCCONNELSVILLE**—Citizens' National Bank; W. O. Sherwood, Vice-Pres. in place of Arga Alderman.

**MINSIEVA**—First National Bank; H. B. Couch, Asst. Cas.

**MONTPELIER**—Montpelier National Bank; Geo. Yesbera, Vice-Pres. in place of Volney Powers; J. W. Williams and W. P. Tressler, Asst. Cas. in place of H. B. Couch and A. C. Hause.

**NILES**—First National Bank; A. J. Leitch, Pres. in place of R. G. Sykes; E. F. Fox, Asst. Cas.

**OXFORD**—First National Bank; no second Vice-Pres. in place of S. C. Richey, deceased.

**PICQUA**—Third National Bank; Jno. L. Prugh, Cas. in place of M. G. Smith.

**ROSEVILLE**—First National Bank; Wm. Porter, Vice-Pres.; E. A. Brown, Asst. Cas.

**SANDUSKY**—Moss National Bank; C. B. Wilcox, 2d Vice-Pres.

**SIDNEY**—First National Exchange Bank; Wm. M. Kingseed, Vice-Pres. in place of H. T. Mathers; no 2d Vice-Pres. in place of Wm. M. Kingseed.

**ST. CLAIRSVILLE**—Second National Bank; Henry Morgan, Vice-Pres. in place of Henry M. Davies; Albert Troll, Cas. in place of I. H. Gaston; Otto Giffin, Asst. Cas. in place of Albert Troll.

**UPPER SANDUSKY**—Commercial National Bank; John L. Lewis, Vice-Pres. in place

of W. M. Carlisle; no Asst. Cas. in place of Chas. H. Layton.

**WAPAKONETA**—People's National Bank; H. W. Backbus, Cas., resigned.

### OKLAHOMA.

**ENID**—First National Bank; W. W. Hagen, Vice-Pres., deceased; John P. Cook, Asst. Cas.

**GUTHRIE**—Bank of Indian Territory; L. N. F. Crozier, Vice-Pres., deceased.

**NORMAN**—First National Bank; Wm. Synnot, Asst. Cas. in place of T. E. Clementa.

**PAWNEE**—First National Bank; S. Thornton, Asst. Cas.

**SHAWNEE**—First National Bank; C. A. Gallo-way, Asst. Cas.

**STILLWATER**—First National Bank; C. P. Rock, Pres. in place of Alex. Campbell; W. E. Hodges, Cas. in place of C. P. Rock; A. H. Campbell, Asst. Cas. in place of W. E. Hodges.

**TECUMSEH**—First National Bank; T. M. Phaup, Vice-Pres.; T. F. Southgate, Asst. Cas.

**WEATHERFORD**—First National Bank Henry Eichenberger, Asst. Cas.

### PENNSYLVANIA.

**ALTOONA**—First National Bank; no Cas. in place of Henry Cryder.

**BERWYN**—Berwyn National Bank; John C. Acker, Cas. in place of J. Comly Hall.

**BROCKWAYVILLE**—First National Bank; S. C. Bond, Vice-Pres.; Gertrude Buzard, Asst. Cas.

**BROOKVILLE**—National Bank of Brookville; John E. Geist, Asst. Cas.

**EMLENTON**—Farmers' National Bank; Thos. Flynn, Vice-Pres.; A. B. Crawford, Asst. Cas.

**EAST BRADY**—People's National Bank; N. E. Graham, Pres.; T. B. Gregory, Vice-Pres.

**EAST STROUDSBURG**—Monroe County National Bank; J. R. Smith, Vice-Pres.; N. S. Brittain, Cas.

**ELLWOOD CITY**—First National Bank; W. J. McKim, Asst. Cas.

**ELIZABETH**—First National Bank; Wm. W. O'Neill, Pres. in place of Joseph Pierce.

**FAYETTE CITY**—First National Bank; Wm. H. Binns, Cas. in place of Wm. E. Shope.

**FRANKLIN**—Lamberton National Bank; Fred. C. McGill, Asst. Cas.

**GLEN CAMPBELL**—First National Bank; S. L. Clark, Cas. in place of J. A. Klingensmith.

**GROVE CITY**—People's National Bank; A. M. Allen, Vice-Pres.; A. A. McKinney, Cas.

**HOMESTEAD**—Homestead National Bank; J. D. Stahl, Pres. in place of Reid Kennedy; Robert Brierly, Vice-Pres. in place of Wm. Ramsay; James L. Ramsay, Cas. in place of Charles R. Smith.

**JEANNETTE**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of J. Luther Jones.

**KITTANNING**—National Bank of Kittanning; H. A. Colwell, Pres. in place of Jas. Moe-grove, deceased.

**LITITZ**—Lititz National Bank; Israel G. Erb, Pres. in place of John B. Erb; Henry R. Erb, Vice-Pres. in place of Israel G. Erb.

**MERCER**—Farmers and Mechanics' National Bank; James D. Emery, Cas. in place of John I. Gordon; R. C. Kerr, Asst. Cas.

**McKEESPORT**—National Bank of McKeesport; John W. Crawford, Vice-Pres. in place of Wm. B. Schiller; J. W. Albig, Asst. Cas.

**MONESSEN**—Monessen National Bank; J. Howard Kelly, Cas. in place of Isaac Jackson; J. H. Underwood, Asst. Cas.

**NEW BLOOMFIELD**—First National Bank; D. Boyd Alter, Asst. Cas.

**OAKDALE**—First National Bank; Jas. Wallace, Vice-Pres.; B. M. Hopper, Asst. Cas.

**PHILADELPHIA**—Sixth National Bank; Wm. S. Emley, Pres. in place of Wm. D. Gardner; Henry D. May, Vice-Pres. in place of Wm. S. Emley.—Market Street National Bank; W. P. Sinnett, Cas. in place of B. F. Dennison; no Asst. Cas. in place of W. P. Sinnett.—Girard National Bank and Independence National Bank; reported will consolidate under former title.—Tradesmen's National Bank; J. T. Colvin, director, deceased.—Drexel & Co.; Geo. W. Perkins, admitted to firm.

**POTTSTOWN**—Security Company; George N. Malsberger, Pres. in place of Jacob Fegeley; W. M. Bunting, Sec. and Treas.

**READING**—First National Bank; A. H. Raignel, Asst. Cas.—National Union Bank; J. Edward Wanner, Asst. Cas.

**SAYRE**—First National Bank; E. B. Wilbur, Pres.; O. L. Haverly, Vice-Pres.; L. D. Atwater, Asst. Cas.

**SOUTH BETHLEHEM**—South Bethlehem National Bank; Adam Brinker, Pres. in place of Jacob Fegeley; S. L. Stephens, Vice-Pres. in place of Adam Brinker.

**TAMAQUA**—Tamaqua Banking and Trust Co.; Daniel Shepp, Pres., deceased.

**TYRONE**—Blair County Banking Co.; Lewis H. Eppley, Vice-Pres. and Cas., deceased.

#### SOUTH CAROLINA.

**CHARLESTON**—People's National Bank; E. P. Grice, Asst. Cas.

**COLUMBIA**—Carolina National Bank; Willie Jones, Vice-Pres. and Cas.

**GAFFNEY**—National Bank of Gaffney; M. Smyth, Asst. Cas.

**ORANGEBURG**—First National Bank and Edisto Savings Bank; Harry C. Wannamaker, Asst. Cas., resigned.

#### SOUTH DAKOTA.

**CENTERVILLE**—First National Bank; G. Nor-gren, Vice-Pres.; D. M. Moser, Cas. in place of R. W. Sayre.

**SIOUX FALLS**—Sioux Falls National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of H. C. Fenn.

#### TENNESSEE.

**GAINESBORO**—First National Bank; B. L. Quarles, Vice-Pres.; W. F. Sadler, Asst. Cas.

**GALLATIN**—People's National Bank; Will G. Harris, Cas. in place of Thomas H. King; W. Y. Allen, Asst. Cas. in place of Will G. Harris.

**MANCHESTER**—First National Bank; J. C. Ramsey, Jr., Asst. Cas.

**NASHVILLE**—Fourth National Bank; G. W. Pyle, Asst. Cas.

**TULLAHOMA**—Traders' National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of T. H. Wilson.

#### TEXAS.

**ABILENE**—Farmers and Merchants' National Bank; Henry Sayles, Jr., Asst. Cas.

**ALBANY**—First National Bank; D. C. Campbell, Asst. Cas. in place of T. W. Guldedge.—Albany National Bank; J. G. Lowdon, Vice-Pres.; W. H. Eddleman, Second Vice-Pres.

**AMARILLO**—First National Bank; Samuel H. Henderson, Asst. Cas.

**ARANSAS PASS**—First National Bank; E. A. Stevens, Pres. in place of J. M. Hoopes.

**BAIRD**—First National Bank; Henry James, Vice-Pres.; no Asst. Cas.

**BAY CITY**—Bay City Bank; Frank Hawkins, Pres., deceased.

**BEAUMONT**—First National Bank; J. M. Edwards, Asst. Cas. in place of Charles H. Stroeck.

**CHANNING**—Channing Mercantile and Bank-ing Co.; capital increased to \$45,000.

**CLARKSVILLE**—Red River National Bank; A. M. Graves, Cas. in place of D. W. Cheatham; M. L. Sims, Jr., Asst. Cas. in place of A. M. Graves.

**COMANCHE**—First National Bank; J. W. Cunningham, Vice-Pres. in place of J. M. Presler; C. T. Cunningham, Asst. Cas. in place of A. G. Adams, Jr.—Comanche National Bank; E. E. Anthony, Asst. Cas.

**DALLAS**—City National Bank; E. O. Tenson, additional Vice-Pres.; C. R. Buddy, Cas. in place of E. O. Tenson; D. B. Harris, Asst. Cas. in place of C. R. Buddy.—National Bank of Commerce; V. E. Armstrong, Asst. Cas.

**DE LEON**—First National Bank; W. C. Streety, Vice-Pres.; B. J. Pittman, Cas.

**EAGLE PASS**—First National Bank; F. V. Blesse, Pres. in place of M. L. Oppenheimer; E. H. Schmidt, Cas. in place of F. V. Blesse.

**EL PASO**—Lowdon National Bank; J. G. Lowdon, Second Vice-Pres.

**FARMERSVILLE**—First National Bank; F. E. Pendleton and J. L. Chapman, Asst. Cas.

**GEORGETOWN**—First National Bank; Lee M. Taylor, Asst. Cas. in place of R. T. Cooper.

**GROESBECK**—Groesbeck National Bank; W. L. Bond, Cas. in place of O. Wiley, Jr.

**MALLETTSVILLE**—Lavaca County National Bank; Ferd Hillje, Vice-Pres. in place of Carey Shaw.

## UTAH.

**NENPHI**—First National Bank; G. M. Whitmore, Cas. in place of C. S. Tingey; Eugene Giles, Asst. Cas.

**PARK CITY**—First National Bank; Simon Bamberger, Vice-Pres. in place of W. W. Chisholm.

## VERMONT.

**BELLOWS FALLS**—Bellows Falls Savings Institution; Henry C. Lane, Pres., deceased.

**BRATTLEBORO**—Vermont National Bank; capital increased to \$200,000.

**RUTLAND**—Clement National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of Samuel M. Willson; C. H. Harrison, Asst. Cas.

## VIRGINIA.

**COVINGTON**—Citizens' National Bank; A. A. McAllister, Vice-Pres.

**IRVINGTON**—Lancaster National Bank; A. Randolph Howard, Vice-Pres.; John F. Gouldman, Jr., Asst. Cas. in place of E. M. Young, Jr.; L. Leland, second Asst. Cas.

**NORFOLK**—City National Bank; John L. Roper, Vice-Pres. in place of C. A. Nash; F. A. Porter, Asst. Cas.

## WASHINGTON.

**COLFAX**—First National Bank; H. G. De Pledge, Asst. Cas.

**EVERETT**—First National Bank; Henry Hewitt, Jr., Pres. in place of Charles Clary; Wm. C. Butler, Vice-Pres. in place of Wm. G. Swailwell; C. D. Fratt, Cas. in place of Jos. A. Swailwell; J. A. Swailwell, Asst. Cas.

**MOUNT VERNON**—First National Bank; Chas. Clary, Pres. in place of Geo. D. McLean; no Vice-Pres. in place of W. M. Ladd.

**OLYMPIA**—Olympia National Bank; Geo. B. Lane, Vice-Pres.; D. E. Crandall, Cas.; no Asst. Cas. in place of D. E. Crandall.

**TACOMA**—Pacific National Bank; C. H. Hyde, Vice-Pres. in place of Chas. P. Masterson. —National Bank of Commerce; A. F. Albertson, Vice-Pres. in place of A. M. Ingersoll.

**HASKELL**—Haskell National Bank; Lee Pierson, Vice-Pres. in place of A. C. Foster; G. R. Couch, Cas. in place of J. L. Jones; Marshall Pierson, Asst. Cas. in place of Lee Pierson.

**HONEY GROVE**—Planters' National Bank; J. C. McKinney, Asst. Cas. in place of W. N. Sadler.

**HOUSTON**—Planters and Mechanics' National Bank; Jno. H. Kirby, Pres. in place of J. H. Burnett; J. H. Burnett, Vice-Pres. in place of Jno. H. Kirby.

**HOWE**—Farmers' National Bank; S. W. Young, Vice-Pres.; B. C. Horbert, Asst. Cas.

**KARNES CITY**—Karnes County National Bank; J. W. Ruckman, Vice-Pres.

**LADONIA**—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of James F. McFarland.

**MARBLE FALLS**—First National Bank; J. R. Yett, Vice-Pres. in place of A. Davis.

**MERKEL**—First National Bank; G. F. West, Vice-Pres.

**MEXIA**—Citizens' National Bank; Jno. L. Wortham, Vice-Pres.

**MINEOLA**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of S. R. Bruce, deceased.

**NEW BRAUNFELS**—First National Bank; Walter Faust, Asst. Cas.

**PALESTINE**—Palestine National Bank; P. W. Ezell, Pres. in place of Jno. R. Hearne; Wm. Broyles, Vice-Pres. in place of A. L. Bowers.

**RUSK**—First National Bank; J. F. Mallard, Asst. Cas. in place of B. Miller.

**ROGERS**—First National Bank; B. F. Bullock, Vice-Pres.

**SNYDER**—First National Bank; G. W. Smith, Pres. in place of H. B. Patterson; J. E. Dodson, Vice-Pres. in place of G. W. Smith; H. B. Patterson, Cas. in place of J. E. Dodson.

**WAXAHACHIE**—Waxahachie National Bank; no 2d Vice-Pres. in place of John Harrison.

**WEATHERFORD**—Merchants and Farmers' National Bank; W. L. Tucker, Asst. Cas. in place of J. O. Tucker.—Citizens' Nat. Bank; Jim P. Owens, additional Asst. Cas.

**WINNSBORO**—First National Bank; R. G. Andrews, Vice-Pres.; Manton W. Jones, Asst. Cas.

**WOLFE CITY**—Wolfe City National Bank; L. A. Dowlen, Asst. Cas. in place of H. S. Rogers.

**YOAKUM**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of J. M. Whitmore.

## WEST VIRGINIA.

**WHEELING**—Wheeling Clearing-House; Alex. Mitchell, Manager.

## WISCONSIN.

**ASHLAND**—Ashland National Bank; J. T. Gregory, Cas. in place of R. B. Bates.—Northern National Bank; R. B. Prince, Asst. Cas.

**BARABOO**—First National Bank; H. G. Merritt, Vice-Pres. in place of R. A. Cowan.

**GRAND RAPIDS**—First National Bank; A. G. Miller, Asst. Cas.

**GREEN BAY**—Citizens' National Bank; Mitchell Joannes, Vice-Pres.; W. J. Parker, Asst. Cas.

**HUDSON**—First National Bank; Jos. Yoerg, Vice-Pres.

**MEDFORD**—First National Bank; Lee W. Gibson, Vice-Pres.

**MENOMONIE**—First National Bank; W. C. Ribenack, Cas. in place of W. C. McLean; Alex. Hosford, Asst. Cas. in place of W. C. Ribenack.

**PORTAGE**—First National Bank; A. Zienert, Vice-Pres. in place of A. C. Flanders, deceased.

**RHINELANDER**—First National Bank; Chas. Chafee, Pres. in place of Leander Choate;

Leander Choate, Vice-Pres. in place of Chas. Chafee.  
**SUPERIOR**—First National Bank; O. H. Whitaker, Asst. Cas.

#### WYOMING.

**DOUGLAS**—First National Bank; J. De F. Richards, Vice-Pres. in place of Bartlett Richards.  
**LARAMIE**—Albany County National Bank;

Robert H. Homer, Pres. in place of S. S. Graham; C. D. Spalding, Asst. Cas. in place of E. Percy Palmer. — **FIRST NATIONAL BANK**; D. C. Bacon, Pres. in place of H. G. Balch, deceased.

**ROCK SPRINGS**—First National Bank; D. C. Bacon, Pres. in place of H. G. Balch; John W. Hay, Vice-Pres.

**SHERIDAN**—First National Bank; J. B. Kendrick, Pres. in place of J. P. Robinson.

### BANKS REPORTED CLOSED OR IN LIQUIDATION.

#### ILLINOIS.

**ASHLEY**—Centennial Bank.  
**DES PLAINES**—Bank of Des Plaines.

#### INDIANA.

**ELETTSVILLE**—Bank of Ellettsville.

#### IOWA.

**LOGAN**—Harrison County Bank.

#### MICHIGAN.

**ISHPEMING**—Ishpeming National Bank; in voluntary liquidation February 25.  
**NILES**—First National Bank.

#### MONTANA.

**HELENA**—Montana National Bank; in voluntary liquidation February 23.

#### NEBRASKA.

**HASTINGS**—Nebraska Loan and Trust Co.; in hands of James M. Clark, Receiver.

#### NEW YORK.

**CASTLETON**—National Bank of Castleton; in voluntary liquidation.

#### TEXAS.

**MOULTON**—First National Bank; in voluntary liquidation January 30.

---

"Practical Bank Advertising."—A book of immeasurable value to every banker who cares to enlarge his business. Adapted to city and country. Half morocco, 745 pages; costs \$10, delivered. Did you receive the specimen pages heretofore sent you? Address **FREMONT PUBLISHING CO.**, Fremont, Ohio.

#### FIDELITY TRUST AND GUARANTY CO., BUFFALO.

"We made no mistake when we gave an order for your 'Practical Bank Advertising.' It is the most complete and suggestive book of the kind I have ever seen. For a progressive bank that believes in advertising, it is worth many times the cost. It is a good investment for any live banker to make."

GEORGE V. FORMAN, *President.*

**Convention of the American Bankers.**—It is expected that a meeting of the executive council of the American Bankers' Association will be held in New York early in April to decide upon a place for holding the next annual convention of the association. Milwaukee and Buffalo will probably be leading contestants.

At a recent meeting of the Milwaukee Clearing-House it was unanimously resolved to invite the convention to meet in that city.

At the convention in Cleveland a strong effort was made to have the meeting of 1900 in Milwaukee, but it was finally decided to go South, and Richmond was selected. There was a general feeling at that time that Milwaukee would be selected for 1901.

On account of the exposition to be held in Buffalo, that city has been mentioned for the convention, but there are many who believe that the experience in Chicago and Atlanta was not such as to recommend an exposition city for the gathering. This is simply because the attractions of the exposition tend to diminish interest in the convention. On the other hand the bankers are afforded an opportunity to make one trip serve for the convention and the exposition, and there is no question as to the suitability of Buffalo as a place for holding the convention.

New York State has had the convention nine times, one of the meetings being at Niagara Falls, while Wisconsin has not yet been honored by a meeting of the association.

**Special Service for Bankers.**—R. B. Bates, for five years National Bank Examiner for Minnesota and Wisconsin, has established himself in business at Milwaukee, Wis., as a note broker and bank agent. By the latter term is meant that he will undertake business which banks may prefer to trust to a special agent, familiar with the banks and with business affairs generally in the Northwest. Mr. Bates has an extensive acquaintance among National bankers in Minnesota and Wisconsin, and especially in Minneapolis, St. Paul, Duluth, Superior, Milwaukee, and Chicago also. He refers to each of the National banks of Milwaukee, and also to any National bank in Wisconsin and Minnesota.

Messrs. Quarles, Spence & Quarles are Mr. Bates' counsel, and as this is one of the most reputable law firms in the Northwest, bankers desiring legal service in that part of the country will find him well prepared to care for their interests.



## NATIONAL BANK RETURNS—RESERVE CITIES.

By the courtesy of the Comptroller of the Currency at Washington, the **BANKERS' MAGAZINE** has been favored with the complete returns of the National banks in all the reserve cities, at the date of the call on February 5, 1901. These are published below in conjunction with the two preceding statements of September 5, 1900, and December 13, 1900. In this form the figures become much more valuable by reason of the comparison. In this complete shape the returns of National banks in the reserve cities are published in the **BANKERS' MAGAZINE** exclusively.

### NEW YORK CITY.

RESOURCES.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 13, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.
Loans and discounts.....	\$500,573,060	\$544,371,588	\$633,755,065
Overdrafts.....	838,063	870,727	22,684
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	80,705,000	81,710,000	82,485,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	84,472,700	83,896,100	84,027,600
U. S. bonds on hand.....	507,340	502,300	2,097,130
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	2,198,157	1,856,224	1,995,068
Stocks, securities, etc.....	76,621,282	74,084,324	79,481,416
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	15,585,051	15,800,605	15,867,912
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	1,598,962	1,637,197	1,661,964
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	33,276,806	45,978,858	40,533,935
Due from State banks and bankers.....	4,775,568	6,461,171	5,746,666
Due from approved reserve agents.....	.....	.....	.....
Checks and other cash items.....	4,561,123	8,240,166	3,245,127
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	75,827,360	125,605,568	178,964,326
Bills of other National banks.....	1,074,917	835,809	1,211,760
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	73,736	85,923	63,709
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:	.....	.....	.....
Gold coin.....	6,322,193	8,991,881	9,189,412
Gold Treasury certificates.....	71,619,270	49,535,450	79,849,330
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	74,390,000	75,895,000	73,120,000
Silver dollars.....	99,523	87,693	87,108
Silver Treasury certificates.....	11,167,153	7,913,542	14,098,586
Silver fractional coin.....	638,929	696,016	608,129
Legal-tender notes.....	49,224,731	36,234,216	47,789,772
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	650,000	150,000	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	1,528,497	1,557,497	1,616,747
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	527,465	1,097,029	1,106,407
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$1,067,355,883</b>	<b>\$1,071,580,790</b>	<b>\$1,256,847,877</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$62,800,000	\$62,800,000	\$62,800,000
Surplus fund.....	47,360,000	47,360,000	47,401,154
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	26,962,781	28,967,102	29,746,076
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	29,351,015	81,055,890	81,516,320
State bank notes outstanding.....	16,542	16,542	16,542
Due to other National banks.....	260,010,232	236,148,939	285,094,297
Due to State banks and bankers.....	170,953,894	130,319,916	191,046,348
Dividends unpaid.....	122,470	91,366	116,096
Individual deposits.....	420,675,667	476,501,534	559,150,657
U. S. deposits.....	32,412,140	32,180,220	32,252,385
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	365,925	294,114	338,898
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	16,305,163	16,825,196	16,369,101
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$1,067,355,883</b>	<b>\$1,071,580,790</b>	<b>\$1,256,847,877</b>
Average reserve held.....	27.94 p. c.	26.06 p. c.	26.90 p. c.
<b>Total lawful money reserve.....</b>	<b>\$213,461,800</b>	<b>\$182,356,799</b>	<b>\$224,738,838</b>

RESOURCES.	ALBANY, N. Y.			BALTIMORE, MD.			BOSTON, MASS.		
	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 13, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 13, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 13, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.
Loans and discounts.....	\$11,000,157	\$12,063,394	\$11,150,750	\$39,393,774	\$39,393,774	\$39,393,774	\$169,143,000	\$166,421,123	\$167,242,549
Overdrafts.....	12,418	4,984	2,039	24,579	53,133	60,553	97,623	43,144	75,127
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	639,000	639,000	639,000	4,187,000	4,257,000	3,752,000	6,232,500	6,377,500	6,477,500
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	222,100	222,100	222,100	2,164,000	2,337,000	2,582,000	4,176,000	4,131,000	4,181,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	11,000	10,000	10,000	89,380	70,380	70,600	63,000	63,000	50,000
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	1,000	1,000	1,000	127,991	107,223	104,959	403,740	199,574	167,312
Stocks, securities, etc.....	1,243,870	1,243,870	1,243,870	4,153,991	4,110,568	4,054,353	9,239,947	7,027,823	7,852,444
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	250,707	250,707	250,707	2,477,597	2,477,597	2,457,353	2,102,606	2,107,990	2,108,610
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	94,358	94,358	94,358	139,061	104,746	104,746	194,379	164,238	164,333
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	3,023,305	3,040,337	3,040,337	4,961,009	4,961,009	4,961,009	12,867,376	14,465,546	13,748,068
Due from State banks and bankers.....	1,078,126	1,401,671	1,401,671	642,002	630,767	623,281	2,099,773	1,999,924	1,997,471
Due from approved reserve agents.....	4,353,389	2,396,510	3,102,716	6,520,691	6,520,691	6,520,691	34,005,632	28,367,587	38,657,776
Checks and other cash items.....	46,971	45,914	52,351	166,073	166,730	265,428	49,255	427,817	474,021
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	132,782	114,067	134,173	1,736,277	2,526,300	2,272,479	8,423,122	12,003,944	12,763,113
Bills of other National banks.....	51,145	46,817	54,372	224,048	224,048	373,524	1,066,292	1,317,270	1,373,079
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	5,835	5,081	6,572	16,373	22,550	16,249	22,029	19,041	23,113
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	498,150	516,376	471,411	539,209	565,947	574,129	1,967,718	1,738,060	1,725,590
Gold Treasury certificates.....	370,765	367,000	373,000	1,204,330	1,277,870	1,277,870	3,673,160	4,984,070	4,981,150
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	50,000	50,000	50,000	1,290,000	980,000	955,000	3,915,000	3,905,000	3,905,000
Silver dollars.....	41,883	40,013	39,358	44,138	53,266	46,544	39,101	38,467	120,590
Silver Treasury certificates.....	41,122	45,341	43,261	1,299,661	1,232,337	1,761,617	3,061,238	3,149,701	3,064,395
Silver fractional coin.....	45,075	41,428	42,624	66,704	103,649	75,292	171,313	167,783	164,370
Legal-tender notes.....	991,164	775,942	813,214	1,503,170	1,593,068	1,579,582	7,967,298	8,905,096	9,130,215
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....				210,000	210,000	187,600	270,000	180,000	323,375
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	31,950	31,950	31,950	211,850	209,875	187,600	303,315	310,475	323,375
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	1,000	1,000	1,000	2,005	2,005	8,250	120,554	321,258	190,402
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$28,830,615</b>	<b>\$22,568,407</b>	<b>\$23,423,664</b>	<b>\$72,513,289</b>	<b>\$73,552,216</b>	<b>\$71,352,907</b>	<b>\$274,123,443</b>	<b>\$267,673,476</b>	<b>\$281,533,476</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,550,000	\$1,550,000	\$1,550,000	\$11,106,290	\$11,538,290	\$11,338,290	\$37,400,000	\$37,400,000	\$37,400,000
Surplus fund.....	1,370,000	1,370,000	1,370,000	4,560,850	4,690,800	4,457,000	14,212,000	14,212,000	14,212,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	297,768	297,768	297,768	1,655,628	2,007,343	1,715,787	6,481,094	5,982,489	6,745,116
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	623,050	619,997	628,617	4,143,600	4,251,930	3,675,080	5,934,445	6,111,350	6,243,950
State bank notes outstanding.....				850	850	850			
Due to other National banks.....	9,024,865	9,121,106	8,965,590	11,099,491	11,999,944	11,998,194	47,104,513	47,104,513	46,943,649
Due to State banks and bankers.....	2,721,849	3,443,552	3,693,750	8,100,747	7,031,451	8,033,411	34,614,949	29,735,787	40,989,698
Dividends unpaid.....	1,247	438	25,267	79,590	59,094	67,998	15,376	16,450	13,106
Individual deposits.....	8,067,275	6,252,215	7,315,451	29,023,008	29,533,615	27,128,411	119,640,339	119,621,338	121,781,440
U. S. deposits.....	216,849	201,339	219,081	2,171,269	2,313,574	2,221,115	3,947,041	3,768,846	3,764,068
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....				41,500	.....	.....	75,915	108,194	86,852
Notes and bills rediscounted.....				895,000	290,000	124,000	965,000	1,532,000	886,540
Bills payable.....				108,474	116,363	64,769	3,404,475	2,472,117	2,253,200
Liabilities other than those above stated.....									
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$28,830,615</b>	<b>\$22,568,407</b>	<b>\$23,423,664</b>	<b>\$72,513,289</b>	<b>\$73,552,216</b>	<b>\$71,352,907</b>	<b>\$274,123,443</b>	<b>\$267,673,476</b>	<b>\$281,533,476</b>
Average reserve held.....	40,07 p. c.	27,47 p. c.	33,04 p. c.	27,14 p. c.	28,70 p. c.	26,70 p. c.	31,40 p. c.	30,90 p. c.	30,70 p. c.
*Total lawful money reserve.....	\$2,623,166	\$1,771,050	\$1,701,344	\$5,967,767	\$6,170,665	\$5,417,622	\$22,768,668	\$22,783,167	\$22,753,280

	BROOKLYN, N. Y.			CHICAGO, ILL.			CINCINNATI, OHIO.		
	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$11,145,981	\$11,594,376	\$11,056,980	\$12,097,182	\$139,473,078	\$148,784,689	\$90,098,908	\$90,098,908	\$91,698,908
Overdrafts.....	9,003	8,230	8,847	812,646	72,674	68,574	14,843	14,843	12,746
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	642,000	642,000	642,000	5,490,000	5,240,000	5,240,000	3,975,000	3,975,000	4,085,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	200,000	200,000	200,000	1,990,000	1,610,000	1,590,000	4,230,500	4,094,500	4,094,500
U. S. bonds on hand.....	9,000	9,000	9,000	174,080	172,080	172,080	337,990	344,080	301,910
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	2,894,670	2,328,449	2,311,983	118,903	97,653	182,497	471,812	444,127	129,476
Stocks, securities, etc.....	590,200	590,200	590,200	12,493,776	10,473,939	11,898,116	9,164,024	9,277,525	11,057,625
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	53,437	53,351	53,351	277,432	277,432	277,432	461,276	445,870	445,870
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	64,652	46,301	73,809	274,556	373,639	247,012	161,497	164,114	173,728
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	303,383	140,908	169,289	42,964,073	37,238,084	41,294,233	4,057,345	4,872,221	4,171,449
Due from State banks and bankers.....	2,097,617	2,377,246	2,323,814	10,090,801	11,262,161	8,618,998	7,048,839	890,895	7,077,188
Due from approved reserve agents.....	98,140	134,611	117,207	990,626	454,143	151,080	7,048,839	6,556,628	8,118,613
Checks and other cash items.....	945,881	990,948	1,317,471	8,901,056	8,217,679	7,061,503	1,593,375	1,607,711	138,089
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	164,163	149,574	173,909	2,878,813	1,442,805	1,491,991	282,710	282,710	844,797
Bills of other National Banks.....	12,612	14,209	7,546	21,987	42,244	28,418	6,383	5,261	5,815
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	498,139	423,048	447,371	11,039,290	12,581,587	12,987,770	991,755	993,800	741,472
Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:	876,900	440,800	396,600	9,877,240	14,604,720	14,999,230	1,802,000	1,645,000	2,005,000
Gold.....	19,778	593,166	898,897	440,737	230,389	238,162	62,746	80,187	55,330
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	68,875	93,052	68,583	6,298,959	3,832,163	4,878,292	497,462	513,715	590,404
Silver.....	771,740	766,894	710,815	232,827	212,158	194,640	31,597	27,446	18,394
Silver fractional coin.....	82,100	82,100	82,100	20,297,906	17,908,630	19,468,678	2,844,857	3,238,949	4,093,489
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	.....	.....	.....	705,000	140,000	140,000	.....	.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas. U. S. Treasurer.....	.....	.....	.....	271,497	291,347	304,540	197,750	198,750	230,249
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	.....	.....	.....	83,502	105,002	80,702	843	6,000	570
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$21,158,384</b>	<b>\$21,423,719</b>	<b>\$21,197,768</b>	<b>\$275,749,135</b>	<b>\$293,712,613</b>	<b>\$281,524,429</b>	<b>\$87,832,895</b>	<b>\$87,843,693</b>	<b>\$74,115,890</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,352,000	\$1,352,000	\$1,352,000	\$19,250,000	\$17,250,000	\$17,250,000	\$7,700,000	\$7,700,000	\$7,700,000
Surplus fund.....	1,900,000	1,900,000	1,900,000	8,190,000	8,210,000	8,210,000	2,775,000	2,775,000	2,775,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	525,883	525,883	525,883	4,332,940	4,376,399	4,999,216	1,580,594	1,580,137	1,690,117
National bank notes issued, less amt. on hand.....	636,400	642,000	634,500	4,997,410	5,199,810	5,097,530	3,735,052	3,793,447	4,361,327
State bank notes outstanding.....	1,846	1,846	1,846	84,327,526	73,902,106	87,193,057	11,134,534	11,134,534	13,372,455
Due to other National banks.....	225,467	336,291	295,563	45,157,261	41,994,575	46,616,916	6,217,967	5,928,736	7,573,530
Due to State banks and bankers.....	3,783,893	3,828,374	3,828,374	6,069	14,061	5,938	2,592	4,198	6,935
Dividends unpaid.....	6,434	12,541,625	12,104,123	103,942,776	107,906,883	109,896,497	27,141,271	29,367,356	31,394,855
Individual deposits.....	171,918	172,566	169,825	1,227,142	1,198,294	1,243,927	3,778,294	3,732,063	3,707,168
U. S. deposits.....	15,640	24,515	23,564	174,800	199,964	121,355	.....	.....	.....
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	73,443	51,367	61,530	252,508	252,508	.....	1,963,451	1,878,199	1,960,496
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$21,158,384</b>	<b>\$21,423,719</b>	<b>\$21,197,768</b>	<b>\$275,749,135</b>	<b>\$293,712,613</b>	<b>\$281,524,429</b>	<b>\$87,832,895</b>	<b>\$87,843,693</b>	<b>\$74,115,890</b>
Average reserve held.....	28.90 p. c.	29.11 p. c.	29.77 p. c.	27.35 p. c.	28.55 p. c.	28.30 p. c.	29.60 p. c.	29.52 p. c.	31.76 p. c.
*Total lawful money reserve.....	\$2,270,586	\$2,136,751	\$2,102,565	\$47,176,959	\$48,859,637	\$52,446,757	\$6,450,387	\$6,199,088	\$7,479,029

		CLEVELAND, OHIO.		COLUMBUS, OHIO.		DENVER, COLORADO.	
		Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.	Sept. 5, 1901.	Dec. 15, 1900.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>							
Loans and discounts.....		\$43,037,580	\$41,757,968	\$40,974,746	\$7,845,611	\$7,984,977	\$14,405,379
Overdrafts.....		38,182	72,815	95,171	7,058	14,671	105,844
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....		3,185,000	3,800,000	3,600,000	500,000	604,000	1,450,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....		500,000	500,000	500,000	275,000	275,000	900,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....		21,550	800		85,400	225,850	1,060,000
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....		39,980	43,880	45,173	6,888	30,955	62,860
Stocks, securities, etc.....		1,990,809	1,978,486	2,380,726	1,825,931	2,028,710	4,580,466
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....		463,526	470,672	464,662	53,700	61,161	70,880
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....		124,670	119,670	128,970	181,867	108,678	70,880
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....		4,446,553	4,062,182	4,443,711	1,397,484	1,087,673	172,388
Due from State banks and bankers.....		1,758,650	1,891,438	2,018,568	1,249,683	1,387,156	2,465,682
Due from approved reserve agents.....		6,528,206	5,181,559	6,731,833	1,780,160	1,777,042	519,900
Checks and other cash items.....		181,083	130,663	171,430	101,289	1,572,655	9,127,005
Exchanges for clearing-house.....		531,140	604,289	582,068	122,297	84,167	47,204
Bills of other National banks.....		295,040	185,671	251,466	129,752	708,489	594,432
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....		9,488	5,289	12,188	128,717	145,286	681,006
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:					2,067	3,166	2,460
Gold.....		1,800,507	1,676,607	1,802,977	398,085	438,457	2,897,565
Gold Treasury certificates.....		761,380	721,000	762,000	84,400	82,500	290,000
Gold clearing-house certificates.....						119,560	445,000
Silver dollars.....		134,455	105,612	202,822	46,701	66,869	61,472
Silver Treasury certificates.....		218,512	181,830	298,500	125,982	169,080	205,000
Silver fractional coin.....		49,751	47,108	79,649	24,325	30,524	28,118
Legal-tender notes.....		1,988,013	2,170,388	2,473,485	665,798	700,288	1,195,000
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....						24,475	35,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....		145,580	159,428	172,400	23,448	38,475	85,000
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....		28,100	38,500	43,482		3,500	3,884
<b>Total.....</b>		<b>\$68,200,572</b>	<b>\$65,381,468</b>	<b>\$68,246,664</b>	<b>\$15,227,866</b>	<b>\$16,138,730</b>	<b>\$41,307,157</b>
							<b>\$41,421,790</b>
							<b>\$40,485,204</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>							
Capital stock paid in.....		\$10,400,000	\$10,400,000	\$10,775,000	\$2,050,000	\$2,050,000	\$1,700,000
Surplus fund.....		2,727,000	2,700,000	2,765,000	491,000	523,675	450,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....		862,608	884,516	867,885	160,328	154,080	684,772
National bank notes issued, less amt 'n hand.....		3,103,140	3,220,130	3,067,890	475,000	464,000	1,687,802
Due to other National banks.....		7,103,386	6,104,183	6,322,073	1,063,711	1,064,000	1,682,400
Due to State banks and bankers.....		7,124,870	6,840,183	11,061,860	1,567,807	1,794,644	6,074,911
Dividends unpaid.....			2,581	2,506	1,514,235	1,684	3,286,168
Individual deposits.....		32,873,822	30,164,514	28,229,361	9,193,430	9,680,266	26,812,461
U. S. deposits.....		424,809	411,713	479,819	238,812	238,807	105,004
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....		25,102	24,818	25,360	13,462	6,075	167,408
Notes and bills rediscounted.....					86,948	181,660	517,000
Bills payable.....			340,000	40,000			
Liabilities other than those above stated.....		1,391,701	1,328,794	1,348,175	49,000		
<b>Total.....</b>		<b>\$68,200,572</b>	<b>\$65,381,468</b>	<b>\$68,246,664</b>	<b>\$15,227,866</b>	<b>\$16,138,730</b>	<b>\$41,307,157</b>
							<b>\$40,485,204</b>
Average reserve held.....		27.30 p. c.	25.86 p. c.	30.56 p. c.	20.53 p. c.	28.28 p. c.	43.47 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....		\$4,962,599	\$4,908,519	\$5,589,448	\$1,875,901	\$1,468,938	\$5,178,478
							<b>\$5,017,155</b>

	DES MOINES, IOWA.			DETROIT, MICH.			HOUSTON, TEXAS.		
	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$4,081,244	\$5,475,080	\$5,015,085	\$15,215,915	\$15,558,904	\$15,399,596	\$9,501,657	\$2,949,142	\$2,949,702
Overdrafts.....	30,081	38,708	41,888	7,080	6,182	7,640	270,022	1,459,814	967,487
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	365,000	405,000	405,000	1,450,000	1,450,000	1,450,000	860,000	860,000	380,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	310,000	810,000	810,000	750,000	750,000	750,000	.....	.....	.....
U. S. bonds owned.....	.....	.....	.....	8,000	8,000	8,000	.....	.....	.....
U. S. bonds on U. S. bonds.....	22,300	22,019	17,400	135,812	135,812	135,812	32,000	19,800	30,689
Stocks, securities, etc.....	203,040	220,477	205,682	1,899,188	1,727,987	1,605,599	22,654	24,912	22,900
Banking houses, furniture and fixtures.....	140,541	113,571	113,416	35,158	35,158	35,158	186,012	186,012	186,271
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	61,297	73,151	73,151	330,183	322,588	320,213	84,435	84,435	84,188
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	60,407	602,418	732,858	1,450,186	1,457,786	1,457,786	725,084	1,007,084	1,171,680
Due from State banks and bankers.....	45,197	73,136	63,368	475,380	475,380	475,380	1,057,084	1,057,084	1,171,680
Due from approved reserve agents.....	1,815,680	714,136	1,098,580	3,049,380	3,049,380	3,049,380	714,136	1,015,789	1,223,459
Checks and other cash items.....	18,094	6,414	17,382	32,403	32,403	32,403	5,948	5,948	5,703
Changes to clearing-house.....	103,274	63,470	64,791	345,328	330,630	330,630	12,807	12,807	12,807
Bills of other National banks.....	64,054	61,300	61,300	237,635	237,635	237,635	55,731	110,977	303,379
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	2,777	2,245	1,865	6,064	6,064	6,064	3,608	3,608	3,924
Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	141,504	122,765	103,635	1,076,522	1,157,787	1,108,587	338,080	338,080	304,580
Gold treasury certificates.....	32,980	75,800	22,000	158,000	158,000	171,980	435,150	840,380	891,280
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....	.....	.....	185,000	70,930	105,000	.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....	22,649	44,847	39,170	84,676	103,347	103,690	38,244	97,915	141,455
Silver treasury certificates.....	27,184	57,080	52,681	212,498	180,184	218,187	183,285	183,285	227,725
Silver fractional coin.....	1,916	11,753	12,484	50,408	52,836	73,543	32,004	32,498	32,498
Legal-tender notes.....	353,338	400,807	309,187	990,438	877,350	848,078	408,144	519,588	628,056
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	.....	30,247	20,277	72,500	72,000	70,430	18,875	18,875	17,372
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	18,250	3,200	.....	15,080	25,601	12,500	.....	.....	.....
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$9,580,027</b>	<b>\$8,905,635</b>	<b>\$9,253,515</b>	<b>\$28,258,197</b>	<b>\$28,704,858</b>	<b>\$28,689,798</b>	<b>\$7,490,917</b>	<b>\$3,899,430</b>	<b>\$9,338,855</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$800,000	\$800,000	\$800,000	\$3,300,000	\$3,300,000	\$3,300,000	\$1,100,000	\$1,100,000	\$1,100,000
Surplus fund.....	220,500	220,500	240,000	618,000	618,000	618,000	610,000	610,000	616,000
Unpaid profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	49,797	82,454	37,016	299,452	298,953	298,953	242,087	242,087	221,248
National bank notes issued, less am't on hand.....	357,542	367,547	402,997	1,394,810	1,403,480	1,398,580	855,000	855,000	876,000
Due to other National banks.....	2,046,978	1,849,380	2,091,225	3,070,253	3,294,141	3,388,443	1,560,461	1,560,461	1,821,724
Due to State banks and bankers.....	3,179,049	2,624,074	2,900,482	5,076,578	5,491,145	5,909,543	1,778,143	1,698,015	641,788
Dividends unpaid.....	6,387	6,387	771	899	230	508	4,721	4,409	6,288
Individual deposits.....	2,614,272	2,405,621	2,405,621	13,522,415	13,522,415	13,012,258	4,394,191	4,394,191	4,628,565
U. S. deposits.....	283,743	283,743	283,315	628,373	628,373	628,373	.....	.....	.....
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	11,756	11,859	12,184	60,517	63,180	58,158	.....	.....	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	60,000	75,000	59,796	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$9,580,027</b>	<b>\$8,905,635</b>	<b>\$9,253,515</b>	<b>\$28,258,197</b>	<b>\$28,704,858</b>	<b>\$28,689,798</b>	<b>\$7,490,917</b>	<b>\$3,899,430</b>	<b>\$9,338,855</b>
<b>Average reserve held.....</b>	<b>38.06 p. c.</b>	<b>22.32 p. c.</b>	<b>30.31 p. c.</b>	<b>29.88 p. c.</b>	<b>29.56 p. c.</b>	<b>29.64 p. c.</b>	<b>45.80 p. c.</b>	<b>40.62 p. c.</b>	<b>55.05 p. c.</b>
<b>* Total lawful money reserve.....</b>	<b>\$612,632</b>	<b>\$720,902</b>	<b>\$589,247</b>	<b>\$2,741,750</b>	<b>\$2,599,632</b>	<b>\$2,531,054</b>	<b>\$1,406,087</b>	<b>\$1,458,249</b>	<b>\$1,725,925</b>



	LOS ANGELES, CAL.			LOUISVILLE, KY.			MILWAUKEE, WIS.		
	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$1,839,485	\$4,708,698	\$4,722,195	\$13,702,160	\$13,618,167	\$13,585,156	\$21,005,731	\$22,110,921	\$22,602,735
Overdrafts.....	63,147	61,013	59,621	16,016	21,167	34,043	301,611	227,582	300,562
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	1,148,000	1,153,000	1,153,000	2,905,000	3,655,000	3,655,000	980,000	900,000	900,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	160,000	160,000	160,000	2,149,280	2,209,280	2,209,700	680,000	680,000	680,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	77,000	77,000	77,000	8,540	11,500	11,500	17,470	18,710	18,710
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	18,825	2,382	2,382	82,627	129,433	122,305	14,411	14,411	14,411
Stocks, securities, etc.....	380,141	357,050	458,112	3,445,560	2,053,787	2,044,194	1,725,282	2,047,147	2,047,147
Banking house, furniture and fixture.....	230,653	231,517	230,200	206,387	210,827	210,278	114,380	124,008	101,910
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	148,275	147,454	145,777	62,708	62,905	44,486	114,957	114,000	118,763
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	340,066	295,641	418,515	1,346,761	1,600,424	1,441,820	1,645,942	1,661,319	1,661,319
Due from State banks and bankers.....	819,884	189,107	249,021	813,467	849,018	703,438	1,171,426	1,069,787	1,064,609
Due from approved reserve agents.....	819,884	693,372	867,155	3,301,641	2,611,868	2,603,688	5,139,786	4,204,885	4,778,186
Checks and other cash items.....	30,726	28,418	25,650	25,031	20,946	24,133	24,253	28,801	28,801
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	150,276	126,759	132,759	155,842	155,842	280,176	569,580	509,066	426,979
Bills of other National banks.....	37,188	62,915	62,915	112,479	108,190	153,521	46,586	46,541	46,541
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	1,486	1,146	1,818	6,123	4,080	6,508	8,989	8,989	15,110
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	690,427	537,310	587,610	705,422	604,180	714,107	1,499,845	1,426,420	1,571,460
Gold Treasury certificates.....	23,500	13,500	15,000	205,100	124,000	63,000	680,000	675,000	675,000
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	90,000	164,000	119,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....	17,454	17,737	31,648	54,949	46,131	48,638	76,400	77,370	90,054
Silver Treasury certificates.....	29,802	68,813	53,946	31,072	42,414	10,945	83,000	90,000	66,000
Silver fractional coin.....	46,843	39,599	47,653	24,962	32,461	28,752	31,636	39,977	39,980
Legal-tender notes.....	40,548	74,376	49,551	895,271	1,055,876	848,232	1,064,538	1,245,368	1,337,825
U. S. certificate of deposit for legal-tenders.....	.....	57,650	.....	137,490	155,250	177,750	40,000	42,500	45,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	57,150	.....	.....	3,400	12,400	5,800	5,000	14,600	6,000
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$9,026,380</b>	<b>\$9,163,877</b>	<b>\$9,620,739</b>	<b>\$28,423,000</b>	<b>\$29,315,706</b>	<b>\$29,416,707</b>	<b>\$38,982,567</b>	<b>\$37,451,438</b>	<b>\$39,727,313</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,300,000	\$1,300,000	\$1,300,000	\$4,645,000	\$4,645,000	\$4,645,000	\$3,250,000	\$3,250,000	\$3,250,000
Surplus fund.....	250,000	250,000	251,000	1,062,500	1,062,500	1,067,500	737,500	737,500	800,000
Undiv. profits less expenses and taxes paid.....	311,255	323,297	336,589	842,942	867,219	857,560	478,362	557,163	494,421
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	1,007,770	1,067,065	1,067,065	2,064,400	3,430,000	3,257,560	788,000	845,000	895,000
Due to other National banks.....	83,716	100,441	232,073	4,698,947	4,698,947	4,694,183	4,128,059	3,608,171	4,317,866
Due to State banks and bankers.....	275,801	422,360	461,214	3,362,135	3,362,135	3,644,868	2,661,767	2,706,667	4,000,766
Dividends unpaid.....	822	411	630	10,690	8,417	14,862	878	2,260	2,260
Individual deposits.....	5,680,150	5,453,491	5,708,430	8,785,133	8,840,274	8,565,561	24,272,048	25,067,640	25,391,162
U. S. deposits.....	82,568	62,800	16,814	1,453,569	1,453,194	1,968,361	810,007	462,546	467,264
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	54,203	62,800	97,166	462,562	317,435	317,435	287,866	162,828	124,266
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	20,000	20,000	20,000	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	55,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	91,662	85,140	145,612	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$9,026,380</b>	<b>\$9,163,877</b>	<b>\$9,620,739</b>	<b>\$28,423,000</b>	<b>\$29,315,706</b>	<b>\$29,416,707</b>	<b>\$38,982,567</b>	<b>\$37,451,438</b>	<b>\$39,727,313</b>
Average reserve held.....	22.35 p. c.	30.14 p. c.	32.01 p. c.	33.04 p. c.	23.46 p. c.	23.65 p. c.	30.58 p. c.	27.47 p. c.	27.82 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$608,065	\$915,336	\$904,408	\$1,916,766	\$1,865,072	\$1,712,754	\$3,438,014	\$3,556,166	\$3,772,323

		—MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.—		—NEW ORLEANS, LA.—		—OMAHA, NEB.—	
		Sept. 5, 1900, Dec. 13, 1900, Feb. 5, 1901.	Sept. 5, 1900, Dec. 13, 1900, Feb. 5, 1901.	Sept. 5, 1900, Dec. 13, 1900, Feb. 5, 1901.	Sept. 5, 1900, Dec. 13, 1900, Feb. 5, 1901.	Sept. 5, 1900, Dec. 13, 1900, Feb. 5, 1901.	
<b>RESOURCES.</b>							
Loans and discounts.....	\$14,287,051	\$14,182,733	\$13,362,780	\$14,294,567	\$15,571,236	\$13,216,470	
Overdrafts.....	14,572	9,770	5,876	448,544	1,804,367	137,456	
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	772,000	772,000	772,000	1,410,000	1,460,000	1,850,000	
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	380,000	380,000	380,000	450,000	450,000	900,000	
U. S. bonds on hand.....	700	500	1,000	4,480	46,580	3,500	
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	1,117,757	1,164,364	1,143,118	39,378	43,655	90,546	
Stocks, securities, etc.....	2,000	2,000	1,431,118	1,909,148	38,668	1,646,109	
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	212,128	212,128	207,128	630,432	618,434	815,756	
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	1,123,806	1,062,217	1,006,797	117,247	103,964	365,651	
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	1,075,280	960,944	664,686	954,601	963,652	1,800,361	
Due from State banks and bankers.....	2,250,963	2,118,276	2,240,971	2,314,772	2,482,044	2,880,389	
Due from approved reserve agents.....	63,556	42,806	29,918	82,666	50,062	116,064	
Checks and other cash items.....	1,081,128	880,242	617,347	794,380	579,488	97,400	
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	87,140	103,955	38,859	140,235	76,204	517,422	
Bills of other National banks.....	4,887	6,971	7,943	20,222	25,261	278,507	
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	734,862	693,485	776,902	162,925	144,072	949,435	
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:	50,000	45,000	40,180	388,180	1,562,140	1,016,310	
Gold.....	55,691	65,803	67,510	495,000	270,000	192,000	
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	28,750	53,500	10,700	60,462	185,644	88,975	
Silver dollars.....	316,677	35,780	17,818	458,632	604,935	110,360	
Silver Treasury certificates.....	38,600	42,015	17,818	53,966	272,001	297,149	
Silver fractional coin.....	88,600	772,241	259,081	984,051	998,966	60,708	
Legal-tender notes.....	5,200	14,000	38,600	70,468	70,500	965,981	
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	5,200	14,000	38,600	70,468	70,500	965,981	
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	5,200	14,000	38,600	70,468	70,500	965,981	
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	5,200	14,000	38,600	70,468	70,500	965,981	
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$23,697,873</b>	<b>\$23,455,683</b>	<b>\$21,562,180</b>	<b>\$36,751,519</b>	<b>\$33,199,351</b>	<b>\$29,398,136</b>	
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>							
Capital stock paid in.....	\$4,000,000	\$4,000,000	\$3,750,000	\$2,300,000	\$2,300,000	\$3,650,000	
Surplus fund.....	667,000	667,000	725,000	2,645,000	2,650,000	410,000	
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	305,665	323,643	317,046	1,397,562	1,439,989	118,533	
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	670,647	755,940	768,000	1,397,562	1,397,562	1,804,860	
Due to other National banks.....	3,890,049	3,872,361	3,775,559	1,397,562	1,397,562	1,804,860	
Due to State banks and bankers.....	3,069,122	2,772,804	2,773,040	1,397,562	1,397,562	5,443,194	
Dividends unpaid.....	2,595	1,188	2,298	1,397,562	1,397,562	5,443,194	
Individual deposits.....	10,507,480	10,381,637	8,964,219	16,340,288	19,568,979	11,420,949	
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	267,161	268,066	276,133	812,331	812,912	601,273	
Deposits and bills rediscounted.....	9,324	28,015	10,925	185,642	125,500	197,121	
Bills payable.....	353,967	362,064	200,000	300,000	300,000	244,367	
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$23,697,873</b>	<b>\$23,455,683</b>	<b>\$21,562,180</b>	<b>\$36,751,519</b>	<b>\$33,199,351</b>	<b>\$29,398,136</b>	
<b>Average reserve held.....</b>	<b>\$1,351,730</b>	<b>\$1,675,044</b>	<b>\$1,172,141</b>	<b>\$3,437,216</b>	<b>\$4,090,304</b>	<b>\$3,438,981</b>	
<b>* Total lawful money reserve.....</b>	<b>\$1,351,730</b>	<b>\$1,675,044</b>	<b>\$1,172,141</b>	<b>\$3,437,216</b>	<b>\$4,090,304</b>	<b>\$3,438,981</b>	



RESOURCES.	PHILADELPHIA, PA.			PITTSBURGH, PA.			PORTLAND, ORE.		
	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.
Loans and discounts.....	\$127,145,476	\$136,609,511	\$136,770,699	\$75,645,349	\$77,240,539	\$78,305,618	\$53,256,765	\$53,614,487	\$54,461,222
Overdrafts.....	6,862	7,632	19,697	65,068	40,517	65,981	104,860	97,125	98,310
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	8,742,500	10,189,500	10,569,500	6,825,280	6,873,260	6,963,360	685,000	695,000	695,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	4,868,000	4,468,000	4,468,000	1,453,000	1,453,000	1,361,000	600,000	600,000	600,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	709,700	848,700	69,700	183,640	159,640	171,760	101,800	101,800	101,800
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	645,174	848,700	431,966	806,409	120,515	125,487	908	908	908
Stocks, securities, etc.....	22,810,475	24,111,425	27,019,223	11,781,913	11,452,088	12,694,084	2,468,967	2,462,625	2,527,495
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	7,781,685	3,740,184	8,789,831	3,691,544	3,760,068	3,767,068	216,447	216,649	216,649
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	12,710,963	708,968	708,781	577,516	603,687	845,368	153,967	151,065	151,065
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	2,881,708	14,082,665	14,082,483	5,708,860	8,453,891	4,976,483	640,919	442,326	469,918
Due from State banks and bankers.....	30,825,396	27,642,400	8,064,466	649,804	641,715	617,063	163,173	272,960	259,510
Due from approved reserve agents.....	1,298,097	27,867,232	86,165,671	12,979,809	10,384,560	13,462,782	755,577	618,521	817,947
Checks and other cash items.....	10,062,968	12,997,781	1,368,168	823,977	446,432	288,250	36,604	25,652	27,443
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	608,370	587,615	812,269	2,969,241	3,673,078	4,181,015	65,016	66,577	64,660
Bills of other National banks.....	57,294	60,141	95,304	23,384	50,558	661,765	13,220	5,690	9,045
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	1,862,757	1,829,448	1,693,694	4,081,417	4,122,716	4,329,981	998,786	1,588,680	1,366,347
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	8,701,740	8,838,310	5,281,960	2,368,100	2,665,000	2,762,500	.....	.....	.....
Gold Treasury certificates.....	12,330,000	10,125,000	10,400,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	251,462	254,418	298,066	243,671	263,226	384,051	4,845	9,100	13,207
Silver dollars.....	3,945,713	4,228,319	8,641,446	2,096,440	1,181,175	2,472,246	11,004	11,365	10,927
Silver Treasury certificates.....	250,818	441,510	331,297	144,119	123,266	156,064	18,287	60,381	89,561
Silver fractional coin.....	2,757,235	2,644,182	3,421,516	4,019,876	4,067,069	3,681,413	53,774	47,616	50,361
Legal-tender notes.....	180,000	468,665	524,175	826,160	831,575	843,785	81,260	81,260	81,260
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	413,232	178,910	161,820	150,605	108,666	90,788	.....	450	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas. Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	94,060	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$251,968,797</b>	<b>\$255,875,691</b>	<b>\$260,155,532</b>	<b>\$180,550,239</b>	<b>\$184,399,840</b>	<b>\$142,531,676</b>	<b>\$10,129,064</b>	<b>\$10,981,394</b>	<b>\$10,810,925</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$19,905,000	\$19,905,000	\$19,905,000	\$13,250,000	\$13,250,000	\$13,850,000	\$11,100,000	\$11,100,000	\$11,100,000
Surplus fund.....	17,275,000	17,905,000	17,920,000	10,345,000	10,345,000	10,665,000	185,000	185,000	187,500
Unpaid dividends.....	3,183,981	2,812,786	3,001,408	3,798,779	4,361,573	4,294,125	698,747	730,270	646,388
National bank notes issued, less am't on hand.....	8,130,022	9,601,242	10,478,443	6,687,182	6,687,245	6,783,660	625,000	620,350	608,500
Due to other National banks.....	55,590,047	56,894,905	56,987,740	18,665,653	19,544,645	17,320,357	963,728	987,590	812,023
Due to State banks and bankers.....	28,527,906	31,433,646	37,581,297	9,297,212	8,045,591	10,098,696	652,408	794,687	810,190
Dividends unpaid.....	40,613	47,378	35,653	56,996	60,745	64,076	.....	.....	456
Individual deposits.....	115,228,946	112,553,543	116,158,751	76,355,543	74,211,932	78,756,133	5,474,569	.....	6,178,501
U. S. deposits.....	4,067,632	4,063,065	4,054,879	1,044,542	1,098,944	1,184,707	9,794	.....	102,269
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	.....	.....	.....	178,376	123,614	145,883	441,807	.....	870,046
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	6,197,622	.....
Bills payable.....	66,996	214,389	32,983	.....	.....	.....	.....	84,941	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	461,046	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$251,968,797</b>	<b>\$255,875,691</b>	<b>\$260,155,532</b>	<b>\$180,550,239</b>	<b>\$184,399,840</b>	<b>\$142,531,676</b>	<b>\$10,129,064</b>	<b>\$10,981,394</b>	<b>\$10,810,925</b>
Average reserve held.....	\$18.53 p. c.	\$20.07 p. c.	\$22.60 p. c.	\$27.33 p. c.	\$29.27 p. c.	\$23.54 p. c.	27.67 p. c.	31.36 p. c.	30.89 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$25,119,718	\$22,876,138	\$24,967,970	\$12,860,523	\$13,368,442	\$13,905,885	\$1,068,695	\$1,705,022	\$1,440,268

## RESOURCES.

	ST. JOSEPH, MO. Sept. 5, 1900, Dec. 15, 1900, Feb. 5, 1901.	ST. LOUIS, MO. Sept. 5, 1900, Dec. 15, 1900, Feb. 5, 1901.	ST. PAUL, MINN. Sept. 5, 1900, Dec. 15, 1900, Feb. 5, 1901.
Loans and discounts.....	\$2,932,017	\$3,130,382	\$3,175,006
Overdrafts.....	13,270	18,254	18,254
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	164,500	164,500	164,500
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	100,000	100,000	100,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	25,900	25,900	25,900
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	52,404	52,404	52,404
Stocks, securities, etc.....	72,000	72,000	72,000
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	892,405	892,405	892,405
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	111,946	111,946	111,946
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	2,053,821	2,053,821	2,053,821
Due from State banks and bankers.....	37,085	37,085	37,085
Due from approved reserve agents.....	82,886	82,886	82,886
Checks and other cash items.....	19,365	19,365	19,365
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	952	952	952
Bills of other National banks.....	123,085	123,085	123,085
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	29,150	29,150	29,150
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:.....			
Gold coin.....	29,667	29,667	29,667
Gold Treasury certificates.....	221,587	221,587	221,587
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	8,446	8,446	8,446
Silver dollars.....	170,678	170,678	170,678
Silver Treasury certificates.....	8,225	8,225	8,225
Silver fractional coin.....	2,500	2,500	2,500
Legal-tender notes.....			
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....			
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....			
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....			
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$7,180,397</b>	<b>\$6,794,744</b>	<b>\$6,807,702</b>
		<b>\$68,685,089</b>	<b>\$104,457,561</b>
		<b>\$112,060,442</b>	<b>\$24,570,008</b>
		<b>\$24,080,480</b>	<b>\$35,434,794</b>
Capital stock paid in.....	\$350,000	\$350,000	\$350,000
Surplus fund.....	111,500	111,500	111,500
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	59,455	59,455	59,455
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	164,500	164,500	164,500
Due to other National banks.....	1,408,062	1,408,062	1,408,062
Due to State banks and bankers.....	2,061,154	2,061,154	2,061,154
Dividends unpaid.....	2,880,717	2,880,717	2,880,717
Individual deposits.....	86,657	86,657	86,657
U. S. deposits.....	359	359	359
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....			
Notes and bills rediscounted.....			
Liabilities other than those above stated.....			
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$7,180,397</b>	<b>\$6,794,744</b>	<b>\$6,807,702</b>
Average reserve held.....	45.37 p. c.	45.37 p. c.	45.37 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$568,036	\$568,036	\$568,036

## LIABILITIES.

Capital stock paid in.....	\$350,000
Surplus fund.....	111,500
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	59,455
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	164,500
Due to other National banks.....	1,408,062
Due to State banks and bankers.....	2,061,154
Dividends unpaid.....	2,880,717
Individual deposits.....	86,657
U. S. deposits.....	359
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$7,180,397</b>
Average reserve held.....	45.37 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$568,036

	SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.			SAVANNAH, GA.			WASHINGTON, D. C.		
	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$18,401,682	\$18,422,768	\$18,072,652	\$1,084,000	\$2,179,052	\$2,116,800	\$11,719,479	\$11,869,618	\$11,908,240
Overdrafts.....	128,910	149,660	110,807	66	2,182	4,971	10,807	9,066	8,077
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	1,800,000	2,800,000	2,800,000	200,000	200,000	200,000	1,170,000	1,170,000	1,219,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	574,000	574,000	574,000	127,000	127,000	127,000	451,000	451,000	451,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	290,000						210,540	206,060	167,700
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	64,730	51,811	49,943	5,677	5,677	5,677	210,540	68,064	68,178
Stocks, securities, etc.....	1,263,554	1,855,842	1,481,811	88,396	88,431	31,282	1,009,498	1,066,709	1,162,781
Banking houses, furniture and fixtures.....	333,000	333,450	308,260	54,756	55,181	56,131	1,124,210	1,167,690	1,197,690
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	71,641	71,396	51,188				91,817	88,874	88,874
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	883,289	616,817	624,165	25,106	38,185	51,897	1,798,967	1,865,499	1,888,018
Due from State banks and bankers.....	3,657,733	4,880,348	3,913,176	20,841	20,719	19,596	855,851	824,096	806,170
Due from approved reserve agents.....	1,724,847	1,733,279	1,407,980	162,891	180,157	88,310	2,898,028	2,561,297	3,040,788
Checks and other cash items.....	291,865	39,067	32,235	443	443	191	181,110	298,084	297,878
Exchanges for clearing-houses.....	707,006	1,081,202	667,261	30,528	17,740		216,499	889,378	368,788
Bills of other National banks.....	25,655	85,285	24,240	42,500	15,000		4,535	12,025	4,065
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	1,110	2,571	3,405	816	1,452	6,905	6,905	9,066	7,439
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	3,017,895	2,800,340	3,532,565	15,032	2,000	36,000	172,397	95,481	60,844
Gold Treasury certificates.....	800,760	522,800	250,170	14,000	48,000	48,000	812,130	1,860,480	1,146,260
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	860,000	226,000	745,000						
Silver dollars.....	53,179	52,864	55,775	9,400	9,000	9,806	10,891	10,891	6,877
Silver Treasury certificates.....	47,114	97,808	39,739	20,296	81,000	69,300	670,588	669,340	680,720
Silver fractional coin.....	38,754	62,497	60,969	20,020	16,200	15,000	19,646	42,821	32,618
Legal-tender notes.....	27,278	67,910	18,728	45,000	60,286	90,000	1,298,446	1,116,377	1,186,718
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....									
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	87,442	112,840	113,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	53,500	53,500	54,092
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	5,622	660		2	2	2	1,200	2,500	
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$34,638,443</b>	<b>\$34,801,054</b>	<b>\$34,331,183</b>	<b>\$2,521,797</b>	<b>\$2,992,582</b>	<b>\$2,998,432</b>	<b>\$24,295,959</b>	<b>\$24,884,800</b>	<b>\$25,456,292</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$6,000,000	\$6,000,000	\$6,115,800	\$750,000	\$750,000	\$750,000	\$2,775,000	\$2,775,000	\$2,775,000
Surplus fund.....	2,475,000	2,475,000	2,650,000	225,000	225,000	225,000	1,321,700	1,321,700	1,492,500
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	783,424	1,118,022	755,273	89,225	120,472	102,672	678,174	735,442	564,688
National bank notes issued less amt on hand.....	1,748,850	2,256,800	2,250,500	199,695	197,795	197,595	1,058,645	1,060,055	1,090,065
State bank notes outstanding.....									
Due to other National banks.....	1,496,055	1,114,241	1,122,534	80,137	143,418	116,908	299,442	353,591	299,498
Due to State banks and bankers.....	5,808,554	5,944,586	5,558,399	157,640	129,705	236,475	667,068	829,980	1,069,464
Dividends unpaid.....	10,910	6,725	17,174	958	513	1,390	4,493	3,678	6,958
Individual deposits.....	16,127,778	15,392,278	15,285,185	644,398	714,825	823,028	17,060,605	17,350,160	17,738,878
U. S. deposits.....	554,872	561,265	464,110	98,447	81,409	87,578	402,680	369,861	365,978
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....				30,475	41,000	33,938	25,805	55,211	30,446
Notes and bills rediscounted.....					43,000	43,000			
Bills payable.....				200,000	500,000	350,000			
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	333,290	22,115	22,115	47,530	44,847	25,856			
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$34,638,443</b>	<b>\$34,801,054</b>	<b>\$34,331,183</b>	<b>\$2,521,797</b>	<b>\$2,992,582</b>	<b>\$2,998,432</b>	<b>\$24,295,959</b>	<b>\$24,884,800</b>	<b>\$25,456,292</b>
Average reserve held.....	24,610	32,622	35,660	20,160	20,160	20,160	33,230	33,560	34,300
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$4,564,060	\$3,669,019	\$4,667,976	\$123,748	\$156,426	\$261,300	\$2,876,106	\$3,196,370	\$3,112,565

# MONEY, TRADE AND INVESTMENTS.

## *A REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SITUATION.*

NEW YORK, March 4, 1901.

THE COMBINATIONS OF ENTERPRISES AND CAPITAL into vast aggregates continue to make the present financial era unique in the history of the civilized world. The latest is the combination of steel interests, which are to be brought together under one company to be known as the United States Steel Corporation. It is authorized to issue \$450,000,000 preferred stock, and \$450,000,000 common stock, and \$300,000,000 bonds. The mere statement of these figures shows what a wonderful change has taken place in the business and financial situation in a very short time.

While it is possible for these great operations to be conducted successfully, in the case just mentioned an underwriting syndicate has guaranteed \$200,000,000 to insure the carrying out of the plan; there is little chance for pessimistic views regarding values to prevail. Consequently, it is not surprising that values of securities have moved upward in the last month, overtopping the highest prices of previous periods. All the list has not participated in the advance, however, and in some cases there have been declines.

There was a falling off in the volume of transactions at the New York Stock Exchange, the total sales of shares being about 21,700,000 shares, as against 30,300,000 shares in January. But February was a short month, with four holidays, reducing the number of business days to 18½, counting Saturdays as half-holidays, while in January there were twenty-four full days. The daily average, therefore, was not much less in February than in January. The bond sales reached nearly \$104,000,000, an increase of \$10,000,000 over the total for January. Many of the bond issues also advanced in price.

In connection with the large financial operations of business corporations attention is naturally directed to the remarkable development of the banking resources of the country's financial center. For the first time in their history the New York Clearing-House banks on February 16 reported aggregate deposits exceeding \$1,000,000,000, and on March 2 the total was \$1,012,514,000. On the same date five years ago the aggregate deposits were less than \$500,000,000.

The last few years have witnessed a building up of gigantic banking institutions for which no previous era in our history furnishes a parallel. A half dozen banks in New York to-day have greater resources and larger deposits than all the clearing-house banks in the city possessed not many years ago. The March 2 statement shows that the National City Bank had nearly \$148,000,000 deposits, the National Park \$73,000,000, the National Bank of Commerce \$72,000,000, the Hanover National \$56,000,000, the Chase National \$49,000,000, the Western National and the First National each \$48,000,000. In these seven institutions alone there are \$494,000,000 deposits at the present time. The aggregate capital of those banks is \$28,600,000, and their surplus is \$34,376,600, making a total banking capital of \$62,976,600. Their deposits, therefore, equal nearly \$8 for each dollar of capital.

The remaining banks have \$48,422,700 capital and \$57,880,400 surplus, making a total banking capital of \$104,303,600, while their deposits amount to about \$518,000,000, or about \$5 deposits for each dollar of capital. The following table shows the total capital, surplus and deposits of the New York Clearing-House banks on March 1 in each year since 1889:

MARCH 1.	Capital.	Surplus.	Total capital including surplus.	Deposits.
1889.....	\$60,762,700	\$52,402,600	\$113,165,300	\$488,095,000
1890.....	60,862,700	57,020,900	117,883,600	418,619,200
1891.....	60,572,700	62,977,200	123,549,900	414,426,100
1892.....	59,372,700	66,007,900	125,380,600	531,983,900
1893.....	60,422,700	69,191,600	129,614,300	472,708,100
1894.....	59,922,700	73,015,200	132,937,900	531,741,200
1895.....	61,622,700	72,028,200	133,650,900	531,685,200
1896.....	61,122,700	73,017,100	134,139,800	499,612,200
1897.....	59,772,700	74,888,100	134,660,800	573,769,900
1898.....	59,022,700	74,271,200	133,293,900	729,214,300
1899.....	57,872,700	75,728,000	133,600,700	910,573,600
1900.....	68,422,700	83,342,900	151,765,600	829,917,000
1901.....	75,022,700	92,257,500	166,480,200	1,012,514,000

The ratio of deposits to total banking capital prior to 1898 was about four to one, sometimes slightly above and sometimes a trifle below. In 1898 it rose to above  $5\frac{1}{2}$  to one, and in 1899 to nearly seven to one, but fell in 1900 to about  $5\frac{1}{2}$  to one. This year the ratio is above six to one. Among the largest banks the ratios at this time are approximately: City, ten to one; Park, thirteen to one; Bank of Commerce, four to one; Hanover, seven to one; Chase, sixteen to one; Western National, twelve to one, and the First National five to one.

New York banking capital declined almost continuously from 1889 to 1899, although there was a pretty steady increase in surplus. Since 1899 capital has increased \$17,150,000; of this \$350,000 represents the capital of two banks newly admitted to the clearing-house, while the following banks increased their capital: City, \$9,000,000; Bank of Commerce, \$5,000,000; Bank of North America, \$300,000; Hanover, \$2,000,000; Corn Exchange, \$400,000, and Garfield, \$800,000. The National Union, with a capital of \$1,200,000 in 1899, has since retired, becoming merged with the National Bank of Commerce.

The increased supply of money is still a subject of considerable interest, for its influence upon financial affairs has been and still is very potent. The total supply of money in the country now amounts to \$2,467,000,000, and of that amount \$1,117,000,000 is in gold. In the United States Treasury there is nearly \$489,000,000 of gold—the largest aggregate ever held. Against this there are \$257,000,000 gold certificates in circulation, leaving \$232,000,000 gold owned by the Government. This is about \$14,000,000 less than at the close of 1900, but very much more than was held a few years ago. In fact, in 1895 the Treasury nearly lost all its gold, the net amount falling to less than \$45,000,000 on January 31 of that year.

The changes in the stock of gold in the leading European banks and in the United States Treasury in recent years are shown in the following table:

JANUARY 1.	England.	France.	Germany.	Austro-Hungary.	Russia.	U. S. Treasury.
	Specie.	Gold.	Coin and bullion.	Gold.	Gold.	Net Gold.
1898.....	\$118,610,265	\$331,788,000	\$210,057,600	\$50,246,600	\$319,415,000	\$121,266,663
1894.....	121,417,200	330,625,100	196,801,200	51,730,800	293,495,100	80,891,600
1895.....	161,087,736	402,795,339	249,399,188	74,228,725	300,539,600	86,244,445
1896.....	218,798,113	379,640,532	211,483,491	118,835,064	368,861,600	63,262,268
1897.....	167,982,295	371,474,545	200,674,994	147,430,618	455,662,300	137,316,544
1898.....	151,942,116	377,820,461	206,451,530	147,766,406	598,917,600	190,911,547
1899.....	147,653,625	352,636,323	189,754,568	174,829,013	510,292,000	246,529,176
1900.....	156,342,522	364,099,100	177,812,000	159,830,000	430,004,000	236,906,230
1901.....	139,509,000	454,113,000	185,170,000	186,630,000	*363,419,000	246,561,321

\* December 1.

The Bank of Germany does not report gold and silver separately, but about two-thirds of its specie holdings are understood to be in gold. We shall have to with-

hold comment on the foregoing table, but the figures make a most interesting exhibit and invite investigation. Some remarkable movements have occurred during the period embraced in the table. In addition to the \$183,000,000 gold gained by the United States Treasury since January 1, 1896, there has been \$451,000,000 added to the gold circulation of the country—a total of \$634,000,000 in the last five years.

The foreign trade movement continues to be of extraordinary volume. The exports of merchandise in January exceeded \$136,000,000—an amount never equalled prior to October, 1900, except in December, 1898. The excess of exports over imports in January was more than \$67,000,000, and this has been exceeded only six times in the history of our foreign trade. This balance makes a total of \$2,494,000,000 net exports of merchandise since January 1, 1896.

One of the distinguishing features of our international trade is the prominent position taken by the United States among the exporting countries. This country in 1900 exported a larger quantity of domestic products than any other country in the world. We were also first in 1898, but yielded precedence to Great Britain in 1899. Last year the United States again took first place with a total of \$1,453,013,659, while the United Kingdom is recorded with \$1,413,348,000, Germany third with \$1,050,611,000, and France fourth with \$787,060,000. In the twenty-five years since 1875 the United States has increased her exports from \$497,263,737, or 192 per cent.; Germany, from \$607,096,000, or seventy-three per cent.; the United Kingdom, from \$1,087,497,000, or thirty-four per cent., and France from \$747,489,000, or five per cent.

The following table, compiled by the Bureau of Statistics from official reports, shows the exports of domestic merchandise from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, in each calendar year from 1875 to 1900:

YEAR.	United States.	United Kingdom.	Germany.
1875.....	\$497,263,737	\$1,087,497,000	\$607,096,000
1876.....	575,735,804	976,410,000	619,919,000
1877.....	607,566,495	967,913,000	672,151,000
1878.....	723,286,821	938,500,000	702,513,000
1879.....	754,656,753	932,160,000	675,397,000
1880.....	875,564,075	1,085,521,000	741,202,000
1881.....	814,162,951	1,188,873,000	724,379,000
1882.....	749,911,309	1,175,099,000	776,228,000
1883.....	777,523,718	1,166,962,000	796,206,000
1884.....	733,789,764	1,134,016,000	779,632,000
1885.....	673,563,506	1,037,124,000	665,962,000
1886.....	699,519,430	1,035,223,000	724,471,000
1887.....	703,319,692	1,079,944,000	762,897,000
1888.....	679,597,477	1,141,365,000	780,076,000
1889.....	814,154,864	1,211,442,000	770,537,000
1890.....	845,999,603	1,282,474,000	809,810,000
1891.....	957,333,551	1,203,169,000	772,679,000
1892.....	923,237,315	1,105,747,000	718,806,000
1893.....	854,729,454	1,082,162,000	753,961,000
1894.....	807,312,116	1,051,196,000	720,607,000
1895.....	807,742,415	1,100,452,000	807,328,000
1896.....	986,830,080	1,168,671,000	857,745,000
1897.....	1,079,834,296	1,139,882,000	884,486,000
1898.....	1,233,564,828	1,135,642,000	894,063,000
1899.....	1,253,486,000	1,287,971,039	1,001,278,000
1900.....	1,453,013,659	1,413,348,000	1,050,611,000

Our total exports of merchandise in the calendar year 1900 were valued at \$1,477,949,170, of which \$602,221,375 went to the United Kingdom, \$197,603,400 to Germany, \$102,900,250 to Canada, \$83,721,501 to the Netherlands, and \$82,533,335 to France. The exports to these five countries have increased from \$640,000,000 in 1890 to \$1,070,000,000 in 1900, or \$430,000,000.

The prominent part taken by our manufactures in our export trade has attracted

much attention both here and abroad. The exports of some of the principal classes of manufactures in each of the last three calendar years are shown in the following table :

	1898.	1899.	1900.
Iron and steel and manufactures of.....	\$82,771,550	\$105,000,047	\$129,683,480
Refined mineral oils.....	47,592,299	59,425,913	66,306,871
Copper and manufactures of.....	34,789,808	43,042,786	57,549,700
Leather and manufactures of .....	21,916,822	26,809,833	27,169,104
Cotton manufactures.....	19,694,480	24,858,929	20,722,759
Agricultural implements.....	9,073,384	13,594,524	15,979,909
Cotton seed oil.....	11,465,357	12,476,135	15,061,240
Chemicals.....	9,732,734	11,949,834	13,765,592
Wood manufactures.....	9,264,356	10,383,412	11,514,456
Paraffine .....	6,362,871	7,652,449	8,185,518
Paper and manufactures of .....	5,578,615	5,628,485	7,027,914
Scientific instruments.....	3,117,980	5,095,730	6,788,438
Fertilizers.....	5,115,440	7,801,924	5,755,468
Tobacco manufactures.....	5,135,464	5,200,628	5,738,167

While our exports of manufactures are far in excess of what they ever were until a few months ago, still there has been some shrinkage recently, and it is possible that there may be further declines. The full returns for December last show that this class of exports aggregated only \$32,468,894, as compared with \$35,652,053 in the previous year. Since January 1 the falling off has continued.

At the short session of Congress, which came to a close to-day, little in the way of financial legislation was done. But in the closing days a measure for reducing taxation was finally carried, which is expected to cut down the revenues between \$40,000,000 and \$50,000,000. Whether this will result in a deficit during the coming year is somewhat problematical, but there would have been no doubt about it had not the River and Harbor bill been talked to death in the Senate. The tax reduction bill removes the stamp tax on bank checks, which will be welcomed by many people, not so much on account of the money saved as the relief from a very great inconvenience.

The New York State Legislature is still considering legislation looking to the taxing of banking institutions and insurance companies. Some of the provisions of the measure proposed are in the highest degree obnoxious, and to some extent are a menace to interests that should be protected most zealously.

An interesting review of the earnings of the railroads in the United States in 1900 has been published in the "Financial Chronicle." In it appears the following summary of the results :

JANUARY 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 181 ROADS.	1900.	1899.	INCREASE.	
			Amount.	Per cent.
Miles of road.....	162,961	158,146	4,835	3.06
Gross earnings.....	\$1,447,480,896	\$1,340,059,724	\$107,421,174	8.02
Operating expenses.....	974,373,198	865,517,424	78,855,774	8.81
Net earnings.....	\$473,107,700	\$444,542,300	\$28,565,400	6.43

An increase of \$107,000,000 in gross earnings and of \$28,500,000 in net earnings is a very favorable showing indeed, particularly as it follows gains of a substantial character during the three years preceding last year.

**THE MONEY MARKET.**—In the local money market a condition of ease still exists notwithstanding the extraordinary magnitude of various financial operations under way. There has been a very slight increase in rates and borrowers find themselves readily accommodated.

At the close of the month call money ruled at  $1\frac{1}{2}$  @  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., averaging about 2 per cent. Banks and trust companies quoted 2 per cent. as the minimum rate. Time money on Stock Exchange collateral is quoted at 3 per cent. for 60 days to 4 months, and  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for 5 to 6 months on good mixed collateral. For commercial paper the rates are  $3\frac{3}{4}$  per cent. for 60 to 90 days endorsed bills receivable,  $3\frac{3}{4}$  @  $4\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. for first-class 4 to 6 months single names, and  $4\frac{1}{2}$  @ 5 per cent. for good paper having the same length of time to run.

## MONEY RATES IN NEW YORK CITY.

	Oct. 1.	Nov. 1.	Dec. 1.	Jan. 1.	Feb. 1.	Mar. 1.
	Per cent. $1\frac{1}{2}$ —2	Per cent. 3—4	Per cent. 3—4	Per cent. $4\frac{1}{2}$ —6	Per cent. $1\frac{1}{2}$ —2	Per cent. $1\frac{1}{2}$ —2
Call loans, bankers' balances.....	2—3	4—	4—	5—	2—	2—
Call loans, banks and trust companies.....	$3\frac{1}{2}$ — $4\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —	4—	5—	3—	3—
Brokers' loans on collateral, 30 to 60 days.....	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —	5—	4— $4\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —5	3— $3\frac{1}{2}$	3—
Brokers' loans on collateral, 90 days to 4 months.....	5—	5—	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —5	5—	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —
Brokers' loans on collateral, 5 to 7 months.....	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —5	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —5	4— $4\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —5	3— $3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —
Commercial paper, endorsed bills receivable, 60 to 90 days.....	5— $5\frac{1}{2}$	5— $5\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$ — $4\frac{3}{4}$	5— $5\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —4	$3\frac{3}{4}$ — $4\frac{1}{4}$
Commercial paper, prime single names, 4 to 6 months.....	$5\frac{1}{2}$ —6	6—	5— $5\frac{1}{2}$	$5\frac{1}{2}$ —6	5—	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —5

NEW YORK CITY BANKS.—To such magnitude have the resources of the banks of New York grown that it is apparent that a new financial era has opened, and that whatever changes may occur in the future there will be no return to the old days of small things. For the first time the deposits of the banks reached a billion dollars on February 16, and on March 2 they exceeded that total by more than \$12,500,000. Loans have not reached the billion mark, but on February 16 they were more than \$914,600,000, the largest ever recorded. In the last four weeks deposits increased \$42,000,000, and loans the same amount. The cash reserve increased only about \$600,000, while the surplus reserve was reduced \$10,000,000.

## NEW YORK CITY BANKS—CONDITION AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

	Loans.	Specie.	Legal tenders.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Feb. 2....	\$871,808,200	\$192,825,000	\$74,493,200	\$969,917,500	\$24,838,825	\$31,319,100	\$1,490,597,400
" 9....	895,289,400	195,890,400	73,120,700	994,593,900	20,382,625	31,231,900	1,630,998,000
" 16....	914,623,000	193,213,400	72,471,800	1,011,329,000	12,852,400	31,158,600	1,830,023,700
" 23....	911,800,900	192,953,300	73,890,100	1,009,188,900	14,546,675	31,225,000	1,230,760,800
Mar. 2....	914,209,400	193,948,500	73,981,100	1,012,514,000	14,801,100	31,309,000	1,322,316,800

## DEPOSITS AND SURPLUS RESERVE ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

MONTH.	1899.		1900.		1901.	
	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.
January.....	\$823,087,700	\$19,180,975	\$740,046,900	\$11,168,075	\$854,189,200	\$11,525,900
February.....	861,637,500	39,232,025	795,917,300	30,871,275	969,917,500	24,838,825
March.....	910,573,800	30,334,900	829,917,000	13,641,550	1,012,514,000	14,801,100
April.....	898,917,000	15,491,850	807,816,800	9,836,150	.....	.....
May.....	883,595,300	25,524,875	852,082,500	21,128,300	.....	.....
June.....	890,061,600	42,710,600	887,954,500	20,122,275	.....	.....
July.....	905,127,800	14,274,550	888,249,300	16,859,375	.....	.....
August.....	862,142,700	10,811,125	895,941,700	27,535,975	.....	.....
September.....	849,738,800	9,191,250	903,486,900	27,078,475	.....	.....
October.....	785,364,200	1,724,450	884,708,800	12,942,600	.....	.....
November.....	761,665,200	2,038,525	841,778,200	5,960,400	.....	.....
December.....	748,078,000	3,536,700	864,410,900	10,865,975	.....	.....

Deposits reached the highest amount, \$1,012,514,000 on Mar. 2, 1901, loans, \$914,623,000 on Feb. 16, 1901, and the surplus reserve \$111,623,000 on Feb. 3, 1894.



## NON-MEMBER BANKS—NEW YORK CLEARING-HOUSE.

DATES.	Loans and Investments.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal tender and bank notes.	Deposit with Clearing-House agents.	Deposit in other N. Y. banks.	Surplus.
Feb. 2.....	\$51,471,000	\$69,482,600	\$3,126,700	\$3,713,240	\$8,967,600	\$3,057,100	\$1,468,950
" 9.....	61,318,600	69,982,700	3,104,200	3,889,830	9,219,300	3,125,900	1,783,525
" 16.....	61,213,100	70,706,400	3,133,400	4,023,100	9,604,300	3,306,000	2,388,700
" 23.....	61,299,600	70,377,100	3,132,800	3,922,100	9,438,900	3,397,100	2,286,625
Mar. 2.....	62,046,100	71,061,300	3,195,900	3,963,100	8,890,400	3,862,400	2,116,475

## BOSTON BANKS.

DATES.	Loans.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Feb. 2.....	\$185,046,000	\$208,380,000	\$13,571,000	\$10,372,000	\$6,111,000	\$123,866,792
" 9.....	185,414,000	209,474,000	12,869,000	9,861,000	6,120,000	128,129,300
" 16.....	187,226,000	214,165,000	12,751,000	9,681,000	6,106,000	140,125,300
" 23.....	188,176,000	211,111,000	12,989,000	9,576,000	6,071,000	106,887,200
Mar. 2.....	188,543,000	210,577,000	12,672,000	9,258,000	6,112,000	132,461,112

## PHILADELPHIA BANKS.

DATES.	Loans.	Deposits.	Lawful Money Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Feb. 2.....	\$164,180,000	\$198,196,000	\$58,758,000	\$9,997,000	\$99,694,300
" 9.....	163,652,000	199,641,000	58,836,000	10,014,000	94,838,600
" 16.....	166,814,000	206,296,000	60,008,000	9,989,000	93,421,600
" 23.....	167,681,000	203,123,000	58,531,000	9,991,000	81,167,800
Mar. 2.....	167,893,000	202,625,000	59,265,000	9,968,000	117,781,793

**MONEY RATES ABROAD.**—The Bank of England reduced its rate of discount from 5 to  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on February 7 and to 4 per cent. on February 21. On February 28 the Bank of Germany reduced its rate from 5 to  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., the first change since July 13, 1900. On the same day the Bank of Austria-Hungary reduced its rate to 4 per cent. from  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., the rate which ruled since February 8, 1900. Discounts of 60 to 90 day bills in London at the close of the month were  $3\frac{3}{4}$  @  $3\frac{3}{8}$  per cent. as against 4 @  $4\frac{1}{8}$  per cent. a month ago. The open rate at Paris was  $2\frac{3}{8}$  @  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. as against  $2\frac{3}{8}$  @ 3 a month ago, and at Berlin and Frankfort  $3\frac{1}{2}$  @  $8\frac{5}{8}$  against  $3\frac{1}{4}$  @  $3\frac{3}{8}$  per cent. a month ago.

**EUROPEAN BANKS.**—The Bank of England gained \$16,000,000 gold during the month and now holds almost as much as it did a year ago. The Bank of France gained \$5,500,000, and the Bank of Germany \$8,000,000. The former has over \$40,000,000 more gold than it held a year ago, and the latter \$13,000,000.

## GOLD AND SILVER IN THE EUROPEAN BANKS.

	January 1, 1901.		February 1, 1901.		March 1, 1901.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
England.....	£28,541,263	.....	£32,663,278	.....	£35,858,945	.....
France.....	93,582,213	£44,307,308	94,158,161	£43,820,947	96,278,043	£43,769,446
Germany.....	26,582,000	13,693,000	28,550,000	14,708,000	30,180,000	15,522,000
Austria-Hungary...	38,325,000	9,908,000	38,400,000	10,155,000	38,765,000	10,445,000
Spain.....	13,988,000	16,374,000	14,001,000	18,563,000	14,001,000	18,495,000
Netherlands.....	4,578,000	5,602,000	5,028,000	5,675,000	5,043,000	5,741,300
Nat. Belgium.....	2,945,000	1,472,000	2,914,000	1,457,000	2,933,000	1,466,000
Totals.....	£208,817,476	£91,353,306	£215,712,439	£92,378,947	£222,006,968	£93,438,746

**FOREIGN EXCHANGE.**—Sterling exchange has been irregular during the month and for a time ruled lower. Late in the month it became stronger under a good demand for both long and short. Commercial drafts are scarce. There has been some buying of 60 day bankers' sterling for investment.

**RATES FOR STERLING AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.**

WEEK ENDED.	BANKERS' STERLING.		Cable transfers.	Prime commercial, Long.	Documentary Sterling 60 days.
	60 days.	Sight.			
Feb. 2.....	4.84½ @ 4.84½	4.88 @ 4.88½	4.88½ @ 4.89	4.83½ @ 4.84	4.83½ @ 4.84
" 9.....	4.84½ @ 4.84½	4.87½ @ 4.88	4.88½ @ 4.89½	4.83½ @ 4.84	4.82½ @ 4.84½
" 16.....	4.84½ @ 4.84½	4.87½ @ 4.87½	4.88½ @ 4.89½	4.83½ @ 4.84	4.83½ @ 4.84
" 23.....	4.83½ @ 4.84	4.87 @ 4.87½	4.87½ @ 4.88	4.83½ @ 4.83½	4.82½ @ 4.83½
Mar. 2.....	4.84 @ 4.84½	4.87½ @ 4.87½	4.88 @ 4.88½	4.83½ @ 4.83½	4.83 @ 4.84½

**FOREIGN EXCHANGE—ACTUAL RATES ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.**

	Nov. 1.	Dec. 1.	January 1.	Feb. 1.	March 1.
Sterling Bankers—60 days.....	4.80½—½	4.81½—½	4.81½—½	4.84½—½	4.84—½
" " Sight.....	4.84—½	4.85½—½	4.85½—½	4.88—½	4.87½—½
" " Cables.....	4.84½—½	4.86—½	4.86½—½	4.88½—½	4.88—½
" Commercial long.....	4.79½—80	4.81½—½	4.80½—1½	4.83½—½	4.83½—½
" Documentary for paym't.....	4.79½—80½	4.80½—2½	4.80½—82	4.83½—½	4.83—½
Paris—Cable transfers.....	5.17½—½	5.16½—½	5.15½—½	5.14½—½	5.16½—½
" Bankers' 60 days.....	5.21½—½	5.20½—1-16	5.20—16½	5.18½—17½	5.19½—18½
" Bankers' sight.....	5.18½—½	5.17½—16½	5.17½—16½	5.15½—1-16	5.17½—16½
Swiss—Bankers' sight.....	5.20—18½	5.19½—18½	5.19½—18½	5.18½—17½	5.18½—½
Berlin—Bankers' 60 days.....	94—1-16	94½—½	94½—½	94½—½	94½—½
" Bankers' sight.....	94½—½	94½—½	95—½	95½—½	95½—½
Belgium—Bankers' sight.....	5.19½—½	5.19½—18½	5.17½—½	5.16½—15½	5.18½—17½
Amsterdam—Bankers' sight.....	40—1-16	40½—½	40½—8-16	40½—½	40½—½
Kroners—Bankers' sight.....	26½—½	26½—½	26½—½	26½—½	26½—½
Italian lire—sight.....	5.48½—4½	5.45—42½	5.43½—41½	5.45—42½	5.45—42½

**GOLD AND SILVER COINAGE.**—The United States mints coined during February \$9,230,300 gold, \$2,242,166 silver, and \$116,500 minor coin, a total of \$11,588,966. The standard silver coinage amounted to \$1,620,000.

**COINAGE OF THE UNITED STATES.**

	1899.		1900.		1901.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
January.....	\$18,032,000	\$1,842,000	\$11,515,000	\$2,364,161	\$12,697,200	\$2,712,600
February.....	14,848,800	1,508,000	13,401,900	1,940,000	9,230,300	2,242,166
March.....	12,176,715	2,348,557	12,596,240	4,341,376		
April.....	7,894,475	2,159,449	12,922,000	3,990,000		
May.....	4,803,400	2,879,418	8,252,000	3,171,000		
June.....	8,159,630	2,155,019	8,820,770	2,094,217		
July.....	5,981,500	794,000	6,540,000	1,827,827		
August.....	10,253,100	2,233,636	5,050,000	2,596,000		
September.....	6,880,947	2,441,268	2,233,335	3,932,185		
October.....	8,220,000	3,313,569	5,120,000	4,148,000		
November.....	6,643,730	2,612,000	13,185,000	3,130,000		
December.....	7,469,952	1,886,805	4,578,697	2,880,555		
Year.....	\$11,344,220	\$26,061,519	\$99,272,942	\$36,206,321	\$21,387,300	\$4,653,166

**SILVER.**—The price of silver fluctuated frequently during the month, but the extreme range was 27½¢@28 7-16. The final price was 28 3-16d, a net advance for the month of ¼d.

**NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.**—The volume of National bank notes outstanding increased \$1,838,525, the circulation based on Government bonds having increased about \$3,500,000, while the circulation secured by lawful money decreased \$1,700,000. Of the \$321,000,000 bonds deposited for circulation \$306,000,000 are

new two per cents, and of nearly \$102,000,000 deposited to secure public deposits \$78,000,000 are of the new issue.

## NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.

	Nov. 30, 1900.	Dec. 31, 1900.	Jan. 31, 1901.	Feb. 28, 1901.
Total amount outstanding.....	\$332,212,405	\$340,061,410	\$346,742,196	\$348,575,661
Circulation based on U. S. bonds.....	299,816,629	308,294,673	315,721,578	319,217,048
Circulation secured by lawful money....	32,395,776	31,766,737	31,020,558	29,358,613
U. S. bonds to secure circulation:				
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	939,450	609,950	553,250	457,250
"    "    1907, 4 per cent.....	12,142,950	7,407,650	6,405,650	6,380,650
Five per cents. of 1894.....	843,000	545,900	286,900	286,900
Four per cents. of 1895.....	5,778,350	4,188,600	3,976,100	3,986,600
Three per cents. of 1898.....	6,920,480	4,518,180	4,126,180	4,086,680
Two per cents. of 1900.....	276,658,500	295,562,550	303,064,900	306,217,750
Total.....	\$303,280,730	\$312,632,890	\$318,422,980	\$321,374,830

The National banks have also on deposit the following bonds to secure public deposits: 4 per cents. of 1907, \$10,285,000; 5 per cents. of 1894, \$474,000; 4 per cents. of 1895, \$11,570,950; 3 per cents. of 1898, \$5,827,290; 2 per cents. of 1900, \$73,171,300; District of Columbia 3.65's, 1924, \$331,000; a total of \$101,863,510.

The circulation of National gold banks, not included in the above statement, is \$79,595.

GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND DISBURSEMENTS.—The revenues of the Government exceeded the disbursements in February by nearly \$7,000,000, but nearly \$3,000,000 of the receipts were on account of the Central Pacific Railroad indebtedness. Excluding that item the receipts were \$4,500,000 less than in January and \$2,700,000 less than in February last year.

## UNITED STATES TREASURY RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES.

RECEIPTS.			EXPENDITURES.		
Source.	February, 1901.	Since July 1, 1900.	Source.	February, 1901.	Since July 1, 1900.
Customs.....	\$18,719,598	\$159,175,618	Civil and mis. ....	\$8,144,479	\$82,415,615
Internal revenue...	22,046,599	202,071,170	War.....	10,033,054	103,881,555
Miscellaneous.....	5,077,926	23,979,196	Navy.....	4,370,270	39,144,380
Total.....	\$45,844,123	\$385,225,984	Indians.....	676,865	7,377,751
Excess of receipts...	6,963,498	33,168,706	Pensions.....	13,200,368	95,375,361
			Interest.....	2,455,599	23,962,636
			Total.....	\$38,880,635	\$352,057,278

## UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES AND NET GOLD IN THE TREASURY.

MONTH.	1900.			1901.		
	Receipts.	Expenditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.	Receipts.	Expenditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.
January.....	\$48,012,165	\$39,189,097	\$218,613,617	\$47,520,297	\$40,109,707	\$221,183,644
February.....	45,681,265	37,738,472	232,225,336	45,844,123	38,880,635	231,150,064
March.....	48,729,837	32,188,271	248,358,064			
April.....	45,039,326	40,903,927	229,461,902			
May.....	45,169,053	40,351,525	218,857,545			
June.....	51,435,832	33,540,673	230,557,185			
July.....	49,955,181	53,979,653	223,567,376			
August.....	49,649,756	50,500,000	218,263,969			
September.....	45,304,326	39,169,971	230,131,162			
October.....	51,626,067	47,963,637	242,670,174			
November.....	48,344,514	41,278,660	243,235,735			
December.....	46,846,508	40,204,622	246,561,322			

UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.—The net debt of the Government was reduced \$7,500,000 in February, making \$12,000,000 since January 1. There was very little change in the general items of the public debt statement, the reduction in the net debt being brought about mainly by a decrease in the National bank note redemption fund of \$1,500,000 and an increase in the cash balance in the Treasury of nearly \$6,000,000.

## UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.

	Jan. 1, 1900.	Jan. 1, 1901.	Feb. 1, 1901.	Mar. 1, 1901.
<b>Interest bearing debt:</b>				
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	\$25,364,500			
Loan of March 14, 1900, 2 per cent.....		\$419,679,750	\$445,890,650	\$445,940,750
Funded loan of 1907, 4 ".....	545,366,560	287,578,100	270,405,100	270,359,350
Refunding certificates, 4 per cent.....	37,170	34,380	33,770	33,570
Loan of 1904, 5 per cent.....	95,009,700	26,992,100	22,989,400	22,938,400
" 1905, 4 ".....	162,315,400	162,315,400	162,315,400	162,315,400
Ten-Twenties of 1898, 3 per cent.....	198,679,000	104,900,000	99,915,940	99,912,940
Total interest-bearing debt.....	\$1,026,772,320	\$1,001,499,770	\$1,001,500,260	\$1,001,500,410
Debt on which interest has ceased.....	1,208,500	2,654,070	2,023,190	1,830,690
<b>Debt bearing no interest:</b>				
Legal tender and old demand notes.....	346,734,863	346,734,863	346,734,863	346,734,863
National bank note redemption acct..	36,299,218	31,531,532	30,472,127	28,991,227
Fractional currency.....	6,880,558	6,878,410	6,878,410	6,877,462
Total non-interest bearing debt.....	\$389,914,640	\$385,144,806	\$384,085,400	\$382,603,553
Total interest and non-interest debt.	1,417,895,460	1,386,644,576	1,387,608,851	1,385,934,653
<b>Certificates and notes offset by cash in the Treasury:</b>				
Gold certificates.....	184,844,619	263,629,379	275,667,279	276,040,969
Silver ".....	401,484,504	427,426,000	428,597,000	427,854,000
Certificates of deposit.....	12,350,000	1,580,000	966,000	710,000
Treasury notes of 1890.....	88,320,280	61,397,000	56,278,000	55,957,000
Total certificates and notes.....	\$686,979,403	\$754,012,379	\$763,537,279	\$760,561,969
<b>Aggregate debt.....</b>	<b>2,104,874,863</b>	<b>2,143,311,025</b>	<b>2,151,146,130</b>	<b>2,146,496,642</b>
<b>Cash in the Treasury:</b>				
Total cash assets.....	1,048,006,042	1,131,271,552	1,134,472,931	1,139,829,028
Demand liabilities.....	764,410,589	841,164,216	841,459,958	840,913,879
Balance.....	\$283,585,453	\$290,107,336	\$293,012,973	\$298,915,149
Gold reserve.....	100,000,000	150,000,000	150,000,000	150,000,000
Net cash balance.....	183,585,453	140,107,336	143,012,973	148,915,149
Total.....	\$283,585,453	\$290,107,336	\$293,012,973	\$298,915,149
Total debt, less cash in the Treasury.	1,184,300,007	1,099,191,310	1,094,595,878	1,087,019,504

**FOREIGN TRADE.**—The export movement continues to be of extraordinary volume, the value of merchandise exports in January being reported at more than \$136,000,000, exceeding all previous records for that month and rarely equalled in any other month excepting during the last three months of last year. The exports were \$9,500,000 less than in December, but nearly \$19,000,000 greater than in January, 1900. The imports of merchandise were \$69,100,194 in value in January, a slight increase over December imports, but \$6,700,000 less than in January a year ago. The excess of exports for the month is more than \$67,000,000, or \$25,500,000 greater than in 1900. For the seven months ending January 31, the exports were more than \$902,000,000, an increase of \$102,000,000 compared with the previous year, while the excess of exports over imports was \$443,000,000, an increase of nearly \$130,000,000.

## EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

MONTH OF JANUARY.	MERCHANDISE.			Gold Balance.		Silver Balance.	
	Exports.	Imports.	Balance.	Exp.,	Imp.,	Exp.,	Imp.,
1896.....	\$86,970,028	\$68,647,600	Exp., \$18,322,428	\$24,576		\$2,407,480	
1897.....	93,951,883	51,354,018	" 42,597,865	500,951		1,370,111	
1898.....	108,426,674	50,827,714	" 57,598,960	3,834,751		1,766,259	
1899.....	115,591,446	58,239,771	" 57,351,675	4,636,893		2,251,954	
1900.....	117,597,148	75,897,102	" 41,700,046	3,698,598	Exp.,	2,424,626	
1901.....	136,317,354	69,100,194	" 67,217,160	4,060,147	"	1,621,205	
<b>SEVEN MONTHS.</b>							
1896.....	524,964,969	478,716,717	Exp., 46,248,252	61,862,559		18,701,884	
1897.....	655,177,127	363,278,017	" 291,899,110	64,022,219	Imp.,	19,677,033	
1898.....	718,367,407	340,616,530	" 377,750,877	22,449,230	"	14,238,859	
1899.....	749,596,115	366,943,381	" 382,652,734	60,235,087	"	15,212,720	
1900.....	800,046,486	486,419,633	" 313,626,853	6,422,632	"	12,359,291	
1901.....	902,220,729	458,831,071	" 443,398,658	22,369,119	"	16,221,123	

**MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.**—There was very little change in the total amount of money in circulation last month, a decrease of \$171,000 being reported. There were, however, some extraordinary changes in the items of circulation. There was an increase of nearly \$13,000,000 in gold coin, and a decrease of \$18,000,000 in gold certificates. These changes appear to be the result of an error in reporting the same items in the previous month, when gold coin decreased nearly \$14,000,000 and gold certificates increased \$43,000,000.

**MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.**

	Dec. 1, 1900.	Jan. 1, 1901.	Feb. 1, 1901.	Mar. 1, 1901.
Gold coin.....	\$624,702,913	\$629,192,578	\$615,576,805	\$628,333,957
Silver dollars.....	73,617,834	76,182,228	63,457,812	71,076,387
Subsidiary silver.....	81,717,505	83,123,463	81,979,691	81,437,330
Gold certificates.....	231,246,349	222,787,929	275,667,279	257,548,739
Silver certificates.....	421,613,407	422,869,408	424,567,000	422,340,190
Treasury notes, Act July 14, 1890.....	63,361,330	61,230,159	58,061,831	55,857,327
United States notes.....	333,686,359	334,587,495	333,064,404	335,421,723
Currency certificates, Act June 8, 1872.....	1,660,000	1,560,000	965,000	.....
National bank notes.....	326,949,170	332,188,526	333,360,361	339,563,012
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$2,158,761,387</b>	<b>\$2,173,251,879</b>	<b>\$2,190,780,213</b>	<b>\$2,190,609,144</b>
Population of United States.....	76,975,000	77,080,000	77,185,000	77,311,000
Circulation per capita.....	\$28.04	\$28.19	\$28.38	\$28.34

**MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.**—The Treasury net holdings of cash increased \$7,000,000 in February, the balance now aggregating \$276,686,084. There is nearly \$489,000,000 gold in the Treasury, of which \$231,000,000 is in excess of gold certificates. The net gold increased nearly \$10,000,000 in February.

**MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.**

	Dec. 1, 1900.	Jan. 1, 1901.	Feb. 1, 1901.	Mar. 1, 1901.
Gold coin and bullion.....	\$474,482,084	\$479,349,251	\$496,850,823	\$488,638,803
Silver Dollars.....	432,439,956	432,967,284	447,339,778	441,391,223
Silver bullion.....	57,600,251	56,937,918	54,853,287	53,790,726
Subsidiary silver.....	5,482,886	4,446,010	6,505,826	7,230,550
United States notes.....	13,011,667	12,093,521	13,626,612	11,259,294
National bank notes.....	5,343,130	7,962,649	13,461,480	10,062,244
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$968,359,944</b>	<b>\$993,746,613</b>	<b>\$1,032,687,906</b>	<b>\$1,012,432,840</b>
Certificates and Treasury notes, 1890, outstanding.....	717,911,086	717,977,491	763,351,110	735,746,756
<b>Net cash in Treasury.....</b>	<b>\$270,448,858</b>	<b>\$275,769,122</b>	<b>\$269,336,796</b>	<b>\$276,686,084</b>

**SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES.**—The estimated stock of money in the country on March 1 was \$2,467,295,228, an increase for the month of \$7,000,000, of which \$4,600,000 was in gold, \$600,000 in silver and \$1,800,000 in National bank notes.

**SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES.**

	Dec. 1, 1900.	Jan. 1, 1901.	Feb. 1, 1901.	Mar. 1, 1901.
Gold coin and bullion.....	\$1,099,184,997	\$1,108,541,829	\$1,112,427,728	\$1,117,082,760
Silver dollars.....	506,251,290	509,149,590	510,847,590	512,467,590
Silver bullion.....	57,600,251	56,937,918	54,853,287	53,790,726
Subsidiary silver.....	87,200,371	87,569,473	88,485,517	88,667,880
United States notes.....	346,681,016	346,881,016	346,681,016	346,681,016
National bank notes.....	332,292,300	340,141,175	346,821,871	348,655,216
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$2,429,210,225</b>	<b>\$2,443,021,001</b>	<b>\$2,460,117,009</b>	<b>\$2,467,295,228</b>

Certificates and Treasury notes represented by coin, bullion, or currency in Treasury are not included in the above statement.

# ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.

The following table shows the highest, lowest and closing prices of the most active stocks at the New York Stock Exchange in the month of February, and the highest and lowest during the year 1901, by dates, and also, for comparison, the range of prices in 1900:

	YEAR 1900.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1901.				FEBRUARY, 1901.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.	Lowest.			High.	Low.	Closing.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe.	48¾	18¾	56¼ - Feb. 16	42¼ - Jan. 21	58¼	49¼	55¼		
" preferred	89¾	58¼	90¾ - Jan. 2	82¼ - Jan. 21	90	87¼	87¼		
Baltimore & Ohio.	89¾	55¼	94 - Jan. 7	81¼ - Jan. 4	93¼	87¼	87¼		
Baltimore & Ohio, pref.	90	72¾	90 - Jan. 7	83¾ - Feb. 28	88¼	83¾	83¾		
Brooklyn Rapid Transit.	88¾	47¾	87¾ - Jan. 12	72¼ - Feb. 27	81¼	72¼	74¼		
Canadian Pacific.	90¾	84¾	91¾ - Jan. 3	88¾ - Jan. 18	90¼	90	90¼		
Canada Southern.	61¼	47¾	59¼ - Feb. 4	54¼ - Jan. 4	59¼	56¼	56¼		
Central of New Jersey.	150¼	115	160 - Jan. 5	145¾ - Jan. 4	156¼	152	155		
Ches. & Ohio vtg. cts.	42¾	24	42¾ - Jan. 2	36¼ - Jan. 21	42¾	38¾	40¼		
Chicago & Alton.	42	31	41¼ - Jan. 9	36¼ - Jan. 21	40¼	38¼	38¼		
" preferred	78¼	68¼	78¾ - Jan. 2	72¼ - Jan. 4	75¼	74	74¼		
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy.	144	119¼	144¼ - Jan. 7	134¼ - Jan. 4	148¼	138¼	142¼		
Chicago & E. Illinois.	109	88	111¼ - Feb. 13	91 - Jan. 2	111¼	94	106¼		
" preferred	125	119¼	134 - Feb. 13	120¼ - Jan. 3	134	125	129¼		
Chicago, Great Western.	18	9¾	21¼ - Feb. 6	16 - Jan. 3	21¼	17¾	18¼		
Chic., Indianapolis & Lou'ville.	29	14	35 - Feb. 8	23 - Jan. 21	35	27	31¾		
" preferred	64	45¼	71¼ - Feb. 9	58¼ - Jan. 21	71¼	65¼	70		
Chic., Milwaukee & St. Paul.	148¼	108¼	162 - Jan. 5	142¼ - Jan. 21	155¼	147¼	154¼		
" preferred	188	160¼	195¼ - Jan. 28	187¼ - Jan. 4	192¼	190	191		
Chicago & Northwestern.	172¾	159¼	177 - Jan. 5	168¼ - Jan. 21	175	170¼	172¼		
" preferred	220	193¼	222¼ - Jan. 5	214 - Feb. 13	217	214	214		
Chicago, Rock I. & Pacific.	123¼	102	128¾ - Jan. 7	117¼ - Jan. 3	128¾	121¼	123¼		
Chic., St. Paul, Minn. & Om.	126	110	137 - Jan. 11	126 - Jan. 2	127	127	127		
" preferred	175	172	185 - Jan. 11	184¼ - Jan. 5	184¼	184	184		
Chicago Terminal Transfer.	147¼	84¾	15¼ - Jan. 31	10¼ - Jan. 19	15¼	13	12		
" preferred	30¾	28¼	30¾ - Jan. 31	33 - Jan. 18	30¾	34¼	34¼		
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. Louis.	76	55	81 - Jan. 14	73¼ - Jan. 25	79	75	76		
Col. Fuel & Iron Co.	59¼	29¼	56¼ - Jan. 2	41¼ - Jan. 21	51¼	41¼	42¼		
Consolidated Gas Co.	201	164	190¼ - Jan. 2	187 - Jan. 18	195	191¼	191¼		
Delaware & Hud. Canal Co.	131¼	108¼	174¼ - Feb. 18	126¼ - Jan. 3	174¼	151	165		
Delaware, Luck. & Western.	194¼	171¼	202 - Jan. 8	188¼ - Jan. 3	198¼	194	198¼		
Denver & Rio Grande.	34¼	16¼	42¼ - Feb. 9	29¼ - Jan. 21	42¼	33	36		
" preferred	87¼	64¼	89¾ - Feb. 9	80 - Jan. 21	89¾	84¼	86¼		
Erie.	27¼	10¼	31 - Jan. 7	24¼ - Jan. 4	30¾	27	27¼		
" 1st pref.	63¼	30¾	69¼ - Jan. 5	59¼ - Jan. 21	68¼	62¼	63¼		
" 2d pref.	43¼	15	48¼ - Jan. 7	39¼ - Jan. 4	46	40¼	42		
Evansville & Terre Haute.	54¾	38¼	55¾ - Feb. 15	41 - Jan. 31	55	41	50¼		
Express Adams.	150	111	162 - Feb. 4	145 - Jan. 8	162	155	160		
" American.	191	142	195 - Feb. 15	170 - Jan. 12	195	178	187¼		
" United States.	59	45	59¼ - Jan. 5	53 - Jan. 26	58¼	54¼	57		
" Wells, Fargo.	140	120	139 - Feb. 8	130 - Jan. 11	139	138	139		
Great Northern, preferred.	191¼	144¾	200 - Jan. 9	188 - Jan. 4	194¾	189	194¼		
Hocking Valley.	42¾	30	49¾ - Feb. 6	41 - Jan. 3	49¾	43¼	48		
" preferred	74¼	58	76 - Feb. 6	69¼ - Jan. 21	76	71	72¼		
Illinois Central.	131	110	139 - Jan. 9	127¾ - Feb. 1	134	127¾	130		
Iowa Central.	27¾	11¾	28 - Jan. 2	21 - Jan. 21	27¾	25¼	26¼		
" preferred	58	39	58 - Feb. 20	48 - Jan. 21	58	52¼	53¾		
Kansas City Southern.	17¼	7	19 - Feb. 4	13¼ - Jan. 4	19	16	16¼		
" preferred	43¾	27¼	42 - Feb. 8	35 - Jan. 4	42	39¼	39¼		
Lake Erie & Western.	52	20¼	46¼ - Jan. 3	39¼ - Jan. 21	45	41	42¼		
" preferred	115	83¼	114 - Feb. 15	108¾ - Jan. 21	114	111	113		
Long Island.	89	47¾	90¾ - Feb. 8	87 - Jan. 3	90¾	88	88		
Louisville & Nashville.	89¼	68¼	93¼ - Feb. 5	84¼ - Jan. 4	93¼	89¼	91¼		
Manhattan consol.	117	84	120¼ - Jan. 12	111 - Jan. 21	121¼	116	117¼		
Metropolitan Street.	182	143¾	174 - Jan. 2	159 - Jan. 21	166	159¾	161¾		
Mexican Central.	17¾	10¾	19¼ - Feb. 13	12¼ - Jan. 21	19¼	14	17¼		
Minneapolis & St. Louis.	71¼	45¼	78¼ - Feb. 25	67¼ - Jan. 19	78¼	69¼	72¼		
" preferred	104¼	87¼	110 - Jan. 12	101¼ - Jan. 21	104¼	107	109¼		
Missouri, Kan. & Tex.	17¼	9	22¼ - Feb. 6	15 - Jan. 21	22¼	18¼	20¼		
" preferred	47¼	25¼	61 - Feb. 5	44¼ - Jan. 18	61	50¼	53¼		
Missouri Pacific.	72¼	38¾	83¼ - Feb. 7	69 - Jan. 4	83¼	85	87¼		
Mobile & Ohio.	49	35	50 - Feb. 25	44 - Jan. 21	50	48¼	49¼		
N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River.	145¾	125¾	148 - Feb. 5	139¾ - Jan. 21	148	142¼	145¾		

## ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.—Continued.

	YEAR 1900.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1901.				FEBRUARY, 1901.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.			Lowest.	High.	Low.	Closing.
N. Y., Ontario & Western.....	32½	18¼	35¼—Jan. 12	28¼—Jan. 21	34¼	30¾	81		
Norfolk & Western.....	45¾	22¾	48 —Feb. 15	42 —Jan. 10	48	44¾	45¾		
" preferred.....	83	67	85¼—Feb. 7	82 —Feb. 15	85¼	82	83¼		
North American Co.....	22¾	13¾	25 —Feb. 15	19¼—Jan. 3	25	20	21½		
Northern Pacific.....	86¼	45¾	90 —Jan. 5	77¼—Jan. 21	87¼	81¼	82¼		
" pref.....	91½	67	89 —Jan. 5	84¼—Jan. 21	88¾	85¾	87½		
Pacific Mail.....	57	25¾	47¼—Jan. 29	38 —Feb. 25	46¼	38	39		
Pennsylvania R. R.....	140¼	124¾	152 —Jan. 5	142¼—Jan. 21	152	146¼	148¾		
People's Gas & Coke of Chic.	111½	81¾	108¾—Jan. 2	105¼—Jan. 21	114¼	98¾	101¼		
Pullman Palace Car Co.....	204	176	203 —Jan. 2	193¼—Jan. 21	201¼	196¼	199		
Reading.....	26	15	38 —Jan. 7	24¼—Jan. 4	35	29¼	30¼		
" 1st preferred.....	71¾	49	77 —Jan. 5	68¾—Jan. 4	77	70	70¾		
" 2d preferred.....	39½	23¾	47¼—Jan. 7	38 —Jan. 3	46	39¾	40¾		
St. Louis & San Francisco.....	24¼	9¾	38¼—Feb. 28	21¼—Jan. 4	38¼	30¾	37		
" 1st preferred.....	78¼	64	82¼—Feb. 15	78¼—Jan. 2	82¾	80¼	82		
" 2d preferred.....	55	31¼	65 —Feb. 14	53¼—Jan. 4	65	59	64¾		
St. Louis & Southwestern.....	18¼	8¾	27¼—Feb. 13	17 —Jan. 4	27¾	23	25¼		
" preferred.....	46¼	21¾	57¼—Feb. 11	41¼—Jan. 3	57¾	51¼	56¼		
Southern Pacific Co.....	45¾	36¾	49¼—Jan. 31	40¼—Jan. 4	49¼	42¾	43¾		
Southern Railway.....	23¾	10¾	24¼—Feb. 26	18 —Jan. 21	24¾	21¼	23¾		
" preferred.....	73¼	49¼	78 —Feb. 25	67¼—Jan. 21	78	73¼	77		
Tennessee Coal & Iron Co.....	104	49	67¾—Feb. 5	50¼—Feb. 28	67¾	50¼	51¾		
Texas & Pacific.....	26¾	18¾	31 —Feb. 5	23¼—Jan. 3	31	26¾	28¼		
Union Pacific.....	81¾	44¾	97¼—Feb. 7	78¼—Jan. 4	97¼	84¾	89¾		
" preferred.....	86¾	70¾	90¼—Feb. 7	81¾—Jan. 21	90¾	83¾	83¾		
Wabash R. R.....	14	6¼	10¼—Feb. 8	11¼—Jan. 3	19¼	13	17		
" preferred.....	27	16	34¾—Feb. 8	23¼—Jan. 4	34¾	27¾	28¾		
Western Union.....	88¼	77¼	91 —Feb. 13	81 —Jan. 21	91	83¾	86¼		
Wheeling & Lake Erie.....	13¼	8	15¼—Feb. 8	11¾—Jan. 31	15¾	11¼	14		
" second preferred.....	38¼	21¾	34¾—Feb. 8	27¼—Jan. 21	34¾	28¾	29¾		
Wisconsin Central.....	20¾	10	19¼—Feb. 14	14¼—Jan. 21	19¼	17	18¼		
" preferred.....	57	30	45¼—Jan. 31	38¼—Jan. 17	45¼	42	42¾		
"INDUSTRIAL"									
Amalgamated Copper.....	90¼	89¾	95 —Feb. 28	83¼—Jan. 21	95	87¾	94		
American Car & Foundry.....	25¼	12¼	23¼—Jan. 3	19 —Jan. 21	23	20¼	21		
" pref.....	72	57¾	73¼—Jan. 7	67 —Jan. 18	72¾	69¾	71¾		
American Co. Oil Co.....	37¾	30	31¼—Jan. 3	26¼—Jan. 18	31	28	28¾		
American Ice.....	40¼	27¼	41¼—Jan. 9	34¼—Feb. 21	41¼	34¼	35¾		
Am. Smelting & Refining Co.....	50¼	34¼	65¼—Jan. 15	45¾—Feb. 26	63¼	48	54¼		
" preferred.....	99	85	100 —Jan. 16	88 —Feb. 26	96¾	88	92¼		
American Steel Hoop Co.....	50¼	17	37¼—Feb. 26	23 —Jan. 18	37¼	28¼	34¾		
" preferred.....	86	64¼	86 —Feb. 18	69 —Jan. 18	86	72¾	81¾		
American Steel & Wire Co.....	58¾	28¾	53¼—Feb. 11	38 —Jan. 14	53¼	38	38¼		
" preferred.....	95	60¼	101¼—Feb. 25	83¼—Jan. 17	101¼	83¾	97		
American Sugar Ref. Co.....	149	95¼	147¼—Jan. 2	131¼—Jan. 18	144¼	133¼	139¼		
American Tin Plate Co.....	57¼	18	79 —Feb. 25	55 —Jan. 4	79	56¾	61		
American Tobacco Co.....	114¾	84¼	122¼—Feb. 27	110¼—Jan. 21	122¼	114¼	119¼		
Anaconda Copper Mining.....	54¾	37¾	48¾—Jan. 2	40¼—Jan. 21	47¾	42¾	46¾		
Continental Tobacco Co.....	40¼	21¾	48¾—Feb. 27	38¾—Jan. 4	48¾	42¾	46¼		
" preferred.....	95	70	98¼—Feb. 26	83¼—Jan. 2	98¼	95¼	98		
Federal Steel Co.....	58¼	28¾	59 —Jan. 2	41 —Jan. 29	55¼	43	43		
" preferred.....	70¾	60¾	90 —Feb. 25	68 —Jan. 21	90	72¾	80¾		
General Electric Co.....	200	120	218 —Feb. 20	183¼—Jan. 10	218	190¼	213		
Glucose Sugar Refining Co.....	60	44	53 —Jan. 2	45 —Feb. 16	50¼	45	45¾		
International Paper Co.....	26¾	14¼	25¾—Jan. 5	20 —Jan. 22	25¼	20¾	21		
" preferred.....	75	58	74¼—Jan. 3	66 —Jan. 21	74	69	73¼		
National Lead Co.....	28¼	15¾	20¼—Jan. 2	15¼—Feb. 26	19	15¼	15¼		
National Steel Co.....	53¼	20	60 —Feb. 25	37 —Jan. 21	50	40¼	44¼		
" preferred.....	97	79¾	102¼—Feb. 25	80 —Jan. 18	102¼	91¼	100¼		
National Tube.....	66¾	40¾	70¼—Feb. 6	51¼—Feb. 28	70¼	51¼	51		
Pressed Steel Car Co.....	58¼	32¼	52 —Jan. 2	35 —Jan. 22	39¾	35¼	39¾		
Republic Iron & Steel Co.....	27¼	8¾	18¼—Jan. 2	12¼—Jan. 22	17¼	13¾	15		
" preferred.....	79¼	49	65¼—Jan. 2	55¼—Jan. 21	64¾	58	62¾		
Standard Rope & Twine Co.....	10¼	4¼	57¼—Feb. 11	3¼—Jan. 19	57	3¾	4¾		
U. S. Leather Co.....	19	7¾	15 —Feb. 9	11 —Jan. 21	15	12¼	12¼		
" preferred.....	79¼	65	79 —Jan. 2	73 —Jan. 15	79¼	73¾	73¾		
U. S. Rubber Co.....	44	21	34 —Jan. 2	18¾—Feb. 20	22¼	18¾	20¼		
" preferred.....	104¾	74¼	85 —Jan. 2	59¾—Feb. 7	62¾	59¾	62		

# RAILWAY, INDUSTRIAL AND GOVERNMENT BONDS.

LAST SALE, PRICE AND DATE AND HIGHEST AND LOWEST PRICES AND TOTAL  
SALES FOR THE MONTH.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ann Arbor 1st g 4's.....	1905	7,000,000	Q J	98	Feb. 28,'01	98½	96	81,000
Aitch., Top. & S. F.								
{ Aitch Top & Santa Fe gen g 4's.....	1905	133,062,500	A & O	103½	Feb. 28,'01	108½	102½	1,551,000
{ " registered.....			A & O	102	Feb. 18,'01	102	102	5,000
{ " adjustment, g. 4's.....	1905	50,513,500	NOV	91½	Feb. 28,'01	93½	91½	997,000
{ " registered.....			NOV	79½	Dec. 11,'99			
{ " stamped.....	1905	1,214,500	M & N	92½	Feb. 25,'01	92½	92½	60,000
{ Equip. tr. ser. A. g. 5's.....	1902	250,000	J & J					
{ Chic. & St. L. 1st 6's.....	1915	1,500,000	M & S					
Atl. Knox. & Nor. Ry. 1st g. 5s.....	1946	1,000,000	J & D	105	Dec. 4,'19			
Balt. & Ohio prior lien g. 3½s.....	1925		J & J	96½	Feb. 28,'01	97½	96½	880,500
{ " registered.....		69,798,000	J & J					
{ " g. 4s.....	1948		A & O	103	Feb. 28,'01	103½	102½	546,000
{ " g. 4s. registered.....		65,963,000	A & O	102	Jan. 19,'01			
{ " Southw'n div. 1st g. 3½s.....	1925		J & J	89½	Feb. 28,'01	90½	89	1,084,000
{ " registered.....		41,990,000	Q J					
{ Pitt Jun. & M. div. 1st g. 3½s.....	1925		M & N	89½	Feb. 28,'01	90½	89½	120,500
{ " registered.....		11,298,000	Q Feb					
{ Monongahela River 1st g. g. 5's.....	1919	700,000	F & A	104½	July 1,'92			
{ Cen. Ohio. Reorg. 1st c. g. 4½s.....	1930	1,018,000	M & S	111	Feb. 28,'99			
Buffalo, Roch. & Pitts. g. g. 5's.....	1937	4,407,000	M & S	116½	Feb. 4,'01	117	116½	29,000
{ " deb. 6's.....	1947	1,000,000	J & J					
{ Alleghany & Wn. 1st g. gtd 4's.....	1938	2,000,000	A & O					
{ Clearfield & Mah. 1st g. g. 5's.....	1943	650,000	J & J	130	Jan. 3,'01			
{ Rochester & Pittsburg. 1st 6's.....	1921	1,300,000	F & A	130½	Feb. 26,'01	130½	130½	1,000
{ " cons. 1st 6's.....	1922	3,920,000	J & D	130	Feb. 7,'01	130	130	1,000
Buffalo & Susquehanna 1st g. 5's.....	1913		A & O	100	Nov. 18,'99			
{ " registered.....		1,056,500	A & O					
Burlington, Cedar R. & N. 1st 5's.....	1906	6,500,000	J & D	107½	Feb. 28,'01	107½	107	23,000
{ " con. 1st & col. 1st 5's.....	1934		A & O	123	Feb. 15,'01	123	119½	21,000
{ " registered.....		7,250,000	A & O	117	Nov. 20,'19			
{ Ced. Rap Ia. Falls & Nor. 1st 5's.....	1921	1,905,000	A & O	113½	Dec. 6,'19			
{ Minneap's & St. Louis 1st 7's.....	1927	150,000	J & D	140	Aug. 24,'95			
Canada Southern 1st int. gtd 5's.....	1908	14,000,000	J & J	107	Feb. 28,'01	107½	107	49,000
{ " 2d mortg. 5's.....	1913		M & S	111	Feb. 19,'01	111	110½	37,000
{ " registered.....		6,000,000	M & S	104	Apr. 24,'09			
Central Branch U. Pac. 1st g. 4's.....	1948	2,500,000	J & D	94	Feb. 4,'01	94	94	10,000
Cent. R. & Bkg. Co. of Ga. c. g. 5's.....	1987	4,880,000	M & N	98	Feb. 25,'01	98½	98	6,000
Central R'y of Georgia, 1st g. 5's.....	1945		F & A	120	Feb. 8,'01	120	120	5,000
{ " registered \$1,000 & \$5,000		7,000,000	F & A					
{ " con. g. 5's.....	1945		M & N	103	Feb. 28,'01	103½	101	1,119,000
{ " con. g. 5's, reg. \$1,000 & \$5,000		16,700,600	M & N	96	Oct. 30,'99			
{ " 1st. pref. inc. g. 5's.....	1945	4,000,000	OCT 1	70	Feb. 28,'01	72	68	515,000
{ " 2d pref. inc. g. 5's.....	1945	7,000,000	OCT 1	31½	Feb. 28,'01	34½	28	1,640,000
{ " 3d pref. inc. g. 5's.....	1945	4,000,000	OCT 1	17	Feb. 28,'01	17½	11	894,000
{ " Macon & Nor. Div. 1st								
{ " g. 5's.....	1946	840,000	J & J	95	Dec. 27,'99			
{ " Mid. Ga. & Atl. div. g. 5s.....	1947	413,000	J & J	102	June 29,'99			
{ " Mobile div. 1st g. 5's.....	1946	1,000,000	J & J	106	Oct. 24,'19			
Central Railroad of New Jersey,								
{ " 1st convertible 7's.....	1902	1,167,000	M & N	106½	Dec. 4,'19			
{ " gen. g. 5's.....	1987		J & J	131½	Feb. 28,'01	131½	128½	222,000
{ " registered.....		43,924,000	Q J	131½	Feb. 28,'01	131½	127½	69,000



BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Am. Dock & Improvm't Co. 5's. 1921		4,987,000	J & J	113 $\frac{3}{4}$	Jan. 21, '01	.....	.....	.....
Lehigh & H. R. gen. gtd g. 5's. 1920		1,082,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Lehigh & W.-B. Coal con. 5's. 1912		2,691,000	Q M	106	Aug. 30, '19	.....	.....	.....
con. extended gtd. 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ 's. 1910		12,175,000	Q M	108 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 20, '01	104	103 $\frac{1}{2}$	98,000
Charleston & Sav. 1st g. 7's. 1906		1,500,000	J & J	108 $\frac{1}{4}$	Dec. 13, '99	.....	.....	.....
Ches. & Ohio 6's g., Series A. 1908		2,000,000	A & O	118 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 31, '01	.....	.....	.....
Mortgage gold 6's. 1911		2,000,000	A & O	119	Feb. 19, '01	119	119	10,000
1st con. g. 5's. 1930		25,858,000	M & N	120 $\frac{3}{4}$	Feb. 27, '01	122	120 $\frac{3}{4}$	48,000
registered.			M & N	117	June 11, '19	.....	.....	.....
Gen. m. g. 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ 's. 1902		28,810,000	M & S	106 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 28, '01	107 $\frac{1}{4}$	106	285,000
registered.			M & S	94 $\frac{1}{4}$	Aug. 23, '19	.....	.....	.....
Craig Val. 1st g. 5's. 1940		650,000	J & J	108	Nov. 26, '19	.....	.....	.....
(R. & A. d.) 1st c. g. 4's. 1909		6,000,000	J & J	106	Feb. 25, '01	106	106	27,000
2d con. g. 4's. 1909		1,000,000	J & J	101 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 27, '01	101 $\frac{1}{4}$	100	17,000
Warm S. Val. 1st g. 5's. 1941		400,000	M & S	101 $\frac{1}{4}$	Apr. 29, '99	.....	.....	.....
Elz. Lex. & B. S. g. 5's. 1902		3,007,000	M & S	102 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 14, '01	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & Alton R. R. s. fund g. 6's. 1903		1,671,000	M & N	106 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 9, '01	.....	.....	.....
refunding g. 3's. 1949		17,433,000	A & O	94	Jan. 25, '01	.....	.....	.....
registered.			A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Miss. Riv. Bdge 1st s. f'd g. 6's. 1912		449,000	A & O	105 $\frac{1}{4}$	Oct. 30, '95	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & Alton Ry 1st lien g. 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ 's. 1950		22,000,000	J & J	84 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 28, '01	86	84 $\frac{1}{4}$	1,598,000
registered.			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy con. 7's. 1903		24,356,000	J & J	109 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 21, '01	109 $\frac{1}{4}$	109	20,000
5's, sinking fund. 1901		2,291,000	A & O	101 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 19, '01	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & Iowa div. 5's. 1906		2,320,000	F & A	104 $\frac{1}{4}$	Apr. 11, '19	.....	.....	.....
Denver div. 4's. 1922		5,479,000	F & A	102	Feb. 21, '01	102	102	25,000
Illinois div. 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ 's. 1949		26,214,000	J & J	103 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 27, '01	103 $\frac{1}{4}$	103 $\frac{1}{4}$	12,000
registered.			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
(Iowa div.) sink. f'd 5's. 1919		2,708,000	A & O	112 $\frac{1}{4}$	Nov. 30, '19	.....	.....	.....
4's. 1919		8,544,000	A & O	106	Feb. 25, '01	106	106 $\frac{1}{4}$	17,000
Nebraska extensi'n 4's. 1927		26,077,000	M & N	112 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 27, '01	112 $\frac{1}{4}$	112 $\frac{1}{4}$	4,000
registered.			M & N	111 $\frac{1}{4}$	June 2, '99	.....	.....	.....
Southwestern div. 4's. 1921		2,950,000	M & S	100 $\frac{1}{4}$	Oct. 15, '19	.....	.....	.....
convertible 5's. 1903		4,081,200	M & S	145 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 25, '01	146 $\frac{1}{4}$	141 $\frac{1}{4}$	49,500
5's, debentures. 1913		9,000,000	M & N	111 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 28, '01	111 $\frac{1}{4}$	111 $\frac{1}{4}$	20,000
Han. & St. Jos. con. 6's. 1911		8,000,000	M & S	123 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 25, '01	123 $\frac{1}{4}$	123 $\frac{1}{4}$	10,000
Chicago & E. Ill. 1st s. f'd c'y. 6's. 1907		2,989,000	J & D	113 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 25, '01	113 $\frac{1}{4}$	113	5,000
small bonds. 1912		2,653,000	J & D	112	Apr. 2, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st con. 6's, gold. 1934		12,996,000	A & O	137 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 14, '01	137 $\frac{1}{4}$	137 $\frac{1}{4}$	10,000
gen. con. 1st 5's. 1937			M & N	124 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 28, '01	124 $\frac{1}{4}$	118 $\frac{1}{4}$	191,000
registered.			M & N	115	Aug. 28, '19	.....	.....	.....
Chicago & Ind. Coal 1st 5's. 1906		4,826,000	J & J	116	Feb. 16, '01	116	116	5,000
Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville.								
refunding g. 6's. 1947		4,700,000	J & J	119 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 27, '01	120 $\frac{1}{4}$	118	86,000
ref. g. 5's. 1947		3,542,000	J & J	108 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 18, '01	108 $\frac{1}{4}$	106 $\frac{1}{4}$	41,000
Louisv. N. Alb. & Chic. 1st 6's. 1910		3,000,000	J & J	114 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 18, '01	114 $\frac{1}{4}$	114 $\frac{1}{4}$	1,000
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul.								
Mil. & St. Paul 1st 7's & g. R.d. 1902		1,469,500	J & J	184 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 27, '01	185	184 $\frac{1}{4}$	2,000
1st 7's & g. 1902		1,157,000	J & J	173 $\frac{1}{4}$	Apr. 10, '19	.....	.....	.....
1st C. & M. 7's. 1903		5,072,000	J & J	180	Jan. 28, '01	.....	.....	.....
Chicago Mil. & St. Paul con. 7's. 1905		4,748,000	J & J	185	Feb. 13, '01	185	185	5,000
terminal g. 5's. 1914		23,676,000	J & J	114 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 26, '01	114 $\frac{1}{4}$	114 $\frac{1}{4}$	5,000
gen. g. 4's, series A. 1909			J & J	113 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 26, '01	114 $\frac{1}{4}$	113 $\frac{1}{4}$	16,000
registered.			Q & J	105 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 19, '98	.....	.....	.....
gen. g. 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ 's, series B. 1909		2,500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered.			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & Lake Sup. 5's. 1921		1,360,000	J & J	119 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 8, '01	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & M. R. div. 5's. 1926		3,083,000	J & J	122 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 23, '01	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & Pac. div. 6's. 1910		3,000,000	J & J	119	Feb. 7, '01	119	119	2,000
1st Chic. & P. W. g. 5's. 1921		26,340,000	J & J	120 $\frac{3}{4}$	Feb. 27, '01	121	120 $\frac{3}{4}$	84,000
Dakota & Gt. S. g. 5's. 1918		2,858,000	J & J	115 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 15, '01	115 $\frac{1}{4}$	115 $\frac{1}{4}$	7,000
Far. & So. g. 6's assu. 1924		1,250,000	J & J	137 $\frac{1}{4}$	July 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st H't & Dk. div. 7's. 1910		5,680,000	J & J	125 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 11, '01	125 $\frac{1}{4}$	125 $\frac{1}{4}$	20,000
1st 5's. 1910		990,000	J & J	110 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 15, '01	.....	.....	.....
1st 7's, Iowa & D. ex. 1908		2,230,000	J & J	187	Jan. 31, '01	.....	.....	.....
1st 5's, La. C. & Dav. 1919		2,500,000	J & J	118 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 23, '01	.....	.....	.....
Mineral Point div. 5's. 1910		2,840,000	J & J	110 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 9, '01	.....	.....	.....
1st So. Min. div. 6's. 1910		7,432,000	J & J	118 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 28, '01	118 $\frac{1}{4}$	118	26,000
1st 6's, South'n div. 1909		4,000,000	J & J	117 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 29, '01	.....	.....	.....
Wis. & Min. div. g. 5's. 1921		4,755,000	J & J	120	Feb. 27, '01	120	120	4,000
Mil. & N. 1st M. L. 6's. 1910		2,155,000	J & D	119 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 13, '01	119 $\frac{1}{4}$	119 $\frac{1}{4}$	2,000
1st con. 6's. 1913		5,062,000	J & D	121 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 7, '01	121 $\frac{1}{4}$	121 $\frac{1}{4}$	3,000

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Chic. & Northwestern con. 7's...1915		12,832,000	Q F	141	Feb. 27, '01	141	141	1,000
gold 7's...1902		7,835,000	J & D	107½	Jan. 16, '01			
registered gold 7's...1902			J & D	107½	Jan. 18, '01			
extension 4's...1896-1928		18,632,000	F A 15	109	Jan. 3, '01			
registered...1887			F A 15	107	Mar. 7, '19'			
gen. g. 3½'s...1887		11,737,000	M & N	110	Jan. 29, '01			
registered...1887			Q F	103	Nov. 19, '98			
sinking fund 6's...1879-1929		5,878,000	A & O	115	Feb. 21, '01	115	115	1,000
registered...1887			A & O	111	Oct. 18, '19'			
sinking fund 6's...1879-1929		6,982,000	A & O	108¾	Jan. 24, '01			
registered...1887			A & O	107	Dec. 18, '19'			
deben. 5's...1900		5,900,000	M & N	110	Feb. 18, '01	110	110	20,000
registered...1900			M & N	105	Dec. 28, '99			
deben. 5's...1921		10,000,000	A & O	116	Feb. 14, '01	116	116	2,000
registered...1921			A & O	107	Nov. 20, '95			
sinking f'd deben. 5's...1921		9,800,000	M & N	124	Feb. 19, '01	124	124	6,000
registered...1921			M & N	122½	Jan. 15, '01			
Des Moines & Minn. 1st 7's...1907		600,000	F & A	127	Apr. 8, '84			
Milwaukee & Madison 1st 6's...1905		1,600,000	M & S	113	Jan. 23, '01			
Northern Illinois 1st 6's...1910		1,500,000	M & S	112¾	Apr. 24, '19'			
Ottumwa C. F. & St. P. 1st 5's...1909		1,600,000	M & S	111¾	Apr. 24, '19'			
Winona & St. Peters 2d 7's...1907		1,562,000	M & N	120¼	Nov. 10, '19'			
Mil., L. Shore & We'n 1st g. 6's...1921		5,000,000	M & N	1367½	Feb. 14, '01	1367½	1367½	3,000
ext. & Impt. s. f'd g. 5's...1929		4,148,000	F & A	125	Feb. 14, '01	125	123¾	28,000
Ashland div. 1st g. 6's...1925		1,000,000	M & S	139¾	Apr. 17, '19'			
Michigan div. 1st g. 6's...1924		1,280,000	J & J	142	Feb. 27, '10	142	142	2,000
con. deb. 5's...1907		438,000	F & A	107¾	Feb. 21, '01	107¾	107¾	1,000
incomes...1911		500,000	M & N	112	Nov. 13, '99			
Chic., Rock Is. & Pac. 6's coup...1917		12,100,000	J & J	131	Feb. 19, '01	131	131	3,000
registered...1917			J & J	130	Nov. 7, '19'			
gen. g. 4's...1908		54,581,000	J & J	109	Feb. 28, '01	110	108½	128,000
registered...1908			J & J	107¾	Nov. 8, '19'			
Des Moines & Ft. Dodge 1st 4's...1905		1,200,000	J & J	99½	Feb. 20, '01	99½	99½	1,000
1st 2½'s...1905		1,200,000	J & J	98¾	Aug. 25, '19'			
extension 4's...1905		372,000	J & J	96	Dec. 19, '19'			
Keokuk & Des M. 1st mor. 5's...1923		2,750,000	A & O	112	Feb. 14, '01	112	112	3,000
small bond...1923			A & O	100	Apr. 15, '97			
Chic., St. P., Minn. & Oma. con. 6's...1930		14,284,000	J & D	139½	Feb. 27, '01	139½	136	14,000
Chic., St. Paul & Minn. 1st 6's...1918		2,120,000	M & N	134	Feb. 8, '01	134	134	2,500
North Wisconsin 1st mort. 6's...1930		800,000	J & J	140	May 31, '19'			
St. Paul & Sioux City 1st 6's...1919		6,070,000	A & O	131½	Feb. 15, '01	131½	131½	14,000
Chic., Term. Trans. R. R. g. 4's...1947		13,400,000	J & J	97	Feb. 28, '01	97½	95¾	180,000
Chic. & Wn. Ind. 1st s'k. f'd g. 6's...1919		478,000	M & N	106	Oct. 4, '99			
gen'l mortg. g. 6's...1932		1,808,000	Q M	119¾	Jan. 28, '01			
Chic. & West Michigan 1st g. 5's...1921		5,733,000	J & D	100	Oct. 28, '93			
Choc., Oklahoma & Gif. gen. g. 6s...1919		4,800,000	J & J	103	Jan. 17, '19'			
Cin., Ham. & Day. con. s'k. f'd 7's...1905		998,000	A & O	115	Dec. 14, '19'			
2d g. 4½'s...1937		2,000,000	J & J	113	Oct. 10, '19'			
Cin., Day. & Ir'n 1st gt. dg. 5's...1941		3,500,000	M & N	113¾	Jan. 29, '01			
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. L. gen. g. 4's...1903		12,634,000	J & D	103¾	Feb. 28, '01	104½	103½	149,000
do Cudro div. 1st g. 4's...1939		5,000,000	J & J	99	Jan. 10, '01			
Cin. Wab. & Mich. div. 1st g. 4's...1901		4,000,000	J & J	101¼	Feb. 28, '01	101½	101½	19,000
St. Louis div. 1st col. trust g. 4's...1900		9,750,000	M & N	104½	Feb. 8, '01	104½	104½	15,000
registered...1900				99	May 4, '99			
Sp'gfield & Col. div. 1st g. 4's...1940		1,035,000	M & S	99	Oct. 12, '19'			
White W. Val. div. 1st g. 4's...1940		650,000	J & J	83	Nov. 22, '99			
Cin., Ind., St. L. & Chic. 1st g. 4's...1936		7,685,000	J & J	104½	Feb. 20, '19'	104½	104½	1,000
registered...1936			Q F	95	Nov. 15, '94			
con. 6's...1920		689,000	M & N	107½	June 30, '93			
Cin., S'dusky & Clev. con. 1st g. 5's...1928		2,571,000	J & J	115½	Feb. 16, '01	115½	115½	20,000
Clev., C. C. & Ind. con. 7's...1914		3,901,000	J & D	136	Feb. 21, '01	136	136	1,000
sinking fund 7's...1914			J & D	119½	Nov. 19, '89			
gen. consol 6's...1934		3,205,000	J & J	136	Feb. 28, '01	136	136	3,000
registered...1934								
Cin., Sp. 1st m. C. C. C. & Ind. 7's...1901		1,000,000	A & O	101¾	Dec. 7, '19'			
Ind. Bloom. & West. 1st pfd 4's...1940		881,500	A & O					
Ohio, Ind. & Wn., 1st pfd. 5's...1938		550,000	Q J					
Peoria & Eastern 1st con. 4's...1940		8,103,000	A & O	98	Feb. 21, '01	99	97	79,000
income 4's...1990		4,000,000	A & O	59	Feb. 28, '01	65	53½	1,488,000

## BOND SALES.

485

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Clev., Lorain & Wheel'g con. 1st 5's 1933		5,000,000	A & O	111	Sept. 5, 19'	....	....	.....
Clev., & Mahoning Val. gold 5's. 1932		2,986,000	J & J	130	May 8, 19'	....	....	.....
registered.....			Q J	.....	.....	....	....	.....
Col. Midd Ry. 1st g. 2-3-4's.....1947		7,500,000	J & J	81	Feb. 28, '01	83½	78¼	1,208,000
1st g. 4's.....1947		1,011,000	J & J	82	Feb. 11, '01	82	78¼	77,000
Colorado & Southern 1st g. 4's.....1929		17,500,000	F & A	85	Feb. 28, '01	87½	83¾	2,221,000
Conn., Passumpsic Riv's 1st g. 4's. 1948		1,900,000	A & O	102	Dec. 27, '93	....	....	.....
Delaware, Lack. & W. mtge 7's. 1907		3,087,000	M & S	128½	Jan. 8, '01	....	....	.....
Morris & Essex 1st m 7's.....1914		5,000,000	M & N	189½	Feb. 28, '01	140	139¼	6,000
7's.....1871-1901		4,991,000	A & O	104½	Feb. 4, '01	104½	104¼	2,000
1st c. gtd 7's.....1915		12,151,000	J & D	139½	Jan. 29, '01	....	....	.....
registered.....			J & D	140	Oct. 28, '98	....	....	.....
N. Y., Lack. & West'n. 1st 6's.....1921		12,000,000	J & J	136	Feb. 5, '01	136	136	5,000
const. 5's.....1923		5,000,000	F & A	119	Feb. 28, '01	119	119	2,000
term. imp. 4's.....1923		5,000,000	M & N	103½	Oct. 15, 19'	....	....	.....
Syracuse, Bing. & N. Y. 1st 7's. 1906		1,986,000	A & O	118½	Nov. 15, 19'	....	....	.....
Delaware & Hudson Canal.								
1st Penn. Div. c. 7's.....1917		5,000,000	M & S	146½	May 2, 19'	....	....	.....
reg.....1917			M & S	150	Feb. 15, '01	150	150	20,000
Albany & Susq. 1st c. g. 7's.....1906		3,000,000	A & O	117	Feb. 7, '01	117	117	10,000
registered.....			A & O	122	June 6, '99	....	....	.....
6's.....1906		7,000,000	A & O	112	Dec. 4, 19'	....	....	.....
registered.....			A & O	112½	Feb. 15, '01	112½	112¼	1,000
Rens. & Saratoga 1st c. 7's.....1921		2,000,000	M & N	147	Dec. 4, 19'	....	....	.....
1st r's.....1921			M & N	151	Jan. 17, '01	....	....	.....
Denver & Rio G. 1st con. g. 4's.....1936		28,650,000	J & J	102½	Feb. 28, '01	103½	102	214,500
con. g. 4½'s.....1936		6,382,000	J & J	110½	Feb. 21, '01	110½	109¾	22,000
imp. m. g. 5's.....1928		8,163,500	J & D	109½	Feb. 14, '01	110	107½	227,000
Des Moines Union Ry 1st g. 5's.....1917		628,000	M & N	111	Feb. 28, '01	111	111	5,000
Detroit & Mack. 1st lien g. 4's.....1996		900,000	J & D	98½	Nov. 20, 19'	....	....	.....
g. 4's.....1996		1,250,000	J & D	89	Feb. 27, '01	89½	88	82,000
Duluth & Iron Range 1st 5's.....1937		6,734,000	A & O	115	Feb. 25, '01	115	110½	31,000
registered.....			A & O	101½	July 23, '89	....	....	.....
2d 1 m 6's.....1916		2,000,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Duluth, Red Wing & S'n 1st g. 5's. 1928		500,000	J & J	92½	Feb. 11, '98	....	....	.....
Duluth So. Shore & At. gold 5's. 1937		4,000,000	J & J	112½	Jan. 12, '01	....	....	.....
Elgin Joliet & Eastern 1st g 5's.....1941		7,852,000	M & N	109½	Dec. 6, 19'	....	....	.....
Erie 1st ext. g. 4's.....1947		2,482,000	M & N	118½	Jan. 28, '01	....	....	.....
2d extended g. 5's.....1919		2,149,000	M & S	121	Jan. 7, '01	....	....	.....
3d extended g. 4½'s.....1923		4,618,000	M & S	124	Feb. 11, '01	124	124	1,000
4th extended g. 5's.....1920		2,926,000	A & O	118	Jan. 26, 19'	....	....	.....
5th extended g. 4's.....1928		709,500	J & D	106½	Feb. 24, 19'	....	....	.....
1st cons. gold 7's.....1920		15,890,000	M & S	143½	Feb. 28, '01	143½	142¾	35,000
1st cons. fund g. 7's.....1920		3,699,500	M & S	134½	Oct. 9, 19'	....	....	.....
Erie R.R. 1st con. g.-as prior bds. 1996		33,452,000	J & J	96½	Feb. 28, '01	97½	96¾	598,000
registered.....			J & J	93½	May 25, '99	....	....	.....
1st con. gen. lien g. 4's. 1996		33,857,000	J & J	83½	Feb. 28, '01	85½	83	1,877,000
registered.....			J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Buffalo, N. Y. & Erie 1st 7's.....1916		2,380,000	J & D	140	Feb. 6, '99	....	....	.....
Buffalo & Southwestern g. 6's. 1908		1,500,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
small.....			J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Chicago & Erie 1st gold 5's.....1982		12,000,000	M & N	121	Feb. 28, '01	121	121	1,000
Jefferson R. R. 1st gtd g. 5's.....1909		2,800,000	A & O	106½	Feb. 15, '01	106½	106½	10,000
Long Dock consol. g. 6's.....1985		7,500,000	A & O	138	Jan. 17, '01	....	....	.....
N. Y. L. E. & W. Coal & R. R. Co.								
1st gtd. currency 6's.....1922		1,100,000	M & N	....	....	....	....	.....
N. Y. L. E. & W. Dock & Imp.								
Co. 1st currency 6's.....1913		3,396,000	J & J	118	Sept. 27, 19'	....	....	.....
N. Y. & Greenw'd Lake gt g 5's. 1946		1,452,000	M & N	109	Oct. 27, '98	....	....	.....
small.....								
Midland R. of N. J. 1st g. 6's.....1910		3,500,000	A & O	118	Feb. 13, '01	118	118	7,000
N.Y., Sus. & W. 1st refdg. g. 5's. 1937		3,750,000	F & J	116½	Feb. 15, '01	116½	116¼	9,000
2d g. 4½'s.....1937		453,000	F & A	94	Feb. 11, '01	94	94	1,000
gen. g. 5's.....1940		2,546,000	F & A	102½	Feb. 28, '01	103	102¾	28,000
term. 1st g. 5's.....1943		2,000,000	M & N	113	Apr. 27, 19'	....	....	.....
registered.....\$5,000 each			M & N	....	....	....	....	.....
Wilkesb. & East. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		3,000,000	J & D	108½	Feb. 20, '01	108½	107½	16,000

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Eureka Springs R'y 1st 6's, g.....1933		500,000	F & A	65	Nov.10,'97	....	....	.....
Evans. & Terre Haute 1st con. 6's.....1921		8,000,000	J & J	124½	Feb. 9,'01	124½	124½	1,000
" 1st General g 5's.....1942		2,223,000	A & O	108	Dec. 28,'19	....	....	.....
" Mount Vernon 1st 6's.....1923		375,000	A & O	110	May 10,'98	....	....	.....
" Sul. Co. Bch. 1st g 5's.....1930		450,000	A & O	95	Sept.15,'91	....	....	.....
Evans. & Ind'p. 1st con. g 6's.....1926		1,591,000	J & J	108	Feb. 21,'01	108½	108	14,000
Florida Cen. & Penins. 1st g 5's.....1918		8,000,000	J & J	100	Sept. 6,'99	....	....	.....
" 1st land grant ex. g 5's.....1930		423,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
" 1st con. g 5's.....1943		4,370,000	J & J	80½	May 14,'96	....	....	.....
Ft. Smith U'n Dep. Co. 1st g 4½'s.....1941		1,000,000	J & J	105	Mar.11,'98	....	....	.....
Ft. Worth & D. C. ctf. dep. 1st 6's.....1921		8,176,000	.....	83	Feb. 28,'01	85	81½	340,000
Ft. Worth & Rio Grande 1st g 5's.....1923		2,863,000	J & J	74½	Feb. 27,'01	76	69½	408,000
Galveston H. & H. of 1882 1st 6's.....1913		2,000,000	A & O	102½	Jan. 26,'01	....	....	.....
Geo. & Ala. Ry. 1st pref. g 5's.....1945		2,230,000	A & O	106	Dec. 12,'88	....	....	.....
" 1st con. g 5's.....1945		2,922,000	J & J	98½	Nov.27,'19	....	....	.....
Ga. Car. & N. Ry. 1st gtd. g 5's.....1927		5,890,000	J & J	99½	Jan. 22,'19	....	....	.....
Hock. Val. Ry. 1st con. g 4½'s.....1909		10,254,000	J & J	105½	Feb. 28,'01	106	104½	235,000
" registered.....		1,401,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
" Col. Hock's Val. 1st ext. g 4's.....1948		1,401,000	A & O	106½	Feb. 6,'01	106½	106½	1,000
Illinois Central, 1st g 4's.....1951		1,500,000	J & J	116	Dec. 13,'19	....	....	.....
" registered.....		1,500,000	J & J	113½	Mar.12,'19	....	....	.....
" 1st gold 3½'s.....1951		2,499,000	J & J	106½	Dec. 14,'19	....	....	.....
" registered.....		2,499,000	J & J	102½	Apr. 15,'98	....	....	.....
" 1st g 3's steri. \$500,000.....1951		2,500,000	M & S	92½	July 13,'96	....	....	.....
" registered.....		2,500,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	.....
" total outstg.....\$13,950,000		15,000,000	A & O	104½	Feb. 15,'01	104½	104½	1,500
" collat. trust gold 4's.....1952		15,000,000	A & O	104½	Jan. 30,'99	....	....	.....
" regist'd.....		24,679,000	M & N	105	Feb. 21,'01	105	105	1,000
" col. t. g. 4's L. N. O. & Tex.....1953		24,679,000	M & N	109½	Dec. 13,'99	....	....	.....
" registered.....		3,000,000	J & D	123	May 24,'99	....	....	.....
" Calro Bridge g 4's.....1950		3,000,000	J & D	102½	Feb. 8,'01	102½	102½	8,000
" registered.....		14,320,000	J & J	88½	Dec. 8,'99	....	....	.....
" Louisville div. g 3½'s.....1953		600,000	F & A	95	Dec. 21,'99	....	....	.....
" registered.....		4,939,000	J & J	92	Dec. 15,'19	....	....	.....
" Middle div. reg. 5's.....1921		4,939,000	J & J	101½	Jan. 31,'19	....	....	.....
" St. Louis div. g 3's.....1951		4,939,000	J & J	102	Jan. 28,'01	....	....	.....
" registered.....		6,321,000	J & J	101½	Sept.10,'95	....	....	.....
" g 3½'s.....1951		6,321,000	J & J	100	Nov. 7,'19	....	....	.....
" registered.....		2,000,000	J & J	124	Dec. 11,'99	....	....	.....
" Sp'gfield div 1st g 3½'s.....1951		2,000,000	J & J	120	Feb. 25,'01	112½	112	2,000
" registered.....		5,425,000	F & A	101½	Jan. 31,'19	....	....	.....
" West'n Line 1st g 4's.....1951		5,425,000	F & A	121	Aug. 3,'19	....	....	.....
" registered.....		470,000	J & D	105	Jan. 22,'19	....	....	.....
" Belleville & Carodt 1st 6's.....1923		241,000	M & S	126½	Feb. 8,'01	126½	126½	5,000
" Carbond' & Shawt'n 1st g 4's.....1932		241,000	J & D	123½	Feb. 14,'01	123½	123½	4,000
" Chic., St. L. & N. O. gold 5's.....1951		16,555,000	J & D	100½	Nov.14,'19	....	....	.....
" gold 5's, registered.....		1,352,000	J & D	106½	Aug.17,'99	....	....	.....
" g 3½'s.....1951		3,500,000	J & D	121	Feb. 24,'99	....	....	.....
" registered.....		538,000	M & S	102½	Nov.16,'19	....	....	.....
" St. Louis, South. 1st gtd. g 4's.....1931		538,000	M & S	102½	Nov.16,'19	....	....	.....
Ind., Dec. & West. 1st g 5's.....1935		1,824,000	J & J	103½	Aug. 8,'19	....	....	.....
" 1st gtd. g 5's.....1935		933,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Internat. & Gt. N'n 1st 6's, gold.....1919		7,954,000	M & N	125½	Feb. 20,'01	125½	125	44,500
" 2d g 5's.....1906		6,593,000	M & S	99	Feb. 28,'01	99½	99	41,000
" 3d g 4's.....1921		2,725,000	M & S	68	Feb. 18,'01	70	67	15,000
Iowa Central 1st gold 5's.....1938		7,650,000	J & D	116½	Feb. 27,'01	116½	116	57,000
Kansas C. & M. R. & B. Co. 1st gtd g 5's.....1929		3,000,000	A & O	69	Feb. 28,'01	70½	69	978,000
Kansas City Southern 1st g 3's.....1950		26,197,000	A & O	63½	Oct. 16,'19	....	....	.....
" registered.....		7,250,000	J & J	123½	Feb. 28,'01	124	122½	47,000
" Lake Erie & Western 1st g 5's.....1937		3,625,000	J & J	113	Feb. 28,'01	118½	117½	27,000
" 2d mtge. g 5's.....1941		2,500,000	A & O	115½	Jan. 9,'01	....	....	.....
" Northern Ohio 1st gtd g 5's.....1945		2,500,000	A & O	....	....	....	....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Lehigh Val. (Pa.) coll. g. 5's.....1907		5,000,000	M & N	104	Aug. 8, '98	....	....	.....
" registered.....			M & N	.....	.....	....	....	.....
Lehigh Val. N. Y. 1st m. g. 4½'s.1940		15,000,000	J & J	110¼	Feb. 27, '01	110¼	110¼	87,000
" registered.....			J & J	110¼	Feb. 20, '01	110¼	110¼	8,000
Lehigh Val. Ter. R. 1st gtd g. 5's.1941		10,000,000	A & O	112	July 9, '19	....	....	.....
" registered.....			A & O	109¼	Oct. 18, '99	....	....	.....
Lehigh V. Coal Co. 1st gtd g. 5's.1933		10,280,000	J & J	108¾	Nov. 21, '99	....	....	.....
" registered.....			J & J	.....	.....	....	....	.....
Lehigh & N. Y. 1st gtd g. 4's.....1945		2,000,000	M & S	95	Jan. 29, '01	....	....	.....
" registered.....			M & S	.....	.....	....	....	.....
Elm., Cort. & N. 1st g. 1st pfd 5's.1914		750,000	A & O	.....	.....	....	....	.....
" g. gtd 5's.....1914		1,250,000	A & O	101½	Sept. 1, '99	....	....	.....
Long Island 1st cons. 5's.....1931		3,610,000	Q J	123	Jan. 10, '01	....	....	.....
" 1st con. g. 4's.....1931		1,121,000	Q J	101	Nov. 22, '99	....	....	.....
Long Island gen. m. 4's.....1938		3,000,000	J & D	103¼	Feb. 28, '01	104	103¾	24,000
" Ferry 1st g. 4½'s.....1922		1,500,000	M & S	105	Jan. 7, '01	....	....	.....
" g. 4's.....1932		325,000	J & D	102¼	May 5, '97	....	....	.....
" unified g. 4's.....1949		5,685,000	M & S	98	Feb. 14, '01	98¼	98	12,000
" deb. g. 5's.....1934		1,135,000	J & D	95	Feb. 15, '01	95	95	3,000
Brooklyn & Montauk 1st 6's.....1911		250,000	M & S	.....	.....	....	....	.....
" 1st 5's.....1911		750,000	M & S	110	Aug. 3, '96	....	....	.....
N. Y. B'k'n & M. B. 1st c. g. 5's.....1935		1,601,000	A & O	107	Jan. 21, '99	....	....	.....
N. Y. & Rock'y Beach 1st g. 5's.1927		883,000	M & S	105	May 4, '19	....	....	.....
Long Isl. R. R. Nor. Shore Branch								
1st Con. gold garn't'd 5's.1932		1,425,000	Q J A N	113	Dec. 23, '19	....	....	.....
Louis. & Nash. gen. g. 6's.....1930		9,515,000	J & D	120	Feb. 28, '01	120	118¾	46,000
" gold 5's.....1937		1,764,000	M & N	112	Feb. 5, '01	112	112	3,000
" Unified gold 4's.....1940		17,994,000	J & J	101	Feb. 28, '01	101¼	100¾	121,000
" registered.....1940			J & J	83	Feb. 27, '93	....	....	.....
" collateral trust g. 5's.1931		5,129,000	M & N	112¾	Feb. 27, '01	112¾	111¾	57,000
" coll. tr 5-30 g. 4's.1903-1918		11,500,000	A & O	100	Feb. 21, '01	101	100	62,000
" Occident branch, 7's.....1917		380,000	M & S	106	Dec. 31, '19	....	....	.....
" E. Hend. & N. 1st 6's.....1919		1,825,000	J & D	115	Nov. 15, '19	....	....	.....
" L. Cin. & Lex. g. 4½'s.....1931		3,258,000	M & N	103	Jan. 18, '98	....	....	.....
" N. O. & Mobile 1st g. 6's.....1930		5,000,000	M & J	120¼	Feb. 11, '01	120¼	120¼	25,000
" 2d g. 6's.....1930		1,000,000	J & J	117	Oct. 1, '19	....	....	.....
" Pensacola div. g. 6's.....1920		580,000	M & S	115	Dec. 5, '19	....	....	.....
" St. Louis div. 1st g. 6's.1921		3,500,000	M & S	120¼	Jan. 22, '01	....	....	.....
" 2d g. 6's.....1930		3,000,000	M & S	63¼	Oct. 1, '19	....	....	.....
" Ken. Cent. g. 4's.....1937		6,742,000	J & J	99¼	Jan. 28, '01	100	99¾	21,000
" L. & N. & Mob. & Montg								
" 1st g. 4½'s.....1945		4,000,000	M & S	112	Jan. 10, '01	....	....	.....
" N. Fla. & S. 1st g. g. 5's.1937		2,098,000	F & A	112	Jan. 7, '01	....	....	.....
" Pen. & At. 1st g. 5's.1921		2,659,000	F & A	113	Jan. 2, '01	....	....	.....
" S. & N. A. con. gtd. g. 5's.1933		3,673,000	F & A	110	Feb. 28, '01	110	110	10,000
" So. & N. Ala. sl'fd. g. 6's.1910		1,942,000	A & O	92¼	Sept. 30, '96	....	....	.....
Lo. & Jefferson Bdg. Co. gtd. g. 4's.1945		8,000,000	M & S	96¾	Nov. 17, '99	....	....	.....
Manhattan Railway Con. 4's.....1990		23,065,000	A & O	106¾	Feb. 28, '01	106¾	106	101,000
Metropolitan Elevated 1st 6's.....1908		10,818,000	J & J	117¾	Feb. 28, '01	117¾	117	112,000
Manitoba Swn. Coloniza'n g. 5's.1934		2,544,000	J & D	.....	.....	....	....	.....
Mexican Central.								
" con. mtge. 4's.....1911		62,643,000	J & J	82	Feb. 28, '01	83¼	81	378,000
" 1st con. inc. 3's.....1939		17,072,000	JULY	29¼	Feb. 27, '01	32¼	27	3,841,000
" 2d 3's.....1939		11,310,000	JULY	15	Feb. 27, '01	16¼	13¾	2,306,000
" equip. & collat. g. 5's.....1917		850,000	A & O	.....	.....	....	....	.....
" 2d series g. 5's.....1919		915,000	A & O	.....	.....	....	....	.....
Mexican Internat'l 1st con. g. 4's.1942		4,635,000	M & S	85¼	Feb. 21, '01	85¼	85	53,000
Mexican Nat. 1st gold 6's.....1927		10,955,000	J & D	103¼	Apr. 19, '19	....	....	.....
" 2d inc. 6's "A" 1917 coup. due		12,285,000	M & S	81	Apr. 10, '19	....	....	.....
" Sept. 1, 1899, stamped 1½% paid						....	....	.....
" 2d inc. 6's "B".....1917		12,285,000	A	17	Apr. 25, '19	....	....	.....
" Northern 1st g. 6's.....1910		1,182,000	J & D	105	May 2, '19	....	....	.....
" registered.....			J & D	.....	.....	....	....	.....

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Minneapolis & St. Louis 1st g. 7's. 1927		950,000	J & D	147½	Feb. 15, '01	147½	147½	20,000
Iowa ext. 1st g. 7's. 1909		1,015,000	J & D	122	Jan. 16, '01	.....	.....	.....
Pacific ext. 1st g. 6's. 1921		1,382,000	J & A	124½	Nov. 14, '19	.....	.....	.....
Southw. ext. 1st g. 7's. 1910		636,000	J & D	123½	Feb. 7, '01	122½	123½	5,000
1st con. g. 5's. 1934		5,000,000	M & N	118½	Feb. 27, '01	118½	117½	12,000
1st & refunding g. 4's. 1949		7,600,000	M & S	99½	Feb. 28, '01	100	99½	471,000
Minneapolis & Pacific 1st m. 5's. 1936		3,208,000	J & J	102	Mar. 26, '87	.....	.....	.....
stamped 4's pay. of int. gtd.						.....	.....	.....
Minn., S. S. M. & Atlan. 1st g. 4's. 1928		8,280,000	J & J	94	Apr. 2, '96	.....	.....	.....
stamped pay. of int. gtd.				89½	June 18, '91	.....	.....	.....
Minn., S. P. & S. S. M., 1st c. g. 4's. 1838		6,710,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
stamped pay. of int. gtd.				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Missouri, K. & T. 1st mtge g. 4's. 1900		39,718,000	J & D	97½	Feb. 28, '01	98	97	447,000
2d mtge. g. 4's. 1900		20,000,000	F & A	77½	Feb. 28, '01	80	75½	1,057,000
1st ext gold 5's. 1944		1,498,000	M & N	96½	Feb. 28, '01	99½	98½	407,000
Booneville Bdg. Co. gtd. g. 7's. 1906		510,000	M & N	100½	Nov. 22, '99	.....	.....	.....
Dallas & Waco 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1940		1,340,000	M & N	90	Sept. 6, '19	.....	.....	.....
Mo. K. & T. of Tex 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1942		2,885,000	M & S	104½	Feb. 28, '01	104½	99½	486,000
Sher. Shreveport & Solist gtd. g. 5's. 1943		1,889,000	J & D	100½	Feb. 16, '01	100½	100	47,000
Kan. City & Pacific 1st g. 4's. 1900		2,500,000	F & A	89½	Feb. 26, '01	90½	88	103,000
Tobo. & Neosho 1st 7's. 1908		187,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mo. Kan. & East'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1942		4,000,000	A & O	109½	Feb. 14, '01	110	109	6,000
Missouri, Pacific 1st con. g. 6's. 1920		14,904,000	M & N	123½	Feb. 25, '01	123½	121½	176,000
3d mortgage 7's. 1906		3,828,000	M & N	116	Feb. 21, '01	116	116	20,000
trusts gold 5's stamp'd 1917		14,376,000	M & S	107½	Feb. 28, '01	108	103½	1,275,000
registered.			M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st collateral gold 5's. 1920		9,636,000	F & A	104½	Feb. 28, '01	106	103	295,000
registered.			F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Leroy & Caney Val. A. L. 1st 5's. 1926		520,000	J & J	94	June 7, '19	.....	.....	.....
Pacific R. of Mo. 1st m. ex. 4's. 1938		7,000,000	M & S	107½	Dec. 20, '19	.....	.....	.....
2d extended g. 5's. 1938		2,573,000	F & A	113	Jan. 8, '01	.....	.....	.....
St. L. & I. g. con. R. R. & I. gr. 5's. 1931		35,718,000	A & O	118½	Feb. 28, '01	117	115½	219,000
stamped gtd gold 5's. 1931		6,945,000	A & O	114½	Feb. 19, '01	115	114½	5,000
unify'g & rfd'g g. 4's. 1929		23,090,000	J & J	91½	Feb. 28, '01	92½	88	2,708,000
registered.			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Verdigris V'y Ind. & W. 1st 5's. 1936		750,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mob. & Birm. prior lien. g. 5's. 1945		374,000	J & J	109	Aug. 31, '19	.....	.....	.....
small.		226,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
inc. g. 4's. 1905		700,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
small.		500,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mob. Jackson & Kan. City 1st g. 5's. 1946		1,000,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mobile & Ohio new mort. g. 6's. 1927		7,000,000	J & J	129½	Feb. 27, '01	130	129½	11,000
1st extension 6's. 1927		974,000	J & D	120	Jan. 31, '01	.....	.....	.....
gen. g. 4's. 1938		9,472,000	Q J	96	Feb. 28, '01	96½	93½	554,500
Montg'ry div. 1st g. 5's. 1947		4,000,000	F & A	112½	Feb. 28, '01	113	112	49,000
registered.			M & S	96½	Dec. 3, '19	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis & Cairo gtd g. 4's. 1931		4,000,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Nashville, Chat. & St. L. 1st 7's. 1913		6,300,000	J & J	128½	Feb. 18, '01	129½	128	6,000
1st cons. g. 5's. 1928		7,412,000	A & O	114	Feb. 25, '01	114½	112½	172,000
1st g. 6's Jasper Branch. 1923		371,000	J & J	113	Dec. 1, '99	.....	.....	.....
1st 6's McM. M. W. & A. 1917		750,000	J & J	108	Mar. 24, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st 8's T. & P. 1917		300,000	J & J	110	Dec. 20, '99	.....	.....	.....
N. O. & N. East. prior lien g. 6's. 1915		1,320,000	A & O	108½	Aug. 13, '94	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. Cent. & Hud. R. 1st c. 7's. 1903		18,470,000	J & J	107½	Feb. 25, '01	107½	107	11,000
1st registered. 1903			J & J	107½	Feb. 28, '01	107½	107	35,000
g. mortgage 3½'s. 1997		37,462,000	J & J	110	Feb. 21, '01	110	109	18,000
registered.			J & J	110	Aug. 27, '19	.....	.....	.....
debenture 5's. 1884-1904		4,886,000	M & S	106½	Feb. 1, '01	106½	106½	3,000
debenture 5's reg. 1904		654,000	M & S	106½	Feb. 21, '01	106½	106½	5,000
reg. debent. 5's. 1880-1904			M & S	108½	Feb. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
debenture g. 4's. 1890-1905		5,468,000	J & D	102½	Jan. 23, '01	.....	.....	.....
registered.			J & D	102½	Jan. 16, '01	.....	.....	.....
deb. cert. ext. g. 4's. 1905		3,730,500	M & N	101	Dec. 6, '19	.....	.....	.....
registered.			M & N	106½	Sept. 26, '99	.....	.....	.....
Lake Shore col. g. 3½'s. 1906		90,578,000	F & A	97½	Feb. 28, '01	97½	96	488,000
registered.			F & A	97	Feb. 21, '01	97	96½	51,000
Michigan Central col. g. 3½'s. 1906		18,900,000	F & A	96	Feb. 25, '01	96½	96½	121,000
registered.			F & A	97	Jan. 11, '01	.....	.....	.....
Beech Creek 1st gtd. 4's. 1906		5,000,000	J & J	112½	Jan. 30, '01	.....	.....	.....
registered.			J & J	106	June 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
2d gtd. g. 5's. 1906		500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered.			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Carthage & Adiron. 1st gtd g. 4's 1981		1,100,000	J & D					
Clearfield Bit. Coal Corporation, 1st s. f. int. gtd. g. 4's ser. A. 1940 }		770,000	J & J	95	July 23, '98			
" small bonds series B. ....		33,100	J & J					
Gouv. & Oswego. 1st gtd g. 5's 1942		300,000	J & D					
Mohawk & Malone 1st gtd g. 4's 1991		2,500,000	M & S	107½	July 6, '91			
inc. 5's. .... 1992		3,900,000	Sept.					
N. Jersey Junc. R. R. g. 1st 4's 1986		1,650,000	F & A	102	Feb. 3, '97			
reg. certificates. ....		4,000,000	F & A					
N. Y. & Putnam 1st con. gtd g. 4's 1993		130,000	A & O	103	May 22, '96			
Nor. & Montreal 1st g. gtd 5's. 1916		50,000,000	A & O					
West Shore 1st guaranteed 4's 2361		8,428,000	J & J	115¼	Feb. 26, '01	115¼	114¾	16,000
registered. ....		40,760,000	J & J	114¼	Feb. 27, '01	115	113¾	78,500
Lake Shore con. 2d 7's. .... 1903		2,000,000	J & D	110¾	Feb. 21, '01	110¾	110¾	2,000
con. 2d registered. .... 1903		4,760,000	J & D	110¾	Jan. 17, '01			
" g 3½'s. .... 1907		2,000,000	J & D	109¼	Feb. 27, '01	109¼	109¼	36,000
registered. ....		1,000,000	J & D	110¾	Mar. 17, '19			
Cin. Sp. 1st gtd L. S. & M. S. 7's 1901		924,000	A & O	108¼	Dec. 1, '97			
Detroit, Mon. & Toledo 1st 7's 1906		840,000	F & A	117	Feb. 13, '01	117	117	10,000
Kal., A. & G. R. 1st gtd c. 5's. 1938		1,500,000	J & J					
Mahoning Coal R. R. 1st 5's. .... 1934		2,250,000	J & J	130	Dec. 17, '19			
Pitt McK'port & Y. 1st gtd 6's. 1932		900,000	J & J	117	May 31, '89			
2d gtd 6's. .... 1934		600,000	J & J					
McKspt & Bell. V. 1st g. 6's. 1918		8,000,000	M & N	106¾	Feb. 25, '01	106¾	105¾	30,000
Michigan Cent. 1st con. 7's. .... 1902		2,000,000	M & N	103	Feb. 19, '01	103	102¾	13,000
1st con. 5's. .... 1902		1,500,000	M & S	119	Jan. 3, '01			
6's. .... 1909		3,576,000	M & S	127¾	Jan. 9, '01			
coup. 5's. .... 1931		2,600,000	Q M	127½	Nov. 8, '19			
reg. 5's. .... 1931		476,000	J & J	105	Jan. 4, '19			
mort. 4's. .... 1940		11,444,000	J & J	106¼	Nov. 26, '19			
mtg. 4's reg. ....		1,200,000	M & N	102¾	Mar. 13, '19			
Battle C. Sturgis 1st g. g. 3's. .... 1989		1,000,000	M & N	102¾	Apr. 6, '19			
N. Y. & Harlem 1st mort. 7's c. 1900		1,200,000	A & O	122	Jan. 30, '01			
7's registered. .... 1900		9,081,000	A & O	127¾	Jan. 18, '01			
N. Y. & Northern 1st g. 5's. .... 1927		400,000	A & O					
R. W. & Og. con. 1st ext. 5's. .... 1922		375,000	F & A	113	Apr. 13, '94			
coup. g. bond currency. ....		1,800,000	M & N					
Oswego & Rome 2d gtd gold 5's 1915		10,425,000	J & J	110	Oct. 15, '19			
R. W. & O. Ter. R. 1st gtd 5's 1918		2,000,000	A & O	108½	Feb. 28, '01	109	108	39,000
Utica & Black River gtd g. 4's 1922		15,007,500	A & O	106¾	Dec. 2, '19			
N. Y., Chic. & St. Louis 1st g. 4's. .... 1937		1,430,000	J & D	102	Feb. 28, '01	102	102	2,000
registered. ....		2,838,000	A & O	197¼	Feb. 27, '01	197		26,000
N. Y., N. Haven & H. 1st reg. 4's 1903		575,000	M & N	135½	Dec. 12, '19			
con. deb. receipts. .... \$1,000			M & N	115½	Oct. 15, '94			
small certifs. .... \$100								
Housatonic R. con. g. 5's. .... 1937		6,000,000	J & J	114	Jan. 5, '19			
New Haven and Derby con. 5's. .... 1918		4,000,000	J & J	113	July 29, '99			
N. Y. & New England 1st 7's. .... 1905								
1st 6's. .... 1905								
N. Y., Ont. & W'n. ref'ding 1st g. 4's 1992		16,937,000	M & S	108	Feb. 28, '01	108	106¼	36,000
registered. .... \$5,000 only.		1,350,000	M & S	101½	Nov. 30, '98			
Norfolk & Southern 1st g. 5's. .... 1941		7,283,000	M & N	110¾	Dec. 14, '19			
Norfolk & Western gen. mtg. 6's 1931		5,000,000	M & N	134½	Feb. 28, '01	134½	134	4,000
imp'tment and ext. 6's. .... 1934		2,000,000	F & A	132¾	Feb. 20, '01	132¾	131	22,000
New River 1st 6's. .... 1932			A & O	133	Jan. 29, '01			
Norfolk & West. Ry 1st con. g. 4s 1996		28,704,600	A & O	102¼	Feb. 28, '01	102¼	100¼	406,000
registered. ....		600,000	A & O	97½	July 18, '99			
small bonds. ....		5,000,000	J & J	107	Nov. 26, '19			
C. C. & T. 1st g. t. g g 5's 1922			J & N	102¾	Feb. 25, '01	102¾	102¾	40,000
Sci'o Val & N.E. 1st g. 4's 1989								
N. P. Ry prior In ry. &ld. gtd. g. 4's. .... 1907		94,007,500	Q J	105¾	Feb. 28, '01	105¾	104¾	381,500
registered. ....		56,000,000	Q J	105¼	Feb. 15, '01	105¼	105¼	1,500
gen. lien g. 3's. .... 2047			Q F	71¼	Feb. 28, '01	71¼	70¾	1,251,000
registered. ....		9,215,000	Q F	70¾	Dec. 10, '19			
St. Paul & Duluth div. g. 4's. .... 1906		7,985,000	J & D					
registered. ....		1,000,000	J & D	131½	Feb. 18, '01	131½	131½	3,000
St. Paul & N. Pacific gen. g. 6's 1923		2,000,000	F & A	132	July 28, '98			
registered certificates. ....		1,000,000	Q F	122½	Feb. 13, '01	122½	122½	1,000
St. Paul & Duluth 1st 5's. .... 1931		1,000,000	F & A	116	Feb. 1, '01	116	116	10,000
2d 5's. .... 1917		1,000,000	A & O	102	Feb. 16, '01	102	102	12,000
1st con. g. 4's. .... 1968		1,538,000	Q MCH	88¾	May 31, '19			
Washington Cen. Ry 1st g. 4's. .... 1948								
Nor. Pacific Term. Co. 1st g. 6's. .... 1933		3,787,000	J & J	116¼	Feb. 26, '01	116¼	116¼	1,000





BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Rio Grande June'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1899		1,850,000	J & D	105	Feb. 27, '01	105	105	12,000
Rio Grande Southern 1st g. 4's. 1940		2,233,000	J & J	80½	Feb. 13, '01	80½	80½	10,000
" guaranteed.....		2,277,000	.....	93	Feb. 21, '01	93	93	6,000
Salt Lake City 1st g. sink fu'd 6's. 1913		297,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Jo. & Gr. Isl. 1st g. 2.342.....1947		3,500,000	J & J	92½	Feb. 28, '01	93½	91½	98,000
St. L. & Adirondack Ry. 1st g. 5's. 1906		800,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" 2d g. 6's.....1906		400,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis & San F. 2d 6's. Class A. 1906		500,000	M & N	112½	Feb. 14, '01	112½	112 ½	9,000
" 2d g. 6's. Class B.....1906		2,683,000	M & N	112½	Feb. 13, '01	112½	112½	5,000
" 2d g. 6's. Class C.....1906		2,399,000	M & N	112	Feb. 28, '01	112	112	2,500
" gen. g. 6's.....1931		7,807,000	J & J	129½	Feb. 21, '01	130	129	16,000
" gen. g. 5's.....1931		12,292,000	J & J	116	Feb. 28, '01	116½	114	98,000
" 1st Trust g. 5's.....1937		1,099,000	A & O	102½	Oct. 17, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" 1st g. 6's P. C. & O.....1919		1,020,000	F & A	118	May 23, '92	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis & San F. R. R. g. 4's. 1906		6,388,000	J & D	95½	Feb. 28, '01	97½	96½	79,000
" Central div. 1st g. 4's.....1929		1,962,000	A & O	96½	Feb. 20, '01	96½	96	51,000
" N. W. div. 1st g. 4's.....1930		1,100,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" S. W. div. g. 5's.....1947		1,500,000	A & O	100	June 19, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Kansas, Midland 1st g. 4's.....1937		1,608,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis S. W. 1st g. 4's Bd. cts. 1909		20,000,000	M & N	97½	Feb. 28, '01	98½	96	1,345,000
" 2d g. 4's inc. Bd. cts. 1909		9,000,000	J & J	77	Feb. 28, '01	80½	76	1,807,500
Gray's Point, Term. 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1947		889,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul, Minn. & Manito'a 2d 6's. 1909		8,000,000	A & O	118½	Feb. 20, '01	118½	118½	2,000
" 1st con. 6's.....1933		13,844,000	J & J	142	Feb. 14, '01	142	142	3,000
" 1st con. 6's, registered.....		.....	J & J	137½	Feb. 23, '90	.....	.....	.....
" 1st c. 6's, red'd to g. 4's.....		.....	J & J	115½	Jan. 29, '01	.....	.....	.....
" 1st cons. 6's, register'd.....		20,993,000	J & J	115½	Nov. 20, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" Dakota ext'n g. 6's.....1910		5,676,000	M & N	120½	Feb. 28, '01	120½	120	12,000
" Mont. ext'n 1st g. 4's. 1937		7,907,000	J & D	105	Feb. 13, '01	105	105	1,000
" registered.....		.....	J & D	104	Jan. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....
Eastern Ry. Minn. 1st d. 1st g. 5's. 1908		4,700,000	A & O	110	Feb. 14, '01	110	110	5,000
" registered.....		.....	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Minn. N. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		5,000,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....		.....	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Minneapolis Union 1st g. 6's.....1922		2,150,000	J & J	128	Apr. 4, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Montana Cent. 1st 6's int. gtd. 1937		6,000,000	J & J	138½	Feb. 16, '01	138½	134½	24,000
" 1st 6's, registered.....		.....	J & J	115	Apr. 24, '97	.....	.....	.....
" 1st g. g. 5's.....1937		2,700,000	J & J	118	Dec. 7, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Willmar & Sioux Falls 1st g. 5's. 1938		3,625,000	J & D	120	Apr. 11, '99	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....		.....	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
San Fe Pres. & Phoe. Ry. 1st g. 5's. 1942		4,940,000	M & S	104	Jan. 11, '01	.....	.....	.....
San Fran. & N. Pac. 1st s. f. g. 5's. 1919		3,872,000	J & J	112	June 9, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Sav. Florida & Wn. 1st c. g. 6's.....1934		4,056,000	A & O	128½	Jan. 13, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" 1st g. 5's.....1934		2,444,000	A & O	112	Mar. 17, '99	.....	.....	.....
" St. John's div. 1st g. 4's. 1934		1,350,000	J & J	94½	Feb. 15, '01	94½	94	53,000
Alabama Midland 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1928		2,800,000	M & N	108½	Feb. 25, '01	109½	107½	43,000
Brunsw. & West. 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1938		3,000,000	J & J	87	Jan. 12, '01	.....	.....	.....
Sil. S. Oc. & G. R. R. & Ig. gtd. g. 4's. 1918		1,107,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Seaboard & Roanoke 1st 5's.....1926		2,500,000	J & J	104½	Feb. 5, '98	.....	.....	.....
Carolina Central 1st con. g. 4's. 1949		2,847,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Sodus Bay & Sout'n 1st 5's, gold. 1924		500,000	J & J	105	Sept. 4, '86	.....	.....	.....
Southern Pacific Co.								
" 2-5 year col. trust g. 4½'s. 1905		10,000,000	J & D	93½	Feb. 28, '01	100½	99½	1,275,000
" g. 4's Central Pac. coll. 1949		28,818,500	J & D	92½	Feb. 28, '01	95½	89½	13,531,000
" registered.....		.....	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Cent. Pac. 1st refund. gtd. g. 4's. 1949		54,743,300	F & A	101	Feb. 28, '01	101½	100	1,028,500
" registered.....		.....	F & A	99½	June 1, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" mtge. gtd. g. 3½'s.....1929		19,877,000	J & D	88½	Feb. 28, '01	88½	85½	2,251,000
" registered.....		.....	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Gal. Harrisb'gh & S. A. 1st g. 6's. 1910		4,756,000	F & A	110	May 28, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" 2d g. 7's.....1905		1,000,000	J & D	107½	Feb. 26, '01	107½	107½	9,000
" Mex. & P. div. 1st g. 5's. 1931		13,418,000	M & N	103	Feb. 28, '01	104	100½	560,000
Houst. E. & W. Tex. 1st g. 5's. 1933		522,000	M & N	106½	Feb. 26, '01	106½	106½	1,000
" 1st gtd. g. 5's.....1933		2,178,000	M & N	104½	July 13, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Houst. & T. C. 1st g. 5's int. gtd. 1937		6,571,000	J & J	111½	Feb. 27, '01	111½	110	21,000
" con. g. 5's int. gtd. 1912		3,311,000	A & O	110½	Nov. 28, 19'	.....	.....	.....
" gen. g. 4's int. gtd. 1921		4,287,000	A & O	90	Feb. 19, '01	90	89	7,000

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Morgan's La & Tex. 1st g 6's.....1920		1,494,000	J & J	125	Feb. 28, '01	125	125	2,000
1st 7's.....1918		5,000,000	A & O	137½	Jan. 29, '01			
N. Y. Tex. & Mex. gtd. 1st g 4's.1912		1,495,000	A & O					
Nth'n Ry of Cal. 1st gtd. g. 6's.1907		3,984,000	J & J	94	Nov. 30, '97			
gtd. g. 5's.....1907		4,751,000	A & O	94	Jan. 4, '01			
Oreg. & Cal. 1st gtd. g 5's.....1927		19,521,000	J & J	106½	Feb. 11, '91	106½	106½	10,000
San Ant. & Aran Pasalst gtd g 4's.1943		18,900,000	J & J	85½	Feb. 28, '01	85½	81	3,044,000
Tex. & New Orleans 1st 7's.....1905		1,847,000	F & A	110½	Feb. 8, '01	110½	110½	5,000
Sabine div. 1st g 6's.....1912		2,575,000	M & S	105½	Nov. 17, '87			
con. g 5's.....1943		1,620,000	J & J	107½	Feb. 28, '01	107½	105½	398,000
South'n Pac. of Ariz. 1st 6's.1903-1910		10,000,000	J & J	112	Feb. 28, '01	112	111½	67,000
of Cal. 1st g 6's ser. A.1905			APR.	108½	Jan. 21, '01			
ser. B.1905			OCT.	110½	Aug. 24, '19			
C. & D.1906			A & O	111½	Jan. 30, '01			
E. & F.1902			A & O	114½	Nov. 8, '99			
1912			A & O	120	Feb. 15, '01	120	120	3,000
1st con. gtd. g 5's.....1937		6,576,000	M & N	107	Nov. 27, '19			
stamped.....1905-1937		19,188,000		108½	Feb. 8, '01	108½	108½	65,000
Austin & Northw'n 1st g 5's.....1941		1,920,000	J & J	105½	Feb. 28, '01	105½	98½	148,000
So. Pacific Coast 1st gtd. g. 4's.1937		5,500,000	J & J					
of N. Mex. c. 1st 6's.1911		4,180,000	J & J	116	Aug. 3, '19			
Gila Val. G. & N'n 1st gtd g 5's.1924		1,514,000	M & N	106½	Feb. 15, '01	106½	105½	40,000
Southern Railway 1st con. g 5's.1904		33,223,000	J & J	115½	Feb. 28, '01	116½	115	434,000
registered.....			J & J	108	Aug. 3, '19			
Memph. div. 1st g. 4-4½ 5's.1906		5,083,000	J & J	109	Jan. 21, '01			
registered.....			J & J					
Alabama Central 1st 6's.....1918		1,000,000	J & J	112½	Aug. 17, '97			
Atlantic & Danville 1st g. 4's. 1948		3,176,000	J & J	94	Feb. 28, '01	94	93½	240,000
Atlantic & Yadkin 1st gtd g 4's.1949		1,500,000	A & O					
Col. & Greenville 1st 5-6's.....1916		2,000,000	J & J	120	Feb. 15, '01	120	120	3,000
East Tenn., Va. & Ga. div. g 5's.1930		3,108,000	J & J	117½	Jan. 29, '01			
con. 1st g 5's.....1956		12,770,000	M & N	120	Feb. 28, '01	120½	119½	188,000
reorg. lien g 4's.....1938		4,500,000	M & S	113½	Feb. 28, '01	113½	115	62,000
registered.....			M & S					
Ga. Pacific Ry. 1st g 5-6's.....1922		5,880,000	J & J	124½	Feb. 7, '01	124½	124½	8,000
Knoxville & Ohio, 1st g 6's.....1925		2,000,000	J & J	127	Feb. 7, '01	127	127	10,000
Rich. & Danville, con. g 6's.....1915		5,597,000	J & J	122½	Feb. 14, '01	123	122½	45,000
equip. sink. f'd g 5's, 1909		818,000	M & S	101½	July 20, '19			
deb. 5's stamped.....1927		3,368,000	A & O	109½	Feb. 15, '01	109½	109½	1,000
Rich. & Mecklenburg 1st g. 4's.1948		15,000	M & N	83	Dec. 10, '19			
South Caro'a & Ga. 1st g. 5's.....1919		5,250,000	M & S	108	Feb. 19, '01	108	108	4,000
Vir. Midland serial ser. A 6's. 1906		600,000	M & S					
small.....			M & S					
ser. B 6's.....1911		1,900,000	M & S					
small.....			M & S					
ser. C 6's.....1916		1,100,000	M & S					
small.....			M & S					
ser. D 4-5's.....1921		950,000	M & S	102	Oct. 13, '99			
small.....			M & S					
ser. E 5's.....1926		1,775,000	M & S	109	Jan. 12, '99			
small.....			M & S					
ser. F 5's.....1931		1,310,000	M & S					
Virginia Midland gen. 5's.....1936		2,382,000	M & N	115½	Feb. 11, '01	115½	114	18,000
gen. 5's gtd. stamped.1926		2,486,000	M & N	118½	Dec. 14, '19			
W. O. & W. 1st cy. gtd. g 4's.....1924		1,025,000	F & A	91½	Sept. 14, '99			
W. Nor. C. 1st con. g 6's.....1914		2,531,000	J & J	119	Nov. 17, '19			
Spokane Falls & North. 1st g 6's.....1939		2,812,000	J & J	117	July 25, '19			
Staten Isl. Ry. N. Y. 1st gtd. g. 4½'s.1943		500,000	J & D					
Ter. R. R. Assn. St. Louis 1g 4½'s.1939		7,000,000	A & O	112½	June 15, '99			
1st con. g. 5's.....1894-1944		4,500,000	F & A	115½	Jan. 2, '01			
St. L. Mers. bdg. Ter. gtd g 5's.1930		3,500,000	A & O	111	Jan. 19, '19			
Tex. & Pacific, East div. 1st 6's, 1905		3,178,000	M & S	104	Feb. 15, '19	104	104	1,000
fm. Texarkana to Ft. Worth								
1st gold 5's.....2000		21,822,000	J & D	118½	Feb. 28, '01	118½	116½	38,000
2d gold income, 5's.....2000		987,000	MAR.	96	Feb. 1, '01	96	96	5,000
Toledo & Ohio Cent. 1st g 5's.....1935		3,000,000	J & J	116	Feb. 28, '01	116½	115	33,000
1st M. g 5's West. div.....1935		2,500,000	A & O	115½	Jan. 14, '01			
gen. p. 5's.....1935		2,000,000	J & D	109½	Feb. 25, '01	109½	109½	16,000
Kanaw & M. 1st g. g. 4's.1990		2,489,000	A & O	97	Feb. 18, '01	97	97	13,000

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		FEBRUARY SALES		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Toledo, Peoria & W. 1st g 4's....1917		4,400,000	J & D	88	Feb. 28, '01	88	88	18,000
Tol., St. L. & Wn. prior lien g 3 1/4's. 1925		2,000,000	J & J	88 1/2	Feb. 28, '01	88 1/4	88	354,000
" registered.....			J & J					
" fifty years g. 4's.....1925		6,500,000	A & O	78	Feb. 26, '01	78 1/2	73	2,456,000
" registered.....			A & O					
Toronto, Hamilton & Buff 1st g 4s. 1946		3,280,000	J & D	98 1/2	Jan. 24, '01			
Ulster & Delaware 1st c. g 5's....1925		1,852,000	J & D	108	Feb. 20, '01	108	108	3,000
Union Pacific R. R. & Id gt g 4s....1947		99,543,000	J & J	106	Feb. 28, '01	106 1/2	105 1/2	910,000
" registered.....			J & J	105	Feb. 18, '01	105	105	5,000
" Oreg. Ry. & Nav. 1st s. f. g. 6's....1909		547,000	J & J	110	Feb. 27, '01	110	110	2,000
" Oreg. R. R. & Nav. Co. con. g 4's. 1946		19,634,000	J & D	104 1/2	Feb. 28, '01	104 1/2	103 1/2	151,000
" Oreg. Short Line Ry. 1st g. 6's. 1922		13,651,000	F & A	127 1/2	Feb. 27, '01	128 1/2	126 1/2	39,000
" Oreg. Short Line 1st con. g. 6's. 1946		10,337,000	J & J	116	Feb. 27, '01	116 1/2	116	101,500
" non-cum. inc. A 5's....1946		649,000	SEPT.	106	Jan. 21, '01			
" Utah & Northern 1st 7's....1908		4,993,000	J & J	119	Feb. 4, '01	119	119	7,000
" g. 5's.....1926		1,677,000	J & J	102 1/2	Oct. 8, '94			
Wabash R.R. Co., 1st gold 5's....1939		31,664,000	M & N	119 1/2	Feb. 28, '01	119 1/2	119	143,000
" 2d mortgage gold 5's....1939		14,000,000	F & A	109 1/2	Feb. 28, '01	112	108 1/2	70,000
" debent. mtg series A....1939		3,500,000	J & J	100	Feb. 28, '01	102 1/2	98 1/2	171,000
" series B....1939		25,740,000	J & J	54	Feb. 28, '01	56 1/2	48 1/2	18,811,000
" 1st g. 5's Det. & Ch. ex. 1940		3,411,000	J & J	111	Jan. 29, '01			
" Des Moines div. 1st g. 4s. 1939		1,600,000	J & J	96 1/2	Feb. 19, '01	96 1/2	96	26,000
" St. L., Kan. C. & N. St. Chas. B.								
" 1st 6's.....1908		1,000,000	A & O	112	Feb. 25, '01	112	112	1,000
Western N.Y. & Penn. 1st g. 5's....1937		10,000,000	J & J	121 1/2	Feb. 28, '01	121 1/2	120 1/2	61,000
" gen g. 3-4's.....1943		9,789,000	A & O	99 1/2	Feb. 30, '01	99 1/2	98 1/2	24,000
" inc. 5's.....1943		10,000,000	Nov.	32	Feb. 16, '01	32	31	3,000
West Va. Cent'l & Pitts. 1st g. 6's. 1911		3,250,000	J & J	113 1/2	Feb. 13, '01	113 1/2	113 1/2	1,000
Wheeling & Lake Erie 1st g. 5's. 1926		2,000,000	A & O	117	Feb. 20, '01	117	116 1/2	28,000
" Wheeling div. 1st g. 5's. 1928		905,000	J & J	113	Feb. 25, '01	113	111 1/2	19,000
" exten. and imp. g. 5's....1930		349,000	F & A	108	Sept. 12, '19			
" Wheel. & L. E. R.R. 1st con. g. 4's. 1949		8,682,000	M & S	91 1/2	Feb. 25, '01	91 1/2	89 1/2	239,000
" Wisconsin Cen. R'y 1st gen. g. 4s. 1949		23,727,000	J & J	89 1/2	Feb. 28, '01	89 1/2	88 1/2	817,000
STREET RAILWAY BONDS.								
Brooklyn Rapid Transit g. 5's....1945		6,625,000	A & O	110	Feb. 27, '01	110 1/2	108 1/2	31,000
" Atl. av. Bkn. imp. g. 5's. 1934		1,500,000	J & J	110	Jan. 20, '99			
" City R. R. 1st c. 5's. 1916. 1941		4,373,000	J & J	115	Feb. 4, '01	115	115	1,000
" Qu. Co. & Sur. con. gtd.								
" g. 5's.....1941		2,255,000	M & N	108	Feb. 14, '01	103	103	11,000
" Union Elev. 1st g. 4-5s. 1950		12,890,000	F & A	98 1/2	Feb. 28, '01	100 1/2	98	281,000
" Kings Co. Elev. R. R. 1st g. 4's. 1949		7,000,000	F & A	89 1/2	Feb. 27, '01	90 1/2	88 1/2	178,000
" Nassau Electric R. R. gtd. g. 4's. 1961		10,474,000	J & J					
" City & Sub. R'y, Balt. 1st g. 5's....1922		2,430,000	J & D	105 1/2	Apr. 17, '95			
" Denver Con. T'way Co. 1st g. 5's. 1933		730,000	A & O	97 1/2	June 13, '19			
" Denver T'way Co. con. g. 6's....1910		1,219,000	J & J					
" Metropol'n Ry Co. 1st g. 6's. 1911		913,000	J & J					
" Louisville Railw'y Co. 1st c. g. 5's. 1930		4,600,000	J & J	109	Mar. 19, '98			
" Market St. Cable Railway 1st 6's. 1913		3,000,000	J & J					
" Metro. St. Ry N.Y. g. col. tr. g. 5's. 1907		12,500,000	F & A	119 1/2	Feb. 21, '01	120 1/2	117 1/2	49,000
" B'way & 7th ave. 1st con. g. 5's. 1943		7,650,000	J & D	121	Feb. 19, '01	122	121	21,000
" registered.....			J & D	119 1/2	Dec. 3, '19			
" Columb. & 9th ave. 1st gtd g 5's. 1903		3,000,000	M & S	126	Feb. 28, '01	126	124 1/2	4,000
" registered.....			M & S					
" Lex ave & Pav Fer 1st gtd g 5's. 1903		5,000,000	M & S	123 1/2	Feb. 14, '01	123 1/2	123	20,000
" registered.....			M & S					
" Met. West Side Elev. Chd. lgtg. 4's. 1938		10,000,000	F & A	98 1/2	Feb. 21, '01	98 1/2	98	76,000
" registered.....			F & A					
" Mil. Elec. R. & Light con. 30 yr. g. 5's. 1926		6,103,000	F & A	106	Oct. 27, '99			
" Minn. St. R'y (M. L. & M.) 1st								
" con. g. 5's.....1919		4,050,000	J & J	109	Oct. 30, '99			
" St. Paul City Ry. Cable con. g. 5's. 1937		2,480,000	J & J	111 1/2	Jan. 24, '01			
" gtd. gold 5's....1937		1,138,000	J & J	112	Nov. 28, '99			
" Third Avenue R'y N.Y. 1st g 5's. 1937		5,000,000	J & J	104 1/2	Feb. 26, '01	104 1/2	104 1/2	158,000
" Union Elevated (Chic.) 1st g. 5's. 1945		4,387,000	A & O	100 1/2	Dec. 14, '99			
" West Chic. St. 40 yr. 1st cur. 5's. 1928		3,969,000	M & N					
" 40 years con. g. 5's.....1936		6,031,000	M & N	99	Dec. 28, '97			

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

## MISCELLANEOUS BONDS.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Adams Express Co. col. tr. g. 4's. 1948		12,000,000	M & S	108½	Feb. 27, '01	109	108½	35,500
B'klyn Ferry Co. of N. Y. 1st c. g. 5's. 1948		6,500,000	F & A	84¼	Feb. 25, '01	84¼	84¼	6,000
B'klyn W. & W. Co. 1st g. tr. cts. 5's. 1945		17,084,000	F & A	68¼	Feb. 21, '01	68¼	68	19,000
Chic. Junc. & St'k Y'ds col. g. 5's. 1915		10,000,000	J & J	110	Aug. 21, '19'	.....	.....	.....
Det. Mack. & Mar. ld. gt. 3½ S A. 1911		3,021,000	A & O	31¼	Feb. 28, '01	33¼	30	365,000
Hackensack Wtr Reorg. 1st g. 5's. 1928		1,080,000	J & J	107½	June 3, '92	.....	.....	.....
Hend'n Bdg Co. 1st s'k. f'd g. 6's. 1931		1,681,000	M & S	113	Nov. 14, '99	.....	.....	.....
Hoboken Land & Imp. g. 5's. 1910		1,440,000	M & N	102	Jan. 19, '94	.....	.....	.....
Iron Steamboat Co. 6's. 1901		500,000	J & J	75½	Dec. 4, '95	.....	.....	.....
Madison Sq. Garden 1st g. 5's. 1919		1,250,000	M & N	102	July 8, '97	.....	.....	.....
Manh. Beh H. & L. lim. gen. g. 4's. 1940		1,300,000	M & N	55	Aug. 27, '95	.....	.....	.....
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock 5's. 1890-1990		2,000,000	J & J	94	May 21, '94	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Ontario Land 1st g. 6's. 1910		443,000	F & A	90	Oct. 3, '99	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis Term. Station Cupples & Property Co. 1st g. 4½ S 20. 1917		3,000,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
So. Y. Water Co. N. Y. con. g. 6's. 1923		478,000	J & J	101	Feb. 19, '97	.....	.....	.....
Spring Valley W. Wks. 1st 6's. 1908		4,975,000	M & S	113¼	Dec. 18, '19'	.....	.....	.....
U. S. Mortgage and Trust Co. Real Estate 1st g. col. tr. bonds.								
Series D 4½'s. 1901-1916		1,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
E 4's. 1907-1917		1,000,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
F 4's. 1908-1918		1,000,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
G 4's. 1903-1918		1,000,000	F & A	100	Mar. 15, '19'	.....	.....	.....
H 4's. 1903-1918		1,000,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
I 4's. 1904-1919		1,000,000	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
J 4's. 1904-1919		1,000,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Small bonds. 1904-1919		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Vermont Marble, 1st s. fund 5's. 1910		400,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
BONDS OF MANUFACTURING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS.								
Am. Cotton Oil deb. ext. 4½'s. 1915		2,919,000	.....	100	Feb. 27, '01	100¼	99¾	161,000
Am. Hide & Lea. Co. 1st s. f. 6's. 1919		8,875,000	M & S	93	Feb. 28, '01	93	92½	49,000
Am. Spirit Mfg. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1915		1,899,000	M & S	82	Feb. 15, '01	82	82	2,000
Am. Thread Co., 1st coll. trust 4's. 1919		5,798,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Barney & Smith Car Co. 1st g. 6's. 1942		1,000,000	J & J	105	Jan. 10, '19'	.....	.....	.....
Gramercy Sugar Co., 1st g. 6's. 1923		1,400,800	A & O	89¼	Feb. 2, '19'	.....	.....	.....
Illinois Steel Co. debenture 5's. 1910		6,200,000	J & J	99	Jan. 17, '99	.....	.....	.....
non. conv. deb. 5's. 1910		7,000,000	A & O	70	Apr. 23, '97	.....	.....	.....
Internat'l Paper Co. 1st con. g. 6's. 1918		9,229,000	F & A	105¼	Feb. 28, '01	106	105	57,000
Knick'r'ker Ice Co. (Chic) 1st g. 5's. 1928		2,000,000	A & O	93	Aug. 25, '19'	.....	.....	.....
Nat. Starch Mfg. Co., 1st g. 6's. 1920		3,089,000	J & J	109	Feb. 26, '01	109	107¼	33,000
Standard Rope & Twine 1st g. 6's. 1948		2,835,000	F & A	55	Feb. 27, '01	62½	52	148,000
inc. g. 5's. 1948		7,500,000	.....	7½	Feb. 28, '01	11	7½	640,000
U. S. Env. Co. 1st sk. fd. g. 6's. 1918		2,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
U. S. Leather Co. ½ g. s. fd. deb. 1915		5,280,000	M & N	115	Feb. 28, '01	115	115	10,000
BONDS OF COAL AND IRON COMPANIES.								
Colo. Coal & Iron 1st con. g. 6's. 1900		2,786,000	F & A	103¼	Jan. 25, '01	.....	.....	.....
Colo. C'l & I'n Devel. Co. gtd g. 5's. 1909		701,000	J & J	55	Nov. 2, '19'	.....	.....	.....
Coupon off. 1919		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Colo. Fuel Co. gen. g. 6's. 1919		1,043,000	M & N	106¼	Feb. 14, '01	106¼	106¼	10,000
Col. Fuel & Iron Co. gen. sf g. 5's. 1943		2,303,000	F & A	98¼	Feb. 28, '01	99	98¼	78,000
Grand Riv. Coal & Coke 1st g. 6's. 1919		949,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

## MISCELLANEOUS BONDS—Continued.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Jefferson & Clearfield Coal & Ir.								
1st g. 5's.....1928		1,777,000	J & D	105½	Oct. 10, '98	....	....	....
2d g. 5's.....1928		1,000,000	J & D	80	May 4, '97	....	....	....
Pleasant Valley Coal 1st g. a.f. 5's. 1928		1,089,000	J & J	106	Oct. 24, '19	....	....	....
Roeh & Pitta. Cl & Ir. Co. pur my 5's. 1946		1,092,000	M & N	.....	.....	....	....	....
Sun. Creek Coal 1st sk. fund 5's. 1912		879,000	J & D	.....	.....	....	....	....
Ten. Coal, I. & R. T. d. 1st g 6's.....1917		1,244,000	A & O	110	Jan. 28, '01	....	....	....
Bir. div. 1st con. 6's.....1917		3,399,000	J & J	107	Feb. 28, '01	109	107	15,000
Cah. Coal M. Co. 1st gtd. g 6's.....1922		1,000,000	J & J	106	Feb. 10, '19	....	....	....
De Bard. C & I Co. gtd. g 6's.....1910		2,771,000	F & A	100½	Feb. 27, '01	101	100	23,000
Wheel L. E. & P. Cl Co. 1st g 5's. 1919		848,000	J & J	82	Jan. 15, '19	....	....	....
GAS & ELECTRIC LIGHT CO. BONDS.								
Atlanta Gas Light Co. 1st g. 5's. 1847		1,150,000	J & D	.....	.....	....	....	....
Bost. Un. Gas 1st cfs s'k f'dg. 5's. 1939		7,000,000	J & J	80½	Feb. 20, '01	80½	80½	8,000
B'klyn Union Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's. 1945		14,210,000	M & N	117½	Feb. 27, '01	117½	117½	19,000
Columbus Gas Co., 1st g. 5's.....1932		1,215,000	J & J	104½	Jan. 28, '98	....	....	....
Detroit City Gas Co. g. 5's.....1923		4,598,000	J & J	98	Feb. 28, '01	98	95½	94,000
Detroit Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's.....1918		888,000	F & A	99½	Nov. 16, '99	....	....	....
Equitable Gas Light Co. of N. Y.								
1st con. g. 5's.....1932		3,500,000	M & S	104	Feb. 14, '01	104	104	30,000
Gas. & Elec. of Bergen Co. c. g. 5's. 1949		1,148,000	J & D	102½	Feb. 15, '01	102½	102	33,000
General Electric Co. deb. g. 5's.....1922		1,270,000	J & D	178	Feb. 28, '01	178	180	15,000
Grand Rapids G. L. Co. 1st g. 5's. 1915		1,225,000	F & A	107½	Dec. 17, '19	....	....	....
Kansas City Mo. Gas Co. 1st g 5's. 1922		3,750,000	A & O	.....	.....	....	....	....
Kings Co. Elec. L. & Power g. 5's. 1937		2,500,000	A & O	.....	.....	....	....	....
purchase money 6's.....1897		5,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
Edison El. Ill. B'kin 1st con. g. 4's. 1939		4,275,000	J & J	98½	Dec. 4, '19	....	....	....
Lac. Gas L't Co. of St. L. 1st g. 5's. 1919		10,000,000	Q F	108	Feb. 20, '01	108	107	19,000
small bonds.....				97½	Nov. 1, '95	....	....	....
N. Y. Gas EL. H. & P. Colstool tr g 5's. 1948		11,500,000	J & D	111½	Feb. 28, '01	111½	109½	124,000
registered.....			J & D	.....	.....	....	....	....
purchase money col tr g 4's. 1949		20,399,000	F & A	95½	Feb. 27, '01	96	95	438,000
Edison El. Ill. 1st conv. g. 5's. 1910		4,312,000	M & S	109½	Jan. 29, '01	....	....	....
1st con. g. 5's.....1905		2,156,000	J & J	120	Nov. 13, '19	....	....	....
Paterson & Pas. G. & E. con. g. 5's. 1949		3,317,000	M & S	.....	.....	....	....	....
Peop's Gas & C. Co. C. 1st g. 6's. 1904		2,100,000	M & N	107	July 13, '19	....	....	....
2d gtd. g. 6's.....1904		2,500,000	J & D	108	Jan. 25, '01	....	....	....
1st con. g 6's.....1943		4,900,000	A & O	120	Feb. 15, '01	120	120	16,000
refunding g. 5's.....1947		2,500,000	M & S	108	Dec. 16, '98	....	....	....
refunding registered.....			M & S	.....	.....	....	....	....
Chic. Gas L't & Coke 1st gtd g 5's. 1937		10,000,000	J & J	108½	Feb. 20, '01	108½	108½	6,000
Con. Gas Co. Chic. 1st gtd. g 5's. 1936		4,348,000	J & J	108½	Feb. 28, '01	108½	108	10,000
Eq. Gas & Fuel. Chic. 1st gtd. g 6's. 1905		2,000,000	J & D	109½	Jan. 2, '01	....	....	....
Mutual Fuel Gas Co. 1st gtd. g 5's. 1947		5,000,000	M & N	102	Feb. 20, '01	102	102	5,000
Trenton Gas & Electric 1st g. 5's. 1949		1,500,000	M & S	109	Feb. 8, '01	109	109	10,000
Utica Elec. L. & P. 1st s. f'dg. 5's. 1950		500,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
Western Gas Co. col. tr. g. 5's.....1933		3,805,500	M & N	107½	Jan. 16, '01	....	....	....
TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CO. BONDS.								
Commercial Cable Co. 1st g. 4's. 2397.		9,532,400	Q & J	102	Jan. 11, '01	....	....	....
registered.....			Q & J	100½	Oct. 8, '19	....	....	....
Total amount of lien, \$13,000,000.						....	....	....
Erie Teleg. & Tel. col. tr. g s f'd 5's. 1928		3,905,000	J & J	109	Oct. 7, '99	....	....	....
Metrop. Tel. & Tel. 1st s'k f'd g. 5's. 1918		2,000,000	M & N	103	Feb. 17, '99	....	....	....
registered.....			M & N	.....	.....	....	....	....
N. Y. & N. J. Tel. gen. g 5's.....1920		1,261,000	M & N	112	Nov. 27, '95	....	....	....
Western Union col. tr. cur. 5's.....1928		8,502,000	J & J	113	Feb. 20, '01	113	111½	30,000
fundg. & real estate g. 4's. 1950		10,000,000	M & N	107½	Feb. 18, '01	107½	107½	11,000
Mutual Union Tel. s. fd. 6's.....1911		1,937,000	M & N	112½	Dec. 20, '19	....	....	....
Northwestern Telegraph 7's.....1904		1,250,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....

## UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	YEAR 1901.		FEBRUARY SALES.		
				High.	Low.	High.	Low.	Total.
United States con. 2's registered...1880			Q J	106	105½	106	105½	15,000
" con. 2's coupon.....1880		445,890,650	Q J	106	106½	105½	105½	44,000
" con. 2's reg. small bonds. 1880			Q J					
" con. 2's coupon small bds. 1880			Q J	105¾	105¾			
" 3's registered.....1908-18			Q F	111	109½	111	110¾	10,500
" 3's coupon.....1908-18		99,015,940	Q F	111½	110	111½	110½	92,500
" 3's small bonds reg.....1908-18			Q F					
" 3's small bonds coupon. 1908-18			Q F	110¾	110	110¾	110¾	8,600
" 4's registered.....1907		270,405,100	J A J A O	114½	113¾	114½	113¾	10,400
" 4's coupon.....1907			J A J A O	114½	113¾	114	113¾	11,500
" 4's registered.....1925		162,315,400	Q F	138	137¼			
" 4's coupon.....1925			Q F	138½	138½			
" 5's registered.....1904		22,939,400	Q F					
" 5's coupon.....1904			Q F	113½	110¾	110¾	110¾	3,000
District of Columbia 3-6's.....1924			F & A					
" small bonds.....		14,224,100	F & A					
" registered.....			F & A					
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.								
Quebec 5's.....1908		3,000,000	M & N					
U. S. of Mexico External Gold Loan of 1890 sinking fund 5's.....			Q J	97	96½	97	96½	3,000
Regular delivery in denominations of £100 and £200.....		£22,555,720						
Small bonds denominations of £20.....								
Large bonds denominations of £500 and £1,000.....								

## BANKERS' OBITUARY RECORD.

**Bechtel.**—George D. Bechtel, Cashier of the First National Bank, Altoona, Pa., died March 5, aged thirty-eight years.

**Brown**—J. J. Brown, a retired capitalist of Omaha, Nebraska, President of the Ashland (Neb.) National Bank, and a director of the Omaha National Bank, and Vice-President of the Omaha Loan and Trust Co., died February 9. He was born in Rensselaer County, N. Y., in 1832. In 1858 he went to Omaha and engaged in general merchandising. When he retired, in 1885, he had built up a large and successful wholesale dry goods business.

**Brownell.**—Wm. A. Brownell, Vice-President of the Keokuk (Ia.) National Bank, died February 20, aged sixty-five years.

**Colvin.**—J. T. Colvin, formerly President of the Tradesmen's National Bank, Pittsburg, Pa., and of the Pittsburg National Bank of Commerce, died January 31, aged sixty-three. He had been prominently associated with banking and other business interests at Pittsburg for about forty years.

**Dawson.**—Wm. Dawson, Sr., a resident of St. Paul, Minn., since 1880, died February 19. He engaged in banking there, organizing the banking house of Dawson & Co. In 1870, and in 1884 he became President of the Bank of Minnesota. This bank failed in 1896. Mr. Dawson was Mayor of St. Paul for three years.

**Egbert.**—Col. Henry G. Egbert, President of the Davenport (Ia.) National Bank, a Civil War veteran and a pioneer citizen of the State, died February 24.

**Eppley.**—Lewis H. Eppley, Vice-President and Cashier of the Blair County Banking Co., Tyrone, Pa., died March 3, aged fifty-six years.

**Fluck.**—H. A. Fluck, Vice-President of the Flemington (N. J.) National Bank, and interested in a number of other corporations, died March 3, aged fifty-two years.

**Lane.**—Henry C. Lane, President of the Bellows Falls (Vt.) Savings Institution, died February 20, aged seventy-seven years.

**Loomis.**—Geo. L. Loomis, President of the Nonotuck Savings Bank, Northampton, Mass., from its organization, died February 16, aged sixty-four years. He had creditably filled a number of offices of trust, and was a successful business man.

**Raff.**—Edward S. Raff, President of the Central Savings Bank, Canton, Ohio, died at Tucson, Arizona, February 2.

**Rickey.**—Harry Rickey, Cashier of the Chestertown (Md.) National Bank, died February 11, aged fifty-two years.

**Shepp.**—Daniel Shepp, President of the Tamaqua (Pa.) Banking and Trust Co. since its organization in 1895, died February 4, aged seventy years.

**Troutman.**—Geo. M. Troutman, who was President of the Central National Bank of Philadelphia from 1865 until 1899, died March 5, aged ninety years. He was a director of the bank and of several other financial corporations at the time of his death. Prior to 1865 he was Cashier of the Western National Bank.

# THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE

*RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING and THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE Consolidated.*

---

FIFTY-FIFTH YEAR.

APRIL, 1901.

VOLUME LXII, No. 4.

---

THE consolidation of the great iron and steel manufactories in a combination under one management suggests a number of subjects for consideration, which are of importance not only to the financial and industrial interests but to all who are interested in the development of government and social institutions.

The history of the progress of the human race abounds in instances of the power of government to influence the methods of trade and commerce, and of the power of organized industry to influence the form of government. There has always been a struggle between the forces that rule and the masses who are ruled. These forces are mutually supported and regulated. The business men of the middle ages obtained scope for their energies in the midst of the oppressions of the feudal system by organizing for themselves municipal governments suited to the pursuits of the governed. As paternal and proprietary governments have gradually given way to such as are more or less representative and derived from the people, the idea has been to shape laws so as to encourage industry and the accumulation of property. But there is still, even under governments purely republican, a remnant of the old antagonism between the ruler and the ruled.

The expenses of government have to be met by the collection of taxes from the producers of wealth; but in a representative government this antagonism takes the form of attempts to modify or direct the ruling forces so that they may be favorable to the interests of the producing population. When individual competition is uncontrolled the action of trade and productive industry on government is comparatively feeble, as the conflicting interests are so numerous and contradictory that they neutralize one another. The growth of corporations and of combinations tends to strengthen the forces which seek to control the machinery of the government and the laws in behalf of special interests.

In the United States the purely representative character of the ruling powers lends itself easily to the control of the influences of organized industry and commerce, and in no country has the organization of the forces of production proceeded so far, with the promise of still greater concentrations. Theoretically, the ballot controls everything; but the spirit of political organization which has grown up outside of legislative enactment now goes far to control the ballot. Industrial and commercial organization, when it desires to control the government, either Federal or State, finds a political organization ready for its uses. The productive forces are the purse-bearers. They furnish the means by which alone governments can be made effective. They also furnish the means by which the political organization which produces the government is created and becomes effective. The business man, whether alone or in combination with other business men, seeks to shape politics and government in a way conducive to his own prosperity. When business men were single units, each working out his own success regardless of others in desperate competition, the men who controlled the political organizations were supreme. They dictated laws and employed the proceeds of taxation in building up the power of their organization. But as the business of the country has learned the secret of combination, it is gradually subverting the power of the politician and rendering him subservient to its purposes. More and more the legislatures and the executive powers of the Government are compelled to listen to the demands of organized business interests. That they are not entirely controlled by these interests is due to the fact that business organization has not reached full perfection. The recent consolidation of the iron and steel industries is an indication of the concentration of power that is possible. Every form of business is capable of similar consolidation, and if other industries imitate the example of that concerned with iron and steel, it is easy to see that eventually the government of a country where the productive forces are all mustered and drilled under the control of a few leaders, must become the mere tool of those forces. There are many indications, in the control of legislatures, that such is the tendency at the present time in the United States. Whether the result of this tendency is desirable or otherwise, is another question.

The dream of socialism has been to have the action of government so directed that it would shape the population into a great industrial army, in which each individual should be provided with the means of occupation and subsistence. The natural growth of business combinations will produce a similar result. If carried out to its logical conclusion every citizen will become the employee or dependent of some one of the great combinations, directed by a head who in his power of financial control will be the autocratic ruler of every individual of



his following. If all these great combinations of particular lines of industry are again made the subject of a still greater combination including in its scope all industries and trades, the men or set of men who are at the head of this aggregation will be the real rulers of the nation. Every professional man as well as all who pursue every other mode of livelihood will be affiliated by the strongest ties to one or the other of the consolidated industries. Every legislator and every executive officer will belong to the same head. Forms of government may not be changed, but they will be employed under the direction of the real rulers. Of course it is easy to see that individual independence, as now understood, is different from what it would be under such a novel state of things, but no doubt it would still be individual independence. Probably under a government directed by a great combination of industrial and productive powers, the degree of individual independence which each citizen sacrifices for the good of the whole would be no greater and perhaps not so great as the independence which each citizen now sacrifices in obedience to existing law and custom. The direction of the industrial and producing forces would enlarge independence in some directions while it might restrict it in others. Wisely conducted, every citizen might, according to his merit and ability, attain higher prizes in life than is possible at the present time. Perhaps in this direction may lie some approximate realization of the dreams indulged in BELLAMY'S "Looking Backward," without the dangers from political corruption that would seem to be inevitable if BELLAMY'S scheme could have been attempted.

It has been charged against corporations and business combinations that they are governed entirely by mercenary motives. But mercenary motives, even taken in their worst sense, form the soil from which arise conditions which render possible the development of the moral graces that are the accompaniment of civilization. Were the powers of productive industry once thoroughly and successfully organized, so as profitably to employ and support every citizen, those to whom it fell to be leaders would no doubt be forced to recognize the necessities of moral and intellectual education and the amenities of life. The action of ANDREW CARNEGIE will probably have great influence in enlightening the minds of those who are to be the future directors and distributors of the production of the present century.

---

THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A CHINESE LOAN, to be offered to the capitalists of the United States under the auspices of German financiers, was undoubtedly premature, but it is probable, when the differences between China and foreign powers have so far advanced toward

settlement as to enable the indemnity to be determined on, that to make the necessary payments and free the Chinese Government from the tutelage of foreign armies, financial help will be desired. But at least, at first sight, a Chinese loan would not seem to be a very desirable investment, although it might prove a profitable speculation. From all accounts the wealth of China has been very much exaggerated. The Chinese men of business who have conducted the trade with foreign countries have had great opportunities and some of them have become very wealthy. But they form but a small part of the population. The governing class, too, have seemed to be very rich, having been allowed great opportunities for private emolument in the collection of taxes. As long as they sent a due share of their requisitions from the people to the Emperor and Empress, the extent of their oppressions was not inquired into.

The manner of collecting public revenue in China, and this revenue must of course be the basis of all loans, is such as to render all calculations very precarious. It is doubtless true that if a modern system of taxation could be enforced with honesty, the revenues could be made adequate to sustain a very large debt. Something of this kind has been established as a foundation for loans already made, and this revenue system under the direction of foreign administrators may be extended. What can be done in this way has been shown by the manner in which the debt of Egypt has been taken care of under British administration. The success in Egypt was due to the taking virtual possession of the Government of that country by Great Britain. Something of the same sort may be the result of the situation in China.

The great conquests of the present day seem to be of a financial nature. The Chinese people, although rigidly attached to their social and religious manners and customs, seem to have long passed the stage of development which inspires a love for any special political national standing. They do not appear to care what dynasty rules the destinies of the Empire. A modern system of taxation honestly conducted would probably lighten the burdens now borne, and would in the end be a blessing to the whole people.

It is evident that it will be difficult to place a Chinese loan unless the revenues of the Empire are placed on a new basis.



THE EDUCATIONAL WORK of the American Bankers' Association, in the organization of the American Institute of Bank Clerks, is beginning to show progress. Headquarters have been established in New York city, and local chapters will be chartered by the institute in the various sections of the country most convenient for the gather-

ing of the clerks to benefit by the course of instruction which has been marked out by the institute. The executive council of the American Bankers' Association, it will be remembered, was instructed at the last convention to appropriate ten thousand dollars to enable the committee to carry on this work.

The clerks and employees of the banks of the country cannot be much less than fifty thousand in number. The system of banking in the United States, encouraging the organization of large numbers of independent banks, nearly every one of which requires several clerks and employees, probably affords employment to a much larger number in proportion to capital and business done than the more monopolistic systems in operation in other countries. In some of the great banks of the large cities it is possible for the newly engaged clerk to learn almost every phase of the banking business if he is attentive and has perseverance and talent. In the large number of small institutions, the routine business of which is done by one or two clerks, there is often little opportunity of obtaining more than a mere routine experience. Even in the large banks the duties tend to become specialized, so that an employee often has the opportunity of learning but little beyond his own narrow division of the general system.

The result of the work of such an institute as is proposed by the educational committee, if taken up generally by the clerical force of the banks, will be to give every employee a wider horizon and tend to prevent him from falling into the narrowness of mind which is alleged by some to be a characteristic trait of those whose life occupation is the performance of monotonous routine duties. It must, however, be borne in mind that the success of the institute depends not only on the support it receives from the employees of banks, but also on the good will and consequent encouragement of the employers. The officers and directors of banks have it in their power to very much retard the work of the institute by being openly hostile or sneeringly indifferent. The value of the certificates issued to the clerks who successfully pass the prescribed examinations will depend somewhat upon the views of bank officers and directors as to the additional practical value which studies of theoretical banking may give to an employee. There can be no question, however, as to the very great value of many of the branches of study provided in the institute's course.

In a very large number of banks the employees are men who have received common or high-school education, with perhaps a course in some business college in addition. A great many employees are relatives and *protéges* of the officers and directors. Some have gone into a bank with little or no education, and their gradual assumption of one duty after another has been their only school. The ordinary bank officer of the present day, to be really convinced of the value of the insti-

tute to his employees, must be able to perceive an improvement in their management of their ordinary duties. Probably the employees themselves will at first be attracted to the institute under the belief that in some way the knowledge which may be acquired there will advance their interests and secure them increase of salary. It is probable that in this respect there will be some disappointment. It is true that increased knowledge is always an advantage in a general way, but it cannot always be applied to immediate use. In any class of men, where no special effort is made to provide educational opportunities for all alike, those whose special gifts and ideas lead them to study have less competition, and find it more easy to advance than where education is forced upon all alike. If any system of educational opportunities raises the general level of culture among any class of employees, the competition among them will be the same as when the same class of employees was at a lower level. Probably in mere knowledge, and even in technical knowledge, bank employees to-day are much in advance of the same class of men fifty years ago.

The work of the institute will, however, bring together the employees of the banks, as the American Bankers' Association has brought their employers together.

In one respect the plans for the institute as outlined in the address of Mr. WM. C. CORNWELL, chairman of the educational committee, do not go far enough. It is proposed to give as rewards for successful examinations certificates only. There should be prizes offered, either in money or in positions. Those banks that have faith in the examinations of the institute as tests of the value and capacity of a candidate for bank employment, should come forward and promise to fill the vacancies that occur in their staff of employees from the eligible lists of the American Institute. Salaried positions in the American Bankers' Association, and on its committees, might also, when vacancies occur, be offered as inducements to excel in the examinations of the institute.

---

THE TAXES OF THE COUNTRY have been reduced by about \$41,000,000, and even with this reduction it is anticipated that there will be a surplus at the end of the next fiscal year, notwithstanding the apparent extravagance of appropriations by Congress. That this expectation will be realized with the continued prosperity of the country there is little doubt. In fact it is probable that the reduced tax list will produce as large a revenue as the full tax did during the previous year. It is also highly probable that with the settlement of affairs in the Philippines the expenditures will be less rather than greater than the estimates. The failure of the subsidy bill and the river and harbor bill to pass

will postpone the expenditure of the sums which were appropriated in these measures. The prospect now is that the resources of the Treasury will be greater than ever before. Already a surplus is beginning to accumulate, although the money market has not yet been affected unfavorably.

In case the collection of revenues should begin to cause a tightening of money, it is intimated that there will be bond purchases made for the sinking fund. As long as rates for money are easy and the prices of bonds are high this will not be resorted to.

The country is fortunate in having at the head of the Treasury a man who is so well versed in the machinery of the money market as to use the power of the Treasury for its reasonable regulation, acting neither prematurely nor tardily, but with a due regard both to national and business interests. Without doubt the cessation of the silver craze and the better public opinion now prevailing on questions of finance have rendered Mr. GAGE's management of the national funds more and more easy. He has, however, invariably shown no hesitation in using the appropriate remedy in every contingency which has arisen during his administration. In handling the loans made, in the refunding operations, in the use of the banks as national depositaries, and in the advance payment of interest, as well as in the calling in of matured securities, he has timed his action to the best advantage of the business community. Mr. MCKINLEY in selecting Mr. GAGE for the Treasury, and in continuing him in this position during the second term, has insured the financial success of his Administration. Mr. GAGE's long experience as a banker gave him the knowledge from a banker's standpoint of what the Treasury should do to secure the health of the money market, and his course has been always calculated to promote the best interests of the Government and the people generally.

---

PERIODS OF LEGISLATIVE FRENZY do not appear to be confined exclusively to the United States. For years the representatives of the people in Congress seemed to be crazy over the public finances, having been forced to this attitude of mind by the views of the public on the silver question. The French, in recent years at least, seem generally to have been sound on matters of finance and have not been carried away by the idea that it might be possible to increase wealth by debasing the coinage. The employment of this device for enriching the treasury of their kings had taught them a lesson in this respect.

Recently, however, a wave of socialism has seemed to run over France, and this has taken form in attacks of all kinds on the accu-

mulation of wealth. In response to the strength of those holding socialistic views, the Chamber of Deputies last month attacked the millionaires by passing a measure for increasing the succession duties where people received money by inheritance or devise or gift. A million francs is the standard sum at which the ordinary succession duties begin to increase under the provisions of this measure. The increase on an inheritance or receipt by gift or devise of one million francs was one-twelfth, on one of two millions and over one tenth of the ordinary tax, on three millions or over an eighth, on five millions and over a fourth, on ten millions or over a half ; on twenty millions and over the tax doubles; on fifty millions and over two and one-half times as great; on one hundred millions and over the tax is tripled.

This, it is said, will amount to confiscation. The measure is on a par with the vague propositions sometimes made by the cranks in this country to prevent any one from becoming a millionaire by gathering in by taxation all fortunes in excess of a certain level sum, which some one shall propound as being the extreme legal limit of personal possession. The French bill, however, does not seem to go so far as this. Apparently any Frenchman or resident can accumulate as much as he is able to, but no one can be made exorbitantly rich by the mere luck of inheritance without giving up a large share to the public treasury. Those who make wills, unless they patriotically wish to help meet the deficit in the revenues, when they have millions to divide must select heirs and beneficiaries enough to break up their hoard into parcels too small for the law to reach.

Before this measure passed by the Deputies can become a law it must be passed upon by the Senate, which it is said will turn it down. In fact, the votes to pass the bill by the House of Deputies would not, it is believed, have been forthcoming if it had not been known that the Senate would prevent its becoming a law. The Senate seems to have its uses in France as well as in the United States.

---

THE INTER-OCEANIC CANAL routes should not be finally determined until there has been a careful consideration of the matter. While the importance of the canal is generally acknowledged, there is still much doubt as to the route which should be chosen as the one which will in the end be the most effectual means of communication between the oceans.

The report of the commission to examine the routes, while it appears to favor that through Nicaragua, nevertheless has much to say in favor of the Panama route, which to a disinterested outsider makes it appear the better of the two, and the one which can be the more quickly and cheaply completed. Probably there would be no doubt

that the Panama route would be selected were it not for the interest of American companies who have already sunk more or less capital in Nicaragua to recover the money they have so far invested without return. It would seem that every American citizen who makes unfortunate investments outside of the boundaries of the United States believes that the Government is bound to relieve him of the losses he has incurred.

In constructing an inter-oceanic canal, the United States will probably have to pay not only for the actual cost of construction, but also for the experiments of all the sanguine speculators who have endeavored to promote the enterprise long years before the time was ripe for it. It is the entanglement and conflict of interests, both political and pecuniary, which has grown up in the last fifty years, that will cost nearly if not quite as much to unravel and reconcile as it will to pay for the legitimate charges of canal construction. Both the Panama and the Nicaragua routes are more or less handicapped in this way. An objection on this ground made to one route can be matched by a similar one made to the other.

The difficulties which seem to surround the division of the narrow band by which the twin western continents are connected would seem to have some resemblance to the supernatural obstacles interposed by the powers of evil to the attempts of the alchemists to discover the elixir of life, or to the confusion by which the completion of the Tower of Babel was prevented.

DE LESSEPS has never received proper recognition for the genius he manifested in completing the Suez Canal. The difficulties he encountered were probably as great or greater than those which now attend the division of the Western Continent. It is true that he too failed at Panama, but he was a different man than when he triumphed at Suez. One such victory was enough to wear out any human frame, and DE LESSEPS was worn out and in his dotage when he undertook Panama. Had he at the time of his last undertaking been the man of Suez, there would now remain no inter-oceanic canal question for the Congress of the United States to settle.

---

EPIDEMICS OF EMBEZZLEMENTS seem to make themselves periodically conspicuous, like such diseases as the plague or smallpox. No doubt there is more or less of this crime going on at all times in all parts of the country. A certain portion of the losses due to it is made good and is never known except to the perpetrator himself. A certain portion is discovered and for various reasons is covered from public view. Another portion goes on until it becomes so great that discovery is almost unavoidable.

When, after a period of comparative quiet on this score, the discovery of a great embezzlement attracts wide attention, every other embezzler in the country as yet undiscovered begins to tremble. If possible, he replaces the amount of his trust as it was before. If not, he very often acts on the principle of being hung for a sheep as well as a lamb, and breaks cover with an increased amount of plunder.

When the news of a great defalcation in a prominent bank spreads, every banker in the country is aroused to a more minute examination of the business of his own institution. When NAPOLEON, shut up in the Island of Lobau, was preparing to cross the Danube and attack the Austrians at Wagram, secrecy as to his plans was of the utmost importance. News was brought him that there had been a spy introduced in the island, who was watching every move and action. NAPOLEON had all his forces drawn up in review, including all the camp-followers. He then announced there was a spy among them, and ordered that every one should examine his neighbor and see if he knew him. The spy was immediately found and executed. The looks of distrust and suspicion which the announcement of the presence of a spy caused in the hosts of NAPOLEON were probably duplicated among the officers, clerks and employees of every bank in the country when the news of a recent great embezzlement was sent along the wires. Undoubtedly, too, a large number of real embezzlers were forced from their concealment by this sudden development of suspicion. A certain number of these were sure to become public, and the result is the apparent epidemic of embezzlement. Every one can remember similar outbreaks in the past. The causes are always at work, but the results appear periodically like spots on the sun.

An embezzlement in a bank, even if it does not seriously affect the resources and the credit of the institution, is always a serious blow to the pride of the management. For this reason, whenever it is possible to conceal a lapse of this kind from the public, it is probably done. For this reason it would be almost impossible to obtain any accurate statistics as to the number of embezzlements occurring in a given time. With the adoption of modern precautionary methods by banks this form of crime tends gradually towards a limit of extinction, that is, it becomes more and more difficult for the employees of a bank to dishonestly use money for their own purposes. But probably opportunities, and consequent temptations to dishonesty, will never be wholly eliminated from the banking business. The integrity of the vast majority of bank officers and clerks is, of course, well understood, but this does not make it any the less prudent for a bank to take every reasonable precaution to secure its funds from the possible attacks of the weak or vicious who occasionally find employment in banks.



THE PRIVILEGE OF ISSUING BANK NOTES to circulate as money, where the banks are allowed to prepare their own plates and print their notes without outside check, is liable to be more or less abused, and where there is legal restriction on the extent to which the privilege shall be used, there is sometimes a tendency to employ it fraudulently.

Formerly in this country the State banks issuing notes had plates prepared each from its own design. They ordered notes printed in such quantities and denominations as seemed convenient, and kept them on hand ready for issue. Banks throughout the world, elsewhere than in the United States, do this to-day. A wisely managed bank issues notes in such quantities only as bear a profitable and safe proportion to its other business. This proportion might vary according to circumstances from nothing to many times its capital, depending upon its liability for deposits and the conditions of the money market.

Legislators, thinking there ought to be some limit to guide bankers, usually have fixed some proportion to capital. The State banks prior to the Civil War were in most cases thus limited. When they issued notes above this limit they committed an illegal act and became liable to penalties. Sometimes when a bank failed all of its notes became worthless as money in the hands of the public, and there was outcry enough even when the amount of notes outstanding was within the limit fixed by law; but a still greater row was made when overissues were discovered. No doubt when a bank found itself in straits there was great temptation, with quantities of blank notes handy, to overissue, and who can say how often these overissues tided over evil times until failure was averted and the solvency of the bank restored. However this may be, when failure did occur overissues seemed to make it tenfold worse. Therefore legislatures still granting the privilege of issuing notes took away the privilege of having the custody of plates and printing. Thenceforward the Government prepared the plates, printed the notes and kept them in its own custody, only sending to the bank the amount which the bank was legally entitled to issue. This, of course, put a stop to overissues. The only way a bank could overcome this check was by forgery.

But while the evil aimed at was thus successfully abolished, there is no doubt disadvantage in this system, in that it causes delay and uncertainty in the supplies of notes. This course was adopted under the free banking system of the State of New York, and a provision enforcing it was inserted in the National Banking Law. A National bank orders its plates prepared and its currency printed. The Comptroller of the Currency keeps on hand in his vaults a certain quantity of notes of each bank ready for issue in place of those that are worn

out and sent in for redemption. Those that are redeemed and still fit for circulation are sent back to the bank. A National bank generally puts in circulation most of the notes it is entitled to and secures by bonds at once. If entitled to \$100,000 circulation this sum is generally all in circulation, and the bank has very little, if any, on hand. If an emergency arises and a sudden run is made upon the bank, and its reserves are exhausted, its circulation privilege does not avail it to extend its credit. If, on the other hand, a bank is entitled to issue \$100,000 in circulation and had deposited bonds for the purpose, but had never issued but \$50,000, permitting \$50,000 to remain unsigned in the Comptroller's custody, if a run be made on this bank after its reserve was exhausted, it could not usually obtain the \$50,000 in notes from the Comptroller, have them signed and ready to issue in time to be of any earthly use.

In fact the system is entirely useless in times of emergency unless the bank itself regards its circulation as a reserve only to be issued when an emergency arises. This course would deprive it of all profit on circulation.

The Canadian banks retain the privilege of managing the printing of their notes, and as they are issued not on bonds, but on the security of general assets, they treat them first as an emergency reserve, and secondly as a source of profit. Notes issued on bonds have to be kept out all the time or the bank loses by them. Notes issued on general credit can be kept in the bank till, and when a run occurs which depletes the ordinary reserve they insure the safety of the institution.

When the new financial law was passed the Government was not prepared to let the banks have the increase of ten per cent. on bonds already deposited to which they were entitled. The Bureau of Engraving and Printing was much behind with the printing of the notes demanded for some weeks, and no doubt the formation of new banks was for a time somewhat retarded by the difficulty of getting notes.

The limit of circulation which a National bank may issue is 100 per cent. of its capital, provided it deposits corresponding security in bonds. Where a bank does not deposit bonds to secure the full amount of circulation, if an emergency should arise, it could deposit more bonds and obtain more circulation. But in the great majority of cases, a bank might fail and be placed in the hands of a Receiver days before the additional circulation could be received and signed ready to pay out.

In fact National banks do not depend at all upon their circulation as a protection in time of emergency. In 1893 large numbers of banks really perfectly solvent closed their doors because they could not obtain cash to pay depositors, and they might have saved themselves

and relieved their depositors if their circulation had been more in their own control.

It is this condition of things which has led to the suggestion of an emergency circulation. But any emergency circulation to be really of use in an emergency would necessarily be liable to danger of over-issue and illegal issue in the hands of ignorant or dishonest bank officials. In the days when the State banks of the United States had the privilege of entirely controlling the printing and issue of their notes, the great majority used the privilege wisely and to the great benefit of themselves and depositors. Some, however, did not, and the recollection of their misconduct as well as the real danger of its repetition by some banks so long as banking under general laws admits unfit men into the banking business, will no doubt prevent any return to this system. If, however, the time ever comes when National banks are permitted to issue notes on their general credit, instead of bonded security, then there could probably be devised some way of issuing notes by which overissues might be checked, and yet under which the notes might in some degree at least answer the purpose of an emergency circulation.

---

SEVERAL FOREIGN LOANS are either impending or have been announced recently. These include a \$250,000,000 British loan and a loan of \$72,000,000 to Germany, besides several important municipal loans in the latter Empire, one of which was placed exclusively in this country. There is a renewal of the rumors also about probable borrowings by Russia in the near future, but these rumors have been repeated so often that credit can not be given them, although there is evidence that the situation of Russia at present would seem to give a color of truth to the reports. The British and German loans are likely to be taken in part in this country, but should Russia conclude to borrow, the loan will perhaps be placed chiefly in Paris.

Through the unexpected prolongation of the South African war, which promises to cost some \$600,000,000, the prices obtainable for securities of the British Government have suffered a marked decline, and this affords an opportunity for American investors to obtain better returns on their capital than could be had by investing in United States bonds. Germany, too, has experienced some financial disturbances which appear to make it advisable to secure foreign subscriptions to the loans of the Empire and of some of the great municipalities.

The placing of foreign loans in this country is fortunate, for several reasons. It diminishes the amount of payments which this country is annually required to make for interest on European capital invested here, for freights, etc. Furthermore, the present remarkable

era of prosperity in this country can not be expected to last forever. When the revulsion comes it will be greatly to the advantage of our banks if they have a considerable line of foreign securities on which they can realize. In the crisis of 1893 Europe returned American securities in large volume, but should another such check to confidence take place it would be possible greatly to mitigate the effects of the crisis by realizing on the foreign loans.

Thus every investment of American capital made abroad strengthens the present financial situation and lessens the probability of such an upheaval as was witnessed in 1893.

It is not improbable that when the payments of subscriptions on some of the new loans come to be made there may be a considerable exportation of gold, but this event will be more beneficial than otherwise, as it is only a witness to the fact that the amount exported, and much more, of course, has been invested in the debt of foreign countries, while the withdrawal of gold from this centre, so far as it may be influential at all, will only tend to modify speculation somewhat.

---

A CRITICISM ON KNOX'S HISTORY OF BANKING in the United States, referred to in the preceding number of the *MAGAZINE*, intimates that the historian has omitted to portray the social and economic influence of banking upon the people. This criticism has an appearance of wisdom and an air of profundity with which many delight to treat financial and economic questions, and is very characteristic of the professional learned man who, unless able to see further into millstones than others, would not be qualified for his duties.

There is probably less humbug in the legal profession than any other, because the keen antagonisms of the courts tear to tatters the mutual courtesies which in other professions hide, to a very great extent, the deficiencies of the weaker brethren.

What has been the effect of banks upon the social and economic condition of the people at the different periods of the history of the United States? The first banks were established in this country about one hundred and twenty-five years ago, and there is most certainly a great difference in the social and economic conditions of the people of the United States to-day compared with the conditions of 1775. If we divide the period into decades great changes may be pointed out in each decade. There were no banks in the modern sense in 1775; there are thousands of them to-day. Since they were invented they have increased and are still increasing. The population of the country has also increased and is still increasing, and it is not impossible to detect some coincidence between the increase of population and the increase of banking.

The impression given by the criticism mentioned is that some profound and hidden influence has been exerted by banks and bankers on modern civilization which has heretofore been overlooked by banking histories. When, however, it is considered that banks are machines, evolved as other machines have been to meet human needs, and that banking machinery is intended to conserve and increase the efficiency of money, it appears that the real investigation, the lack of which is deplored, is one regarding the social and economic influence of the use of money. A history of banking is an aid to such an investigation, but research would be confined within too narrow bounds in such a history. To deplore its absence is as if one regretted the omission by the historian of agricultural machinery of the profound consideration of the social and economic influence of agriculture on the people. The part cannot contain the whole. It is true that the social and economic growth of a people is aided and advanced by inventions and improvements, and the discovery and application of new forces and resources; but to ascribe the growth to the accompaniments and signs and results of growth is to put the cart before the horse.

The true problem seems to be, What conditions of social and economic development give birth to the mental activity resulting in new inventions and discoveries? What stages of civilization caused the processes of observation and reasoning which brought about the discoveries and inventions that revolutionized the world? It was some condition of social development that produced the thoughts in the brain of COLUMBUS that drove him to the discovery of the Western Continent. What were the conditions that introduced printing and gunpowder, harnessed steam and electricity, and caused the invention of banks? This appears to be more properly a metaphysical than an economic question. The growth of society calls forth conditions suitable for such growth; the conditions do not influence it, they are part of it.

It is possible, of course, to show what were the social and economic conditions during every separate decade or year since 1775, or since the introduction of banking methods into the United States, and to compare the growth of banking capital in each successive period. But nothing very definite would result from such a comparison, as besides banks there have been innumerable other accompaniments of development. The banking historian performs his part when he has traced the processes by which these monetary machines have been gradually evolved, with the various experiences which have been gained in their operation. It is no fault that he has not concerned himself with a study of the interdependent effects of one economic development in connection with a number of others, or entered into

a fruitless attempt to determine to what extent existing social and economic conditions are due to banks, or to what extent the use of banks is due to existing social and economic conditions.

---

THE ADVOCATES OF A SAFETY FUND, in discussing the currency question, have made very little reference to the amounts which the Government has realized from the notes of National banks which have been lost or destroyed, and which never have or never will be presented for redemption. In many of the political attacks in campaigns now little remembered, it was freely asserted that those lost and destroyed notes were a source of great profit to the banks.

In popular opinion the gain which may result from this cause, whether it finally goes to the Government or the banks, is much exaggerated. In the minds of the public their own individual losses become illogically mixed up with the notes which fail to be presented to the issuing bank for redemption. Paper money is, when freely circulated, subject to great wear and tear. It is destroyed by fire and water. On the other hand the possessors of money take great care of it, and the Government affords great facilities for the redemption of the veriest tatters and fragments. The wear is the greatest on those denominations that are the most frequently used in hand to hand trade. The paper fractional currency issued during the war, and for some years subsequent thereto, was probably subjected to as hard usage as could be experienced by any paper money. It has been said that "these useful little notes were stuffed in the trousers pocket of the soldier with the jack-knife, the cartridge, the plug of tobacco and other handy articles, and soon became unfit for circulation. They became ragged and filthy, and had to be returned for redemption." One or two of these notes in the hands of one held at a distance from an exchange office or bank, so mutilated or worn as to be uncurrent, might often be wholly lost. There were issued of these small notes an amount of \$368,720,074, although not over fifty millions were outstanding at any one time. By the public debt statement of March 1, 1901, \$6,877,462 were still outstanding, and the notes are still coming in for redemption. But this sum carried on the public debt statement does not represent the total amount which has not been presented for redemption, inasmuch as by the act of June 21, 1879, an estimated amount of \$8,375,934 was charged off as lost and destroyed, and became a profit to the Government. The amount still carried as outstanding on the Treasury books in 1880, after this reduction was made, was \$7,214,954. Since 1880, or during a period of twenty-one years, \$336,492 has been presented for redemption, leaving, as before stated, \$6,887,462 still carried in the debt statement.

The losses on fractional currency are pronounced greater than on any other form of money issued by the United States. The Comptroller of the Currency, in discussing the corresponding loss on National bank notes in his report for 1883, referring to the clause in the law of July 12, 1882, extending the charters of National banks, which provided that any gain that may arise from the failure to present the notes of the National banks shall inure to the United States, said: "It is believed that the gain arising from the accidental loss or destruction of circulating notes will amount to from one to one and a half per cent. upon the highest amount outstanding during each period of twenty years." He estimated the amount of gain to the Government at that time at \$4,000,000, and remarked that this gain did not properly belong to the Government or to the banks. It properly belongs to the owners of the notes at the time of their loss or destruction. Of course these owners cannot be determined. He suggested that this gain should be carried to an insolvent bank redemption fund. This is obviously the only just and reasonable disposition of this gain by means of the losses of the general public. Assuming the gain to have been four millions of dollars in 1883, another twenty years having about elapsed, it is fair to estimate that the present amount of a fund derived from this source would be about eight millions of dollars, a very respectable foundation for a safety fund. With this fund set aside the assessments on the banks for a safety fund to protect circulation based on assets might be considerably reduced and render the introduction of this new system safe from the beginning.

---

THE ACTION OF MR. CARNEGIE in giving large sums of money for establishing libraries, and promoting other benefactions for the public, and his declaration that before his death he intends to give away the bulk of his large fortune, give him a unique place in the world's history. Perhaps no man, whether sovereign or private citizen, has ever acquired the power to dispose of so great a mass of wealth. The despotic sovereigns of antiquity very often accumulated large amounts of treasure which they simply stored away as a source of power, if the ordinary means by which they maintained their sway seemed to begin to weaken. Wealth and power are in some respects synonymous terms. Monarchs like the Persian kings were able to command the services of the great bulk of their subjects without reward. These subjects were slaves in that their actions were entirely directed and availed of by the king without the payment of wages. Mere physical services could be commanded by force, but the intelligent direction of the services of the masses, so that their efforts would supply the necessities and luxuries of life, required a degree of willingness

that could not generally be obtained except by the prospect of reward. The rewards offered were power over others, and more or less freedom of action. The discipline of society was maintained by the establishment of ranks and castes.

These ancient rulers did not require treasures so as to be able to induce the mass of people to work for them. The kings of Persia demanded a regular tribute in gold from their officers, and this gold was melted into ingots and stored in the treasure city of Susu, where it constantly increased. When that city was taken by Alexander the Great this long accumulated gold was seized and distributed among his followers.

Wealth to-day does not imply an accumulation of tangible treasure. Mr. CARNEGIE's wealth does not consist of the iron he has manufactured in his career or of the money for which this iron has from time to time been exchanged. It consists in rights which he has acquired under the social and political agreements called laws and constitutions and contracts, to certain portions of the profits to be derived from the operation of a great industrial organization, built up under his direction and guidance. When he gives away millions to establish libraries or to provide for the men who are a part of the industrial organization, he merely transfers a part of the proceeds of his interests to the support of the objects chosen rather than spend these proceeds on himself or use them to build up new means of earning more wealth.

During the last half-century the power of great wealth has more and more attracted the attention of ambitious men to whom the uncertainties of obtaining power by the solicitations necessary in political life were distasteful. The power of great wealth is more autocratic and self-centred. Formerly men were content to found families as monuments to themselves or to devote a portion of their lives to congenial occupations and amusements. Now the control of the machinery of the stock markets, and production, trade and commerce is the object of rivalry between men of wealth, as the control of territories and populations was the object of rivalry among the petty monarchies in the early stages of human development. The man who enters on this career of conquest can seldom pause any more than could the man who aspired to sit among the kings. Voluntary abdications of monarchs has been of rare occurrence, and few such rulers have experienced any happiness from their unusual course. The Empress THEODOSIA held that honor required one who had once attained the imperial throne to surrender it only with life.

It remains to be seen whether the great industrial princes of to-day can surrender their wealth with safety to themselves any more than the absolute ruler.



## BANK EXAMINATIONS.

---

The object of keeping accounts is to know from day to day just how the business of an individual firm or corporation stands. With the complication of business the accounts grow more difficult both to keep and to understand, and become something of a puzzle except to experts. Any system of book-keeping that simplifies the records of business without rendering them less complete is welcomed by the business world. Intricacies of accounts present opportunities for concealment and deception. A very large proportion of embezzlements and misappropriations in banks have been concealed for greater or less periods of time by the changes which may be made from one account to another.

The National Banking Law has had a good effect on bank bookkeeping by rendering the methods followed by the banks more uniform. The law requiring reports to be made to the Comptroller of the Currency gives the Comptroller power to call for them in such form as he may require. These reports are usually called for five times a year, and are required to represent the condition of the bank at the close of business on any past day selected by the Comptroller. As the report may be called for any day, it is necessary to keep the accounts of every National bank so as to be able to strike an accurate balance of resources and liabilities, for every business day. The National Currency Act at first required reports to be made on regular dates, but this was taken advantage of by the banks, to so conduct their business as to make a specially good showing at the periods when the reports had to be made. This also affected general business, as it was easier to obtain loans just after a report day had passed, and there was apt to be a call on business men towards the end of each quarterly period, to pay in their loans so as to make a good showing. When this law was in force, the number and capital of the banks involved was not very great. If the custom of making reports at fixed quarterly dates had been continued to the present time the business of the whole country would have had to conform itself to these quarterly fluctuations. It was better for business and for the purpose of checking the operations of the banks, to make the change to the present law controlling the reports. It makes the banks more careful and leads their managers to scrutinize the daily balance sheets, and tends to make them more cautious in conducting their business.

As stated before, the necessity for making these reports tends to secure uniform methods of keeping accounts by all the National banks. The periodical visits of the bank examiner also have much to do with securing a uniform style of bookkeeping. For their own convenience the bank examiners make suggestions when they find the bookkeeping defective or awkward, and they point out desirable improvements. The bank examiner is to some extent the eye of the Comptroller's office. In the last resort he affords the greatest protection against possible mismanagement and fraud.

The requirements of the National banking laws as to the organization of

banks are very rigid, and if they are adhered to by the officers and directors, insure a safe start for the institution. But if it were not for the bank examiner it would not be possible for the Comptroller to be certain that the associates were acting in good faith. Of course reports are made under oath of the payment of capital and other preliminaries, but unless the examiner examines into the conditions on the spot, this might all be more or less deceptive. As a matter of fact, with the system of preliminary examinations, it is next to impossible to fraudulently place a National bank in condition to receive deposits; but if it were not for the strictness with which the accounts were compared with the actual assets by the bank examiner, there would be attempts made to start fictitious banks to defraud the public.

Under the State bank system which prevailed before the Civil War such frauds were not uncommon in those States where the Government failed to exercise supervision by means of examinations.

The bank examiner is a very important functionary under the National banking laws, not only when the bank is first started but in every stage of its subsequent business. His successful employment under the National banking laws has led to the very general introduction of like examinations under the banking laws of the several States. The Comptroller's office, supervising the business of banks in all the States, has to employ a large staff of examiners, each of whom has a certain number of banks which form his district. Some of the larger cities form special districts. The State banking laws generally provide a State Superintendent or Commissioner who conducts the examinations himself or employs assistants to do so, according to the number of banks under his supervision. Under the National banking laws the expense of the examination is paid by the banks, and there is no limit to the number of men who might be employed by the Comptroller to make examinations. He might employ a local man to examine any given bank, and give the job to a different man on the occasion of each examination. This would not, however, be as conducive to securing good and uniform service as the system which has gradually grown up under successive Comptrollers of the Currency. The occasional examination of one bank would not give a man any very great experience, nor would the fee received be a very great inducement to devote much time and study to the business.

The custom grew up of dividing the country into districts containing a suitable number of banks and entrusting the examination of the banks in that district to one man. The fees received from the banks within a district usually afforded sufficient remuneration to enable one man to devote his whole time to making examinations. In this way the office of the Comptroller of the Currency has secured a corps of expert examiners, who thoroughly understand the peculiarities and necessities of the business. A bank examiner necessarily learns considerable diplomacy. In one way and to a certain extent he is a detective. But as is well known, the great majority of the banks he visits are honestly and carefully conducted in the interests of their stockholders and depositors. Their officers are as anxious that everything shall be right as the Comptroller can possibly be. The examiner, therefore, has to approach the bank to make the examination in a friendly spirit, and with a manner expressing confidence in its officers. At the same time he has to remember that the very reason of having examinations is the fact that any bank may go wrong, and it is necessary to keep his mind con-

stantly on the alert for the suspicious circumstance or appearance that may lead to some unexpected discovery. The cordiality and courtesy with which he is received may be a blind intended to mislead him. Some of the failures to discover bad management and fraud before the bank was wrecked have been due to the over-confidence of the examiner, because previous examinations have shown the bank to be all right. The very fact that an examiner has overlooked a fault on one occasion may blind him more readily the next time.

An examiner kept too long in one district may form opinions about banks which lead him to take too much on trust. To obviate this danger of an examiner becoming too much given to mere routine work in his district, the Comptroller of the Currency adopted the practice of changing men from one district to another. This had good results in more ways than one. It reduced the danger of an examiner being corruptly used by dishonest bank officials, and where there was no danger of this kind it gave the man a wider experience.

The system of employment of bank examiners which has been elaborated by degrees in the office of the Comptroller of the Currency, is probably as good a one as could be devised for the purpose. Of course the main defect in the eyes of some is that a number of appointments are made by political influence. It is easy to see that, were the appointee selected placed to examine the banks in the State or district from which the political influence securing the appointment emanated, the examiner might, perhaps, be induced to be too lenient in some cases. However, the system of changing from one district to another very seldom leaves the man in the district from which he derives his political influence. Of course, the Comptroller's office is no more than any Government office entirely free from the effects of the solicitations of friends of banks and of bank examiners whose position gives them political weight. The failure of a bank often brings to light the most surprising efforts to protect and shield bank officers who have gone wrong and who have strong political affiliations. An honest bank examiner and the Comptroller of the Currency himself may be subjected to the very greatest pressure to make the one or the other serviceable by the suppression of evidence or the abstention from pressing penalties. But this sort of thing is seldom if ever of any avail. The friends of a defaulter or embezzler who has laid himself liable to the penalties of the National Banking Law may at first believe the story of the men who have the hardihood to attempt to face down their misdeeds, but when they become acquainted with all the evidence they generally withdraw their support.

Perhaps one of the most desperately fought cases of this kind was that of a bank wrecked in a country town in Western New York. The brother of the President held the controlling influence in the bank and although but a director was the real manager of the whole business. This man stood high in the estimation of one of the great political parties—had been a member of Congress, a delegate to the national nominating convention, an eloquent and bold speaker, the boss of the political machine in his own district, a man of surpassing physical and nervous force. He belonged to and was the head of an old and wealthy family in the town, which owned a large estate of valuable land. It was found afterwards that he was a desperate character, had been leading for many years a double life, and had in fact by means of a

gang of men over whom he had in various ways secured control, really terrorized the town in which his bank was located. There had been irregularities in the bank for years, but they had been covered up in various ways so as to deceive the examiner, chiefly by the facility with which his political influence enabled him to secure loans of canal funds and also loans from rich political friends.

But at length the difficulties of the bank became so great through the lavish expenditure of its director, that the examiner's report showed to the Comptroller something was wrong. At first the trouble was supposed to be one that could be remedied. The director and his brother, the President, were supposed to be rich, they could make good the deficiency of capital by selling their landed property. Every solicitation was made by political friends to secure delay. The director endeavored unsuccessfully to obtain more loans of public money. The case dragged on for months. At last a special examiner was sent, to arrive if possible at some definite idea of the real condition of the bank and the possibility of rehabilitation. The director was aware of the examiner's coming. When the Government official arrived at the depot, he was met by the director's carriage and horses, to drive him to the village, which was some distance from the depot. After arriving at the top of a hill the driver started the horses at a run and threw down the reins. The intention was evidently to kill or injure the examiner in the run-away. The officer, however, held a revolver to the driver's head and made him take up the reins and control the horses. The driver protested that he had no bad intention, and the matter was passed over. The examiner could not procure admission to the bank that day, and that night the books were stolen, and as was afterwards discovered, buried. These transactions and the flight of the President were a confession of guilt. The director still faced the forces of the Government which were put in operation, ascribing the condition of the bank to the absconding brother. Things now drew to a conclusion. The books were unearthed by detective work, the evidence of the real transactions and condition of the bank obtained, the director was indicted and arrested. He was tried in one judicial district and the jury failed to agree. Tried in another, he was convicted. Between conviction and sentence he was, wonderful to relate, admitted to bail. He went home, became sick and died and was buried. Stories, however, were rife that he did not die, that there was merely a dummy funeral, and this wonderful director lived years after in Mexico. In this case political influence was unsuccessfully tried to its fullest extent, but as the facts of the case became clear, political friends became chary of acting openly, and if they gave any help it was furtive and ineffectual.

The life of a bank examiner is usually monotonous enough, but this experience in the State of New York shows the possibilities of striking adventure.

Ordinarily the banks in the districts in the older States are situated closely together so that the examiner could easily travel from one to the other and there were few long journeys to make. But in the districts including the Territories the examiner was often forced to take long journeys by stage and sometimes on horseback, and these journeys were not always free from risk. Moreover, the frontier banks had for depositors a class of people who were prone to take the law into their own hands. When an examiner found it necessary to close one of these banks, the enraged depositors could not easily

understand why those who happened to be on the spot should not at once divide among themselves such valuables as happened to remain. The examiner who took possession so that the remaining assets might be liquidated and the proceeds fairly divided among all the creditors in accordance with law, was looked upon with almost as much disfavor as the guilty bank officials. Often, before he could induce the angry crowd to listen to reason, he ran great risk of becoming a victim of frontier justice.

It may be put down to the credit of these people, when a hearing was finally obtained and the methods of the Government in such cases explained, that the excitement subsided, and the justice of the examiner's position in seeking to protect the rights of all was acquiesced in.

In travelling from bank to bank, the frontier examiners often witnessed the holding up of stages by road agents, and though not usually contributing very much to the exchequer of the robbers, had to undergo their share of the danger of being hit by stray bullets. One of these examiners who, for a number of years was the guide, philosopher and friend of the frontier banks, has recounted in his memoirs how, when on his route to Santa Fé, New Mexico, seated on the seat with the stage-driver with the box of treasure at their feet concealed among robes and blankets, he had the pleasure of looking into the barrel of a shot-gun, which he described as seeming to him of a much larger bore than common. This position was so prolonged as to be unpleasant, while the assistant to the gun-holder was lining up the other passengers and searching the interior of the stage. A request to turn the aim a little from his head was responded to by the inquiry in a high falsetto voice, whether he could not entertain himself by reading the New York "Herald" at the bottom of those barrels. This particular road agent, afterwards shot, killed and buried on this stage route, turned out to be a woman—whose history was immediately surrounded with a halo of romance.

The National and other banks of the United States are generally conducted with skill and honesty. The great ease with which any one who has persuaded or who can induce others to contribute sufficient capital and go into the banking business, naturally puts some men who have had little or no banking experience in the position of managing officers.

The great adaptability of business men in this country, however, reduces the danger from this cause to a minimum. There is, however, a small proportion of the great number of banks which may be in some degree unsafe from the inexperience of their officers. There must also in every business be a small proportion of dishonest men, or of those who become so under the pressure of circumstances. If it were not for this narrow fringe of poor banking material the work of bank examiners might perhaps be unnecessary. From the standpoint of the Government, however, it is necessary to see that the provisions of the banking laws are complied with.

It is possible to conceive that banks might run on for many years safely and perhaps never fail, while violating many of these laws, but the responsibility assumed by the Government makes it necessary to have knowledge as complete as possible of the working of every bank organized under its laws.

Primarily the office of the Comptroller of the Currency exerts its powers to preserve the Government from loss, in the responsibility it has assumed in guaranteeing the National bank note. Incidentally every operation of the bank is involved in this, as the Government, if the securities deposited spe-

cially to protect circulation happen to fall short, has a first lien, in case of failure, on all the assets of the bank. As a matter of fact, in the failures that have occurred, the security for circulation has usually shown a surplus over the amount necessary to redeem circulation which has been applied to the other liabilities of the bank. The assets of the bank have never been levied upon to make good the Government guaranty of its circulation. But in case of loss by a National bank failure, the stockholders and depositors have not any great show of right in complaining that the Government by its bank examinations did not prevent the disaster. The stockholders elect the management of the bank, and the directors elected have control of the officers. The position of the Government in regard to deposits in National banks is similar to its position in regard to registered letters. It guarantees neither the depositor nor the sender of the registered letter against loss (except to a small extent in the latter case). It merely takes all possible care that those who steal or cause the loss of either shall be detected and punished. In this the small loss of deposits in National banks for thirty-five years shows the general utility and efficiency of bank examinations.

## KNOX'S HISTORY OF BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES.

### OPINIONS AS TO THE MERITS OF THE WORK.

**MILWAUKEE (Wis.) JOURNAL:** This is the most complete and important work on this subject. The author was for seventeen years Deputy Comptroller and Comptroller of the Currency. His position gave him every opportunity to become thoroughly conversant with his subject. He began life as a banker in Minnesota in the fifties. His habitual study of the subject made him master of every detail. His style of writing is crisp as a new bank note. He is clear and makes his subject interesting to students.

The opening chapters are on the origin and development of banking in the Colonies, Continental money, and banking under the laws of the Continental Congress and the Constitution from 1784 to 1817.

His history of the first and second United States Bank is worthy especial notice. An account of wildcat money is of much interest.

The history is brought up to date by Mr. Bradford Rhodes, Editor of the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*.

Each State receives attention under the head of Banking Under State Laws. The additional matter furnished by Mr. Rhodes will be found valuable.

The book gives solid facts, not theories or fancies.

It is an authoritative and trustworthy record.

Sketches of distinguished financiers are given with steel-plate portraits.

It is a volume which will be found very valuable to all bankers and students of finance.

**SAN FRANCISCO (Cal.) CALL:** A book upon a subject so important as American banking prepared under the direction of such an authority as Mr. Knox, merits the attention of every student of our history or of banking problems.

Interesting as are the accounts of the Bank of the United States and the National banks, perhaps the student of politics as applied to finance may find more instruction in the record given of State banks. The various papers on that portion of the general subject constitute a special feature of the work and add much to its value.

**BUFFALO (N. Y.) EXPRESS:** As a repository of facts and a record of what has been done, this work can not fail to be of decided and enduring value.

## THE EDUCATION OF A BANKER.

---

### *PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL TRAINING OF BANK CLERKS AND OFFICERS*

---

#### THE COLLECTION DEPARTMENT.

No department of the bank offers to a clerk so interesting a field of labor and one so full of the experiences leading to a wide acquaintance with banking in general as that of collections.

The collection clerk handles a greater variety of transactions, has more calls upon his general resources and is thrown into contact with more strangers who, properly handled, may become friends and customers of the bank, than any other employee. To fill his position acceptably he must have good judgment, a cool head, a well-controlled temper, a large degree of tact and never-failing courtesy. If added to this he possesses some experience gained in the world of business outside of the bank, so much the better, for he can then more fully understand the needs of the bank's customers and the character of the business they entrust to him.

The intelligent collection clerk will treat his department as the most important advertising feature of his bank. While the other employees come mostly into contact with the bank's own customers, he comes into touch also with strangers, both individuals and banks, each one of whom should be treated as a possible customer. The demands upon his courtesy, tact and skill are never-ending, and he should not be so hampered with detail work that he cannot give proper time and attention to those who come to his window, and to his correspondence.

#### LOCAL COLLECTIONS.

After examining all the items which have been carried over and getting them freshly in mind, the collection clerk checks out the day's maturing notes, and after placing them in the hands of the messengers gives his attention to the morning mail. He should sort this over, taking out those items which demand immediate attention and laying aside those which can wait, such as notes yet to mature and foreign items, for attention later.

The local drafts should be checked out at once, and in so doing a memorandum should be made in pencil on the face of each item, showing the date of the letter of transmission, date of receipt, protest and other special instructions. Thus, "6-23-25 N. P. D. O. P." would indicate that the correspondent's letter was dated June 23, received on the 25th, no protest, documents deliverable on payment only. By use of arbitrary signs, instead of abbreviations, the instructions can be fully noted on each item in an instant, and much time saved later in looking up forgotten instructions. Moreover, no excuse is left for either collection clerk or messenger failing to follow instructions.

After checking out, the items are entered in a local collection register, which should be numbered, and the collections numbered to correspond. The

value of numbers in enabling the clerk instantly to place his hand upon the desired entry cannot be overestimated. The items may be entered very briefly, say by owner, drawee, amount and, of course, the owner's number and date, or they may be entered in full detail including special instructions. After being entered the collections are distributed in pigeon-holes or baskets for the messengers, who in turn arrange them for most conveniently presenting on their routes. For purposes of identification it is well to place upon bills of lading the same numbers placed upon the accompanying drafts. A collection clerk was recently called upon in court to identify certain bills of lading which had passed through his hands some weeks before, but he was unable to do so. Had his collection numbers been upon the bills of lading he would have had no difficulty. He immediately adopted this plan, and has since found it of much use, especially in replacing bills which, through accident, had become detached from drafts, saving time and uncertainty.

The messenger should be impressed with the fact that each item placed in his hands is or is not subject to protest, and that he must always know. If protestable he should so inform the drawee in case the draft is not paid on presentation; most business men will pay protestable items if possible, when they may refuse or neglect to promptly attend to those which are not. One of the greatest sources of annoyance to the collection clerk is the habit some banks have of sending out items with "no protest slips" attached, while the letter accompanying either gives instructions to protest, or no instructions at all. Many banks instruct their clerks in such cases to disregard the slips entirely and follow the instructions in the letter, absence of instructions being held equivalent to instructions to protest. This seems arbitrary, but it is the safest way. The use of the no protest slip should be limited wholly to the purpose of memorandum and never be allowed to take the place of written instructions upon the letter of enclosure.

Sometimes all items including locals, foreigners and notes are entered upon one register and then transferred; but much time and labor is saved by entering directly upon the different registers and ticklers.

The messenger, returning from his route, should have the collection numbers upon his checks, and in case of cash he should bring a list showing the numbers and amounts. When drafts are refused, he should put the reason for refusal upon the back of each draft; but in the case of notes a verbal report is preferable. A messenger should never be permitted to make entries of any sort upon notes. They differ materially from drafts, and entries upon them may lead to serious results. For instance, a messenger presented a note to the maker who refused payment, saying, that George Smith & Sons had promised to take up the note for him. When returned to the collection clerk it bore the endorsement of George Smith & Sons which, the clerk remembered, it had not borne when it left the bank. In answer to his inquiry the messenger replied, "Oh, yes, I forgot to tell you that the man said Smith & Sons would pay the note for him, so I put their name on the back." It is easy to imagine what complications might have arisen had not the facts been drawn out, for neither the maker nor the alleged endorser paid the note.

If the messenger leaves a written notice at the drawee's office, as he should do in all cases where the drawee or his representative is absent, a memorandum to that effect should be placed on the back of the draft, and the date. The collection clerk must watch his messengers narrowly at all times, and



especially when they are inexperienced or careless. The ease with which they say, "all right," is proverbial. They should be made to understand that their replies may bind the bank as firmly as if made by the officers themselves, and that they must be cautious accordingly. When collections cannot be presented because of distance from the bank or the office of the drawees, notices by mail or telephone should be promptly sent. While some banks notify by postal card, it is usually more satisfactory to the drawee to receive his notice enclosed in an envelope.

In the handling of notes great care must be exercised as to protest instructions, maturities and interest. If collateral is attached it should be examined. If errors in figuring interest or maturities are noted, the sending bank should be notified when receipt is acknowledged. The note tickler should give the names of the maker and owner, owner's date and number, instructions as to protest and mention of collateral if attached. About a week or ten days before maturity a notice giving the face, interest, exchange and due-date should be sent each maker. These notices may be made from the tickler or, as is perhaps safer, from the notes themselves. Protestable notes not paid by the close of banking hours should be promptly handed to the notary. All other unpaid notes should be returned to the owners not later than the following day. Past-due notes should never be permitted to lie in the bank without special instructions from the owners. Some banks insist upon having a receipt for all returned items, but usually the letter of transmission is considered sufficient.

#### FOREIGN COLLECTIONS.

In sending out foreign, or out-of-town collections, pains must be taken that the same instructions are given as have been received. The items should be entered in a foreign register, which should have space for drawer and drawee (or maker and payee), date and time of drafts (date and maturity of notes), protest instructions, attached papers, bank where sent, amount (including interest), exchange and collection charges if so drawn, owner, owner's date and number. This register should be numbered and the items numbered to correspond. The letter transmitting the foreign collections should be simple in form, giving number, drawee or maker, amount, protest instructions and attached papers. So many country banks fail to acknowledge receipt of collections that many collection clerks make the practice of enclosing with every note or other important item a postal-card receipt properly filled out and directed to their banks, ready for signing and mailing. Failure to get receipts for collections may lead to serious trouble. Often letters are lost in the mails and failure to get acknowledgment of receipt in due course should always be promptly investigated, and if the item is lost, immediate steps be taken to prevent damage to the interested parties. Where payment or the return of the unpaid item is not secured within a reasonable time, a tracer should be sent asking for a report, or the immediate return of the collection.

Some country banks are exasperatingly slow about returning unpaid collections and require the most vigorous prodding. They seem to be wholly indifferent to the annoyance caused a careful correspondent by their unbusinesslike ways, and no amount of pleading or even threats seem to have any effect. One country bank goes so far as to refuse to return unpaid drafts unless each is accompanied by a certain sum in stamps to pay for trouble and

postage, and all tracers and letters of remonstrance are mercilessly thrown into the waste-basket. This bank can be pardoned for refusing to do business for nothing, and if its rule is understood and complied with, no trouble results. But in most cases the delays are due to unbusinesslike methods or a failure to appreciate the annoyance caused.

One of the most troublesome features of the foreign collection clerk's work is the difference in State laws regarding days of grace. He must keep continually before him a table and figure his maturities accordingly. Some collection clerks seem to ignore the fact of a difference in the laws as to grace and persist in figuring all maturities according to the laws of their own States. Of course the collecting bank is responsible for making corrections, but this does not excuse the sending bank from knowing when its notes are due, wherever they mature.

The selection of correspondents is often left largely to the collection clerk, and he needs to exercise great care lest his bank suffer loss through failure or negligence on their part. The responsibility of a bank for its agents is hardly disputed. When it is found that a bank is careless or makes exorbitant charges and no better correspondent can be found, it is often more satisfactory to send by express. Most express companies refuse to take protestable items, however, which lessens their usefulness as collectors.

#### COLLECTIONS ON HAND.

An intelligent system of grouping local items in process of collection is necessary for accurate and rapid handling. They should be classified and each class kept in its proper place, be it pigeon-hole, basket or envelope. They may be distributed as "due to-day," "past-due," "protestable," "notified by mail," "telephoned," etc., etc., but however they may be grouped, a system once adopted must be religiously followed.

Upon making credits, remitting for, or returning items it is well to have at hand the original letter of transmission, not only that the sender's address (if a business house) may always be put upon the envelope, but to assure the following of special instructions, such as telegraphing payment or non-payment, remitting a certain bank for credit, etc. On returning unpaid items it is usually sufficient to refer in the letter to the reasons for refusal given on the back of the collection, but in important cases the reasons should be written on the letter for future reference.

#### PROFIT OR LOSS.

The collection clerk should keep an accurate account of the earnings of his department. If he does not keep a teller's sheet, he can at least keep a record of the exchange. Then if his department is charged with its expenses, salaries, books, stationery, postage, etc., he can know whether his department is a source of profit or loss, and intelligently exert his efforts toward making it as profitable as possible.

#### ADVISING.

Nothing the collection clerk can do will tend to popularize his department more than accuracy and fullness in advising. He should acknowledge receipt of all items, advise all acceptances and payments. If a correspondent uses numbers, he should always and invariably report by number.

## TRAINING MESSENGERS.

The training of the bank messengers naturally falls upon the collection clerk, and proves to be a valuable, though sometimes unpleasant, source of experience. Unless he is fortunate enough to have a voice in their selection, or his officers are more critical of applicants than some, he will have raw material placed in his hands which will try his patience and ingenuity to the last degree. A really good messenger is as rare as other really good things, and when one is found his training is a source of genuine pleasure. But he rarely enjoys that pleasure long, for the good messenger is always in demand for higher things. The others cause him no end of worry and discouragement before they are brought under proper control or are dropped. So many are chosen because they are their father's sons, the fathers urging them into the banks not knowing what else to do with them, that all sorts of material is provided, from the young boy of small learning but good brain and ready adaptability, to the college graduate, well educated, but often so sadly absent-minded.

## BILLS OF LADING.

The greatest care should always be exercised in the handling of bills of lading. All instructions should be carefully noted, and followed to the letter. When instructions are indefinite or incomplete, additional instructions should be procured with the least possible delay. Especially is this true where the shipments are perishable. Eternal vigilance is then the price of safety. Customs differ as to the delivery of bills of lading upon acceptance of drafts, but whenever bills are delivered a receipt should be taken therefor, preferably upon the back of the draft itself. Sometimes instructions like these will be received: "If not paid upon arrival of goods, protest." In such cases the collection clerk should examine the bill of lading, and if able to determine over what route the shipment will arrive, instruct the local freight agent to advise him upon the arrival of the goods. If he cannot determine over what route the shipment will come, he will do well to write or wire the sender of the collection that his bank cannot be responsible for proper protest. It will sometimes happen that drawees will report to the messengers that goods have not arrived, merely because they are not ready to pay the drafts. If the collection clerk's suspicions are aroused, an inquiry of the freight agent will settle the matter. If unreasonable delay in arrival occurs, a letter to the sender of the collection suggesting that a tracer be sent will assure him that the bank is looking out for his interests, and save the collection clerk from criticism, just or unjust.

## DEEDS AND MORTGAGES.

The practice of closing real-estate transactions through banks is rapidly increasing. If not handled by the officers themselves, these matters are usually turned over to the collection clerk, who sometimes finds them the most difficult and troublesome features of his work.

When deeds are placed in his hands for delivery, they should always be accompanied by minute written instructions, and without them he should refuse to handle the papers at all. Sometimes both deeds and funds are placed in the bank in escrow while certain technicalities are being cleared up. In such cases the instructions should be signed by both parties. Such

transactions rightfully belong to the lawyers, but because of convenience and responsibility as well as lower charges, much of this business now falls to the banks. The transactions often become complicated, involving many papers and parties. In one instance a piece of land was sold to one man, by him deeded to two others, while five different real-estate brokers shared in the commissions, the collection clerk being required to see that all moves were correctly made, the proper commissions paid, etc., etc. Such work as this should be charged for in proportion to the time and trouble involved, and not according to ordinary collection rates.

A bank should never be called upon to pass upon the correctness of a title, although it is not infrequently requested; but every collection clerk should be familiar with the forms of deeds, mortgages, satisfactions, assignments, etc., and should know when they are properly filled out, signed, witnessed, acknowledged and stamped. Then if he will insist upon having full written instructions and follow them, he need have no cause for worry; on the contrary, he will find this experience interesting and of much practical value.

#### GENERAL SUGGESTIONS.

At all times the collection clerk should be in close touch with the officers, not because of a desire to shift the responsibility that belongs to him, but because their knowledge and acquaintance are greater than his, and when in doubt it is better for him to secure their judgment than to take risks. He should, in all cases, however, form his own judgment first, and if his and theirs conflict, he should find the reasons and profit thereby.

The collection clerk should keep well posted as to events, reading banking journals, and keeping close watch of local conditions through the daily press and mercantile reports. He should always be cautious, yet if he is over-cautious—especially in the matter of taking checks—he may make his department very unpopular. In large cities collection clerks are often instructed to take none but certified checks, but this is practically impossible. Exceptions must be made, and usually he must take upon himself that responsibility. He can sometimes protect himself and at the same time avoid giving offense by having the checks certified by his messengers. However, he should not forget that if he has the check certified without instruction from the maker he takes upon himself the risk of the failure of the bank upon which it is drawn. In dealing with strangers or with those whose credit is doubtful there is but one safe way, and that is to insist upon certified checks. He should remember that in some States a certification by telephone is not binding, because the statutes provide that an oral acceptance is without value.

Taken all in all, the collection department offers exceptional opportunities for the observation of business methods, extension of acquaintance and development of executive ability; and while the department has its unpleasant and trying features, it has its compensations in varied experience and general development.

SEYMOUR S. COOK.

---

**The Banker's Bible.**—W. H. Buletson, Assistant Cashier of the Ionia County Savings Bank, Ionia, Mich., writes as follows under date of March 4:

"I enclose herewith draft on Chase National for \$5 in payment of 1901 subscription.

As the Bible is necessary to religion, so is the **BANKERS' MAGAZINE** necessary to good banking."

## \* MODERN BANKING METHODS.

---

*A NEW SERIES ON PRACTICAL BANKING—HELPFUL HINTS DERIVED  
FROM EXPERIENCE.*

---

As has formerly been stated, a bank's principal source of profit is derived from the loaning of money, or the buying of paper, the loans being made chiefly to those engaged in various business pursuits. The basis for loans is credit, just as the basis of all business is credit.

A bank discounts paper, or buys paper; it does so upon the knowledge it has regarding the maker or endorser of the paper. Even where a bank loans upon collateral security it is done upon the knowledge of the value of that collateral, and of the financial ability of the corporation issuing the collateral. Good credit is often worth more to business houses than the actual capital employed, and the consideration of credits is a leading feature of the banking business, especially in our larger cities and towns.

A credit department in a bank is as necessary as in a mercantile house, and it should be managed with the same care. A description of such a department with diagrams of the best forms will be found in the February, 1900, number of this *MAGAZINE*.

It is comparatively easy to loan money, the difficulty being to be sure of the repayment of the loan.

More banks have been ruined by the losses sustained from bad loans than from defalcations, and, as has been stated in previous chapters, too great care cannot be exhibited in a careful study of a borrower's personal character, as well as his financial ability. A man's financial condition may apparently be good, yet his personal habits be such as to wreck him. Let me give a case in point. A merchant in one of our cities, who was a very active business man, and apparently successful, was quoted in the mercantile reporters "capital over one million, credit high;" at that very time he was selling his paper, through brokers, in various parts of the country. The question was finally raised as to why a man of such standing should have to go so far from home to raise money, and an investigation showed that he had ruined his credit in his own locality by his unsatisfactory and unreliable methods of doing business; by his personal habits and by his manner of treating people. He failed for a large amount, a natural conclusion to such a condition.

The dispensing of credit is one of the most responsible features of banking, for it may be the means of the making or breaking of any business man or firm unless handled with great care and discretion.

The banker is in a position to know when a borrower is going beyond the safety line, and he should take the liberty of cautioning him or of withholding further loans. The difficulty here is that too often the banker allows him-

---

\* Continued from the March number, page 356. This series of articles commenced in the *MAGAZINE* for August, 1898, page 249.

self to be led by an over-confident customer into loaning him more than was safe, then, when the pinch comes, he is persuaded into advancing more with the hope that by so doing the whole loan may be secured by the final success of the project. In most such cases the operation is speculative in its character, and in all such loans the deposit of collateral cannot be too strongly recommended.

The question naturally arises here as to the margin of credit in such cases. This depends largely upon the character of the collateral. If the collateral should be United States bonds, of course it is perfectly safe to loan the full face value. The same can be said regarding the bonds of some of the States. With regard to railroad or industrial securities, it will be well to act with great care, for the value of these securities is dependent upon so many contingencies, and their actual realizing market value must be carefully considered and kept continually in view. Among the most careful and successful bankers it is considered wise with this class of securities to keep a margin of from twenty-five per cent. to fifty per cent. beyond their actual selling value.

One point should ever be before the banker regarding his collateral loans, and that is the readiness with which they can be turned into money when needed. It is for this reason that mortgages are not considered a good class of securities for loans for banks of deposit, where the depositor's money is payable on demand, for they are what is considered slow assets, it seldom being able to realize upon them quickly, especially if a pressure comes.

Savings banks often adopt mortgages as their form of investments, but they are generally protected by their rules from any sudden heavy drafts, which gives them the opportunity to raise the necessary funds.

It is quite customary to require a statement of their affairs from many borrowers.

The best forms for these statements can be found in the February, 1900, number of this MAGAZINE. It is well to keep in mind that there are two ways of "padding" a statement, one by a fictitious increase of assets, the other by a fictitious decrease of liabilities. The former method is the more common. Let me give two instances that came to my personal attention.

A large corporation that was actively pushing for business all over the country had a mail-order department, and employed a large force of typewriters and others constantly sending out circulars, and corresponding with people, seeking for business. The expense of doing all this they estimated at \$100,000, and reported it in their statement of assets as "prospective customers" for the amount named. While they may have valued to themselves the work done as being worth that much to them, yet this could not legitimately be considered an asset, nor could a bank, loaning upon the strength of such an asset, have realized from it if forced to do so, which is the proper way in which to consider an asset.

Another concern, a large dealer, in making a statement to a bank increased their assets over and above what was called for by their books, by \$50,000, adding this sum to the statement of merchandise on hand. An inquiry showed that this fictitious sum was added because they *thought* they could *probably* sell out their business and good will for this advance, and they could not show solvency without it.

This was not a realizable asset, as was shown later when the concern failed.

## DEFALCATIONS AND EMBEZZLEMENTS.

While it is no doubt true that the majority of bank officers and employees are honest, yet it is a fact that too much dishonesty exists, and while occasionally a case gets into the public print, yet in most of the instances the loss to the bank is made good by the friends of the faithless clerk or officer, and he is allowed to quietly resign. This policy may not be conducive to good discipline in the bank, but very naturally banks feel sensitive about having a stain of this character become known to the public, often bringing upon them and their management severe criticism, and naturally shaking that confidence they have been earnestly seeking to secure.

In treating of this subject it may be well to consider first the causes.

The officers and employees of banks are naturally brought in contact with men of all kinds, and the temptations which are thrown out to them to speculate, in the hopes of accumulating a little wealth, are numerous.

As a general rule these defalcations are not committed in one stroke. Once in a while an officer or employee helps himself to the money in sight and "skips" for unknown regions, but more often the money is drawn out by degrees as needed for the schemes at hand, and every attempt made to cover the tracks. The delinquents often begin in a comparatively small way, of course intending to return the money abstracted as soon as the profits from the scheme into which they have embarked have materialized.

Once started, the demands for more money increase, for of course the scheme is a "sure thing," but the profits promised do not appear, and the man is dragged on, hoping against hope. Falsification naturally follows the robbery, just as lying follows stealing, and an investigation finally develops the fact, which closes his career with disgrace, often behind the prison doors.

This speculative fever, which seems to have affected all classes, and has grown tremendously in the past thirty years, has proved to be the principal cause of embezzlements in banks. Much of the speculation now carried on, such as dealing in futures, or on margin, is simply gambling, and when we consider gambling we must associate with it horse-racing, pool-selling and book-making, the gambling houses, and their accompaniments, fast living and dissipation, all calculated, sooner or later, to ruin a man.

The political field, with its excitement and promise of great possibilities, is very enticing, and too often the banker is led within its meshes. He aspires to be a political leader, to go to Congress, or perhaps be Governor; to do this requires money, plenty of it, and if he is not a wealthy man the bank too often has to pay it, to its serious loss. More than one banker has been wrecked on this reef.

Extravagance in living is another cause. Bankers are expected to maintain a certain social position, but whatever the aspirations are in this respect nothing should ever lead them to live beyond their means, for with the accumulation of debts comes the temptation to obtain the money illegally with which to pay them.

Discouragement may be considered another cause, although not as frequent a one as those before mentioned. A man may sometimes be driven by discouragement to commit an act that he would not think of doing under different circumstances. Nothing is more encouraging than a recognition of faithful services, and it pays to adopt this policy. Few things are more dis-

couraging than, when the chance for promotion comes, it is found that political, business, or family influence has more weight with the bank management than honesty, integrity and ability.

Too many banks pay their employees insufficient salaries, the responsibility not being considered as it should be. This is an unwise policy, for bank clerks as a rule are expected to appear like gentlemen, and they can hardly take the interest in the bank's affairs that they should if no interest is taken in them. Inducing them to become stockholders has worked well in many instances.

One serious cause of defalcations is an inherent weakness, which sometimes makes it difficult for a good-natured bank officer to use with proper effect that valuable word "no," and the failure to do this has been the cause of serious loss, and has led to defalcations, misapplication of funds, and their attendant, the falsification of accounts.

Nearly every department of the bank has been the sufferer at some time from the dishonesty of officers or employees, and the methods employed have been numerous, but I doubt if it would be wise to detail more than a few in a general way.

It may, however, be set down, almost as a rule, that where there has been embezzlement, falsification of the records may be found as a natural accompaniment.

Banks have been started in fraud, the "capital stock" considered "paid in" and so reported, when in reality the only payments were by notes, and these continually renewed from time to time when the bank examiner was expected. The whole scheme being to obtain deposits with which to carry on some operations. Of course such a bank could not last very long.

Fictitious persons, or mere "straw men," have been used upon paper for the purpose of obtaining money from the bank in an apparently legitimate manner. Loans have been obtained by officers upon good and well-secured paper, which has been afterwards removed from the bank and worthless paper substituted. Collaterals have been removed from the bank by officers and employees having access to them, and hypothecated for their private use.

Overdrafts of officers and those connected with them to the extent of hundreds of thousands of dollars have been allowed, and upon the advent of the bank examiner, his assistant has been paid not to disclose them, and at other times the pages of the ledger containing these have been torn out and the books falsified. Loans have been made in the legitimate way to bank officers upon collateral, and the notes with the collateral, when due, simply removed, not paid, and the accounts falsified.

Clerks sometimes, through fear of being discharged if they refuse, feel obliged to make entries in the books which they know to be false and intended to cover fraudulent transactions.

My advice to all such is to most positively refuse. Better to lose your job in the bank and preserve your honor and self-respect. I know of more than one instance where the clerk who profited not one cent, but simply obeyed orders, had to suffer the penalty of the law for aiding and abetting a criminal officer.

In more than one instance collusion has been discovered between various employees in the bank, or between some employee or officer and an outsider. In the case of collusion between employees it may be certain that one of the



tellers is one of the guilty parties, for it is money the thieves are after. While collusion between employees does sometimes occur, still the most frequent form is between some one inside the bank and an outsider, and this is done in various ways; among them are giving false credits, suppressing overdrafts, cashing and suppressing fictitious checks, issuing certificates of deposit, or Cashier's checks, or drafts on other banks without pay, relinquishing discounted notes or collateral without the paper being paid, and many other methods too numerous to mention.

Carelessness in the management, or want of a proper system in the accounting of a bank, often opens the door, and is taken advantage of by the sharp and unscrupulous. In fact, in almost every instance of embezzlement that has come to my personal attention some looseness in the methods or carelessness in carrying out of the operations has been taken advantage of by the guilty one.

The system employed in a bank cannot be too perfect, nor can its rules of operation be too inflexible.

The prevention of defalcations is a subject in which all bankers are interested. While it is a fact that neither strict rules, nor even legislation will prevent *all* dishonesty, yet such careful supervision can be employed, and such restrictions can be placed upon those connected with the bank, that it will be difficult to do much injury before detection.

Character is the first point to be considered, for in the selection of officers or employees this comes prominently to the front. No man addicted to gambling, either with cards, stocks or otherwise, or to habits of dissipation, should be considered for a moment, no matter what his popularity or influence. If at any time a suspicion, however slight, should arise reflecting upon the character or habits of any one connected with the bank, he should be subjected to an investigation. This should be done as a matter of business, without sentiment, and should the suspicion be well founded, he should be either dismissed or requested to resign, whether any loss has been sustained by the bank or not, for the business of a bank is such that there is too much risk attending the retaining of such a person in its employ.

It is not a good plan to permit employees to have their personal accounts in the bank with which they are connected, unless it be the only bank in town, and only then under rigid restrictions, and no overdrafts should be permitted.

Special privileges should not be granted to officers or employees with regard to borrowing money from their bank. When such loans are requested they should be passed upon in the regular way by the board of directors, and special inquiry should be made as to the conditions and circumstances under which the loan is required, and wherever possible collateral should be obtained.

It is advisable that the mail coming into a bank be received and opened by some officer, not by an employee, he distributing to the proper departments such as belong to them.

It is very advisable that the work of a bank, however few the transactions, should be properly closed up and posted daily. Some small banks have a practice of posting their ledgers once or twice a week, and entering up their discounted paper once a week. This practice is careless, and it is hardly possible with such methods to keep as close track of the business as should be done.

Some banks have a faulty method of carrying large amounts of the checks, foreign as well as local, coming into their hands through the various channels, for instance all received after one o'clock, over into the next day's business.

This method is exceedingly unsafe, and has been taken advantage of frequently. Each day's business should be cleaned up so far as possible, with extremely few carry-overs, and those small and well accounted for.

Some banks oblige their employees to secure certain lines of deposits. This is a very unsafe policy, as it places the employee under obligations to a customer, and this often opens the door to collusion. The duty of securing customers should devolve upon the stockholders, and no one connected with the active management of the bank should be placed in such position.

Whenever it is possible it will be found safe to permit no officer or employee handling the money of a bank to make the records, and it will be found a safeguard to have all the transactions for the receiving or paying of money recorded twice by separate individuals, one being a check upon the other.

Tellers sometimes take it upon themselves to make temporary loans upon mere checks or receipts.

This often opens the door to crookedness, or the means of covering it. Each department in a bank has one regular channel through which its transactions should go, and any departure from this is sure to let down the bars and leave the way open for wrong-doing. Thus, there is only one proper channel through which loans should be made, and no well managed bank will allow such innovations as mentioned.

The cash items at the teller's desk often form a "hole" in which to conceal irregularities or defalcations, and should be watched carefully.

With regard to the individual ledgers—the three-column balance ledgers should be proved at least once a month, instead of yearly as I have seen many times. The Boston ledger system is preferable in enabling a proof to be taken daily.

In either of the above systems the daily balances should be extended in *ink*, never in pencil. Some of the most glaring frauds I have seen covered for a time by having the daily balances extended in pencil, enabling them to be altered easily to suit the occasion.

Pass-books should be balanced monthly, this being the surest proof of the correctness of the accounts, and it is much better, where possible, to have them balanced by some one other than the bookkeeper. In cases where it is impossible to obtain the pass-book, a statement of the account should be made from the ledger or vouchers and this should be sent to the customer with a postal card for return as to the correctness of the account.

Overdrafts are an abnormal condition, always troublesome to a well-managed bank. It is not a good policy to allow them, unless they have been especially arranged for, and collateral deposited to secure them, and especially is this so with relation to those connected with the bank.

Keep a close watch on the loans and discounts, for through these channels many defalcations have been committed and successfully covered for quite a period before detection. The want of care often exhibited in the keeping of the two principal books in the discount department, the discount register and tickler, has frequently opened the way to crooked transactions. As the dis-

count register is the daily record of the loans made, so the tickler, when properly kept, should be the daily record of all loans repaid, in whatever way.

The loans should be proved frequently, either by a committee, or by some one appointed for that purpose. While proving the loans it is well to take into consideration the question of interest and discount, for these are channels to be watched.

The manner in which the majority of these examinations are made by the committees, even by those who are striving to do their duty, also a large proportion of the examinations of paper as made by the National and State bank examiners, are such that it is comparatively easy for a dishonest employee or official to fool them for a considerable time. I understand fully the limitations of time in many of these examinations, yet, in more than one case that has come to my personal attention, had only a few hours more been given to it, and a little more attention to the detail, the banks could have been saved heavy losses.

Bank officials are often in demand for positions of trust in other corporations in their locality, but the wisdom of permitting such combinations to exist should receive the consideration of the board of directors, for the division of interest, with the natural demands for accommodation required in trade, present temptations too serious to be ignored. Should circumstances appear to warrant them, however, it will be found advisable to have periodical audits made with the view of preventing the application of the funds of one office to conceal any possible defalcation in the other.

#### METHODS FOR SAFEGUARDING THE BANK.

Various methods are employed by banks to prevent or circumvent defalcations, such as the shifting of the clerks from desk to desk ; the employment of a double force of clerks, one set working at night to verify the work done during the day ; the appointment of an examining committee of the clerks to examine the affairs of the bank.

The objections to these are, for the first plan, that it can hardly be carried on with any degree of success without seriously interfering with the regular work of the bank, except merely the shifting of desks with the individual bookkeepers. The chief objection to the second plan is the heavy expense, in reality about doubling the usual expense for salaries. For the third plan the objection is, that, in the first place the only time in which such an examination can be made is at night, and the clerks who have been working all day are hardly in a condition to work at night and do justice to it.

Then again, the usual friendly feeling existing between the clerks acts as a bar against that spirit of perfect impartiality which should exist in an examination of this kind. I have more than once heard clerks reviled by their fellows for reporting to the officials an irregularity that was necessary to be known, and that would have caused loss and trouble if not reported. Another objection is that those working side by side get into the habit of taking it for granted that the work of their fellows is correct, consequently do not give that careful attention to the detail in an examination that they should. Some banks employ an auditor as one of their regular working force. The trouble with this is that, where everything has been smooth, clean sailing for a long time he naturally falls into a perfunctory way of performing his work, consequently the sharp, shrewd fellow circumvents him.

The plan that has given the best satisfaction, when properly carried out, is to have an examination made by an experienced bank public accountant, an outside man, once or twice a year. He should be a man thoroughly familiar with the banking business, and should be allowed to set his own date, not even the officers knowing when he is coming. The fact that such an examination will be made, and will be absolutely impartial, and that the exact condition of each department will be reported upon to the board of directors, will be the means of deterring many from careless or irregular transactions, or from worse. Let me emphasize the point *that the examiner should be familiar with the banking business*. Banking is like any other trade, and can only be learned by working at it. A man may be a good mercantile accountant, but be really useless in making a thorough examination of a bank.

The experience of some banks, especially where the officers have been consulted as to how the examination of various departments should be made, has been rather unpleasant in this respect.

A careful examination by a competent man, concluding with a detailed report covering the condition of each department, is a great satisfaction to both officers and directors. The weak places can be shown and improved methods can be recommended, and the effect upon the public that such an examination is made periodically is to strengthen its confidence in the bank.

The examinations made by the directors are necessary, but can be only supervisory, and they have little time to go into the detail. The same can be said of the majority of the examinations made by National and State bank examiners, their special object being simply to learn if the bank is carrying on its business according to the law.

A. R. BARRETT.

(To be continued.)

**REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE MINT.**—The BANKERS' MAGAZINE has just received the Annual Report of the Director of the Mint for 1900. It is remarkable for the scope and fullness of its information concerning everything related to coinage and to the precious metals. We have already published considerable advance matter from the report, and it is impossible at present to give anything additional from this veritable cyclopædia of monetary knowledge.

These reports have always had a deservedly high reputation, and Mr. Roberts has not merely sustained the record made by his predecessors, but has far surpassed it.

**THE NATIONAL BANKS.**—In another part of this issue of the MAGAZINE will be found the official comparative statement of the National banks of the United States. It shows a remarkable gain in the business of those institutions in the past year. Total resources, which were \$4,674,910,713 on February 13, 1900, were \$5,435,906,257 on February 5, 1901, a gain of \$760,995,544; individual deposits have increased in the same time from \$2,481,847,035 to \$2,753,969,721, a gain of \$272,122,686, and loans and discounts have increased from \$2,481,579,945 to \$2,814,388,346, a gain of \$332,808,401; specie has increased from \$339,577,824 to \$399,956,143, a gain of \$60,378,319. The National banks now hold \$332,971,037 in gold coin and certificates. In the period under review the circulating notes have increased from \$204,912,546 to \$309,466,046, a gain of \$104,553,500. The number of National banks in the country on February 13, 1900, was 3,604, and on February 5, 1901, 3,999, a gain of 395, and the highest total ever reported.

## ENLARGING THE INTEREST IN THE CONVENTIONS OF THE AMERICAN BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

---

The Executive Council of the American Bankers' Association will meet in New York on April 24 and 25 to determine the time and place for holding the next annual convention.

In another part of this issue a correspondent of the *MAGAZINE* suggests some reforms in the method of arranging the programme for the convention. Some of these suggestions are similar to those made by the Editor of the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*, and by other correspondents. It is certain that there is always more or less dissatisfaction at the conventions over the nomination and election of officers. No doubt in the long run the men who have been selected for the executive council and for the presidency and vice-presidency are the men who would have been selected were the method of nomination and election different, but they would not be virtually pledged to sustain the cut-and dried projects of the council as they now are when their election is the result of the present system of nomination, which savors of the star chamber and is undemocratic and un-American. The methods suggested may not be the best that can be devised, but the idea intended to be carried out is to have the nominations and elections made according to the free and unbiased opinion of all the delegates, not hampered or influenced in any manner by the existing executive organization.

This meeting of the council in New York practically marks the beginning of the work of the convention of 1901. The preparation of a programme for the coming meeting will be the work of the months intervening before the convention meets, and the rest of the year after the convention will be occupied with the publication and distribution of the proceedings and the routine work of the several committees and the building up of the association by solicitation of new members.

Taking the past history as an index there are many of the members of the association who have plans to suggest and measures which they desire the association to adopt. Very often these members interested in the highest success of the association do not appreciate the necessity of presenting their suggestions through the proper channels. It is the province of the executive council to prepare the programme and say what shall and what shall not be brought before the convention. Many delegates seem to forget this and first broach their ideas in the convention without any previous submission to the council, and are disappointed and often provoked that they can obtain no hearing. Any change in the constitution or by-laws of the association, and all resolutions and new business and matters for discussion generally, have to be previously passed on by the council before they can come to the convention. The council may report either favorably or unfavorably, and the convention may then either sustain or oppose the council.

The council has been gradually increased in numbers since the association was first formed. At first it had only nine members, now it has thirty. This

increase was advocated for several reasons, but the original idea of a larger council was to render its power over the convention less. In fact, however, this increase has really increased the power of the council in the convention.

The position of the council in reference to debates on the floor of the convention is analogous to that of the English ministry on the floor of Parliament. The delegates are divided into the supporters and the opponents of the council whenever any debatable question comes up. The council, for instance, reports some measure unfavorably which has the support of a respectable number of delegates. The thirty members of the council scattered in the assembly are prepared to sustain the council's action. They generally speak with a unanimity of purpose, a persistence and force that previous concert gives, and they generally exert a sway over the large number of neutral delegates that carries a majority with them. The greater the number of the council, the greater the force thus created. The members of the council have usually secured their nomination to the council because of their ability and the interest they have taken in the association as shown by faithful attendance at the conventions, and the activity manifested in the work of their respective State associations. They are quite often men who have demonstrated their ability to debate effectively the measures that come before the convention. All these facts tend to explain the preponderant influence maintained by the council in the deliberations of the conventions. The rules which the association has deemed it wise to adopt and continue in force, also place the control of affairs largely in the hands of the council.

The power of the council was also increased by making the president and vice-president *ex-officio* members. The presiding officer is thus likely to decide in favor of the council, and to use all his power against anything occurring contrary to its behests. Before the president was a member of the council he was a much fairer presiding officer for the convention, that is, he was freer from bias against unrecommended measures.

In another respect the convention is analogous to Parliament. The members of the ministry and the incumbents of official positions are selected from the members of Parliament; so the members of the council are generally chosen from the delegates to the convention, and also the members of the working committees and other executors of the plans of the association are generally selected by the council, although no doubt many of these selections could be made by the convention. The same effects are noticed both in Parliament and in the conventions of the American Bankers' Association. The London "Economist" of March 23 seriously discusses the growing power of the British cabinet, and inclines to the opinion that the control of affairs is gradually passing from the House of Commons to the ministry. There can be no doubt that in the American Bankers' Association the management of affairs has actually passed into the hands of the council, and that a number of precedents have been established which render it nearly impossible for the delegates to the conventions, the rightful source of authority, to have more than a nominal voice in the proceedings.

A member of Parliament who becomes dangerous by opposition is furnished with an office and then becomes a staunch supporter of the ministry; so a delegate who becomes conspicuous by his opposition to the council frequently after becoming a member of that body is found to be one of the most strenuous advocates of its privileges. This is no more than is to be expected, and

the council as a rule seeks to act for the best interests of the association generally.

There are, however, some contingencies which arise under the rules and methods of conducting conventions hitherto which enable the council to exercise through the presiding officer certain powers of cutting off debate which sometimes causes dissatisfaction. The exercises of a literary character are not sufficiently separated from the business of the convention relating to new measures and to the nomination and election of officers. The programme thus often exhibits incongruous features. The impatience to enjoy the excitement of active debate, or of an election, always dear to the true American, often interferes with the proper attention that courtesy at least requires should be given to invited speakers, often experts on subjects of much real importance. Not only are the sessions often confused and disorderly from this mixture of motive in the audience, but they are often shortened and further confused by the interference of the opportunities offered for social entertainment. If a speaker or reader of a paper often finds his audience impatient and eager to get away, it is because the hour is approaching for some excursion or entertainment provided for the delegates by the local bankers.

It would seem that a proper arrangement of the programme might remedy much of this difficulty. It would surely be easy to have the report of the nominating committee and the election following on this report made at a separate session at which no other business may be transacted. The first session including addresses of welcome, the address of the President, reports of officers, of committees and of the executive council and all the new business, could certainly be made exclusive of everything else. The set addresses, papers and speeches, ought surely to have sessions set apart purely for their consideration.

It is a question whether under present conditions there is anything gained by having the technical papers read before the convention. A time limit must necessarily be imposed which frequently does not permit of adequate treatment of important subjects. Such papers do not gain much by oral presentation, and the question occurs whether it would not be better to have papers of this kind printed and distributed among the members in advance, and if deemed of enough interest the delegates might then profitably discuss the various subjects embraced in the respective papers. An important debate of this character would be valuable, and much more interesting than listening to the reading of long-drawn-out papers. Besides, it would give more of the delegates an opportunity of being heard, and would tend to break up the monopolizing of the time by those whose names are on the programme.

At present what should be the most valuable feature of the convention often becomes so wearisome as to impair interest in the whole proceedings. The difficulties of a proper adjustment of the matter in question are recognized, but doubtless the executive council will be able to surmount them after full consideration.

The separation of the programme, as suggested by our correspondent, according to the nature of the business, will prevent the confusion noticeable at all recent conventions. It is to be hoped that the executive council will recognize the reasonableness of necessary improvements. Among the thirty members there must be a majority who favor progressive methods in conducting the affairs of the association, and who will see to it that the conventions are really helpful to all who attend them.

## BANKING AND FINANCIAL NOTES.

### REVIEW OF THE WORLD'S MONETARY PROGRESS.

#### SEMI-ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BANK OF JAPAN.

The thirty-seventh semi-annual meeting of the shareholders of the Bank of Japan was held at the hall of the Bank February 16. The financial statement for the past year showed the following result :

	Yen.
Profits.....	2,165,619
First dividend (six per cent. per annum).....	900,000
Reserve.....	700,000
Bonus to the officials of the Bank and social expenses.....	170,000
Balance .....	1,395,619
Second dividend (six per cent. per annum).....	900,000
Net balance to be brought forward to next account.....	495,619

Governor Yamamoto, in reviewing the report, commented on the economic conditions of the country. There has been a considerable expansion in the foreign trade, but the result of the year's trading showed a balance of 83,130,000 yen against Japan. This was due in part to the diminished demand abroad for silk and other products and partly to the disturbances in China. Specie exports amounted to over 50,000,000 yen. The diminution of specie combined with the increase demand for money occasioned by the North China affair, rendered it necessary for the Bank to fall back on the issue of notes in excess of the prescribed limits, a certain amount of such excess-notes being found at the end of every month after June. The Bank has steadily endeavored since 1899 to tighten its purse-strings and call in its loans as far as possible, but in view of the extraordinary increase in the demand for money, it was realized that any violent attempt on the part of the Bank to contract the amount of its general loans would have been attended with dangerous consequences to the general credit.

In concluding his address to the shareholders the Governor of the Bank said :

" To sum up, the year under review witnessed the economic world of Japan engaged in a hard and constant struggle against various adverse circumstances, the unfavorable balance of trade, the scarcity of money, and the market disturbances produced by the Chinese affair—a struggle which is still maintained at the present moment.

We are arrived at an important juncture in the financial and economic history of the country. That store of money made up of the war indemnity and the proceeds of national loans, by which the country has been enabled since the late war with China to conduct various undertakings, has already been nearly exhausted, while not a small number of important undertakings remain yet to be taken in hand both by Government and by private individuals. But the result of our foreign trade is now such as to make it impossible for us to expect a speedy reflux of specie to this country ; neither is it easy to see how the stock of our capital can otherwise be replenished.

To conduct the operations of the Bank and rearrange its affairs in such a way as to meet without failure the requirements of this difficult situation, is a task to which I am deter-



mined to devote my whole energy, and for the successful prosecution of which I must rely upon your support and assistance."

#### AUSTRALASIAN GOLD PRODUCTION IN 1900.

The Australasian gold production has increased greatly since 1890, when the total was 1,587,947 ounces. For three years the rate of increase was only moderate, but from 1893 to 1894 the total rose from 1,876,563 ounces to 2,239,205 ounces. Again, for three years the increase was slow, but the developments in Western Australia caused the total to spring from 2,375,735 ounces for 1896 to 2,929,959 ounces for 1897. Two years of surprising increases followed, the total for 1898 being 3,547,079 ounces and that for 1899 4,461,105 ounces. The year 1900 has, however, witnessed retrogression, the total being 4,174,811 ounces, showing a decrease of 286,294 ounces. Nearly every State has produced less gold during the past year.

The following table indicates the movement in the production of each State for the last decade and for the past year:

STATE.	1890. Ounces.	1899. Ounces.	1900. Ounces.
New South Wales.....	127,490	509,418	345,000
New Zealand.....	148,198	389,558	371,998
Queensland.....	610,587	948,771	951,065
South Australia.....	24,881	32,990	29,397
Tasmania.....	20,510	83,992	89,000
Victoria.....	588,590	854,500	807,407
Western Australia.....	22,806	1,643,876	1,580,949
Total.....	1,587,947	4,461,105	4,174,811

The increase for the decade is 2,586,864 ounces, and the decrease for the year, as already stated, is 286,294 ounces. During the ten years, every State has increased its production to a greater or less extent, but Western Australia and Queensland stand first in this matter. In fact, the production of these two States in 1900, viz., 2,532,014 ounces, constituted over three-fifths of the Australasian total.

The extent to which Australasia has benefited by the great increase in gold production during the last ten years is best indicated by a comparison of values. The total value of the production at £3 15s. (\$18.24) per ounce for the years 1890, 1899 and 1900 is as follows:

YEAR.	Value.	Value.
1890.....	£5,995,000	\$29,174,667
1899.....	16,729,000	81,411,678
1900.....	15,655,000	76,185,067

From 1890 to 1899, the increase in the total value was £10,734,000 (\$52,237,011), but the total value for 1900 was less than that for the previous year by £1,074,000 (\$5,226,621).

The exports of gold, notwithstanding a smaller production, have increased materially. Approximately, the returns show the following result for the years 1899 and 1900:

1899.....	\$51,171,247
1900.....	60,621,990

Shipments on a moderate scale have been made to South Africa and India, while there have been large shipments to San Francisco.

#### THE STOCK OF GOLD IN THE UNITED STATES.

For some time Mr. Maurice L. Muhleman, who is Deputy Assistant Treasurer at New York, and a recognized expert on coinage and currency, has

been making an investigation in regard to the stock of gold in the country. He publishes a partial result of his investigations in the "Political Science Quarterly" for March. As to his conclusions he says: "My conclusion now is that the overestimate of our gold stock amounts certainly to one hundred millions, probably to one hundred and twenty-five millions, and possibly to one hundred and fifty millions." The scope of his inquiry covers the quarter of a century immediately preceding June 30, 1898. The facts on which he bases his conclusions are given as follows:

Error in original Linderman estimate.....	29.3	29.3 millions.
Errors in classifying imports and exports.....	40.0 to	50.0 "
Loss to Canada, not reported.....	10.0 to	18.0 "
Loss by passenger movement.....	20.0 to	31.0 "
Underestimate of industrial use of coin .....	15.0 to	18.0 "
A total of from.....	114.3 to	146.3 "

Deducting these sums—say, one hundred and thirty millions—from the gold not accounted for, there remains, as a sum supposed to be in the hands of the people, about one hundred and forty-four millions—an amount which is much more reasonable than two hundred and seventy-four millions." (This latter amount being apparently in the hands of the people on June 30, 1898.)

#### STATE OF THE BRITISH FINANCES.

For the fiscal year ending March 31, 1901, the revenues of the United Kingdom were £140,018,624, an increase of £10,261,894 over the preceding year, but leaving a deficit of about £50,000,000. The estimates of expenditures for 1901-02 are as follows:

Normal expenditure.....	£123,513,000
War outlays.....	58,230,000
Total.....	£181,743,000
Estimated receipts.....	127,520,000
Deficit.....	£54,223,000

Below we set out the descriptions, dates of maturity, interest and amounts of the British debt as given in a recent issue of "The Statist":

NAME.	Date of maturity.	Interest per cent.	Amount.
Treasury bills.....	Within 12 months and renewable	....	£21,153,000
Exchequer bonds.....	August 7, 1908.....	3	10,000,000
Exchequer bonds.....	December 7, 1905.....	3	14,000,000
2½ per cent. stock.....	Redeemable at par on and after January 5, 1905, at one month's notice, in amounts of not less than £14,000,000.	2½	31,667,904
2½ per cent. stock.....	Redeemable at par on and after January 5, 1905, at one month's notice. The whole must be redeemed at one time.	2½	4,635,991
National war loan.....	To be redeemed at par April 5, 1910.	2½	30,000,000
Consols.....	Redeemable April 5, 1923, at par, on such notice and in such order and manner as Parliament may direct.	2½	502,657,132
Terminable annuities.....		....	60,238,686
Total debt.....			£674,252,912

\*After April 5, 1903, 2½ per cent.

It is now estimated that the cost of the present war will reach a total of £148,966,700 (about \$744,833,500). A loan for \$250,000,000 is considered probable about the end of the present month.

# BANKING LAW DEPARTMENT.

---

## IMPORTANT LEGAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST TO BANKERS.

---

All the latest decisions affecting bankers rendered by the United States Courts and State Court of last resort will be found in the *MAGAZINE'S* Law Department as early as obtainable.

Attention is also directed to the "Replies to Law and Banking Questions," included in this Department.

---

### PLEDGEE OF NATIONAL BANK STOCK—LIABILITY.

United States Circuit Court, E. D. Pennsylvania, December 7, 1900.

*HAYES vs. FIDELITY INSURANCE, TRUST AND SAFE DEPOSIT CO.*

A pledgee of shares of stock in a National bank, with a power of attorney in blank to transfer the same indorsed thereon and signed by the pledgor, does not become liable as owner for an assessment thereon by causing them to be transferred on the books of the bank to a third person for the purpose of being held by him as trustee for both parties, and in accordance with the contract of pledge, although the pledgor did not expressly authorize such transfer.

---

On motion for new trial.

MCPHERSON, J. B., *District Judge*: I think that the facts in this case do not differ materially from the facts in *Anderson vs. Warehouse Co.* (111 U. S. 479, 4 Sup. Ct. 525), and therefore that in accordance with that decision, which was recognized as correct in *Pauly vs. Trust Co.* (165 U. S. 606), this motion must be refused. In the last-named case several rules relating to the liability of shareholders in National banking associations were laid down by the supreme court, and the fourth of these rules (to be found at the foot of page 619, 165 U. S., page 470, 17 Sup. Ct., and page 849, 41 L. Ed.) is evidently founded upon *Anderson vs. Warehouse Co.* The rule is as follows:

"That if one receives shares of stock in a National banking association as collateral security to him for a debt due from the owner, with power of attorney authorizing him to transfer the same on the books of the association, and, being unwilling to incur the responsibilities of a shareholder as prescribed by the statute, causes the shares to be transferred on such books to another under an agreement that they are to be held as security for the debt due from the real owner to his creditor—the latter acting in good faith, and for the purpose only of securing the payment of that debt, without incurring the responsibility of a shareholder—he, the creditor, will not, although the real owner may, be treated as a shareholder, within the meaning of section 5151 of the Revised Statutes."

The case now before me comes precisely within this rule, except that there was no proof of an express agreement that the shares transferred to Hand on the books of the bank should be held as security for the debt due from the Delamaters, the pledgors and the real owners of the shares, to the Fidelity Company, the creditor and pledgee. It does not seem to me, however, that this difference is important, because the jury have found as a fact that the shares were always thus held by Hand as security, and that, when the Fidel-

ity Company caused the name of Hand to be inserted in the blank powers of attorney signed by the pledgors, the company did so with the intention, not of converting the shares to their own purposes, or of treating them as if the company was the real owner, but solely with the intention that Hand should hold them as trustee for all the parties concerned.

This being the fact, and Hand's title being thus in reality a title in trust for both parties to the pledge, I think it should make no difference that the pledgors did not formally agree that the shares should be transferred. Even if they had refused to agree to the transfer, they have suffered no harm or injury, and it is difficult to see upon what ground they could be heard to complain. They are not complaining or seeking relief—certainly not in this suit, to which they are not parties—but, even if they themselves were complaining of the transfer because they did not agree to it expressly, I should still adhere to the opinion that I expressed at the trial, namely, that when they indorsed the certificates in blank, and delivered them as collateral security to the Fidelity Company to hold as pledged for the loan, the pledgors thus authorized the company to transfer the certificates to a third person, to be held by him in accordance with, but not in opposition to, the terms of the contract of pledge. Hand did hold the shares, as the jury have found, in accordance with the original contract of pledge, and I think, therefore, that the transfer to him was impliedly authorized by the indorsement in blank and the delivery of the shares to the pledgee.

A new trial is refused.

---

#### CERTIFICATION OF RAISED CHECK—LIABILITY OF BANK.

New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, March, 1900.

#### THE CONTINENTAL NATIONAL BANK OF NEW YORK vs. THE TRADEMEN'S NATIONAL BANK OF NEW YORK.

If a bank, having information in its possession of the amount for which a check had originally been drawn, nevertheless certifies the same for a larger or raised amount, it is guilty of culpable negligence, which will prevent the recovery of the amount paid upon the same to an innocent holder who has parted with value on the faith of the certification.

Although a contract of certification extends ordinarily only to the genuineness of the signature and the amount and availability of the fund upon which it is drawn, the reason being that the certifying bank has superior, if not exclusive, information in these respects, while as to the body of the instrument others have equal facilities for judging, nevertheless, if the bank does possess information that the body is a forgery, the reason for the rule ceases, and the bank is not entitled to protection against the consequences of its own negligence in sending the fraudulent draft into circulation.

The general rule that money paid under a mistake of a material fact may be recovered back, although there was negligence on the part of the person making the payment, is subject to the qualification that the payment cannot be recalled when the position of the party receiving it has been changed in consequence of the payment and it would be inequitable to allow a recovery.

---

HIRSCHBERG, J.: The disposition of this appeal would involve no difficulty but for one remark of the learned trial justice to the jury. On a previous trial a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff by direction of the court. The Appellate Division in the First Department reversed the judgment entered on that verdict, and the luminous and elaborate opinion then written settled the law of the case so that on a new trial it was only necessary to ascertain from the jury whether the plaintiff was negligent in paying and retain-

ing the draft on June 14, and whether the defendant paid its fraudulent depositor in reliance thereon (*Continental Bank vs. Tradesmen's Bank*, 36 App. Div. 112). The defendant's liability to refund the money in this action so far as affected by the previous certification of the raised draft by the plaintiff on June 13, regarded as an act of negligence in and by itself, was not considered by the court at all. Mr. Justice Ingraham said (page 114):

"The question as to the right of the plaintiff to recover back this money may be viewed in two aspects: First, with reference to its liability on the certification of the draft on June 13; and, second, as to the right to recover the amount paid to the defendant, such payment having been made on June 14 and in the regular course of business. In the view we have taken of this second aspect of the question it is unnecessary to discuss the obligation of the plaintiff to the defendant, the holder of the draft, in consequence of the certification on June 13."

On the second trial, nevertheless, the learned trial justice said to the jury:

"The question seems to me to be narrowed down to a single one, and that is, whether the Continental National Bank, at the time that they certified the draft of the Philadelphia bank drawn upon it, were guilty of culpable negligence in doing so. That appears to be about the question involved in this case. And that is, as I understand, the question as stated by Mr. Justice Ingraham in his opinion in this case on appeal." The defendant excepted specifically to this portion of the charge, but it was not withdrawn or modified in any way, nor was the jury instructed that the plaintiff's negligence in certifying the draft could only operate to defeat a recovery when taken in connection with the subsequent negligence charged, viz: that of paying the draft when finally presented. The court did, indeed, correctly charge the jury on the question of the culpable negligence of the plaintiff in receiving the draft on June 14, retaining and paying it without examination and verification, notwithstanding it had in its possession ample proof of the fraud, and on the question of the payment by the defendant to its depositor, relying upon such acceptance and payment by the plaintiff. The evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of the jury in the defendant's favor upon these questions, but, inasmuch as a finding of the jury adverse to the defendant on these questions would under the charge be still consistent with a finding in its favor on the question of the original certification, and the verdict may accordingly have been based solely thereon, the question of law not considered on the former appeal must be determined now.

It is unnecessary to recapitulate the facts. They are set forth in detail in the opinion in the first department. The drawer of the draft was the Philadelphia National Bank, one of the plaintiff's depositors, accustomed to draw almost daily, and invariably notifying the plaintiff of the fact. The notifications were in the form of daily letters of advice containing a list of the drafts, with serial number, date, amount and name of payee. The one in question was drawn and dated June 7, 1894, payable to Henry F. Thompson in the sum of \$76, and bore the serial number 2269. Written information of the fact was at once conveyed by mail to the plaintiff and received by it. On June 13 the draft, having meanwhile been raised to \$7,660 and its date changed to June 12, 1894, was presented to the plaintiff for certification and promptly certified. The written information of the fact of the fraud deducible from the advices received from Philadelphia between and including June 7 and 13

was on the bookkeeper's desk at the time, but was unexamined and disregarded. The draft was deposited by Thompson with the defendant, and, after passing through the clearing-house and being accepted and paid by the plaintiff, was drawn against by Thompson, with the exception of a small balance still remaining in defendant's hands. The action is brought to recover the difference between the amount of the draft as raised and as originally drawn, as money had and received by the defendant from the plaintiff by mistake.

While the precise question does not appear to have been decided, in this State the Court of Appeals has come so close to it in the final decision in *Clews vs. Bank of New York National Banking Association* (114 N. Y. 70) that, in view of the manifest injustice of any other result, I have no hesitation in applying it to the support of this judgment. There a draft for \$254.50 was certified by the bank on which it was drawn, and was thereafter raised to \$2,540 and the date altered. Clews, before receiving it as good, sent a messenger to the bank to inquire whether the certification was good. The bank had, of course, knowledge of the date and amount of the original draft in its certification book, and had also received a letter notifying it that the draft had been lost and to stop payment. Without making recourse to this information, the teller replied "Yes" to the inquiry, and Clews, having thereupon taken the draft in payment for bonds sold, was permitted to recover from the bank, not upon the certification, but for actionable negligence. I can see no difference in principle between that case and the case of a draft presented to the bank after it has been raised and then certified by the bank with full knowledge or the means of knowledge of the fraud. Had Clews received the raised draft uncertified, and had he then sent it to the bank for certification before accepting it, its certification by the bank without examination would have presented the conditions existing in the case at bar; but it would be impossible to say that such deliberate certification, without verifying the integrity of the draft, would be any less an act of culpable negligence or less calculated to betray the holder to his loss than would be the utterance of a hurried "Yes" in response to an inquiry at the window. And the negligence of the plaintiff in originally certifying the draft in question on June 13 with the correspondence before it which would have disclosed the fraud is certainly not in any degree less culpable than the recognition and payment of it on the following day, when the act may be assumed to have been in reliance on the fact that it bore the unquestionably genuine certification of the bank's own officer.

On any other theory the consequences of plaintiff's negligence will be visited upon the defendant, a party wholly innocent and free from blame. The defendant asserts that it did not actually part with its money until after the plaintiff had ratified its original certification by subsequent recognition and payment of the draft, and if, therefore, the act of certification be regarded merely as a "mistake," it was one which resulted in loss to an innocent holder before its discovery. "The object of certifying a check," said Mr. Justice Swayne in *Merchants' Bank vs. State Bank* (10 Wall. U. S. 648), "as regards both parties, is to enable the holder to use it as money. The transferee takes it with the same readiness and sense of security that he would take the notes of the bank. It is available, also, to him for all the purposes of money." When an innocent holder parts with value on the faith of such a certification, the situation arises which was suggested by Judge Rapallo in *National Bank*

of Commerce vs. National Mechanics' Banking Association (55 N. Y. 211, 216): "If the defendant had shown that it had suffered loss in consequence of the mistake committed by the plaintiff, as, for instance, if in consequence of the recognition by the plaintiff of the check in question the defendant had paid out money to its fraudulent depositor, then, clearly, to the extent of the loss thus sustained the plaintiff should be responsible." In that case the check was altered after its certification. In *Louisiana National Bank vs. Citizens' Bank of Louisiana* (28 La. An. 189) it was held that a bank certifying a raised check without knowledge of the forgery was primarily liable to any innocent holder for value on the principle that he whose act has caused a loss should bear the loss.

It is conceded that the contract of certification extends only to the genuineness of the signature and the amount and availability of the fund upon which it is drawn. The reason underlying this limitation is that the certifying bank has superior, if not exclusive, information in these respects, while as to the body of the instrument others have equal facilities for judging. But where the bank does possess information that the body is a forgery the reason for the rule ceases, and it is difficult to see why the bank should be protected against the consequences of its own negligence in setting the fraudulent draft in circulation. 'The ordinary rules limiting the warrant of a certification to signature and funds only apply when the bank has no knowledge of the history of the instrument and of the facts connected with the drawing, delivery, indorsement,' etc. (Morse on Banks and Banking, 3d ed., vol. 1, sec. 414). In *Kingston Bank vs. Eltinge* (40 N. Y. 391) the plaintiff's means of ascertaining the truth were not exclusive. "It cannot be denied," said the Court (p. 395), "that either party might have made inquiry, and would probably have learned the actual facts. \* \* \* This course, however, was open to either party, and there is no more negligence in failing to obtain the knowledge by one party than the other. The defendants were equally bound with the plaintiffs to possess the knowledge, and, if the want of it is a ground of complaint, are equally censurable with the plaintiffs for not possessing it." In *Mayer vs. Mayor* (63 N. Y. 455) it was held that the general rule that money paid under a mistake of a material fact may be recovered back, although there was negligence on the part of the person making the payment, is subject to the qualification that the payment cannot be recalled when the position of the party receiving it has been changed in consequence of the payment, and it would be inequitable to allow a recovery. The person making the payment must, in that case, bear the loss occasioned by his own negligence. To the like effect is *National Park Bank vs. Steele & Johnson Manufacturing Co.* (58 Hun, 81), cited by appellant. There a promissory note, payable to defendant's order for goods sold, was certified by the plaintiff and thereafter transferred to the Tradesmen's National Bank and by it credited to the payee. The next day the note was paid through the clearing-house, the proceeds received by the Tradesmen's National Bank, and by it paid over to the defendant. The certification was made by the assistant teller of the bank without authority, and the amount was in excess of the maker's account, and the court held that while the certification was a careless act, that circumstance was not sufficient to prevent a recovery from the defendant, inasmuch as it had not changed its condition in any respect by reason of the certification of the note and the payment of the money upon it.

The Court said in reference to the Tradesmen's National Bank that "as it had paid over the money to the defendant its agency in the transaction had ceased, and it was not liable to refund the money to the plaintiff." I think the facts bring the case now under consideration fairly within the exceptions to the rule permitting a recovery of money paid under a mistake of fact. Where a party pays money by reason of a mistake arising solely from a negligent failure to avail himself of special knowledge at his command, he ought not to be permitted to recover it from the one to whom it has been paid where the latter must in such case sustain the entire loss because he in turn has parted in good faith with the money on the credit of, and in reliance upon, such mistake.

In the view taken it becomes unnecessary to consider the exceptions bearing upon that portion of the charge relating to the rules of the clearing-house and the negligence predicated on the transactions of June 14. They have been examined, however, and nothing is found affecting the validity of the proceedings.

The judgment and order should be affirmed.

All concur.

---

#### LIEN ON STOCK—KANSAS STATUTE.

Supreme Court of Kansas, January 5, 1901.

#### BATTEY vs. EUREKA BANK OF EUREKA, *et al.*

Under the statute of Kansas, while the officers of a State bank are prohibited from making loans or discounts to a stockholder on the security of stock in the bank, and while the bank cannot thereafter become the purchaser or holder of loans on such stock unless it shall become necessary to prevent loss upon a debt previously contracted in good faith, yet, if a stockholder has become liable to the bank as principal, surety, or otherwise on debts not incurred on such security, it will be entitled to a lien on his stock for such debts as are due and unpaid, and while such liability continues.

The clause of the banking statute of Kansas, "a debt previously contracted in good faith," means loans and discounts honestly made in the belief that they were safe investments for the bank, and were made without fraud, pretense, or any purpose to injure the bank.

---

This action was brought by the Eureka Bank, a corporation organized under the laws of Kansas, to recover a judgment against one William Martindale, for money borrowed of the bank, and to enforce the lien of the bank against stock of the bank owned by Martindale. The certificates for such stock had come into the possession of one R. T. Battey, who had been appointed trustee for Martindale by the Federal court; and such trustee had demanded of the officers of the bank that they transfer the stock to him; but the bank, claiming a lien on the stock, refused to make the transfer until the indebtedness was paid. The trustee was made a party to the suit, and an order was asked requiring him to surrender to the Eureka Bank the certificates of stock obtained from Martindale.

JOHNSTON, *J.* (omitting part of the opinion): The trustee challenges so much of the judgment as gives the bank a lien on the Martindale stock. It is to be noted that the agreement under which the trustee was appointed provided that liens on bank stock should not be deemed to be waived or affected by the agreement, and also, in the deed conveying his property to Battey, Martindale specially excepted liens of the Eureka Bank on the stock in question. Battey took no more than the deed of trust conveyed to him. He was not an assignee in bankruptcy or under the general assignment laws,



but was a trustee of an express trust, and his right in the Martindale property was measured by the terms of the instrument by which Martindale conveyed the property to him. He was to take that property, convert it into money, and apply it among the creditors of Martindale as the Federal court might direct. By the preliminary agreement and the deed of trust he had notice that liens on the stock were claimed, and also that Martindale recognized the existence of a lien in favor of the Eureka Bank upon the stock in question; and of necessity the stock passed into his hands subject to the rights and equities of the bank. Without settling the question of estoppel asserted against Battey, we pass to the question of the validity of the lien asserted by the bank.

The question is determined by the provisions of the bank act. By one section it is provided that: "The shares of stock of an incorporated bank shall be deemed personal property, and shall be transferred on the books of the bank in such manner as the by-laws thereof may direct; but no transfer of stock shall be valid against a bank so long as the registered holder thereof shall be liable as principal debtor, surety or otherwise to the bank for any debt which shall be due and unpaid, nor in such case shall any dividend, interest or profit be paid on such stock so long as such liabilities continue, but all such dividends, interests or profit shall be retained by the bank and applied to the discharge of such liabilities; and no stock shall be transferred on the books of any bank without the consent of the board of directors, where the registered holder thereof is in debt to the bank for any matured and unpaid obligation; and no transfer of stock shall be made when the bank is in a failing condition, or when its capital is impaired. All transfers of stock shall be certified to the Bank Commissioner immediately." (Gen. St. 1899, § 458.)

There was a by-law of the bank which expressly provided that the bank shall have a first and prior lien upon the stock for debts due to the bank by the owners of such stock. The statute already quoted, independent of the by-laws, clearly gives the bank a lien upon the stock when the stockholder is liable as principal debtor, surety, or otherwise to the bank for any debt due and unpaid. If an indebted stockholder were to transfer his stock free from any lien or claim of the bank, it might result in an impairment of the capital; and so, to protect the capital and customers of the bank, the Legislature created a lien, and placed a limitation in the statute which prevents the stockholder from transferring his stock to even a *bona fide* purchaser while his liability to the bank continues. The statute goes further than the giving of a lien to the bank, as it prohibits payment to the stockholder of any dividend, interest, or profit on the stock while he is liable to the bank for indebtedness of any kind. The Legislature of Michigan passed a statute containing a provision almost identical with the one under consideration, and the Supreme Court of that State held that it created a lien in favor of the bank against which a *bona fide* purchaser of the stock was not protected. (Michigan Trust Co. vs. State Bank of Michigan, 111 Mich. 306, 69 N. W. 645; Citizens' State Bank of Monroeville vs. Kalamazoo Co. Bank, 111 Mich. 313, 69 N. W. 663; Oakland County Sav. Bank vs. State Bank of Carson, 113 Mich. 284, 71 N. W. 453.)

If the section stood alone, all would concede the existence of the lien; but the contention is that another section of the act necessarily denies a lien to

the bank. It provides that: "No bank shall employ its moneys, directly or indirectly, in trade or commerce, by buying and selling goods, chattels, wares and merchandise, and shall not invest any of its funds in the stock of any other bank or corporation, nor make any loans or discounts on the security of the shares of its own capital stock, nor be the purchaser or holder of any such shares unless such security or purchase shall be necessary to prevent loss upon a debt previously contracted in good faith; and stock so purchased or acquired shall, within six months of the time of its purchase, be sold or disposed of at public or private sale. After the expiration of six months any such stock shall not be considered as a part of the assets of any bank: provided, that it may hold and sell all kinds of property which may come into its possession as collateral security for loans or any ordinary collection of debts, in the manner prescribed by law: provided, further, that any goods or chattels coming into the possession of any bank as aforesaid shall be disposed of as soon as possible, and shall not be considered as a part of the bank's assets after the expiration of six months from the date of acquiring same." (Gen. St. 1899, § 417.)

This section, standing by itself, might perhaps be interpreted as prohibiting a bank acquiring a lien upon the stock of its debtors. A somewhat similar provision in the National Banking Act of 1864 was so viewed by the Supreme Court of the United States (*Bank vs. Lanier*, 11 Wall. 369; *Bullard vs. Bank*, 18 Wall. 589).

These decisions were made under an act which did not expressly give a lien, as is done in our statute. On the other hand, the National Banking Act of 1863, which gave a bank a lien on the stock of its debtors, was modified by the act of 1864, and in place of the lien provided in the former act there was substituted the prohibition against a bank making a loan on the shares of its own capital stock. As was remarked in *Bank vs. Lanier*, *supra*: "Congress evidently intended, by leaving out of the act of 1864 the thirty-sixth section of the act of 1863, to relieve the holders of bank shares from the restrictions imposed by that section. The policy on the subject was changed, and the directors of banking associations were, in fact, notified that hereafter they must deal with their shareholders as they deal with other people."

The striking out of the section giving a lien, and the substitution of the prohibitory provision, clearly evidenced the intention of Congress, and hence by-laws of banks attempting to create liens on stock were held to be in conflict with the act, and therefore void. Our statute presents a very different aspect. As has been seen, it expressly gives a lien on the stock of an indebted stockholder, and in another section of the act, passed at the same time, it declares that a bank cannot "make any loans or discounts on the security of the shares of its own capital stock, \* \* \* unless such security \* \* \* shall be necessary to prevent loss upon a debt previously contracted in good faith."

What, then, was the legislative purpose in regard to creating liens on the capital stock of banks? These provisions, being included in the same act, should be reconciled, and, if possible, both given force and effect. In our view, an absolute prohibition of liens on bank stock was not within the legislative intention, and, further, that there is room for the operation of both sections. Considered together, they mean that a bank is prohibited from making a loan or discount in the first instance on the security of its own stock,

and that it shall not thereafter become the purchaser or the holder of loans on stock unless it shall become necessary to prevent loss upon a debt previously contracted in good faith. It would result in this : that while the officers of the bank could not accept the stock as a specific security for a loan or discount when the debt was first contracted, they might afterwards accept the stock as security if the debt had been previously contracted in good faith.

This provision, as will be observed, is mainly an admonition to the officers, and the leading purpose was to prevent a bank from using its money in trade or commerce, buying or selling merchandise, or in the purchase of stock of other banks or corporations, or dealing in its own stock ; and the only penalty provided in the section is that such stock, when secured by it, shall not be considered as a part of the assets of the bank after six months. It will be noted that there is nothing in the statute itself which renders a security taken by the officers of a bank in violation of the provisions unenforceable. And when the section is considered in connection with the other one, which absolutely gives the lien, it furnishes strong reasons for the application of the doctrine that a contract made contrary to such a statute is not unenforceable in the absence of a declaration in the statute itself prohibiting its enforcement.

The National Banking Act forbids the loaning of money by National banks upon mortgages upon real estate, but it has been held that, where such a loan was made, the mortgage was good and enforceable, notwithstanding the violation of this provision ; that the disregard of the prohibitory clause did not vitiate the security taken for the loan, but only laid the bank taking it open to proceedings at the instance of the Government (*Bank vs. Matthews*, 98 U. S. 621 ; *Bank vs. Whitney*, 103 U. S. 99 ; *Bank vs. Townsend*, 139 U. S. 67). In *Union Gold Mining Co. vs. Rocky Mountain National Bank* (96 U. S. 640), the company was sued by the bank for money which was loaned to it, and they set up as a bar that the loan was made in violation of the banking law, because it exceeded one-tenth of the bank's paid-up capital stock ; but the court held that the violation of the prohibition did not affect the validity of the loan, and that the violation could only be questioned by the Government.

In *Thompson vs. Bank* (146 U. S. 240), the bank certified a check for a customer who did not have a deposit to meet the check, and received therefor bonds as collateral security. This was in violation of the banking law, and the right of the bank to hold its lien on the bonds was contested because of the violation. The court held that the bank could hold the bonds notwithstanding the certification was made in contravention of the act of Congress, and in its decision said : " Moreover, it has been held repeatedly by this court that, where the provisions of the National Banking Act prohibited certain acts by the banks or their officers without imposing any penalties or forfeitures applicable to the particular transactions which have been executed, their validity can only be questioned by the United States, and not by private parties."

If, however, we should disregard the absence of a prohibition in the statute itself prohibiting the enforcement of a security taken in violation of the act, and should accept the view of the plaintiff in error, we would be unable to grant him the relief which he asks. If the section expressly authorizing a lien is to be regarded as modified by the prohibition, it would result in the view that a bank could never have a lien where a loan was contracted on the

specific security of its own capital stock, and could never afterwards claim a valid lien on stock except to prevent loss upon a debt previously contracted in good faith.

In the first place, it must be held that the loans were not made by the Eureka Bank to Martindale on the security of the stock which he owned. The certificate was not given to Tucker, the Cashier, nor was any reference made to the stock at the time the loans were negotiated. It is true that Tucker admitted that he had in mind at the time that Martindale was a stockholder, and that he might not have loaned him so large an amount if it had not been for his connection with the bank. He claimed, however, that the reason that the money was loaned upon his individual note was the fact that Martindale was a large owner of real estate and other banking interests, and was regarded by him to be a man of great wealth. The district court concluded from the testimony that the loan was not made upon the faith of the stock as a specific security, but was based rather on the personal credit of Martindale, and we think the testimony sustains this conclusion.

Was the debt contracted in good faith? A greater amount was loaned to Martindale than is permitted to be loaned to a single individual under the by-laws and banking rules; and, besides, no security was taken, which is not in accord with the usages and requirements of banking. The non-observance of these usages, rules, and requirements does not necessarily imply dishonesty and bad faith on the part of the Cashier. Good faith in this connection means that the loans were honestly made by Tucker in the belief that they were safe investments for the bank, and that there was an absence of fraud, pretense, or any purpose to wrong the bank (*Doctor vs. Furch*, 91 Wis. 464, 65 N. W. 161; *Winters vs. Haines*, 84 Ill. 585; 14 Am. and Eng. Enc. Law [2d Ed.] 1078).

If the loans were fraudulently and collusively made, and the claim that Martindale was financially sound and abundantly able to meet the loans was not in fact believed, but was a mere pretense, there would be a lack of good faith, which would condemn the transaction. Under the testimony and the finding of the trial court, however, it must be held that the loans were honestly made by the Cashier in the belief that Martindale was not only solvent, but that he was financially strong, and that the loans made to him were safe investments; and, further, that they were made without any intent to wrong the bank, or any one else, and therefore, under the rules heretofore stated, were made in good faith.

None of the errors assigned can be sustained, and therefore the judgment of the district court will be affirmed.

---

*CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT—NEGOTIABILITY—AUTHORITY OF TRUST  
COMPANY TO ISSUE.*

United States Circuit Court, W. D. Pennsylvania, December 26, 1900.

BANK OF SAGINAW *vs.* TITLE AND TRUST CO. OF WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA.

A trust company authorized to receive deposits has implied authority to issue certificates of deposit in the ordinary form.

A certificate of deposit, in the ordinary form, payable to the order of the depositor, upon the return of the certificate properly indorsed, is a negotiable instrument.

Such a certificate of deposit will be held negotiable by the Federal courts, though a contrary rule prevails in the courts of the State where it was made and issued.

ACHESON, *Circuit Judge*: The plaintiff is a corporation of the State of Michigan engaged in the banking business at Saginaw, in that State. The defendant is a corporation of the State of Pennsylvania, doing business at Connellsville, Pa. The suit is upon six certificates of deposit issued by the defendant, and of which the plaintiff is indorsee and holder. The certificates are alike in form, and the following copy of one represents the general character of all of them :

Certificate of Deposit. Not Subject to Check.	\$500.00.	\$500.00. No. 2.
	TITLE & TRUST COMPANY OF WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA.	
	CONNELLSVILLE, Pa. Feb. 5, 1900.	
	J. F. Barrows has deposited with this company five hundred dollars, payable to the order of J. F. Barrows on return of this certificate properly indorsed.	
	W. M. RUTH, <i>Treasurer</i> .	

Indorsed: J. F. BARROWS.

The sworn statement of claim sets forth that on or about February 12, 1900, J. F. Barrows, having indorsed each of these certificates in blank in the usual manner, presented them, so indorsed, at the plaintiff's banking house in Saginaw, asking that they be cashed, and that thereupon the plaintiff, in the usual course of its business as a bank, received and cashed them, paying therefor full value. These allegations are not denied in the affidavit of defense, and there is no suggestion therein that the plaintiff is not a *bona fide* holder for value of the certificates. Upon the pleadings the plaintiff must be so regarded.

That the defendant company is authorized to receive deposits of money is conceded, but it is denied that it had lawful authority to issue such certificates as those in suit. There is, however, no statutory or other inhibition of such certificates. These certificates are in the form commonly used everywhere in the commercial world by bankers and companies receiving money deposits, and the defendant's right to issue them in the course of its business and as an incident thereto is not to be doubted. At any rate, I do not see that it is open to the defendant to raise the question.

The case, I think, turns upon the question of the negotiability of the certificates sued on. Now, that such a certificate of deposit is a negotiable instrument possessing the qualities of a negotiable promissory note was determined by the Supreme Court of the United States in *Miller vs. Austen* (13 How. 218, 228). To the same effect are the decisions of all the State courts except those of Pennsylvania (5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 805). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that a certificate of deposit, although containing negotiable words, has none of the incidents of a negotiable promissory note. (*Patterson vs. Poindexter*, 6 Watts & S. 227; *Bank vs. Mangan*, 28 Pa. St. 452; *London Sav. Fund Soc. vs. Hagerstown Sav. Bank*, 36 Pa. St. 498.)

There is, however, no statute in Pennsylvania regulating this matter, and the question here is one of general jurisprudence. That courts of the United States are not controlled by the decisions of the State courts on questions of general commercial law is authoritatively settled. (*Swift vs. Tyson*, 16 Pet. 1; *Oates vs. Bank*, 100 U. S. 239; *Brooklyn City & N. R. Co. vs. National Bank of New York*, 102 U. S. 14, 29.) Mr. Justice Bradley in *Railroad Co. vs. Lockwood* (17 Wall. 357, 367), said: "But on a question of general commercial law, the Federal courts administering justice in New York have equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction with the courts of that State." In *Brooklyn City &*

N. R. Co. vs. National Bank of New York (*supra*), the question related to the legal effect of a transfer by indorsement of negotiable paper before maturity as mere security for an antecedent debt. The transaction occurred in New York, and the question had been there determined by decisions of the highest court of the State. It was contended that, as the bank was located in New York, and the other parties were citizens of that State, and the contract had been made there, the Federal courts were bound to follow the decisions of the State court, whether they met their approval or not. The Supreme Court of the United States rejected the argument, refused to follow the State decisions, and, speaking by Mr. Justice Harlan, said:

"The decisions of the New York court which we are asked to follow in determining the rights of the parties under a contract there made are not in exposition of any legislative enactment of that State. They express the opinion of that court, not as to the rights of parties under any law local to that State, but as to their rights under the general commercial law existing throughout the Union, except where it may have been modified or changed by some local statute. It is a law not peculiar to one State, or dependent upon local authority, but one arising out of the usages of the commercial world."

This is very pertinent to the case in hand, and furnishes a complete answer to the contention that the question at issue is governed by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania because this State is the place where the contracts were made and where they are to be performed. The parties to the commercial instruments in suit did not contract with reference to the State decisions any more than they did with reference to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. They contracted with reference to the general commercial law.

In view of the authorities cited, it is clear that upon the controlling question of the negotiability of the instruments in suit the decision in *Miller vs. Austen* is conclusive of this controversy. Judgment therefore must be entered in favor of the plaintiff for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense, and it is so ordered.

#### CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT—NECESSITY FOR DEMAND.

Court of Appeals of New York, February 26, 1901.

COTTLÉ, *et al.* vs. MARINE BANK OF BUFFALO.

A certificate of deposit, in the usual form, is not payable until demand; and the bank is not bound to pay the deposit except upon the production and surrender of the certificate properly indorsed.

Such a demand is necessary before an action can be maintained against the bank upon the certificate.

The original plaintiff, John J. P. Read, since deceased, brought this action to recover the amount of two deposits of money made by him with the defendant, for which, upon the first deposit, the defendant gave to him a certificate in these words: "State of New York. Marine Bank. \$1,255. Buffalo, November 12, 1881. J. J. P. Read has deposited in this bank twelve hundred and fifty-five dollars to the order of himself, and payable to his order hereon, with interest at four per cent. per annum. W. K. Allen, Cashier. 6,037,"—and upon the second deposit, the following: "State of New York.

Marine Bank. \$1,000. Buffalo, June 1, 1883. John J. P. Read has deposited in this bank one thousand dollars to the credit of himself, and payable to his order hereon, with interest at three per cent. per annum. W. K. Allen, Cashier. No. 6,165."

The answer alleged that the certificates had never been presented to it for payment, and also that they were held by George W. Rockwell, as executor of Elizabeth Rockwell, and that he claimed to own them as such, and had forbidden payment thereof to the plaintiff. Read, the depositor, resided with his sister, Mrs. Rockwell, at the time of each deposit, and until June 26, 1886, when she changed her place of residence and took with her the certificates.

Read commenced an action against her for the recovery of the certificates, which action was pending at her death, January 7, 1887, and is still pending. Read procured an order from the court requiring Mrs. Rockwell to produce the certificates before a referee. This she did, and Read there inspected and took copies of them. Mrs. Rockwell retained possession of the certificates until her death, when they came into the possession of George W. Rockwell, who claimed to hold the same as the executor of her last will and testament. While George W. Rockwell had the possession of the certificates, claiming thus to hold them, Read, the depositor and original plaintiff, demanded of the defendant payment of the same, but he did not produce them to the defendant, nor have the possession of them, and the defendant refused payment. George W. Rockwell soon after presented the certificates to the defendant, and forbade payment of the same to Read. The certificates had not been lost, and remained unpaid.

The trial court found the above facts, and held that Read did not make the proper demand of the defendant, in that he did not and could not produce and offer to surrender to it the certificates, properly indorsed, and directed judgment for the defendant.

LONDON, J.: The trial court did not find that Read, the original plaintiff, did produce the certificates upon the trial, and offer to surrender them, properly indorsed, to the defendant to be canceled. There is a statement to that effect contained in the proceedings upon the trial as stated in the case. But the findings show that the plaintiff's sister, Mrs. Rockwell, before this action was commenced, had taken possession of the certificates; that Read had commenced an action against her to recover possession of them; that that action was pending when this action was commenced; and that Read had obtained in that action copies of the certificates, but not the certificates themselves. The case contains evidence tending to show, apart from the findings, that upon a former trial of this action, Mr. Rockwell having produced the certificates under a subpoena, the Court directed their deposit with the clerk of the court, and that Read, in a subsequent action against the clerk, to which Mr. Rockwell was not a party, recovered possession of them, and thus was able to produce them upon this trial. (See *Read vs. Brayton*, 143 N. Y. 342.)

Thus the disputed title to the certificates, between Read and his sister, remains undetermined. We held upon the former appeal in this case that the risk of determining that title could not, in this action, be cast upon the defendant. (136 N. Y. 454.)

These facts account for the absence of any finding by the trial court of the production of the certificates by the original plaintiff upon this trial, and his offer to indorse and surrender them to the defendant. We cannot, in view

of the unanimous affirmance by the appellate division, supply this finding—certainly not for the purpose of a reversal ; but, if we could do so, it is by no means clear, under the facts stated, that we ought to do it.

The judgment, therefore, should be affirmed, upon the rule which we stated upon the former appeal, in 136 N. Y. 454, in which the Court, speaking by Maynard, J., said :

“ Construing the defendant's contract according to the rules of commercial law, it was not bound to pay the deposit except upon the production and surrender of the certificates, properly indorsed.”

Thus, the case of the plaintiffs fails, because their testator neither made the proper demand before he commenced his action, nor has been able to procure a finding that he made a proper surrender of the certificates upon the trial.

That a certificate of deposit is not due until actual demand has long been settled in this State (*Downes vs. Phoenix Bank*, 6 Hill, 297 ; *Payne vs. Gardner*, 29 N. Y. 146 ; *Pardee vs. Fish*, 60 N. Y. 265 ; *Howell vs. Adams*, 68 N. Y. 314 ; *Boughton vs. Flint*, 74 N. Y. 476 ; *Munger vs. Bank*, 85 N. Y. 581 ; *Smiley vs. Fry*, 100 N. Y. 262).

The plaintiffs insist that the commencement of the action was a sufficient demand. As between maker and holder, a promissory note payable upon demand is due forthwith (*Wheeler vs. Warner*, 47 N. Y. 519 ; *McMullen vs. Rafferty*, 89 N. Y. 457 ; *De Lavallette vs. Wendt*, 75 N. Y. 579) ; and therefore, a demand, with tender of the note to the maker, is not a condition precedent to the maturity of the cause of action. The note may be surrendered upon the trial. But in this case the paper requires payment upon a specified condition, namely, “ to his [the depositor's] order hereon,” and the demand must correspond with the obligation of payment ; and that requires the presentation of the certificate to the bank, properly indorsed, unless the bank should waive the indorsement. The action is at law, and the right of recovery had not accrued when it was commenced. The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

*COLLECTIONS—LIABILITY OF BANK WHERE PARTIES ARE DISCHARGED BY  
NEGLECT TO PROPERLY PROTEST PAPER.*

Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, January, 1901.

*HITCHCOCK vs. BANK OF SUSPENSION BRIDGE.*

A bank receiving a promissory note for collection, whether the same be payable at its counter or elsewhere, is liable for any neglect of duty in its collection by which any of the parties are discharged.

Where a notary public in the employ of the bank protests a note before the day of its maturity, so that the indorsers are discharged, the bank is liable.

Where the indorsers so discharged are solvent, and the maker is insolvent, the measure of the damage is the principal of the note and the interest thereon, together with the necessary fees of protest.

But the bank cannot be charged with the costs of an unsuccessful suit brought to test the question of the liability of the indorsers, where it has had nothing to do with the bringing of such suit.

Appeal by the defendant, the Bank of Suspension Bridge, from a judgment of the supreme court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Niagara on June 28, 1900, upon the decision of the court rendered after a trial at the Niagara special term.



The findings of the trial court in this action were based entirely upon a stipulation entered into between the counsel for the respective parties during the progress of the trial. From this stipulation it appears that the plaintiff, who was a customer of the defendant, deposited with it some time prior to October 1, 1897, three promissory notes for collection. Each of these notes bore the names of three indorsers. The notes were dated September 1, 1894, and by their terms fell due respectively upon the first days of October, November and December, 1897. A notary public in the employ of the defendant protested the notes for non-payment as they fell due, without allowing any days of grace. The maker of these notes was insolvent, and in an action brought against the indorsers it was held that inasmuch as the notes were not properly protested the indorsers were released from all liability thereon, and judgment was thereupon rendered against the plaintiff herein for fifty-seven dollars and thirty-nine cents costs.

The defendant had notice of the bringing of the action against the indorsers, and after its decision was notified of the result, which notification was accompanied by an offer from the plaintiff to assign his cause of action if the defendant desired to appeal from the judgment. This offer was not accepted, whereupon the present action was brought against the defendant to recover the damages sustained by reason of its negligence in not properly protesting the notes in question, and the issues raised herein were tried at an Equity Term of the Supreme Court held in Niagara county in June, 1900. A decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the amount of the notes, with interest and protest fees thereon, together with the costs of the former action against the indorsers, and from the judgment subsequently entered this appeal is brought.

ADAMS, *P. J.*: There can be no question, we think, but that the defendant, by reason of its omission to have the notes in question properly protested, became liable to the owner thereof for whatever damage resulted from such omission. It is well settled in this State that a bank receiving a promissory note for collection, whether the same be payable at its counter or elsewhere, is liable for any neglect of duty in its collection by which any of the parties are discharged, and the indorsement and delivery of such note to a bank for collection is a sufficient consideration for the undertaking on the part of the bank to charge the indorser by a regular notice of non-payment. (*Bank of Utica vs. Smedes*, 3 Cow. 662; *Montgomery County Bank vs. Albany City Bank*, 7 N. Y. 459; *Ayrault vs. Pacific Bank*, 47 *Id.* 570; *Palmer vs. Holland*, 51 *Id.* 416.)

Inasmuch as it is conceded that the maker of these notes was insolvent, the plaintiff's sole recourse was to the only indorser who was solvent, and as he was released from his contract of indorsement by the failure on the part of the bank to properly protest the notes, it follows that the measure of the plaintiff's damage was the principal of the notes and interest due thereon, together with the necessary fees of protest. We think, however, that this was the limit of the defendant's liability. The plaintiff was not obliged to bring suit against the indorsers before seeking redress of the bank, for when the fact was brought to his knowledge that the bank had failed to take the necessary steps to charge the indorsers, his right of action against it was complete and he might have resorted to such right in the first instance. This, however, he failed to do, preferring for some unexplained reason to test the question of

the indorsers' liability. He was not asked to do this by the bank, nor was he induced to do so by any misrepresentation upon the part of any of its officers. We consequently see no propriety in charging the bank with the costs of that unsuccessful action, especially as the only authorities we are able to find upon the subject establish a rule quite contrary to the plaintiff's contention. (*Downer vs. Madison County Bank*, 6 Hill, 648; *Ayrault vs. Pacific Bank*, 1 Abb. Pr. [N. S.] 381.)

Our conclusion, therefore, is that the judgment appealed from should be modified by striking therefrom the costs of the former action, together with the interest thereon, and as thus modified, affirmed, without costs of this action to either party.

All concurred.

---

### CONDENSED LEGAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST TO BANKS.

---

#### *ASSIGNMENTS—CERTIFICATE OF PURCHASE OF REAL ESTATE—RIGHTS OF ASSIGNEE—NOTICE TO EMPLOYEE—CUSTOM OF CONDUCTING BUSINESS.*

A borrower from a bank pledged as collateral, among other securities, a certificate of purchase of real estate at judicial sale; the consideration stated therein being \$6,740. The certificate was in an envelope, which was indorsed with the figures "\$4,750." On inquiry as to the discrepancy, the pledgor stated that a third person owned an interest of \$2,000 in the certificate, and that he could only pledge the same for the amount of his own interest, which was \$4,750. Whether the name of the third person interested in the certificate was asked for or given did not clearly appear. In fact, as between the pledgor and such third person, the latter was entitled to priority of interest in the certificate. A statute of the State (*Hurd's Rev. St.* 111. c. 77, § 29) made such certificates assignable by indorsement, and declared the assignee "entitled to the same benefits therefrom in every respect that the person therein named would have been if the same had not been assigned." *Held*, that the bank was put upon inquiry, and took the certificate subject to the rights which might have been asserted as against the pledgor.

Where a borrower from a bank presented collaterals to the Assistant Cashier, who was authorized to represent the bank in the transaction, and was directed by the latter, in accordance with custom, to take such collaterals to the note teller, who had charge of the collaterals to be checked up, notice to the teller in regard to the rights of a third person in one of the securities pledged was notice to the bank.

*Zeis vs. Potter, et al.* 105 Fed. Rep. (U. S.) 671.

---

#### *COUNTIES—BONDS—SUBSCRIPTION TO RAILROAD STOCK—VALIDITY—STATUTORY PROVISIONS—ACTIONS—DEFENSES—BROKEN PROMISE OF RAILROAD.*

Where bonds were issued by a county in payment of a subscription for railroad stock, the fact that unfulfilled promises were made by officers of the railroad, to citizens of the county, that the road would run through the county, to induce them to vote for the subscription, will not affect the right of innocent purchasers of the bonds for value to recover thereon.

Where county bonds and interest coupons issued in payment of subscrip-

tion for railroad stock were transferred, without indorsement by the owner, to another person to collect in any manner he pleased, with the right to sue thereon in his own name, or compromise, as he saw fit, the balance, after deducting expenses and commissions, to be paid to the owner, the collector could maintain a suit thereon, since he had the right to do with the bonds and coupons as he pleased, and had an interest in enforcing payment.

Acts 1868, pp. 514-520, authorized counties to subscribe for stock of railroads throughout the State, to be paid in bonds, if a majority of voters voting favored the subscription. Acts 1868, p. 566, amended the charter of a railroad, and provided that counties through which the road passed might subscribe for stock of the company, and issue bonds in payment, if two-thirds of the voters voting favored such action. A county through which this road did not run accepted the railroad's proposition, and subscribed for stock, issuing bonds in payment, on the vote of a majority, but less than two-thirds, of the electors voting at an election for that purpose, under Act 1868, pp. 514-520. *Held*, that as the road did not pass through or into the county, and there was no absolute repugnance between the general and special acts, the general act was not repealed, and the county's subscription and bond issue were binding on the county.

Any irregularity in the conduct of the election or issuance of the bonds was cured by Acts 1869-70, p. 305, ratifying and making valid the election in such county for subscription, in bonds of the county, to the stock of such railroad.

*Carpenter vs. Greene County*, 29 So. Rep. (Ala.) 194.

---

*DEPOSITS—REAL PARTY IN INTEREST—ADMISSION—ESTOPPEL.*

Where it was agreed that an agent should receive the proceeds of all sales of tobacco at a warehouse, and procure the money to pay for all purchases made, he to be reimbursed before anything should be due the principal, and such agent deposited a sum in a bank in his own name as Cashier, instructing the bank to pay the funds to no one else, and subsequently the balance due on the bank account was assigned by the principal to the agent, the bank was not entitled, as against the agent, to set off against the balance a sum due it from the principal.

Where, in a suit by a depositor against a bank to recover a balance alleged to be due, plaintiff stated that the suit was for the benefit of certain other parties, and he recovered judgment, such statement did not estop him from claiming the funds in a subsequent suit in which the bank endeavored to set off against the balance a debt due from the others, the depositor explaining that what he meant was that, in case he failed to recover the alleged balance, the other parties would be liable for it to him, and it appearing that the debt due the bank had been contracted prior to the statement.

*Nolting vs. National Bank of Virginia*, 37 S. E. Rep. (Va.) 804.

---

*INSURANCE POLICIES—ASSIGNMENT TO CREDITOR—EXTENT OF LIEN—EVIDENCE—WITNESSES—BANK DIRECTORS—COMPETENCY—TRANSACTION WITH DECEDENT.*

A creditor may acquire by assignment an interest in insurance policies on the life of his debtor, limited solely to the amount of the latter's liability at

the time of his death, together with such premiums, with interest thereon, as the creditor has paid to preserve the insurance; the residue belonging to the insured's estate whether the policies were assigned absolutely or as collateral.

Bank directors are competent to testify in favor of the bank to a transaction with a decedent relied on by it in an action between it and the decedent's administrator.

In support of a claim by a bank that insurance policies on the life of a decedent were held by it to secure all his indebtedness to it, including that as a guarantor on two notes, two of its directors, who arranged for the assignment of the policies, testified positively that it was made with that understanding; and the president who conversed with him after his proposition to assign had been accepted, said that he so understood it. To overcome this evidence, it was shown that after the assignment payments were made to the bank by him and his trustees under an assignment for creditors, and credited on the guaranteed notes; but it clearly appeared that these payments were made, not on account of his liability as a guarantor, but on account of his indebtedness to the maker of the notes. *Held*, that under the evidence the bank was entitled to deduct the entire debt from the proceeds of the policies.

First Nat. Bank of Roanoke vs. Speece, 37 S. E. Rep. (Va.) 843.

#### MORTGAGES—CONTRACT—MISUNDERSTANDING—REFORMATION.

To secure a loan of \$1,900, G, who could not read, executed a bond and mortgage for \$2,400 to the company making the loan, thinking the papers were a bond and mortgage for \$1,900. Both G and her husband, acting as her agent, understood perfectly that they were to pay \$18 a month until \$1,900 were paid. The company did not make clear to G the meaning of the transaction by which a premium of \$500 was added to the amount of the loan, and the bond and mortgage made for \$2,400. No fraud was intended. *Held*, that the company's failure to make clear its proposition did not entitle G to have the bond and mortgage reformed, since the parties were not in fiduciary relations, and G understood the material parts of the transaction.

Garvey vs. New York Building Loan Banking Co. 68 N. Y. Supp. 317.

#### TAXATION—ASSESSMENT OF TRUST PROPERTY—VALIDITY.

Under laws 1896, c. 908, § 32, which provides that a person holding taxable property as a trustee shall be assessed as such, but shall be designated as trustee, and such assessment carried out in a separate line from his individual assessment, an assessment of funds in the hands of a resident trustee, which constitute three separate trusts, created by the same will, and not shown to be differently invested, is not invalid because it fails to assess the trusts separately.

Caumann, *et al.* vs. Feitner, *et al.* 68 N. Y. Supp. 226.

#### INSOLVENCY—COLLECTIONS—FOLLOWING TRUST FUNDS—RIGHTS OF BENEFICIARY—APPEAL—REVIEW.

Money collected by a bank for another on notes or drafts, and retained, is held in trust for the owner, and does not become a part of the assets of the bank; and if the bank thereafter becomes insolvent, and a Receiver is appointed, the one for whom the collection is made is a preferred creditor.

Where trust funds are wrongfully converted, the beneficiary is entitled to

the funds, or the proceeds thereof, so long as he can definitely trace them, until they reach the hands of an innocent holder.

Where trust money has been wrongfully commingled by a trustee with his own, and he makes payment from the common fund, it will be presumed that he paid out his own, and not trust, money.

The claim of a beneficiary for trust money may be preferred, to the extent of the cash found among the assets of an insolvent trustee at the time of his failure, where it is not affirmatively shown that the cash assets are not part of the trust fund.

State vs. Bank of Commerce of Grand Island, *et al.* 85 N. W. Rep. (Neb.) 43.

---

NOTES—IMPROPER PROTEST—DAMAGES—MEASURE OF DAMAGES.

Where a notary public in the employ of a bank protested notes left for collection, without allowing days of grace, by reason of which improper protest the indorsers were relieved from liability, the bank was liable to the owner of the notes for whatever damages he sustained thereby.

Where the maker of notes was insolvent, and the indorsers were discharged by reason of a bank's failure to properly protest the notes, the measure of the owner's damages for such failure was the principal and interest of the notes, with protest fees, and not the expenses of a suit on the notes against the indorsers, since the owner was not compelled to look to them before seeking redress from the bank.

Hitchcock vs. Bank of Suspension Bridge, 68 N. Y. Supp. 234.

---

PARTNERSHIP—FICTITIOUS NAMES—CERTIFICATE—JUDGMENT.

A "banking partnership" whose capital stock is not divided into shares and transferable on the books of the "concern," is within the general provisions of the act of May 19, 1894, and the amendments, prohibiting the use of fictitious names in partnerships (Bates' Ann. St. §§ 3170-1 to 3170-7), and at each change in the partnership, is required to file a new certificate.

A judgment taken by such partnership in its firm name upon a note with a power of attorney to confess judgment, and releasing all errors, after a change has taken place in its membership, and before the filing of a new certificate, is invalid, and may be set aside by the debtor or his assignee for the benefit of creditors; and where the latter refuses, on request of the creditors, to bring suit, the creditors, or any of them, may maintain an action to set it aside for the benefit of themselves and all other creditors of the debtor.

Cobble, *et al.* vs. Farmers' Bank, *et al.* 59 N. E. Rep. (Ohio) 221.

---

PROMISE TO PAY DEPOSITOR'S DEBT—CASHIER'S AUTHORITY—STATUTE OF FRAUDS—APPEAL.

A National bank which has received and retained the benefits resulting from its contract to pay for goods sold on its credit and delivered to a depositor in pursuance of the contract, cannot avoid liability thereon on the ground that the contract was *ultra vires*.

Where a party deals with the Cashier of a bank in good faith, without notice of any want of authority on his part, and the act done is within the apparent scope of his authority, the bank is bound by the contract.

A promise by a bank to pay for goods to be sold on its credit and delivered

to a depositor is not within the statute of frauds, and hence need not be in writing.

A bank which has agreed to pay for goods to be sold on its credit to a depositor is liable to the vendor for the value of the goods delivered under the contract.

First National Bank of Greenville vs. Greenville Oil and Cotton Co. 60 S. W. Rep. (Texas) 828.

---

*TAXATION—ASSESSMENT OF BANK SHARES—INCREASE OF VALUATION WITHOUT NOTICE—NATIONAL BANK SHARES—ENJOINING COLLECTION OF ILLEGAL TAX.*

Rev. St. Ohio, §§ 2808, 2809, which require the State Board of Equalization for incorporated banks to meet annually on a fixed date, to examine the returns of said banks to the county auditors, and the value of their shares as fixed by the auditors, and to hear complaints and equalize the value of said shares "according to the rules prescribed in title thirteen for valuing and equalizing the values of real and personal property," when read in connection with the provisions of said title thirteen, confer no power on the board to change the valuation of bank shares without reasonable notice to the parties interested and an opportunity for a full hearing; and an increase in the valuation of the shares of a National bank made by such board at a subsequent meeting, to which no adjournment was shown by its records, and without notice to the bank or its shareholders, is not merely irregular, but void for want of jurisdiction.

A National bank may maintain a suit in a Federal court to enforce the right given by Rev. St. Ohio, § 5848, to enjoin the collection of taxes levied on an illegal assessment.

Mercantile National Bank of Cleveland vs. Hubbard, County Treasurer, 105 Fed. Rep. (U. S.) 809.

---

*TAXATION—SAVINGS BANKS—SECURITIES—STATUTES—FRANCHISE TAX—RECORD.*

Code, Art. 81, § 86, requires every Savings bank to pay an annual franchise tax of one fourth of one per cent. on the total amount of deposits held by such bank, and provides that "no other tax shall be laid on such bank, institution or corporation in respect to such deposits," but that its real estate shall be liable to taxation. Acts 1890, c. 491, which is made a part of section 86, as section 86a, prescribes that nothing in section 86 shall be construed as granting exemption from taxation to any property which is legally taxable, because of its ownership by a Savings bank. Previous to the passage of section 86 the total amount of deposits of Savings banks to be taxed had been ascertained by deducting from the gross amount of deposits the portion of the same invested in non-taxable securities. A bank had paid the tax of one-fourth of one per cent. on its deposits, and a tax on its realty, but not a tax levied by a municipality on its securities. *Held*, in an action to collect the municipal tax on securities purchased with deposits, that Acts 1890, c. 491, and Code, Art. 81, § 86, must be construed together, and hence Savings banks are liable to a franchise tax of one-fourth of one per cent. on the total amount of their deposits, without any deduction for the portion invested in non-taxable securities, and therefore the tax on the securities was void.

Where the record shows that a Savings bank has capital stock which is subject to taxation, no recovery of the tax can be had where the record does not show that the assessment and levy were such as the law required.

Mayor, etc., of City of Westminster vs. Westminster Savings Bank, 48 At. Rep (Md.) 34.

---

*TRUST COMPANIES—POWER TO ISSUE CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT—FEDERAL COURTS FOLLOWING STATE DECISIONS—QUESTIONS OF COMMERCIAL LAW—CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT—NEGOTIABILITY.*

In the absence of statutory provisions on the subject, a trust company authorized to receive money on deposit has lawful authority to issue certificates of deposit therefor in the usual form.

The courts of the United States are not controlled by the decisions of the State courts on questions of general commercial law, and a Federal court will follow the decisions of the Supreme Court as to the negotiability of an instrument, notwithstanding a contrary holding by the courts of the State where the transaction took place.

A certificate of deposit in the ordinary form, payable to the order of the depositor, is a negotiable instrument possessing the qualities of a negotiable promissory note.

Bank of Saginaw vs. Title and Trust Co. of Western Pennsylvania, 105 Fed. Rep. (U. S.) 491.

---

**DECISIONS OF CANADIAN COURTS AFFECTING BANKERS.**

[Edited by John Jennings, B. A., LL. D.; Toronto.]

---

*MORTGAGE—HIRE RECEIPT OR VENDOR'S LIEN—INSURANCE OF MACHINERY COVERED BY BOTH—PRIORITIES—SUBROGATION.*

GOLDIE vs. THE BANK OF HAMILTON (Ont. Appeal Reports, Vol. 27, p. 619).

**STATEMENT OF FACTS:** This was an appeal from the judgment of Sir William Meredith, C. J., at the trial.

A firm of millers, Harper & Co., to secure their overdue indebtedness to the Bank of Hamilton gave to it two mortgages on all their lands, buildings, machinery, water privileges, etc., subject to a prior mortgage to one Wilson, all of which mortgages contained covenants to insure. In pursuance of the covenant in the Wilson mortgage insurance to the amount of \$7,000 was placed and all, with the exception of one policy for \$1,500, made payable to Wilson. No further insurance was placed after the mortgages to the bank, but it was not disputed that the Bank of Hamilton, as second mortgagee, was equitably entitled to the surplus of the insurance moneys after satisfying Wilson's claim.

Some time after these transactions Harper & Co. were desirous of equipping their mill with new machinery and received an offer from the plaintiffs to supply the machinery and do the work required for a cash payment and the old machinery and upon condition that the property in the new machinery should not pass from them, the plaintiffs, until it was fully paid for and upon the further condition that the machinery should be insured in the plaintiff's favor. The parting with the machinery covered by the mortgages referred to could be lawfully done only with the consent of the mortgagee, and Harper & Co. sent the plaintiffs' offer to the bank with a request for such consent which,

with a full knowledge of the only terms on which the plaintiffs would put in the machinery, the bank gave. Wilson did not consent, but the contract was carried out notwithstanding. No new insurance was placed and before payment of any of the mortgages or of the plaintiffs' lien on the new machinery the mill and contents were destroyed by fire. A few days later the defendants' general manager bought in for the bank the Wilson mortgage and Wilson's rights under the insurance policies. The loss on machinery, belting, etc., was adjusted at \$4,500, which sum the insurance companies paid into court to await the result of this action to decide the priorities.

**DECISION:** The appeal was heard before Osler, Maclellan, Moss & Lister, JJ., who held in substance as follows; Maclellan, J. A., dissenting:

Wilson not having given a consent to the change in the machinery covered by his security, the plaintiffs put in the new machinery with notice of Wilson's prior claim, and that claim is therefore the first charge on the insurance. On this item therefore judgment for payment out of court to Turnball for the defendants of a sufficient sum, with the insurance previously received direct from the companies as adjusted loss on the mill, to satisfy the Wilson mortgage.

As to the surplus after this had been paid out, the bank having with full knowledge consented to the substitution for the machinery covered by its mortgages of new machinery, the property in which was to remain in the plaintiffs and which was to be insured in their favor by Harper & Co., had in effect given the plaintiffs a priority, the plaintiffs thereupon became entitled to the benefit of the equitable right to the surplus of the insurance moneys which the Bank of Hamilton before had as second mortgagee. On this item, therefore, judgment for payment out to the plaintiffs of the surplus to be applied on account of the lien on the policies acquired by the bank's consent.

Further, as the Wilson mortgage created a charge on the lands, water privileges, etc., as well as on the machinery (or the insurance fund which now represents the machinery) the bank had two sources from which it might seek payment, while the plaintiff can claim only on one of these. If, therefore, the bank satisfy this mortgage, as it had done, from that one of the sources to which alone the plaintiff can come (the insurance moneys) and so disappoint the plaintiffs, to that extent the plaintiffs is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the defendants as against the other source of payment to the extent of the insurance moneys they would have received under their agreement with Harper & Co. Judgment, therefore, in this respect that on payment out of the moneys directed to be paid to Turnball of his claim under the Wilson mortgage he assign that mortgage to the plaintiffs, to secure the balance of insurable value of the work done and machinery supplied by them.

---

*CERTIFIED CHECK—ALTERATION AFTER CERTIFICATION—PAYMENT IN GOOD FAITH—RECOVERY BACK—DUTY OF BANK IN CERTIFYING.*

BANK OF HAMILTON *vs.* IMPERIAL BANK OF CANADA (27 Ont. Appeal Reports, p. 590).

**STATEMENT OF FACTS:** This was an appeal by the defendants from the judgment of MacMahon, J., at the trial directing the payment to the plaintiffs by the defendants of the sum of \$495 and costs.

On January 25, 1897, one Carl Bauer had at his credit in the Bank of Hamilton, Toronto, the sum of \$10.25 and on that date he presented to the bank's ledger-keeper a check on his own account payable to "cash or bearer," for \$5, which check was stamped by the ledger-keeper, "Bank of Hamilton,



Toronto, Entered, January 25, 1897." At the time it was so stamped there was a considerable blank space between the written word, "five," and the engraved word, "dollars," and the space for the numerals after the engraved, "&," was entirely blank. After having the check so marked Bauer wrote the word, "hundred," in the first of these blank spaces and the figures 500.00 in the second. The check thereupon had the appearance of a valid certified check for \$500 and was accepted as such and that amount placed to the credit of Bauer by the Imperial Bank of Canada with whom he deposited the check on the following day, January 26. Bauer immediately after drew \$485 from the Imperial Bank of Canada.

The check in question was on January 27 sent to the clearing-house and was received from it by the Bank of Hamilton at ten o'clock that morning and was along with all other certified checks so received entered in a supplementary cash book, which book was on the following morning, January 28, checked with the deposit ledger. In this checking the fraudulent raising of the check was discovered and the Imperial Bank was at once notified and on the same day a demand in writing for the return of \$495 was served on them.

The clearing-house rules applicable to the case are rules No. 13 and 14. Rule No. 13 provides that errors in exchange and claims arising from the return of items are to be adjusted directly between the banks concerned, but in case of non-payment the manager of the clearing-house on receiving notice before twelve o'clock noon on the day the item is received from the clearing-house shall deduct the amount from the settling sheets of the banks concerned. Rule 14 provides that nothing in the foregoing rule shall deprive any bank of any right it might have otherwise than under rule 13 to return or object to any item.

The Imperial Bank refused to repay the \$495, and after a great deal of fruitless negotiation action was instituted by the Bank of Hamilton, which obtained judgment as above.

**DECISION:** The appeal was heard before Armour, C. J. O., and Osler, Maclellan, Moss and Lister, JJ. A. It was contended that the Bank of Hamilton by marking the check in the form in which it was presented put it in the power of Bauer to make it appear a valid certified check for the increased amount, and so was liable to the parties prejudiced. This is a claim in what is technically "negligence," which term in law means more than mere carelessness, inasmuch as to constitute "negligence" there must be at the time the alleged negligent act or omission occurs, some person or persons to whom a duty at law to take care is owed. At the time the Bank of Hamilton certified the check in question it was under no legal duty to any one to take care and the case of *Schofield vs. the Earl of Lonsborough* in the House of Lords in 1896 holds directly that the acceptor of a bill of exchange is not under a duty to take precautions against a fraudulent alteration of a bill after acceptance.

The question then resolved itself into whether the Bank of Hamilton, having paid the check through the clearing-house under a mistake of fact, were entitled to recover it back. The defendants contended that there was an absolute rule of law that unless notice is given and a demand for repayment made on the day on which the forged instrument was paid, they cannot recover back. The court, however, held, Armour, C. J. O., dissenting, that where money was paid, as here, under mistake of fact and without considera-

tion, the right of the party so paying to recover was lost only when the delay in giving notice prejudiced the position of the party receiving the money. Here the check was not endorsed; there was no one to whom the Imperial Bank could look but Bauer, and its right was not in any way prejudiced by the delay. There being no endorsers, there was no one entitled to notice of dishonor on the day of dishonor. The clearing-house rule 13 as restricted by rule 14 could not affect the right of the Bank of Hamilton at law.

Judgment for the plaintiffs and appeal dismissed, with costs.

The court did not deem it necessary to decide whether the stamping of the check as described was an acceptance within the Bills of Exchange Act so as to render it liable on the instrument, but Moss, J. A., in the course of his judgment says: "The effect of the certifying was only to show on the face that it was drawn on funds sufficient to meet its payment."

## REPLIES TO LAW AND BANKING QUESTIONS.

Questions in Banking Law—submitted by subscribers—which may be of sufficient general interest to warrant publication will be answered in this department.

A reasonable charge is made for Special Replies asked for by correspondents—to be sent promptly by mail. See advertisement in back part of this number.

### COLLECTIONS—NOTARY'S FEE.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

LANSING, Mich., February 18, 1901.

SIR: On January 24 we received for collection, with orders to protest if not paid, a note of \$250 made by P. Bros. to B. M. Works, and endorsed over to the bank who sends it to us. Including grace the note was due on the 28th. On the 25th the maker came in and gave a new note for the same amount and paid \$5.12 interest. Interest should have been \$6.25, but the teller made a mistake; on the same day we sent the following: "I enclose herewith draft for \$5, being the interest on the note you sent January 21; also new note to the order of B. M. Works, Mr. — says this is his agreement, but I am holding the old note here, and if this is not satisfactory, please wire at once and I will protest, as this note is due on the 28th, including grace. Yours truly, Cashier."

The day the note was received we received the following message: "Collect \$1.25 more for interest."

This message came "collect" and we refused to accept it, but knowing its contents we collected \$1.25 more. That same evening we got the following: "Protest and return note." We accordingly protested the note and returned it but did not send the extra \$1.25. This had been charged to Mr. P., and we gave him credit for same. Now they all refuse to pay protest fee, and we would like to know if the collecting bank must lose it, and if it should have paid fifty cents for the collect message, when it made a charge of but twelve cents for handling the whole transaction?

Later the new note was accepted in exchange for the old one.

CASHIER.

*Answer.*—As the telegram was sent in response to the letter of the collecting bank, and was made necessary by the mistake of that bank, the charges therefor should legally and in fairness be paid by that bank. But as the protest was made by the express direction of the forwarding bank, the notary's fees should be paid by the latter.

### AUTHORITY OF RECEIVER TO DRAW CHECKS.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

BALTIMORE, Md., March 4, 1901.

SIR: A bank is a party to a creditor's suit for the winding up of the affairs of a corporation and the distribution of the assets among its creditors. The court passes an order directing the Receiver of the corporation to deposit in that bank; the deposits to be subject to the order of the court. Is the bank chargeable with constructive notice of the order, and would it be liable if it allowed the Receiver to withdraw the funds upon his own check without the order of the court? Please answer this in the April issue of the BANKERS' MAGAZINE, giving reference to authorities upon the subject.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY.

*Answer.*—A Receiver is merely an officer of the court, and unless it is otherwise provided by statute, his powers are only those conferred upon him by the order of his appointment and the course and practice of the court. (Davis vs. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 217; Attorney-General vs. Life and F. Co. 4 Paige [N. Y.] 224; Booth vs. Clark, 17 How. [U. S.] 332; Delaware, etc., R. Co. vs. Markley, 45 N. J. Eq. 139.) The money or other property in his hands is in *custodia legis*, and at all times under the control and subject to the orders of the court; (*Re Christian Jensen Co.* 128 N. Y. 550, 553), and all persons dealing with that property are bound to take notice of any limitations placed by the court upon the Receiver's authority. Hence, where a Receiver is directed to deposit money in a bank designated by the court, that bank must ascertain at its own peril whether the Receiver has authority to draw checks against the deposit, and especially is this true where the limits of the Receiver's authority are defined in the order directing the deposit to be made. If the Receiver has no authority to withdraw the funds without the order of the court, then very clearly the bank would be liable for permitting him to do so.

---

#### SURETY ON JOINT NOTE.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine :*

DAYTON, Ohio, March 29, 1901.

SIR: In case a joint note was given, and has been running for sixteen years, during which time the maker of the note pays part of the principal and interest, is the surety compelled to pay the balance of the note? Time of note one year after date. No notice given surety of non-payment.

BOOKKEEPER.

*Answer.*—The facts above given are not sufficient to enable us to express a definite opinion. If the surety has not recognized his liability, either expressly or by implication, since the note matured, then, aside from any other questions which arise in cases of this character, the statute of limitations affords a complete bar to any action against him. The surety, however, by his conduct, or by express agreement, may have waived this defense, as well as all others; but whether he has done so or not could not be determined without a full knowledge of all the facts.

---

#### LIABILITY OF BANKS TO HOLDERS OF CHECKS.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine :*

KANSAS CITY, Mo., March 22, 1901.

SIR: A commission firm sold cattle for J and deposited the proceeds in a bank to their own credit, giving J a check for the amount less their charges. The bank had no knowledge as to the source from which the deposit was derived, and paid it out on checks of the firm, and when J's check was presented it was refused payment for want of funds. Between the time the deposit was made and the time the check was presented the bank had collected a draft in favor of the firm exceeding the amount of the check, and had credited the proceeds to the firm, at the same time charging it with the amount of a demand note it held against the firm. Did this render the bank liable for the amount of J's check, the draft having been deposited at the time the note was given, and being collateral to it?

CASHIER.

*Answer.*—No. The lien attached in favor of the bank as soon as the note was given.

---

#### PAYMENT OF FORGED OR ALTERED PAPER.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine :*

DETROIT, Mich., April 2, 1901.

SIR: It was the custom of a grain dealer doing business in a place by an agent to furnish the agent with checks on a bank, signed in blank, to be signed by the agent when issued in payment for grain. Such a check, after having been signed in blank by both the dealer and the agent, was stolen and filled out by a third person, and was presented to and paid by the bank. Was the bank liable for this loss?

H. O. B.

*Answer.*—No. As between the grain dealer and the bank, the former would have to stand the loss.

## CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine :*

LOS ANGELES, Cal., March 18, 1901.

SIR: A bank, on receiving certain notes as special deposits, issued a certificate for the amount of the notes, made out a printed form, from which the words "in current funds" were erased and the words "in current notes" substituted. The certificate was marked "special deposit." Having been transferred, this certificate was sent by the holder to the bank for payment. The notes had not been collected, and the Cashier was directed to return the certificate; but as the signature was torn he was instructed to prepare and transmit a duplicate. In doing so he carelessly omitted to change the printed form by erasing "in current funds" and substituting "in current notes." The bank almost immediately afterwards became insolvent and passed into the hands of a Receiver. Is the latter liable on the certificate as for current funds?

BOOKKEEPER.

*Answer.*—No. He is only obliged to surrender to the holder the notes constituting the special deposit for which the original was issued. The second certificate was not given in payment of the first and was only substituted for it.

## PREFERENCES AFFECTED BY INSOLVENCY.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine :*

SIR: For three days there was a slight run on a bank, which suspended on the third day at three P. M. The Cashier believed the bank had sufficient assets to pay the depositors could it avoid suspension, and in the forenoon of the third day paid J his deposit. He insisted that in making payments he acted to protect the bank, and not with a view to making preferences. During the run and before the payment to J he had persuaded some depositors not to withdraw, in one instance giving his reason for the request the closeness of the money market. Could a Receiver for the bank recover the amount so paid to J on the ground that it was a payment after an act of insolvency, or in contemplation thereof, with a view to giving a preference?

J. G. M.

*Answer.*—We do not think so. There is nothing in the statement of facts showing any act of insolvency or that the payment was made with a view to create a preference.

## TRUST FUNDS.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine :*

HOUSTON, Tex., March 19, 1901.

SIR: The mortgagor of cattle sold them with the consent of the first mortgagee and deposited the proceeds of the sale to his own credit in a bank, which was a second mortgagee, applying the money to the payment of the debt due to the bank. Prior to the sale the mortgagor agreed with the first mortgagee that the proceeds of the sale should be sent to the bank to be applied on the first mortgage. The bank officers knew of the first mortgage, and of its priority, and that such mortgage was to be paid when the cattle were sold. Can the first mortgagee recover the money from the bank?

R.

*Answer.*—No. There was no such notice to the bank as the agreement between the mortgagor and the first mortgagee as would charge it with knowledge of the trust character of the fund.

## LIABILITY OF OFFICERS BORROWING FROM BANK.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine :*

CHARLESTON, S. C., March 11, 1901.

SIR: We have a statute here in South Carolina forbidding the directors and officers of a State bank from borrowing any money from the bank on pain of criminal prosecution. A bank in this county recently closed its doors, being compelled to do so because of bad loans made the Cashier. Are the other officers and directors criminally liable under that statute?

G. O. W.

*Answer.*—No. The statute applies only to the officer borrowing.

## DISCRETION OF OFFICERS.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine :*

— Wis., March 8, 1901.

SIR: By concurrence of all the officers an amount exceeding the entire capital stock of a bank was loaned to a single person. He was a director of the bank and the chief merchant of the place. A large part of the loan was secured by him while his business and financial

standing were good, and the balance was loaned to him with the object of preserving his credit, and with the purpose on the part of the bank officers to enable him to continue business, in the hope that he would finally be able to pay. As a result of this loan the bank became insolvent, but assets enough materialized to pay depositors and creditors. Can the directors be held personally liable to recoup the stockholders for their loss? M. A. C.

*Answer.*—No ; not if fraud is not shown and the acts of the directors were in perfect good faith. Although the transaction was unwise and hazardous, the stockholders had placed themselves under the honest discretion of the directors.

#### PUBLICATION OF UNTRUE STATEMENT.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine :*

— Nebraska, March 4, 1901.

SIR: The first year a bank was run the officers in order to make a good showing omitted to draw their salaries, and made no mention thereof in the published statement required by statute, leaving the amount of the salaries to the credit of the bank. Afterwards the bank became insolvent. Can such officers now put in claims for these salaries? J. S. ST. J.

*Answer.*—We are confident they cannot as against outside creditors, but if the liabilities to these are paid, we see no reason why such salaries cannot be allowed as against the remaining stockholders.

#### PREFERRED CLAIM.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine :*

OTTUMWA, Iowa, March 5, 1901.

SIR: H bank sent a New York draft to the C bank to be deposited to its credit. The C bank, which was insolvent, sent the draft to the N bank, in New York, to be deposited to its credit. The N bank applied the draft to reduce a debt due it by the C bank, the draft being paid by the drawee, after some delay, under express directions from the H bank. Under these circumstances is the H bank entitled to the payment of the amount of the draft by the Receiver of the C bank as a preferred claim? AGENT.

*Answer.*—No ; the amount of the assets for distribution among creditors not having been increased in that amount by the deposit of the draft.

#### TITLE TO FUNDS.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine :*

SEATTLE, Wash., Feb. 28, 1901.

SIR: A merchant indorsed a draft, generally, to a firm of brokers for collection. They indorsed it for deposit to their own credit with the M bank, where they kept their account. The M bank forwarded it to another bank for collection, and it was paid the next day. On the day the draft was paid the M bank made a loan to the brokers, with an agreement that their deposit was to stand as security therefor. The same day the brokers made a general assignment for the benefit of their creditors. On the succeeding day the M bank received the proceeds of the draft from its agent, credited it on the account of the brokers, and applied it on their indebtedness. Later in the same day the bank was notified by the merchant that he was the owner of the draft, and had deposited it with the brokers for collection only. The question is, can the merchant recover the amount of the draft from the bank? TELLER.

*Answer.*—No, if you have stated all the facts. The proceeds of the draft vested in the bank on payment being made to its agent, and it then became accountable to the brokers only, against whom it had an account which it would offset. The merchant should file his claim against the insolvent estate of the brokers.

#### RELATION BETWEEN BANK AND DEPOSITOR—PAPER FOR COLLECTION.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine :*

BOSTON, Mass., March 31, 1901.

SIR: The owner of negotiable paper placed it with a Boston bank, to be transmitted to its New York correspondent for collection, for the account of the owner, and the Boston bank so instructed the New York bank. Could the owner of the paper, individually, hold the New York bank for negligence in not promptly giving notice of dishonor? PHOENIX.

*Answer.*—Yes. The transaction made the New York bank the agent of the owner, and liable to him for its negligence under such agency.

## ELECTION OF CASHIER.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

MILWAUKEE, Wis., March 20, 1901.

SIR: A by-law of a National bank provides that the Cashier shall hold his office for one year. In case the directors fail to re-elect him at the end of the year, merely allowing him to go on with his duties, and he so continues, is he an officer *de facto* or *de jure*? DIRECTOR.

*Answer.*—He is an officer *de jure*. The National Bank Act provides that the Cashier of a National bank shall hold his office subject to the pleasure of the board of directors, and the by-law you speak of is nugatory.

## STOLEN PASS-BOOK.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

BUFFALO, N. Y., March 21, 1901.

SIR: A Savings bank in opening an account with one who could neither read nor write, asked him certain questions, the answers to which were entered in the signature-book. The pass-book was stolen from the depositor and presented at the bank by another. He was asked the questions which had been asked the depositor, and answered all of them satisfactorily, and the bank paid the amount of the deposit to him. Can the real depositor recover the money?

SAVINGS BANK.

*Answer.*—Not unless he can show acts of negligence on the part of the bank, which your statement of facts do not reveal. From your statement the bank exercised reasonable prudence, and this is all that was required of it.

## TITLE TO DEPOSITS.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

WINONA, Minn., March 13, 1901.

SIR: I made a deposit with the K bank with instructions to credit the amount to the account of the X bank for the use of O, with whom I had agreed to arrange a credit. I afterwards learned that at this time the X bank was indebted to the K bank, and the latter bank applied the deposit in payment of the indebtedness. The X bank became insolvent without having received the deposit, except as it was applied on its indebtedness. Can I recover the deposit from the K bank?

PROMOTER.

*Answer.*—Yes. The K bank took the deposit in trust for the purposes you designated, and could not apply it any other way.

## CONCEALMENT OF DEPOSIT.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

SIR: At the time my father died he had money deposited in both banks in this place. I knew of the deposit in the A bank, but not of the deposit in the F bank. I am his only heir and the deposit in the A bank, was transferred to me. Recently I received notice of a claim for collection from the F bank and paid the same at the bank with a check on the A bank. Even then they did not tell me of the deposit, and I only learned of it several months afterwards by finding my father's pass-book. Can I not recover damages from the F bank for concealing from me all knowledge of the deposit, as it caused me embarrassment, and especially so at the time I paid the collection in its hands?

G. M.

*Answer.*—From your statement we cannot see that the F bank did anything affirmatively toward a concealment of the deposit. If it knew you had no knowledge of it, its conduct was certainly reprehensible, but we do not consider their conduct actionable. On the other hand, if it attempted to conceal the deposit from you in any manner, other than by silence or negative acts, we think you could recover any damages you sustained.

## DRAFT ATTACHED TO BILL OF LADING.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

SIR: Our house shipped a consignment of paper on the order of a publisher in N, attaching the bill of lading to a draft for the amount of the order and sending it to the bank at N. The bill of lading was so indorsed as to give the bank control of the possession of the goods, and they were only to be delivered on payment of the draft. The bank allowed the drawee of the draft to take the goods without payment, and the draft has not been paid. We are

advised that this was the same as a wrongful conversion on account of the bank, and that we may hold it accordingly. Is this so? BROKER.

*Answer.*—Yes. You can hold the bank individually for the amount.

---

#### DEPOSITORS' AGENT.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

WICHITA, Kans., March 9, 1901.

SIR: I have kept a deposit in a bank at W authorizing the bank to pay the same out on checks drawn by my agent in payment for wheat bought by him at the elevator. This has been going on for three years, and accounts are rendered to me by my agent as I request them. The bank knew that the money was mine and also my purpose in keeping it there. I have just found out, on appointing another agent, that during the last year over \$800 was applied by the bank to money due it from my former agent. Can I recover this money of the bank or must I look to my former agent for it? BANK DIRECTOR.

*Answer.*—You can recover it from the bank.

---

#### GARNISHMENT OF NEGOTIABLE PAPER.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

DETROIT, Mich., Feb. 18, 1901.

SIR: We have numerous experiences in connection with service of garnishment on us aiming at funds supposed to be in our hands. We would like the favor of your carefully considered opinions as to the liability we would be under on the following propositions: On the first of the month, we certified at request of X, and delivery to him his check payable to L; on second of month we are served with garnishment in suit of B against L, and warned verbally at time of service not to pay the certified check, as the funds alleged to be in our hands are being attached. If the check should be presented by L would we have the power or be under obligation, to detain it? Could we safely pay it to L? We also issue negotiable certificates of deposit payable to order of depositor. Are we under any obligation to take cognizance of a garnishment served against money so deposited, and disclose the fact that a negotiable certificate has been issued; and must we detain this certificate if presented by payee, or decline to pay and hold the funds? PRESIDENT.

*Answer.*—The laws of the different States are conflicting as to the right of garnishment in cases of negotiable paper. But the courts of Michigan hold that garnishee process is not available where the paper is not overdue and still negotiable. In *Littlefield vs. Hodge* (6 Mich. 328) it was said: "Garnishee process is not, we think, properly applicable to such paper, until it has ceased to become negotiable, by falling due. The debtor cannot know certainly in whose hands his obligation may be when it matures, and his admission that such a note is outstanding cannot be effectual as an admission of indebtedness to the original holder, of such a character as to be a continuing liability in his hands." And in *Korp vs. National Bank* (76 Mich. 679) this principle was applied to a certificate of deposit issued by a bank. In that case, the Court said: "The object of the garnishee law is to furnish reasonable facilities for reaching property of the debtor due him, or held for him by third persons. But it never was intended to deprive a garnishee of any of his own rights or to subject him to the danger of double actions. Where bank paper is out, and subject to transfer, the bank may not have any means of knowing, and cannot be compelled to hunt up, at its peril, the possible holders, or to pay any one but the holder. Usually, it is entitled to have the paper produced and delivered up before payment." The same reasoning would apply where a check has been certified by a bank; for in such case the bank would be primarily liable on the instrument, and, as respects the holder, would be in the same position as where it has issued a certificate of deposit. The same rules would apply in Minnesota. (*Hubbard vs. Williams*, 1 Minn. 54.)

## LIFE AND FIRE INSURANCE.

### LIFE ANNUITIES.

To pay a stipulated sum on the termination of a particular life, and to pay a stipulated annual sum until the termination of a particular life—this is the radical difference between an insurance on life and an annuity on life. The latter is very nearly the former reversed. One begins when and where the other ends. One pays in periodical installments and draws out a lump sum which may probably exceed them; the other pays in a lump sum and draws out installments which may equal or even exceed the principal, but probably will fall short of it. In either form of transaction the interest of the individual is opposed to that of "the company" (i. e. all the other members) considered as a cold moneyed question. In life insurance the sooner the man dies the larger the money returns for his estate and the worse for the company, which wants to get the utmost premiums out of him, and the longest use of them; but the sooner the annuitant dies the sooner the company is rid of a burden and the poorer does his bargain prove.

What is called "selection" is against the company, in both cases. The more doubtful a man feels of his longevity the more ready he is to take life insurance and the surer to hold fast to it after he has it; hence the company is compelled to impose a physical examination or it would become loaded with weaklings. This power of relection is quite equivalent, as to the effect on mortuary experience, to the positive power of going out into the public places and haling men in as policy holders. On the other hand, there could be no better business than issuing annuities if the company only had this power of apprehension. As a financial proposition the company desires feeble and already-marked folk, who will make their deposit and depart within a year or two; but the man who thinks he has only a very short term left would scorn an annuity—he would prefer to spend his principal himself.

So there is no medical examination, and no question is asked except about age, which alone governs the rate. This rate is expressed as the purchase-money for a \$100 annuity or as the amount of annuity which \$1,000 will buy, the only difference between these being in the form of expression. The rate of return ranges from just inside six (at age forty) to about 21 1-3 per cent. annual interest (at age eighty five); the annuity depends solely on age at starting, and remains uniform to the last. It is plain that these rates are more than money is worth, and that the company always begins—and continues—by paying out more than it can earn.

This is a losing transaction which is explained by its being a speculation in chances of survival. It is such on both sides, and sometimes the result is strikingly speculative. Nearly forty years ago, one man of about seventy-five deposited \$700 for an annuity of \$131, and lived twenty-nine years, having drawn \$3,739. In another case an accident company found itself saddled with a \$500 annuity on a widow, as part settlement on a policy. Her prospects were good, and the company sought to purchase the claim outright, as was entirely legitimate, but she refused to sell; in a few months she unexpectedly died, and what we are forced to call "luck" declared itself on the company's side. In another recent case, a man died before he was able to call for his first annuity, and his executors were at first struck with the injustice of his having received no return, but thought better of it. They were wrong; he received his equal chances, and if a company did not sometimes win annuities would be impossible.



Annuities figure considerably as one method of settling insurance policies and are useful thus ; but this is a form we do not at present consider. A "deferred" annuity calls for annual premiums during a term of years, and begins the annuity at the end of such term. The total cost is less, because involving the chance of parting with a steadily increasing deposit in case of death before the annuity age is reached.

Whether life annuities are desirable cannot be stated broadly ; they are so when they fit the case. The sinking of the principal—always the foundation of the whole transaction—should always be remembered. That very fact (and only that) enables large returns to be had from the money ; but whether it is wise and right to buy them depends upon the individual case, and of this every man must be his own judge.

One use of annuities, however, may be approved almost without reserve—for servants and for most small legatees in preference to a lump sum entrusted to weak hands where it is very liable to be lost. A simple nature, unused to money and trustful because experience has not come to teach caution, can be much better guarded by a simple annuity.

The comparatively small use of life annuities in this country does not condemn them. Our Government deals with them only in the familiar form of pensions. Our life insurance companies have not cared to press them greatly, and the solicitor in the field has not been attracted by them. The financial and social conditions here have not favored them, but are beginning to do so. In consequence there is a marked although quiet increase in their issues. They have their distinctive points of value ; they are certain, very remunerative for their term, free from worry, and conducive to longevity. Where they apply they are excellent indeed.

#### TRouble AMONG THE FRATERNALS.

The oldest rule in finance is that high interest means poor security. It is quite possible to pay five per cent. a month on deposits, but if the banker disappears at the end of a half year the depositor can think it over ; if the process continues longer, or even if the rate goes as high as ten per cent. weekly and is so paid for a while (as in case of the Brooklyn "money mill" last year) the process is the same always—it is easy to pay one man supposed interest out of his own principal or that of others, until the thing breaks of its growing weight.

An equally certain rule is that—with temporary exceptions and qualifications admitted—inadequate purchase-price means either bad quality in goods or failure to deliver.

Stated compactly, the difference between regular level-premium (sometimes called Old Line) life insurance and the assessment class is that one uses a commuted or averaged charge and the other attempts an unsuccessful compromise line between such average and an unaveraged rate. The natural or purely mathematical charge, conformed exactly to the increasing annual risk of dying, increases annually ; but because nobody would consent to pay an increasing rate the table rate is averaged, being too large in the early years and too small in some of the later. On the contrary, the assessment plan—originally strictly *post-mortem* and excluding reserve—has undertaken reserve only as compelled to and still tries to get along with what is adequate only for "term" or temporary insurance. Often the insurance has been clipped in settling claims ; the organization itself has broken down in many cases ; and some, of which the Mutual Reserve Fund is best known, are now struggling to get out of the slough to firm ground.

To use an illustration which bankers will appreciate, the regular or level-premium is like a corporation that issues long-term bonds and at once begins a steady process of accumulating a sinking fund against them. The other plan, as ordinarily begun, issues such bonds and not only omits the sinking fund but is certain to have

diminishing resources, later on ; at its best, it makes only a partial provision and reserves the right to try, when the pinch is felt, to make some further one.

Life insurance does not go by favor or by luck. In the matter of mortality experience all companies are under the same natural conditions, and while there may be small differences temporarily and poor management can raise mortality above the average, nothing can avail to depress it below. Hence, on the broad side, what one can do all can do.

"Fraternal" have had some advantage over other assessment associations in that they have had a better *esprit de corps* and hence more persistency in the membership. But even the oldest and largest of these are in stress, and, last year, officers of the National Fraternal Congress appeared before the assembled State insurance commissioners and urged them to recommend to their several legislatures the enactment of laws to establish minimum premium rates by fraternal. This means that when associations get into trouble and are forced to revise their charges upward they are further harassed by promoters who launch new associations at tempting rates, which makes it harder to get new young members and retain the younger part of existing membership. The statutes do not dictate the scale of level-premiums, not establishing either a minimum or a maximum. If a company should start with a plainly inadequate rate table, or if one should weakly cut its table, State commissioners would very surely use their discretionary power to deny it a license, but the law provides only for technical insolvency after the fact ; it does not in terms try to regulate premiums. This fraternal appeal is therefore unusual. In response to it, bills have appeared in some States prohibiting any new associations at lower rates than the net rates (*i. e.*, rates without the customary "loading" for expense) approved by the National Fraternal Congress, these approved rates being about one-fourth below those of the standard level-premium tables. Another response is a movement in the Northwest (just taking form when this article was written) to found another national association in opposition to the present Congress and its attempt.

---

#### FIRE UNDERWRITING IN 1900.

Some men in business—it might be inaccurate to call them business men—come to grief because they drift along without seriously undertaking to find out the net result of their operations. Others make the attempt but bungle in doing it ; and others, perhaps, err in the method itself.

It is not often easy and probably is rarely possible to determine this with exact certainty. The point in the story about the small trader who said he had made a fine profit that afternoon, and admitted he had occupied it in marking up the goods on his shelves, is solely in the impossibility, not only of making values what one wishes but of knowing just what stock on hand is really worth. It might be imagined that insurance, which does not need to take account of stock in just that way, could have no embarrassment in balancing a year's account ; yet underwriters do not agree upon the method. Roughly speaking, income is premiums, against which are set losses and expenses. Losses paid evidently cannot be taken, because a year might carry over to the next a heavy sum of claims not due ; hence losses incurred are the important factor. Thus the official report, part I, issued last month, shows that ninety-four fire companies operating in this State (pretty nearly divided among the home companies, those of other States, and the foreign ones) had losses incurred of a little over two millions more than their premiums less the estimated one-third for expenses ; sixty-nine had \$916,247 excess of premiums, leaving a net shortage of \$1,132,877. The National Board use another method of computation. Against the net premiums of the year (*i. e.* the gross premiums less the not very considerable amount paid for reinsurance of portions of risks considered too large to prudently

carry alone) is set the sum of losses paid and management expenses during the year. The difference between these two amounts ought to be, and in many cases is, a plus quantity, *i. e.*, an excess of premiums; but whatever it is the increase or decrease in liabilities during the year is compared with it, adding or subtracting as the case might be. Stated in other words, losses paid and expenses, plus any increase or minus any decrease in liabilities, are compared with premiums, and the net difference is the year's profit or loss. As an example, one company comes out thus :

Premiums received in 1900.....	\$2,055,688
Losses paid in 1900.....	\$1,152,042
Expenses paid in 1900.....	786,412    1,938,454
	<hr/>
	+ \$117,184
Deduct increase of liabilities in 1900.....	188,622
	<hr/>
Underwriting loss.....	— \$71,438

This method uses losses paid instead of those incurred and makes the changes in liabilities a factor. It is the more correct method because it more nearly conforms to the fact that no one year is a complete period of underwriting. For liability on account of unearned premiums (or reserve) does not move exactly with premium receipts. This would be so if premiums were evenly distributed through the year, and if risks were all written for the same term; but since premiums may bunch up near the close of the year (as well as for other causes of liability), a company may show an apparent excess of premiums over outgo, and yet be in a worse condition of balance for the year's operations if it were then to close accounts and retire.

On this method of computation, while nearly a third of the companies had premiums somewhat in excess of paid losses and management expenses, three-fourths of them increased their liabilities; so that twenty-seven made an underwriting profit in 1900 and 187 made a loss, meaning by this (as above explained) that 187 could have closed out at the end of 1899 in a better condition than they could do so now. Carrying the inquiry further back, we have :

	<i>Gain.</i>	<i>Loss.</i>
1900.....	.....	\$7,797,852
1899.....	.....	18,423,862
1898.....	.....	1,919,650
1897.....	\$9,116,045	.....
1896.....	12,300,126	.....
1895.....	8,884,328	.....
1894.....	9,963,171	.....
1893.....	.....	10,410,102
1892.....	.....	6,877,489
1891.....	.....	9,218,797
1890.....	2,843,984	.....
1889.....	.....	5,369,963
1888.....	671,621	.....
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	\$43,904,225	\$59,522,565
Net loss 1888-1900.....		15,618,340

This condition is certainly disturbing, if not discouraging. Its causes and mode of remedy may be difficult to ascertain, but the need of so doing is clear.

---

**An Old and Successful Bank.**—The State Savings, Loan and Trust Company, of Quincy, Ill., is one of the old and successful banking institutions of the West. It is successor to the well-known banking firm of L. & C. H. Bull, established in 1881, having been reorganized a few years ago under its present title with \$300,000 capital. It is examined annually and makes quarterly reports to the State Auditor.

The progressive nature of the management is shown by the attractive character of the advertising matter issued calling attention to the various features of the business—commercial banking, Savings bank, safe-deposit department, trust department and mortgage loans.

The officers are: President, W. S. Warfield; Secretary and Cashier, Edward J. Parker; Vice-Presidents, Charles H. Bull, S. B. Montgomery.

## IS MR. BELLAMY'S PROPHECY TO BE FULFILLED ?

[From "Looking Backward," by Edward Bellamy.]

The organization of labor and the strikes were an effect, merely, of the concentration of capital in greater masses than had ever been known before. Before this concentration began, while as yet commerce and industry were conducted by innumerable petty concerns with small capital, instead of a small number of great concerns with vast capital, the individual workman was relatively important and independent in his relations to the employer. Moreover, when a little capital or a new idea was enough to start a man in business for himself, workingmen were constantly becoming employers and there was no hard and fast line between the two classes. Labor unions were needless then, and general strikes out of the question. But when the era of small concerns with small capital was succeeded by that of the great aggregations of capital, all this was changed. The individual laborer who had been relatively important to the small employer was reduced to insignificance and powerlessness over against the great corporation, while, at the same time, the way upward to the grade of employer was closed to him. Self-defence drove him to union with his fellows.

The records of the period show that the outcry against the concentration of capital was furious. Men believed that it threatened society with a form of tyranny more abhorrent than it had ever endured. They believed that the great corporations were preparing for them the yoke of a baser servitude than had ever been imposed on the race, servitude not to men but to soulless machines incapable of any motive but insatiable greed. Looking back, we cannot wonder at their desperation, for certainly humanity was never confronted with a fate more sordid and hideous than would have been the era of corporate tyranny which they anticipated.

Meanwhile, without being in the smallest degree checked by the clamor against it, the absorption of business by ever larger monopolies continued. In the United States, where this tendency was later in developing than in Europe, there was not, after the beginning of the last quarter of the century, any opportunity whatever for individual enterprise in any important field of industry, unless backed by a great capital. During the last decade of the century, such small businesses as still remained were fast failing survivals of a past epoch, or mere parasites on the great corporations, or else existed in fields too small to attract the great capitalists. Small businesses, as far as they still remained, were reduced to the condition of rats and mice, living in holes and corners, and counting on evading notice for the enjoyment of existence. The railroads had gone on combining till a few great syndicates controlled every rail in the land. In manufactories, every important staple was controlled by a syndicate. These syndicates, pools, trusts, or whatever their name, fixed prices and crushed all competition except when combinations as vast as themselves arose. Then a struggle, resulting in a still greater consolidation, ensued. The great city bazaar crushed its country rivals with branch stores, and in the city itself absorbed its smaller rivals till the business of a whole quarter was concentrated under one roof with a hundred former proprietors of shops serving as clerks. Having no business of his own to put his money in, the small capitalist, at the same time that he took service under the corporation, found no other investment for his money but its stocks and bonds, thus becoming doubly dependent upon it.

The fact that the desperate popular opposition to the consolidation of business in a few powerful hands had no effect to check it, proves that there must have been a strong economical reason for it. The small capitalists, with their innumerable petty concerns, had, in fact, yielded the field to the great aggregations of capital, because they belonged to a day of small things and were totally incompetent to the demands of an age of steam and telegraph and the gigantic scale of its enterprises. To restore the former order of things, even if possible, would have involved returning to the day of stage-coaches. Oppressive and intolerable as was the regime of the great consolidations of capital, even its victims, while they cursed it, were forced to admit the prodigious increase of efficiency which had been imparted to the national industries, the vast economies effected by concentration of management and unity of organization, and to confess that since the new system had taken the place of the old, the wealth of the world had increased at a rate before undreamed of. To be sure this vast increase had gone chiefly to make the rich richer, increasing the gap between them and the poor; but the fact remained that, as a means merely of producing wealth, capital had been proved efficient in proportion to its consolidation. The restoration with the subdivision of capital, if it were possible, might indeed bring back a greater equality of conditions with more individual dignity and freedom, but it would be at the price of general poverty and the arrest of material progress.

Was there, then, no way of commanding the services of the mighty wealth-producing principle of consolidated capital, without bowing down to a plutocracy like that of Carthage? As soon as men began to ask themselves these questions, they found the answer ready for them. The movement toward the conduct of business by larger and larger aggregations of capital, the tendency toward monopolies, which had been so desperately and vainly resisted, was recognized at last, in its true significance, as a process which only needed to complete its logical evolution to open a golden future to humanity.

Early in the last century the evolution was completed by the final consolidation of the entire capital of the nation. The industry and commerce of the country, ceasing to be conducted by a set of irresponsible corporations and syndicates of private persons at their caprice and for their profit, were intrusted to a single syndicate representing the people, to be conducted in the common interest for the common profit. The nation, that is to say, organized as the one great business corporation in which all other corporations were absorbed; it became the one capitalist in the place of all other capitalists, the sole employer, the final monopoly in which all previous and lesser monopolies were swallowed up, a monopoly in the profits and economies of which all citizens shared. In a word, the people of the United States concluded to assume the conduct of their own business, just as one hundred odd years before they had assumed the conduct of their own government, organizing now for industrial purposes on precisely the same grounds on which they had then organized for political ends. At last, strangely late in the world's history, the obvious fact was perceived that no business is so essentially the public business as the industry and commerce on which the people's livelihood depends, and that to entrust it to private persons to be managed for private profit, is a folly similar in kind, though vastly greater in magnitude, to that of surrendering the functions of political government to kings and nobles to be conducted for their personal glorification. \* \* \*

The change had been long foreseen. Public opinion had become fully ripe for it, and the whole mass of the people was behind it. There was no more possibility of opposing it by force than by argument. On other hand the popular sentiment toward the great corporations and those identified with them had ceased to be one of bitterness, as they came to realize their necessity as a link, a transition phase, in the evolution of the true industrial system. The most violent foes of the great private monopolies were now forced to recognize how invaluable and indispensable had been

their office in educating the people up to the point of assuming control of their own business. Fifty years before, the consolidation of the industries of the country under national control would have seemed a very daring experiment to the most sanguine. But by a series of object lessons, seen and studied by all men, the great corporations had taught the people an entirely new set of ideas on this subject. They had seen for many years syndicates handling revenues greater than those of States, and directing the labors of hundreds of thousands of men with an efficiency and economy unattainable in smaller operations. It had come to be recognized as an axiom that the larger the business the simpler the principles that can be applied to it; that, as the machine is truer than the hand, so the system, which in a great concern does the work of the master's eye in a small business, turns out more accurate results. Thus it came about that, thanks to the corporations themselves, when it was proposed that the nation should assume their functions, the suggestion implied nothing which seemed impracticable even to the timid. To be sure it was a step beyond any yet taken, a broader generalization, but the very fact that the nation would be the sole corporation in the field would, it was seen, relieve the undertaking of many difficulties with which the partial monopolies had contended.

---

### AMERICAN BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL IN NEW YORK, APRIL 24 AND 25.

A meeting of the Executive Council of the American Bankers' Association will be held at the Lawyers' Club, Equitable Building, 120 Broadway, New York city, April 24 and 25, the sessions beginning at 11 A. M. Prior to that date the chairman of the council, Mr. Caldwell Hardy, President of the Norfolk National Bank, Norfolk, Va., would be pleased to have the members of the council send him suggestions regarding any measures they may desire to bring to the attention of the council.

The place for holding the next annual convention will be decided on at this meeting, and the educational work and other matters of interest to the association will be considered.

The principal contestants for the next convention will be Milwaukee and Buffalo, the chances of success appearing to favor the former city.

---


**THE STOCK OF GOLD.**—In the annual report of the Director of the Mint for the year 1900 there is published a large amount of correspondence with foreign bankers, steamship agents, etc., relating to the invisible gold exports and imports. From the results of the investigations the Director estimates that an annual allowance of \$500,000 should be made for gold permanently lost to the circulation by being carried out of the country by travellers, and that while the investigation had not been completed, enough was known to indicate that the stock of gold in the country was at least \$50,000,000 less than officially reported.

---

**AMERICAN ENTERPRISE.**—In the "North American Review" for March, Charles R. Flint reviews the business situation in the United States, and cites the following as an illustration of how American enterprise is pushing our products into distant markets :

"I know no better illustration of the far-reaching control of our mechanical perfection than the fact that we are to-day shipping lumber from this country to South America, transporting it by rail, reloading on vessels and carrying it through one thousand miles of forest along the Amazon, to lay it down finally in an interior town of Brazil cheaper than it can be manufactured at the very doors of this town by the crude processes employed there."







## REFORM IN METHODS OF TAXATION.


The following thoughtful suggestions in regard to taxation are from an address before the last annual meeting of the Michigan Political Science Association, by Harvey J. Hollister, Cashier of the Old National Bank, Grand Rapids, Mich.:

"Our present system of taxation does not bear upon all equally. The demand for reform is pressing and, as another has well said: 'We face a transition period in taxation and the practical question is whether inevitable changes shall be evolutionary or revolutionary,' and further adds: 'The result will depend upon whether these changes shall be directed by intelligence and experience or by ignorance and prejudice.'

That conditions have existed in the past, and still exist, involving glaring injustice, continuing from year to year without protest, is known to those who have been in the thick of business affairs. You who are engaged in the activities of business life will bear me out in this broad statement. Many are bearing heavier burdens than justice demands, simply because others are unwilling to bear their true share. Certain forms of property never escape taxation, for they are subject to observation. The humble home invariably bears its full share and, as a rule, constitutes the sole possession of its owner. The home of the wealthy neighbor also bears its full share, each property being assessed, we will say, at its proper valuation, but here the equality stops; the assessor goes no further and in many cases the personal property which constitutes the larger portion of its occupant's wealth remains undiscovered, he having found himself unable to go further. This for reasons many—some good and some otherwise. One or two instances bearing upon this matter, out of many that I might give, will sufficiently illustrate my statement. I may properly say here that the persons referred to have gone where the subject we are to discuss to-day does not enter; at least, that is our hope.

One gentleman, whom I had long and favorably known, usually uncommunicative, in an unusual outburst of confidence, informed me that he was receiving a net income from bonds, mortgages and other taxable securities of not less than \$15,000, and that he was paying taxes upon \$5,000 of personal property. I remonstrated with him, reminding him that he was shifting a portion of the burden that was justly for him to bear upon other shoulders. He replied that the assessor had placed that sum upon his books and that he had not felt it imperative to see that the figures were increased. Another quite similar instance occurred, where, however, the income was considerably larger from various taxable property and securities, the assessment being the same as in the first instance.

In each of these cases, the gentlemen were men of high standing and undoubted integrity. Neither of them would for a moment have felt it right to have withheld from an individual the last cent to which he was entitled, but somehow—you can tell how, as well as I—strict responsibility ceased with these gentlemen when it had to do with the impersonal. I am only stating facts that have been duplicated many



HARVEY J. HOLLISTER.

times within the knowledge of the observant man. It is this condition of affairs, growing more and more serious from year to year, that arouses public attention as never before, and so serious is it that the question may well be asked, will the inevitable changes that must occur be evolutionary or revolutionary?

During the larger part of the last four years the State has had this subject presented earnestly, if not always in the wisest way, by our late Governor, and some legislation has been enacted having for its object the solution of this vexed and vexing question. Doubtless there is more of legislation to follow: how wise it will be, time only can tell. Already a commission, the powers of which to some seem extraordinary, has been instituted and much hard work has been done by it. Much of its work, I venture to say, has been of a very uncomfortable nature. It has, as we well know, pursued its duty with energy and, as I believe, with the sincere purpose to act justly according to the facts obtainable, but, as a rule, working under great difficulties that in some cases must have seemed insurmountable. This must continue to be so from the very nature of the duties imposed, although the law with its dignity is behind the commission. I have only words of commendation for the work of that commission, so far as the effort has been made on the part of its members to bring hidden things to light, thus making the unequal equal, so far as seemed possible. Must such a body having in view the best interests of all, be compelled forever to seek—yes, ferret out—the hitherto unobserved taxable properties that have thus far escaped taxation? Is the individual conscience, sensitive enough to its responsibility to the individual, to have no sense of civic responsibility? Passing strange, yet is it not too true, that there are many who see no wrong, no injustice, in placing undue burdens upon the public who would repudiate such action toward the individual?

On the other hand, corporate interests, however useful and sacred, must with equal intent recognize the rights of the humblest individual. The people, as a whole, are to be the masters and controllers of events and not the few who, by reason of temporary conditions, seem for the time being to hold the reins.

The importance of good tax laws was the subject upon which I was invited to speak, but how can we have good laws and have those laws operative unless the individual—singly or collectively—recognizes the duty of standing on a higher level of responsibility and action? The ethical side of this question, shun it as we may, is after all the real side. That the ethical side is looming up and claiming universal attention is cause for sincere gratitude, for otherwise how could legislation, as now enacted or to be enacted, do more than work upon the outside? 'To transfer the didactic into the practical is the task that awaits the teacher of the twentieth century.'

To-day we are witnesses to the fact that certain persons are transferring personal property to other States where the same may, for the time being, escape observation and taxation. This line of action has gone on, too, in the face of the fact that until now they have never borne their full share of the current expenses of the State, a demand never onerous, in proportion to benefits received, if equally shared by all. The lamentable fact exists that there are not a few of our citizens that seem to be utterly oblivious to the privileges and benefits that the State has conferred. What State has treated her citizens more generously, conferred upon them greater freedom of action or more enlarged opportunities—as a native of this State and always a resident I ought to know whereof I speak—and under an equitable system of taxation would place lighter burdens upon property? Let the citizen seriously consider this side of this burning question, learn to treat the State as a person and friend, and I believe it will go far toward that satisfactory solution for which many men are longing. The continued social and industrial prosperity of our people depends upon the attaining of justice, so far as that is possible, in the collection and expenditure of public moneys."

## THE NATIONAL DEBT OF RUSSIA.

[From the "Russian Journal of Financial Statistics."]

The national debt of Russia is of comparatively recent origin. The predecessors of Peter I and the great reformer himself were able, without having recourse to public credit in any of its modern forms, to meet the extraordinary needs of long years of wars and internal commotions. An issue of copper tokens at a forced rate



M. DE WITTE, RUSSIAN MINISTER OF FINANCE.

[From "The World's Work," by permission of Messrs. Doubleday, Page & Co.]

(1656), a loan of twenty thousand roubles made in 1619 on the King of England and almost as soon repaid, benevolences levied on rich private individuals and on monasteries, concessions of licenses or privileges, the enhancement of taxes and the periodic alteration of the coinage\*—such are pretty nearly all the extraordinary resources of which the Russian State availed itself, during a century and a half (1619–1768), in order to manage Sweden, Turkey, Poland, etc. One may believe that recourse to public credit, supposing that it had been possible, would have had for Russia of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries less grievous consequences than the excesses of taxation to which the central power had to resign itself. Not to mention the

\* At a time when the price of the pood (36.11 lb avoirdupois) of copper on the market varied between four and six roubles (or an average of five roubles per pood, or seven pounds equal one rouble), Peter the Great ordered the issue of copper coin at the rate of 12.8, 15.4, twenty and finally forty roubles to the pood (or nine pounds equal ten roubles).

innumerable evils which they imposed upon contemporaries, these fiscal excesses had as their necessary consequence if not the establishment of serfdom (which *de facto* already existed throughout Eastern Europe) at least the tightening to the last degree of tension of the bonds which attached the peasant to the soil.

It was but one hundred and thirty-two years ago, at the beginning of the reign of Catherine II, that the Russian Government really made its first appeals to public credit. The means employed were such as the age admitted—issues of assignats (inconvertible currency) and the placing abroad of loans of small amount repayable at short term—four, at the most, eight, years. All governments have long cruised on board the unfunded debt before sighting the port of the consolidated debt. The foreign loans, almost all realized through the intermediary of an illustrious Amsterdam house which still exists, the Hopes, were generally concluded at a less rate of interest than that at which France borrowed in Holland. They were not, however, destined to attain any importance until the second half of the nineteenth century; at the death of the great empress, the amount outstanding did not exceed £8,000,000.

The assignats, on the contrary, were not long in presenting a considerable total. Issued at first with prudence (9,000,000 of roubles for the first two years, 1769-1770), they rendered immense services in a country where there existed no other circulating medium than a very trifling stock of copper coin. Then appeared the inevitable abuses of this financial expedient, the yielding to the allurements of a resource considered at first as exceptional. Paper money is, as is known, the morphine of the financial pharmacopœia; it is a remedy the more dangerous that one administers it oneself, while the conclusion of a foreign loan necessitates a consultation of doctors (represented by a syndicate of bankers). The ministers of Catherine II had moreover the excuse of successful wars, of immense accretions of territory and of a manifest expansion of the economic forces of the country. Thus it was that, by 1803, the issues of assignats reached the figure, formidable for that time, of two hundred and fifty million roubles.

It is, however, to be borne in mind that the effective circulation of the assignats, among the public always remained much below the totals which figure in official documents. A fraction of the notes issued were to be found at any moment in the hands of the innumerable paymasters. Was this fraction a fifth or even a quarter? This may indeed be granted, although it is impossible to prove it.

The wars of Napoleon caused a new deluge of paper money, as shown in the table below, borrowed from the classical work of M. Brzeski:

YEARS.	—So-called assignat-roubles.—	
	New issues.	Amount outstanding by Dec. 31.
1804.....	10,858,550	290,658,550
1805.....	31,540,580	292,199,110
1806.....	27,040,850	319,239,960
1807.....	63,099,545	382,339,505
1808.....	15,089,075	477,398,580
1809.....	55,832,720	533,231,300
1810.....	46,172,590	479,373,890
1811.....	2,620,520	581,994,400
1812.....	64,500,000	645,894,400
1813.....	103,440,000	749,334,400
1814.....	48,791,500	798,125,900
1815.....	27,697,800	825,823,700
1816.....	5,690,000	831,423,700
1817.....	4,573,300	836,000,000

The loans issued between 1817 and 1822,\* for the withdrawal of part of these

\* These funds still figure to-day, for a total amount of some importance, in the national debt of the Empire. They are the inconvertible loans: five per cent. 1820, five per cent. 1822 and six per cent. 1817-1818. The greater part of the bonds of 1822 are payable in roubles and in pounds (at a fixed exchange ratio: Rouble 1 equal 3 s. 1 d.).

assignats, gave birth to the debt payable in silver roubles. This debt existed undoubtedly before 1817, but the elements of which it was formed were not in general anything other than : (a) funds delivered in exchange for property acquired by the State, and (b) what long constituted a flaw in the financial organization of Russia—securities placed at the disposition of the public services and furnishing them, in the form of interest received on bonds every year, the equivalent of incompressible (but dilatable) budgetary grants.

The withdrawals of the period 1818–1823 reduced the remainder of assignats issued to 595,776,310 roubles, a figure which was not subject to any modification during the twenty years following.

On January 1, 1824, the national debt of Russia (exclusive of Poïand) could be valued at a little over £60,000,000, namely :

Funded or consolidated debt payable in florins.....	£4,000,000
Funded or consolidated debt payable in silver roubles.....	a30,000,000
Unfunded debt, bearing interest.....	3,250,000
Unfunded debt, not bearing interest.....	b27,000,000
Total.....	£64,250,000

a The securities of the first category and a considerable part of those of the second were placed in Holland. The Dutch *rentiers* are the most ancient, the most constantly faithful and, relatively, the most important of the purchasers of Russian funds.

b Roubles 595,776,310 assignats reckoned at about 11 d. (average and almost constant exchange during the period 1825–1840).

Here, the same observation is to be made as above. The bonds and assignats forming this total of £64,250,000 were not all in the hands of the public, whether Russian or foreign. The coffers of the Treasury retained an appreciable part of it.

Two wars, the one with Persia (1826), the other with Turkey (1827–1829), and the Polish insurrection (1831) resulted in the addition of nearly £20,000,000 to the debt of the Empire, which, in 1837, presented a total of £80,000,000.

In 1842 began the first railway loans (the St. Petersburg–Moscow line). The credit of Russia attains a level—if not a depth\*—which it was not destined to surpass till forty-eight years later (during the ministry of M. Vyshnegradski, 1887–1892). The Russian Minister of Finance, Count Vronchenko, bought in 1847 of the Bank of France at the rate of one-hundred and fifteen and three quarters per 100, two million francs of French five per cent. *Rente* and, at the rate of 77.95, 142,000 francs of three per cent. *Rente*, for the aggregate sum of £2,000,000.

One year after (June, 1848), the French five per cent. *Rente* was at fifty per cent. (owing to *ateliers nationaux*, etc.). In 1849, Russian troops were pacifying Hungary. And yet Russia was able, in the beginning of 1850, to issue in London, at an actual rate of interest of five per cent., a loan of £5,500,000 (the so-called first four and one-half per cent. loan, the remainder of which was redeemed in 1891).

#### THE RUSSIAN DEBT FIFTY YEARS AGO.

On the eve of the Crimean War, Russia as yet possessed but 621 miles of railways open to traffic, and her debt funded and unfunded, including the excess of the note issues over the total bullion, was near £144,000,000.†

\* To have an excellent credit (to find money at moderate interest) does not mean that one has a vast credit (that one is in a position to place a considerable loan, even at an onerous rate of interest). Kankrin, the Russian Minister of Finance from 1823 to 1844, was able to borrow below five per cent; he could not have found a lender, even at five and one-half per cent. for a sum of £12,000,000.

† An author whom we have quoted before and who is justly held to be an authority, M. Brzeski, gives the figure as 1,034,124,435 silver roubles (over £160,000,000 at the exchange of that time). But he acknowledges implicitly that he takes no account of the coin and bullion. This item reached 123,700,000 roubles (about £20,000,000).

After the liquidation of the expenses of the Crimean War, of those of the final pacification of the Caucasus and of those of the second Polish insurrection, that is about January 1, 1864, the £144,000,000 of 1853 had more than doubled. At the beginning of 1864, the Russian railway system—for the most part concessions\*—as yet reckoned but 2,175 miles fully open to traffic, and the operation of the redemption connected with the emancipation of the serfs was only just beginning.

The incorporation of the Polish debt in the Russian budget, the completion of the emancipation operation (for which purpose securities to the amount of 600,000,000 roubles were issued, the balance of which was converted in 1891-1894), the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1879, the pacification of Central Asia and the vigorous impulse given to the construction of the railway system from 1867 to 1886, brought the net total of the national debt on January 1, 1887, to £524,000,000. At that time, the net revenue of the total Russian railway system had never reached, for any one financial year, £9,500,000.

#### THE PRESENT ELEMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN DEBT AND THE CAUSES OF ITS INCREASE SINCE 1887.

On January 1, 1900, the consolidated debt of Russia amounted to £656,000,000:

(1) Nine-tenths of it is composed of three per cent., three and one-half per cent. and four per cent. loans, while, thirteen years ago, the four and one-half per cent., five per cent., five and one-half per cent. and six per cent. funds alone formed more than three-quarters of the Russian debt. The conversions, owing to which this metamorphosis has been effected, have had the result of increasing the nominal capital of the debt by about £40,000,000 (and of yielding a real economy to the Treasury, on the service of the interest alone, of about £2,500,000 a year).†

(2) Between January 1, 1887, and January 1, 1900, there were incorporated in the budget of the national debt £140,000,000 of redeemed railways securities and £13,500,000 of (four and one-half and five per cent.) gold bonds of the former Mutual Land Credit Society (bonds whose origin goes back to the period 1863-1877.)

(3) From 1887 to 1900, the State constructed, from the general resources of the budget, railways of considerable importance, one of which alone, the Trans-Siberian, has cost up till now over £52,000,000.

If, notwithstanding the augmentations which it would seem should result on these three heads (more than £240,000,000), the national debt, during the last thirteen years, has after all increased but £80,000,000, this is because: (1), for 1887-1899, the fulfillment of the ordinary budgets balanced with a total surplus of £103,000,000 (of which £80,000,000 was for 1887-1898); (2), during this same period of thirteen years the normal action of amortization (referred to the ordinary budget) wiped off more than £40,000,000 worth of bonds, and (3), the total unpaid and not yet effected expenses‡ are about £40,000,000 above what they were thirteen years ago.

(4) The bullion exceeding the total issues of notes and Exchequer bills, there is no longer any unfunded debt (unless the so-called unpaid expenses be reckoned as such).

\* The sixth four per cent. gold loan of 1894 (454,400,000 francs) was devoted entirely to the redemption of a part of the conceded lines, which were already open to traffic in 1864 (Great Railway Company).

† The Russian loans converted and redeemed in cash between 1887 and 1900 amounted—at the dates of their respective redemptions—to the grand total of £441,662,000. This explains the extensive and uninterrupted issues of new securities by the Russian Government in the period 1887-1900. During these fourteen years the Russian Treasury, by means of new loans, did not receive a single farthing of capital more than the old capital it repaid its former creditors.

‡ Corresponding, to a certain degree, to paymaster-general account in England (see end of p. 13 and beginning of p. 14).

(5) The net revenue of the State railway system alone, for the average of the two financial years 1897-1898, exceeds £14,000,000.

(6) The extent of the State railway system having increased by more than 5,600 miles from January 1, 1897, to December 31, 1899, that is in three years, it is to be presumed that the net revenue of this system in 1900 will be near £16,000,000, an amount more than sufficient to meet half the expenditure required by the service of the national debt.

#### NATIONAL DEBT OF RUSSIA, JANUARY 1, 1901.

On January 1, 1901, the remainder of the Russian loans entering into the Public Debt reached the general total of £656,547,764, consisting of the following :

##### *Nominal Interest (Gross).*

	<i>Capital.</i>	<i>Interest.</i>
3 per cent. loans.....	£20,165,250	£1,804,958
3½ " ".....	16,524,783	578,367
3.79 " ".....	4,758,091	180,332
3.80 " ".....	8,995,900	341,844
4 " ".....	503,658,332	20,226,333
4½ " ".....	28,649,528	1,289,229
5 " ".....	27,726,929	1,386,346
6 " ".....	4,068,942	244,137
Total.....	£356,547,764	£26,051,546

**The Flatbush Trust Co.**—This prosperous institution was opened for business July 20, 1890, its capital being \$200,000 and the paid-in surplus \$100,000. Within a year from the date of its opening the deposits had grown to \$639,590, and on January 1, 1901, they amounted to \$797,247, while the total resources were \$1,113,403.

This gratifying increase in business is due to several causes: first, the business was established where it was needed; second, the territory tributary to the institution is a very attractive residential part of the city and is growing rapidly. Another factor in the company's success is to be found in the management, which is exceptionally strong. The officers are: President, William Brown; Vice-President, John Z. Lott; Second Vice-President, John H. Ditmas; Third Vice-President, Gustave A. Jahn; Secretary, Edmund D. Fisher. Following are the directors: George M. Boardman, of Paterson, Boardman & Co., New York; William Brown, President; F. A. M. Burrell, of Chas. A. Schieren & Co., New York; Pomeroy Burton, New York World, New York; Geo. C. Case, lawyer, Brooklyn; Warren Cruikshank, of E. A. Cruikshank & Co., New York; Henry B. Davenport, lawyer, Brooklyn; John H. Ditmas, Second Vice-President; Hon. Edmund H. Driggs, Member of Congress, Brooklyn; William Halls, Jr., Vice-President Hanover National Bank, New York; George M. Henderson, real estate, Brooklyn; F. W. Holmes, of F. W. Holmes & Sons, New York; Gustave A. Jahn, Third Vice-President; John Lefferts, Jr., of Sutphen & Lefferts, attorneys, Brooklyn; John, Z. Lott, Vice-President; G. W. Maynard, Mechanics' Bank, Brooklyn; George A. Needham, treasurer Remington & Sherman Co., safes, New York; Lewis E. Pierson, Cashier New York National Exchange Bank, New York; Dick S. Ramsay, President Hide and Leather National Bank, New York; Walter L. Tyler, of the A. B. See Manufacturing Co., New York and Brooklyn; A. W. Schmidt, treasurer Germania Real Estate and Improvement Co., New York and Brooklyn; Alexander C. Snyder, of Ross & Snyder, lumber, Brooklyn; Richard Young, President Richard Young Co., New York.

Counsel, Henry D. Lott.

In order to present properly the beauties of the part of the city where the institution is located, the company has issued an attractive book under the title of "Flatbush, Past and Present." It is a most interesting history of the ancient town of Flatbush, which has now become one of the most progressive and attractive sections of the Greater City. The book is handsomely printed and bound and contains many fine illustrations.

**Water Supply for Bank and Other Buildings**—One of the best ways of pumping water is by the use of heated air in a Rider or an Ericsson Hot Air Pumping Engine. These engines take up very little room, are absolutely safe and require very few repairs. They can be placed in the corner of a cellar or shed and require but little attention. In short, there is no better method of obtaining a water supply than by the use of these combination engines and pumps. An advertisement of the Rider-Ericsson Engine Company appears in our advertising pages.

## ASSOCIATED BANKS MUTUAL GUARANTEE ASSOCIATION.

---

***A SYSTEM WHICH WILL PREVENT RUNS ON BANKS AND INSURE DEPOSITORS SECURING PROMPTLY ONE HUNDRED CENTS ON A DOLLAR FROM INSOLVENT BANKS.***

---

Whenever the country passes through a period of financial depression or experiences hard times, the depression is intensified and the hard times prolonged from the fact that some banks fail during such times, and the confidence of people in all banks is more or less weakened.

A moment's consideration will show how lack of confidence in banks operates to intensify a depression.

A bank fails; it has many depositors, and they know that the bank will be in the hands of a Receiver for years, and after the bank is finally wound up they will only get twenty, forty or sixty per cent. of their money, as the case may be; rumors begin to circulate about some neighboring banks and depositors begin to withdraw their deposits; in the first place, to be sure of getting one hundred cents on a dollar, and in the second place to have their money where they can get hold of it if they require to use it.

The money held by banks on deposit is largely loaned to business and manufacturing firms on notes. Deposits being withdrawn, the borrowers must be called upon to pay their notes; in many cases this is difficult, for the manufacturer has the money tied up in raw materials which must be converted into the finished product, sold, and pay obtained before the borrowed money can be returned. The banks, however, must have the money they have loaned to meet the demands of depositors who are making withdrawals, and they are especially insistent with firms which they consider weak. The inevitable result is that many weak firms are crowded to the wall and go into the hands of Receivers. The money they owe to other firms is locked up sometimes for a long time and their creditors seldom get one hundred cents on a dollar even after long delay. Thus the depression spreads and extends, getting continually worse until the lowest point is reached; weak institutions have gone into insolvency, and public confidence gradually but slowly becomes re-established; depositors return their money to the banks, new loans are made, business extends and prospers and the country resumes its normal condition.

I do not want it understood that I consider the withdrawal of deposits from banks the cause of financial depression. The causes of financial depression are far deeper and more complex, but I do maintain that every financial depression is intensified and prolonged by the extensive withdrawal of deposits through the lack of confidence of depositors in the stability of the banks.

Let us consider if we can not devise some simple system, easily understood and easily worked, which will insure absolute confidence of all people in banks and remove every possibility of depositors making a run on a bank as the result either of an idle rumor or, as is unfortunately sometimes the case, the truth leaking out, that some bank is unsound and in financial distress. Many a really sound bank has been wrecked through an unfortunate and ill-timed run of depositors at some critical period. All will admit that runs on banks would become a thing of the past and an



impossibility if every depositor in every bank could be made to feel that every cent he had on deposit was absolutely safe and that even if the bank should fail, he could at any time draw out his money in full, without a day's delay or the loss of a penny. All will admit that such a condition of affairs is greatly to be wished for and there is no question but that such a condition can be easily and economically brought about.

The last century is noted for many things, but it is noted for nothing more than for the enormous development of insurance companies which insure the lives both of men and beasts against accident and disease in every form, and of property against destruction by fire, flood, lightning and storm, and even the credits which business men extend to customers. The number of insurance companies in this country is legion, the objects for which they are organized are innumerable, but in all this vast array no company has been organized to insure the depositors in banks against loss by the failure of the bank. It is certain that runs on banks would be a thing of the past if an insurance company was organized with this object in view, and was established on such a sound and secure basis that every depositor in the bank insured would have absolute confidence that, in case of failure, his deposit would be paid instantly in full, if he chose to call for it.

The manufacturers of this country have worked out a system of mutual fire insurance which is simple and economical and may well engage the attention of bank directors. In the mutual fire insurance companies there is no capital stock. Each manufacturer pays into the treasury at the beginning of the year his premium of one per cent. or whatever it may be. In case so many mills are destroyed by fire that the money in the treasury is insufficient to meet the losses, he is liable for an additional assessment, but no manufacturer can be assessed more than five times the amount of his premium on his policy. As a matter of fact, these mutual companies never make assessments, but the premiums are sufficient to pay all expenses and losses and leave a balance of from eighty to ninety per cent. of the premium to be returned at the end of the year. One of the manufactories under the management of the writer paid a premium of one per cent. on \$25,000, amounting to \$250 annually, and received back each year for a number of years over eighty per cent. of the premium, or more than \$200 annually, making the cost of insurance less than one-twentieth of one per cent. These mutual companies are carrying over a billion dollars of insurance at the extremely low rate mentioned because the companies are purely mutual; no stock, no advertising, no expenses except a regular and thorough inspection of each plant once in three months. The losses are low because every plant must be equipped with automatic sprinklers, fire-pumps, night watchman and everything which long experience has shown to be necessary to prevent a fire from getting a start and to enable it to be promptly extinguished if it does get a start. Any plant which will not fully comply with the requirements of the inspectors will promptly have its insurance cancelled. Mutual insurance companies do not solicit insurance, but the manufacturing plant wanting insurance has to solicit the company to give them insurance and have to comply with all demands in the way of protection before a policy will be issued. Each plant usually has one vote for directors for each ten thousand dollars of insurance it carries.

This magnificent system of insurance has been built up to enormous proportions because it is cheap, because it settles claims promptly and never makes contests, and because, by its rigid system of inspection and rigid requirements, it has enormously reduced the percentage of fire losses among the manufacturing plants it insures.

There is no reason why a similar system of mutual insurance can not be devised by the banks of this country for their protection against loss by runs and lack of confidence. A number of banks could send delegates who would elect directors and

they in turn would elect the officers. The only paid officer would be the secretary, and the only employees would be inspectors. An assessment would be levied on each bank in proportion to its capital. At the end of each year the unexpended portion would be returned with the exception of a small amount which would go to establish a gradually increasing reserve fund. Each bank in the mutual company would be subjected to a thorough inspection at regular intervals, and if its affairs were not up to the requirements of the company, the bank would have to meet the requirements or the policy would be cancelled. Each bank would notify the public that all their depositors were insured by the Associated Banks Mutual Guarantee Association and the public would be made to understand that if any bank insured in this company should fail, the company would immediately send an agent or make arrangements with some neighboring bank to pay depositors in full at once.

Banks insured in such a company would rarely or ever fail, for they would be regularly and thoroughly inspected, and they would never be subjected to runs. How could any body of depositors ever take alarm and make a run on a bank, if they knew that hundreds of banks and several hundred million dollars were back of that particular bank, and that in case of failure there would not be the delay of a day in drawing out their money if they should want it.

The fact is that the insurance company would probably never be compelled to pay a loss, for it would only insure depositors, and it would be almost impossible for a bank under this system to lose more than its capital stock, and if its assets were sufficient to pay the depositors, the insurance company would not be called upon to pay anything.

What are the advantages and what are the objections to the system suggested? Among the advantages may be mentioned the facts spoken of at the beginning. It would prevent depositors from losing confidence in any bank no matter what rumors were circulated; it would prevent runs on banks; it would prevent the withdrawal of capital from banks and consequently from business and manufacturing enterprises and therefore lessen the intensity of panics.

There are really no objections to the system. The expense would be small compared with the enormous benefits gained by the banks and the general public. Many strong banks will say that they have no need of such insurance; that their affairs are sound; their surplus and reserves are large; that everybody knows they are all right; that no run could be made on their bank, and even if one were made, it would not seriously damage them. While all this is true of many banks, it is equally true that when a bank fails many people lose confidence in all banks, and at such times all banks suffer. The objection may be made that National banks are now subject to inspection and further inspection would be useless, but National banks fail occasionally in spite of inspection, and such inspections do not inspire depositors with the confidence that a system of insurance would give.

The matter is well worth the serious attention of bankers. If some system can be devised which will enable depositors of failed banks to be paid in full at once, it will be a great boon to the public in every section of our country. No one knows what hardships have been experienced by business men who have unexpectedly found money they had on deposit and intended for use, suddenly tied up, sometimes for years; nor what actual and serious suffering have been endured by widows and orphans who had money in some bank upon which they were living, and of which they were deprived by the failure of the bank and of which they finally received back only a small portion after years of weary waiting.

The expense of this system of insurance will be small; the possible benefits are large; the system suggested is worthy of a trial.

CHARLES T. RAYMOND.

LOCKPORT, N. Y.

## THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF BANK CLERKS.

---

Provision was made at the last annual convention of the American Bankers' Association for the organization of an institute of bank clerks, and the sum of \$10,000 was appropriated for that purpose. For some time the committee on education has had the matter under consideration, and a definite plan of organization and work has now been formulated. The institute is styled the American Institute of Bank Clerks. An idea of its general scope may be gained from the following extracts from the constitution :

1. To unite fraternally and socially through local chapters or otherwise all those engaged in different localities in the banking business, or who intend to become connected with it, either as officers of banks, trust companies or Savings banks, or as bankers, or as clerks of banks, trust companies, Savings banks or banking houses, who desire to improve themselves by devoting a portion of their time to the study of the matters connected with the banking business.

2. To specially train all who become associated with the institute in those branches of practical education which have a direct bearing upon the business of banking.

3. To originate and circulate literature relating to the practice and science of banking and of business administration.

4. To afford to those associated with the institute the advantages of lectures upon business methods, the principles of banking, the science of finance, applied economics, commerce, accounts and other subjects of practical value to them.

5. To conduct for the benefit of those associated with the institute a correspondence school of banking, under the charge of a competent faculty.

6. To conduct examinations of bank clerks and others associated with the institute with respect to their technical qualifications, and to issue certificates setting forth the results of such examinations.

The correspondence school of banking provides for instruction in penmanship, spelling, grammar, composition and rhetoric, business correspondence, shorthand, typewriting, commercial geography, financial and commercial history, bank arithmetic, double-entry bookkeeping, bank bookkeeping, practical banking, commercial law, government, practical finance. Fees for instruction in these branches are to be as follows :

**REGISTRATION FEE**—In each and every course (time unlimited), \$1; always payable in advance.

**COURSES OF STUDY**—Preliminary examination, all necessary lesson papers, progressive examinations, final examination and award of certificate of improvement and proficiency (time unlimited), as follows :

Penmanship, spelling, English grammar, each \$4.

Composition and rhetoric, business correspondence, shorthand, typewriting, commercial geography, financial and commercial history, bank arithmetic, each \$8.

Double-entry bookkeeping, bank bookkeeping, practical banking, commercial law, each \$12.

Government, finance, each \$20.

Payable in quarterly installments, in advance. Those who pay in full in advance may omit the registration fee.

---

The course of study has been selected with evident care, and perhaps could not be much improved on, though we should like to see the French, German and Spanish languages added as soon as practicable; doubtless this could not be done until the local chapters are organized.

There are many persons who have misgivings as to the value of instruction on the correspondence plan, though it is manifestly of material advantage to those who can

not otherwise procure an education. But it is not improbable that when the local chapters become fully organized the educational work will be carried on largely through their instrumentality. A substantial service has been done by the institute in indicating the studies that should be pursued, even though a course of instruction should be taken elsewhere than through the correspondence school.

The American Institute of Bank Clerks appears to have made a good beginning in the important work that is to engage its attention, the better education of bank clerks in those branches which have a direct bearing on the business in which they are engaged.

**NEW BANK BUILDINGS.**—There are perhaps more new bank buildings being put up or remodelled and improved than at any previous time in the history of the country. Even in many of the smaller cities the banks are putting up pretentious structures and fitting them up in a style that a short time ago would have been regarded as extravagant. A substantial building is no doubt a good advertisement for a bank, and often the increased patronage following expenditures for such purpose soon reimburses the bank for its outlay. The improved buildings generally add to the facilities for doing business.

The present tendency seems to be to erect buildings one or two stories in height, using all the rooms exclusively for the bank. This gives a characteristic appearance to the structure and also permits superior lighting; but in places where real estate is high, it puts a considerable amount of money in a form yielding no returns. On the other hand, in many cases, where large office buildings are put up the investment becomes more or less speculative.

Upon the whole, the marked increase in the number of fine bank buildings in the past few years may be taken as an indication that the banking institutions of the United States are experiencing a season of solid prosperity.

**The Securities Company.**—This corporation was organized to do business in New York city in July, 1899, and by its statement of December 31, 1900, has assets amounting to \$7,563,890.86. It may give a better idea of the company's present standing to publish the statement in full, as made on the above date. The complete figures are:

ASSETS.		LIABILITIES.	
Stocks and bonds.....	\$4,238,209.87	Capital.....	\$1,700,000.00
Mortgages.....	1,091,939.61	Surplus.....	700,000.00
Real estate.....	950,666.01	Undivided profits.....	74,312.42
Bills and accounts receivable....	307,739.28	Dividends payable Jan. 15, 1901...	42,500.00
Accrued interest receivable.....	106,218.11	Consols outstanding.....	4,842,172.96
Cash.....	820,117.38	Sundry accounts payable.....	136,742.58
		Interest accrued and taxes unpaid.....	69,162.30
Total.....	\$7,563,890.86	Total.....	\$7,563,890.26

Ample protection for the company's obligations is afforded by the assets, and the substantial difference between the resources and liabilities, and a further guaranty is to be found in the management, which is made up of men well and favorably known in the financial world.

Charles M. Preston, formerly Superintendent of the Banking Department of the State of New York, is President; Charles M. Jesup, who was Second Vice-President of the Metropolitan Trust Co., of New York, from 1890 to 1899, is Vice-President. The Secretary and Treasurer is Andrew J. Miller, and the Assistant, Edwin G. Woodling. The directors are: R. Reading Bertron, Otto T. Bannard, George Coppel, John W. Farquhar, Wm. Duryea, Benjamin Graham, Charles M. Jesup, W. O. Jones, Hon. John Kean, United States Senator from New Jersey; Charles M. Preston, Wm. Rotch, Alexander C. Robinson, G. Henry Whitcomb.

Both capital and large capacity for financial management are represented in the above list of names. Among the successful operations of the company may be mentioned the financing of several large corporate enterprises, such as street railways and other important undertakings.

## THE CONVENTIONS OF THE AMERICAN BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine :*

SIR : The growth of the American Bankers' Association and its increasing capacity to do good work for the banking interests make it of importance that all its methods shall be up to date and in accordance with the wishes of those who constitute its membership and the delegates who attend the conventions.

The executive council is to meet in New York, April 24th and 25th for the purpose of arranging the programme, time and place of the next annual convention. Heretofore the council has only taken one day for its meeting. The necessity of allowing more time for the consideration of the business of the association at the meetings of the council has long been apparent. I have attended a number of the conventions, and have been impressed at the last three with the confusion with which business is carried on, and how often the real interests of the association are only imperfectly considered. The trouble has seemed to me to arise in great part from the lack of orderly arrangement of the programme. The opening exercises and business, the consideration of banking and economic topics by invited speakers, the nomination and election of officers, and the social entertainment, are all mixed together so that each branch interferes with the proper treatment of the others. The selection of the new members of the executive council (fixing up a "slate" in advance), seems to occupy an undue part of the time of the executive council's clerk (known as secretary), and of some of the association's officers then in power. There is too much lobbying and caucusing. In fact the whole air of the convention and its surroundings is rather that of a political caucus, than of a meeting for calmly discussing plans for the betterment of banking interests. The confusion of the programme is a great weapon in the hands of the lobbying element.

There may be no regular way to close debate on a disagreeable subject, but the announcement that the train or boat on which some excursion is about to start has the same effect. Delegates who are in an excited state of mind over the success of a favorite candidate cannot listen with much equanimity to the reading of papers and the delivery of addresses by experts upon the subjects treated of.

The secretary is the chief salaried officer of the association. He is elected every year by the council. It is natural that the incumbent should desire to secure his re-election. Every year one-third of the council retire and new members are elected to replace them. The secretary, of course, desires that these incoming members shall be favorable to his continuing in office. Having considerable weight with the existing council, he lobbies with them for the new candidates who will be favorable to his interests. The new councilmen are made to feel that the secretary has brought them into notice and secured them the shining honor of their selection. The delegates at large have little to do with this selection. Under present methods they merely ratify the nominations which are practically made by the secret influences of the organized executive of the association. The secretary should either be made a permanent officer during satisfactory behavior, or there should be a return to the old plan of making some prominent bank officer honorary secretary, who will employ an assistant to do the routine work.

To remedy some of the defects of the procedure at the annual conventions, all business that relates to the nomination and election of officers should be transacted

at a session of the delegates especially set apart for that purpose, at which ample time should be given to conduct the business in an orderly and careful manner.

The nominations for president and vice-president should be made by the delegates in the manner suggested by Mr. Bradford Rhodes at the Cleveland convention, and since advocated in a letter to the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* by Mr. N. B. Van Slyke, one of the surviving organizers of the association at Saratoga in 1875. This will, of course, require an amendment to the constitution. It seems to me that the members of the council should be nominated in the way proposed by Mr. Van Slyke, viz.: one member of the council from each State Bankers' Association, or perhaps more than one according to what proportion of the membership of the State association are also members of the American Bankers' Association. This would tend to increase the membership of the latter.

The addresses and papers prepared in response to invitations should also have separate sessions of the convention set apart for them exclusively, so that the invited speakers should not be liable to be insulted by interruption and general distraction. The opening addresses and reports of committees and other business of the association, except the election of officers, should be attended to at a separate session subject to adjournment to such other time as may be convenient for its completion.

These matters might be regulated by the by-laws or by special rules which could be drawn up without any amendment to the constitution. It seems to me to be absolutely necessary for the satisfaction of the delegates and for the good of the association that some such rules should be adopted.

The conventions are not now run by the constitution and acknowledged by-laws so much as by a series of customs and precedents which are looked upon as almost too sacred to interfere with. Whenever any improvement is suggested these precedents, which have no foundation in the laws and constitution, are almost invariably cited in opposition to the manifest wishes of the delegates. The management of the association should be the pride of all the delegates and not the perquisite of a self-perpetuating clique.

S. D. M.

CHICAGO, April 2, 1901.

**Westchester Trust Company.**—Although comparatively a new institution, the Westchester Trust Company, of Yonkers, N. Y., has built up a very large and desirable line of business. Its deposits are now considerably over \$600,000, and the total resources are approaching the \$1,000,000 mark. This satisfactory condition is due to the fact that the company found a good field to work in, and besides the management is such as to merit public confidence.

The company transacts a regular banking and trust company business, acting as executor, administrator, guardian and trustee, and the policy of the company is to be of the greatest possible service to its patrons and others seeking its aid. The officers are: President, John Hoag, Vice-Presidents, Francis M. Carpenter, Howard Willets; Secretary, Charles P. Marsden. Its directors are well and favorably known, as may be inferred from the list given below:

Amzi L. Barber, president Trinidad Asphalt Co., New York; John E. Borne, president Colonial Trust Co., New York; Francis M. Carpenter, county treasurer, White Plains, New York; Edward F. Hill, secretary Union Stove Works, Peekskill, New York; John Hoag, ex-treasurer Westchester county, Sing Sing, New York; Robert E. Hopkins, Tidewater Oil Co., New York; Edson Lewis, ex-mayor Mount Vernon, New York; Richard P. Lounsbery, Lounsbery & Co., New York; Isaac W. Maclay, Maclay & Davies, New York; Daniel S. Remsen, Remsen & Parsons, New York; Henry Sidenberg, G. Sidenberg & Co., New York; Louis Stern, Stern Bros., New York; Samuel Thomas, president Chicago, Ind. and Louisville RY Co., New York; Robert B. Van Cortlandt, Kean, Van Cortlandt & Co., New York; Howard Willets, New York.

The company has been designated by the banking department as a legal depository for Savings banks and for lawful reserves of New York State banks and bankers, and has also been designated by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court as a legal depository for court and trust funds.

## ORGANIZATION OF BANK CLERKS.

---

On March 28 a largely attended meeting of bank clerks was held in the rooms of the Board of Trade and Transportation, New York city, for the purpose of forming a down-town chapter of the American Institute of Bank Clerks. S. Ludlow, Jr., of the Fourth National Bank, was elected chairman. Addresses explaining the scope and purpose of the institute were made by the president, Wm. C. Cornwell, and the secretary, A. O. Kittredge. President Cornwell spoke in part as follows :

"There is an impression throughout the United States that New York is conservative, and I believe this impression to be correct. Conservatism, however, does not mean rejection of good ideas, nor does it imply timidity or tardiness. To be conservative, in the sense in which I believe New York is conservative, is simply to hold fast to methods and systems which have been proven good and not to forsake them for others and newer ones until the latter have been found, by careful and radical investigation, to be better.

It has been repeatedly intimated to the officers of the American Institute of Bank Clerks that New York would be among the last to become actively interested in our educational work. Nobody has ventured to make any discouraging prophecies about the ultimate result, the pessimism of the prophets having been strictly confined to imaginary lukewarmness and lack of progress. If anybody has had any fears about the progressive spirit of New York, and personally I wish it understood that I have had none, such fears must be dispelled by the interest manifested at this meeting, and by the character and earnestness of those in attendance. A score of citizens throughout the United States are taking steps to organize local chapters, but New York is among the first to complete the preliminary work. The bank clerks of New York, by their ready and enthusiastic response, have demonstrated the fact that their conservatism has not deterred them from accepting something so manifestly to their advantage. They have shown their disposition to do their part in keeping New York where it belongs, in the front rank of progress.

Competition in every line is keener now than at any previous time in the history of commerce and finance. Only the best of people succeed in business life to-day. No man, if he hopes to rise in his profession, can understand his work too well, or master too many of its details. The competition in banking is sharp and its demands are constantly becoming greater, officials of the highest character and attainments are necessary, and reliance can only be placed upon subordinates who are able to outgrow their routine work and comprehend the scientific principles of banking and their relationship to general business. The competent bank clerk must have the respect of the customers of the institution in which he is employed, and the time is at hand when the fairly good man, so called, will have only a third-rate chance. If the American Institute of Bank Clerks shall succeed in elevating the standard of the working force in banks, it will have served its purpose.

New York is the financial center of America, and its present generation of bankers have proven themselves to be important factors in the substantial prosperity of our country. In trying times they have repeatedly shown their discernment, patriotism and courage. Their sterling worth will become more and more apparent as years go by, and it will be a source of satisfaction to them, as it is to me to-day, to realize that there is abundant material out of which to mould their successors, equally able and equally trustworthy, reflecting credit upon their profession, their city and their country.

But the bank clerks of this country have concluded that there are some things to be learned about their business which can be gotten at only slowly or not at all, in the daily routine of their work.

And the request for the formation of this institute came originally from the bank clerks themselves, in the form of a petition signed by several hundred clerks, and sent in to the committee on education two years ago. They wanted some sort of a plan put into operation, by means of which those who wanted to, could learn the practical things which would enable them to fill the positions they held more intelligently and satisfactorily, and to be prepared for promotions, if any were offered.

I need not tell you men gathered here to-day how difficult it is for a clerk on a lower round to learn anything about the work of the man next above him, or in another depart-

ment. The work of a bank clerk seems to be hedged about with a high wall over which he cannot see, and within which he is daily locked, confined and doomed to mechanical routine.

The object of this institute is to let him study what is going on outside this wall—to let him learn the use of the various branches of education as applied to the practical work of a bank clerk, so that the work he is doing may be done with a better knowledge of what it means, and how it should be done; also enabling him to do it better and to do more of it; enabling him also to accept higher and better paid work. If good luck or growing business sends it in his direction. Thus prepared he is standing, we will say, in center field, holding down his small plot of turf, but ready, by reason of alert eye and trained nerve and muscle, so that when Dame Fortune hurls the hot pigskin out his way, he places himself with quick skill in its course, unflinchingly meets it, holds it for the hundredth part of a second, and then with lightning strength, sends it speeding back to victory.

I am sure you appreciate the fact that the serious work of the institute must be done by each one of you individually. The chapter you are about to form, no matter how successful it proves, cannot take the place of hard individual work in the various branches which you choose to take up.

The meetings, however, with their discussions and addresses, will interest and make delightful the work of the student; and vitalized by the enterprise which you have shown thus early in inaugurating this branch, and guided by the wisdom I am sure you have in abundance, I predict for the down-town chapter a prosperous career in the front rank of the institute."

Brief talks were also made by William Sherer, Manager of the New York Clearing-House, and Bradford Rhodes, Editor of the BANKERS' MAGAZINE. In the course of his remarks Mr. Sherer said :

"It has been my good fortune to meet more bank clerks in the course of my experience than, perhaps, any other man, and I can say that no more intelligent, virtuous and deserving class of men exists in the United States than here. You should supplement these qualities now by more study. It remains for you to better yourselves by taking advantage of opportunities offered by the institute."

Committees were appointed to perfect the organization, and the meeting then adjourned.

The Alexander Hamilton Chapter, of Harlem, has also been organized with about forty members.

### NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

DOCKHAM'S AMERICAN REPORT AND DIRECTORY OF THE TEXTILE MANUFACTURE AND DRY GOODS TRADE. Boston: C. A. Dockham & Co.

This is a list of the manufacturers of and dealers in cotton, woollens, hats, etc., and is a valuable work of reference to all having relations with those engaged in these branches of business. That the work meets the requirements of its patrons is evidenced by the fact that it is now in the thirty-fifth year of its publication.

BANKERS AND MERCHANTS' INTEREST TABLES. By FRANCIS H. COFFIN and DAVID H. MOORE. New York: D. Appleton & Co. Price \$10.

We have just received from Messrs. D. Appleton & Company a volume entitled "Bankers and Merchants' Interest Tables," compiled by Francis H. Coffin and David H. Moore. This volume will be a valuable acquisition to the working system of every banker, broker, lawyer and large business house in general.

The computations are on the basis of 360 days per annum at  $3\frac{1}{2}$ , 4, 5 and 6 per cent. and there is a calculation of interest on every sum from \$1 to \$1,000. A page of calculations is devoted to every day from one to 126 days consecutively, and the rest of the year is figured by months, each month having a separate page. This method is followed for the four rates the book contains, and makes a more comprehensive set of tables than we have yet seen. A one per cent. one-day table on the basis of 365 days is embodied in the book for figuring interest on daily balances.

The volume is handsomely printed on excellent paper, and is bound substantially, and ought to prove a valuable business adjunct.



# CONDITION OF THE NATIONAL BANKS.

Abstract of reports of condition of National banks in the United States on Sept. 5, Dec. 13, 1900, and Feb. 5, 1901. Total number of banks Sept. 5, 8,871; Dec. 13, 8,942; Feb. 5, 1901, 8,999.

RESOURCES.	Sept. 5, 1900.	Dec. 13, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.
Loans and discounts.....	\$2,698,759,642	\$2,706,534,643	\$2,814,388,946
Overdrafts.....	23,130,598	41,682,539	36,968,829
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	294,860,130	306,622,180	317,916,390
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	102,811,380	101,414,820	101,749,780
U. S. bonds on hand.....	11,047,870	10,024,920	11,073,870
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	9,951,815	8,488,368	8,287,158
Stocks, securities, etc.....	387,255,545	373,479,621	391,438,492
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	81,209,233	82,375,256	82,596,860
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	26,002,369	26,006,292	25,363,718
Due from National banks.....	220,678,982	244,577,101	246,655,587
Due from State banks and bankers.....	64,972,431	73,682,522	72,390,968
Due from approved reserve agents.....	450,714,269	417,722,712	472,178,397
Internal-revenue stamps.....	1,470,910	1,448,459	1,273,005
Checks and other cash items.....	19,749,086	19,942,532	18,611,077
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	124,517,116	183,475,503	238,845,632
Bills of other National banks.....	25,416,866	24,708,730	24,978,528
Fractional currency, nickels and cents.....	1,241,387	1,257,946	1,375,719
Specie.....	373,328,410	359,672,224	399,956,143
Legal-tender notes.....	145,046,498	141,284,945	152,386,333
U. S. certificates of deposit.....	2,085,000	850,000	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund.....	14,244,066	14,832,543	15,423,179
Due from Treasurer U. S.....	1,620,068	2,610,830	2,444,169
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$5,048,138,499</b>	<b>\$5,142,069,692</b>	<b>\$5,435,906,257</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$630,299,030	\$632,353,405	\$634,696,505
Surplus fund.....	261,874,067	262,387,647	266,520,594
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes.....	127,594,908	141,506,613	132,988,589
National bank notes outstanding.....	238,948,631	206,917,320	309,466,046
State bank notes outstanding.....	52,231	52,231	52,231
Due to other National banks.....	609,652,961	581,694,283	655,570,230
Due to State banks and bankers.....	243,805,378	244,141,379	273,029,869
Due to trust companies and Savings banks.....	215,868,530	179,697,906	247,790,356
Due to approved reserve agents.....	27,209,179	38,901,889	28,684,680
Dividends unpaid.....	1,171,963	975,675	1,407,607
Individual deposits.....	2,508,248,557	2,623,997,521	2,753,999,721
U. S. deposits.....	87,596,246	87,992,732	88,709,088
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	6,221,742	6,385,362	6,323,388
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	6,000,740	4,924,761	8,439,066
Bills payable.....	10,645,714	10,877,991	7,347,556
Liabilities other than those above.....	27,918,568	27,073,920	25,970,423
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$5,048,138,499</b>	<b>\$5,142,069,692</b>	<b>\$5,435,906,257</b>

Changes in the principal items of resources and liabilities of National banks as shown by the returns on Feb. 5, 1901, as compared with the returns on Dec. 13, 1900, and Feb. 13, 1900.

ITEMS.	SINCE DEC. 13, 1900.		SINCE FEB. 13, 1900.	
	Increase.	Decrease.	Increase.	Decrease.
Loans and discounts.....	\$107,853,703	.....	\$332,868,401	.....
U. S. bonds.....	12,677,560	.....	67,482,980	.....
Due from National banks, State banks and bankers and reserve agents.....	55,172,252	.....	161,250,130	.....
Specie.....	40,283,919	.....	63,378,319	.....
Legal tenders.....	11,101,387	.....	29,919,839	.....
U. S. certificates for legal tenders.....	.....	\$850,000	.....	\$14,500,000
Capital stock.....	2,343,100	.....	21,612,040	.....
Surplus and other profits.....	.....	4,434,076	35,586,219	.....
Circulation.....	10,548,726	.....	104,553,500	.....
Due to National and State banks and bankers.....	160,420,678	.....	340,192,283	.....
Individual deposits.....	129,972,199	.....	272,122,686	.....
United States Government deposits.....	654,631	.....	.....	14,233,200
Bills payable and rediscounts.....	5,026,129	.....	579,124	.....
Total resources.....	203,816,565	.....	760,995,544	.....

## BANKING AND FINANCIAL NEWS.

This Department includes a complete list of NEW NATIONAL BANKS (furnished by the Comptroller of the Currency), STATE AND PRIVATE BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, DISSOLUTIONS AND FAILURES, etc., under their proper State heads for easy reference.

### NEW YORK CITY.

—The Garfield National Bank, located at Twenty-third street and Sixth avenue, has increased its capital stock to \$1,000,000, and has a surplus of \$1,000,000. These figures are larger than those of any other bank in the part of the city north of Pearl street.

On February 5 the official report to the Comptroller showed \$300,000 capital and \$800,000 surplus, so that the capital has been increased to five times what it was formerly and \$300,000 added to surplus. The resources of the bank on the above date were \$9,181,323.

This prosperity may be attributed to the very favorable location of the bank, which is in the heart of what is the greatest retail district in the United States; and the management of the bank has been such as to make the most of its fortunate situation. Its officers are: President, W. H. Gelshehen; Vice-President, Charles W. Morse; Cashier, R. W. Poor; Assistant Cashier, W. L. Douglass. Directors, James H. Breslin, James McCutcheon, W. H. Gelshehen, Charles T. Willis, Charles W. Morse, Harry F. Morse and Morgan J. O'Brien.

The bank's home is in the Masonic Temple, which affords especially good advantages for the large and growing business. As the bank was organized so recently as 1881, it will be seen that its progress and prosperity have been remarkable. In the year 1900 alone it paid a dividend of fifty per cent. on the original capital. For these shares \$1,600 has been offered and refused.

—City stock to the amount of \$2,500,000 was recently awarded to the firms of Kuhn, Loeb & Co. and Farson, Leach & Co., the price offered being 110.51 for all of the bonds. This puts the bonds on a basis of about 3.08 per cent. to the city as against a basis of 2.94 on which the last issue—3 per cents.—was sold. Comptroller Coler contends that the reason that the city did not get as good a price for the 3½ bonds is that, because of the new law taxing the surplus of trust companies for State purposes, the trust companies will not buy city bonds for their surplus investments. In speaking of the matter he said:

"The Legislature has imposed a direct State tax on trust companies, and has deprived the city of the power to tax the securities that they hold. City bonds are exempt from taxation except for State purposes. There is, therefore, no inducement to the trust companies to prefer New York city bonds to outside bonds which are an equally good investment, being as free from taxation as ours. The State gets the tax on the securities and what the State gains is our loss. I estimate that the new tax law has cost the city of New York at least \$50,000 on this bond sale. On account of it there has not been the interest among the trust companies in the sale that there would have been otherwise, and the city has had to pay the bill. There is no advantage to be gained by the trust companies in the purchase of our bonds now."

—On March 21 the New York County National Bank, for the third time in its history, paid a special dividend of 100 per cent. from the accumulated earnings.

—At a meeting of the directors of the Western National Bank, March 27, W. L. Moyer, of Butte, Montana, was elected a Vice-President. Mr. Moyer is one of the well-known and successful bank officers of the West. For nine years he was an officer and director of the American Trust and Savings Bank, Chicago, and more recently became managing partner of the firm of Daly, Donahoe & Moyer, of Butte. He has been secretary of the Illinois Bankers' Association, Vice-President of the American Bankers' Association for Montana, and is now a member of the executive council.

—Recently important advances were reported in the price of shares of the National City Bank and the National Bank of Commerce, the former selling at 660 and the latter at 441.

It is believed that the advance has been partly due to an impression in the public mind that the two banks have been considering the matter of consolidating.

—It is reported that efforts are being made to secure control of the stock of the Kings County Bank for the purpose of reorganizing the institution as a trust company, and that another bank may also be absorbed.

—Messrs. Zimmermann & Forshay recently invited subscriptions to the new German three per cent. gold loan (amounting in all to about \$72,000,000), at the official price of 87½ with interest added.

—Geo. W. Ely, for many years secretary of the Stock Exchange, but who recently resigned to become President of the Bankers' Trust Co., which was later absorbed by another company, has sold his seat in the Stock Exchange for \$55,000, the record price. Mr. Ely paid \$1,000 for his seat about forty years ago. He will probably retire from business and locate in California.

—Messrs. Isaac Sprague, Allen B. Forbes, Percy W. Brooks and John W. Edminson have been admitted as partners in the firm of N. W. Harris & Co. N. W. Halsey, heretofore a resident member of the firm at New York, has retired.

—The offer made in the circular issued by Messrs. J. P. Morgan & Co. on March 2, 1901, in behalf of the syndicate having in charge the reorganization of a number of corporations into the United States Steel Corporation, having been accepted by more than ninety-eight per cent. of the holders of stock in the several companies therein mentioned, the plan proposed in said circular has become operative. Messrs. J. P. Morgan & Co. now offer, by authority and for account of the United States Steel Corporation, in exchange for the preferred and common stock of the American Bridge Co. and for the stock of the Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines, respectively, certificates for preferred stock and common stock of the United States Steel Corporation upon the following basis:

For each \$100, par value, of preferred stock of the American Bridge Co., \$110, par value, in the preferred stock of United States Steel Corporation.

For each \$100, par value, of common stock of the American Bridge Co., \$105 in the common stock of United States Steel Corporation.

For each \$100, par value, of stock of the Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines, \$135, par value, in the preferred stock and \$135, par value, in the common stock of United States Steel Corporation.

The authorized capital stock of the United States Steel Corporation has been increased to \$550,000,000 of preferred stock and \$550,000,000 of common stock. The corporation has appropriated and has agreed to issue \$425,000,000 of such preferred stock and \$425,000,000 of such common stock under the contract referred to in said circular of March 2, 1901, and it proposes to issue the remainder of such authorized capital stock for future requirements and acquisitions.

—Rudolf Keppler has been nominated for a fourth term as President of the New York Stock Exchange. Other names on the regular ticket which will be voted for at the annual election of the Exchange on May 13 are: for secretary, William McClure; for treasurer, F. W. Gilley; for chairman, McPherson Kennedy; for trustee of the Gratuity Fund to serve five years, William Alexander Smith; for members of the governing committee to serve four years, J. T. Atterbury, W. W. Heaton, J. B. Mabon, J. H. Prall, R. H. Thomas, Louis C. Clark, Martin Erdman, J. W. Henning, William Robinson and H. C. Swords. The last five candidates are new men.

—On March 12 the stockholders of the Seventh National Bank voted to increase the capital stock from \$300,000 to \$500,000.

—A branch of the Corn Exchange Bank has been opened at 113th street and Broadway.

—The Consumers' National Bank is the title of a prospective institution to be formed with a capital stock of probably \$500,000. It will be backed principally by brewing and liquor firms.

—The New York County National Bank, located at Eighth avenue and Fourteenth street, and the West Side Bank, located at Eighth avenue and Thirty-fourth street, will in the future be more closely allied; the former bank having purchased a controlling interest in the West Side Bank.

The West Side Bank will continue under the management of Christian F. Tietjen, President, and Theodore M. Bertine, Cashier. This bank was organized in 1889, and has returned in dividends to its stockholders several times the amount of its capital, which is \$200,000, and has a surplus of \$488,000. It is believed that this connection will still further add to the prosperity which it has enjoyed in the past.

—Ernest Iselin, son of Adrian Iselin, Jr., has been admitted as a member of the firm of A. Iselin & Co.

—The name of the Sprague National Bank of Brooklyn has been changed to the Sprague National Bank of New York.

—Barkley Wyckoff, formerly Second Assistant Cashier of the Astor National Bank, has been elected Assistant Cashier to succeed Harris Fahnestock.

—In accordance with previous announcement the capital stock of the Lawyers' Title Insurance Company was, on March 15, increased from \$1,000,000 to \$2,000,000; seventy per cent.

of this increase was taken by the Central Realty Bond and Trust Company, the Equitable Life Assurance Company, James Stillman and others. The board of directors of the Central Realty Bond and Trust Company was increased by the election of James Stillman, President of the National City Bank; James H. Hyde, Vice-President of the Equitable Life Assurance Society; Henry Morgenthau, President of the Central Realty Company, and Thomas D. Jordan.

—Mr. Felix Schuster, Governor of the Union Bank of London, was a recent visitor to this city, being in the country for the purpose of making some observations of matters relating to international trade.

—The Bank of New York National Banking Association recently observed the 117th anniversary of its founding. On February 24, 1784, a meeting of merchants was held in the old Merchants' Coffee House for the incorporation of the bank, and on March 15, Gen. Alexander McDougall was elected President, and twelve directors were chosen. The constitution was drawn by Alexander Hamilton. The bank has paid 233 consecutive dividends to stockholders, amounting to \$16,291,694.75. For 104 years the bank has been located at Wall and William streets.

—Mr. J. P. Morgan, head of the firm of J. P. Morgan & Co., sailed for Europe on board the steamship Teutonic, April 8.

—The Continental National Bank was, on April 8, merged with the Hanover National Bank. Relations between the two banks have been close for some time, and owing to the fact that the business of the Continental National was not increasing, that taxation was growing, and that its building, on an expensive site, was not in construction and equipment of the character to be most suitable, and especially as the offer made for its shares was advantageous, it was deemed prudent to effect the consolidation.

Mr. Benjamin Perkins, President of the Continental National, has been elected a director of the Hanover National.

As the buildings of the two banks adjoin, it is considered probable that a new building will be erected on the site.

Reference has been made in a former number of the MAGAZINE to the remarkable growth of the Hanover National Bank in recent years. Its business will, of course, be substantially increased by the absorption of its neighbor.

#### NEW ENGLAND STATES.

**Boston.**—At a meeting of the board of directors of the State Street Trust Company, March 25, L. W. Wiggin was elected an Assistant Treasurer.

—James H. Crocker was recently elected Assistant Cashier of the Central National Bank.

—The directors of the National Hide and Leather Bank, on March 15, voted to recommend to the shareholders that the capital of the bank be reduced from \$1,500,000 to \$1,000,000.

—Alfred Ewer, National bank examiner of this city, has selected for his assistant Charles F. Johnson, Jr., of the National Bank of Redemption.

Mr. Johnson has served in various capacities in the bank named, and will succeed Maurice H. Ewer, who has gone to New York to fill the newly-created position of auditor in the National Park Bank of that city.

—The Third National Bank has reduced its capital from \$1,500,000 to \$1,000,000, returning \$500,000 in cash to the shareholders.

—On March 11 the Boston Associated Board of Trade adopted a report recommending that checks on seventy-eight banks in New England, outside of Boston, be deposited with the State Street Trust Company for collection by express. Under the present system these banks refuse to remit cash at par on the face of the checks drawn on them. The trust company will charge the actual expense of collection and depositors will be allowed to draw on checks in about four days.

It is said that as the only object which the out-of-town banks can have in making charges for remitting checks on themselves is to reap the exchange profit, it is believed that when that profit shall have disappeared and the full amount of the checks shall be paid in cash they will find it more to their advantage and convenience to join the clearing-house system and pay their checks each day by one draft on their correspondents in Boston or New York without charge. It is expected that the plan will go into effect on April 15.

—Messrs. Farson, Leach & Co., of Chicago and New York, are now represented in Boston by Henry W. Forbes, with an office at 95 Milk street.

**Bank Resumes Business.**—On March 19 the Ashaway (R. I.) Savings Bank, which was closed by the trustees on January 14, resumed business, depositors agreeing to forego interest for three years, and to accept a discount on withdrawals of eighteen per cent. the first year, twelve per cent. the second year and six per cent. the third year.

**Taxation of Bank Deposits.**—The following act was recently passed by the Legislature of Maine:

An act to tax interest-bearing deposits in trust and bank companies.  
Be it enacted, etc.:

Section 1. Every trust and banking company incorporated under the laws of this State shall, semi-annually, on or before the second Mondays of May and November, make a return to the State assessors, signed and sworn to by its Treasurer, of the average amount of its time interest-bearing deposits for the six months preceding each of said days, from which return the State assessors shall in each case deduct an amount equal to the amount of United States bonds, the shares of corporation stocks, such as are by law of this State free from taxation to the stockholders, and the assessed value of real estate owned by the said trust and banking company. For willfully making a false return the corporation Treasurer forfeits not less than five hundred nor more than five thousand dollars. Such Treasurer shall pay to the Treasurer of State on account of said deposits one-half of one per cent.

Section 2. One-half of said tax shall be assessed on the average amount of said deposits for the six months ending on and including the last Saturday of April, and the other half on such average for the six months ending on and including the last Saturday of October.

Section 3. This act shall take effect when approved.

### MIDDLE STATES.

**Philadelphia.**—The Fourth Street National Bank reports the following changes in officers: B. M. Faires, Second Vice-President; E. F. Shanbacher, Cashier, in place of R. H. Rushton (Mr. Rushton has been for some time both Vice-President and Acting Cashier); W. Z. McLearn, Assistant Cashier in place of E. F. Shanbacher and B. M. Faires.

—On April 2 the shareholders of the Girard National Bank voted to increase the capital stock from \$1,000,000 to \$1,500,000. This increase is consequent on the recent acquirement of the business of the Independence National Bank. Improvements are to be made in the banking rooms of the Girard National, including the construction of new vaults.

**Jersey City, N. J.**—The Greenville Banking and Trust Co. has purchased the building at Ocean and Lembeck avenues, Greenville, paying therefor \$35,000.

**Safe Deposit Vaults.**—The *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* some time ago called attention to the possibilities of profit in this line of business, and suggested that such a department might prove a profitable investment. The following, from a recent issue of the Port Jervis (N. Y.) "Gazette," bears out the pertinence of the suggestion:

"The case of safety deposit vaults put in by the National Bank of Port Jervis several weeks ago, mention of which was made in this paper, filled, evidently a long-felt want in this community; that is, it turns out to be but the beginning of the filling of the long-felt necessity, for the bank, because of the demand, has been obliged to order another case of fifty vaults which will be in readiness for use in a very few days. Residents of Port Jervis and those in the country for many miles about who have been renting safety deposit vaults in New York city, Middletown and Newburgh, realized quickly that it is more convenient to have safe keeping for their valuables at or near their homes where they can be reached very quickly if desired without the outlay of time and expense required by a trip to the above-named cities.

The cost is nothing compared to the sense of safety that one has concerning his valuable papers, heirlooms, jewelry, plate, etc. He is as certain concerning the safety as the officials of the bank are of the security of their money, for the safe deposit vault is within the steel vault of the bank with its bolts and bars and time lock and other appliances for security and the safety deposit vault itself is of chilled steel and the compartments of a similar material. There is no question about the security against fire and burglars.

The compartments in the vault are about two feet in length and are of the following depth and width: 3x5, 4x5, 5x5, 5x10 and 10x10 inches."

**Baltimore, Md.**—Alexander Brown, the well-known banker and financier, has resigned as director of a number of institutions and will take an extended European trip. His active connection with the banking house of Alexander Brown & Sons will continue as usual.

—It is announced that a majority of the shareholders of the Guardian Trust Co. have ratified an agreement to consolidate with the Maryland Trust Co.

—Thornton Rollins, who has been Vice-President of the Continental National Bank, was recently elected President to succeed Col. Wilbur F. Jackson, who retired on account of ill health. Mr. Rollins is a director of several important financial institutions and is well-known for his active business connections.

Geo. W. Moore, of the oyster and fruit-packing firm of Moore & Brady, succeeds Mr. Rollins as Vice-President.

—The People's Bank is to be reorganized as the Maryland National Bank, and the capital may be increased later on from \$200,000 to \$300,000. The People's Bank Building, at the corner of Sharp and Lombard streets, which was lately damaged by fire, is being reconstructed as a seven-story office structure. It will probably be ready for use in about three months.

—A call has been signed by the directors of the International Trust Company for a general meeting of the stockholders to consider and act upon a proposition to decrease the capital stock from \$3,000,000 to \$2,000,000 and to reduce the surplus of the company from \$1,500,000 to \$1,000,000. At present the stock and surplus is three-quarters paid, and to accomplish the proposed decrease it is contemplated to issue three shares of full-paid stock for every four shares of the present stock. This, with the cancellation of about \$250,000 of stock bought in the market, would carry out the plan.

—At a special meeting of the directors of the Citizens' Trust and Deposit Co., April 2, it was decided to recommend to the stockholders that the affairs of the company be liquidated.

**Newark, N. J.**—The Newark Trust Co. will begin business in the Roseville section of the city about May 1, with \$100,000 capital. Cyrus Peck and others are the incorporators.

**The Trust Company Tax.**—The New York Legislature has passed a law placing a tax of one per cent. on the capital and surplus of trust companies.

**Supervision of Foreign Banks.**—The Legislature of New York has passed an act providing for the examination and supervision of foreign bankers by the State Superintendent of Banks.

**Pittsburg.**—Some notable gains have been made by the National banks of this city in recent years. Compilations made by "The Pittsburg Banker" show that from February 4, 1899, to February 5, 1901, capital increased from \$12,150,000 to \$13,450,000, and the surplus and profits from \$11,638,576 to \$15,164,082. The total deposits rose in the same period from \$70,338,817 to \$108,273,627.

—The incorporators of the Consolidated Stock and Produce Exchange of Pittsburg have perfected their organization with total membership of 100, and nine directors. The officers chosen were John Montgomery, President; Thomas Hackett, Vice-President; J. C. Schaefer, Treasurer, and E. B. Simpson, Secretary.

—Business men of the south side are organizing the People's Trust Co., with \$250,000 capital.

—The Moreland Savings and Trust Co. is a new institution, headed by Andrew Moreland, formerly of the Carnegie Steel Co.

—The Pittsburg Trust Co., it is reported, is perfecting arrangements to issue 10,000 new shares of stock to be sold at \$400 a share. This will bring the total capital up to \$2,000,000 and \$4,000,000 surplus.

—A fine fifteen story office building, to cost about \$600,000, will be put up by the People's Savings Bank at Fourth avenue and Wood street.

The People's Savings Bank has a capital of \$300,000, a surplus of \$200,000 and undivided profits amounting to about \$83,000. Its officers are D. McK. Lloyd, President; Thomas Wightman, Vice-President; Edward E. Duff, Secretary and Treasurer. The directors are Judge Edwin H. Stowe, Thomas Wightman, William J. Moorhead, William R. Thompson, George Wilson, A. E. W. Painter, David P. Black, Robert Wardrop and D. McK. Lloyd.

—The clearing-house reports for March show that the local bank exchanges broke all records for the same month, and for any other month in the history of Pittsburg. They were exceptionally heavy, showing an increase over the same month last year of \$42,800,000, or considerably more than \$1,000,000 a day. Compared with the month of February, 1901, there was an increase of more than \$24,800,000. The increase in exchanges for the year to date was \$122,500,000 more than for the same period of last year, and establishes a new record.

—J. D. Callery and others are organizing the City Trust Co., to be located in the City Savings Bank building and to be closely affiliated with that institution, which is an old and prosperous bank.

**Binghamton, N. Y.**—The consolidation of the Strong State and the Susquehanna Valley bank with the First National Bank became effective on March 25, the capital being \$400,000 and the surplus \$150,000. Officers are: President, Wm. G. Phelps; First Vice-President, F. B. Newell; Second Vice-President, J. W. Sturtevant; Cashier, A. J. Parsons.

**Buffalo, N. Y.**—The Fidelity Trust and Guaranty Company has changed its title to the Fidelity Trust Co.

**Wilkes-Barre, Pa.**—The banks of this city have established a clearing-house. Geo. S. Bennett, President of the Wyoming National Bank, is President of the clearing-house, and George Flannigan, Cashier of the same bank, Secretary.

## SOUTHERN STATES.

**Savannah, Ga.**—There was a very marked increase in business in this city in 1900 compared with the previous year. Bank clearings rose from \$138,414,654 to \$248,313,824, or an increase of seventy-eight per cent. This is a greater gain than reported by any other city in

the United States or Canada, and compares with a decrease of 8.5 per cent. for the country at large.

**Augusta, Ga.**—A modern bank building is to be erected by the Georgia Railroad Bank, to be occupied by the bank exclusively.

**Atlanta, Ga.**—The Country Bank Stock Security Company, in which Wm. S. Witham was largely interested, is going out of business. Mr. Witham has recently retired as President of several of the banks which he has been connected with for some time.

—St. Julien Ravenel has resigned as a director of the Lowry National Bank on account of his removal to New York city, and has been succeeded by W. G. Raoul, a prominent capitalist who has been identified with several important successful railway enterprises.

**North Carolina Banks.**—On February 5, the condition of the State, Savings and private banks of North Carolina, as officially reported, was as follows (cents omitted):

RESOURCES.		LIABILITIES.	
Loans and discounts.....	\$10,245,321	Capital stock.....	\$2,718,069
Overdrafts.....	202,319	Surplus fund.....	582,125
United States bonds.....	23,900	Undivided profits.....	478,564
North Carolina State bonds.....	137,850	Dividends unpaid.....	12,947
All other stocks, bonds & mortg's.	630,507	Notes rediscounted.....	260,798
Premium on bonds.....	8,195	Bills payable.....	195,962
Banking houses.....	190,122	Time deposits.....	715,563
Furniture and fixtures.....	146,815	Deposits subject to check.....	10,060,049
All other real estate.....	220,038	Demand certificates.....	584,545
Demand loans.....	437,743	Due to banks.....	222,380
Due from banks.....	2,579,450	Cashiers' checks.....	87,256
Cash items.....	224,387	Certified checks.....	2,936
Gold coin.....	235,723	Miscellaneous.....	361,426
Silver coin.....	188,324		
National bank notes.....	511,810		
Miscellaneous.....	300,380		
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$16,282,590</b>	<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$16,282,590</b>

**Richmond, Va.**—The Hotel Jefferson, one of the finest hotels of the South, and known to many bankers of the country on account of the last convention of the American Bankers' Association having been held there, was destroyed by fire on the night of March 29.

## WESTERN STATES.

**Bank Books as Evidence of Depositor's Property.**—The Legislature of Indiana recently made some amendments of the law in regard to examining the books of a bank for evidence that a depositor is concealing taxable property. Through the courtesy of Mr. M. B. Wilson, President of the Capital National Bank, of Indianapolis, the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* is able to present the new law. In explaining the changes made by the act Mr. Wilson says:

"The law as it heretofore stood on the statute book allowed county tax assessors to demand a full list of the depositors in any bank in their respective counties, and the amount they had on deposit on April 1, as well as their names. The present law provides that an assessor can only call upon a bank for an individual's account when there is sufficient cause to suspect that he has not given in his full deposits. In other words, the law has deprived the assessors of the authority to make the bank a medium by which they may discover the financial condition of all the bank's customers."

Following is a complete copy of the act:

"Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Indiana, that Section 34 of 'An act concerning taxation, repealing all laws in conflict therewith and declaring an emergency,' approved March 6, 1891, be and the same is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 34. If in listing and assessing property for taxation, any township assessor or county assessor may have good reasons to believe that any person, firm or corporation within his jurisdiction has omitted to return for taxation any taxable property that should have been returned by such person, firm or corporation, then such township assessor or county assessor, as the case may be, may file his affidavit in the circuit court of the county wherein such tax return should have been made or with the judge thereof in vacation, setting forth his belief that certain property, to be named in the affidavit, has been unlawfully omitted from a certain specified tax return of a designated person, firm or corporation, within his jurisdiction, and that some other person, firm or corporation to be named in the affidavit, has in his or its possession certain specified books or papers containing evidence tending to show such unlawful omission of taxable property. Upon the filing of such an affidavit a writ shall forthwith issue and be served by the sheriff of said county, requiring the person, firm or corporation having possession of such books or papers to permit the inspection by the affiant of such books or papers, or so much thereof as may be specifically named in such writ and being only such books or papers, or so much thereof, as may contain evidence tending to show the unlawful omission of taxable property complained of in said affidavit. And the court, or the judge in vacation, issuing such writ shall, for the purpose of enforcing obedience thereto, possess and exercise all the powers usually possessed and exercised by it or him in contempt proceedings. Like writs may be issued and enforced upon like affidavits, made either by a county auditor, by the Auditor of State, by any member of a county board of review, or by any member of the State Board of Tax Commissioners. All costs incurred on account of the filing of an affidavit, the issue of a writ thereon, and the service of such writ, shall be a charge against the county in which such proceedings are had, and shall be allowed by the board of commissioners thereof.

Provided, however, if as a result of such proceedings, it is found that such designated person, firm or corporation have unlawfully failed to return property for taxation, then the county shall recover the costs from such person, firm or corporation. Every township assessor, county auditor, Auditor of State, board of review and board of tax commissioners shall have power to administer all necessary oaths or affirmation in the discharge of their duties.

It shall be the duty of all assessors, and all other officers charged with the duty of listing property for taxation, or charged with the duty of collecting taxes, to give in writing all information they may acquire in reference to the concealment of property from taxation by any person, firm or corporation before mentioned to the county auditor, Auditor of State, or to the county board of review or State Board of Tax Commissioners.

Section 2. No inspection of the books or papers of any person, firm or corporation by any tax officer shall be permitted or required except as specified in the foregoing section, and all laws or parts of laws in conflict herewith are hereby repealed.

Section 3. An emergency exists for the immediate taking effect of this act, and the same shall be in force from and after its passage."

**New State Bank Examiner.**—Wm. Donovan, President of the Lansing (Mich.) State Savings Bank, resigned recently to accept an appointment as State bank examiner, succeeded T. M. Joslyn.

**Detroit, Mich.**—On March 15 a number of business men met and formed a temporary organization of the Detroit Stock Exchange.

**Kansas City, Mo.**—The Bank of Grand Avenue was recently absorbed by the National Bank of Commerce.

**Grand Rapids, Mich.**—On March 11 the National City Bank began doing business in its newly remodelled building. Many visitors inspected the handsome rooms.

A pleasant event occurred at the meeting of the board of directors held in the morning, when the Cashier, James R. Wylie, presented to the board the framed portraits of George Kendall, N. L. Avery and Col. George G. Briggs. The directors' room now contains portraits of Thomas D. Gilbert, late President, also of Julius Houseman and L. D. Putnam, besides the three named. N. L. Avery is on the present board, the others being former directors of the bank, now deceased.

Mr. Wylie referred to the loyalty and integrity of former directors and brief remarks were made by D. M. Amberg, Paul Doty, F. Letellier and P. C. Fuller of the present board.

**New Bank Examiner.**—J. Mack Scholl, of Carthage, Ill., has been appointed a National bank examiner for that State.

**Missouri Bankers' Association.**—The annual convention of the Missouri Bankers' Association will be held at St. Joseph, May 22 and 23.

**Duluth, Minn.**—The First National Bank has opened a savings department, for the accommodation of those wishing to deposit smaller sums than received by the commercial bank.

**New Bank Commissioner.**—Frank J. Wikoff, of Stillwater, Oklahoma Territory, recently succeeded W. S. Search as Bank Commissioner, the latter having gone into the banking business and is interested in the American National Bank, of Oklahoma City.

**Michigan Bankers' Association.**—The thirteenth annual convention of the Michigan Bankers' Association will be held at Grand Rapids June 4 and 5.

**Jacksonville, Ill.**—The private banking firm of M. P. Ayers & Co., established in 1852, has changed the form of organization, and henceforth will be known as the Ayers National Bank. It will have \$200,000 capital, and for the present will issue \$100,000 circulation. Directors and officers are: M. P. Ayers, President; A. E. Ayers, Vice-President; John A. Ayers, Cashier; C. G. Rutledge, Assistant Cashier; William Brown, Albert Crum, John R. Davis, Edward S. Greenleaf, Edward P. Kirby.

**Cleveland, Ohio.**—On March 23 the stockholders of the Cleveland Savings and Banking Co. voted to increase the capital from \$100,000 to \$200,000.

—The Colonial National Bank will increase its capital stock from \$500,000 to \$2,000,000 and the surplus to \$800,000, the new stock being sold at 150.

—The Savings and Trust Company will probably increase its capital stock from \$750,000 to \$1,500,000.

**Chicago.**—The board of directors of the Continental National Bank have voted to issue during this month the additional \$1,000,000 of capital stock voted by the stockholders last August, making the total capital \$3,000,000. One share of new stock will be issued at par to every holder of two shares of old stock.

**St. Louis, Mo.**—Circulars were recently sent to the shareholders of the Mechanics' Bank asking their opinion as to the propriety of changing the form of organization to a National bank. The capital stock of the bank is \$1,000,000 and the surplus \$500,000, while, according to the last statement, the undivided profits were \$108,975. Dividends amounting to two per cent. quarterly have been paid, and the stock has sold from \$215 to \$217 a share.



—The Commonwealth Trust Company has been incorporated with \$3,000,000 capital, the stock to be placed at \$215 per share. Charles H. Turner will be President.

—Shareholders of the Third National Bank voted on March 19 to increase the capital from \$1,000,000 to \$2,000,000.

—Former Judge Sheldon, who was appointed referee to hear testimony in the \$250,000 damage suit brought by ex-Governor William J. Stone, Receiver of the Mullanphy Savings Bank, against the directors of the bank for alleged carelessness in the management of the bank, recently filed his report recommending that judgments for large amounts be rendered against the bank officials.

### PACIFIC SLOPE.

**San Francisco.**—It is reported that the banks in the California Bankers' Association will hereafter cash each other's checks on San Francisco at par, this innovation being made to obviate the necessity of sending money by postal and express money orders. This applies to checks not exceeding \$50.

—The detailed directors' report submitted at the annual meeting of the London, Paris and American Bank, Limited, held in London, March 14, shows that after deducting expenses of management, income tax, rebate, etc., and making full provision for bad and doubtful debts, the amount available for distribution (including £8,635 6s brought forward from the previous year) is £52,200 10s 7d. An interim dividend of three per cent. for the first half of the year was paid on September 7, absorbing £12,000, and the board recommended that the balance, £40,200 10s 7d, be appropriated as follows: Dividend of four per cent. for the six months ended December 31, last, making seven per cent. for the year (free of income tax), £16,000; transfer to reserve fund, making it £200,000, £15,000; leaving to be carried forward to new account, £29,200, 10s 7d.

Mr. J. Howard Gwyther (the Chairman of the Company) called attention to the fact that the managers had found increased competition and lowering rates of interest, but notwithstanding these drawbacks, were able, after the usual dividend, to transfer a substantial sum to the reserve fund, which is now £200,000, and equal to half the paid-up capital. "At the commencement of the century," he continued, "it is perhaps fitting that we should indulge in retrospect. Our progress during the period of our existence has been gradual but continuous, and affords ample proof of the firm hold we have upon the trading community of San Francisco, and the high credit we enjoy. A few figures may interest the shareholders, as proving the correctness of the above remarks. Our deposits in 1884 were about \$1,500,000; last year they totalled \$4,750,000. The local advances were \$3,000,000 in 1884, and \$4,600,000 in 1890. Our portfolio in London contained bills to the extent of £100,000 in 1884, and £700,000 in 1900. Last year California was prosperous. Although the wheat harvest was somewhat short, and prices ruled low, other products have been plentiful and profitable. There is no doubt that the Pacific Coast is developing rapidly, in common with the other sections of the United States. The trade with China, Japan and Australia is increasing; the tonnage statistics of San Francisco show ample proof of the progress of the port, and now that the retention of the Philippines has been included in the programme of the Republican party, we may fully expect an advantage to California from the adoption of that wise policy."

—The annual meeting of the stockholders of the Anglo-Californian Bank was held in London March 7. The directors made full and satisfactory reports of the operations of the bank for the calendar year 1900. The net profits of the year were £33,611 19s, to which must be added £9,504 8s 8d, carried over from the previous year. This makes £43,116 7s 8d available for appropriation. An *ad interim* dividend of six shillings per share was paid in September, 1900, and a similar dividend is now payable, making it six per cent. for the year. The sum of £17,000 was placed to reserve fund account, making it £110,000 and £11,134 7s 8d carried to the profit and loss account. The arrangement for the extinguishment of deferred shares on payment out of the reserve fund of £42,000 has been sanctioned by the High Court of Justice and will be completed as soon as possible. There were 600 of these deferred shares issued at the start at the par value of £1 each. The resources at the close of the last calendar year were £23,054, 15s 14s 8d.

**Seattle, Wash.**—The committee of the Chamber of Commerce having in charge the alleged excessive charges of the banks, by way of discount on foreign bills, has succeeded in meeting with all the banks of the city, and the banks have unitedly responded to the request for a reduction, in a liberal manner. As a result of the conference recently engaged in, the following schedule of charges has been agreed to by all the banks of the city that are members of the clearing-house:

On amounts of \$100 or under, one per cent.; on amounts over \$100 and under \$500 one-half per cent.; on amounts from \$500 up to \$5,000, one-quarter per cent.; on amounts over \$5,000, one-eighth per cent.

This reduction is considered liberal, and means a great deal to the foreign merchant, when it is borne in mind that before this agreement the charges on sums up to, say, \$4,500, were \$45 whereas, under the present arrangement, they amount only to \$10.25.

**Pasadena, Cal.**—The First National Bank, it is reported, will establish a Savings Institution, to be operated as an auxiliary to its present business. The title of the Savings bank will be the Pasadena Savings, Trust and Deposit Co., and the capital will be \$50,000.

**New Holiday for Wyoming.**—The Wyoming Legislature has passed a law making Lincoln's birthday a legal holiday.

## NEW BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, ETC.

### NEW NATIONAL BANKS.

The Comptroller of the Currency furnishes the following statement of new National banks organized since our last report. Names of officers and other particulars regarding these new National banks will be found under the different State headings.

#### NATIONAL BANKS ORGANIZED.

- 5730—First National Bank, Spring Lake, New Jersey. Capital, \$25,000.  
5731—Southern National Bank, Wynnewood, Indian Territory. Capital, \$50,000.  
5732—City National Bank, Tulsa, Indian Territory. Capital, \$25,000.  
5733—First National Bank, Blossom, Texas. Capital, \$25,000.  
5734—First National Bank, Montgomery, Indiana. Capital, \$25,000.  
5735—National Bank of Holdenville, Holdenville, Indian Territory. Capital, \$25,000.  
5736—First National Bank, Perkaskie, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$50,000.  
5737—First National Bank, Trenton, Texas. Capital, \$25,000.  
5738—First National Bank, Essex, Iowa. Capital, \$25,000.  
5739—Ladonia National Bank, Ladonia, Texas. Capital, \$35,000.  
5740—Kingfisher National Bank, Kingfisher, Oklahoma. Capital, \$25,000.  
5741—Farmers and Merchants' National Bank, Gilmer, Texas. Capital, \$50,000.  
5742—First National Bank, Dayton, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$25,000.  
5743—First National Bank, Jewell Junction, Iowa. Capital, \$25,000.  
5744—People's National Bank, Latrobe, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$100,000.  
5745—First National Bank, Hibbing, Minnesota. Capital, \$25,000.  
5746—First National Bank, Tully, New York. Capital, \$25,000.  
5747—First National Bank, Ashland, Oregon. Capital, \$25,000.  
5748—First National Bank, Sulphur, Indian Territory. Capital, \$25,000.  
5749—Itasca National Bank, Itasca, Texas. Capital, \$30,000.  
5750—First National Bank, Killeen, Texas. Capital, \$25,000.  
5751—First National Bank, Ritzville, Washington. Capital, \$30,000.  
5752—Citizens' National Bank, Shreveport, Louisiana. Capital, \$100,000.  
5753—First National Bank, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Capital, \$25,000.  
5754—American National Bank, Lebanon, Tennessee. Capital, \$25,000.  
5755—Lehigh National Bank, Lehigh, Indian Territory. Capital, \$25,000.  
5756—Tell City National Bank, Tell City, Indiana. Capital, \$30,000.  
5757—Council Grove National Bank, Council Grove, Kansas. Capital, \$50,000.  
5758—National Exchange Bank, Weatherford, Oklahoma. Capital, \$25,000.  
5759—First National Bank, Gordon, Texas. Capital, \$25,000.  
5760—Old Citizens' National Bank, Zanesville, Ohio. Capital, \$300,000.  
5761—Citizens' National Bank, Jacksboro, Texas. Capital, \$30,000.  
5762—First National Bank, Clarington, Ohio. Capital, \$25,000.  
5763—Ayers National Bank, Jacksonville, Illinois. Capital, \$200,000.  
5764—First National Bank, St. Anthony, Idaho. Capital, \$25,000.

#### APPLICATIONS TO ORGANIZE NATIONAL BANKS APPROVED.

The following notices of intention to organize National banks have been approved by the Comptroller of the Currency since last advice:

- National Exchange Bank, Castleton, New York; by James R. Downer, *et al.*  
Commercial National Bank, Zanesville, Ohio; by Geo. Brown, *et al.*  
Citizens' National Bank, Waynesboro, Pennsylvania; by S. B. Rhinehart, *et al.*  
Farmers' National Bank, Odebolt, Iowa; by R. W. Sayre, *et al.*  
Suffern National Bank, Suffern, New York; by J. B. Campbell, *et al.*  
Plattsburg National Bank, Plattsburg, New York; by Stephen Moffett, *et al.*  
First National Bank, Moody, Texas; by J. C. Reynolds, *et al.*  
First National Bank, Anadarko, Oklahoma; by James A. Carroll, *et al.*  
Hicksville National Bank, Hicksville, Ohio; by J. L. Bevington, *et al.*  
Paris National Bank, Paris, Missouri; by D. H. Moss, *et al.*  
O'Neill National Bank, O'Neill, Nebraska; by H. P. Dowling, *et al.*

First National Bank of Beaver Springs, Adamsburg, Pennsylvania; by Kemer C. Walter, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Mart, Texas; by A. P. Smyth, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Patterson, Louisiana; by Bernard Levy, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Lidgerwood, North Dakota; by M. O. Movius, *et al.*  
 Gainesville National Bank, Gainesville, New York; by John T. Symes, *et al.*  
 Shreveport National Bank, Shreveport, Louisiana; by J. W. Holbert, *et al.*  
 American National Bank, Abilene, Texas; by J. F. Cunningham, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Paulding, Ohio; by W. H. Phipps, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Stroud, Oklahoma; by H. S. Emerson, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Elk City, Oklahoma; by A. L. Thurmond, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Savannah, Missouri; by Truman D. Parr, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Kiowa, Oklahoma; by A. J. Dunlap, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Atoka, Indian Territory; by J. G. Streean, *et al.*  
 Second National Bank, Meyersdale, Pennsylvania; by C. W. Truxal, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Elmwood, Nebraska; by Edwin Jeary, *et al.*  
 Back Bay National Bank, Boston, Massachusetts; by C. H. W. Foster, *et al.*  
 Citizens' National Bank, Westernport, Maryland; by Joseph T. Laughlin, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Dwight, Illinois; by Charles R. Romberger, *et al.*  
 Jonesport National Bank, Jonesport, Maine; by J. A. Coffin, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Sweetwater, Texas; by J. V. W. Holmes, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Forsyth, Montana; by Charles Davis, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Weldon, North Carolina; by Wm. H. S. Burghwyn, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, New Carlisle, Ohio; by Walter E. Robinson, *et al.*  
 National Bank of Ionia, Ionia, Michigan; by H. B. Webber, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Monongahela City, Pennsylvania; by Wm. P. Warne, *et al.*

## APPLICATION FOR CONVERSION TO NATIONAL BANKS APPROVED.

First International Bank, Kirksville, Missouri; into Baird National Bank.  
 Bank of Vermillion, Abbeville, Louisiana; into First National Bank.  
 State Bank of Henderson County, Stronghurst, Illinois; into First National Bank.  
 American State Bank, Mount Carmel, Illinois; into American National Bank.  
 Bank of New Amsterdam, New York; into New Amsterdam National Bank.  
 People's Bank, Baltimore, Maryland; into Maryland National Bank.  
 Ramsey County Bank, Devil's Lake, North Dakota; into Ramsey County National Bank.

## NEW BANKS, BANKERS, ETC.

## ALABAMA.

GEORGIANA—Vinson Banking Co.; capital, \$6,000; Pres., M. C. Vinson; Cas., J. H. Vinson.

MONTGOMERY—Union Trust and Savings Co.; capital, \$100,000; Pres., Michael Cody; Vice-Pres., Joseph Norwood; Sec., J. S. Wilcox.

STEVENSON—Bank of Stevenson; capital, \$5,000; Pres., W. H. Bogart; Vice-Pres., J. G. Wilkinson and W. J. Tally; Cas., N. C. Alston.

## ARKANSAS.

MORRILLTON—Citizens' Bank; Pres., Henry James; Cas., J. H. McClung; Asst. Cas., J. S. Moose.

## CALIFORNIA.

PASADENA—Pasadena Savings, Trust and Deposit Co.; capital, \$50,000.

## FLORIDA.

MADISON—Madison County State Bank; capital, \$30,000; Pres., Randall Pope; Vice-Pres., R. D. Rowe; Cas., S. E. Cobb.

PENSACOLA—American Savings Bank and Trust Co.; capital, \$20,000.

## GEORGIA.

COVINGTON—Bank of Covington; capital, \$25,000; Pres. L. O. Benton; Vice-Pres., N. Z. Anderson; Cas., M. C. Thompson.

CUTHBERT—Bank of Randolph; capital \$25,000.

FITZGERALD—Bowen Banking Co.; capital, \$25,000; Pres., R. V. Bowen; Vice-Pres., M. Dickson; Cas., J. J. Dorminy.

VIDALIA—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$25,000.

## IDAHO.

ST. ANTHONY—First National Bank (successor to Idaho State Bank); capital, \$25,000 Pres., Albert K. Steunenberg; Cas., Guy E. Bowerman.

## ILLINOIS.

ARMINGTON—E. F. Verry & Son.

ASHLEY—Watson, Bates & Co.; capital, \$12,000; Cas., James E. Estes.

CAMERON—Cameron State Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Geo. Bruington; Vice-Pres., James French.

DES PLAINES—First State Bank; capital, \$25,000.

DOWNES—Farmers' Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., Frank Cowden; Cas., E. B. Lanier; Asst. Cas., J. W. Dooley.

HARTSBURG—Bank of Hartsburg; capital, \$10,000; Pres., B. R. Behrends; Cas., Daniel Van Gerpen.

JACKSONVILLE—Ayers National Bank (successor to M. P. Ayers & Co.); capital, \$20,000.

000; Pres., Marshall P. Ayers; Cas., John A. Ayers; Asst. Cas., C. G. Rutledge.  
**NAUVOO**—People's State Bank; Capital \$25,000; Pres., Joseph Nelson; Vice-Pres., Wm. Thornburg; Cas., Frank W. Yeager.  
**NEW BADEN**—New Baden Bank; Pres., F. Schlafly; Cas., Jno. S. Ackerman; Asst. Cas., August Ackerman.  
**NOBLE**—Bank of Noble; capital, \$7,000.  
**OWANECO**—Eaton Bros.

### INDIANA.

**MONTGOMERY**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., John M. Crawford. Vice-Pres., S. L. McPherson; Cas., Wm. Kennedy; Asst. Cas., Mary Watham.  
**TELL CITY**—Tell City National Bank; capital, \$30,000; Pres., Michael Bettinger; Cas., Gustave Huthstelnier.

### INDIAN TERRITORY.

**HENRYETTA**—State Bank.  
**HOLDENVILLE**—National Bank of Holden-ville; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Willard Johnston; Cas., C. S. Reed.  
**LEHIGH**—Lehigh National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., F. R. Phillips; Cas., Boone Williams.  
**MILL CREEK**—State Bank.  
**POTEAU**—Bank of Poteau; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Ed. McKenna; Cas., T. C. Moore.  
**SULPHUR**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., T. F. Gafford; Cas., C. J. Webster.  
**TULSA**—City National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Wm. J. Trimble; Vice-Pres., J. M. Hall; Cas., L. D. Marr.  
**WESTVILLE**—Westville Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., P. Coppock; Cas., W. T. La Follette.  
**WOODVILLE**—Bank of Woodville; capital, \$5,000; Pres., H. G. Beard; Cas., S. P. Bennett.  
**WYNNEWOOD**—Southern National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., A. B. Dunlap; Vice-Pres., W. J. Smith; Cas., E. C. Borchers.

### IOWA.

**BOXHOLM**—Farmers' Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., Mahlon Head; Cas., J. H. Roberts; Asst. Cas., A. Henderson.  
**DEDHAM**—Dedham Savings Bank; capital, \$15,000; Pres., J. G. Caton; Cas., Lynn Caton.  
**ESSEX**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., A. Broodeen; Cas., N. C. Nelson.  
**FAYETTE**—State Bank (successor to Bank of Fayette); capital, \$35,000; Pres., W. A. Hoyt; Vice-Pres., J. A. Claxton; Cas., C. R. Carpenter.  
**GRAND RIVER**—Valley Bank; Cas., Hoyle Gilreath.  
**HARCOURT**—Harcourt Exchange Bank (J. H. Johnson).  
**INWOOD**—People's Savings Bank; capital, \$15,500; Pres., E. Renshaw; Cas., Chris. Erickson.  
**JEWELL JUNCTION**—First National Bank

(successor to Farmers and Traders' Bank) capital, \$25,000; Pres., H. C. Smith; Vice-Pres., James B. Thompson; Cas., A. Alexander; Asst. Cas., F. H. Alexander.  
**MAXWELL**—Citizens' Bank; Pres., G. W. Rhine; Cas., F. G. Ainley.  
**SUPERIOR**—Superior Savings Bank (successor to Superior Bank); capital, \$10,000; Pres., F. H. Daley; Cas., P. W. Blackert.  
**URBANA**—Urbana Savings Bank; capital, \$12,000; Pres., S. W. Winters; Cas., F. H. Bryner.

### KANSAS.

**AGRA**—First State Bank; capital, \$5,000.  
**BURRTON**—Burrton State Exchange Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., W. H. Wilson; Cas., M. D. Eales.  
**CLAY CENTRE**—Citizens' State Bank; capital, \$15,000; Pres., F. B. Fullington; Cas., P. P. Kehoe.—Union State Bank; Cas., Geo. W. Hanna.  
**COUNCIL GROVE**—Council Grove National Bank (successor to Morris County State Bank); capital, \$50,000; Pres., Lewis Mead; Cas., R. S. Davidson.  
**CUBA**—State Bank; capital, \$10,000.  
**DENISON**—Denison State Bank; capital, \$7,000; Pres., J. S. Lanning; Cas., J. W. Lanning.  
**EMPORIA**—Emporia State Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., William Wayman; Vice-Pres., William Addis; Cas., Fremont Miller.  
**ESBON**—State Bank; capital, \$3,000; Pres., H. B. Kelm; Cas., D. H. Kelso.  
**KINGMAN**—Kingman State Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Jos. C. Paxton; Cas., O. C. Atkinson.

### KENTUCKY.

**JUNCTION CITY**—First State Bank; capital, \$15,000; Pres., A. Miller; Vice-Pres., J. W. Shelby; Cas., M. D. Ransdell.

### LOUISIANA.

**BATON ROUGE**—Louisiana State Bank; capital, \$75,000; Pres., Joe Gottlieb; Vice-Pres., D. S. Dooley; Cas., W. H. Bynum.  
**SHREVEPORT**—Citizens' National Bank (successor to S. B. McCutchen); capital, \$100,000; Pres., S. B. McCutchen; Cas., M. A. McCutchen.  
**MORGAN CITY**—Morgan County Bank; Pres., J. R. Norman.

### MARYLAND.

**REISTERSTOWN**—Reisterstown Savings Bank; capital, \$10,000.

### MICHIGAN.

**BROWN CITY**—Kearns & Co.  
**NILES**—Snell & Co.—Niles City Bank; Pres., D. S. Scoffson.

### MINNESOTA.

**GREY EAGLE**—Bank of Grey Eagle; capital, \$5,000; Pres. and Cas., R. H. Sliter; Asst. Cas., C. N. Sliter.  
**HIBBING**—First National Bank (successor to Lumbermens & Miners' Bank); capital,

\$25,000; Pres., Andrew A. Davidson; Cas., Stephen R. Kirby.  
**LANESBORO**—Farmers and Mechanics' Bank; (Nelson Bros.)

**MISSOURI.**

**BUFFALO**—O'Bannon Banking Co.; capital, \$5,000.

**KANSAS CITY**—Provident Trust Co.

**ST. LOUIS**—Commonwealth Trust Co.; capital, \$3,000,000.—Guy P. Billon, Banker.

**TRENTON**—Grundy County Bank; Pres., W. O. Garvin; Vice-Pres., R. C. Morton; Cas., L. M. Brown.

**NEBRASKA.**

**OVERTON**—First State Bank (successor to Bank of Overton); capital, \$10,000; Pres., E. L. Kiplinger; Cas., T. L. Doherty; Asst. Cas., L. K. Doherty.

**STOCKHAM**—Houghton Bros.; capital, \$5,000.

**NEW HAMPSHIRE.**

**DOVER**—MERCHANTS' Savings Bank; Pres., W. W. Cushman; Treas., C. C. Goss.

**NEW JERSEY.**

**SPRING LAKE**—First National Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., Oliver H. Brown; Vice-Pres., Wm. H. Potter; Cas., Frederick F. Shock.

**NEW YORK.**

**TULLY**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Frank J. Carr; Vice-Pres., F. R. Hazard; Cas., Willis Maine.

**NORTH CAROLINA.**

**DUNN**—Bank of Dunn; capital, \$50,000; Pres., L. J. Best; Cas., J. W. Purdie.

**FRANKLINTON**—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$10,000.

**GREENVILLE**—Greenville Banking and Trust Co.; Pres., L. I. Moore; Vice-Pres., W. M. Smith; Cas., R. J. Cobb.

**KINSTON**—Citizens' Savings Bank; capital, \$30,000.

**RALEIGH**—North Carolina Trust Co.

**ROCKINGHAM**—Richmond County Savings Bank; Cas., W. L. Scales.—Farmers' Bank.

**NORTH DAKOTA.**

**LEEDS**—Farmers' Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., H. N. Peck; Cas., E. B. Page.

**OHIO.**

**BELLEFONTAINE**—Commercial and Savings Bank Co.; capital, \$50,000.

**BROOKVILLE**—People's Bank; Pres., T. B. Mills; Cas., T. A. Beck.

**CAMBRIDGE**—Commercial Bank Co.; capital, \$50,000.

**CAREY**—Carey Banking Co.; capital, \$25,000; Pres., J. S. Fait; Cas., Fred Rowalt; Asst. Cas., F. W. Ackerman.

**CLAMINGTON**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Charles Muhleman; Cas., Julius Steiger.

**CLEVELAND**—Dollar Savings and Banking Co.; capital, \$50,000.—Prudential Savings Co.; capital, \$1,000,000.—Prudential Trust Co.; capital, \$1,000,000.

**LOCKLAND**—Cincinnati Trust Co.; M. Devaney, Mgr.

**MARION**—Marion Savings Bank Co.; capital, \$50,000.

**MIDDLEFIELD**—Middlefield Banking Co.; capital, \$25,000.

**TOLEDO**—Lucas County Savings and Loan Co.; capital, \$100,000.

**WEST JEFFERSON**—Farmers' Bank; Pres., Owen Harbage; Cas., Ben Harbage; Asst. Cas., A. C. Millikin.

**ZANESVILLE**—Old Citizens' National Bank (successor to Citizens' National Bank); capital, \$200,000; Pres., Willis Bailey; Cas., H. A. Sharpe.

**OKLAHOMA.**

**BLACKBURN**—Bank of Blackburn; capital, \$5,000; Pres., G. W. Sutton; Cas., W. T. Litten.

**BRECKENRIDGE**—Bank of Breckenridge; capital, \$5,000.

**BYRON**—Byron State Bank; capital, \$5,000.

**CLEO**—Farmers and Merchants' Bank; capital, \$10,000.

**CORDELL**—Bank of F. C. Finerty & Co.; capital, \$10,000; Pres., F. C. Finerty; Cas., C. J. Johnston.

**FORT SILL**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Geo. M. Paschal; Vice-Pres., W. M. McGregor; Cas., Frank M. English; Asst. Cas., W. J. Donald.

**KINGFISHER**—Kingfisher National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., L. F. Potter; Cas., G. A. Nelson.

**WEATHERFORD**—National Exchange Bank (successor to State Exchange Bank); capital, \$25,000; Pres., O. B. Kee; Cas., O. H. Cafky.

**OREGON.**

**ASHLAND**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Eugene A. Sherwin; Cas., Andrew McCallen.

**GRANT'S PASS**—Grant's Pass Banking and Trust Co.; capital, \$50,000.

**PENNSYLVANIA.**

**CANONSBURG**—Citizens' Trust Co. (successor to Citizens' Bank); capital, \$125,000.

**CHAMBERSBURG**—Chambersburg Trust Co.

**DAYTON**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., C. W. Ellenberger; Cas., A. J. Gourley.

**LATROBE**—People's National Bank; capital, \$100,000; Pres., Philip Doherty; Cas., Chas. R. Smith.

**PERKASIE**—First National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., Henry G. Moyer; Cas., Milton C. Pyle.

**PITTSBURG**—People's Trust Co.; capital, \$250,000.—Moreland Savings and Trust Co.—City Trust Co.

**SEWICKLEY**—Sewickley Valley Trust Co.; capital, \$125,000.

**WASHINGTON**—Washington Trust Co.

**SOUTH CAROLINA.**

**BEAUFORT**—Bank of Beaufort; capital, \$15,000; Pres., M. W. Taylor; Vice-Pres., B. L. Jones; Cas., W. E. Hern.

**GAFFNEY**—Southern States Trust Co.; capital, \$250,000.

**SOUTH DAKOTA.**

**HARRISBURG**—Bank of Harrisburg; capital, \$10,000; Cas., W. H. Wasem.

**TENNESSEE.**

**EAGLEVILLE**—Bank of Eagleville; capital, \$80,000; Pres., J. C. Williams; Cas., A. B. Robertson.

**LEBANON**—American National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., E. E. Beard; Cas., W. H. Brown.

**TEXAS.**

**BLOSSOM**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., R. V. Womack; Vice-Pres., J. R. Westbrook; Cas., J. D. Norwood.

**CENTER POINT**—Farmers and Merchants' Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., H. M. Burney; Cas., G. P. McCorke.

**CRAWFORD**—Bank of Crawford; Pres., Chas. F. Smith; Cas., C. H. Graves; Asst. Cas., A. O. Jordan.

**FORT WORTH**—Hunter-Phelan Savings and Trust Co.

**GILMER**—Farmers and Merchants' National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Cas., W. O. Boyd.

**GOLDTHWAITE**—D. H. Trent.

**GORDON**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., A. P. Wilbar; Cas., J. M. Winston.

**ITASCA**—Itasca National Bank; capital, \$30,000; Pres., Rufus Martin; Vice-Pres., John W. Park; Cas., W. H. Coffman; Asst. Cas., H. E. Chiles.

**JACKSBORO**—Citizens' National Bank; capital, \$30,000; Pres., T. C. Phillips; Cas., F. H. Jones.

**KILLEEN**—First National Bank; capital,

\$25,000; Pres., Charles M. Campbell; Cas., J. M. Warren.

**LADONIA**—Ladonia National Bank; capital, \$35,000; Pres., Charles T. Jackson; Cas., W. C. Evans.

**MATADOR**—Matador Bank; capital, \$10,000; J. H. P. Jones, Banker.

**TRENTON**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., J. B. Robinson; Cas., John Donaghey.

**VIRGINIA.**

**BERKLEY**—Berkley People's Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Foster Black; Cas., W. B. Dougherty.

**GORDONSVILLE**—Lockwood & Co.; capital, \$5,000.

**REEDSVILLE**—L. E. Mumford Banking Co.

**WEST APPOMATTOX**—Appomattox Banking and Trust Co.; Pres., J. R. Atwood; Cas., R. F. Burke.

**WASHINGTON.**

**KENT**—M. M. Morrill.

**MOUNT VERNON**—Skagit Trust Co.; capital, \$50,000.

**ODESSA**—Odessa State Bank; capital, \$15,000; Pres., J. D. Bassett; Vice-Pres., J. E. Prouty; Cas., R. C. Kennedy.

**RITZVILLE**—First National Bank (successor to Adams County Bank); capital, \$30,000; Pres., J. D. Bassett; Cas., Geo. A. Kennedy.

**WISCONSIN.**

**WAUZeka**—Bank of Wauzeka; capital, \$5,000; Pres., W. A. Vaughn; Cas., John Koch.

**WESTFIELD**—Westfield State Bank (successor to Westfield Bank); capital, \$40,000; Pres., Wm. H. Moss; Vice-Pres., Clarence E. Peirce; Cas., Julius Warnke.

**CANADA.**

**LONDON**—Canada Trust Co.

**MITCHELL**—Bank of Hamilton.

**CHANGES IN OFFICERS, CAPITAL, ETC.****ALABAMA.**

**BIRMINGHAM**—First National Bank; W. W. Crawford, Asst. Cas.—Steiner Bros.; Leo K. Steiner, Pres.; Carl Steiner, Cas.; W. C. Hamilton, Asst. Cas.

**EUTAW**—First National Bank; Jas. Murphy, Cas., deceased.

**TALLADEGA**—First National Bank; Jere T. Dumas, Vice-Pres., deceased.

**ARKANSAS.**

**HELENA**—First National Bank; E. E. Agee, Asst. Cas.

**CALIFORNIA.**

**LOS ANGELES**—Citizens' Bank; W. B. Wightman, Pres. in place of J. J. Fay, Jr.

**FLORIDA.**

**ARCADIA**—First National Bank; Albert Carlton, Pres. in place of Ziba King, deceased; Thos. B. King, Vice-Pres.

**TAMPA**—Exchange National Bank; Ziba King, Vice-Pres., deceased.

**GEORGIA.**

**ARLINGTON**—Bank of Arlington; Geo. Harrison, Pres. in place of W. S. Witham.

**ATLANTA**—Lowry National Bank; W. G. Raoul, elected director in place of St. Julian Ravenel.

**MACON**—American National Bank; R. J. Taylor, Vice-Pres., in place of James D. Stetson, deceased.

**NEWMAN**—First National Bank; E. W. Snead, Asst. Cas.

**SWAINSBORO**—Bank of Swainsboro; G. S. Rountree, Pres. in place of W. S. Witham.

**THOMASTON**—Farmers and Merchants' Bank; W. S. Witham no longer Pres.

**WARRENTON**—Bank of Warrenton; J. F. Allen, Pres. in place of W. S. Witham.

ILLINOIS.

CHICAGO—National Bank of the Republic; no Asst. Cas. in place of H. R. Kent.—Chicago National Bank; F. W. McLean and A. Uhlraub, Asst. Cas.—Produce Exchange Bank; absorbed by Western State Bank.—Merchants' Loan and Trust Co.; J. W. Doane, director, deceased.

CHILLICOTHE—First National Bank; Ira D. Buck, Vice-Pres.

DE LAND—First National Bank; C. E. Emland, Vice-Pres.; E. B. Chenowith, Asst. Cas.

DUNDEE—First National Bank; A. V. Chapman, Vice-Pres.

FAIRBURY—First National Bank; no Pres. in place of I. P. McDowell, deceased.

HOOPESTON—First National Bank; J. E. Whitman, Asst. Cas. in place of R. H. Le Vin.

NEWTON—Bank of Newton; R. G. Hall, Cas., resigned.

SPRINGFIELD—State National Bank; E. W. Payne, Pres. in place of R. D. Lawrence, deceased.

ST. ANNE—First National Bank; Jno. P. Pallissard, Cas.

INDIANA.

HAMMOND—First National Bank; Edward E. Towle, Pres., deceased.

HOPE—Citizens' National Bank; James Homsher, Vice-Pres.; Allena Kennedy, Asst. Cas.

INDIANAPOLIS—American National Bank; Theodore Stempfel and Andrew Smith, Asst. Cas.—Indiana Trust Co.; E. G. Cornelius, Vice-Pres., deceased.

SOUTH BEND—South Bend National Bank; Myron Campbell, Pres. in place of William Miller, deceased.

IOWA.

CLARION—First National Bank; F. W. Walker, Asst. Cas. in place of J. M. Overbaugh.

DES MOINES—Grand Avenue Savings Bank; John M. Mehan, director, deceased.

DYERSVILLE—Farmers' State Bank; Herman Zernecke, Asst. Cas.

NORA SPRINGS—First National Bank; M. Jean Williams, Asst. Cas.

OELWEIN—Commercial Savings Bank; capital increased to \$50,000.

PETERSON—First National Bank; E. L. Mantor, Asst. Cas. in place of J. E. Allison.

TRIPOLI—German Savings Bank; capital increased to \$20,000.

KANSAS.

ABILENE—Abilene State Bank; G. A. Rogers, Pres. in place of C. N. Prouty.

GREAT BEND—Citizens' National Bank; Robert Merton, Vice-Pres.

WICHITA—American State Bank; J. N. Richardson, Cas. in place of Morris J. Lloyd.

LOUISIANA.

CROWLEY—First National Bank; B. M. Lambert, Vice-Pres.; L. H. Clark, Asst. Cas.

LAKE CHARLES—Calcasieu National Bank; J. W. Gardiner, Asst. Cas. in place of Herman W. Rock.

MAINE.

BANGOR—Merrill & Co.; Isaac H. Merrill, deceased.

EASTPORT—Eastport Savings Bank; Samuel D. Leavitt, Pres., deceased.

SANFORD—Sanford National Bank; Eugene M. Hewett, Asst. Cas.

MARYLAND.

BALTIMORE—National Mechanics' Bank; Alexander Brown, director, retired.—Guardian Trust and Deposit Co.; absorbed by Maryland Trust Co.—Continental National Bank; Thornton Rollins, Pres. in place of Wilbur F. Jackson, resigned.

CANTON—Canton National Bank; C. R. Kendig, Vice-Pres. in place of Joshua Horner.

HURLOCK—Farmers' Bank; L. D. Corcoran, Asst. Cas.

OAKLAND—First National Bank; M. N. Wilson, Vice-Pres.; M. R. Hamill, Asst. Cas.

MASSACHUSETTS.

AMESBURY—Powow River National Bank; capital reduced to \$100,000.

BOSTON—State Street Trust Co.; L. W. Wiggins, Asst. Treas.—Central National Bank; James H. Crocker, Asst. Cas.—Colonial National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of Otis Shepard, deceased; Benjamin W. Munroe, director, deceased.—First Ward National Bank; Wesley A. Gove, Vice-Pres., deceased.—Mercantile Trust Co.; S. S. Blanchard, director, deceased.

LAWRENCE—Essex Savings Bank; J. H. Eaton, Treas., deceased.

LOWELL—Prescott National Bank; Geo. F. Richardson, Pres. in place of Daniel Gage, deceased.

WALTHAM—Waltham Savings Bank; Charles F. Stone, Treas., resigned.

MICHIGAN.

CHELSEA—Chelsea Savings Bank; Geo. P. Glazier, Cas., deceased.

DURAND—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of Ernest T. Sidney.

LANSING—Lansing State Savings Bank; William Donovan, Pres., resigned.

MANISTIQUE—First National Bank; A. S. Putnam, Vice-Pres.

QUINCY—Quincy State Bank; capital increased \$20,000.

ROCKLAND—Ontonagon County National Bank; L. Stanwood, Vice-Pres. in place of Wm. B. Jeffs.

YALE—First National Bank; F. A. Griswold, Vice-Pres. in place of James McColl.

MINNESOTA.

ADA—First National Bank; A. L. Henson, 2d Vice-Pres.; C. E. Peterson, Asst. Cas. in place of G. H. Hosmer.

AUSTIN—Citizens' National Bank; A. Johnson, Asst. Cas.

**BRECKENRIDGE**—First National Bank; F. W. Johnson, Asst. Cas. in place of J. L. Matthews.

**CLAYTON**—First National Bank; C. T. Ekstrand, Asst. Cas. in place of L. M. Bolter.

**EAST GRAND FORKS**—First National Bank; W. H. Pringle, Pres. in place of C. Madison; G. F. Peterson, Vice-Pres. in place of G. R. Jacobi; G. R. Jacobi, Cas. in place of W. H. Pringle.

**FAIRMONT**—Martin County National Bank; Geo. Wohlbeter, Vice-Pres.; A. W. Gamble, Asst. Cas.

**FERGUS FALLS**—Fergus Falls National Bank; P. M. Joyce, Pres.; J. S. Ulland, Vice-Pres.

**HERON LAKE**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of J. A. Pearson.

**MINNEAPOLIS**—First National Bank; J. F. R. Foss, 2d Vice-Pres. in place of J. S. Pillsbury; E. C. Brown, 2d Asst. Cas.

**PARK RAPIDS**—First National Bank; J. S. Hedditch, Vice-Pres.; M. C. Schoneberger, Asst. Cas.

**SLAYTON**—First National Bank; A. S. Dyer, Vice-Pres. in place of C. Murdock.

**WINNEBAGO CITY**—First National Bank; H. W. Sinclair, Vice-Pres.

#### MISSOURI.

**CALLAO**—Bank of Callao; J. H. Wright, Pres.; J. W. Lindley, Vice-Pres.; H. G. Riggs, Cas.

**HOUSTONIA**—Bank of Houstonia; capital reduced to \$25,000.

**LATHROP**—First National Bank; George W. Shinn, Vice-Pres.; Joe T. Doherty, Asst. Cas.

**SARCOXIE**—First National Bank; J. P. Boyd, Vice-Pres.

**SPRINGFIELD**—Union National Bank; Jas. R. Vaughan, Vice-Pres. in place of F. R. Massey.—Holland Banking Co.; C. B. Holland, Pres., deceased.

**ST. JOSEPH**—National Bank of St. Joseph; Huston Wyeth, Vice-Pres. in place of Wm. M. Wyeth.

**ST. LOUIS**—Third National Bank; capital increased to \$2,000,000.

**WARRENSBURG**—Citizens' Bank; John T. Cheatham, Pres., deceased.

#### MONTANA.

**FORT BENTON**—Stockmen's National Bank; Charles E. Duer, Pres. in place of John W. Power, deceased; Louis D. Sharp, Cas. in place of Charles E. Duer; no Asst. Cas. in place of Louis D. Sharp.

**MILES CITY**—State National Bank; John S. Truscott, 2d Vice-Pres. in place of Lee C. Harmon.

#### NEBRASKA.

**ASHLAND**—National Bank of Ashland; Randall K. Brown, Pres. in place of J. J. Brown, deceased.

**COLUMBUS**—Commercial National Bank; Herman P. H. Oehlrich, Vice-Pres. in place of H. Oehlrich.

**HASTINGS**—First National Bank; Dell Henry, Asst. Cas., resigned.—Adams County Bank; J. B. Meserve, Pres. in place of William Kerr; Lloyd Lynn, Cas. in place of J. B. Meserve.

**HUMPHREY**—First National Bank; J. W. Bender, Vice-Pres. in place of T. D. Robinson.

**ST. EDWARD**—First National Bank; Nels Hasselbach, Vice-Pres.; W. F. Flory, Asst. Cas.

#### NEW HAMPSHIRE.

**GROVETON**—Groveton National Bank; R. C. Chessman, Pres. in place of Daniel J. Daley; A. H. Eastman, Vice-Pres.; Geo. M. Marshall, Cas. in place of Elmer J. Noyes.—Cooch County National Bank; W. H. Fowler, Vice-Pres.

#### NEW JERSEY.

**BELMAR**—First National Bank; Foran S. Hutchinson, Vice-Pres.

**BLAIRSTOWN**—First National Bank; Abram R. Williams, Vice-Pres.; Theo. B. Dawes, Cas. in place of D. M. Cook.

**BRIDGETON**—Bridgeton National Bank; Samuel H. Hitchner, Asst. Cas.

**HIGH BRIDGE**—First National Bank; James M. Apgar, Vice-Pres.

**JAMESBURG**—First National Bank; Joseph C. Magee, Pres. in place of F. L. Buckelew; F. H. Pownall, Vice-Pres. in place of Joseph C. Magee.

**ORANGE**—Second National Bank; John O. Heald, Pres. in place of A. M. Matthews.

**PHILLIPSBURG**—Second National Bank; Wm. O'Neill, Vice-Pres.

**RAHWAY**—Rahway National Bank; Wm. H. Potter, Vice-Pres.

#### NEW YORK.

**ALEXANDRIA BAY**—First National Bank of the Thousand Islands; Thomas H. Donald, Vice-Pres.

**BINGHAMTON**—Strong State Bank; Susquehanna Valley Bank and First National Bank; consolidated under latter title; capital, \$400,000; surplus, \$150,000; Pres., William G. Phelps.

**BROOKLYN**—Sprague National Bank of Brooklyn; title changed to Sprague National Bank of New York.—National City Bank; James Thompson, director, deceased.—Hamilton Trust Co.; E. D. Bushnell elected director.

**BUFFALO**—Fidelity Trust and Guaranty Co.; title changed to Fidelity Trust Co.

**FALCONER**—First National Bank; James P. Clark, Vice-Pres.

**GROTON**—First National Bank; Frank Conger, Pres.; Jay Conger, Cas.

**HERMON**—First National Bank; Wm. N. Beard, Vice-Pres.

**HOOSICK FALLS**—First National Bank; Addison Getty, Cas., deceased.

**NEW YORK**—Central National Bank; W. M.



Woods, Vice-Pres. — Citizens' National Bank; E. S. Schenck, Cas. in place of W. M. Woods. — Astor National Bank; Barkley Wyckoff, Asst. Cas. in place of Harris Fahnestock; no 2d Asst. Cas. in place of Barkley Wyckoff. — Domestic Exchange National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of Wm. Kent; E. R. Moody, Asst. Cas. — Garfield National Bank; capital increased from \$200,000 to \$1,000,000; surplus, \$1,000,000. — Western National Bank; W. L. Moyer, Vice-Pres. — Hamilton & Myers; Mark K. Hamilton, deceased. — Lawyers' Title Insurance Co.; capital increased from \$1,000,000 to \$2,000,000. — Dix & Phye; John H. Phye, deceased. — A. Iselin & Co.; Ernest Iselin, admitted to firm March 21. — H. B. Hollins & Co.; Fernando Yznaga, deceased. — Seventh National Bank; capital increased to \$500,000 to take effect May 1.

NIAGARA FALLS—Bank of Niagara; Edward J. Mackenna, Vice-Pres., resigned.

ONEONTA—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of E. C. Slade.

POTSDAM—Citizens' National Bank; Edson M. Perkins, Pres. in place of Wm. L. Pert; W. M. Hawkins, Vice-Pres. in place of Edson M. Perkins.

RYE—Rye National Bank; J. Mayhew Wainwright, Vice-Pres.; John Leonard, Asst. Cas.

## NORTH CAROLINA.

ELIZABETH CITY—First National Bank James B. Blades, Vice-Pres. in place of J. G. Wood.

WILMINGTON—Atlantic National Bank; F. J. Heywood, Jr., Asst. Cas.

## NORTH DAKOTA.

COOPERSTOWN—First National Bank; W. A. Langlie, Cas. in place of R. L. Langlie; Iver Udgard, Asst. Cas. in place of H. A. Langlie and Herbert Weeks.

FRESSENDEN—First National Bank; H. Thorson, Vice-Pres. in place of E. H. Birch.

LAKOTA—National Bank of Lakota; H. E. Baird, Vice-Pres.

## OHIO.

CHARDON—First National Bank; L. T. Wilmot, Vice-Pres., deceased.

CLEVELAND—Metropolitan National Bank; F. J. Roehl, Asst. Cas. — Colonial National Bank; capital increased to \$2,000,000; surplus increased from \$50,000 to \$800,000. — Cleveland Savings and Banking Co., capital, increased from \$100,000 to \$200,000.

COLUMBUS—New First National Bank; capital increased to \$500,000.

GARRETTSVILLE—First National Bank; W. E. Agler, Cas. in place of J. S. Tilden; no Asst. Cas. in place of W. E. Agler.

LEWISBURG—People's Banking Co.; Lewis F. Farmerlee, Pres., deceased.

THURMAN—Centreville National Bank; no Pres. in place of L. M. Beman, deceased.

## OKLAHOMA.

OKLAHOMA—American National Bank; S. E. Moss, Vice-Pres. — Western National Bank; capital increased to \$100,000.

## OREGON.

LA GRANDE—Farmers and Traders' National Bank; J. H. Robbins, Vice-Pres. in place of J. D. McKennon.

## PENNSYLVANIA.

ALTOONA—First National Bank; J. M. Skyles, Asst. Cas. in place of Geo. D. Bechtel, deceased.

BELLE VERNON—First National Bank; Pierce Ferguson, Asst. Cas.

DELTA—People's National Bank; Robert S. Parke, Cas., deceased.

EAST BRADY—People's National Bank; D. L. Taylor, Cas. in place of C. J. Crawford.

EPHRATA—Farmers' National Bank; Geo. M. Dierolf, Asst. Cas.

FREEPORT—Freeport Bank; James H. Maize, Cas. in place of Cyrus M. Ludwick; Wm. A. Hild, Asst. Cas. in place of C. D. Ludwick.

HALIFAX—Halifax National Bank; Charles W. Ryan, Cas., deceased.

HAZLETON—First National Bank; Jno. B. Price, Pres. in place of H. O. Rodgers; P. G. Heidenreich, Cas. in place of Jno. B. Price; no Asst. Cas. in place of P. J. Heidenreich.

LATROBE—People's National Bank; D. W. Jones, Vice-Pres.

MIFFLINEBURG—Farmers' Bank; H. G. Wolf, Pres., deceased.

NAZARETH—Second National Bank; J. J. Maus, Vice-Pres.

NEW CASTLE—Citizens' National Bank; E. E. McGill, Asst. Cas.

PHILADELPHIA—Fourth Street National Bank; B. M. Fairies, Second Vice-Pres.; E. F. Shanbacker, Cas. in place of R. H. Rush-ton; W. Z. McLearn, Asst. Cas. in place of E. F. Shanbacker and B. M. Fairies. — Central National Bank; Geo. M. Troutman, director, deceased.

PITTSBURG—Union Trust Co.; H. W. Gleffer, Sec. in place of John A. Irwin, resigned. — People's National Bank; D. E. Park, Second Vice-Pres. — Farmers' National Bank and Freehold Bank; Christopher L. Magee, director, deceased.

POTTSVILLE—Pennsylvania National Bank; David H. Seibert, Pres. in place of John W. Ryon, deceased; C. T. Brown, Cas. in place of David H. Seibert.

READING—National Union Bank; Edwin Boone, Vice-Pres. and Cas.; J. E. Wanner, Asst. Cas.

TAMAQUA—Blair County Banking Co.; F. J. Gates, Vice-Pres.; F. M. Warin, Cas. in place of Lewis H. Eppley, deceased.

WAYNESBURG—Farmers and Drovers' National Bank; W. H. Ullom, Asst. Cas.

**WILKINSBURG**—First National Bank; J. E. Peterson, Asst. Cas.

#### RHODE ISLAND.

**ASHAWAY**—Ashaway Savings Bank; resumed business March 19.

**NEWPORT**—Island Savings Bank; Augustus C. Titus, Pres., deceased.

**PROVIDENCE**—Industrial Trust Co.; Henry R. Barker, director, deceased.

#### TENNESSEE.

**GAINESBORO**—Bank of Gainesboro; S. B. Fowler, Pres., deceased.

**GREENEVILLE**—First National Bank; J. H. Doughty, Vice-Pres. in place of N. Hacker.

#### TEXAS.

**ATLANTA**—First National Bank; C. Willis, Asst. Cas.

**BOWIE**—City National Bank; Wm. A. Ayres, Asst. Cas.

**CANYON**—Stockmen's National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of J. M. Thacker.

**COLORADO**—City National Bank; J. D. Wulfjen, Vice-Pres. in place of C. A. O'Keefe.

**COOPER**—Delta National Bank; C. E. Anderson, Vice-Pres. in place of J. A. Blackwell.

**GILMER**—First National Bank; F. S. Eberhart, Vice-Pres.; no Asst. Cas. in place of J. W. Saunders.

**GRAND SALINE**—First National Bank; D. C. Earnest, Vice-Pres.

**GRAPEVINE**—Grapevine National Bank; J. E. M. Yates, Vice-Pres.; Zeb Jenkins, Asst. Cas.

**IOWA PARK**—First National Bank; W. R. Ferguson, Vice-Pres.

**MINERAL WELLS**—First National Bank; J. W. Smith, Cas. in place of H. N. Frost.

**NEW BOSTON**—First National Bank; T. A. Fuller, Vice-Pres.

**PLAINVIEW**—First National Bank; R. C. Ware, Vice-Pres.

**ROSEBUD**—First National Bank; E. Rotan, Vice-Pres.

**SAN ANTONIO**—City National Bank; N. T. Wilson, 2d Vice-Pres.

**SHERMAN**—Grayson County National Bank; J. W. Blake, Pres. in place of J. H. Nall; W. P. Head, Cas. in place of J. W. Blake.

**SHINER**—First National Bank; E. F. Wolters, Vice-Pres.; Earl Fry, Asst. Cas.

**SONORA**—First National Bank; D. A. Cauthorne, Vice-Pres. in place of E. F. Vander Stucken.

**STEPHENVILLE**—First National Bank; W. S. Watson, Asst. Cas.

**WEST**—First National Bank; J. O. Jenkins, Vice-Pres.

**TYLER**—Citizens' National Bank; J. W. Wright, Pres. in place of S. H. Cox; R. Bergfeld, Vice-Pres.; H. J. McIntosh, Cas. in place of J. W. Wright.

**VELASCO**—Velasco National Bank; Rees P. Sweeny, Asst. Cas.

**WYLLIE**—First National Bank; D. A. Cook, Asst. Cas. in place of Lee Barrier.

#### VERMONT.

**BELLOWS FALLS**—Bellows Falls Savings Institution; L. M. Read, Pres., in place of H. C. Lane, deceased.

**RUTLAND**—Clement National Bank; C. H. Harrison, Asst. Cas.

#### VIRGINIA.

**MANASSAS**—Manassas National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of A. G. Clapham.

**RICHMOND**—Southern Trust Co.; John R. Williams, Pres., deceased.

#### WASHINGTON.

**FAIRHAVEN**—Citizens' National Bank; E. W. Andrews, Pres.; Geo. E. Souper, Asst. Cas.

#### WEST VIRGINIA.

**CHARLESTON**—Kanawha National Bank; J. D. Baines, Vice-Pres.

**HUNTINGTON**—Huntington National Bank; E. Ensign, Vice-Pres. in place of F. B. Enslow.

**MARTINSBURG**—Citizens' National Bank; Walter J. Lambert, 2d Vice-Pres. in place of J. Whann McSherry.

**MORGANTOWN**—Citizens' National Bank; Isaac Van Voorhis, Vice-Pres.

**PARKERSBURG**—Farmers and Mechanics' National Bank; C. T. Hiteshew, Asst. Cas.—Central Banking and Security Co.; capital increased to \$300,000.

**POINT PLEASANT**—Point Pleasant National Bank; J. Findman, Vice-Pres.

**ST. MARY'S**—First National Bank; W. T. Dotson, Vice-Pres. in place of S. Ankrom; F. C. Percival, Cas. in place of W. B. McGregor.

#### WISCONSIN.

**ANTIGO**—First National Bank; W. B. McArthur, Cas. in place of F. T. Zentner; no Asst. Cas. in place of W. B. McArthur.

**LAKE GENEVA**—Farmers' National Bank; Andrew Kull, Vice-Pres.

**MANITOWOC**—National Bank of Manitowoc; F. T. Zentner, Cas. in place of G. J. Moses; G. A. Nyhagen, Asst. Cas.

**OCONTO**—Citizens' National Bank; R. G. Shumway, Pres.

**STEVEN'S POINT**—First National Bank; J. P. Mallick, Vice-Pres.

**WAUPACA**—Waupaca County National Bank; Richard Lea, Vice-Pres. in place of L. D. Moses; no Asst. Cas. in place of W. B. McArthur.

#### MEXICO.

**MEXICO CITY**—Central Bank of Mexico; capital increased to \$3,000,000.

#### CANADA.

##### ONTARIO.

**BERLIN**—Bank of Montreal; R. G. Wallace, Mgr.

**LONDON**—Bank of British North America; W. T. Oliver, Mgr.

**STAYNER**—Bank of Toronto; Richard Pashby, Mgr.

**BANKS REPORTED CLOSED OR IN LIQUIDATION.****ALABAMA.**

**BIRMINGHAM**—Berney National Bank; in voluntary liquidation to take effect March 11.

**CONNECTICUT.**

**SOUTH NORWALK**—First National Bank; in voluntary liquidation February 18.

**MARYLAND.**

**BALTIMORE**—American National Bank; Geo. R. Gaither, permanent Receiver.

**MICHIGAN.**

**NILES**—First National Bank; in hands of Joseph W. Selden, Receiver, March 9.

**MINNESOTA.**

**MINNEAPOLIS**—Flour City National Bank; in voluntary liquidation February 28.

**MISSOURI.**

**ST. LOUIS**—Gaylord, Blessing & Co.

**TEXAS.**

**GOLDTHWAITE**—First National Bank; in voluntary liquidation February 28.

**WASHINGTON.**

**EVERETT**—Everett National Bank; in voluntary liquidation.

**Failures, Suspensions and Liquidations.**

**Kansas.**—The Citizens' Bank, of La Cygne, was reported closed for examination by a bank examiner February 28.

**Michigan.**—It appears that the failure of the First National Bank, of Niles, reported last month, was caused by a shortage in the Cashier's accounts, which may amount to from \$130,000 to \$150,000. Joseph W. Selden has been appointed Receiver. Stockholders will have to be heavily assessed, and it is not probable that the bank will resume business.

**Missouri**—**ST. LOUIS.**—Gaylord, Blessing & Co., one of the oldest brokerage firms in the city, made an assignment March 12. It is stated that the liabilities are \$50,000 in excess of the assets. The firm had done business for thirty-five years. Thomas A. Stoddart and Guy P. Billon are the assignees.

**New York.**—The Brewster Banking Office, of Hannibal, closed March 30, with liabilities reported at \$75,000.

**New Counterfeit \$5 National Bank Note.**—The National Iron Bank of Morristown, N. J., series of 1882, check letter A, charter No. 1113, Tillman, Register; Morgan, Treasurer; portrait of Garfield; scalloped chocolate seal. The serial number of the note examined is T675948; bank No. 2873. This is a deceptive counterfeit, printed on two pieces of paper between which silk fiber has been distributed. The face of the note, apparently printed from an engraved plate, is defective in detail when compared with the genuine. The word "Cashier" abbreviated in the genuine to "Cash'r" appears in the counterfeit as "cash." In the counterfeit no fiber appears on the surface of the paper. The portrait of Garfield is flat. The border of the face of the note is badly done, the small "V's" and "5's" being irregular, and where in the sections of the border in the genuine the lettering of the words "national currency" is first black on a white background and then white on a black background, the counterfeit inscriptions are all black on a white background, every alternate one being illegible. In some of these sections, owing to bad spacing, "currency" is spelled "currecy." The decorative dash under the words "Deposited with the Treasurer," over the small panel "United States," has been omitted in the counterfeit and the word "treasury" in "Register of the Treasury," is spelled "Treasurg." The back of the note is a dead chocolate in color instead of red-brown as in the genuine. In the quotation of the penalty clause lower back of note a number of words are misspelled, notably "engraving," "itas" for "this," "pusession," "aepr" for "paper," "feleny," "tive" for "fine," "theusand" for "thousand," "imprisenment," and "exceeding" for "exceeding." The figure 4 in the date 1884 in the penalty clause is reversed.

**WANTED.**—By young married man now holding the position of Assistant Cashier in a \$200,000 Bank, a position as Assistant Cashier or Paying and Receiving Teller. Reason for wanting to change is my wife's health. Best of references and 17 years' experience.

Address **BANKER**, Box 557, **BANKERS' MAGAZINE**, 87 Maiden Lane, New York, N. Y.

# MONEY, TRADE AND INVESTMENTS.

---

## A REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SITUATION.

---

NEW YORK, April 3, 1901.

FAVORABLE CONDITIONS STILL PREVAIL in the commercial and financial world and optimism dominates the situation. No more thankless task could be imposed upon any one than that of giving warning of a possible change for the worse in the near future. The most conservative of thinkers and writers lean to the view that whatever may be the ultimate outcome of the present extraordinary conditions, there is no immediate danger of a set-back or overthrow of prosperity.

At the same time prices of securities are at the highest figure ever recorded. Stocks which in the recollection of Wall Street were selling for less than half their par value command at the present time a premium greater than the entire price at which they sold. The great majority of stocks sold higher last month than at any previous time.

Transactions at the New York Stock Exchange average 1,000,000 shares a day, and more than once during the month were close to 2,000,000 shares, yet many people can remember when the sale of 600,000 shares in a single day nearly paralyzed the machinery for reporting the transactions. When to this enormous business are added sales of about \$5,000,000 of bonds each day, it is apparent that the Stock Exchange is busier than it ever was before. The total sales of stocks last month were 27,000,000 shares, and of bonds \$132,000,000. In March, 1896, they were less than 5,000,000 shares of stock and about \$35,000,000 of bonds.

There have been few special events to affect the value of securities or to influence confidence. There is rather a steady development of those conditions which have been factors in the improvement of the past three years or more. The foreign trade movement continues to be of enormous volume, the exports in February again exceeding \$100,000,000 and the net exports aggregating nearly \$50,000,000. This makes for eight months of the current fiscal year total exports of \$1,015,000,000 as compared with \$557,000,000 only six years ago, and an excess of exports over import of \$492,000,000 as against only \$91,000,000 in 1895.

This extraordinary balance of exports leaves the situation free of all apprehension regarding gold exports. At the close of the month one shipment of gold to Europe was reported, but it caused no distrust, for almost contemporaneous with the news of the event came the announcement that a German loan was to be placed here. The country is undoubtedly a large lender abroad and that makes the question of gold exports one of little moment.

At the same time our gold supply is increasing. The stock of gold in the Treasury now amounts to nearly \$500,000,000, the largest ever held, and about one-half of it belongs to the Government. The Government finances are in excellent condition, and the surplus now exceeds \$308,000,000. This amount would be sufficient to retire all the bonds maturing in 1904 and 1907 could the Government secure them at par. Or it would retire ninety per cent. of all the greenbacks outstanding to secure which the Government is now carrying \$150,000,000 gold.

One of the last acts of Congress before its adjournment on March 4 was to pass an act reducing the revenue, it is estimated, at about \$40,000,000. Secretary Gage is reported as estimating that the surplus revenues of the Government will be reduced to \$40,000,000 a year, and this sum is likely to be applied to the extinguishment of

a part of the debt, for the time is coming when the large surplus in the Treasury will cause an outcry for relief for the money market.

The surplus for the nine months of the current fiscal year is about \$40,000,000, and the Secretary estimates that it will be increased to about \$60,000,000 by the end of June. Reports were current that the Government would come into the market to buy bonds, but Mr. Gage has expressed very conservative views on the matter and seems to have no intention to buy any but the short-term bonds, and these only at what seems to him to be a fair price. A purchase of \$2,000,000 was made at private sale just about the close of the month, the terms not being publicly stated.

That there is a possibility of tight money in the near future is indicated in the low reserves now carried by the New York Clearing-House banks, their surplus being below \$8,000,000, which compares with about \$10,000,000 a year ago, \$15,000,000 in 1899, \$35,000,000 in 1898, and \$47,000,000 in 1897. Money rates are still low, but there is evidence of a very extensive speculation, while operations such as the great steel combination, which has been agreed to by ninety-eight per cent of the shareholders in the various properties, must have an important influence upon the money market.

Other large financial operations are under way, among them an increase of \$100,000,000 in the capital of the Pennsylvania Railroad. The Great Northern Railroad is also to issue \$25,000,000 of new stock. These are only significant features of the times, which are days of no small things. The railroads generally are enjoying the highest prosperity, and since "industrials" have become the cards of speculators, railroad securities have been advancing to a securer investment status than most of them had in the old days of granger legislation. St. Paul last month increased its rate of dividend to six per cent. per annum, and its price is now in the neighborhood of 150. This is also one of the significant changes that have occurred in the last few years, for St. Paul was once a football in Wall Street.

There has been little to disturb the feeling of confidence in the past month. There have been some rumors of another coal strike, but the terms agreed upon with the miners last autumn have been extended for another year. The demand for recognition of the miners' union has apparently not been pressed, although Mr. J. P. Morgan had a conference with some of the unofficial representatives of the miners, and the result seems to have been the removal of any likelihood of trouble.

The iron and steel trades are in flourishing condition and the consumption of products is in every way satisfactory. The output of pig iron is increasing at a rate which promises to make new records shortly. On June 1 the weekly capacity of furnaces in blast reached 296,376 tons, but on November 1 it had fallen to 215,304 tons. Since the latter date it has been increasing again, and on March 1 it reached 292,899 tons, although there are only 248 furnaces in operation as compared with 298 on July 1 last. The stocks of pig iron are steadily falling, being only 585,448 tons on March 1, compared with 536,764 tons on February 1 and 641,466 tons on November 1.

The complete statistics of Bessemer steel production for the year 1900 have been published by the American Iron and Steel Association. They show that the production of Bessemer ingots was 6,684,770 tons, as compared with 7,586,354 tons in 1899, the year of the largest production. The output of Bessemer steel rails was 2,361,921 tons, which is the highest record ever made, beating 1899, which showed a total of 2,240,767 tons.

One of the six kinds of paper currency in use for a number of years has been eliminated during the past month. The last of the currency certificates, known as certificates of deposit, have been retired. These certificates were issued under the act of 1872 in denominations of \$5,000 and \$10,000 only, and were used by the banks as a reserve in place of legal-tender notes deposited in the Treasury for which the

certificates were issued. At one time there were as many as \$76,000,000 of these certificates outstanding. The act of March 14, 1900, repealed the law authorizing the issue of currency certificates of which there were about \$15,000,000 then outstanding.

Under the act of 1900 the Treasury notes of 1890 are also being retired and silver certificates are replacing them. Through the operation of that law there have been some important changes in the paper currency in circulation. The following table shows the amount of each kind of Government paper in circulation on March 1, 1900, just before the act was passed, and on April 1, 1901:

	March 1, 1900.	April 1, 1901.	Change.
Gold certificates.....	\$181,266,337	\$248,286,099	Increase, \$67,019,762
Silver certificates.....	400,108,487	427,206,320	" 27,102,833
Certificates of deposit.....	15,270,000	.....	Decrease, 15,270,000
Treasury notes 1890.....	85,945,227	53,728,232	" 32,216,995
United States notes (greenbacks) ..	333,711,366	336,889,481	Increase, 3,178,115
Total Government paper money..	\$1,016,296,417	\$1,066,110,182	Increase, \$49,813,715

Since March 1, 1900, \$15,000,000 certificates of deposit and \$32,000,000 Treasury notes of 1890 have been retired, while \$67,000,000 gold certificates, \$27,000,000 silver certificates, and \$3,000,000 greenbacks have been put in circulation. While \$47,000,000 of certain notes have been retired their place has been more than filled by the issue of \$97,000,000 other notes, making a net increase in Government paper money of nearly \$50,000,000.

The changes in the net cash in the Treasury since the act of March, 1900, was passed, are of interest as reflecting the influence of the gold standard law upon the financial condition of the Treasury. We show the net holdings of Government cash on the two dates mentioned:

	March 1, 1900.	April 1, 1901.	Change.
Gold coin and bullion.....	\$232,225,336	\$249,046,644	Increase, \$16,821,308
Silver dollars and bullion.....	10,414,612	17,817,328	" 7,402,716
United States notes.....	13,069,650	9,791,535	Decrease, 3,278,115
National bank notes.....	3,776,647	8,945,979	Increase, 5,169,332
Fractional silver.....	5,308,841	9,016,799	" 3,707,958
Minor coin, fractional currency.....	488,499	662,690	" 209,191
	\$265,278,585	\$295,310,975	Increase, \$30,032,390

The cash in the Treasury in excess of certificates has increased \$30,000,000 since March 1, 1900, of which increase nearly \$17,000,000 is in gold, \$11,000,000 in silver and \$5,000,000 in National bank notes, while there was a decrease of \$3,000,000 in United States notes. This represents, of course, only a small part of the actual cash in the Treasury, which has reached an enormous sum, far in excess of what was ever before held until a very recent period. At the present time there is deposited in the vaults of the Treasury nearly \$1,000,000,000 of gold and silver coin and bullion. This, with \$58,000,000 of notes and certificates, makes a total of \$1,057,000,000 cash now in the possession of the Government. How this money has accumulated is indicated in the following table:

MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.

APRIL 1.	Gold.	Silver.	Notes and certificates.	Total.
1880.....	\$144,010,551	\$64,856,996	\$34,084,859	\$242,952,406
1885.....	241,440,797	191,218,302	123,552,833	556,211,932
1890.....	320,225,794	335,560,614	47,523,954	703,310,362
1895.....	139,486,496	510,259,890	181,237,047	731,018,423
1896.....	171,885,710	508,939,744	165,952,144	846,777,598
1897.....	189,242,803	517,048,212	151,057,505	857,348,520
1898.....	210,603,236	512,432,535	97,818,324	821,154,194
1899.....	278,306,356	506,976,982	45,861,618	831,144,956
1900.....	422,000,915	502,582,325	72,584,586	997,167,826
1901.....	497,332,743	501,605,124	58,107,407	1,057,045,274

The Government has now about an equal supply of gold and silver, while in 1895 silver was nearly four times the amount of gold. The total is about half a billion dollars of each, and the Government owns about \$250,000,000 of its gold and about \$27,000,000 of its silver. With so large a visible supply of coin in the hands of the Government, the United States is an object lesson to other nations whose policy it is to prevent the sword and the purse falling into the same hands.

**NATIONAL BANKS OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.**—The first statement submitted this year to the Comptroller of the Currency by the National banks of the country is for February 5 and in many respects is the most remarkable ever made by those institutions. Since the previous statement, of December 13, 1900, the number of banks has increased fifty-seven, individual deposits nearly \$180,000,000, amounts due banks and bankers \$160,000,000, loans \$108,000,000 and resources \$294,000,000. Capital increased only \$2,343,100, while surplus increased more than \$4,000,000, but undivided profits were reduced \$8,500,000. These banks increased their gold reserves \$31,000,000, silver nearly \$9,000,000 and legal tenders \$10,000,000. The following table shows the changes in some of the important items as indicated in the statements issued during the past two years:

CONDITION OF THE NATIONAL BANKS OF THE UNITED STATES.

	<i>Capital.</i>	<i>Surplus.</i>	<i>Individual deposits.</i>	<i>Gold.</i>	<i>Silver.</i>	<i>Legal tenders.</i>
April 5, 1899.....	\$607,263,570	\$246,169,804	\$2,437,223,420	\$317,210,531	\$46,952,020	\$130,055,423
June 30, 1899.....	604,865,327	248,146,168	2,522,157,509	309,334,008	47,484,088	134,927,985
September 7, 1899	605,772,970	248,449,235	2,450,725,505	291,612,581	46,958,802	127,754,651
December 2, 1899.	606,725,265	250,367,602	2,390,810,361	274,687,240	40,138,136	114,732,795
February 13, 1900.	631,064,465	252,899,088	2,481,847,035	289,381,232	50,196,592	136,966,493
April 26, 1900.....	617,051,455	253,724,596	2,449,212,656	597,633,828	60,367,240	146,198,063
June 29, 1900.....	621,536,461	256,249,448	2,458,092,757	295,121,378	60,802,331	146,950,522
September 5, 1900	630,209,630	261,874,068	2,508,248,537	312,158,312	61,170,098	147,131,493
December 13, 1900	632,353,495	262,337,648	2,623,937,522	301,619,990	58,062,234	142,134,945
February 5, 1901..	634,696,505	266,520,505	2,753,999,722	332,971,037	66,985,107	152,366,332

There are now 3,999 National banks in operation, the largest number ever in existence at one time. The increase during the last year has been 395, a gain almost without precedent in the history of the system. The increase in capital during the year was \$21,612,000, but the aggregate capital is still more than \$50,000,000 less than it was in 1898. The capital of the National banks reached its maximum on December 9, 1892, when it amounted to \$689,698,017. At that time there were 3,784 banks in existence and their average capital was \$182,300. The present capital of National banks averages only about \$159,000. The recent growth of the system is shown in the following comparison for the last eleven years; the figures being obtained from the first statements made in each year:

<b>ABOUT MARCH 1.</b>	<i>Number of banks.</i>	<i>Capital.</i>	<i>Surplus and profits.</i>	<i>Individual deposits.</i>	<i>Total resources.</i>
1891.....	3,801	\$662,518,459	\$316,488,186	\$1,483,450,033	\$3,065,002,152
1892.....	3,711	679,970,110	330,644,507	1,702,240,958	3,436,672,359
1893.....	3,806	688,642,876	348,545,913	1,751,439,374	3,459,721,236
1894.....	3,777	678,536,910	333,460,102	1,546,800,444	3,324,734,902
1895.....	3,728	662,100,100	330,100,495	1,667,843,286	3,378,520,537
1896.....	3,699	653,994,915	334,219,715	1,648,062,899	3,347,844,199
1897.....	3,634	642,424,195	333,714,916	1,666,219,961	3,446,038,799
1898.....	3,564	628,890,320	334,628,320	1,982,480,933	3,946,947,174
1899.....	3,579	608,301,245	333,962,295	2,232,193,157	4,403,883,073
1900.....	3,604	613,084,465	363,872,965	2,491,847,036	4,674,910,713
1901.....	3,999	634,696,505	399,459,185	2,753,999,722	5,435,906,257

All of the items in the foregoing table are larger in amount at the present time than at any previous period with the single exception of capital. The surplus and

undivided profits equal sixty three per cent. of the capital as compared with only about forty-eight per cent. in 1891. The individual deposits now equal \$26 for each dollar of capital and surplus while in 1891 they were only \$15.

Prior to the present era of prosperity the National banking system reached its highest stage of development in the autumn of 1892. Then the total resources of these banks amounted to \$3,510,000,000 and individual deposits to \$1,765,000,000. Depression then ruled until the autumn of 1896 when the resources were only \$3,263,000,000 and individual deposits \$1,597,000,000. In a little more than four years the former have increased \$2,172,000,000 and the latter \$1,157,000,000.

**THE MONEY MARKET.**—In the local money market there has been a general advance in rates in all departments. In view of the extraordinary operations that are taking place in the financial world it is surprising that the rates for money have not gone very much higher. Such operations a few years ago would have been impossible.

At the close of the month call money ruled at  $2\frac{1}{4}$  @ 3 per cent., averaging about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. Banks and trust companies quoted  $2\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. as the minimum rate. Time money on Stock Exchange collateral is quoted at  $3\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. for 30 to 90 days, and  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for 4 to 6 months on good mixed collateral. For commercial paper the rates are  $3\frac{1}{2}$  @ 4 per cent. for 60 to 90 days endorsed bills receivable, 4 @  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for first-class 4 to 6 months single names, and 5 per cent. for good paper having the same length of time to run.

#### MONEY RATES IN NEW YORK CITY.

	Nov. 1.	Dec. 1.	Jan. 1.	Feb. 1.	Mar. 1.	Apr. 1.
	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.
Call loans, bankers' balances.....	3 — 4	3 — 4	$4\frac{1}{4}$ — 6	$1\frac{1}{4}$ — 2	$1\frac{1}{4}$ — $2\frac{1}{4}$	$2\frac{1}{4}$ — 3
Call loans, banks and trust companies.....	4 —	4 —	5 —	2 —	2 —	2 —
Brokers' loans on collateral, 30 to 60 days.....	$4\frac{1}{4}$ —	4 —	5 —	3 —	3 —	$3\frac{1}{4}$ —
Brokers' loans on collateral, 90 days to 4 months.....	5 —	4 — $4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$ — 5	3 — $3\frac{1}{4}$	3 —	$3\frac{1}{4}$ — $3\frac{1}{2}$
Brokers' loans on collateral, 5 to 7 months.....	5 —	$4\frac{1}{4}$ — 5	5 —	$3\frac{1}{4}$ —	$3\frac{1}{4}$ —	$3\frac{1}{4}$ —
Commercial paper, endorsed bills receivable, 60 to 90 days.....	$4\frac{1}{4}$ — 5	4 — $4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$ — 5	3 — $3\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$ —	$3\frac{1}{4}$ — 4
Commercial paper prime single names, 4 to 6 months.....	5 — $5\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$ — $4\frac{1}{2}$	5 — $5\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$ — 4	$3\frac{1}{4}$ — $4\frac{1}{4}$	4 — $4\frac{1}{2}$
Commercial paper, good single names, 4 to 6 months.....	6 —	5 — $5\frac{1}{4}$	$5\frac{1}{2}$ — 6	5 —	$4\frac{1}{4}$ — 5	5 —

**NEW YORK CITY BANKS.**—Only one new record was made by the New York Clearing House banks last month, loans reaching the highest figure, \$918,789,600 on March 9. During the first three weeks of the month there was a loss in deposits of \$12,000,000 of which nearly \$4,000,000 was recovered in the last week. Loans were reduced \$3,000,000 between March 9 and 23 but were increased \$6,000,000 in the final week of the month. The net changes for the month are an increase of \$2,600,000 in loans and a decrease of \$8,200,000 in deposits. Reserves decreased \$9,000,000 and surplus \$7,000,000, the latter now being less than \$8,000,000.

#### NEW YORK CITY BANKS—CONDITION AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

	Loans.	Specie.	Legal tenders.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Mar. 2....	\$914,209,400	\$193,948,500	\$73,981,100	\$1,012,514,000	\$14,801,100	\$31,309,000	\$1,302,316,800
" 9....	918,789,600	191,134,100	72,565,300	1,011,928,500	10,717,275	31,469,000	1,537,997,600
" 14....	914,812,700	189,428,100	72,120,900	1,006,185,600	10,003,900	31,585,000	1,444,715,000
" 23....	910,739,100	188,488,300	71,608,700	1,000,458,300	10,272,425	31,533,100	1,746,510,800
" 30....	916,880,900	186,570,800	72,370,500	1,004,283,200	7,870,500	31,635,000	1,610,110,800



## DEPOSITS AND SURPLUS RESERVE ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

MONTH.	1899.		1900.		1901.	
	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.
January .....	\$823,087,700	\$19,180,975	\$740,048,900	\$11,168,075	\$854,189,200	\$11,525,900
February .....	861,637,500	39,232,025	795,917,300	30,871,275	969,917,500	24,888,825
March .....	910,573,600	30,384,900	829,917,000	13,641,550	1,012,514,000	14,801,100
April .....	896,917,000	15,494,850	807,816,800	9,836,150	1,004,288,200	7,870,500
May .....	883,536,300	25,524,675	852,062,500	21,128,300	.....	.....
June .....	890,081,600	42,710,800	897,964,500	20,122,275	.....	.....
July .....	906,127,800	14,274,550	898,249,300	16,859,375	.....	.....
August .....	862,142,700	10,811,125	897,841,700	27,535,975	.....	.....
September .....	849,798,800	9,191,250	903,486,900	27,078,475	.....	.....
October .....	786,364,200	1,724,450	884,706,800	12,942,600	.....	.....
November .....	761,636,500	2,068,525	841,775,200	5,950,400	.....	.....
December .....	748,078,000	8,536,700	864,410,900	10,885,675	.....	.....

Deposits reached the highest amount, \$1,012,514,000 on Mar. 2, 1901, loans, \$918,799,600 on March 9, 1901, and the surplus reserve \$111,623,000 on Feb. 3, 1894.

## NON-MEMBER BANKS—NEW YORK CLEARING-HOUSE.

DATES.	Loans and Investments.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal tender and bank notes.	Deposit with Clearing-House agents.	Deposit in other N. Y. banks.	Surplus.
Mar. 2.....	\$62,046,100	\$71,061,800	\$8,196,900	\$3,953,100	\$8,980,400	\$3,862,400	\$2,116,475
" 9.....	62,119,800	70,375,700	3,100,800	8,970,600	8,820,900	3,494,500	1,792,375
" 16.....	62,803,900	71,407,600	8,053,700	3,883,300	8,857,700	3,646,000	1,628,800
" 23.....	63,175,500	71,569,100	8,005,400	3,905,200	8,686,500	3,946,400	1,643,725
" 30.....	64,081,400	72,468,700	8,016,800	3,805,400	8,713,800	3,847,400	1,266,225

## BOSTON BANKS.

DATES.	Loans.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Mar. 2.....	\$188,543,000	\$210,577,000	\$12,672,000	\$9,258,000	\$8,112,000	\$132,461,112
" 9.....	189,897,000	214,827,000	13,008,000	8,888,000	6,114,000	133,956,200
" 16.....	190,581,000	218,196,000	13,598,000	9,109,000	6,115,000	142,280,100
" 23.....	192,308,000	220,993,000	14,016,000	9,273,000	6,117,000	145,377,100
" 30.....	192,914,000	218,189,000	13,873,000	8,862,000	6,154,000	136,183,300

## PHILADELPHIA BANKS.

DATES.	Loans.	Deposits.	Lawful Money Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Mar. 2.....	\$167,893,000	\$202,925,000	\$59,265,000	\$9,988,000	\$117,731,783
" 9.....	167,636,000	202,654,000	60,013,000	9,996,000	90,061,600
" 16.....	167,893,000	203,129,000	58,854,000	9,996,000	87,879,100
" 23.....	169,490,000	208,667,000	58,190,000	9,994,000	99,144,100
" 30.....	171,012,000	204,855,000	58,027,000	9,842,000	95,745,400

**MONEY RATES ABROAD.**—The official rates of discount of the leading European banks have remained unchanged with a slight advance in open market rates at Paris, Berlin and Frankfort. The Bank of Bombay reduced its rate from 9 to 8 per cent. on March 7 and the Bank of Bengal, at Calcutta, from 8 to 7 per cent. on March 21. Discounts of 60 to 90 day bills in London at the close of the month were  $3\frac{3}{4}$  @  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., the same as a month ago. The open market rate at Paris was  $2\frac{3}{4}$  per cent. as against  $2\frac{3}{8}$  @  $2\frac{1}{2}$  a month ago, and at Berlin and Frankfort 4 against  $3\frac{1}{2}$  @  $3\frac{5}{8}$  per cent. a month ago.

## MONEY RATES IN FOREIGN MARKETS.

	Nov. 16.	Dec. 14.	Dec. 28.	Jan. 25.	Feb. 15.	Mar. 1.
London—Bank rate of discount.....	4	4	4	5	4½	4
Market rates of discount:						
60 days bankers' drafts.....	3 15-16	3 1½—4	4	4½	3½	3½
6 months bankers' drafts.....	3 15-16	3 1½—4	4	4½	3½-¾	3½
Loans—Day to day.....	2½	3	3	3½	3	3
Paris, open market rates.....	2½	3	3	2½	2½	2½
Berlin, .....	4¼	4½	4½	3½	3½	3½
Hamburg, .....	4¼	4½	4½	3½	3½	3½
Frankfort, .....	4¼	4½	4½	3½	3½	3½
Amsterdam, .....	3¼	3½	3½	3¼	3½	3¼
Vienna, .....	4¼	4½	4½	3½	3½	3½
St. Petersburg, .....	...	...	...	...	...	...
Madrid, .....	3½	3½	3½	3½	3½	3½
Copenhagen, .....	6	6	6	6	5	5

## BANK OF ENGLAND STATEMENT AND LONDON MARKETS.

	Dec. 18, 1900.	Jan. 16, 1901.	Feb. 15, 1901.	Mar. 15, 1901.
Circulation (exc. b'k post bills).....	£29,243,670	£29,119,815	£28,636,425	£28,464,725
Public deposits.....	7,960,886	7,033,552	8,099,614	12,276,415
Other deposits.....	38,984,069	43,714,740	37,281,782	38,092,353
Government securities.....	18,187,060	19,067,471	13,397,665	12,805,280
Other securities.....	27,146,764	31,062,744	29,377,682	30,851,462
Reserve of notes and coin.....	19,684,663	19,825,016	22,724,011	25,730,207
Coin and bullion.....	31,103,533	31,169,331	33,565,436	36,419,933
Reserve to liabilities.....	4½%	3½%	4½%	5½%
Bank rate of discount.....	4½	5½	4½	4½
Price of Consols (2½ per cents.).....	97 7-16	96 15-16	96½	96½
Price of silver per ounce.....	29 18-16d.	29 8-16d.	29d.	29½
Average price of wheat.....	26s. 10d.	.....	26s. 8d.	25s. 9d.

EUROPEAN BANKS.—There has been very little change in the gold holdings of the European banks during the past month. With the exception of Russia, however, all have more gold than they held a year ago, France showing a gain of \$90,000,000 and Germany of \$30,000,000. Russia lost \$46,000,000.

## GOLD AND SILVER IN THE EUROPEAN BANKS.

	February 1, 1901.		March 1, 1901.		April 1, 1901.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
England.....	£32,663,278	.....	£35,858,945	.....	£36,187,865	.....
France.....	94,156,161	£43,820,947	95,276,043	£43,769,446	95,114,842	£43,964,229
Germany.....	28,560,000	14,708,000	30,180,000	15,522,000	30,362,000	15,682,000
Austro-Hungary.....	38,400,000	10,155,000	38,765,000	10,445,000	38,923,000	10,669,000
Spain.....	14,001,000	16,563,000	14,001,000	16,495,000	14,002,000	16,560,000
Netherlands.....	5,028,000	5,675,000	5,043,000	5,741,300	5,058,400	5,670,500
Nat. Belgium.....	2,914,000	1,457,000	2,933,000	1,466,000	2,998,000	1,496,000
Totals.....	£215,712,439	£92,378,947	£222,006,988	£93,438,746	£222,661,107	£94,041,739

FOREIGN EXCHANGE.—The market for sterling became, stronger early in the month and advanced sharply later. A scarcity of bankers' bills and a demand for remittance on account of securities sold in London accounted for the advance. A shipment of gold to Paris was made by the City Bank on March 30, but at the current rates of exchange no profit could be figured on the shipment.

## RATES FOR STERLING AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

WEEK ENDED.	BANKERS' STERLING.		Cable transfers.	Prime commercial, Long.	Documentary Sterling, 60 days.
	60 days.	Sight.			
Mar. 2.....	4.84 @ 4.84½	4.87¼ @ 4.87½	4.88 @ 4.88¼	4.83¼ @ 4.83¾	4.83 @ 4.84½
" 9.....	4.84 @ 4.84½	4.87¼ @ 4.87½	4.88 @ 4.88¼	4.83¼ @ 4.83¾	4.83¼ @ 4.84½
" 16.....	4.84¼ @ 4.84½	4.87½ @ 4.87¾	4.88¼ @ 4.88½	4.83½ @ 4.84	4.83½ @ 4.84½
" 23.....	4.84¾ @ 4.85	4.88 @ 4.88¼	4.88¾ @ 4.89	4.84¼ @ 4.84½	4.83¾ @ 4.84½
" 30.....	4.84¾ @ 4.85	4.88 @ 4.88¼	4.88¾ @ 4.89	4.84¼ @ 4.84½	4.83¾ @ 4.85

## FOREIGN EXCHANGE—ACTUAL RATES ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

	Dec. 1.	January 1.	Feb. 1.	March 1.	April 1.
Sterling Bankers—60 days.....	4.81 $\frac{1}{2}$ —2	4.81 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{3}{4}$	4.84 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	4.84 — $\frac{1}{4}$	4.84 $\frac{1}{2}$ —5
“ “ Sight.....	4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{3}{4}$	4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{3}{4}$	4.88 — $\frac{1}{4}$	4.87 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	4.88 — $\frac{1}{4}$
“ “ Cables.....	4.86 — $\frac{1}{4}$	4.86 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	4.88 $\frac{1}{2}$ —9	4.88 — $\frac{1}{2}$	4.88 $\frac{1}{2}$ —9
“ Commercial long.....	4.81 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	4.80 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	4.83 $\frac{1}{2}$ —4	4.83 $\frac{1}{2}$ —4	4.84 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$
“ Documentary for paym't.....	4.80 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{2}$	4.80 $\frac{1}{2}$ —82	4.83 $\frac{1}{2}$ —4	4.83 — $\frac{1}{4}$	4.83 $\frac{1}{2}$ —5
Paris—Cable transfers.....	5.167 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$	5.157 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.147 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.167 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.15 — 147 $\frac{1}{2}$
“ Bankers' 60 days.....	5.207 $\frac{1}{2}$ —1-16	5.20 — 199 $\frac{1}{2}$	5.18 $\frac{1}{2}$ —17 $\frac{1}{2}$	5.19 $\frac{1}{2}$ —18 $\frac{1}{2}$	5.18 $\frac{1}{2}$ —17 $\frac{1}{2}$
“ Bankers' sight.....	5.17 $\frac{1}{2}$ —167 $\frac{1}{2}$	5.167 $\frac{1}{2}$ —16 $\frac{1}{2}$	5.157 $\frac{1}{2}$ —1-16	5.17 $\frac{1}{2}$ —167 $\frac{1}{2}$	5.157 $\frac{1}{2}$ —15 $\frac{1}{2}$
Swiss—Bankers' sight.....	5.197 $\frac{1}{2}$ —18 $\frac{1}{2}$	5.197 $\frac{1}{2}$ —18 $\frac{1}{2}$	5.18 $\frac{1}{2}$ —17 $\frac{1}{2}$	5.18 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.167 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$
Berlin—Bankers' 60 days.....	94 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$	94 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$	94 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$	94 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$	94 $\frac{1}{2}$ —5 $\frac{1}{4}$
“ Bankers' sight.....	94 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$	95 — $\frac{1}{4}$	95 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$	95 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$	95 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$
Belgium—Bankers' sight.....	5.197 $\frac{1}{2}$ —18 $\frac{1}{2}$	5.17 $\frac{1}{2}$ —	5.16 $\frac{1}{2}$ —15 $\frac{1}{2}$	5.18 $\frac{1}{2}$ —17 $\frac{1}{2}$	5.16 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$
Amsterdam—Bankers' sight.....	40 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$	40 $\frac{1}{2}$ —3-16	40 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$	40 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$	40 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$
Kroners—Bankers' sight.....	26 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$	26 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$	26 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$	26 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$	26 $\frac{1}{2}$ — $\frac{1}{4}$
Italian lire—sight.....	5.45 — 42 $\frac{1}{2}$	5.43 $\frac{1}{2}$ —41 $\frac{1}{2}$	5.45 — 42 $\frac{1}{2}$	5.45 — 42 $\frac{1}{2}$	5.43 $\frac{1}{2}$ —41 $\frac{1}{2}$

GOLD AND SILVER COINAGE.—The mints coined \$6,182,152.50 gold in March, \$3,120,580.50 silver and \$90,184 minor coin. There was \$1,542,350 of silver dollars coined.

## COINAGE OF THE UNITED STATES.

	1899.		1900.		1901.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
January.....	\$18,032,000	\$1,642,000	\$11,515,000	\$2,364,161	\$12,657,200	\$2,713,000
February.....	14,848,800	1,598,000	13,401,900	1,940,000	9,230,300	2,242,166
March.....	12,176,715	2,346,557	12,596,240	4,341,376	6,182,152	3,120,580
April.....	7,894,475	2,159,449	12,922,000	3,930,000	.....	.....
May.....	4,803,400	2,879,416	8,252,000	3,171,000	.....	.....
June.....	8,159,630	2,155,019	3,820,770	2,094,217	.....	.....
July.....	5,981,500	794,000	6,540,000	1,827,827	.....	.....
August.....	10,253,100	2,233,636	5,050,000	2,536,000	.....	.....
September.....	6,860,947	2,441,268	2,293,335	3,932,185	.....	.....
October.....	8,220,000	3,313,569	5,120,000	4,148,000	.....	.....
November.....	6,643,730	2,612,000	13,185,000	3,130,000	.....	.....
December.....	7,469,952	1,886,605	4,576,697	2,880,555	.....	.....
Year.....	\$11,344,220	\$26,061,519	\$99,272,942	\$36,295,321	\$28,069,652	\$8,075,746

SILVER.—The price of silver in London last month fell to the lowest price touched since January, 1900, the price on March 29 and the final for the month being 27 5-16 d. per ounce. The highest price, 28 3-16 d., was recorded on the first of the month, the net decline being  $\frac{7}{8}$  d.

## MONTHLY RANGE OF SILVER IN LONDON—1899, 1900, 1901.

MONTH.	1899.		1900.		1901.		MONTH.	1899.		1900.		1901.	
	High	Low.	High	Low.	High	Low.		High	Low.	High	Low.	High	Low.
January..	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{4}$	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	27	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	July.....	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	...	...
February	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	August..	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	...	...
March....	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	Septemb'r	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	29 $\frac{1}{4}$	...	...
April.....	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	...	...	October..	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	30 $\frac{1}{2}$	29 $\frac{1}{4}$	...	...
May.....	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	28	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	...	...	Novemb'r	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	29 $\frac{1}{4}$	...	...
June.....	28	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	...	...	Decemb'r	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	29 $\frac{1}{4}$	...	...

## FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COIN AND BULLION—QUOTATIONS IN NEW YORK.

	Bid.	Asked.		Bid.	Asked.
Trade dollars.....	\$ .60	\$ .65	Twenty marks.....	\$4.73	\$4.76
Mexican dollars.....	.49	.51	Spanish doubloons.....	15.50	15.70
Peruvian soles, Chilean pesos..	.42 $\frac{1}{2}$	.43 $\frac{1}{2}$	Spanish 25 pesos.....	4.78	4.80
English silver.....	4.82	4.87	Mexican doubloons.....	15.50	15.70
Victoria sovereigns.....	4.85	4.87	Mexican 20 pesos.....	19.53	19.58
Five francs.....	.93	.96	Ten guilders.....	3.96	4.02
Twenty francs.....	8.84	8.86			

Fine gold bars on the first of this month were at par to  $\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. premium on the Mint value. Bar silver in London, 27 $\frac{1}{4}$  d. per ounce. New York market for large commercial silver bars, 50% @ 60% c. Fine silver (Government assay), 50% @ 61 c. Official price, 80% c.

**NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION**—There was an increase in bank notes outstanding last month of nearly \$1,500,000, the total now exceeding \$350,000,000 of which nearly \$321,000,000 is based on Government bonds, an increase during the month of \$1,700,000. The holdings of Government bonds by the banks increased \$1,800,000.

#### NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.

	Dec. 31, 1900.	Jan. 31, 1901.	Feb. 28, 1901.	Mar. 30, 1901.
Total amount outstanding.....	\$347,061,410	\$346,742,188	\$348,575,661	\$350,021,811
Circulation based on U. S. bonds.....	306,294,673	315,721,578	319,217,048	320,910,906
Circulation secured by lawful money....	81,766,737	31,020,558	29,358,613	29,110,906
U. S. bonds to secure circulation:				
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	609,950	553,250	457,250	317,250
"      "      1907, 4 per cent.....	7,407,650	6,405,650	6,380,650	6,494,400
Five per cents. of 1894.....	545,990	288,900	286,900	286,900
Four per cents. of 1895.....	4,188,000	3,976,100	3,986,000	3,736,000
Three per cents. of 1898.....	4,518,180	4,126,180	4,065,080	4,077,080
Two per cents. of 1900.....	295,562,550	303,094,900	306,217,750	308,264,750
Total .....	\$312,832,880	\$318,422,980	\$321,374,830	\$323,178,960

The National banks have also on deposit the following bonds to secure public deposits: 4 per cents. of 1907, \$10,810,000; 5 per cents. of 1894, \$524,000; 4 per cents. of 1895, \$11,498,900; 3 per cents. of 1898, \$5,793,280; 2 per cents. of 1900, \$73,161,300; District of Columbia 3.65's, 1894, \$583,000; a total of \$101,917,510.

The circulation of National gold banks, not included in the above statement, is \$79,586.

**GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND DISBURSEMENTS.**—The report of the United States Treasury for March shows that the receipts exceeded the expenditures by \$9,128,263, but included in the receipts was \$1,496,090 paid into the Treasury on account of the Central Pacific Railroad indebtedness. The surplus for the nine months ended March 31 was over \$42,000,000 as compared with \$54,000,000 for the corresponding period last year.

#### UNITED STATES TREASURY RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES.

Source.	RECEIPTS.		Source.	EXPENDITURES.	
	March, 1901.	Since July 1, 1900.		March, 1901.	Since July 1, 1900.
Customs.....	\$21,048,597	\$180,234,215	Civil and mis.....	\$10,822,602	\$93,228,217
Internal revenue...	24,820,424	226,391,594	War.....	10,635,787	114,517,342
Miscellaneous.....	4,522,104	28,501,300	Navy.....	6,014,510	45,158,870
Total.....	\$49,891,125	\$435,117,109	Indians.....	1,402,814	8,780,565
Excess of receipts...	9,128,263	42,206,909	Pensions.....	11,162,248	106,527,609
			Interest.....	724,900	24,587,537
			Total.....	\$40,762,862	\$302,820,140

#### UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES AND NET GOLD IN THE TREASURY.

MONTH.	1900.			1901.		
	Receipts.	Expenditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.	Receipts.	Expenditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.
January.....	\$48,012,165	\$39,189,097	\$218,613,617	\$47,520,287	\$40,109,707	\$221,183,644
February.....	45,631,265	37,738,472	232,225,396	45,844,123	38,880,635	231,150,064
March.....	48,729,837	32,188,271	248,358,064	49,891,125	40,762,862	249,046,643
April.....	45,039,326	40,903,927	229,461,962			
May.....	45,160,053	40,351,525	218,857,545			
June.....	51,435,832	33,540,873	220,557,185			
July.....	49,955,161	53,979,653	223,567,376			
August.....	49,688,756	50,500,000	218,263,909			
September.....	47,304,326	39,169,071	230,131,162			
October.....	51,029,067	47,963,637	242,670,174			
November.....	48,344,514	41,278,690	243,235,735			
December.....	40,846,508	40,204,622	246,561,322			

**UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.**—The interest-bearing debt of the Government remains unchanged, the refunding operations having come to a close. The currency

certificates have been eliminated from the statement, their issue having been discontinued under the act of March 1900. The net cash balance in the Treasury was increased nearly \$10,000,000 and the debt less cash in the Treasury was reduced about the same amount.

## UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.

	Jan. 1, 1901.	Feb. 1, 1901.	Mar. 1, 1901.	Apr. 1, 1901.
<b>Interest bearing debt:</b>				
Loan of March 14, 1900, 2 per cent.....	\$419,879,750	\$445,890,850	\$445,940,750	\$445,940,750
Funded loan of 1907, 4 .....	287,578,100	270,405,100	270,359,350	270,359,350
Refunding certificates, 4 per cent.....	84,380	83,770	83,570	83,570
Loan of 1904, 5 per cent.....	26,992,100	22,939,400	22,938,400	22,938,400
" 1925, 4 .....	182,315,400	182,315,400	182,315,400	182,315,400
Ten-Twenties of 1898, 3 per cent.....	104,900,040	99,915,940	99,912,940	99,912,940
<b>Total interest-bearing debt.....</b>	<b>\$1,001,499,770</b>	<b>\$1,001,500,280</b>	<b>\$1,001,500,410</b>	<b>\$1,001,500,410</b>
Debt on which interest has ceased.....	2,654,070	2,023,180	1,830,690	1,770,140
<b>Debt bearing no interest:</b>				
Legal tender and old demand notes....	346,734,963	346,734,963	346,734,963	346,734,963
National bank note redemption acct..	81,531,632	30,472,127	28,991,227	28,708,555
Fractional currency.....	6,878,410	6,878,410	6,877,462	6,877,462
<b>Total non-interest bearing debt.....</b>	<b>\$385,144,806</b>	<b>\$384,085,400</b>	<b>\$382,603,553</b>	<b>\$382,315,880</b>
<b>Total interest and non-interest debt.</b>	<b>1,386,644,576</b>	<b>1,385,608,861</b>	<b>1,385,984,653</b>	<b>1,385,586,430</b>
<b>Certificates and notes offset by cash in the Treasury:</b>				
Gold certificates.....	263,629,379	275,667,279	276,040,989	276,704,989
Silver .....	427,428,000	428,597,000	427,854,000	431,841,000
Certificates of deposit.....	1,580,000	995,000	710,000	.....
Treasury notes of 1890 .....	61,397,000	58,278,000	55,957,000	53,881,000
<b>Total certificates and notes.....</b>	<b>\$754,012,379</b>	<b>\$763,537,279</b>	<b>\$760,561,989</b>	<b>\$762,426,989</b>
<b>Aggregate debt .....</b>	<b>2,143,311,025</b>	<b>2,151,146,180</b>	<b>2,146,496,642</b>	<b>2,148,013,419</b>
<b>Cash in the Treasury:</b>				
Total cash assets.....	1,131,271,552	1,134,472,981	1,139,829,028	1,155,899,210
Demand liabilities.....	841,164,216	841,459,968	840,913,979	846,955,699
<b>Balance .....</b>	<b>\$290,107,336</b>	<b>\$293,012,973</b>	<b>\$298,915,149</b>	<b>\$308,443,521</b>
Gold reserve.....	150,000,000	150,000,000	150,000,000	150,000,000
Net cash balance.....	140,107,336	143,012,973	148,915,149	158,443,521
<b>Total .....</b>	<b>\$290,107,336</b>	<b>\$293,012,973</b>	<b>\$298,915,149</b>	<b>\$308,443,521</b>
<b>Total debt, less cash in the Treasury.</b>	<b>1,009,191,310</b>	<b>1,004,586,878</b>	<b>1,087,019,504</b>	<b>1,077,142,908</b>

FOREIGN TRADE.—While the exports of merchandise in February were \$23,000,000 less than in January and \$6,000,000 less than in February last year, they still were nearly \$113,000,000, making the nineteenth consecutive month in which the

## EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

MONTH OF FEBRUARY.	MERCHANDISE.			Gold Balance.	Silver Balance.
	Exports.	Imports.	Balance.		
1896.....	\$77,701,904	\$62,478,116	Exp., \$15,223,788	Imp., \$9,468,296	Exp., \$2,599,529
1897.....	79,821,066	59,237,377	" 20,583,709	" 477,023	" 2,394,588
1898.....	94,917,453	53,074,649	" 41,842,804	" 5,132,260	" 1,074,236
1899.....	93,837,151	60,258,452	" 33,578,699	" 4,580,944	" 2,892,047
1900.....	119,426,085	68,838,941	" 50,587,044	" 507,458	" 2,111,811
1901.....	112,947,361	63,927,265	" 49,020,096	" 1,412,032	" 1,750,572
<b>EIGHT MONTHS.</b>					
1896.....	602,666,873	541,194,833	Exp., 61,472,040	Exp., 52,394,263	Exp., 21,391,413
1897.....	734,998,213	422,515,394	" 312,482,819	Imp., 64,490,242	" 22,071,620
1898.....	813,284,890	393,001,179	" 419,593,681	" 27,581,499	" 15,913,195
1899.....	843,433,266	427,201,833	" 416,231,433	" 64,816,031	" 18,104,707
1900.....	919,473,471	555,253,574	" 364,219,897	" 6,930,090	" 14,471,912
1901.....	1,015,185,374	522,900,380	" 492,224,994	" 23,886,395	" 17,951,410

exports exceeded \$100,000,000. The imports of merchandise were nearly \$64,000,000, a decrease of more than \$5,000,000 compared with January and of nearly that amount compared with February, 1900. The net exports were \$49,000,000 as com-

pared with nearly \$50,600,000 a year ago. The magnitude of our exports is indicated in the fact that in the eight months ended February 28 the total was in excess of \$1,015,000,000, an amount not equalled in any full year prior to 1896. The exports exceed the imports for the eight months by \$492,000,000 and the silver net exports were about \$18,000,000, while the imports of gold exceeded the exports by nearly \$24,000,000.

**MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.**—There was a decrease in the volume of money in circulation in March of \$3,300,000, a reduction of \$1,500,000 in gold coin and of \$9,000,000 in gold certificates, being reported partly offset by increases of \$5,000,000 in silver certificates and \$2,500,000 in bank notes.

#### MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

	Jan. 1, 1901.	Feb. 1, 1901.	Mar. 1, 1901.	Apr. 1, 1901.
Gold coin.....	\$629,192,578	\$615,576,806	\$628,333,957	\$626,824,954
Silver dollars.....	76,182,326	63,457,812	71,076,367	72,299,960
Subsidiary silver.....	83,123,463	81,979,691	81,437,330	80,863,107
Gold certificates.....	232,787,929	275,667,279	257,548,739	248,286,069
Silver certificates.....	422,399,403	428,597,030	422,340,690	427,206,330
Treasury notes, Act July 14, 1890.....	61,230,159	58,091,831	55,857,327	53,728,232
United States notes.....	334,587,495	333,054,404	335,421,722	336,890,481
Currency certificates, Act June 8, 1872..	1,560,000	995,000	.....	.....
National bank notes.....	332,188,526	333,360,391	338,593,012	341,155,427
Total.....	\$2,173,251,879	\$2,190,780,213	\$2,190,609,144	\$2,187,243,580
Population of United States.....	77,080,000	77,183,000	77,311,000	77,427,000
Circulation per capita.....	\$28.19	\$28.38	\$28.34	\$28.26

**MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.**—The gross cash in the Treasury increased \$7,000,000 last month, while certificates and Treasury notes outstanding decreased \$6,500,000, making an increase of more than \$13,000,000 in the net cash.

#### MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.

	Jan. 1, 1901.	Feb. 1, 1901.	Mar. 1, 1901.	Apr. 1, 1901.
Gold coin and bullion.....	\$479,340,251	\$496,850,923	\$488,698,803	\$497,332,743
Silver Dollars.....	432,937,264	447,389,778	441,391,233	441,709,960
Silver bullion.....	56,937,918	54,853,287	53,790,726	52,407,220
Subsidiary silver.....	4,446,010	6,505,826	7,230,550	9,016,799
United States notes.....	12,093,521	13,626,612	11,259,294	9,791,535
National bank notes.....	7,952,649	13,461,480	10,062,244	8,945,979
Total.....	\$993,746,613	\$1,062,687,906	\$1,012,432,840	\$1,019,204,256
Certificates and Treasury notes, 1890, outstanding.....	717,977,491	763,351,110	735,746,756	729,220,651
Net cash in Treasury.....	\$275,769,122	\$299,336,796	\$276,686,084	\$289,983,605

**SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES.**—The total stock of money in the country increased nearly \$10,000,000 in March of which \$7,000,000 was in gold and \$1,500,000 in National bank notes. Fractional silver coin increased \$1,200,000.

#### SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES.

	Jan. 1, 1901.	Feb. 1, 1901.	Mar. 1, 1901.	Apr. 1, 1901.
Gold coin and bullion.....	\$1,108,541,829	\$1,112,427,723	\$1,117,082,760	\$1,124,157,697
Silver dollars.....	509,149,590	510,847,590	512,467,590	514,009,940
Silver bullion.....	56,937,918	54,853,287	53,790,726	52,407,220
Subsidiary silver.....	87,599,473	88,486,517	88,667,880	89,899,906
United States notes.....	346,681,016	346,681,016	346,681,016	346,681,016
National bank notes.....	340,141,175	346,821,871	348,655,256	350,101,406
Total.....	\$2,443,021,001	\$2,460,117,009	\$2,467,295,228	\$2,477,227,185

Certificates and Treasury notes represented by coin, bullion, or currency in Treasury are not included in the above statement.

# ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.

The following table shows the highest, lowest and closing prices of the most active stocks at the New York Stock Exchange in the month of March, and the highest and lowest during the year 1901, by dates, and also, for comparison, the range of prices in 1900:

	YEAR 1900.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1901.				MARCH, 1901.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.			Lowest.	High.	Low.	Closing.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe.	48 $\frac{3}{4}$	18 $\frac{3}{4}$	63 $\frac{1}{4}$	Mar. 30	42 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 21	63 $\frac{1}{4}$	54 $\frac{1}{4}$	63 $\frac{1}{4}$
" preferred .....	89 $\frac{3}{4}$	58 $\frac{1}{4}$	96	Mar. 30	82 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 21	96	87 $\frac{1}{4}$	96
Baltimore & Ohio .....	99 $\frac{3}{4}$	55 $\frac{1}{4}$	95 $\frac{3}{4}$	Mar. 6	81 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 4	95 $\frac{3}{4}$	87 $\frac{1}{4}$	92
Baltimore & Ohio, pref. ....	90	73 $\frac{1}{4}$	94	Mar. 6	83 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 28	94	84 $\frac{1}{4}$	91
Brooklyn Rapid Transit. ....	88 $\frac{3}{4}$	47 $\frac{1}{4}$	87 $\frac{3}{4}$	Jan. 12	72 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 27	85 $\frac{3}{4}$	74	83
Canadian Pacific .....	99 $\frac{3}{4}$	84 $\frac{1}{4}$	95	Mar. 20	88 $\frac{3}{4}$	Jan. 18	95	89 $\frac{1}{4}$	93
Canada Southern .....	61 $\frac{1}{4}$	47 $\frac{1}{4}$	65 $\frac{1}{4}$	Mar. 29	54 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 4	65 $\frac{1}{4}$	56 $\frac{1}{4}$	64 $\frac{1}{4}$
Central of New Jersey .....	150 $\frac{3}{4}$	115	180	Jan. 5	145 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 4	156 $\frac{1}{4}$	154	156
Ches. & Ohio vtg. cdfs. ....	42 $\frac{3}{4}$	24	49	Mar. 15	36 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 21	49	39 $\frac{3}{4}$	46 $\frac{3}{4}$
Chicago & Alton .....	42	31	49 $\frac{3}{4}$	Mar. 29	36 $\frac{3}{4}$	Jan. 21	49 $\frac{3}{4}$	38 $\frac{1}{4}$	42 $\frac{3}{4}$
" preferred .....	74 $\frac{1}{4}$	68 $\frac{1}{4}$	78	Mar. 25	72 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 4	78	74 $\frac{1}{4}$	78
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy .....	144	119 $\frac{1}{4}$	170 $\frac{1}{4}$	Mar. 30	138 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 4	170 $\frac{1}{4}$	143 $\frac{1}{4}$	175 $\frac{1}{4}$
Chicago & E. Illinois .....	104	88	119 $\frac{3}{4}$	Mar. 25	91	Jan. 2	119 $\frac{3}{4}$	106	118 $\frac{1}{4}$
" preferred .....	125	119 $\frac{1}{4}$	135	Mar. 18	120 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 3	135	129 $\frac{1}{4}$	134 $\frac{1}{4}$
Chicago, Great Western .....	18	9 $\frac{3}{4}$	24 $\frac{1}{4}$	Mar. 15	16	Jan. 3	24 $\frac{1}{4}$	18 $\frac{3}{4}$	22 $\frac{1}{4}$
Chic., Indianapolis & Lou'ville	29	14	40 $\frac{3}{4}$	Mar. 25	23	Jan. 21	40 $\frac{3}{4}$	31	38 $\frac{1}{4}$
" preferred .....	64	45 $\frac{1}{4}$	74	Mar. 15	58 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 21	74	69 $\frac{3}{4}$	73
Chic., Milwaukee & St. Paul ..	148 $\frac{1}{4}$	108 $\frac{1}{4}$	182	Jan. 5	142 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 21	154 $\frac{1}{4}$	147 $\frac{1}{4}$	150 $\frac{1}{4}$
" preferred .....	188	169 $\frac{1}{4}$	195 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 23	184 $\frac{1}{4}$	Mar. 26	195	184 $\frac{1}{4}$	185 $\frac{1}{4}$
Chicago & Northwestern .....	172 $\frac{3}{4}$	156 $\frac{1}{4}$	184 $\frac{1}{4}$	Mar. 30	168 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 21	184 $\frac{1}{4}$	172	184 $\frac{1}{4}$
" preferred .....	220	195 $\frac{1}{4}$	222 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 5	207	Mar. 1	217	207	218
Chicago, Rock I. & Pacific .....	122 $\frac{1}{4}$	102	136	Mar. 30	117 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 3	136	122 $\frac{1}{4}$	135
Chic., St. Paul, Minn. & Om...	126	110	137	Jan. 11	125	Mar. 2	134	125	134
" preferred .....	175	172	185	Jan. 11	180	Mar. 29	180	180	180
Chicago Terminal Transfer...	147 $\frac{1}{4}$	8 $\frac{1}{4}$	18	Mar. 23	10 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 19	18	12 $\frac{1}{4}$	17 $\frac{1}{4}$
" preferred .....	39 $\frac{3}{4}$	28 $\frac{1}{4}$	43 $\frac{1}{4}$	Mar. 18	39	Jan. 18	43 $\frac{1}{4}$	35 $\frac{1}{4}$	41 $\frac{1}{4}$
Clev. Cin. & St. Louis .....	78	55	82 $\frac{1}{4}$	Mar. 25	73 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 25	82 $\frac{1}{4}$	75 $\frac{1}{4}$	81
Col. Fuel & Iron Co. ....	56 $\frac{1}{4}$	29 $\frac{1}{4}$	56 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 2	41 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 21	56 $\frac{1}{4}$	42 $\frac{1}{4}$	55 $\frac{1}{4}$
Consolidated Gas Co. ....	201	164	216 $\frac{1}{4}$	Mar. 18	187	Jan. 18	216 $\frac{1}{4}$	192	214
Delaware & Hud. Canal Co. ....	134 $\frac{1}{4}$	108 $\frac{1}{4}$	174 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 18	126 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 3	174 $\frac{1}{4}$	163	173 $\frac{1}{4}$
Delaware, Lack. & Western ..	344 $\frac{1}{4}$	171 $\frac{1}{4}$	220	Mar. 30	188 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 3	220	192	218
Denver & Rio Grande .....	94 $\frac{1}{4}$	16 $\frac{1}{4}$	49 $\frac{1}{4}$	Mar. 25	29 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 21	49 $\frac{1}{4}$	37 $\frac{1}{4}$	48 $\frac{1}{4}$
" preferred .....	87 $\frac{1}{4}$	64 $\frac{1}{4}$	100	Mar. 27	80	Jan. 21	100	87 $\frac{1}{4}$	97 $\frac{1}{4}$
Erie .....	27 $\frac{1}{4}$	10 $\frac{1}{4}$	37 $\frac{1}{4}$	Mar. 29	24 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 4	37 $\frac{1}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{4}$	29 $\frac{1}{4}$
" 1st pref. ....	69 $\frac{1}{4}$	30 $\frac{1}{4}$	70 $\frac{1}{4}$	Mar. 22	59 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 21	70 $\frac{1}{4}$	63 $\frac{1}{4}$	69 $\frac{1}{4}$
" 2d pref. ....	43 $\frac{1}{4}$	15	61	Mar. 21	39 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 4	61	42	58 $\frac{1}{4}$
Evansville & Terre Haute .....	54 $\frac{1}{4}$	38 $\frac{1}{4}$	58	Mar. 25	41	Jan. 31	58	50 $\frac{1}{4}$	58
Express Adams .....	150	111	165	Mar. 12	145	Jan. 8	165	180	185
" American .....	191	142	208 $\frac{1}{4}$	Mar. 25	170	Jan. 12	208 $\frac{1}{4}$	182	212
" United States .....	59	45	80	Mar. 28	53	Jan. 26	80	57	80
" Wells, Fargo .....	140	120	145	Mar. 27	130	Jan. 11	145	140	144 $\frac{1}{4}$
Great Northern, preferred .....	191 $\frac{1}{4}$	144 $\frac{1}{4}$	208	Mar. 15	188	Jan. 4	208	194	201
Hocking Valley .....	42 $\frac{1}{4}$	30	55 $\frac{1}{4}$	Mar. 15	41	Jan. 3	55 $\frac{1}{4}$	47 $\frac{1}{4}$	54 $\frac{1}{4}$
" preferred .....	74 $\frac{1}{4}$	58	77 $\frac{1}{4}$	Mar. 25	69 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 21	77 $\frac{1}{4}$	73 $\frac{1}{4}$	78
Illinois Central .....	133	110	139 $\frac{1}{4}$	Mar. 18	127 $\frac{1}{4}$	Feb. 1	139 $\frac{1}{4}$	130	138 $\frac{1}{4}$
Iowa Central .....	27 $\frac{1}{4}$	11 $\frac{1}{4}$	35	Mar. 22	21	Jan. 21	35	28	32 $\frac{1}{4}$
" preferred .....	53	39	64	Mar. 22	48	Jan. 21	64	53	61 $\frac{1}{4}$
Kansas City Southern .....	17 $\frac{1}{4}$	7	20 $\frac{1}{4}$	Mar. 14	18 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 4	20 $\frac{1}{4}$	19 $\frac{1}{4}$	20
" preferred .....	43 $\frac{1}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{4}$	45	Mar. 15	35	Jan. 4	45	36 $\frac{1}{4}$	42 $\frac{1}{4}$
Lake Erie & Western .....	52	20 $\frac{1}{4}$	63 $\frac{1}{4}$	Mar. 30	39 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 21	63 $\frac{1}{4}$	41	62 $\frac{1}{4}$
" preferred .....	115	83 $\frac{1}{4}$	130	Mar. 29	108 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 21	130	113	129 $\frac{1}{4}$
Long Island .....	89	47 $\frac{1}{4}$	78	Mar. 6	67	Jan. 3	78	67	72
Louisville & Nashville .....	89 $\frac{3}{4}$	69 $\frac{1}{4}$	101	Mar. 25	84 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 4	101	91 $\frac{1}{4}$	100 $\frac{1}{4}$
Manhattan consol .....	117	64	129 $\frac{1}{4}$	Mar. 18	111	Jan. 21	129 $\frac{1}{4}$	117 $\frac{1}{4}$	127
Metropolitan Street .....	182	143 $\frac{1}{4}$	174	Jan. 2	158	Jan. 21	182	180 $\frac{1}{4}$	184
Mexican Central .....	17 $\frac{1}{4}$	10 $\frac{1}{4}$	25 $\frac{1}{4}$	Mar. 21	12 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 21	25 $\frac{1}{4}$	17	23 $\frac{1}{4}$
Minneapolis & St. Louis .....	71 $\frac{1}{4}$	45 $\frac{1}{4}$	89 $\frac{1}{4}$	Mar. 25	67 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 19	89 $\frac{1}{4}$	75 $\frac{1}{4}$	85 $\frac{1}{4}$
" preferred .....	104 $\frac{1}{4}$	87 $\frac{1}{4}$	114 $\frac{1}{4}$	Mar. 21	101 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 7	114 $\frac{1}{4}$	108	113 $\frac{1}{4}$
Missouri, Kan. & Tex. ....	17 $\frac{1}{4}$	7	25 $\frac{1}{4}$	Mar. 28	15	Jan. 21	25 $\frac{1}{4}$	19 $\frac{1}{4}$	25 $\frac{1}{4}$
" preferred .....	47 $\frac{1}{4}$	25 $\frac{1}{4}$	61	Feb. 5	44 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 18	60 $\frac{1}{4}$	52 $\frac{1}{4}$	57 $\frac{1}{4}$
Missouri Pacific .....	72 $\frac{1}{4}$	39 $\frac{1}{4}$	103 $\frac{1}{4}$	Mar. 28	99	Jan. 4	103 $\frac{1}{4}$	87	102 $\frac{1}{4}$
Mobile & Ohio certificates ..	49	35	82	Mar. 6	79	Mar. 1	82	79	81
N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River ..	145 $\frac{1}{4}$	125 $\frac{1}{4}$	148	Feb. 5	139 $\frac{1}{4}$	Jan. 21	148	145 $\frac{1}{4}$	147

## ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.—Continued.

	YEAR 1900.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1901.		MARCH, 1901.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.	Lowest.	High.	Low.	Closing.
N. Y., Ontario & Western.....	32½	18¼	37 — Mar. 30	29¾ — Jan. 21	37	37	36¼
Norfolk & Western.....	43¾	22½	58¾ — Mar. 15	42 — Jan. 10	52¾	45¾	51¼
" preferred.....	83	67	87 — Mar. 25	82 — Feb. 15	87	83¼	86
North American Co.....	22¾	13¾	91¼ — Mar. 25	73¼ — Mar. 14	91¼	76	88
Northern Pacific.....	96¼	45¾	96 — Mar. 29	77¼ — Jan. 21	96	82¼	96¼
" pref.....	91½	67	96¾ — Mar. 28	84¼ — Jan. 21	96¾	87	92½
Pacific Mail.....	57	25¾	47¼ — Jan. 29	33¼ — Mar. 21	39	33¼	36¼
Pennsylvania R. R.....	149¼	124¼	155¾ — Mar. 25	124¼ — Jan. 21	155¾	149¼	154¼
People's Gas & Coke of Chic.....	111½	81½	108¼ — Mar. 19	95¾ — Jan. 21	112¼	101	109½
Pullman Palace Car Co.....	204	176	210¼ — Mar. 30	195¾ — Jan. 21	210¼	192¼	210¼
Reading.....	26	15	30¼ — Mar. 29	24¼ — Jan. 4	30¼	29¼	35¼
" 1st preferred.....	71¾	49	77 — Jan. 5	63¼ — Jan. 4	76¼	69¼	75
" 2d preferred.....	80¾	23¾	51¾ — Mar. 29	38 — Jan. 8	51¾	40	51¼
St. Louis & San Francisco.....	24¼	8½	47¼ — Mar. 12	21¼ — Jan. 4	47¼	38	42¼
" 1st preferred.....	78¼	64	88 — Mar. 12	73¼ — Jan. 2	88	82	82¼
" 2d preferred.....	55	31¼	72¾ — Mar. 13	53¼ — Jan. 4	72¾	64	69¼
St. Louis & Southwestern.....	18¼	8½	30¼ — Mar. 25	17 — Jan. 4	30¼	26	30¼
" preferred.....	45¼	21¾	65 — Mar. 25	41¼ — Jan. 8	65	57½	64¼
Southern Pacific Co.....	45¼	30¾	49¼ — Jan. 31	40¾ — Jan. 4	46¾	42¾	46¾
Southern Railway.....	23¾	10¾	29¼ — Mar. 25	18 — Jan. 21	29¼	23¼	23¼
" preferred.....	73¾	49¾	81¾ — Mar. 19	67¼ — Jan. 21	81¾	70¾	79¾
Tennessee Coal & Iron Co.....	104	49	67¾ — Feb. 5	49¾ — Mar. 7	62¼	49¾	61¾
Texas & Pacific.....	26¾	13¾	36¼ — Mar. 30	23¼ — Jan. 8	36¼	28	36
Union Pacific.....	81¾	44¾	97¼ — Feb. 7	79¼ — Jan. 4	94¾	86¼	92
" preferred.....	85¾	70¾	90¾ — Feb. 7	81¾ — Jan. 21	86¾	82¾	84¾
Wabash R. R.....	14	6¼	21¾ — Mar. 25	11¼ — Jan. 8	21¾	16¾	20¾
" preferred.....	27	16	42¼ — Mar. 25	23¼ — Jan. 4	42¼	23¼	40
Western Union.....	98¼	77¼	97 — Mar. 30	87 — Jan. 21	97	86¼	96
Wheeling & Lake Erie.....	13¼	8	21¾ — Mar. 29	11¾ — Jan. 31	21¾	13¾	19
" second preferred.....	38¼	21¾	38 — Mar. 28	27¼ — Jan. 21	38	29¼	26
Wisconsin Central.....	20¾	10	21¾ — Mar. 14	14¼ — Jan. 21	21¾	18	20
" preferred.....	57	30	48¾ — Mar. 14	33¼ — Jan. 17	48¾	42¾	45
"INDUSTRIAL"							
Amalgamated Copper.....	99¼	89¾	109¾ — Mar. 6	83¾ — Jan. 21	109¾	94¼	100
American Car & Foundry....	25¼	12¾	27¼ — Mar. 25	19 — Jan. 21	27¼	20¾	27
" pref.....	72	57¾	82¼ — Mar. 30	67 — Jan. 18	82¼	71¼	82
American Co. Oil Co.....	37¾	30	81¼ — Jan. 8	27 — Mar. 8	28¼	24	26¼
American Ice.....	49¼	27¼	41¾ — Mar. 15	34¼ — Feb. 21	41¾	36	40¾
Am. Smelting & Refining Co.....	56¼	34¼	65¼ — Jan. 15	45¾ — Feb. 26	59¾	51¾	55
" preferred.....	99	85	100 — Jan. 16	88 — Feb. 26	97	90¼	96
American Steel Hoop Co.....	50¼	17	46 — Mar. 29	23 — Jan. 18	46	34¼	42¾
" preferred.....	86	64¼	96 — Mar. 29	69 — Jan. 18	96	80¼	96
American Steel & Wire Co.....	597½	26¼	53¼ — Feb. 11	38 — Jan. 14	46¾	38	46¼
" preferred.....	95	69¼	111¼ — Mar. 29	83¾ — Jan. 17	111¼	95	111¼
American Sugar Ref. Co.....	149	95¼	147¾ — Jan. 2	131¼ — Jan. 18	144¼	129¼	140
American Tin Plate Co.....	57¼	16	70 — Feb. 25	55 — Jan. 4	74¾	61	74¼
American Tobacco Co.....	114¾	84¼	122¾ — Mar. 18	110¼ — Jan. 21	122¾	119¼	125
Anaconda Copper Mining....	54¾	37¾	45¾ — Mar. 5	40¾ — Jan. 21	45¾	45	46¾
Continental Tobacco Co.....	40¼	21¼	49¾ — Feb. 27	38¾ — Jan. 4	47¾	44	44¼
" preferred.....	95	70	108¼ — Mar. 15	93¼ — Jan. 2	108¼	98¼	105
Federal Steel Co.....	58¼	28¾	59 — Jan. 2	41 — Jan. 29	52¼	42¾	52¼
" preferred.....	79¾	60¾	104¼ — Mar. 29	68 — Jan. 21	104¼	86	104¼
General Electric Co.....	200	120	219 — Mar. 25	183¼ — Jan. 10	219	210	217
Glucose Sugar Refining Co..	6¼	44	53 — Jan. 2	45 — Feb. 16	50	45	69¾
International Paper Co.....	267½	141¼	28 — Mar. 22	20 — Jan. 22	28	21	26¼
" preferred.....	75	58	81 — Mar. 25	69 — Jan. 21	81	73	79¼
National Lead Co.....	28¼	15¾	20¾ — Jan. 2	15 — Mar. 14	19¼	15	16
National Steel Co.....	53¼	20	57 — Mar. 30	37 — Jan. 21	57	43¾	57
" preferred.....	97	79¾	118¼ — Mar. 30	90 — Jan. 18	118¼	90¼	118¼
National Tube.....	667½	40¾	70¾ — Feb. 6	51¼ — Feb. 28	64¾	52	64¼
Pressed Steel Car Co.....	58¾	32¼	52 — Jan. 2	30 — Mar. 7	36¾	30	36¾
Republic Iron & Steel Co.....	27¼	8¼	19¼ — Mar. 30	12¾ — Jan. 22	19¼	15¼	19
" preferred.....	79¾	49	75¼ — Mar. 30	55¼ — Jan. 21	75¼	63¾	75¼
Standard Rope & Twine Co..	10¼	4¼	5¾ — Feb. 11	3¼ — Mar. 6	4¼	3¼	4¼
U. S. Leather Co.....	19	7¾	15 — Feb. 9	11 — Jan. 21	14¼	12	13¾
" preferred.....	79¼	65	79 — Jan. 2	73 — Jan. 15	79¼	73¼	76¼
U. S. Rubber Co.....	44	21	34 — Jan. 2	18¼ — Mar. 11	22	18¼	20¼
" preferred.....	104¾	74¾	85 — Jan. 2	57¼ — Mar. 11	67¼	57¼	66¾



# RAILWAY, INDUSTRIAL AND GOVERNMENT BONDS.

LAST SALE, PRICE AND DATE AND HIGHEST AND LOWEST PRICES AND TOTAL  
SALES FOR THE MONTH.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ann Arbor 1st g 4's.....1905		7,000,000	Q J	99½	Mar. 28, '01	101	97½	157,000
Atch. Top. & S. F.								
Atch Top & Santa Fe gen g 4's.1905		138,062,500	A & O	104½	Mar. 29, '01	104½	103½	2,006,000
" registered.....1905			A & O	102	Feb. 18, '01			
" adjustment, g. 4's.....1905		47,452,000	NOV	95½	Mar. 30, '01	96½	91½	1,469,000
" registered.....1905			NOV	79½	Dec. 11, '99			
" stamped.....1905		4,276,000	M & N	95½	Mar. 30, '01	96½	91½	226,500
Equip. tr. ser. A. g. 5's.1902		250,000	J & J					
Chic. & St. L. 1st 6's.....1915		1,500,000	M & S					
Atl. Knox. & Nor. Ry. 1st g. 6s. 1946		1,000,000	J & D	105	Dec. 4, '19			
Balt. & Ohio prior lien g. 3½s. 1925		60,798,000	J & J	97½	Mar. 30, '01	97½	96½	822,000
" registered.....1946			J & J	95½	Mar. 18, '01	95½	95½	3,000
" g. 4s. registered.....1946		65,963,000	A & O	104½	Mar. 30, '01	105	105	861,000
" g. 4s. registered.....1946			A & O	104	Mar. 8, '01	104	102	6,000
Southw'n div. 1st g. 3½s. 1925		41,980,000	J & J	90½	Mar. 30, '01	91½	89½	1,353,000
" registered.....1925			Q J					
Pitt Jun. & M. div. 1st g. 3½s. 1925		11,293,000	M & N	91	Mar. 18, '01	91½	89½	192,000
" registered.....1925			Q Feb					
Monongahela River 1st g. g. 5's. 1919		700,000	F & A	104½	July 1, '92			
Cen. Ohio. Georg. 1st c. g. 4½s. 1930		1,013,000	M & S	111	Feb. 23, '99			
Buffalo, Roch. & Pitts. g. g. 5's.....1907		4,407,000	M & S	116½	Feb. 4, '01			
" deb. 6's.....1947		1,000,000	J & J					
Alleghany & W'n. 1st g. gtd 4's. 1906		2,000,000	A & O	130½	Mar. 8, '01	130½	130½	1,000
Clearfield & Mah. 1st g. g. 6's.....1943		650,000	J & J	130½	Mar. 28, '01			
Rochester & Pittsburg. 1st 6's. 1921		1,300,000	F & A	130	Feb. 7, '01			
" cons. 1st 6's.....1922		3,920,000	J & D					
Buffalo & Susquehanna 1st g. 5's. 1913		1,056,500	A & O	100	Nov. 18, '99			
" registered.....1913			A & O					
Burlington, Cedar R. & N. 1st 5's. 1906		6,500,000	J & D	107½	Mar. 25, '01	107½	107½	15,500
" con. 1st & col. 1st 5's.....1904		7,260,000	A & O	127½	Mar. 19, '01	127½	127½	20,000
" registered.....1904			A & O	117	Nov. 20, '19			
Ced. Rap. Ia. Falls & Nor. 1st 5's. 1921		1,905,000	A & O	113½	Dec. 6, '19			
Minneap's & St. Louis 1st 7's. g. 1927		150,000	J & D	140	Aug. 24, '95			
Canada Southern 1st int. gtd 5's. 1906		14,000,000	J & J	107½	Mar. 27, '01	107½	107	95,000
" 2d mortg. 5's.....1913		6,000,000	M & S	108½	Mar. 30, '01	109½	107½	108,000
" registered.....1913			M & S	108	Mar. 22, '01	108	108	10,000
Central Branch U. Pac. 1st g. 4's. 1948		2,500,000	J & D	95	Mar. 29, '01	95	95	6,000
Cent. R. & Bkg. Co. of Ga. c. g. 5's. 1907		4,880,000	M & N	102	Mar. 30, '01	102	99½	57,000
Central R'y of Georgia 1st g. 5's. 1945		7,000,000	F & A	120½	Mar. 25, '01	120½	120½	15,000
" registered \$1,000 & \$5,000.....1945			F & A					
" con. g. 5's.....1945		16,700,800	M & N	107½	Mar. 30, '01	107½	108	1,141,000
" con. g. 5's, reg. \$1,000 & \$5,000.....1945			M & N	95	Oct. 30, '99			
" 1st pref. inc. g. 5's.....1945		4,000,000	OCT 1	72	Mar. 29, '01	73½	70½	482,000
" 2d pref. inc. g. 5's.....1945		7,000,000	OCT 1	31½	Mar. 29, '01	36½	30½	1,652,000
" 3d pref. inc. g. 5's.....1945		4,000,000	OCT 1	14	Mar. 30, '01	19½	14	888,000
" Macon & Nor. Div. 1st g. 5's.....1946		840,000	J & J	95	Dec. 27, '99			
" Mid. Ga. & Atl. div. g. 5s. 1947		413,000	J & J	102	June 29, '99			
" Mobile div. 1st g. 5's.....1946		1,000,000	J & J	106	Oct. 24, '19			
Central Railroad of New Jersey								
" 1st convertible 7's.....1902		1,167,000	M & N	108	Mar. 30, '01	108	106½	8,000
" gen. g. 5's.....1907		43,924,000	J & J	133½	Mar. 30, '01	137½	132½	415,000
" registered.....1907			Q J	131½	Mar. 18, '01	187	181	60,500

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Am. Dock & Improvm't Co. 5's, 1921		4,987,000	J & J	114½	Mar. 29, '01	115	114½	24,000
Lehigh & H. R. gen. gtd g. 5's, 1920		1,082,000	J & J					
Lehigh & W.-B. Coal con. 5's, 1912		2,691,000	Q M	108	Mar. 15, '91	108	106	1,000
con. extended gtd. 4½'s, 1910		12,175,000	Q M	102¾	Mar. 28, '01	102¾	102½	221,000
N.Y. & Long Branch gen. g. 4's, 1941		1,500,000	M & S					
Charleston & Sav. 1st g. 7's, 1936		1,500,000	J & J	108¾	Dec. 13, '99			
Ches. & Ohio 6's, g., Series A, 1908		2,000,000	A & O	116½	Mar. 12, '01	116½	116½	1,000
Mortgage gold 6's, 1911		2,000,000	A & O	119	Mar. 11, '01	119	119	1,000
1st con. g. 6's, 1939		25,858,000	M & N	121¾	Mar. 30, '01	122	120¾	72,000
registered.			M & N	119¾	Mar. 16, '01	119¾	119¾	1,000
Gen. m. g. 4½'s, 1902		28,810,000	M & S	108	Mar. 30, '01	108¾	104½	798,000
registered.			M & S	94½	Aug. 23, '91			
Craig Val. 1st g. 5's, 1940		650,000	J & J	103	Nov. 26, '91			
(R. & A. d.) 1st c. g. 4's, 1939		6,000,000	J & J	106¾	Mar. 19, '01	106¾	106	23,000
2d con. g. 4's, 1939		1,000,000	J & J	101¾	Feb. 27, '01			
Warm S. Val. 1st g. 5's, 1941		400,000	M & S	101¾	Apr. 29, '99			
Elz. Lex. & B. S. g. 5's, 1902		3,007,000	M & S	101	Mar. 30, '01	101	100¾	55,000
Greenbrier Ry. 1st gtd. 4's, 1940		2,000,080	M & N					
Chic. & Alton R. R. s. fund g. 6's, 1903		1,671,000	M & N	105¾	Jan. 9, '01			
refunding g. 3's, 1949		17,433,000	A & O	93¾	Mar. 1, '01	93¾	93½	10,000
registered.			A & O					
Miss. Riv. Bdge 1st s. f'd g. 6's, 1912		449,000	A & J	105¾	Oct. 30, '95			
Chic. & Alton Ry 1st lien g. 3½'s, 1950		2,000,000	J & J	85½	Mar. 30, '01	85½	84½	893,000
registered.			J & J					
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy con. 7's, 1903		24,358,000	A & J	109½	Mar. 28, '01	109½	104½	35,000
5's, sinking fund, 1901		2,291,000	J & O	102¾	Mar. 1, '01	102¾	102½	2,000
Chic. & Iowa div. 5's, 1906		2,320,000	F & A	104¾	Apr. 11, '91			
Denver div. 4's, 1922		5,479,000	F & A	102	Mar. 7, '01	102	102	2,000
Illinois div. 3½'s, 1949		26,214,000	J & J	103¾	Mar. 29, '01	104	103¾	17,000
registered.			J & J					
(Iowa div.) sink. f'd 5's, 1919		2,709,000	A & O	113¾	Nov. 30, '91			
4's, 1919		8,544,000	A & O	107	Mar. 8, '01	107	107	2,000
Nebraska extensi'n 4's, 1927		26,077,000	M & N	115¾	Mar. 28, '01	115¾	112½	21,000
registered.			M & N	111½	June 2, '99			
Southwestern div. 4's, 1921		2,950,000	M & S	100¾	Oct. 15, '91			
convertible 5's, 1908		1,599,600	M & S	174¾	Mar. 30, '01	174¾	150	65,500
5's, debentures, 1913		9,000,000	M & N	112	Mar. 18, '01	112	111	52,000
Han. & St. Jos. con. 6's, 1911		8,000,000	M & S	121	Mar. 13, '01	121	121	5,000
Chicago & E. Ill. 1st s. f'd c'y. 6's, 1907		2,989,000	J & D	113½	Mar. 1, '01	113½	113½	1,000
small bonds, 1902		2,653,000	J & D	112	Apr. 2, '99			
1st con. 6's, gold, 1934		12,990,000	A & O	140	Mar. 29, '01	140	138½	14,000
gen. con. 1st 5's, 1937			M & N	124½	Mar. 29, '01	126½	124½	142,000
registered.			M & N	115	Aug. 28, '91			
Chicago & Ind. Coal 1st 5's, 1936		4,626,000	J & J	124	Mar. 28, '01	125	119	20,000
Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville.								
refunding g. 6's, 1947		4,700,000	J & J	123¾	Mar. 28, '01	123¾	119	24,000
ref. g. 5's, 1947		3,542,000	J & J	110¾	Mar. 25, '01	110¾	110	9,000
Louisv. N. Alb. & Chic. 1st 6's, 1910		3,000,000	J & J	114½	Mar. 13, '01	114½	114½	1,000
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul.								
Mil. & St. Paul 1st 7's \$ g. R. d., 1902		1,469,500	J & J	185	Mar. 12, '01	185	184	6,000
1st 7's 2., 1902		1,157,000	J & J	172¾	Apr. 10, '91			
1st C. & M. 7's, 1903		5,072,000	J & J	190	Jan. 28, '01			
Chicago Mil. & St. Paul con. 7's, 1905		4,748,000	J & J	184½	Mar. 7, '01	186	184	61,000
terminal g. 5's, 1914		23,675,000	J & J	115	Mar. 29, '01	115	114½	7,000
gen. g. 4's, series A, 1939			J & J	112¾	Mar. 29, '01	114½	113½	237,000
registered.			Q J	105½	Feb. 19, '98			
gen. g. 3½'s, series B, 1939		2,500,000	J & J					
registered.			J & J					
Chic. & Lake Sup. 5's, 1921		1,360,000	J & J	119½	Jan. 3, '01			
Chic. & M. R. div. 5's, 1926		3,083,000	J & J	122½	Jan. 23, '01			
Chic. & Pac. div. 6's, 1910		3,000,000	J & J	118	Mar. 15, '01	118	118	6,000
1st Chic. & P. W. g. 5's, 1921		25,340,000	J & J	120¾	Mar. 29, '01	122	120¾	71,000
Dakota & Gt. S. g. 5's, 1918		2,856,000	J & J	116½	Mar. 2, '01	116½	116	20,000
Far. & So. g. 6's assu., 1924		1,250,000	J & J	137½	July 18, '98			
1st H't & Dk. div. 7's, 1910		5,680,000	J & J	126	Mar. 8, '01	126	126	5,000
1st 5's, 1910		990,000	J & J	110¼	Jan. 13, '01			
1st 7's, Iowa & D. ex, 1908		2,230,000	J & J	187	Jan. 31, '01			
1st 5's, La. C. & Dav., 1919		2,500,000	J & J	118½	Jan. 23, '01			
Mineral Point div. 5's, 1910		2,840,000	J & J	110¾	Jan. 9, '01			
1st So. Min. div. 6's, 1910		7,432,000	J & J	118½	Mar. 27, '01	119½	118	7,000
1st 6's, Southw'n div., 1909		4,000,000	J & J	117½	Jan. 29, '01			
Wis. & Min. div. g. 5's, 1921		4,755,000	J & J	120	Feb. 27, '01			
Mil. & N. 1st M. L. 6's, 1910		2,155,000	J & D	119	Mar. 21, '01	119	119	10,000
1st con. 6's, 1913		5,092,000	J & D	121½	Mar. 12, '01	122	121½	2,000

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Chic. & Northwestern con. 7's...1915		12,882,000	Q F	141½	Mar. 29, '01	142½	140	15,000
gold 7's.....1902			J & D	108	Mar. 19, '01	108	108	1,000
registered gold 7's.....1902		7,744,000	J & D	108	Mar. 28, '01	108	107¾	25,000
extension 4's.....1886-1926		18,682,000	F A 15	112	Mar. 20, '01	112	112	4,000
registered.....1902			F A 15	107	Mar. 7, '19'			
gen. g. 3½'s.....1967		11,883,000	M & N	110¼	Mar. 27, '01	110½	109¼	38,000
registered.....1902			Q F	108	Nov. 19, '98			
sinking fund 6's. 1879-1929		5,878,000	A & O	116¾	Mar. 8, '01	116¾	116¾	1,000
registered.....1902			A & O	111	Oct. 18, '19'			
sinking fund 5's. 1879-1929		6,982,000	A & O	110¾	Mar. 14, '01	110½	110½	6,000
registered.....1902			A & O	107	Dec. 18, '19'			
deben. 5's.....1909		5,900,000	M & N	110¼	Mar. 14, '01	110½	110½	10,000
registered.....1902			M & N	105	Dec. 28, '99			
deben. 5's.....1921		10,000,000	A & O	117	Mar. 7, '01	117	117	1,000
registered.....1902			A & O	107	Nov. 20, '95			
sinking f'd deben. 5's. 1923		9,800,000	M & N	124¾	Mar. 27, '01	124¾	124¾	12,000
registered.....1902			M & N	122½	Jan. 15, '01			
Des Moines & Minn. 1st 7's.....1907		600,000	F & A	127	Apr. 8, '84			
Milwaukee & Madison 1st 6's.....1906		1,600,000	M & S	113	Jan. 23, '01			
Northern Illinois 1st 5's.....1910		1,500,000	M & S	111	Mar. 20, '01	111	111	25,000
Ottumwa C. F. & St. P. 1st 5's.....1909		1,600,000	M & S	111¼	Apr. 24, '19'			
Winona & St. Peters 2d 7's.....1907		1,692,000	M & N	120½	Nov. 10, '19'			
Mil., L. Shore & We'n 1st g. 6's. 1921		5,000,000	M & N	138	Mar. 21, '01	138¼	138	3,000
ext. & impt. s. f'd g. 5's. 1929		4,148,000	F & A	126½	Mar. 20, '01	126½	126	6,000
Ashland div. 1st g. 6's. 1925		1,000,000	M & S	139½	Apr. 17, '19'			
Michigan div. 1st g. 6's. 1924		1,281,000	J & J	142¾	Mar. 21, '10	142¾	142¾	1,000
con. deb. 5's.....1907		436,000	F & A	107½	Feb. 21, '01			
incomes.....1911		500,000	M & N	112	Nov. 13, '99			
Chic., Rock Is. & Pac. 6's coup...1917		12,100,000	J & J	130¾	Mar. 23, '01	130¾	130¼	4,000
registered.....1917			J & J	132½	Mar. 27, '01	132½	132½	10,000
gen. g. 4's.....1968		54,581,000	J & J	109	Mar. 29, '01	109	108¾	251,000
registered.....1902			J & J	107½	Nov. 8, '19'			
Des Moines & Ft. Dodge 1st 4's. 1906		1,200,000	J & J	99½	Feb. 20, '01			
1st 2½'s.....1906		1,200,000	J & J	86½	Aug. 25, '19'			
extension 4's.....1906		672,000	J & J	98	Dec. 19, '19'			
Keokuk & Des M. 1st mor. 5's. 1923		2,750,000	A & O	112½	Mar. 21, '01	112½	112	5,000
small bond.....1923			A & O	100	Apr. 15, '97			
Chic., St. P., Minn. & Oma. con. 6's. 1930		14,307,000	J & D	140¾	Mar. 29, '01	141	140	25,000
Chic., St. Paul & Minn. 1st 6's. 1918		2,110,000	M & N	140½	Mar. 11, '01	140½	140½	1,000
North Wisconsin 1st mort. 6's. 1930		796,000	J & J	140	Mar. 22, '01	140	140	7,000
St. Paul & Sioux City 1st 6's.....1919		6,070,000	A & O	131½	Feb. 15, '01			
Chic., Term. Trans. R. R. g. 4's. 1947		18,400,000	J & J	97	Mar. 29, '01	98	96¼	359,000
Chic. & Wn. Ind. 1st s.k. f'd g. 6's. 1919		478,000	M & N	106	Oct. 4, '99			
gen'l mortg. g. 6's.....1922		1,868,000	Q M	119	Mar. 13, '01	119	119	5,000
Chic. & West Michigan R'y 5's.....1921		5,753,000	J & D	100	Oct. 28, '98			
Choc., Oklahoma & Gif. gen. g. 5s. 1919		4,800,000	J & J	103	Jan. 17, '19'			
Cin., Ham. & Day. con. s.k. f'd 7's. 1906		996,000	A & O	115	Dec. 14, '19'			
2d g. 4½'s.....1937		2,000,000	J & J	113	Oct. 10, '19'			
Cin., Day. & Ir'n 1st gt. dg. 5's. 1941		3,500,000	M & N	115	Mar. 15, '01	115	114	9,000
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. L. gen. g. 4's. 1938		12,834,000	J & D	105¼	Mar. 27, '01	105¼	106¾	187,000
do Cairo div. 1st g. 4's. 1939		5,000,000	J & J	99	Jan. 10, '01			
Cin., Wab. & Mich. div. 1st g. 4's. 1931		4,000,000	J & J	101½	Feb. 28, '01			
St. Louis div. 1st col. trust g. 4's. 1930		9,750,000	M & N	105	Mar. 1, '01	105	105	5,000
registered.....1902			M & N	99	May 4, '99			
Sp'gfield & Col. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		1,035,000	M & S	94	Oct. 12, '19'			
White W. Val. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		650,000	J & J	83	Nov. 22, '99			
Cin., Ind., St. L. & Chic. 1st g. 4's. 1936		7,685,000	Q F	104½	Feb. 20, '19'			
registered.....1902			Q F	95	Nov. 15, '94			
con. 6's.....1920		689,000	M & N	107½	June 30, '98			
Cin., S'dusky & Clev. con. 1st g. 5's. 1928		2,571,000	J & J	115	Mar. 1, '01	115	115	4,000
Clev., C., C. & Ind. con. 7's.....1914		3,991,000	J & D	136	Feb. 21, '01			
sinking fund 7's.....1914			J & D	119½	Nov. 19, '99			
gen. consol 6's.....1934		3,205,000	J & J	136½	Mar. 21, '01	136½	136	47,000
registered.....1902			J & J					
Cin., Sp. 1st m. C., C. & Ind. 7's. 1901		1,000,000	A & O	161¾	Dec. 7, '19'			
Ind. Bloom. & West. 1st pfd 4's. 1940		961,500	A & O					
Ohio, Ind. & W., 1st pfd. 5's.....1938		500,000	Q J					
Peoria & Eastern 1st con. 4's.....1940		8,103,000	A & O	100	Mar. 26, '01	100	97½	105,000
income 4's.....1990		4,000,000	A	68	Mar. 30, '01	73	58	1,507,000

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Clev., Lorain & Wheel'g con. 1st 5's 1983		5,000,000	A & O	111	Sept. 5, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Clev., & Mahoning Val. gold 5's. 1988		2,988,000	J & J	130	May 8, 19'	.....	.....	.....
registered.....			Q J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Col. Midd Ry. 1st g. 2-3-4's..... 1947		7,500,000	J & J	87	Mar. 30, '01	87	80½	1,228,000
1st g. 4's..... 1947		1,011,000	J & J	87	Mar. 30, '01	87	80½	355,000
Colorado & Southern 1st g. 4's..... 1920		18,050,000	F & A	89½	Mar. 30, '01	89	84½	1,673,000
Conn., Passumpsic Riv's 1st g. 4's 1943		1,900,000	A & O	102	Dec. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
Delaware, Lack. & W. mtge 7's..... 1907		3,087,000	M & S	121	Mar. 22, '01	121	121	5,000
(Morris & Essex 1st m 7's..... 1914		5,000,000	M & N	139½	Mar. 8, '01	139½	139½	1,000
7's..... 1871-1901		4,991,000	A & O	104½	Feb. 4, '01	.....	.....	.....
1st c. gtd 7's..... 1915		12,151,000	J & D	140½	Mar. 27, '01	140½	140½	5,000
registered.....			J & D	140	Oct. 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., Lack. & West'n. 1st 6's..... 1921		12,000,000	J & J	136	Feb. 5, '01	.....	.....	.....
const. 5's..... 1923		5,000,000	F & A	118½	Mar. 5, '01	118½	118½	1,000
term. imp. 4's..... 1923		5,000,000	M & N	103½	Oct. 15, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Syracuse, Bing. & N. Y. 1st 7's..... 1906		1,988,000	A & O	118½	Nov. 15, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Warren Rd. 1st rtdg. gtd g. 3½'s 2000		905,000	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Delaware & Hudson Canal.								
1st Penn. Div. c. 7's..... 1917		5,000,000	M & S	145½	Mar. 19, '01	145½	145½	1,000
reg..... 1917			M & S	150	Feb. 15, '01	.....	.....	.....
Albany & Nuaq. 1st c. g. 7's..... 1906		3,000,000	A & O	117	Feb. 7, '01	.....	.....	.....
registered.....			A & O	122	June 6, '99	.....	.....	.....
6's..... 1906		7,000,000	A & O	112	Dec. 4, 19'	.....	.....	.....
registered.....			A & O	112½	Feb. 15, '01	.....	.....	.....
Rens. & Saratoga 1st c. 7's..... 1921		2,000,000	M & N	151	Mar. 1, '01	151	151	4,000
1st r 7's..... 1921			M & N	151	Jan. 17, '01	.....	.....	.....
Denver & Rio G. 1st con. g. 4's..... 1936		28,650,000	J & J	102	Mar. 28, '01	102½	102	249,300
con. g. 4½'s..... 1936		6,382,000	J & J	110	Mar. 27, '01	110½	110	27,000
impt. m. g. 5's..... 1928		8,103,500	J & D	110½	Mar. 28, '01	111	109½	236,000
Des Moines Union Ry 1st g. 5's..... 1917		628,000	M & N	111	Feb. 28, '01	.....	.....	.....
Detroit & Mack. 1st lien g. 4's..... 1906		900,000	J & D	91½	Mar. 26, '01	91½	89	175,000
g. 4's..... 1906		1,250,000	J & D	89	Feb. 27, '01	.....	.....	.....
Duluth & Iron Range 1st 5's..... 1937		6,734,000	A & O	115	Mar. 23, '01	115	115	2,000
registered.....			A & O	101½	July 23, '99	.....	.....	.....
2d l m 6's..... 1916		2,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Duluth, Hed Wing & S'n 1st g. 5's 1928		500,000	J & J	92½	Feb. 11, '98	.....	.....	.....
Duluth So. Shore & At. gold 5's..... 1937		4,000,000	J & J	115	Mar. 25, '01	115	115	3,000
Elgin Joliet & Eastern 1st g 5's..... 1941		7,852,000	M & N	109½	Dec. 6, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Erie 1st ext. g. 4's..... 1947		2,482,000	M & N	118½	Jan. 28, '01	.....	.....	.....
2d extended g. 5's..... 1919		2,149,000	M & S	121	Jan. 7, '01	.....	.....	.....
3d extended g. 4½'s..... 1923		4,618,000	M & S	116½	Mar. 4, '01	116½	116½	6,000
4th extended g. 5's..... 1920		2,926,000	A & O	123½	Mar. 6, '01	124	123½	2,000
5th extended g. 4's..... 1928		709,500	J & D	106½	Feb. 24, 19'	.....	.....	.....
1st cons. gold 7's..... 1920		15,890,000	M & S	143½	Feb. 26, '01	.....	.....	.....
1st cons. fund g. 7's..... 1920		3,899,500	M & S	135½	Mar. 20, '01	135½	126½	1,500
Erie R.R. 1st con. g. 4's prior bds. 1906		38,452,000	J & J	99	Mar. 30, '01	99	98½	1,708,000
registered.....			J & J	98½	May 25, '99	.....	.....	.....
1st con. gen. lien g. 4's 1906		38,857,000	J & J	89½	Mar. 30, '01	89½	89½	9,847,000
registered.....			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Buffalo, N. Y. & Erie 1st 7's..... 1916		2,380,000	J & D	140	Feb. 6, '99	.....	.....	.....
Buffalo & Southwestern g. 6's..... 1908		1,500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
small.....			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Chicago & Erie 1st gold 5's..... 1903		12,000,000	M & N	122	Mar. 29, '01	122	120½	30,000
Jefferson R. R. 1st gtd g. 5's..... 1908		2,900,000	A & O	106½	Feb. 15, '01	.....	.....	.....
Long Dock consol. g. 6's..... 1935		7,500,000	A & O	139½	Mar. 25, '01	140	139½	20,000
N. Y. L. E. & W. Coal & R. R. Co.								
1st gtd. currency 6's..... 1922		1,100,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. L. E. & W. Dock & Imp.								
Co. 1st currency 6's..... 1913		3,396,000	J & J	118	Sept. 27, 19'	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Greenw'd Lake gtd g. 5's..... 1946		1,452,000	M & N	109	Oct. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
small.....								
Midland R. of N. J. 1st g. 6's..... 1910		3,500,000	A & O	118½	Mar. 18, '01	118½	118	17,000
N. Y., Sus. & W. 1st refdg. g. 5's..... 1937		3,750,000	J & J	116½	Feb. 15, '01	.....	.....	.....
2d g. 4½'s..... 1937		453,000	F & A	94	Feb. 11, '01	.....	.....	.....
gen. g. 5's..... 1940		2,548,000	F & A	104½	Mar. 30, '01	104½	100	194,500
term. 1st g. 5's..... 1943		2,000,000	M & N	113	Apr. 27, 19'	.....	.....	.....
registered..... \$5,000 each			M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Wilkesb. & East. 1st gtd g. 5's..... 1942		3,000,000	J & D	110½	Mar. 20, '01	110½	110	6,000

# BOND SALES.

629

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Bureka Springs R'y 1st 6's, g.....1933		500,000	F & A	65	Nov. 10, '97	....	....	.....
Evans. & Terre Haute 1st con. 6's. 1921		3,000,000	J & J	123½	Mar. 26, '01	124	123½	2,000
1st General g 5's.....1942		2,223,000	A & O	111	Mar. 19, '01	111	108½	26,000
Mount Vernon 1st 6's.....1923		375,000	A & O	110	May 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
Sul. Co. Bch. 1st g 5's.....1930		450,000	A & O	95	Sept. 15, '01	.....	.....	.....
Evans. & Ind'p. 1st con. g 6's.....1926		1,591,000	J & J	108	Feb. 21, '01	.....	.....	.....
Florida Cen. & Penins. 1st g 5's.....1918		3,000,000	J & J	100	Sept. 6, '99	.....	.....	.....
1st land grant ex. g 5's.....1930		423,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st con. g 5's.....1943		4,370,000	J & J	80½	May 14, '96	.....	.....	.....
Ft. Smith U'n Dep. Co. 1st g 4½'s. 1941		1,000,000	J & J	105	Mar. 11, '98	.....	.....	.....
Ft. Worth & D. C. ctfa. dep. 1st 6's. 1921		3,176,000	.....	106	Mar. 30, '01	107½	82½	2,250,000
Ft. Worth & Rio Grande 1st g 5's. 1928		2,963,000	J & J	85	Mar. 30, '01	87	75½	675,000
Galveston H. & H. of 1882 1st 5s. 1913		2,000,000	A & O	102½	Jan. 26, '01	.....	.....	.....
Geo. & Ala. Ry. 1st pref. g. 5's.....1945		2,280,000	A & O	106	Dec. 12, '88	.....	.....	.....
1st con. g 5s.....1945		2,922,000	J & J	98½	Nov. 27, '19'	.....	.....	.....
Ga. Car. & N. Ry. 1st gtd. g. 5's.....1927		5,390,000	J & J	99½	Jan. 22, '19'	.....	.....	.....
Hock, Val. Ry. 1st con. g. 4½'s.....1909		10,254,000	J & J	106	Mar. 25, '01	106	105½	230,000
registered.....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Col. Hock's Val. 1st ext. g. 4's. 1948		1,401,000	A & O	106½	Feb. 6, '01	.....	.....	.....
Illinois Central, 1st g. 4's.....1951		1,500,000	J & J	116	Dec. 13, '19'	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	J & J	118½	Mar. 12, '19'	.....	.....	.....
1st gold 8½'s.....1951		2,499,000	J & J	107½	Mar. 29, '01	107½	107½	3,000
registered.....		.....	J & J	102½	Apr. 15, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st g 3s sterl. 2,500,000.....1951		2,500,000	M & S	92½	July 13, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
total outstg.....\$13,950,000		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
collat. trust gold 4's.....1952		15,000,000	A & O	104½	Feb. 15, '01	.....	.....	.....
regist'd.....		.....	A & O	104½	Jan. 30, '99	.....	.....	.....
col. t. g. 4s L. N. O. & Tex. 1953		24,679,000	M & N	105½	Mar. 27, '01	105½	105½	8,000
registered.....		.....	M & N	109½	Dec. 13, '99	.....	.....	.....
Calro Bridge g 4's.....1950		3,000,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	J & D	123	May 24, '99	.....	.....	.....
Louisville div. g. 3½'s. 1953		14,320,000	J & J	103	Mar. 4, '01	103	103	1,000
registered.....		.....	J & J	88½	Dec. 8, '99	.....	.....	.....
Middle div. reg. 5's.....1921		600,000	F & A	85	Dec. 21, '99	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis div. g. 5's.....1951		4,989,000	J & J	91	Mar. 23, '01	91	90	29,000
registered.....		.....	J & J	101½	Jan. 31, '19'	.....	.....	.....
g. 5½'s.....1951		6,321,000	J & J	102½	Mar. 14, '01	102½	102½	5,000
registered.....		.....	J & J	101½	Sept. 10, '96	.....	.....	.....
Sp'gfield div 1st g 3½'s. 1951		2,000,000	J & J	100	Nov. 7, '19'	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	J & J	124	Dec. 11, '99	.....	.....	.....
West'n Line 1st g. 4's. 1951		5,426,000	F & A	114½	Mar. 25, '01	114½	114	15,000
registered.....		.....	F & A	101½	Jan. 31, '19'	.....	.....	.....
Belleville & Carodt 1st 6's.....1923		470,000	J & D	121	Aug. 3, '19'	.....	.....	.....
Carbondale & Shawt'n 1st g. 4's. 1932		241,000	M & S	105	Jan. 22, '19'	.....	.....	.....
Chic., St. L. & N. O. gold 5's.....1951		16,555,000	J & D	126½	Feb. 8, '01	.....	.....	.....
gold 5's, registered.....		.....	J & D	123½	Feb. 14, '01	.....	.....	.....
g. 3½'s.....1951		1,332,000	J & D	100½	Nov. 14, '19'	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	J & D	106½	Aug. 17, '99	.....	.....	.....
Memph. div. 1st g. 4's. 1951		3,500,000	J & D	105½	Sept. 10, '19'	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	J & D	121	Feb. 24, '99	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis, South. 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1931		538,000	M & S	102½	Nov. 16, '19'	.....	.....	.....
Ind., Dec. & West. 1st g. 5's.....1935		1,824,000	J & J	105	Mar. 20, '01	105	105	1,000
1st gtd. g. 5's.....1935		953,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Internat. & Gt. N'n 1st 6's, gold. 1919		7,954,000	M & N	126½	Mar. 1, '01	126½	126	15,000
2d g. 5's.....1909		6,593,000	M & S	99	Mar. 30, '01	99	96½	245,000
3d g. 4's.....1921		2,725,000	M & S	73	Mar. 14, '01	73	65	31,500
Iowa Central 1st gold 5's.....1938		7,850,000	J & D	117	Mar. 29, '01	117	116	10,000
Kansas C. & M. R. & B. Co. 1st		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
gtd g. 5's.....1929		3,040,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kansas City Southern 1st g. 3's. 1950		26,197,000	A & O	72	Mar. 30, '01	72½	69	1,017,000
registered.....		.....	A & O	63½	Oct. 16, '19'	.....	.....	.....
Lake Erie & Western 1st g. 5's.....1937		7,250,000	J & J	123½	Mar. 20, '01	123½	123	14,000
2d mtg. g. 5's.....1941		3,625,000	J & J	118½	Mar. 20, '01	118½	118½	1,000
Northern Ohio 1st gtd g 5's.....1945		2,500,000	A & O	115½	Jan. 9, '01	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Lehigh Val. (Pa.) coll. g. 5's.....1997		8,000,000	M & N	104	Aug. 8, '98	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....			M & N			.....	.....	.....
Lehigh Val. N. Y. 1st m. g. 4½'s.1940		15,000,000	J & J	110½	Feb. 27, '01	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....			J & J	111	Mar. 25, '01	111	111	5,000
Lehigh Val. Ter. R. 1st gtd g. 5's.1941		10,000,000	A & O	112	July 9, '19	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....			A & O	109½	Oct. 18, '99	.....	.....	.....
Lehigh V. Coal Co. 1st gtd g. 5's.1933		10,280,000	J & J	103½	Nov. 21, '99	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....			J & J			.....	.....	.....
Lehigh & N. Y., 1st gtd g. 4's.....1945		2,000,000	M & S	100	Mar. 28, '01	100	100	5,000
" registered.....			M & S			.....	.....	.....
{ Elm., Cort. & N. 1st g. 1st pfd 6's.1914		750,000	A & O			.....	.....	.....
" g. gtd 5's.....1914		1,250,000	A & O	101½	Sept. 1, '99	.....	.....	.....
Long Island 1st cons. 5's.....1931		3,610,000	Q J	123	Jan. 10, '01	.....	.....	.....
" 1st con. g. 4's.....1931		1,121,000	Q J	101	Nov. 22, '99	.....	.....	.....
" Long Island gen. m. 4's.....1938		3,000,000	J & D	105	Mar. 20, '01	105	104	27,000
" Ferry 1st g. 4½'s.....1922		1,500,000	M & S	102½	Mar. 20, '01	102½	102½	2,000
" g. 4's.....1932		325,000	J & D	102½	May 5, '97	.....	.....	.....
" unified g. 4's.....1949		5,885,000	M & S	100	Mar. 29, '01	101	97½	119,000
" deb. g. 5's.....1934		1,135,000	J & D	95	Feb. 15, '01	.....	.....	.....
" Brooklyn & Montauk 1st 6's.....1911		250,000	M & S			.....	.....	.....
" 1st 5's.....1911		750,000	M & S	110	Aug. 8, '98	.....	.....	.....
" N. Y. B'kin & M. B. 1st c. g. 5's.....1935		1,601,000	A & O	107	Jan. 31, '99	.....	.....	.....
" N. Y. & Rock'y Beach 1st g. 5's.1927		883,000	M & S	105	May 4, '19	.....	.....	.....
" Long Isl. R. R. Nor. Shore Branch						.....	.....	.....
" 1st Con. gold garn't'd 5's.1932		1,425,000	QJAN	118	Dec. 28, '19	.....	.....	.....
{ Louis. & Nash. gen. g. 6's.....1930		9,380,000	J & D	119½	Mar. 28, '01	120	119	32,000
" gold 5's.....1937		1,764,000	M & N	113	Mar. 28, '01	113	113	4,000
" Unified gold 4's.....1940			J & J	102½	Mar. 29, '01	102½	101½	238,000
" registered.....1940		17,994,000	J & J	83	Feb. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
" collateral trust g. 5's.1931		5,129,000	M & N	112½	Mar. 15, '01	112½	112½	2,000
" coll. tr 5-20 g. 4's.1903-1918		11,500,000	A & O	102	Mar. 29, '01	102	100½	81,000
" Cecilian branch. 7's.....1907		380,000	M & S	108	Dec. 31, '19	.....	.....	.....
" E., Hend. & N. 1st 6's.....1919		1,335,000	J & D	115	Nov. 15, '19	.....	.....	.....
" L. Clin. & Lex. g. 4½'s.....1931		3,258,000	M & N	103	Jan. 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
" N. O. & Mobile 1st g. 6's.....1930		5,000,000	J & J	129½	Feb. 11, '01	.....	.....	.....
" 2d g. 6's.....1930		1,000,000	J & J	117	Oct. 1, '19	.....	.....	.....
" Pensacola div. g. 6's.....1920		580,000	M & S	115	Dec. 5, '19	.....	.....	.....
" St. Louis div. 1st g. 6's.1921		3,500,000	M & S	126½	Jan. 22, '01	.....	.....	.....
" 2d g. 8's.....1930		3,000,000	M & S	63½	Oct. 1, '19	.....	.....	.....
" Ken. Cent. g. 4's.....1937		6,742,000	J & J	100	Mar. 26, '01	100	99½	20,000
" L. & N. & Mob. & Montg						.....	.....	.....
" 1st g. 4½'s.....1945		4,000,000	M & S	110½	Mar. 28, '01	110½	110½	1,000
" N. Fla. & S. 1st g. g. 5's.1937		2,068,000	F & A	112	Jan. 7, '01	.....	.....	.....
" Pen. & At. 1st g. g. 6's.1921		2,659,000	F & A	113	Jan. 2, '01	.....	.....	.....
" S. & N. A. con. gtd. g. 5's.1936		3,673,000	F & A	110	Feb. 28, '01	.....	.....	.....
" So. & N. Ala. si'f'd g. 6s.1910		1,942,000	A & O	92½	Sept. 30, '96	.....	.....	.....
Lo. & Jefferson Bdg. Co. gtd. g. 4's.1945		3,000,000	M & S	100	Mar. 19, '01	100	100	5,000
Manhattan Railway Con. 4's.....1930		28,065,000	A & O	108½	Mar. 27, '01	108½	105½	411,000
Metropolitan Elevated 1st 6's.....1906		10,818,000	J & J	117½	Mar. 29, '01	117½	117	13,000
Manitoba Swn. Coloniza'n g. 5's.1934		2,544,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mexican Central.								
" con. mtge. 4's.....1911		62,643,000	J & J	83	Mar. 30, '01	85	82½	1,017,000
" 1st con. inc. 3's.....1939		20,511,000	JULY	32	Mar. 30, '01	33½	29½	8,471,000
" 2d 3's.....1939		11,310,000	JULY	37	Mar. 30, '01	19½	15	8,891,000
" equip. & collat. g. 5's.....1917		850,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" 2d series g. 5's.....1919		915,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mexican Internat'l 1st con g. 4's.1942		4,635,000	M & S	84½	Mar. 26, '01	84½	82½	198,000
Mexican Nat. 1st gold 6's.....1927		10,955,000	J & D	103½	Apr. 19, '19	.....	.....	.....
" 2d inc. 6's "A" 1917 coup. due		12,265,000	M & S	81	Apr. 10, '19	.....	.....	.....
" Sept. 1, 1899, stamped 1½% paid						.....	.....	.....
" 2d inc. 6's "B".....1917		12,265,000	A	17	Apr. 25, '19	.....	.....	.....
" Northern 1st g. 6's.....1910		1,182,000	J & D	105	May 2, '19	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....			J & D			.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Minneapolis & St. Louis 1st g. 7's. 1927		950,000	J & D	147½	Feb. 15, '01			
• Iowa ext. 1st g. 7's. 1909		1,015,000	J & D	122	Mar. 19, '01	122	121½	15,000
• Pacific ext. 1st g. 6's. 1921		1,362,000	J & A	124½	Nov. 14, '99			
• Southw. ext. 1st g. 7's. 1910		636,000	J & D	123½	Feb. 7, '01			
• 1st con. g. 5's. 1934		5,000,000	M & N	118½	Feb. 27, '01			
• 1st & refunding g. 4's. 1949		7,600,000	M & S	108	Mar. 29, '01	100½	97	529,000
Minneapolis & Pacific 1st m. 5's. 1936		3,206,000	J & J	102	Mar. 26, '97			
• stamped 4's pay. of int. gtd.								
Minn., S. S. M. & Atlan. 1st g. 4's. 1926		8,280,000	J & J	94	Apr. 2, '95			
• stamped pay. of int. gtd.				89½	June 18, '91			
Minn., S. P. & S. S. M., 1st c. g. 4's. 1938		6,710,000	J & J					
• stamped pay. of int. gtd.								
Missouri, K. & T. 1st mtge g. 4's. 1990		39,718,000	J & D	99	Mar. 30, '01	99	96½	1,618,500
• 2d mtge. g. 4's. 1990		20,000,000	F & A	80½	Mar. 30, '01	81	78	1,667,000
• 1st ext gold 5's. 1944		1,496,000	M & N	100	Mar. 28, '01	104	99½	484,000
Booneville Bdg. Co. gtd. g. 7's. 1916		510,000	M & N	106½	Nov. 22, '99			
Dallas & Waco 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1940		1,840,000	M & N	100	Mar. 5, '01	100	99	25,000
Mo. K. & T. of Tex 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1942		3,085,000	M & S	104½	Mar. 23, '01	105	101	373,000
Sher. Shreveport & Solist gtd. g. 5's. 1943		1,699,000	J & D	102½	Mar. 27, '01	102½	101½	10,000
Kan. City & Pacific 1st g. 4's. 1949		2,500,000	F & A	91	Mar. 18, '01	91	90½	12,000
Tebo. & Neosho 1st gtd. 5's. 1908		187,000	J & D					
Mo. Kan. & East'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1942		4,000,000	A & O	110½	Mar. 13, '01	110½	109½	15,000
Missouri, Pacific 1st con. g. 6's. 1920		14,904,000	M & N	123½	Mar. 30, '01	124	122	82,000
• 3d mortgage 7's. 1908		3,828,000	M & N	116½	Mar. 27, '01	116½	116	5,000
• trusts gold 5's stamp'd 1917		14,876,000	M & S	106	Mar. 30, '01	106½	104½	674,000
• registered			M & S					
• 1st collateral gold 5's. 1920		9,636,000	F & A	106½	Mar. 28, '01	106½	102	199,000
• registered			F & A					
Leroy & Caney Val. A. L. 1st 5's. 1928		520,000	J & J	100	Mar. 14, '01	100	100	6,000
Pacific R. of Mo. 1st m. ex. 4's. 1938		7,000,000	M & S	107½	Dec. 20, '99			
• 2d extended g. 5's. 1938		2,573,000	F & A	115	Mar. 28, '01	115	113½	21,000
St. L. & I. g. con. R.R. & I. gr. 5's. 1931		35,716,000	A & O	118½	Mar. 29, '01	119	116½	172,000
• stamped gtd gold 5's. 1931		6,945,000	A & O	114½	Feb. 19, '01			
• unify'g & rfd'g g. 4's. 1929		23,090,000	J & J	95½	Mar. 30, '01	96½	91½	1,112,000
• registered			J & J					
Verdigris V'y Ind. & W. 1st 5's. 1936		750,000	M & S					
Mob. & Birm. prior lien, g. 5's. 1945		374,000	J & J	109	Aug. 31, '99			
• small		228,000	J & J					
• inc. g. 4's. 1945		700,000	J & J					
• small		500,000						
Mob. Jackson & Kan. City 1st g. 5's. 1946		1,000,000	J & D					
Mobile & Ohio new mort. g. 6's. 1927		7,000,000	J & J	131½	Mar. 27, '01	131½	131	19,500
• 1st extension 6's. 1927		974,000	J & D	126	Mar. 20, '01	126	126	1,000
• gen. g. 4's. 1928		9,472,000	Q J	96	Mar. 18, '01	96	95½	194,500
• Mont'ry div. 1st g. 5's. 1947		4,000,000	F & A	115	Mar. 29, '01	115	112½	121,000
• St. Louis & Cairo gtd g. 4's. 1931		4,000,000	M & S	100	Mar. 21, '99	100	100	2,000
Nashville, Chat. & St. L. 1st 7's. 1913		6,800,000	J & J	128½	Mar. 29, '01	128½	128½	25,000
• 1st cons. g. 5's. 1928		7,412,000	A & O	116	Mar. 30, '01	116	114½	179,000
• 1st g. 6's Jasper Branch. 1923		371,000	J & J	123	Mar. 28, '01	123	123	8,000
• 1st 6's McM. M. W. & A. 1917		750,000	J & J	108	Mar. 24, '96			
• 1st 6's T. & P. 1917		800,000	J & J	110	Dec. 20, '99			
N. O. & N. East. prior lien g. 6's. 1915		1,320,000	A & O	108½	Aug. 13, '94			
N. Y. Cent. & Hud. R. 1st c. 7's. 1903		18,470,000	J & J	107½	Mar. 28, '01	107½	107½	8,000
• 1st registered. 1903			J & J	107½	Feb. 28, '01			
• g. mortgage 3½'s. 1997		87,462,000	J & J	110½	Mar. 16, '01	110½	110	20,000
• registered			J & J	110	Aug. 27, '99			
• debenture 5's. 1884-1904		4,686,000	M & S	104½	Mar. 18, '01	104½	104½	4,000
• debenture 5's reg. 1884-1904		654,000	M & S	106½	Feb. 21, '01			
• reg. debent. 5's. 1899-1904			M & S	108½	Feb. 21, '98			
• debenture g. 4's. 1890-1906		5,488,000	J & D	102½	Mar. 19, '01	102½	102½	10,000
• registered			J & D	102½	Jan. 16, '01			
• deb. cert. ext. g. 4's. 1906		8,730,530	M & N	103	Mar. 7, '01	103	103	7,000
• registered			M & N	106½	Sept. 28, '99			
Lake Shore col. g. 3½'s. 1998		90,578,000	F & A	97½	Mar. 30, '01	97½	97	473,000
• registered			F & A	96	Mar. 22, '01	97	95½	35,000
Michigan Central col. g. 3½'s. 1998		18,900,000	F & A	96	Mar. 28, '01	96½	96	188,000
• registered			F & A	97	Jan. 11, '01			
Beech Creek 1st gtd. 4's. 1936		5,000,000	J & J	111	Mar. 1, '01	111	111	1,000
• registered			J & J	106	June 17, '98			
• 2d gtd. g. 5's. 1936		500,000	J & J					
• registered			J & J					

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Carthage & Adiron. 1st gtd g. 4's 1981		1,100,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Clearfield Bit. Coal Corporation, 1st s. f. int. gtd. g. 4's ser. A. 1940		770,000	J & J	95	July 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
small bonds series B. ....		38,100	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Gouv. & Oswego. 1st gtd g. 5's 1942		300,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mohawk & Malone 1st gtd g. 4's 1991		2,500,000	M & S	107½	July 6, '19	.....	.....	.....
inc. 5's. ....		3,900,000	Sept.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. Jersey Junc. R. R. 1st 4's 1886		1,650,000	F & A	102	Feb. 3, '97	.....	.....	.....
reg. certificates. ....		.....	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Putnam 1st con. gtd g. 4's 1938		4,000,000	A & O	108	May 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
Nor. & Montreal 1st g. gtd 5's. 1916		130,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
West Shore 1st guaranteed 4's 2361		50,000,000	J & J	115½	Mar. 27, '01	116½	115½	62,000
registered. ....		.....	J & J	115	Mar. 30, '01	115½	114½	111,000
Lake Shore con. 2d 7's. ....		8,428,000	J & D	110½	Mar. 9, '01	110½	110½	9,000
con. 2d registered. ....		.....	J & D	110½	Mar. 8, '01	110½	110½	1,000
g 3's. ....		40,760,000	J & D	109½	Feb. 27, '01	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....		.....	J & D	110½	Mar. 17, '01	.....	.....	.....
Cin. Sp. 1st gtd L. S. & M. 8. 7's. 1901		1,000,000	A & O	108½	Dec. 1, '97	.....	.....	.....
Detroit, Mon. & Toledo 1st 7's. 1906		924,000	F & A	117	Feb. 13, '01	.....	.....	.....
Kal., A. & G. R. 1st gtd c. 5's. 1938		840,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mahoning Coal R. R. 1st 5's. 1934		1,500,000	J & J	120	Dec. 17, '19	.....	.....	.....
Pitt Mck. port & Y. 1st gtd 6's. 1932		2,250,000	J & J	117	May 31, '99	.....	.....	.....
2d gtd 6's. ....		900,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
McKest & Bell. V. 1st g. 6's. ....		600,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Michigan Cent. 1st con. 7's. ....		8,000,000	M & N	108½	Mar. 15, '01	109½	108½	8,000
1st con. 5's. ....		2,000,000	M & N	108½	Mar. 11, '01	108½	108	7,000
6's. ....		1,500,000	M & S	119	Jan. 3, '01	.....	.....	.....
coup. 5's. ....		3,576,000	M & S	127½	Jan. 9, '01	.....	.....	.....
reg. 5's. ....		.....	Q M	127½	Nov. 8, '19	.....	.....	.....
mort. 4's. ....		2,600,000	J & J	110	Mar. 8, '01	110	110	1,000
mtg. 4's reg. ....		.....	J & J	106½	Nov. 26, '19	.....	.....	.....
Battle C. Sturgis 1st g. g. 8's. ....		476,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Harlem 1st mort. 7's c. 1900		11,444,000	M & N	103½	Mar. 13, '19	.....	.....	.....
7's registered. ....		.....	M & N	102½	Apr. 6, '19	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Northern 1st g. 5's. ....		1,200,000	A & O	122	Jan. 30, '01	.....	.....	.....
R. W. & Og. con. 1st ext. 5's. ....		9,081,000	A & O	128½	Mar. 20, '01	129½	128½	3,000
coup. g. bond currency. ....		.....	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Oswego & Rome 2d gtd gold 5's 1915		400,000	F & A	113	Apr. 13, '94	.....	.....	.....
R. W. & O. Ter. R. 1st gtd 5's 1918		375,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Utica & Black River gtd g. 4's. 1922		1,800,000	J & J	110	Oct. 15, '19	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., Chic. & St. Louis 1st g. 4's. ....		19,425,000	A & O	108½	Mar. 27, '01	109½	108½	108,000
registered. ....		.....	A & O	109½	Dec. 2, '19	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., N. Haven & H. 1st reg. 4's 1903		2,000,000	J & D	102	Feb. 28, '01	.....	.....	.....
con. deb. receipts. ....		15,007,500	A & O	108½	Mar. 26, '01	200	197½	34,000
small certs. ....		1,430,000	.....	195	Feb. 21, '01	.....	.....	.....
Housatonic R. con. g. 5's. ....		2,838,000	M & N	136	Mar. 12, '01	137	134	9,000
New Haven and Derby con. 5's. ....		575,000	M & N	115½	Oct. 15, '94	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & New England 1st 7's. ....		6,000,000	J & J	114	Jan. 5, '19	.....	.....	.....
1st 6's. ....		4,000,000	J & J	113	July 29, '99	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., Ont. & W'n. ref'ding 1st g. 4's 1902		16,937,000	M & S	106	Mar. 30, '01	106½	106	42,000
registered. ....		\$5,000 only.	M & S	101½	Nov. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
Norfolk & Southern 1st g. 5's. ....		1,350,000	M & N	112½	Mar. 28, '01	112½	111	20,000
Norfolk & Western gen. mtg. 6's 1931		7,283,000	M & N	134½	Mar. 22, '01	134½	134½	1,000
imp'ment and ext. 6's. ....		5,000,000	F & A	132½	Feb. 20, '01	.....	.....	.....
New River 1st 6's. ....		2,000,000	A & O	133½	Mar. 4, '01	133½	133½	11,000
Norfolk & West. Ry 1st con. g. 4s. 1906		28,704,600	A & O	103½	Mar. 29, '01	104	103	473,000
registered. ....		.....	A & O	97½	July 18, '99	.....	.....	.....
small bonds. ....		.....	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
C. C. & T. 1st g. t. g. 5's 1922		600,000	J & J	107	Nov. 26, '19	.....	.....	.....
Sci'o Val & N.E. 1st g. 4's 1939		5,000,000	J & N	103½	Mar. 28, '01	103½	102½	28,000
N. P. Ry prior In ry. & Id. gtd g. 4's. ....		94,007,500	Q J	106	Mar. 30, '01	106	105½	451,000
registered. ....		.....	Q J	105½	Mar. 26, '01	105½	104½	9,000
gen. lien g. 3's. ....		56,000,000	Q F	72½	Mar. 29, '01	72½	71	1,728,500
registered. ....		.....	Q F	70½	Dec. 10, '19	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul & Duluth div. g. 4's. ....		9,215,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....		.....	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul & N. Pacific gen. g. 6's 1923		7,985,000	F & A	131½	Feb. 18, '01	.....	.....	.....
registered certificates. ....		.....	Q F	132	July 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul & Duluth 1st 5's. ....		1,000,000	F & A	123½	Feb. 13, '01	.....	.....	.....
2d 5's. ....		2,000,000	A & O	116	Feb. 1, '01	.....	.....	.....
1st con. g. 4's. ....		1,000,000	J & D	102	Feb. 16, '01	.....	.....	.....
Washington Cen. Ry 1st g. 4's. ....		1,538,000	Q MCH	88½	May 31, '19	.....	.....	.....
Nor. Pacific Term. Co. 1st g. 6's. ....		3,787,000	J & J	116½	Mar. 14, '01	116½	116½	2,000



## BOND SALES.

633

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ogd. & L. Ch. Ry. 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1948		4,400,000	J & J					
Ohio River Railroad 1st 5's. 1908		2,000,000	J & D	112	Feb. 27, '01			
gen. mortg. g 6's. 1907		2,428,000	A & O	95	Dec. 12, 19'			
Omaha & St. Lo. 1st g 4's. 1901		2,376,000	J & J	75	Apr. 4, 19'			
Pacific Coast Co. 1st g. 5's. 1946		4,446,000	J & D	110	Mar. 20, '01	110%	109	51,000
Panama 1st sink fund g. 4 1/2's. 1917		1,636,000	A & O	105	Mar. 12, '01	195	105	8,000
s. f. subsidy g 6's. 1910		1,846,000	M & N	101	Dec. 15, '99			
Pennsylvania Railroad Co.								
Penn. Co.'s gtd. 4 1/2's, 1st. 1921		19,467,000	J & J	115	Mar. 19, '01	115 1/2	114 1/2	11,000
"    reg. 1921			J & J	114 1/2	Mar. 8, '01	114 1/2	114 1/2	2,000
"    gtd. 3 1/2 col. tr. reg. cts. 1937		5,000,000	M & S	113 1/2	Feb. 15, '99			
Chic., St. Louis & P. 1st c. 5's. 1902		1,506,000	A & O	123 1/2	Mar. 23, '01	120 1/2	120 1/2	4,000
"    registered. 1902			A & O	110	May 8, '92			
Clev. & P. gen. gtd. g. 4 1/2's Ser. A. 1942		3,000,000	J & J	121	Oct. 22, 19'			
"    Series B. 1942		2,000,000	A & O					
"    Series C 3 1/2's. 1948		3,001,000	M & N					
"    Series D 3 1/2's. 1950		328,000	F & A					
R. & Pitts. gen. gtd. g. 3 1/2's Ser. R. 1940		2,251,000	J & J	102	Nov. 7, 19'			
"    C. 1940		1,508,000	J & J					
Newp. & Cin. Bge Co. gtd. g. 4's. 1945		1,400,000	J & J					
"    Pitts., C. C. & St. L. con. g. 4 1/2's. 1940		10,000,000	A & O	118	Mar. 28, '01	118	118 1/2	10,000
"    Series B gtd. 1942		8,788,000	A & O	117 1/2	Mar. 29, '01	117 1/2	117 1/2	2,000
"    Series C gtd. 1942		1,379,000	M & N	113 1/2	Feb. 14, '01			
"    Series D gtd. 4's. 1945		4,983,000	M & N	109	Apr. 12, 19'			
"    Series E gtd. g. 3 1/2's. 1949		5,899,000	F & A	99	Dec. 21, 19'			
Pitts., Ft. Wayne & C. 1st 7's. 1912		2,917,000	J & J	133 1/2	Feb. 19, '01			
"    2d 7's. 1912		2,546,000	J & J	137 1/2	Nov. 27, 19'			
"    3d 7's. 1912		2,000,000	A & O	136 1/2	Jan. 28, '01			
Penn. RR. Co. 1st RI Est. g 4's. 1923		1,675,000	M & N	108	May 12, '97			
con. sterling gold 6 per cent. 1905		22,762,000	J & J					
con. currency, 6's registered. 1905		4,718,000	Q M 15					
con. gold 5 per cent. 1919		4,998,000	M & S					
"    registered. 1919			Q M					
con. gold 4 per cent. 1943		3,000,000	M & N					
Allegh. Valley gen. gtd. g. 4's. 1942		5,899,000	M & S	110	Aug. 28, 19'			
Clev. & Mar. 1st gtd. g. 4 1/2's. 1935		1,250,000	M & N	112 1/2	Mar. 7, 19'			
Del. R. R. & Bge Co 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1936		1,800,000	F & A					
G. R. & Ind. Ex. 1st gtd. g. 4 1/2's. 1941		4,455,000	J & J	112	Jan. 30, '01			
Sunbury & Lewistown 1st g. 4's. 1936		500,000	J & J					
U'd N. J. RR. & Can Co. g 4's. 1944		5,646,000	M & S	117	May 1, 19'			
Peoria & Pekin Union 1st 6's. 1921		1,496,000	Q F	133 1/2	Jan. 26, '01			
"    2d m 4 1/2's. 1921		1,499,000	M & N	101	Oct. 31, 19'			
Pere Marquette.								
Flint & Pere Marquette g. 6's. 1920		3,999,000	A & O	127	Feb. 4, '01			
"    1st con. gold 5's. 1909		2,850,000	M & N	114 1/2	Mar. 18, '01	114 1/2	113	38,000
"    Port Huron d 1st g 5's. 1909		3,325,000	A & O	115 1/2	Mar. 28, '01	115 1/2	114 1/2	16,000
Sag'w Tusc. & Hur. 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1931		1,000,000	F & A					
Pine Creek Railway 6's. 1932		3,500,000	J & D	137	Nov. 17, '93			
Pittsburg, Clev. & Toledo 1st 6's. 1922		2,400,000	A & O	107 1/2	Oct. 28, '98			
Pittsburg, Junction 1st 6's. 1922		478,000	J & J	121	Nov. 23, '96			
Pittsburg & L. E. 2d g 5's ser. A. 1928		2,000,000	A & O	112	Mar. 25, '93			
Pittsburg, Pains. & Fpt. 1st g. 5's. 1916		1,000,000	J & J	90	June 24, '99			
Pitts., Shena'go & L. E. 1st g. 5's. 1940		3,000,000	A & O	113 1/2	Mar. 8, '01	113 1/2	113 1/2	2,000
1st cons. 5's. 1943		408,000	J & J	87 1/2	Jan. 12, 19'			
Pittsburg & West'n 1st gold 4's. 1917		1,599,000	J & J	100%	Mar. 28, '01	100%	100%	1,000
J. P. M. & Co., cfts., 1917		8,111,000		100%	Mar. 27, '01	100%	100%	20,000
Pittsburg, Y & Ash. 1st cons. 5's. 1927		1,562,000	M & N	121 1/2	Mar. 8, '01	121 1/2	121 1/2	2,000
Reading Co. gen. g. 4's. 1907		63,537,000	J & J	95	Mar. 30, '01	95%	93%	1,912,000
registered. 1907			J & J	88	Nov. 15, 19'			
Rio Grande West'n 1st g. 4's. 1939		15,200,000	J & J	101 1/2	Mar. 29, '01	101 1/2	100	197,000
mge & col. tr. g. 4's ser. A. 1949		4,003,000	A & O					
Utah Cen. d 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1917		550,000	A & O	88 1/2	Sept. 27, 19'			

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Inve.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Rio Grande Junc'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1909		1,850,000	J & D	105	Feb. 27, '01	....	....	128,000
Rio Grande Southern 1st g. 4's. 1940		2,283,000	J & J	84	Mar. 28, '01	84	81	128,000
guaranteed.....		2,277,000	....	93½	Mar. 22, '01	93½	93½	19,000
Salt Lake City 1st g. sink fu'd 6's. 1913		297,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
St. Jo. & Gr. Isl. 1st g. 2.342..... 1947		3,500,000	J & J	94½	Mar. 29, '01	95	93	80,000
St. L. & Adirondack Ry. 1st g. 5's. 1906		800,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
2d g. 6's..... 1906		400,000	A & O	....	....	....	....	....
St. Louis & San F. 2d 6's, Class A. 1906		500,000	M & N	112½	Feb. 14, '01	....	....	....
2d g. 6's, Class B..... 1906		2,683,000	M & N	112	Mar. 11, '01	112	112	4,000
2d g. 6's, Class C..... 1906		2,399,000	M & N	112½	Mar. 27, '01	112½	112½	1,600
gen. g. 6's..... 1906		7,807,000	J & J	132	Mar. 28, '01	132	129½	77,000
gen. g. 5's..... 1906		12,292,000	J & J	117½	Mar. 25, '01	117½	116½	20,000
1st Trust g. 5's..... 1907		1,099,000	A & O	102½	Oct. 17, '19	....	....	....
1st g. 6's P. C. & O..... 1919		1,020,000	F & A	118	May 23, '02	....	....	....
St. Louis & San F. R. R. g. 4's. 1906		6,288,000	J & D	99½	Mar. 30, '01	100	96	176,000
Central div. 1st g. 4's. 1929		1,962,000	A & O	99½	Mar. 29, '01	99½	97½	25,000
N. W. div. 1st g. 4's..... 1930		1,100,000	A & O	98½	Mar. 28, '01	98½	96½	3,000
S. W. div. g. 5's..... 1947		1,500,000	A & O	100	June 19, '19	....	....	....
Kansas, Midland 1st g. 4's..... 1937		1,608,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	....
St. Louis S. W. 1st g. 4's Bd. ctf's., 1909		20,000,000	M & N	99½	Mar. 30, '01	100½	97½	1,280,000
2d g. 4's inc. Bd. ctf's., 1909		9,000,000	J & J	80	Mar. 30, '01	81½	79½	5,151,000
Gray's Point, Term. 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1947		389,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	....
St. Paul, Minn. & Manito'a 2d 6's..... 1909		7,998,000	A & O	118½	Feb. 20, '01	....	....	....
1st con. 6's..... 1908		13,344,000	J & J	141	Mar. 30, '01	141½	141	17,000
1st con. 6's, registered.....		....	J & J	137½	Feb. 23, '00	....	....	....
1st c. 6's, red'd to g. 4's.....		20,974,000	J & J	116½	Mar. 4, '01	116½	116½	1,000
1st cons. 6's registered.....		....	J & J	115½	Nov. 20, '19	....	....	....
Dakota ext'n g. 6's..... 1910		5,676,000	M & N	120½	Mar. 14, '01	120½	120½	9,000
Mont. ext'n 1st g. 4's..... 1907		7,907,000	J & D	106½	Mar. 29, '01	106½	106½	6,000
registered.....		....	J & D	104	Jan. 27, '00	....	....	....
Eastern Ry. Minn. 1st d. 1st g. 5's..... 1906		4,700,900	A & O	110	Feb. 14, '01	....	....	....
registered.....		....	A & O	....	....	....	....	....
Minn. N. div. 1st g. 4's..... 1940		5,000,000	A & O	....	....	....	....	....
registered.....		....	A & O	....	....	....	....	....
Minneapolis Union 1st g. 6's..... 1922		2,150,000	J & J	128	Apr. 4, '19	....	....	....
Montana Cent. 1st 6's int. gtd..... 1937		6,000,000	J & J	136½	Mar. 12, '01	136½	136½	10,000
1st 6's, registered.....		....	J & J	115	Apr. 24, '07	....	....	....
1st g. g. 5's..... 1907		2,700,000	J & J	122	Mar. 6, '01	122	122	1,000
registered.....		....	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
Willmar & Sioux Falls 1st g. 5's. 1908		3,625,000	J & D	120	Apr. 11, '00	....	....	....
registered.....		....	J & D	....	....	....	....	....
San Fe Pres. & Phoe. Ry. 1st g. 5's. 1942		4,940,000	M & S	104	Jan. 11, '01	....	....	....
San Fran. & N. Pac. 1st s. f. g. 5's. 1919		3,872,000	J & J	112	June 9, '19	....	....	....
Sav. Florida & Wn. 1st c. g. 6's..... 1934		4,066,000	A & O	126½	Jan. 13, '19	....	....	....
1st g. 5's..... 1934		2,444,000	A & O	112	Mar. 17, '00	....	....	....
St. John's div. 1st g. 4's. 1934		1,350,000	J & J	94½	Feb. 15, '01	....	....	....
Alabama Midland 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1928		2,800,000	M & N	106½	Feb. 25, '01	....	....	....
Brunsw. & West. 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1938		3,000,000	J & J	87	Jan. 12, '01	....	....	....
Sil. S. Oc. & G. R. R. & Ig. gtd. g. 4's. 1918		1,107,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
Seaboard & Roanoke 1st 5's..... 1926		2,500,000	J & J	104½	Feb. 5, '00	....	....	....
Carolina Central 1st con. g. 4's. 1949		2,847,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
Sodus Bay & Sout'n 1st 5's, gold. 1924		500,000	J & J	105	Sept. 4, '06	....	....	....
Southern Pacific Co.								
2-5 year col. trust g. 4's. 1906		15,000,000	J & D	101	Mar. 30, '01	101½	97½	1,278,000
g. 4's Central Pac. coll. 1949		28,818,500	J & D	92½	Mar. 30, '01	93½	92	4,067,500
registered.....		....	J & D	....	....	....	....	....
Cent. Pac. 1st refund. gtd. g. 4's. 1949		58,086,500	F & A	101	Mar. 30, '01	101½	100½	644,500
registered.....		....	F & A	99½	June 1, '19	....	....	....
mtg. gtd. g. 3½'s..... 1929		19,896,000	J & D	88½	Mar. 30, '01	89	87½	848,000
registered.....		....	J & D	....	....	....	....	....
Gal. Harrisb'gh & S. A. 1st g. 6's. 1910		4,756,000	F & A	106½	Mar. 22, '01	106½	106½	2,000
2d g. 7's..... 1905		1,000,000	J & D	107½	Feb. 26, '01	....	....	....
Mex. & P. div. 1st g. 5's. 1931		13,418,000	M & N	105½	Mar. 30, '01	105½	102½	681,000
Houst. E. & W. Tex. 1st g. 5's. 1933		501,000	M & N	106½	Feb. 23, '01	....	....	....
1st gtd. g. 5's..... 1933		2,199,000	M & N	104½	July 18, '19	....	....	....
Houst. & T. C. 1st g. 5's int. gtd. 1937		6,571,000	J & J	118	Mar. 25, '01	113	112	40,000
con. g. 5's int. gtd..... 1912		3,311,000	A & O	110½	Nov. 28, '19	....	....	....
gen. g. 4's int. gtd..... 1921		4,287,000	A & O	94	Mar. 28, '01	95	90	21,000

# BOND SALES.

685

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date: highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Morgan's La & Tex. 1st g 6's....1920		1,494,000	J & J	125	Feb. 26, '01	....	....	....
1st 7's.....1918		5,000,000	A & O	137½	Jan. 29, '01	....	....	....
N. Y. Tex. & Mex. gtd. 1st g 4's....1912		1,465,000	A & O	94	Nov. 30, '97	....	....	....
Nth'n Ry of Cal. 1st gtd. g. 6's....1907		3,964,000	J & J	113	Jan. 4, '01	....	....	....
gtd. g. 5's.....1912		4,751,000	A & O	107½	Mar. 23, '01	107½	105½	106,000
Oreg. & Cal. 1st gtd. g 5's.....1927		19,521,000	J & J	87	Mar. 29, '01	88	85	1,855,000
San Ant. & Aran Pass 1st gtd g 4's....1943		18,900,000	J & J	110¾	Feb. 8, '01	....	....	....
Tex. & New Orleans 1st 7's.....1905		1,347,000	F & A	106¾	Nov. 17, '97	....	....	....
Sabine div. 1st g 6's....1912		2,575,000	M & S	107¾	Mar. 30, '01	107¾	106¾	350,000
con. g 5's.....1943		1,620,000	J & J	112	Feb. 28, '01	....	....	....
South'n Pac. of Ariz. 1st g 6's 1909-1910		10,000,000	J & J	108½	Jan. 21, '01	....	....	....
of Cal. 1st g 6's ser. A. 1905			APR.	110¾	Aug. 24, '19	....	....	....
ser. B. 1905		30,217,500	A & O	111½	Jan. 30, '01	....	....	....
ser. C & D. 1906			A & O	114½	Nov. 8, '99	....	....	....
ser. E & F. 1902			A & O	120	Feb. 15, '01	....	....	....
1st con. gtd. g 5's....1937		6,809,000	M & N	107	Nov. 27, '19	....	....	....
stamped.....1905-1937		20,420,000	....	109¾	Mar. 28, '01	109¾	109	21,000
Austin & North'n 1st g 5's....1941		1,920,000	J & J	105¾	Mar. 30, '01	105½	103½	292,000
So. Pacific Coast 1st gtd. g. 4's....1937		5,500,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
of N. Mex. c. 1st g 6's....1911		4,180,000	J & J	110	Mar. 22, '01	110	110	1,000
Gila Val. G. & N'n 1st gtd g 5's....1924		1,514,000	M & N	107	Mar. 4, '01	107	107	6,000
Southern Railway 1st con. g 5's....1944								
registered.....		33,223,000	J & J	110½	Mar. 30, '01	117½	115½	357,000
Memph. div. 1st g. 4½ 5's....1906		5,083,000	J & J	108	Aug. 3, '19	....	....	....
registered.....			J & J	109	Jan. 31, '01	....	....	....
Alabama Central, 1st 6's.....1918		1,000,000	J & J	120	Mar. 25, '01	120	120	9,000
Atlantic & Danville 1st g. 4's....1948		3,175,000	J & J	94¾	Mar. 27, '01	94¾	94	230,000
Atlantic & Yadkin, 1st gtd g 4's....1949		1,500,000	A & O	....	....	....	....	....
Col. & Greenville, 1st 5-6's.....1916		2,000,000	J & J	120	Mar. 29, '01	120	119¾	2,000
East Tenn., Va. & Ga. div. g 5's....1930		3,106,000	J & J	117½	Jan. 29, '01	120	120	6,000
con. 1st g 5's.....1956		12,770,000	M & N	120	Mar. 15, '01	114¾	113¾	47,000
reorg. lien g 4's.....1938		4,500,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
registered.....			M & S	....	....	....	....	....
Ga. Pacific Ry. 1st g 5-6's.....1922		5,660,000	J & J	127	Mar. 21, '01	127¼	127	11,000
Knoxville & Ohio, 1st g 6's.....1925		2,000,000	J & J	127	Mar. 23, '01	127	123	3,000
Rich. & Danville, con. g 6's.....1915		5,597,000	J & J	123	Mar. 1, '01	123	123	20,000
equip. sink. f'd g 5's....1909		818,000	M & S	101¼	July 20, '01	....	....	....
deb. 5's stamped.....1927		3,368,000	A & O	109¼	Feb. 15, '01	....	....	....
Rich. & Mecklenburg 1st g. 4's....1948		15,000	M & N	83	Dec. 10, '19	....	....	....
South Caro'a & Ga. 1st g. 5's.....1919		5,250,000	M & S	108	Feb. 19, '01	....	....	....
Vir. Midland serial ser. A 6's....1906		600,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
small.....			M & S	....	....	....	....	....
ser. B 6's.....1911		1,900,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
small.....			M & S	....	....	....	....	....
ser. C 6's.....1916		1,100,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
small.....			M & S	....	....	....	....	....
ser. D 4-5's.....1921		950,000	M & S	102	Oct. 13, '99	....	....	....
small.....			M & S	....	....	....	....	....
ser. E 5's.....1926		1,775,000	M & S	109	Jan. 12, '99	....	....	....
small.....			M & S	....	....	....	....	....
ser. F 5's.....1931		1,310,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
Virginia Midland gen. 5's.....1936		2,392,000	M & N	115½	Mar. 14, '01	115½	115½	7,000
gen. 5's gtd. stamped....1926		2,466,000	M & N	113¼	Dec. 14, '19	....	....	....
W. O. & W. 1st cy. gtd. 4's.....1924		1,025,000	F & A	91½	Sept. 14, '99	....	....	....
W. Nor. C. 1st con. g 6's.....1914		2,531,000	J & J	119	Mar. 29, '01	119	119	2,000
Spokane Falls & North. 1st g. 6's....1939								
Staten Isl. Ry. N. Y. 1st gtd. g 4½'s....1943		500,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	....
Ter. R. R. Assn. St. Louis 1g 4½'s....1939		7,000,000	A & O	116	Mar. 18, '99	116	116	15,000
1st con. g. 5's.....1894-1944		4,500,000	F & A	115½	Mar. 12, '01	115½	115½	43,000
St. L. Mers. bdg. Ter. gtd g. 5's....1930		3,500,000	A & O	115	Mar. 6, '01	115	115	1,000
Tex. & Pacific, East div. 1st 6's....1905								
fm. Texarkana to Ft. Worth.....		3,178,000	M & S	104	Feb. 15, '19	....	....	....
1st gold 5's.....2000		21,822,000	J & D	119	Mar. 29, '01	120	118½	93,000
2d gold income, 5's.....2000		957,000	MAR.	96	Mar. 30, '01	98	90	126,000
Toledo & Ohio Cent. 1st g 5's....1935								
1st m. g 5's West. div....1935		2,500,000	A & O	115½	Jan. 14, '01	....	....	....
gen. g. 5's.....1935		2,000,000	J & D	106¾	Feb. 25, '01	....	....	....
Kanaw & M. 1st g. g. 4's....1940		2,466,000	A & O	99	Mar. 23, '01	99	97	27,000

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Toledo, Peoria & W. 1st g 4's....1917		4,400,000	J & D	93½	Mar. 30, '01	94	92	18,000
Tol., St. L. & Wn. prior lien g 3½'s. 1925		9,000,000	J & J	92	Mar. 28, '01	92½	89½	375,000
" registered.....			J & J					
" fifty years g. 4's.....1925		6,500,000	A & O	85½	Mar. 30, '01	85½	78	2,442,000
" registered.....			A & O					
Toronto, Hamilton & Buff 1st g 4s. 1946		3,230,000	J & D	98½	Mar. 16, '01	98½	98½	11,000
Ulster & Delaware 1st c. g 5's....1925		1,852,000	J & D	108	Feb. 20, '01			
Union Pacific R. R. & Id gt g 4s....1947		99,543,000	J & J	105¾	Mar. 30, '01	106¾	105¾	432,500
" registered.....			J & J	104½	Mar. 22, '01	104½	104½	1,000
" Oreg. Ry. & Nav. 1st a. f. g. 6's. 1909		547,000	J & J	110	Feb. 27, '01			
" Oreg. R. R. & Nav. Co. con. g 4's. 1946		19,634,000	J & D	104½	Mar. 27, '01	104½	104	81,000
" Oreg. Short Line Ry. 1st g. 6's. 1922		13,651,000	F & A	129½	Mar. 30, '01	129½	127½	45,000
" Oreg. Short Line 1st con. g. 5's. 1946		10,387,000	J & J	117	Mar. 30, '01	117	115½	128,000
" non-cum. inc. A 5's.....1946		649,000	EMPT.	108	Jan. 21, '01			
" Utah & Northern 1st 7's.....1908		4,993,000	J & J	119	Mar. 1, '01	119	119	1,000
" g. 5's.....1925		1,577,000	J & J	118	Mar. 7, '01	118	118	2,000
Wabash R.R. Co., 1st gold 5's.....1909		31,664,000	M & N	119½	Mar. 29, '01	119½	118	223,000
" 2d mortgage gold 5's.....1909		14,000,000	F & A	110½	Mar. 29, '01	110½	109½	101,000
" debent. mtg series A....1909		3,500,000	J & J	101½	Mar. 31, '01	101½	100	40,000
" series B.....1909		25,740,000	J & J	69½	Mar. 30, '01	69½	59½	35,284,000
" 1st g. 5's Det. & Ch. ex. 1940		3,411,000	J & J	111	Mar. 18, '01	110½	110	11,000
" Des Moines div. 1st g. 4s. 1909		1,600,000	J & J	98½	Feb. 19, '01			
" St. L., Kan. C. & N. St. Chas. B.								
" 1st 6's.....1908		1,000,000	A & O	112	Feb. 25, '01			
Western N.Y. & Penn. 1st g. 5's....1907		10,000,000	J & J	121½	Mar. 25, '01	121½	121½	138,000
" gen g. 3-4's.....1943		9,789,000	A & O	100½	Mar. 22, '01	100½	96½	127,000
" inc. 5's.....1943		10,000,000	Nov.	40	Mar. 21, '01	40	40	1,000
West Va. Cent'l & Pitts. 1st g. 6's. 1911		3,250,000	J & J	113½	Mar. 30, '01	113½	113½	30,000
Wheeling & Lake Erie 1st g. 5's. 1925		2,000,000	A & O	116	Mar. 29, '01	117½	116	83,000
" Wheeling div. 1st g. 5's. 1928		894,000	J & J	114½	Mar. 25, '01	116½	114½	15,000
" exten. and imp. g. 5's....1930		343,000	F & A	108	Sept. 12, '19			
" Wheel. & L. E. R.R. 1st con. g. 4's. 1949		10,211,000	M & S	91½	Mar. 30, '01	93	89	1,597,000
" Wisconsin Cen. Ry 1st gen. g. 4s. 1949		24,635,000	J & J	90½	Mar. 30, '01	91	87½	2,009,000
<b>STREET RAILWAY BONDS.</b>								
Brooklyn Rapid Transit g. 5's....1945		6,625,000	A & O	110	Mar. 13, '01	110	110	6,000
" Atl. av. Bkn. Imp. g. 5's. 1984		1,500,000	J & J	110	Jan. 20, '99			
" City R. R. 1st c. 5's. 1916. 1941		4,373,000	J & J	115	Mar. 7, '01	115	115	4,000
" Qu. Co. & Sur. con. gtd. g. 5's.....1941		2,255,000	M & N	108½	Mar. 12, '01	103½	103	10,000
" Union Elev. 1st g. 4-5s. 1950		12,890,000	F & A	101½	Mar. 30, '01	102	98	980,000
" Kings Co. Elev. R. R. 1st g. 4's. 1949		7,000,000	F & A	98	Mar. 30, '01	98	89½	324,000
" Nassau Electric R. R. gtd. g. 4's. 1951		10,474,000	J & J					
" City & Sub. Ry. Balt. 1st g. 5's. 1922		2,430,000	J & D	105½	Apr. 17, '96			
" Denver Con. T'way Co. 1st g. 5's. 1933		730,000	A & O	97½	June 13, '19			
" Denver T'way Co. con. g. 6's....1910		1,219,000	J & J					
" Metrop'ln Ry Co. 1st g. 6's. 1911		913,000	J & J					
" Grand Rapids Ry 1st g. 5's.....1916		2,500,000	J & D					
" Louisville Railway Co. 1st c. g. 5's. 1930		4,600,000	J & J	109	Mar. 19, '98			
" Market St. Cable Railway 1st 6's. 1913		3,000,000	J & J					
" Metro. St. Ry N. Y. g. col. tr. g. 5's. 1907		12,500,000	F & A	120	Mar. 29, '01	120½	119	109,000
" B'way & 7th ave. 1st con. g. 5's. 1943		7,650,000	J & D	120	Mar. 21, '01	120½	120	2,000
" registered.....			J & D	119½	Dec. 3, '19			
" Columb. & 9th ave. 1st gtd g 5's. 1908		3,000,000	M & S	123½	Mar. 21, '01	123½	123	5,000
" registered.....			M & S					
" Lex ave & Pav Fer 1st gtd g 5's. 1903		5,000,000	M & S	121½	Mar. 25, '01	122½	121½	17,000
" registered.....			M & S					
" Met. West Side Elev. Chic. 1st g. 4's. 1938		10,000,000	F & A	101½	Mar. 29, '01	101½	100	136,000
" registered.....			F & A					
" Mil. Elec. R. & Light con. 30yr. g. 5's. 1926		6,103,000	F & A	106	Oct. 27, '99			
" Minn. St. Ry (M. L. & M.) 1st con. g. 5's.....1919		4,050,000	J & J	109	Oct. 20, '99			
" St. Paul City Ry. Cable con. g. 5's. 1937		2,480,000	J & J	111½	Jan. 24, '01			
" gtd. gold 5's.....1937		1,138,000	J & J	112	Nov. 28, '99			
" Third Avenue R'y N. Y. 1st g. 5's. 1937		5,000,000	J & J	125	Mar. 29, '01	125	125	10,000
" Union Elevated (Chic.) 1st g. 5's. 1943		4,387,000	A & O	109½	Dec. 14, '99			
" West Chic. St. 40 yr. 1st cur. 5's. 1923		3,989,000	M & N					
" 40 years con. g. 5's.....1936		6,031,000	M & N	99	Dec. 28, '97			

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

## MISCELLANEOUS BONDS.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Adams Express Co. col. tr. g. 4's. 1948		12,000,000	M & S	104½	Mar. 30, '01	105	104	45,500
B'klyn Ferry Co. of N. Y. 1st c. g. 5's. 1948		6,500,000	F & A	91	Mar. 30, '01	91	89½	834,000
B'klyn W. & W. Co. 1st g. tr. cts. 5's. 1945		17,084,000	F & A	77½	Mar. 27, '01	78	68½	364,000
Chic. Junc. & St'k Y'ds col. g. 5's. 1915		10,000,000	J & J	111	Mar. 7, '01	111	111	2,000
Det. Mack & Mar. ld. gt. 8½ S. A. 1911		3,021,000	A & O	34½	Mar. 27, '01	35½	31½	337,000
Hackensack Wtr Reorg. 1st g. 5's. 1926		1,090,000	J & J	107½	June 3, '02	....	....	....
Hend'n Bdg Co. 1st s'k. f'd g. 6's. 1931		1,681,000	M & S	113	Nov. 14, '99	....	....	....
Hoboken Land & Imp. g. 5's. .... 1910		1,440,000	M & N	102	Jan. 19, '94	....	....	....
Iron Steamboat Co. 6's. .... 1901		500,000	J & J	75½	Dec. 4, '95	....	....	....
Madison Sq. Garden 1st g. 5's. .... 1919		1,250,000	M & N	102	July 8, '97	....	....	....
Manh. Beh H. & L. lim. gen. g. 4's. 1940		1,300,000	M & N	55	Aug. 27, '95	....	....	....
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock 5's. .... 1890-1900		2,000,000	J & J	94	May 21, '94	....	....	....
N. Y. & Ontario Land 1st g. 6's. .... 1910		443,000	F & A	90	Oct. 3, '99	....	....	....
St. Louis Term. Station Cupples & Property Co. 1st g 4½'s 5-20. 1917		3,000,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	....
So. Y. Water Co. N. Y. con. g. 6's. 1923		478,000	J & J	101	Feb. 19, '97	....	....	....
Spring Valley W. Wks. 1st 6's. .... 1906		4,975,000	M & S	112½	Dec. 18, '19	....	....	....
U. S. Mortgage and Trust Co. Real Estate 1st g col tr. bonds.								
Series D 4½'s. .... 1901-1916		1,000,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
" E 4's. .... 1907-1917		1,000,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	....
" F 4's. .... 1908-1918		1,000,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
" G 4's. .... 1908-1918		1,000,000	F & A	100	Mar. 15, '19	....	....	....
" H 4's. .... 1908-1918		1,000,000	M & N	....	....	....	....	....
" I 4's. .... 1904-1919		1,000,000	F & A	....	....	....	....	....
" J 4's. .... 1904-1919		1,000,000	M & N	....	....	....	....	....
Small bonds. ....		....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Vermont Marble, 1st s. fund 5's. .... 1910		400,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	....
BONDS OF MANUFACTURING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS.								
Am. Bicycle Co. sink. fund deb. 5's. 1919		9,200,243	M & S	81	Mar. 29, '01	81	79	206,000
Am. Cotton Oil deb. ext. 4½'s. .... 1915		2,919,000	....	101½	Mar. 28, '01	101½	100	75,000
Am. Hide & Lea. Co. 1st s. f. 6's. .... 1919		8,375,000	M & S	94	Mar. 30, '01	96	90½	262,000
Am. Spirit Mfg. Co. 1st g. 6's. .... 1915		1,899,000	M & S	80	Mar. 28, '01	81	78½	14,000
Am. Thread Co., 1st coll. trust 4's. 1919		5,798,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
Barney & Smith Car Co. 1st g. 6's. 1942		1,000,000	J & J	105	Jan. 10, '19	....	....	....
Gramercy Sugar Co., 1st g. 6's. .... 1923		1,400,000	A & O	89½	Feb. 2, '19	....	....	....
Illinois Steel Co. debenture 5's. .... 1910		6,200,000	J & J	99	Jan. 17, '99	....	....	....
" non. conv. deb. 5's. .... 1910		7,000,000	A & O	70	Apr. 23, '97	....	....	....
Internat'l Paper Co. 1st con. g. 6's. 1918		9,229,000	F & A	108½	Mar. 30, '01	108½	105½	301,000
Knickerbocker Ice Co. (Chic) 1st g 5's. 1925		2,000,000	A & O	98	Aug. 25, '19	....	....	....
Nat. Starch Mfg. Co., 1st g 6's. .... 1920		3,089,000	J & J	108½	Mar. 19, '01	108½	107½	5,000
Standard Rope & Twine 1st g. 6's. 1946		2,835,000	F & A	60	Mar. 30, '01	60	48½	204,000
" inc. g. 5's. 1946		7,500,000	....	7½	Mar. 30, '01	8	6	217,000
U. S. Env. Co. 1st sk. fd. g. 6's. .... 1918		2,000,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
U. S. Leather Co. ½ g s. fd deb. 1915		5,280,000	M & N	115	Mar. 23, '01	115	115	17,000
BONDS OF COAL AND IRON COMPANIES.								
Colo. Coal & Iron 1st con. g. 6's. 1900		2,766,000	F & A	101½	Mar. 22, '01	101½	101½	10,000
Colo. C'l & I'n Devel. Co. gtd g. 5's. 1909		700,000	J & J	55	Nov. 2, '19	....	....	....
" Coupon off. ....		....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Colo. Fuel Co. gen. g. 6's. .... 1919		1,043,000	M & N	108½	Feb. 14, '01	....	....	....
Col. Fuel & Iron Co. gen. sf g 5's. 1943		2,308,000	F & A	100	Mar. 30, '01	100	98	120,000
Grand Riv. Coal & Coke 1st g. 6's. 1919		949,000	A & O	....	....	....	....	....

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

**MISCELLANEOUS BONDS—Continued.**

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		MARCH SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Jefferson & Clearfield Coal & Ir.								
1st g. 5's.....1928	1,777,000	J & D	105½	Oct. 10, '98				
2d g. 5's.....1928	1,400,000	J & D	80	May 4, '97				
Pleasant Valley Coal 1st g. s. f. 5's. 1928	1,227,000	J & J	105	Oct. 24, '19				
Roch & Pitta. Cl & Ir. Co. pur my 5's. 1946	1,062,000	M & N						
Sun. Creek Coal 1st sk. fund 5's. 1912	379,000	J & O						
Ten. Coal, I. & R. T. d. 1st g 5's. 1917	1,244,000	A & O	108	Mar. 20, '01	108	105	20,000	
Bir. div. 1st con. 5's. 1917	3,366,000	J & J	109	Mar. 20, '01	110	105	37,000	
Cah. Coal M. Co. 1st gtd. 5's. 1922	1,000,000	J & J	105	Feb. 10, '19				
De Bard. C & I Co. gtd. g 5's. 1910	2,771,000	F & A	101	Mar. 20, '01	101½	100	8,500	
Wheel L. E. & P. Cl Co. 1st g 5's. 1919	846,000	J & J	82	Jan. 15, '19				
<b>GAS &amp; ELECTRIC LIGHT CO. BONDS.</b>								
Atlanta Gas Light Co. 1st g. 5's. 1947	1,150,000	J & D						
Bost. U. n. Gas tct cts s'k f'd g. 5's. 1909	7,000,000	J & J	80½	Feb. 20, '01				
B'klyn Union Gas Co. 1st con g. 5's. 1945	14,210,000	M & N	117½	Mar. 29, '01	117½	117	23,000	
Columbus Gas Co., 1st g. 5's.....1932	1,215,000	J & J	104½	Jan. 28, '98				
Detroit City Gas Co. g. 5's.....1928	5,055,000	J & J	101½	Mar. 26, '01	101½	98½	300,000	
Detroit Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's.....1918	881,000	F & A	99½	Nov. 16, '99				
Equitable Gas Light Co. of N. Y. 1st con. g. 5's.....1932	3,500,000	M & S	104	Feb. 14, '01				
Gas. & Elec. of Bergen Co. c. g. 5's. 1949	1,148,000	J & D	101½	Mar. 25, '01	102½	101½	205,000	
General Electric Co. deb. g. 5's. 1922	1,080,000	J & D	180	Mar. 27, '01	180	180	5,000	
Grand Rapids G. L. Co. 1st g. 5's. 1915	1,225,000	F & A	107½	Dec. 17, '19				
Kansas City Mo. Gas Co. 1st g 5's. 1922	3,750,000	A & O						
Kings Co. Elec. L. & Power g. 5's. 1937	2,500,000	A & O						
purchase money 5's. 1947	5,000,000	J & J						
Edison El. Ill. Bkin 1st con. g. 4's. 1989	4,275,000	J & J	96½	Dec. 4, '19				
Lac. Gas L't Co. of St. L. 1st g. 5's. 1919	10,000,000	Q F	108	Mar. 29, '01	109	107	44,000	
small bonds.....			97½	Nov. 1, '95				
N. Y. Gas EL. H. & P. Col steel tr g 5's. 1948	11,500,000	J & D	115½	Mar. 29, '01	115½	111½	67,000	
registered.....		J & D						
purchase money col tr g 5's. 1949	20,889,000	F & A	96½	Mar. 20, '01	97½	95½	780,000	
Edison El. Illu. 1st conv. g. 5's. 1910	4,312,000	M & S	107½	Mar. 28, '01	108	107½	28,000	
1st con. g. 5's.....1905	2,156,000	J & J	121½	Mar. 29, '19	121½	121	13,000	
Paterson & Pas. G. & E. con. g. 5's. 1949	3,317,000	M & S						
Peop's Gas & C. Co. C. 1st g. 5's. 1904	2,100,000	M & N	107	July 13, '19				
2d gtd. g. 5's.....1904	2,500,000	J & D	104	Mar. 29, '01	104	104	1,000	
1st con. g. 5's.....1943	4,900,000	A & O	125	Mar. 11, '01	125	124½	11,000	
refunding g. 5's.....1947	2,500,000	M & S	106	Dec. 16, '98				
refunding registered.....		M & S						
Chic. Gas Lt & Coke 1st gtd g. 5's. 1937	10,000,000	J & J	108½	Feb. 20, '01				
Con. Gas Co. Chic. 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1936	4,346,000	J & D	107	Mar. 25, '01	107	106½	12,000	
Eq. Gas & Fuel, Chic. 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1905	2,000,000	J & J	118½	Mar. 2, '01	118½	118½	10,000	
Mutual Fuel Gas Co. 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1947	5,000,000	M & N	105	Mar. 29, '01	105	102	97,000	
Trenton Gas & Electric 1st g. 5's. 1949	1,500,000	M & S	109	Feb. 8, '01				
Utica Elec. L. & P. 1st s. f'd g. 5's. 1950	500,000	J & J						
Western Gas Co. col. tr. g. 5's. 1933	3,806,500	M & N	107½	Jan. 16, '01				
<b>TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CO. BONDS.</b>								
Commercial Cable Co. 1st g. 4's. 2397.								
registered.....	11,532,400	Q & J	102	Jan. 11, '01				
Total amount of lien, \$20,000,000.		Q & J	100½	Oct. 8, '19				
Erie Telegr. & Tel. col. tr. g s f'd 5's. 1928	3,906,000	J & J	109	Oct. 7, '99				
Metrop. Tel. & Tel. 1st s'k f'd g. 5's. 1918	2,000,000	M & N	103	Feb. 17, '99				
registered.....		M & N						
N. Y. & N. J. Tel. gen. g 5's. 1920	1,261,000	M & N	112	Nov. 27, '95				
Western Union col. tr. cur. 5's. 1938	8,502,000	J & J	114	Mar. 23, '01	115½	111½	110,000	
fundg & real estate g. 4's. 1950	10,000,000	M & N	108½	Mar. 30, '01	109½	108½	2,000	
Mutual Union Tel. s. fd. 5's.....1911	1,957,000	M & N	112½	Dec. 20, '19				
Northwestern Telegraph 7's.....1904	1,250,000	J & J						

## UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	YEAR 1901.		MARCH SALES.		
				High.	Low.	High.	Low.	Total.
United States con. 2's registered...1930		445,940,750	Q J	106¼	105¼	106¼	105¼	11,000
" con. 2's coupon...1930			Q J	106½	105¼	106½	106½	2,500
" con. 2's reg. small bonds...1930			Q J	105¾	105¾	.....	.....	.....
" con. 2's coupon small bds...1930			Q J	105¾	105¾	.....	.....	.....
" 3's registered...1908-18		99,912,940	Q F	111½	109¼	111½	110¾	104,500
" 3's coupon...1908-18			Q F	112	110	112	110¾	25,500
" 3's small bonds reg...1908-18			Q F	112	110	112	111	1,800
" 3's small bonds coupon...1908-18			Q F	114¼	113	113	113	6,000
" 4's registered...1907		270,359,350	J A J & O	115	113¾	115¼	114	25,500
" 4's coupon...1907			J A J & O	115	113¾	115¼	114	25,500
" 4's registered...1925			Q F	137½	137½	137½	137½	10,000
" 4's coupon...1925			Q F	138¼	137½	138¼	137½	51,000
" 5's registered...1904		22,938,400	Q F	111½	111½	111½	111½	6,500
" 5's coupon...1904			Q F	112¼	110¾	111½	111½	1,000
District of Columbia 3-65's...1924			F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" small bonds...1924			F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" registered...1924		14,224,100	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.								
Quebec 5's...1908		3,000,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
U. S. of Mexico External Gold Loan of 1890 sinking fund 5's			Q J	97¼	96½	97¼	97	7,500
Regular delivery in denominations of £100 and £200			.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Small bonds denominations of £20			.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Large bonds denominations of £500 and £1,000		£22,555,720	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

## BANKERS' OBITUARY RECORD.

**Bliss.**—Geo. T. Bliss, son of George Bliss, of the old firm of Morton, Bliss & Co., New York city, died March 24, aged fifty years. He was for a time connected with the London house and later with the American firm, where he remained until it was merged into the Morton Trust Co.

**Cheatham.**—John T. Cheatham, President of the Citizens' Bank, Warrensburg, Mo., died March 23, aged sixty-five years.

**Cornelius.**—Edward G. Cornelius, Second Vice-President of the Indiana Trust Co., Indianapolis, died March 1. He was born in Kentucky in 1833, but had resided in Indiana since childhood. For many years he was actively and successfully engaged in merchandising and manufacturing.

**Dumas.**—J. T. Dumas, for many years Vice-President of the First National Bank, Talladega, Ala., died March 6. He was born at Arlington, Ala., in 1847. He had been prominently connected with the cotton manufacturing industry.

**Eaton.**—Hon. J. H. Eaton, formerly mayor of Lawrence, Mass., and Treasurer of the Essex Savings Bank, died March 22, aged about seventy years.

**Getty.**—Addison Getty, Cashier of the First National Bank, Hoosick Falls, N. Y., died March 25, aged fifty-two years.

**Glazier.**—Geo. P. Glazier, one of the successful business men of Chelsea, Mich., and for twenty-five years Cashier of the Chelsea Savings Bank, died March 5.

**Gorham.**—Charles T. Gorham, one of the oldest and best-known residents in Michigan, and long identified with banking, died March 11, aged eighty-nine years. In 1840 he established a private bank at Marshall, Mich., and carried on business successfully for a quarter of a century, when the bank was incorporated as a National bank, and for thirty years Mr. Gorham was President. In 1870 he was appointed United States Minister to The Hague, and at the expiration of his term was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Interior.

**Gove.**—Hon. Wesley A. Gove, Vice-President of the First Ward National Bank, Boston, died March 13. Mr. Gove was born at Boston in 1840. He had been a member of both branches of the Legislature, besides holding other important positions.

**Holland.**—Gen. C. B. Holland, President of the Holland Banking Co., Springfield, Mo., died March 5, aged about eighty-five years. He was born in Tennessee in 1816, and had resided at Springfield, Mo., since 1841, and in 1875 opened a banking business there, having been

previously interested in cotton manufacturing and a director of the branch of the State Bank of Missouri. In 1836 he served as a non-commissioned officer in the war against the Seminole Indians in Florida, and when the Civil War broke out took an active part in organizing troops to support the Government. He was commissioned a brigadier general of the State military forces, and performed important services.

**Ives.**—Albert Ives, who in 1847 established a private bank in Detroit, Mich., died March 21, aged ninety-one.

**King.**—Judge Ziba King, President of the First National Bank, Arcadia, Fla., and Vice-President of the Exchange National Bank, of Tampa, Fla., died March 7, aged sixty-four. He had been a member of both branches of the Legislature.

**Leavitt.**—Samuel D. Leavitt, mayor of Eastport, Me., and President of the Eastport Savings Bank, and a director of the Frontier National Bank, of Eastport, died March 9, aged sixty-four. He was active in politics, and was wealthy.

**Marsh.**—William W. Marsh, President of the Union National Bank, of Omaha, Neb., and treasurer of the Omaha Street Railway Co., died April 2 at Nassau, in the Bahama Islands, aged sixty-nine years.

**Merrill.**—Isaac H. Merrill, of the firm of Merrill & Co., Bangor, Me., died March 4. He was born July 17, 1846. For some time he was engaged in business in Chicago. About 1870 he located at Bangor and became associated with his father in the banking business. Upon the death of his father he formed a partnership with James H. Bowler, under the name of Bowler & Merrill. Mr. Bowler died in 1893 and the name of the firm was changed to Merrill & Co.

**Miller.**—Hon. Wm. Miller, President of the South Bend (Ind.) National Bank, died recently at the age of eighty. He had been connected with the bank for more than thirty years, and was greatly esteemed for his character and business capacity.

**Murphy.**—James Murphy, Cashier of the First National Bank, Eutaw, Ala., died March 19, aged twenty-nine years.

**Parke.**—Robert S. Parke, Cashier of the People's National Bank, Delta, Pa., died March 19, in his seventy-fifth year.

**Paton.**—John Paton, formerly a well-known banker of New York city, died at his home in London, March 30. He was born in Scotland in 1831, and early in life entered the employ of a firm of Liverpool merchants engaged in the American trade, and later became a clerk in the Bank of British North America in London. He afterward went to Kingston, Canada, as one of the agents of the bank.

In 1869 Mr. Paton was called to this city to assume the duties of the agency of the Bank of British North America, he being the first agent of the bank here. In this position he continued until the close of 1872, when, in company with Morris K. Jesup, he established the firm of M. K. Jesup, Paton & Co., the name of which was subsequently changed to Jesup, Paton & Co., and in 1884 to John Paton & Co., on account of the retirement of Mr. Jesup.

In 1892 Mr. Paton retired and became a special partner with Mr. Jesup in the firm of Cuyler, Morgan & Co., from which both gentlemen retired in 1899.

**Pondir.**—John Pondir, at one time a prominent Wall Street broker in New York city, died March 19, aged about eighty-one years.

**Ryan.**—Charles W. Ryan, Cashier of the Halifax (Pa.) National Bank, was shot and killed by a bank robber on March 14. Two men attempted to rob the bank, but although the Cashier was killed, the robbers were captured before they could secure any of the funds.

**Ryon.**—John W. Ryon, President of the Pennsylvania National Bank, Pottsville, Pa., died March 9, aged seventy-six years. From 1850 to 1853 he was district attorney for his county, and in 1878 was elected to Congress.

**Stetson.**—John D. Stetson, Vice-President of the American National Bank of Macon, Ga., and a prominent financier in the State, died March 18.

**Titus.**—Augustus C. Titus, President of the Island Savings Bank, Newport, R. I., formerly President of the National Exchange Bank, and identified with other business affairs of prominence, died March 11. He was a native of North Haverhill, N. H., but had resided at Newport for over thirty-five years.

**Towle.**—Edward E. Towle, Cashier of the First National Bank, Hammond, Ind., with which he had been connected since its establishment, died March 1.

**Williams.**—John R. Williams, President of the Southern Trust Company, Richmond, Va., and one of the principal owners of the Buckingham State Quarry Company, died March 21, aged about fifty-eight years.

**Wilmot.**—L. T. Wilmot, Vice-President of the First National Bank, Chardon, Ohio, died March 15, aged seventy-five years.

**Yznaga.**—Fernando Yznaga, who had been connected with the firm of H. B. Hollins & Co., New York city, for twenty years, died March 8, aged forty-eight years.



# THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE

*RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING and THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE Consolidated.*

---

FIFTY-FIFTH YEAR.

MAY, 1901.

VOLUME LXII, No. 5.

---

THE IMMENSE INCREASE IN THE EXPORT TRADE of the United States and the outlook for still greater exploitation of foreign markets for our products and manufactured goods, naturally attract attention to the best methods of conducting the banking business to which this developing trade gives rise. International banking has become of greater importance. This is now carried on by banks and banking firms in the country, through foreign banking institutions, and through branches established abroad by private banking firms. Private banking firms of New York city have attained great importance through their skill and experience in doing this kind of business. They have gradually grown into great prominence, because the field has been entirely unoccupied by any institution specially authorized by Congress or State authority to meet the demand. It has been a marked fact in the history of banking in the United States, that as business has demanded new facilities they have been furnished by private enterprise. When abuses grew up in banking the legislative function was appealed to by the people to regulate the business, and by degrees most of the banks in the country have been brought under the regulation of special laws. The legislation has, however, as a rule followed rather than preceded the development of the business.

Now it is said in various quarters that a great international institution should be authorized or chartered by Congress by which exporters can carry on their operations with greater facility and less expense. Such an institution would have branches in foreign countries and in the outlying territories of the United States, and be prepared to give the credits that are required to cheaply effect the export of products and manufactures.

It is hardly possible that a charter which shall contain the proper powers and restrictions could be drafted and intelligently acted upon by Congress, without a careful investigation of the whole subject.

Such an investigation is necessary to show that an institution of this kind would be an improvement on the present methods of doing the business. There have as yet been no complaints that our exporters are put to unnecessary expense in their foreign dealings. It is probable that the competition among the private banking firms and banks reduces the charges made to a minimum, and there have been no serious failures to show that greater security is required. Still, there can be little doubt that an ably conducted Congressional investigation of the foreign trade of the country and its methods would throw much light on the subject, and might make much clearer the reasons for the exportation and importation of gold periodically, as well as show whether much of this movement could not be done away with by the adoption of other methods. It is possible that it might be shown that an international bank, with branches abroad, would have a very beneficial effect on the regulation of exchanges. Hitherto those who have advocated such an institution have seemed to have been guided by the model of the Bank of England or the old Bank of the United States. The methods of doing international business have very much changed since the days when the Bank of the United States flourished, and the Bank of England has no monopoly of the business between Great Britain and other countries. It is possible that savings could be made in the regulation of foreign exchanges, not only in the United States but also in other countries, by the establishment of an institution for this especial purpose. From the large number of private firms and banks which now reap profit from this business, notwithstanding competition, it is probable that there is a possibility of effecting savings to the public by an international clearing-house in the same way as clearing-houses now effect savings in domestic exchange.

The objection to the establishment of an international bank, whenever of late years such an institution is proposed, arises from the fear that it would not be confined to the business for which it is ostensibly created but would be another competitor in the line of ordinary banking. Before anything is done by Congress, a very careful investigation of the whole subject of the foreign exchanges as now managed is absolutely necessary. Objections would undoubtedly arise from those who now do this business, and if there is no prospect of an improvement which would benefit and encourage the export trade of the country, the subject had better not be meddled with. Usually it is better for the trading public to let the bankers determine on needed improvements in banking machinery as necessity seems to call for them. It is time for the legal authorities to interfere when manifest abuses arise, or when the demand for revenue requires taxation to be imposed. There seems little likelihood that there will be any imposition of tax under the provisions of the Constitution forbidding export

duties, and there has been as yet no complaint of any undue advantage taken of the public by those who now furnish banking facilities for foreign trade.

---

FOREIGN LOANS IN THIS COUNTRY will probably take time to secure the standing of permanent investments. Although there is plenty of surplus capital here, yet there is in prosperous times abundant opportunity to invest it at home. The industrial development of the United States is now in a transition stage when there are large sums required to effect the changes, and when the improvements to be made promise large profits within short periods of time. There are few foreign countries where public credit is as great or greater than in this country. The credit of many of the States, cities and municipalities is much superior to that of most foreign States, and in many cases equal to that of the Federal Government. The legal status of domestic loans is well understood, as well as their taxable standing. There need be no surprises after investment as there was when an income tax was deducted from the interest on the British Exchequer bills purchased a month or two since in New York.

Before foreign loans will secure the same standing on our exchanges as domestic investments, the people generally must become more accustomed to them, so that they can be everywhere as freely used as collateral as are the domestic stocks and bonds. The formalities required in transferring foreign securities from hand to hand and the legal remedies for defects in observing these formalities must be understood. In many countries there is more red tape about this than Americans might at first take kindly to or are accustomed to here. At first this market may accept short-time securities more readily than the longer investments. The same disinclination to long risks may be observed in the history of the loans of the United States. In the early days it was more easy for the Government to borrow on Treasury notes running one, two and three years than it was on bonds running longer to maturity. Of course in funding operations long bonds were taken at a very early date but not when money was originally borrowed. The same thing was noticeable at the time of the Civil War. It was easier to float Treasury notes, certificates, 7-30 notes, etc., than it was to place the long bonds. When the funding of this floating debt became necessary then bonds were more freely taken. The great credit of the United States in floating the Spanish war loan was even greater than it appeared, in that long bonds were freely accepted, in the face of the uncertainty as to the length or the result of the war. Capitalists may be willing to loan money to a nation just going into a war the magnitude of which cannot be foreseen, if

they have the privilege of drawing out in a year or so. When the war has eventuated they may be willing to fund into longer securities.

It is rather novel to hear it stated that a foreign loan payable in dollars would be more readily accepted here than one payable in pounds sterling. Formerly the pound sterling was considered the most desirable basis of international loans. But this change of the statement is correct owing to the superior position of this country as a loaning nation. In loans of the British Government, the capitalists are offered the very cream of foreign securities. These will probably be taken without any special guaranty by financial institutions here. But when it comes to other foreign loans, the securities will probably have to be vouched for by some syndicate or institution here, through which sales can be effected and interest calculated and paid. It must also be remembered that the extensive investments in all kinds of foreign government securities, if it should ever become a habit here, would very much enlarge the work of the State Department, in persuading slow and poor governments to meet their liabilities. There would be frequent use of the navy to enforce demands. At least this has been the experience of England, France and Germany, whose citizens have gone extensively into foreign loans.

---

THE LAPSE OF THE HAY-PAUNCEFOTE TREATY has postponed the construction of an oceanic canal between the Atlantic and Pacific, but the delay will perhaps prove a blessing in disguise. The Nicaragua route has been pressed by its advocates with so much persistence and force that the public have been led to believe that there was some sort of implied obligation that if an inter-oceanic canal were constructed by the Government of the United States, this route was necessarily to be selected. In fact there seems to accompany the public sentiment in favor of the canal a similar sentiment that this route alone could be chosen, and it appears to be almost un-American to suggest that the Panama route might be better. The connection of the French with the Panama scheme, and that a foreign company might be benefited by the purchase of their existing rights, of course arouses the hostility of those who think Government favors should be dispensed at home.

No one as yet appears to know what are the real conclusions of the commission appointed to examine the comparative advantages and cost of the construction of the canal by the different routes. The report so far as given out appears to have favored the Nicaragua route. But it has been intimated, since the adjournment of Congress and the failure of the treaty, that strong arguments in favor of the Panama route may be deduced from the report of the commission.

when it is finally made to the President. In fact, it begins to look as if much of the indifference to the success of the treaty displayed in the Senate may have been due to the consciousness that there was no desire to commit the country irrevocably, as would have been the case if the treaty had been ratified, to the Nicaragua route. Part of the opposition to the treaty was perhaps the result of aversion on the part of railroad interests to the construction of any canal, but some of it was probably due to the consciousness that Nicaragua might prove to be the inferior route.

If a canal is to be constructed every one wants it to be a success. It has probably become apparent to many that if the canal should be constructed through Nicaragua, there would be a good outlook for the subsequent completion of the Panama canal, and that the superiority of the latter route for commerce generally would deprive the Nicaragua canal of much business and profit. On the other hand, were the United States to select the Panama route and finish that canal, it is probable that no Government or private company would ever undertake to utilize the Nicaragua route.

The failure of the treaty will give time for the information gathered by the Inter-Oceanic Canal Commission to be laid before the public. The people of the United States, while no doubt in favor of a canal, will not care to have this bias of public opinion to be used in favor of the scheme which is most difficult, least advantageous to commerce and most expensive. Which this is the full report of the commission will probably show.

---

THE INSURANCE OF BANK DEPOSITORS was proposed in a communication published in the last issue of the *MAGAZINE*, the plan being somewhat different from the ones usually suggested. Banks that are carefully managed feel reluctant to contribute to a safety fund for insuring depositors in banks that are recklessly managed.

The suggestions made in the April number of the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* by Mr. CHARLES T. RAYMOND appear to contemplate the formation of a mutual insurance company among the banks to guarantee the safety of deposits, a reserve fund to be provided by assessments on the banks in proportion to their capital. In support of the feasibility of his plan, Mr. RAYMOND cites the successful experience of mutual fire insurance companies. Although the conditions are essentially different in the case of banks, in some things the results would be similar. If banks are to assume responsibility for each other, they would be interested in seeing that every precaution was taken to insure safety, as the fire insurance companies do, and they would insist on careful inspection and management.

Whatever may be thought of the practicability of insuring bank depositors, any plan that would tend to improve the management of the banks, either by more frequent and thorough inspection or otherwise, is worth considering. In addition to the supervision by the State and Federal authorities, limited supervision and control are already exercised through clearing-house associations with manifestly beneficial results.

At first sight it would seem that the absolute prevention of bank failures is wholly desirable, but a careful examination of the subject may qualify this opinion. If only the weak and rotten banks failed, their extinction would be a cause for congratulation; and, besides, the occasional failures of banks has a tendency to make depositors more careful, as well as to increase the watchfulness of those who direct other institutions. But on the other hand the failure of a bank works serious injury to a business community, and not infrequently the failure of a weak concern causes a run on a really solvent bank and leads to its suspension.

If the banks of the country or of any State or district should decide to put in force a system of mutual insurance, they could devise some effective means of quietly forcing unsound institutions into liquidation.

The idea of insuring bank depositors has never commended itself to bankers generally, and it is usually regarded as chimerical. But it is probable that many of the inventions now in common use were similarly regarded a few years ago. It took the banks of New York a long time to find out that there was a better way to settle their balances than by lugging bags of coin around to each other, and it is not impossible that in the future some plan may be devised whereby the waste involved in the shipment and reshipment of gold between nations will be similarly obviated.

Proposals for taxing all banks to provide a safety fund to secure depositors are objectionable; but if the banks in any particular locality desire voluntarily to make contributions to a fund for this purpose, they certainly have a right to do so. Their experiment would be watched with much interest.

Good management is the best protection that depositors can have, and this is realized in Mr. RAYMOND's plan, which would undoubtedly operate in one direction to promote better banking, by securing rigid inspection from the insurance company. Would it, on the other hand, tend to make people careless in selecting banks as depositories, knowing that they were at least sure to get their money back anyway? And would this also in turn encourage reckless banking?

The conclusion of most people who have studied the question seems to be that the insurance of bank depositors is a matter that is not so

easy as appears at first sight; but that it is entirely impracticable has not been shown.

Mr. RAYMOND contemplates insuring depositors only, but it is interesting to note that the banks in Boston are agitating the matter of insuring stockholders also against loss by failures and assessments.

---

THE AMOUNT OF GOLD IN THE TREASURY has been steadily increasing, until in April it exceeded in amount not only any sum held at any previous date, but was also greater than any stock of gold held at any other reserve point in the world. The other chief reserves of gold are held by the State banks of France, England, Germany, Austria and Russia. That the great reserves which uphold not only the financial prosperity of each country, but international commerce as well, are practically in the hands of the ruling authorities shows how intensely the ideas of Government are absorbed in the problem of maintaining order and tranquillity by means of favorable monetary conditions. Notwithstanding the continuance of great military armaments in most civilized countries, it seems as if the time had arrived when the efforts of the soldier will henceforward be secondary to those of the financier. Formerly great kings and rulers accumulated in places of safe-keeping treasures, which they took from their people, and only expended them under circumstances of military necessity. These treasures, needed at all times to stimulate productive energies, were prevented from exercising their salutary influence in times of peace, and when their expenditure was forced only effected a very small proportion of the benefits they might have conferred. Poured out spasmodically and without method, they raised prices and unsettled all markets. Statesmen now see the necessity of cultivating the happiness and welfare of the masses of the people by giving the fullest scope to their industrial activity. The old adage that "Satan finds some mischief still for idle hands to do," has been exemplified on the largest scale by the experience of nations whose financial prosperity has been neglected by the governing powers. Tyranny and despotism have been credited with the suffering and bloodshed that have attended popular revolutions. Ignorance of financial principles has had far more to do with the failure of government than the despotic instincts of rulers.

The great majority of mankind would be perfectly contented were they furnished the occupation that secured them the means of living easily, whatever the form of their government. On the other hand, under governments based on forms recognized as free and popular, there is great danger of popular discontent, if financial conditions are suffered to become unfavorable. Even in this country, the success

of a party or administration consists in its ability to direct the financial conditions so as to prevent the recurrence of financial distrust and the consequent industrial idleness. That this has been a department of politics too much neglected in the past, will be readily conceded. On all hands the administrators of the civilized powers are recognizing that their lease of power depends upon keeping the wheels of productive industrial forces moving easily in all their parts. They must do this or sooner or later give way to other administrators who can be more successful.

These great reserves of gold held by the Treasury of the United States and by the banks which represent the Treasuries of other great nations are the foundations on which rest the power by which governments are potentially able to insure that their subjects may obtain the employment which will afford them a satisfactory livelihood. Questions may arise as to the comparative economy of these reserves, but of their general usefulness there can be no doubt.

There are signs that the present Administration at Washington watches the financial prognostics of the country with more solicitude and intelligence than any that has preceded it in our history. The President knows perhaps better than any of his predecessors not only that the prosperity of the people insures content with the Government, but further, that it is within the power of an Administration to direct and guide the forces which uncontrolled may either insure or overturn this prosperity. In selecting his minister of finance, the President showed not only the sagacity with which he has been accredited but an instinct as to the possibilities of government finance which amounts to genius. Many of the Secretaries of the Treasury have been men of ability and some have been trained financiers, but most of them have administered the finances of the Government without due recognition of their intimate interdependence, under our complex financial laws, with the ordinary business of the country. They have often sought to protect the Treasury, whatever happened to business interests, and have failed perhaps at times to keep in view the absolute identity of business and Government prosperity. The views of Mr. GAGE are wider, and he is just the man to advise the President as to all the prognostics of the financial and business horizon and to use the power of the Treasury to avert possible danger.

The recent warning sent out from Washington as to the possibility of the excessive absorption of capital in the craze for industrial combination indicates how attentively the signs of business progress are watched by the present Administration. Of course much may be said about the dangers of Treasury control. It seems, however, that Congress in its wisdom has for many years built up a system of financial laws, which with the design of affording safety to public money



and superior credit to the Government, must necessarily in its workings have serious effects upon ordinary business. These effects may be made either beneficent or otherwise, and an Administration in power has every motive to prevent them from being the latter.

Every one who remembers the shaking of Government credit by the diminution of the reserve in 1893, cannot fail to rejoice at the great increase in the stock of gold in the Treasury which has taken place under the present Secretary of the Treasury. Even if the investigations of Mr. MUHLEMAN have reduced the estimated stock of gold in the hands of the people from \$274,000,000 to about \$140,000,000, wiping out \$130,000,000 of what the lamented JAMES FISK would call phantom gold, yet with over half a billion of gold in the Treasury, and nearly as much more in the hands of the people and the banks, there is little danger that exports of gold will in the future arouse the apprehensions they have in the past. Neither is this gold in the Treasury out of circulation; a large part of it is represented by gold certificates which are constantly performing the very important duty of the settlement of the exchanges.

---

THE EXTENSION OF THE AMERICAN CURRENCY SYSTEM to the Philippine Islands would seem to be one of the possibilities of the future. It is true that the people in these islands have been upon a silver basis, using Spanish and Mexican coins of that metal, but there would be but little expense in ordering a recoinage of the silver now in circulation in the islands into American subsidiary coin subject to the various regulations of the present law of the United States. The token character of this coinage and its redemption in gold would prevent its exportation and keep it in the islands. The foreign business would be done on a gold basis.

It seems to have been formerly supposed that trade in the East had to be carried on with silver, but the Japanese, who are in the very Orient itself, have found the gold standard necessary and advantageous for them.

The expense of the recoinage would be more than paid out of the gain given to the token coinage, an American half-dollar redeemable in gold being about equal in value to the silver in the Mexican dollar, although taking less than half as much silver.

The adoption of the gold standard would at once regulate and simplify all accounts and relieve the people of the annoyance of losses in the use of a money not conforming to the world's standard.

On the other hand, suggestions for the free coinage of silver in the Philippine Islands, under the auspices of the United States, savor of interested motives on the part of some combination or clique. It

would be impossible to restrict the effects of such a move to the islands. The coins minted under such a permission would be coins of the United States, and it would be hard to prevent their appearance in all parts to which its sovereignty extends. The experience with the trade dollars is not forgotten. These coins, minted for use in the Eastern trade, were soon found in circulation here at home, subjecting many to annoyance and loss. It would be the same with any special silver coinage intended for the Philippines. No one wants the silver question reopened, as it would be by such an obvious entering wedge as this plan would be. If free coinage of silver were permitted there, in the heart of countries where such large stocks of silver are known to be held, no one can tell what quantities would be sent to the mint. The plan would not even have the advantage of benefiting the home production of silver.

---

JAY COOKE, THE GREAT FINANCIER OF THE CIVIL WAR, although in retirement, still survives and is said to be writing his memoirs, which will be published after his demise.

The rapid march of events causes the public to forget the prominent men who retire from active life. Although still breathing the upper air, and no ghosts, they have, when their names happen to appear, all the effect of supernatural visitors. There is no more vivid illustration of the resurrection than the publication of the memoirs of a man who has borne a great part, at some interesting historical period, and has been intimately acquainted with his fellow actors on the stage, and who has survived many years in obscurity. The world is eager for the pure unbiassed opinion of a well-placed observer of his fellow men, who has outlived most of them long enough to be able to express himself without fear of libel suits and with no hope of reward and, perhaps, with the slightest flavor of that bitterness in which a forgotten man may be entitled to indulge himself. A financier, too, of all others, may have had glimpses of his contemporaries when the confidence of monetary transactions removed the mask of dignity and position. It is, however, said that memoirs, now-a-days, are not so frank as they once were, and that a new ROSSEAU is needed to set the pace, and make death-bed revelations more consonant with facts not altogether agreeable to established reputations.

JAY COOKE was at the height of his repute from the close of the war until the failure of his firm, in the financial crisis of 1873, caused by its becoming involved in the fortunes of the Northern Pacific Railway Company. He knew intimately CHASE, FESSENDEN and McCULLOCH, the three finance ministers of the Civil War, and was brought in contact with a host of celebrities of that period—statesmen, diplo-

mats and soldiers. He started in life as the member of a private banking firm in Philadelphia, and by degrees, as the demands of the war placed larger and larger loans on the market, he became practically the financial adviser of the Secretary of the Treasury. The Treasury ostensibly guided its finances without much regard to the banks of the country. In fact, Secretary CHASE, as may be seen from Mr. SPAULDING'S "Financial History of the War," was rather antagonistic to the banks which possessed the greatest influence and resources, and seemed to be extremely jealous lest they should have an opportunity to make money out of the necessities of the Government. His experiment in 1861 in borrowing \$150,000,000 from the associated banks of New York, Boston and Philadelphia was not satisfactory to him, and has been the subject of much controversy. Many financiers, among them the late GEORGE S. COE, have held that the war might have been financed through the banks and specie payments maintained if Mr. CHASE had had more confidence in the banking ideas and methods of that day. However, all the Secretary's early plans and recommendations to Congress savor of his desire to make the Government independent of the existing banks. The National banking system suggested or adopted by him, the old demand notes, the legal-tender proposition, seem to have arisen from this motive. The banks on their part recognized these plans as antagonistic to them and fought them as well as they were able. Mr. CHASE was driven to the least sound of these propositions, in order to secure a currency independent of State bank notes which would suffice to pay the armies and enable the vast loans he found necessary to be floated. He succeeded in making himself independent of the controlling banking interests of the day, but it seems that he could not after all make the Treasury independent of banking machinery and methods. It was the necessity he was under that apparently led to the gradual growth of the intimate relations between the firm of JAY COOKE & Co. and the United States Treasury until the firm became as much the accredited agent of the Government as the Bank of England ever was of the Government of Great Britain. There seems to have been no special authorization by Congress of this connection, and yet of the immense sums of money raised by loans during the Civil War JAY COOKE & Co. probably furnished over two-thirds. The first popular loan was engineered by Mr. COOKE, and it has even been said that he furnished the backbone and confidence as well as advice as to method which made the loan a success.

Of course the history of these transactions has never been written and perhaps Mr. COOKE will throw some light on them in his projected memoirs. Better than anyone else he knows the difficulties in which the great finance minister was involved, and can describe his

doubts and hesitations, his gloom under the terrible burdens, his growing hopes as ways and means of using the financial centers and post offices to distribute the popular loan were devised, and his satisfaction when success crowned the effort of his confidential agent.

After the promotion of CHASE to the supreme bench, Mr. COOKE held similar relations with Mr. FESSENDEN and Mr. McCULLOCH, and was evidently the right-hand man of each in succession. There is no doubt that he was the ROBERT MORRIS of the Civil War, and that he instructed the financial ministers of that period in the one point in which they, with perhaps the exception of McCULLOCH, seemed to lack experience, the great power and utility of banking machinery in the distribution of great loans. It may well be surmised that he was of as much use to McCULLOCH as he was to the others. The fault of the latter was superabundance of caution, and if he had not had an active and enterprising agent, tried and accredited by his predecessors, possibly he would not have ventured to have gone as far as he did. Mr. COOKE was also largely employed by BOUTWELL, who succeeded McCULLOCH.

If in his memoirs Mr. COOKE should make claims for shaping the financial policy of the Civil War and the settlement of the floating loans that may to some extent seem to dim the laurels of the three ministers who employed him, such claims would not be distrusted by those who have carefully noted the extant history of that period, and who have conversed with many who were cotemporaries of the events. All three, CHASE, FESSENDEN and McCULLOCH, were older men, who had passed the period of life assigned to enterprise. JAY COOKE was born in 1821, and was about forty years old. CHASE and FESSENDEN were politicians by trade, and McCULLOCH was what would to-day be considered a successful country banker. Mr. COOKE furnished the experience and qualities which it was not strange they, in a measure, lacked.

It may suggest itself that we should not criticize the bridge that carried us over. But it is necessary to the eventual truth of history that the component parts of that bridge should be curiously examined.

The failure of JAY COOKE & Co., in 1873, was due to the difficulty of rendering the Northern Pacific road profitable at that time. The crash was great and started the famous panic of 1873. There was no great syndicate of bankers to step in and save JAY COOKE, as the Barings were saved in 1890. Yet the securities of the Northern Pacific with such support would probably have paid out better and in shorter time than the Argentine securities that overloaded the Barings. To-day the stock of the Northern Pacific is substantially at par, showing that JAY COOKE's judgment was only wrong as to

the time and means required. After his failure he worked energetically to pay the creditors of the firm, and those who waited secured settlement in full. Of course his name will never appear very bright to those who lost by delay and by investments in Northern Pacific.

Mr. COOKE is only eighty years old and he may live for some years yet. His memoirs when published may revive and perpetuate his fame.

---

THE GROWTH OF THE NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM during the last decade is of interest in showing the tendency in the gradual reduction of the percentage of capital to the deposits and to the aggregate resources of the banks. The more wealthy a country becomes and the more developed its resources, the less the capital required to inspire the confidence of depositors.

As has been hitherto pointed out, the examination of the returns of banks which were in business in the first half of the century shows that the capital employed, contributed by the stockholders, was usually much greater than the money contributed to the business in the form of deposits. Of course some allowance has to be made for the different banking methods prevailing at different periods. Capital was in the early part of the century often fictitious, that is, represented by stock notes which were often made good by issues of circulating notes based on the credit of the bank. But even the banks whose capital was undoubtedly paid in had difficulty in securing lines of deposits in proportion to their capital, as the deposits of modern banks, both State and National, are proportionate to their capital. In the case of modern Savings banks, we have in many cases the phenomenon of the public making deposits with institutions that do not have any capital at all, thus realizing the bankers' ideal of doing business entirely upon the capital of their customers. Probably, in the case of many of the older banks in the United States, the stockholders have long since drawn out in dividends all of the capital they originally contributed, and the stock now standing on the books represents profits just as much as the properly named surplus. This is the condition to which any well-managed bank attains in time.

The capital of the National banks reached its maximum in 1893, when it was \$688,642,876, a little over thirty-nine per cent. of deposits. In March of the present year it was \$634,696,505, a little over twenty-three per cent. Of course the surplus and profits which also afford security to depositors must not be forgotten. In 1893 the capital and surplus of the banks taken together were \$1,027,188,789, being about sixty per cent. of deposits. In March of the present year the capital and surplus of the National banks were \$1,034,155,690, or a little over thirty-three per cent. of deposits.

The credit of the banks with their depositors, as far as it is indicated by the necessity of furnishing security in the form of capital contributed by stockholders, has very nearly doubled. All this has happened in the face of demands that are from time to time made for more security for depositors. The confidence thus increasing is a proof of the general feasibility of issuing circulation on the credit of the banks without the deposit of special security. The great competition in the banking business has had its effect in reducing the proportion of capital. Nevertheless, as long as the system of free banking prevails in the United States, it would not do to relax the provisions for the payment of capital in the organization of new banks, but in the future the old established banks will come by degrees to have a great advantage over those newly started, and this as new banking territory becomes scarcer will tend to repress the organization of new institutions.

Of course the great gain of last year in the number of National banks, the greatest in any year since the inauguration of the system, was due to the advantages granted by the new financial law. Many of these new National banks formerly did business under the State bank systems and the gain of the National banks merely represents a change from one system to another. The granting of the privilege of circulation based on general credit would in the same way bring about a further increase in the number of National banks, and if the privilege was sufficiently liberal it would probably bring the greater part of the banking capital of the country under the provisions of the National laws.

The stockholders of the banks are not the only ones who will be benefited by the increase in banking credit. As profits increase from the increased proportion of deposits, the ability of the banks to pay interest on balances grows greater. The tendency to add to the deposit line by paying interest, although deplored by many bankers, arises from the greater power of the old-established banks, and in time will make the depositors as much sharers in the profits of the banking business as are the stockholders.

---

THE INVESTIGATION IN REGARD TO THE STOCK OF GOLD conducted by Mr. MUHLEMAN, under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, to discover if possible the errors in the amount of gold estimated in the Treasury statements to be in the hands of the people outside of the Treasury and the banks, is a very interesting one, and while the results arrived at are not positively conclusive, they certainly afford a sufficient reason for the labor and ingenuity expended in these researches.

Soon after the close of the war, when the resumption of specie payments was an object devoutly wished for, Dr. LINDERMAN, then Director of the Mint, made an estimate of the specie in the United States, which, as the Doctor was an authority on such matters, has always been accepted as the basis of the further calculations that were annually made by the Treasury officials. The results were the statements of the gold in the country, seen and unseen, appearing in the Treasury reports. Of the total sum said to be in the country at any given time, much could be actually placed. The Treasury held a certain amount, and the banks reported that they held another sum, but beyond these sums, there was said to be about \$274,000,000 in the hands of the people, that is they had it somewhere either in their pockets or hoarded away. This is a large sum.

Before gold and paper money were on a par there was perhaps a strong motive to keep the gold in hiding, although one would think that the premium it bore would have brought most of it out. There was always some mystery as to who had the gold. On the Pacific Coast, where gold was really circulated in known quantities, people were seen to have and to use gold in making payments. In the rest of the country, where a large share of this hidden gold was supposed to be, no one ever saw any of it paid out or used. It did not come into the banks. It did not turn up in the shape of hoards discovered when estates were distributed. If the same amount in any particular kind of paper money were in people's hands, it was sure to be seen or found; but this estimated gold was rarely if ever seen. So gradually a great doubt began to arise about this mysterious gold which appeared nowhere but in the Treasury statements. That it had no existence was asserted again and again. Yet it seemed hardly possible that so accurate a man as Dr. LINDERMAN could be mistaken. There was certainly reason in his original estimate, and even now Mr. MUHLEMAN does not find that this estimate was out of the way more than \$29,300,000. After taking into account all sources of error, it is now concluded that the \$274,000,000 should be reduced to about \$130,000,000—a little less than one-half. But even this is a large sum, and if it was in ordinary circulation, as money is usually handled by the people, it would seem that more gold would be seen than is the fact. There is not now much hoarding of money among the people. With the growth of Savings banks, all who have any surplus money are anxious to get interest for it. The very smallest estates administered on are in the form of Savings bank books where cash is involved.

In fact, even with the reduced amount of \$130,000,000, there is still a mystery about where this gold is, if it is really in existence. Probably the amount of each kind of money that is in circulation in

any community could be quite accurately determined by the amounts deposited in the local banks. If, for instance, the amount of bank notes or legal-tender notes or gold certificates paid into the local banks each day represented a percentage of the amount of that kind of money afloat in the community, then the amount of gold paid in each day ought to be somewhere about the same percentage of the gold afloat in the community. If no gold is paid into the banks it is a very fair reason for believing that there is no gold afloat. The Comptroller of the Currency could investigate this matter in this way, by asking the assistance of the National banks, to make a report of all forms of money paid in on a given day. Probably the character of the payments to the National banks would be an accurate indication of payments to all other banks. If it turned out that the payments of legal tenders, or bank bills or silver certificates showed a certain percentage of those estimated afloat in the country, then if gold was really afloat as now estimated (\$130,000,000) a percentage of it would also be paid into the banks. The result of such an investigation would either prove or disprove Mr. MUHLEMAN'S conclusion. If it were thus rendered very probable that there was no gold afloat, the conclusion would have to be reached that it never existed or has been lost in some unaccountable way.

Some interesting facts in regard to the per cent. of gold, silver and paper deposited in the National banks may be found in Knox's "History of Banking," pages 211-12.

---

THE SPECULATION IN WALL STREET in the closing days of April broke all previous records of trading on the New York Stock Exchange, and prices rose to a height that exceeded the roseate predictions of the most optimistic bulls. Everybody was anxious to buy, and price seemed to be a matter of secondary concern. It is not to be expected that this condition of the public mind will continue forever, and there is sure to come a time when nearly everybody will be as anxious to sell as they now are to buy, and a crash will follow. But no one can predict when this change of sentiment will occur. Business conditions are exceptionally good, and there are no political complications in sight, either foreign or domestic. It is unsafe to make predictions, however, either one way or the other. On a notable occasion, when an American seaman was engaging the enemy, he was asked to surrender. He replied that he had not yet begun to fight. Possibly the present boom movement is just beginning.

President MCKINLEY'S speeches to the people who greet him on his trans-continental tour voice the general feeling of confidence in the actual and solid prosperity of the country.



## THE GREAT ACTIVITY IN BUSINESS AND SPECULATION.

---

Business and speculation continue to be at top-notch figures in almost all lines, and there are beginning to be some evidences of apprehension of an impending financial revulsion. It is hardly to be expected that prices can go on steadily rising for an indefinite time or that business can continue to be uniformly prosperous; but there does not appear to be any disturbing factor in sight at present, unless the Chinese situation may have possibilities that can not be foreseen.

The opportunities afforded for investment in the stocks of consolidated industries have been largely availed of by the public, and apprehensions have found expression that so much money will be required in this way that the ordinary business of the country may suffer. The expectations of those who are making such investments have, it is feared, been raised to a point that threatens liability to disappointment.

The recurring pulses of prosperity and hopeful speculation, followed by subsequent depression, which have characterized the financial history of the United States, have tended to make conservative business men extremely watchful. In the midst of prosperity they are on the lookout for the first symptoms of the culmination of the way. In the midst of depression they watch with equal certainty for the rising of the tide. It is, however, to be hoped that as the lessons of experience are learned these fluctuations of business will become less violent, and be brought more under control, so that the alternations between dull and active times will be unaccompanied by any special disaster.

The tendency to combination of similar business interests, caused primarily by the desire to obviate the effects of competition, will also render the business world less liable to insane financial panic. No doubt human nature, always the same, led by the desire for gain, will always be apt to push profitable speculation to the danger point; but the markets at the great money centres of the world are now so dominated by the banking interests, and these interests are so consolidated, and managed with such watchfulness, that they can check the impulses of the public, whenever they seem to need control. The action of the Bank of England, taken in combination with its great clientage of joint-stock banks at the time of the Baring failure, saved the London market from the worst consequences of a threatened panic. If analogous action had been taken earlier, before speculation in Argentine securities had gone so far, there would probably have been no serious menace from that quarter.

Securities of every class must to-day be floated through the co-operation of the banks. The market price is determined to a great extent by the value as collateral for bank loans. If the eagerness of the public forces too high a quotation, the banks have it in their power to exercise their own judgment as to collateral value, and thus check the error in public opinion. In the United

States the force that is possessed by the banks in this direction is supplemented by that of the Treasury, which can by judicious action or inaction affect the quantity of money available. The warnings that are heard and the apprehensions expressed are manifestations that the conservative force is ready to be exercised.

While it is all very well to be on the lookout for danger signals, yet there does not seem in the present situation of the new securities offered anything that calls for any great apprehension. There never was a time when so many enterprises were being undertaken as now, but there is nothing to show that these enterprises are out of proportion to the demands of the country. The improvements and developments of the last decade are viewed in retrospect with pride and congratulation, and yet at every step in their undertaking and progress toward completion they were accompanied by the same doubts and apprehensions as accompany the enterprises on a larger scale now put on foot.

In an address before the London Institute of Bankers, published elsewhere in this issue of the *MAGAZINE*, the speaker referred to the great prosperity of the United States following the enactment of the new financial law. He remarked that the nations of Europe were already seriously alarmed at our growing power, but that what we are doing now would be insignificant compared with what would happen when the United States rises to the full measure of its strength and places the financial system on a thoroughly scientific basis throughout.

**FALLIBILITY OF FIGURES.**—It is a familiar maxim that figures can not lie; but the Editor of the "Russian Journal of Financial Statistics" does not seem to have much respect for the maxim. He points out that in estimating the loss in the production of coal on account of a recent strike in Austria, the estimates of two leading London publications went wide of the mark. One of them calculated that the quantity of coal that would have been brought out by some 60,000 miners in two months was a hundred thousand tons; another estimated the loss in production at 54,000,000 tons. The Russian Editor claims that the real product would have been 2,900,000 tons, and that the quantity was twenty-nine times greater than estimated by "The Economist," and nineteen times less than stated by the "Saturday Review."

Commenting on the unreliable nature of much of what passes for correct statistical information the Russian journal says:

"It is, alas, beyond question that the pretended sources of statistics are often enough bogs infested with batrachians; bogs whose deleterious emanations the public has good reason to shun. Instead of draining these bogs, some statisticians delight in them. Seated in the stagnant water, they pass their time in complimenting each other on their talents, their conscientiousness and infallibility."

**ILLEGAL BANK TAXES.**—Probably there are very few assessments of banking capital now made which are legal.—*The Nation* (New York).

This may be too sweeping; but it is no doubt true that the banks are paying more taxes than they should, and there is good ground for believing that in many cases unjust assessments could be successfully fought in the courts.

**MAKING LITERATURE PAY.**—Friend: Your son, I understand, has literary aspirations. Does he write for money?

Father (feelingly): All the time.—*Equitable Record*.

## THE WATERING OF STOCK.

---

“Watering of stock” is a phrase often used without much idea of its real meaning whenever corporations and combinations of capital are made the bugaboos of some political or social attack. The general idea is that the wily managers, by doubling the nominal value of the stock, create something out of nothing, which they transfer from the pockets of the public to their own.

If a concern starts with a capital, say, of \$100,000, and invests this in a certain money-earning plant, and the plant earns twelve per cent. on the \$100,000 where the going rate of interest is six per cent., then the stock will be quoted in the market at double its nominal value. If each share is nominally valued at \$100, it will really be worth \$200. No man who owns it will sell it for less, because he receives as much income on that share as he could get on any other \$200.

Suppose the going rate of interest is four per cent., the share mentioned would be worth \$300. What earthly difference does it make then whether the nominal value of the share is fixed at \$100 or \$200 or \$300, if the annual dividend warrants. It is the earning power of the corporation that determines the value of the stock.

On the other hand, it is said that a railroad, for instance, is capitalized at a certain sum, and that a new railroad with the same plant could be constructed for half that sum. This may be true, but the earning power of the existing road may be ample to pay the going rate of interest on the stock. If the new road were built, the two together in competition would earn no more and perhaps not so much as the one.

In regard to railroads, however, it is further said that while a road may be able to earn dividends on a certain amount of stock, it can only do so by charging prices greater than ought to be paid by the public for the service. If the stock were reduced to the actual cost of the plant, and the plant were only expected to produce a profit sufficient to pay the going rate of interest on that stock, then the charges to the public might be reduced.

It may be true that charges for freight and other transportation should be less, and that if they were less it would be a public benefit, but as long as the business is done by a private corporation, so long it will be conducted with a view to the greatest possible earnings that are compatible with freedom from competition. The struggle of a railroad manager is to reduce the expenses of transportation as much as possible, and to charge for the services as much as the public will bear. When the earning rate of the road is determined, this fairly determines the real value of the stock, and there seems to be no harm in making the nominal value and real value of the shares coincide as nearly as possible, although this may be called watering the stock.

It is also said that the increase in nominal value of the stock is a device used to benefit some stockholders at the expense of others, to evade taxation and to avoid legislative restrictions on the charges for transportation. But

there is nothing in the mere act of making stock conform to the earning power of the plant that warrants this conclusion.

No doubt men who have secured control of railroads have often yielded to the temptation to enrich themselves at the expense of their fellow incorporators, of the public and of the State. They have evaded and deceived, but they could have done the same things in other ways. A strict investigation into the real earning power of the plant would always give an exact basis for taxation. A strict inquiry into the legality of stock increase would always prevent the deception of stockholders.

The trouble has been that there has been a laxness on the part of legislation and the enforcement of law, growing out of a want of adequate knowledge of the real earning capacity of railroads. If from the first all corporations, including railroads, had been held to as rigid a system of accountability to the State as has been enforced for many years in regard to banks and a few other corporations, the abuses complained of would have been prevented or very much reduced.

It must be remembered that railroad corporations have all come into existence within the last half-century. Banking corporations had in this country over fifty years the start of them. During the first fifty years of banking experience in the United States, considering the magnitude of the capital involved, there were as many abuses in banking operations, including the plunder of stockholders, of depositors, of the general public and of the State, as in the case of the railroads during the last fifty years. It took half a century to bring banks into order, and the experience with banks points to a similar eventual disposition of railroad difficulties. The suggestion that the State should own the banks was early made, just as it is now made in regard to railroads. Experience has shown that this was no true solution of bank difficulties, and it is safe to conclude that it will be no solution of the proper control of the management of the more complicated corporations.

It is a mistake to suppose that what is called the watering of stock is the parent of railroad abuses. The root of these abuses has been error of judgment in the selection of routes and the construction of roads. The evident benefit of railroad communication to a developed community often led to construction in advance of such development, with consequent loss to all concerned. As a bank would not pay in a place where there was no accumulated wealth, so a railroad will not pay where there is nothing to be transported. For a road to pay from the start there must be a proper adjustment of resources, both developed and undeveloped, upon which the enlivening power of transportation can act.

In the construction of the electric trolley roads which are now attracting so much enterprise, the whole operation can be seen on a scale that can be easily comprehended by the ordinary observer. A well settled and prosperous rural section lying between growing towns or cities is selected. The ordinary roads of this country are filled with the teams and carriages of the inhabitants who are in constant business communication with these towns. A company is formed who divide the nominal stock of the corporation among themselves. They contribute enough on their stock to pay for surveys and to secure right of way. The right of way is as a rule obtained for nothing. With this and statistics as to the wealth and value of the section of the country traversed and estimates of travel, it is not difficult to bond the road for

enough to insure its construction. From the very start the road pays the interest on the debt and generally interest on the stock. The stock goes to par or above, and is in fact almost a clear profit to the incorporators. The success of one such company leads to the formation of others. The routes selected grow less and less desirable as more companies are formed. So far they have all paid, and there is in most every case a margin of increase of earning power over that calculated. The time will come, however, when routes will be selected in less thickly-settled sections, where the immediate earnings will be less and more will depend on future development. There will then occur the same difficulties in nursing the fortunes of electric roads as have been experienced with steam roads, although, perhaps, they will be better controlled and overcome. In the case of some of these roads already the earning power far exceeds the nominal value of the stock after paying the cost of construction.

---

**CHECK AND DEPOSIT SYSTEM IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.**—In an article on "The Deposit and Clearing-House System of Austria-Hungary" in the March number of "Sound Currency," Prof. Parker Willis, of Washington and Lee University, presents some interesting facts as to the rapidly growing use of deposits as a medium of exchange in Austria-Hungary. Taken as a whole, the development of the check and deposit system here has progressed much further than in Austria. The system in Austria, however, owing to the greater concentration, presents some aspects of this form of credit currency more clearly than they can be seen here. For example, the Austrian Postal Savings Bank, which is described at length by Prof. Willis, has a "check and clearing" service which operates through the various post offices of the country. The depositors in this branch of the Bank are enabled to carry on a great many transactions through its agency alone. It is as if a person at Rochester, N. Y., having occasion to pay a sum to another person in Nashville, Tenn., could do so by merely turning in a check for the amount at the Rochester post office—the central post office promptly placing the sum to the credit of the proper party at Nashville, and sending each party an appropriate notice of the transaction, accompanied by a statement of his account as it stands after the transaction is entered. Where both parties are depositors, the matter is thus settled without any transfer of money at all, since everything is done within a single institution instead of through a number of independent banks as would be done here.

---

**MR. GAGE'S STRONG-BOX.**—Elsewhere in this issue of the MAGAZINE will be found an interesting discussion of the new currency law by the members of the London Institute of Bankers. In referring to the practice of the United States Treasury in locking up money, one of the speakers said :

"The United States are, at present, in—I use the word with all respect—a semi-barbaric condition in having a Secretary of the Treasury sitting on enormous boxes of coin as our Chancellor of the Exchequer used to do in the Middle Ages."

This is an apt description of the antiquated law that compels the Secretary of the Treasury to take money from the channels of business where it is needed and lock it up in the Government vaults where it serves no purpose whatever except to illustrate our folly to the world. Mr. Gage would, of course, quickly unlock his strong-box if his hands were not tied by the law. The banks can not put this hoarded money in circulation, because in order to receive Government deposits they have to invest more money in bonds than they get back as deposits.

In refusing to place any confidence in banks because they sometimes fail the Government is about as wise as the person who would refuse to travel on a railway train because accidents sometimes happen.

## THE TREASURY BOND PURCHASES.

---

The purchase of United States bonds on Government account at a time when the loan market was in a comparatively easy condition, is a further evidence of the intention of the Secretary that ample precautions shall be taken in order to avoid in time the worst effects of the tendency to accumulate surplus in the Treasury. On previous occasions bond purchases were resorted to only as a sort of emergency remedy when the market had reached the last verge of endurance on account of scarcity of money.

No doubt the Treasury might, by waiting until prices had been squeezed down to the lowest point, secure somewhat better terms for itself. This attitude of seeking its own interests at the expense of the public's savored too much of the Shylock, and was not only unbecoming and unwise in a government, charged with the welfare of the monetary interests, but is a policy abandoned by enlightened private capitalists.

There is no reason why the Government should not buy its own securities whenever it can secure the same advantages in the market as any other investor, that is when the interest saved by the purchase is the same that would be realized by the ordinary investor.

The Government is forced by the sub-Treasury law to withdraw large sums of money from circulation, and the study of the Treasury should be to take such a course as will return this money to the channels of trade with the least disturbance. It is better to anticipate and prevent large accumulations of surplus by early purchases than to let the market be driven to the last verge of endurance before applying this remedy.

The practice of purchasing the public debt in anticipation of its date of maturity originated very early in the history of the Treasury. Commissioners of the sinking fund were authorized in the act refunding the Revolutionary debt. The sinking fund was at first regarded by many as a mysterious machine for the automatic payment of national debts. The reason of its immense influence in improving public credit seems to have been that previously there was little provision made for the payment of government loans. Engagements were very badly kept, and even the payment of interest was uncertain. The sinking fund was a guarantee that the principal of a public loan would either be paid at a fixed date or that it would be bought in as soon as the revenues of the State permitted. It indicated the revival of the debt-paying conscience of governments.

The first commissioners of the sinking fund in the United States were authorized to purchase the public debt in advance of maturity whenever its market value was par or less. As Government credit stood in the early part of the last century, they had frequent opportunities of so doing. A similar provision now would render any purchases practically impossible. But perhaps the fixing of a limit at which the Treasury should begin to purchase bonds, with due regard to the realized rate of interest and the surplus on hand, would not be a bad thing. The matter is now left to the discretion of

the head of the Treasury Department. With some Secretaries this discretion might not be exercised in accordance with the most approved financial principles. It might even be availed of to assist the schemes of favorites. If a limit at which bonds might be offered for redemption by the public were fixed, it would probably act as a stay to the market when it began to suffer from the piling up of the surplus in the Treasury. The elements of the limit should be the amount of Treasury accumulation, and the realized rate of interest on long Government bonds to the investor. Of course the market may become stringent from other causes than the excess of Government revenues, but when stringency is due to this cause a fixed limit for the redemption of bonds might afford automatic relief.

---

STATE CONTROL OF THE LIQUOR TRAFFIC.—Owing to the great abuses resulting from the liquor traffic in Russia, the Government has virtually taken control of the trade in distilled spirits. The "Journal of the Royal Statistical Society" (London) for March contains an interesting paper by M. Alexis Raffalovich, entitled "The State Monopoly of Spirits in Russia, and Its Influence on the Prosperity of the Population," in which the results of the assumption of the spirit monopoly by the State are summarized. One effect noted is the very large increase of deposits in the Savings banks, there being an increase of 53.3 per cent. in the number of Savings banks, 76.7 per cent. in the number of depositors and 70.5 per cent. in the amount of deposits in the four years since the adoption of the plan.

Summarizing his conclusions, M. Raffalovich says:

"It can be gathered from what has already been said as to the financial results of the monopoly on the deposits in the Savings banks and in the redemption payments, that the new measure has exercised a most favorable influence on the economic progress of the population, so far as this can be proved by the study of those statistics which, being the touchstone of the prosperity of the Russian population, were the most likely to be influenced by the introduction of the system of the Government sale of spirits. It has been ascertained that in all the provinces where the monopoly has been introduced a general improvement of the economic conditions of the population has been observed: whether this is to be attributed mainly to the introduction of the monopoly, or to any other circumstance, not discovered up to this time, may be a matter of opinion, but anyhow the fact remains that the prosperity of the population has much improved in those provinces where the monopoly has been introduced."

---

PAPER CURRENCY OF SIAM.—On September 21 next (the anniversary of the King's birthday), the Government of Siam will begin the issue of paper currency. The notes will be of the following denominations: Ticals, 5, 10, 20, 100 and 1,000, and, by a royal decree, will be declared legal tender throughout Siam, except at the office of issue. The value of the tical is about 29.4 cents.

The new currency will be of great assistance to trade in this country, as there is great confusion and loss under the prevailing system. At the present time the rupee is used in the north of Siam, and in the south the silver tical and the Mexican dollar. On account of the very slow means of communication, the trader is often at the mercy of the Chinese money changers, whose charges are sometimes exorbitant. Again, the advantage that paper currency will have over the heavy, bulky silver coins will be very great.

It is the intention of the Government at first to hold the notes against silver for purchase by anyone who wishes to use them. It is anticipated that the banks will be heavy purchasers. The present bank notes are not legal tender and often will not be accepted among the ignorant, even in the city of Bangkok. The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, the largest in the country, has already reached its limit of paper issue (\$10,000,000). After this, it must deposit with the Hongkong Government dollar for dollar on all further issues of notes. By the purchase of the Government notes for use, it will save all expense and trouble of issue and handling. The vaults of the local banks are filled to overflowing with silver coin and a safe outlet is sought. For a time the Government proposes to hold in reserve the entire value of all sales made, but as Siam's credit becomes established in other countries, a safe reserve will be held and the surplus invested in foreign securities.

The present treasury balance is about 12,000,000 ticals at home and £350,000 in Europe. Siam has no public debt.

## BANKING AND FINANCIAL NOTES.

---

### REVIEW OF THE WORLD'S MONETARY PROGRESS.

---

#### DECLINE IN THE TRADE OF GREAT BRITAIN.

Serious concern is manifested by "The Statist" (London) in its issue of April 13 in regard to the unsatisfactory state of the foreign trade of Great Britain. For the twelve months ending with March 31, 1901, the total excess of imports over exports was £187,000,000, which compares with £165,000,000 in 1899, with £131,000,000 in 1895, £93,000,000 in 1890 and £81,000,000 in 1887. Compared with 1890 the excess of imports over exports has more than doubled.

Commenting on the trade with the United States, "The Statist" says:

"In 1900 the value of our imports from the United States amounted to £138,700,000, while the value of their purchases of British goods was only £19,700,000. Thus our imports from exceeded our exports to the United States by no less than £119,000,000. And in the first quarter of 1901 the balance in favor of the States has still further increased. Our imports of articles specified in our returns for the three months to the end of March have been of the value of nearly £33,000,000, as against £26,000,000 in the corresponding three months of last year, an increase of nearly £7,000,000. On the other hand, the value of our exports to the United States of specified articles for the past three months has been only £2,923,000, as against £3,919,000 for the corresponding quarter of 1900, a decrease of nearly £1,000,000. Thus the balance of our imports from over our exports to the United States has during the past quarter increased nearly £8,000,000. Assuming that in the remaining nine months of the year the balance of our imports from the United States over our exports to that country are the same as for the corresponding nine months of last year, the excess of our imports from over our exports to that country for the current year would amount to the enormous sum of £127,000,000."

Should the high prices of railway and other securities cause the United States to refuse to pay back these obligations in liquidation of these large balances, "The Statist" is of the opinion that there may be a considerable demand upon London for gold in the coming autumn.

#### FINANCIAL CONDITIONS IN JAPAN.

It is reported that financial conditions in Japan continue to be unsatisfactory. Owing to the stimulus given to various enterprises by the Chinese indemnity and the foreign loans, there has been an increase in the expenditures of the population, and a large increase of imports. Living expenses are stated to have increased seventy per cent. in the last few years. Foreign capital appears to be reluctant to enter the Japanese market, and school and municipal bonds are in many cases rendered undesirable to foreigners because of the faulty regulations and conditions attending their issue.

The difficulties are aggravated by the fact that the banks (other than the Bank of Japan) have loaned largely on non-liquid securities and have a large part of their capital tied up in investments in merchandise, lands and bonds. Dealers in silk and cotton goods complain of the prevailing dullness.



Below we give the exports and imports of commodities and of coin and bullion at ten-year periods from 1869 to 1889, and annually from 1890 to 1899, according to the official reports:

*Japanese Exports and Imports of Commodities, Coin and Bullion, 1869, 1879, 1889 and Annually from 1890 to 1899.*

YEARS.	* COMMODITIES.		† SPECIE AND BULLION.	
	Exports.	Imports.	Exports.	Imports.
	Yen.	Yen.	Yen.	Yen.
1869.....	12,908,977	20,788,638	.....	.....
1879.....	28,175,770	32,963,002	12,778,868	8,134,808
1889.....	70,080,705	66,103,786	5,188,529	14,173,245
1890.....	56,603,506	61,728,580	13,773,531	1,200,607
1891.....	79,527,272	62,927,268	1,452,968	13,888,526
1892.....	91,102,753	71,326,079	9,720,758	22,883,756
1893.....	89,712,864	88,237,171	12,280,188	11,186,486
1894.....	113,246,086	117,481,955	34,379,111	26,783,652
1895.....	136,112,177	129,280,578	27,301,698	5,874,164
1896.....	117,842,760	171,674,474	11,596,888	39,142,208
1897.....	163,135,077	219,300,771	19,219,163	81,466,713
1898.....	165,753,752	277,502,156	86,987,480	42,563,781
1899.....	214,929,894	220,401,925	11,178,247	20,168,500

\* The values in these returns are represented in gold yen since the year 1896, in silver yen since the year 1888 to 1897, prior to which they comprise gold as well as silver yen.

† Statistics of specie and bullion exported or imported before the year 1871 are unprocurable.

#### FINANCIAL AFFAIRS IN URUGUAY.

It is reported that the internal and foreign debt of the Republic of Uruguay is being carefully provided for by the Government, and that funds have been scrupulously provided for the prompt liquidation of all the obligations of Uruguay as they fall due.

The Bank of the Republic, which is under the direction of the Government, is shown to be in a flourishing and prosperous condition. One of the most commendable features of this bank is the loaning of money in small amounts to stock growers, planters, and farmers, enabling persons engaged on a small scale in these important industries to profit by obtaining the necessary funds for the carrying on and marketing of their products. The operations of this bank, together with its branches, have had a stimulating and salutary effect upon the private banking institutions of the country and have increased the tendency to more generally facilitate the loaning of money to persons engaged in the industries in question.

The circulation of the Bank at the close of 1900 was \$5,034,426.

#### FOREIGN COMMERCE OF MEXICO FOR FIRST HALF OF FISCAL YEAR 1901.

For the first six months of the fiscal year 1901 the total foreign commerce of Mexico was as follows: Imports, \$32,159,248.68, gold; exports, \$77,469,-674.39, silver.

The valuation of the imports in silver, as given by the Bureau of Statistics of Mexico, is equivalent to \$65,067,118.76, thus making a difference of \$12,402,055.63, silver, in favor of the exports.

The imports during the six months show a gain of \$6,132,864.76, silver, over those of the same period of 1899-1900, while the exports indicate an increase of \$11,047,479.89, silver.

## \* MODERN BANKING METHODS.

*A NEW SERIES ON PRACTICAL BANKING—HELPFUL HINTS DERIVED FROM EXPERIENCE.*

The fact that banks are the custodians of large amounts of the people's money seems to make them liable to the attacks of all kinds of sharp, shrewd and unprincipled people, desirous of obtaining a portion of the money illegitimately. Of course there is the professional bank burglar, but in consequence of the great improvements in recent years in the structure of vaults and locks, he seems to have little occupation. Then there is the "hold-up" method, but this has become pretty precarious, and the banks subject to such visits, by protecting their officers with bullet-proof screens, make it comparatively difficult for the desperadoes to succeed. The professional forger and check-raiser next demand our attention, and here is something which has caused serious losses and is difficult to contend with. Individual cases of forgery of notes or checks sometimes occur among the officers or employees or customers of banks, but these seldom extend far, or are of very large amounts, and are soon discovered.

The most dangerous forger is the professional—the man or men who make a business of robbing by this method. I said "men" because the operation is generally performed by a gang of three who work together, each having his part to perform. One is called "the backer," a shrewd, sharp, businesslike man who plans the scheme and furnishes the necessary money; the next is called "the writer" who is expert as a penman and in the handling of certain necessary chemicals; and the next is "the presenter," and for this purpose is generally selected a bright, intelligent, gentlemanly appearing man with a pleasing manner and fluent tongue.

Drafts are obtained for small amounts, generally for even dollars, between the sums of ten and one hundred, most often between ten and thirty. These are skillfully altered or "raised" by the addition of the word "hundred" or "thousand" and of the necessary ciphers. Where the writing or figures of a draft are to be altered, the original is obliterated by the use of chemicals, and where sensitive paper is used the proper color is returned. Even where fine lines are made by the lithographer upon the draft as a protection against alteration and they become partially destroyed in the alteration, they are replaced by the expert penman in so skillful a manner as to almost defy detection. Even the punched-out holes, giving the amount, are most skillfully filled up by pieces of the same size, and by the use of paper pulp, the whole being afterwards ironed so as to completely obliterate the former punchings, and new punchings are made to correspond with the raised figures.

Forged letters of advice and letters of credit are easily manufactured.

Even where it becomes necessary to obtain the endorsement of a Cashier

\* Continued from the April number, page 534. This series of articles commenced in the MAGAZINE for August, 1896, page 249.

to a draft guaranteeing the endorsement of a payee, this is most skillfully forged. Where it becomes important for the "presenter" to make the acquaintance of officers of a bank, forged letters of introduction are easily made.

One of the gang will sometimes open an office in some town and put out a sign as though transacting a legitimate business; make the acquaintance of some business man, and through him get an introduction to a bank, ostensibly for the purpose of opening an account, and will apparently transact a legitimate business for a time, obtaining, if possible, the confidence of the bankers until finally the scheme is worked, and the bank is the loser and the bird has flown.

I have told something of the methods of these fellows for the purpose of putting those of the unwary on their guard, for no one can tell where these sharpers will strike, as they seldom work continuously but in sudden moves in different parts of the country, and the least suspecting ones are liable to be victims at any time.

To judge something of the extent to which forgeries have been carried on by professionals, it is learned that capitalized syndicates have engaged in it, and only a few years ago one of these gangs, it was estimated, victimized banks in different parts of the country to the amount of \$300,000 in three months.

One word regarding the signatures of bank officers. Some are made very oddly, but at the same time almost illegible. The most difficult signature to forge is the one written in a plain round hand.

A few precautionary rules it may be well to consider.

In the first place, eternal vigilance is the price of safety in cases of this kind.

If a stranger presents himself to the bank for the purpose of transacting any business, no matter how introduced, investigate him *thoroughly*.

For matters of identification place no value upon letters or papers of any kind, for it is unsafe to pay money on a check or draft without positive identification, or the certainty that the endorsements are correct.

Study human nature. There is no criminal, or man who is willing to knowingly connect himself with a criminal act, but what shows something in his face that will arouse the suspicion of a discerning man. There is always more or less lying connected with every criminal act, and a close student of character can detect this sooner or later, either upon the facial lines or in the eyes, or certainly something in his manner upon conversing with the party. Such a party can never bear close inquiry or cross-questioning on any subject.

Never compromise with a criminal, whether he be a defaulting officer or employee or an outsider. Such a course is sure to encourage others.

The protective committee of the American Bankers' Association has done very effective work in the breaking up of gangs of forgers. If every bank in the United States would become a member of this association, and thus exhibit to the public the metal card telling of their membership, it would have a deterrent effect upon forgers or check-raisers, for the banks would then form a continuous unbroken line working together, and calling to their aid the best legal talent and strongest detective force in the country.

The confession of a professional thief may not be out of place here: "If there were two banks standing close together, and one was a member of the Bankers' Association, the boys would tackle the one that was not a member first."

A. R. BARRETT.

(To be continued.)

## THE ONLY LOTTERY LOAN OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

---

When governments were still ignorant of the methods by which a solid and enduring credit may be built up, they were accustomed to resort to all sorts of questionable devices to secure money. These devices covered the brutal forced loan, or requisition, and the no less deadly appeal to the gambling instincts of the people by means of lotteries. The lottery loan was a sort of disguised lottery, in regard to which the consciences of statesmen and others satisfied themselves, because it was easy to make it appear that no one could draw a blank.

The lottery loan showed how the spirit of calculation in the minds of capitalists might be blinded by the spirit of gambling. Governments and private enterprises in need of money, but whose credit was such that a rate of six per cent. would be no inducement to lenders, by offering the same rate of interest by means of a lottery loan could secure cheerful and liberal responses. The ingenious deviser of the lottery loan, starting, say, with six per cent. as the amount of interest to be paid on the whole loan to date of maturity, would divide it into two parts, say four per cent. for regular interest and two per cent. to meet the prizes involved in the lottery feature. The separate bonds or debentures would bear four per cent. No one investing would lose the principal and four per cent. interest. A certain number of bonds were drawn at fixed periods for payment. Of these bonds certain ones, determined by lot, received prizes paid out of the reserved two per cent. The prizes in the earlier drawings were comparatively small, but became larger as the drawings progressed. The approach of a drawing naturally encouraged speculation in the bonds, which raised their prices as the last drawings with the larger prizes drew near, until the excitement culminated with the last drawing and redemption.

The lottery loan of the United States Government was engineered by two such distinguished statesmen as John Adams and Benjamin Franklin, and as may be surmised only under circumstances of the direst necessity. While it may be called a loan of the United States Government, yet the Government was not then working under its present Constitution, but under the old Articles of Confederation, and it was just after the close of the Revolutionary struggle, when the Government was in the depths of financial depression.

To illustrate the difficulty of securing money, it is said that an enterprising Holland banker, by the name of John de Neufville, who had been applied to by Dr. Franklin for a loan, offered to furnish all the money that might be needed on condition that the title to all the public lands in the country be made over to him. The magnitude of the ambition of this Dutch banker clearly defines him as the financier of his era. Franklin did not accept the proposition.

Robert Morris was the Superintendent of Finance in the United States, and John Adams and Benjamin Franklin were in charge of diplomatic and

financial affairs abroad. Morris met pressing bills at home by drawing on the Holland bankers who acted for the Colonies. In the latter part of 1783, he drew drafts for 1,250,000 guilders on these bankers, who only had on hand about one-third of the amount. The drafts were presented for acceptance in 1783, but did not come due till March and May, 1784. The bankers being out of funds and seeing no way of raising them, permitted the protest of the drafts. After consultation between Messrs. Adams, Franklin and the bankers, various expedients proving fruitless, it was at length decided to place a lottery loan on the market. Six and even seven per cent. had proved no temptation to the public. Other governments of better credit offered terms equally as good. But the offer to borrow 2,000,000 guilders at four per cent., and to issue 690,000 guilders in further debentures as a premium or bonus to those who were lucky enough to have their bonds draw the proposed prizes, was sufficient to induce the public to advance the money.

Mr. Adams thought that this plan involved enormous sacrifices, and that he would be blamed. He wrote that he was a "witness that American credit in Holland was dead, never to rise again, at least until the United States shall agree upon some plan of revenue and make it certain that principal and interest will be paid."

But things were not so bad as Mr. Adams thought. The lottery loan was a success, and as the event proved the whole cost amounted or was equivalent to an interest of only  $6\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., or less than the straight loan of seven per cent. which had been deemed impracticable. In fact, considering the necessity of the Colonies, their poor credit, the scarcity of money, the competition for loans in the same market of Russia, France and other well-settled nations, it is surprising that Adams and Franklin managed to save the honor of the United States even by this dubious method.

The lottery loan principle is now virtually abandoned by all well-settled governments. The principle is, however, retained to some extent in the issues and redemptions of bonds. Thus it is provided in the loan acts that the bonds first issued, that is bearing the earliest numbers, shall be redeemed last when a loan is called in. This gives the earlier issued bonds a somewhat longer period to maturity, and makes them, under certain circumstances, bear a higher premium, and in so far is a kind of bonus to the holders. The effect of this provision is noticeable in all refunding operations and causes promptitude in subscriptions when new loans are offered. As credit strengthens the length of a loan to maturity becomes of greater value to the borrower and of less advantage to the Government.

---

**TAX ON CALLS.**—On April 29 the United States Supreme Court decided that a "call," as the word is used in the Stock Exchange, is an agreement to sell, and, therefore, subject to taxation at the rate of two cents a hundred dollars under the War Revenue law.

The opinion said :

"Calls are not distributed as mere advertisements of what the owner of the property described therein is willing to do. They are sold, and in parting with them the vendor receives what to him is satisfactory consideration. Having parted for value received with that promise, it is a contract, binding on him, and such a contract is neither more nor less than an agreement to sell and deliver at the time named the property described in the instrument."

# BANKING LAW DEPARTMENT.

---

## IMPORTANT LEGAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST TO BANKERS.

---

All the latest decisions affecting bankers rendered by the United States Courts and State Court of last resort will be found in the MAGAZINE'S Law Department as early as obtainable.

Attention is also directed to the "Replies to Law and Banking Questions," included in this Department.

---

### NATIONAL BANKS—RECEIVING CORPORATE STOCK IN PAYMENT OF DEBT.

Supreme Court of North Dakota, October 18, 1900.

TOURTELOT vs. WHITHED.

A contract by the terms of which a National bank receives corporate stock of another corporation in payment of a debt owing to the bank by such other corporation is not *ultra vires* as to the bank when, at the time of making the contract, such corporation is financially embarrassed, and unable to meet its commercial obligations as they mature. Such contract is directly incidental to the proper exercise of the powers for which the bank was chartered.

---

This was an action by E. C. Tourtelot, Receiver of the Grand Forks National Bank, against H. L. Whithed, assignee of the North Dakota Milling Company, to compel the allowance and the *pro rata* payment by the assignee of alleged claims held by the bank against the milling company, aggregating \$14,000, and the accrued interest thereon. These claims were presented to the assignee, and were by him disallowed, except in the sum of \$2,985.83. This action of the assignee was sustained by the trial court and the plaintiff appealed.

BARTHOLOMEW, C. J. (omitting part of the opinion): The real point in controversy, as we conceive it, is this: Had the Grand Forks National Bank power to receive the stock of the milling company in payment of a pre-existing debt, the bank at the time honestly and reasonably supposing that it could realize the money owing to it more quickly and more certainly by that course than by attempting to enforce the original debt? And this is perhaps but another form for asking: Was the transaction named properly incident to the due prosecution of the banking business? The case of First National Bank of Charlotte vs. National Exchange Bank, 92 U. S. 122, is instructive. The point decided is thus stated by Mr. Chief Justice Waite: "The question presented for our consideration in this case is whether a National bank, organized under the National Banking Act, may in a fair and *bona fide* compromise of a contested claim against it, growing out of a legitimate banking transaction, pay a larger sum than would have been exacted in satisfaction of the demand, so as to obtain by the arrangement a transfer of certain stocks in railroad and other corporations, it being honestly believed at the time that by turning the stocks into money under more favorable circumstances than then existed, a loss, which would otherwise accrue from the transaction, might be averted or diminished." In the course of the opinion it is said:

"Dealing in stocks is not expressly prohibited, but such prohibition is

implied from the failure to grant the power. In the honest exercise of the power to compromise a doubtful debt owing to a bank, it can hardly be doubted that stocks may be accepted in payment and satisfaction, with a view to their subsequent sale or conversion into money so as to make good or reduce an anticipated loss. Such a transaction would not amount to a dealing in stocks. It was, in effect, so decided in *Fleckner vs. Bank* (8 Wheat. 351), where it was held that a prohibition against trading and dealing was nothing more than a prohibition against engaging in the ordinary business of buying and selling for profit, and did not include purchases resulting from ordinary banking transactions. For this reason among others the acceptance of an indorsed note in payment of a debt due was decided not to be 'dealing' in notes. Of course, all such transactions must be compromises in good faith, and not mere cloaks or devices to cover unauthorized practices."

In *Holmes & Griggs Mfg. Co. vs. Holmes & Wessell Metal Co.* (127 N. Y. 252), it is said: "It is doubtless true that a corporation can not purchase or deal in stocks of another corporation unless expressly authorized by law so to do;" citing cases. "It is equally true, however, that it may do whatever may be necessary in the exercise of its corporate franchise. The selling of property and the collection of debts are among the powers given; and hence it may take title to all kinds of property, even the stock of another company, in payment of a debt."

In *People vs. Chicago Gas Trust Co.* (130 Ill. 268) the court condemns the purchase by one gas company of the stock of another gas company, and places the ruling upon the specific ground that such purchase was not directly appropriate to the execution of the specific power granted. But the court in terms concedes the right of the purchasing company to receive such stock in payment of a debt. (See, further, *Ditch Co. vs. Zellerbach*, 37 Cal. 543; *Howe vs. Carpet Co.* 82 Mass. 493; *Ellerman vs. Stock Yards Co.* 49 N. J. Eq. 217; *Thomp. Corp.* § 5,719; *Mor. Priv. Corp.* §§ 648, 649, 700, 705.)

These authorities, we think, clearly establish the principle that any act done by a corporation which is directly incidental to the proper exercise of its franchises can not be *ultra vires*. The bank had the undoubted power to collect the debt owing to it, and in the exercise of that right it had the incidental power to exchange the debt for property from which it honestly and reasonably supposed it could more certainly realize the money. We have already held that the bank made the exchange for those reasons. The fact, if it be a fact, that the sequel showed such exchange to be disastrous to the bank could not affect the original power to make the exchange.

But we desire to place our ruling also upon another ground. We may concede that the contract of the bank to exchange the debt for the milling stock was *ultra vires*, and yet we can not reverse this judgment. We notice first that this contract has been fully consummated upon both sides. The stock has been delivered with intent therewith to pay the debt. The stock has been accepted, and the evidences of indebtedness delivered to the debtor, with intent thereby to extinguish the debt. It is an executed contract and one, as we shall see, wherein the law will leave the parties where it finds them. The authorities upon this subject are in confusion, and unless carefully analyzed may be deemed contradictory. The term *ultra vires* has been used without accurate discrimination. Certain contracts on the part of corporations may be prohibited by positive law, either statutory or com-

mon. Where such contracts are made by corporations they are of course unlawful. They are *mala prohibita* and void for the same reason that the prohibited contract of an individual would be void. Yet courts have termed them *ultra vires*, and have then proceeded to say that *ultra vires* contracts were void and might be disregarded at pleasure. More properly speaking *ultra vires* contracts of a corporation are such as do not in any manner serve the accomplishment of the purposes for which the corporation is chartered. They are contracts not positively forbidden but impliedly forbidden because not expressly or impliedly authorized. Mr. Zane, in his late and valuable work on "Banks and Banking," at page 61 *et seq.*, is inclined to draw the line just here and say that all so-called *ultra vires* contracts that are made in violation of positive law are void, while all *ultra vires* contracts that are in excess of granted powers are voidable merely, and voidable only prior to completed execution. We are not required to go so far in this case. Perhaps we are not prepared to go quite so far, but where a contract is *ultra vires*, not because the corporation may not make it under any circumstances, but by reason of the particular circumstances under which it is made, then it is never void, and the plea of *ultra vires* can not be made by either party after the contract has been executed by the other party. The case under consideration well illustrates our meaning. If the contract in question be *ultra vires* it is not because it is prohibited by positive law, or because it is a contract that the bank could not make under any circumstances. It is conceded that the bank might take the corporate stock as collateral security for a present loan, and in order to collect the loan it might sell the collateral and become the purchaser and legal owner thereof. It is also conceded that the bank might, in the language of counsel, "take such stock in compromise of a doubtful or contested claim where to do so would prevent a possible loss." If *ultra vires* it was because of the circumstances under which it was made, and as already stated the plea of *ultra vires* will not avail.

---

#### NATIONAL BANK—GUARANTY.

Supreme Court of North Carolina, March 26, 1901.

#### HUTCHINS vs. PLANTERS' NATIONAL BANK OF RICHMOND.

Where a National bank agrees by letter that a draft not to exceed a certain sum, drawn upon a designated person, in payment for merchandise to be shipped will be paid, and the person to whom such guaranty is given relies thereon, and ships the merchandise, the bank will be liable for the amount of the draft.

---

CLARK, J.: The defendant demurred on the ground that, "being a National bank, it had no power, under the National Banking Act creating it, to guaranty the debt sued upon." The judge sustained the demurrer and dismissed the action. The plaintiff's appeal presents only the correctness of that ruling for review.

The allegation in the complaint, which is admitted by the demurrer, is that the defendant by letter agreed that a draft drawn by plaintiff, not to exceed \$300, upon Chalkley & Co., for hides to be shipped them by plaintiff, should be paid, and that in consideration of that guaranty the plaintiff shipped the hides to Chalkley & Co., but "defendant failed and refused, to pay the draft as it had contracted and agreed to do, and the same was protested



for non-payment," etc. The National Banking Act contains no prohibition against such banks guarantying paper, but it is contended that the terms of the statute do not authorize a National bank to make a contract of guaranty.

In *People's Bank vs. Manufacturers' Nat. Bank* (101 U. S. 181, 183) it is said: "A guaranty is a less onerous and stringent contract than that created by indorsement. We see no reason to doubt that, under the circumstances of this case, it was competent for the defendant to give the guaranty here in question. It is to be presumed that the Vice-President had rightfully the power he assumed to exercise, and the defendant is estopped to deny it. Where one of two innocent parties must suffer by the wrongful act of a third, he who gave the power to do the wrong must bear the burden of the consequences."

In *Railroad Co. vs. McCarthy* (96 U. S. 258, 267) it is said: "The doctrine of *ultra vires*, when invoked for or against a corporation, should not be allowed to prevail where it would defeat the ends of justice or work a legal wrong," citing several cases. And in *State Board of Agriculture vs. Citizens' St. Ry. Co.* (47 Ind. 407): "Although there may be a defect of power in the corporation to make a contract, yet if a contract made by it is not in violation of its charter or of any statute prohibiting it, and the corporation has by its promise induced a party relying on the promise, and in execution of the contract, to expend money and perform his part thereof, the corporation is liable on the contract."

In *Oil Creek & A. R. R. Co. vs. Pennsylvania Transp. Co.* (83 Pa. 160): "Where a corporation has entered into a contract which has been fully executed on the other part, and nothing remains for it to do but to pay the consideration promised, it will not be allowed to set up the plea of *ultra vires*." To same support, 5 *Thomp. Corp.* § 6024, and cases there cited. "Even if a contract is *ultra vires*, yet if it is not illegal, the defendant is estopped from setting up that defense, as it would be a fraud on the plaintiff to allow this to be done; he having entered into the transaction relying upon said contract." (*Bushnell vs. Bank*, 10 Hun, 378; *Arms Co. vs. Barlow*, 63 N. Y. 62; *Wat. Corp.* 604.)

And, indeed, the authorities and the text-writers seem fairly uniform to this purport. The case strongly relied on to the contrary is *Bowen vs. Bank* (36 C. C. A. 553, 94 Fed. 925), but there the learned judge stresses the fact that in that case the plaintiff (unlike the present) "had notice that there were no funds in the bank to meet the checks, and that he knew that the contract was one of guaranty, pure and simple." It may be doubted if the latter case could be sustained on review, but it is very different from this. Here, if it be conceded that the guaranty was *ultra vires*, it was not expressly prohibited or illegal. The plaintiff acted on it, and, relying on it, he parted with his property and shipped the hides. The defendant is estopped, on both reason and precedent, to aver that it was not empowered to give the guaranty. It does not lie in the defendant's mouth to say that it had no authority to do what it did, after the plaintiff has shipped his hides, relying upon the defendant's promise that the draft should be paid. In the preface to the fourth edition of *Cook on Corporations* it is well said: "The doctrine of *ultra vires* is disappearing. The old theory that a corporate act beyond the express and implicit corporate powers was illegal and not enforceable, no matter whether actual injury had been done or not, has given way to the practical view that

the parties to a contract which has been wholly or partially executed will not be allowed to say it was *ultra vires* of the corporation."

The judgment sustaining the demurrer is reversed.

---

*NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW—ORDER PAYABLE OUT OF A PARTICULAR FUND.*

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, March 6, 1901.

NATIONAL SAVINGS BANK vs. CABLE, *et al.*

Under the Negotiable Instruments Law an order upon a Savings bank, directing it to pay to the order of the payee a specific sum, or what may be due upon the deposit book of the depositor, is not negotiable, and does not import a consideration.

---

This was an action by the National Savings Bank, of New Haven, to determine the title to a deposit. The defendant Cable interposed a counterclaim, claiming the deposit under an order in the following form :

"\$300. New Haven, Connecticut, August 16th, 1899. Treasurer National Savings Bank, New Haven: Pay Julius C. Cable, or order, three hundred dollars (\$300), or what may be due on my deposit book, No. E632. John D. Edwards. Witness: Sellman Zunder."

To this counterclaim the plaintiff demurred, and the demurrer was sustained.

TORRANCE, J. (omitting part of the opinion): The counterclaim also failed to show any consideration for the order or its acceptance. If the order had been negotiable, it might have been held to import a consideration, but it is not negotiable. It is payable out of a particular fund. It is to pay \$300, or what may be due on a specified book. The amount to be paid is made to depend upon the adequacy of a specified fund. Such an order is conditional, and so not negotiable (Neg. Inst. Law, §§ 1, 3, Pub. Acts 1897, c. 74).

---

*CHECK—PRESENTATION—WHEN PRESENTATION DISPENSED WITH.*

Supreme Court of Georgia, January 26, 1901.

HAYNES vs. WESLEY.

By the execution and delivery of an ordinary check the drawer contracts with the payee that the bank will pay to the latter or his order the amount designated on presentation. Being a simple contract in writing, the limitation prescribed by the statute in which suit may be brought for its enforcement is six years from the date of presentation, and refusal to pay, unless presentation is in law excused.

Ordinarily, the drawer is not bound until payment is demanded and refused, but presentation is not necessary when the drawer, at the time of its delivery, had no funds to his credit in the bank on which it was drawn. In that event the statute begins to run from the date of the check.

---

This was an action upon two checks for \$2,840, drawn by the defendant upon the Atlanta National Bank. One of the defenses was that action was barred by the statute of limitations.

LITTLE, J. (omitting part of the opinion): Treating the petition, then, as an action based on the checks, it is necessary to determine the nature of the undertaking between the drawer and payee, which is evidenced by the check, in order to determine the period of time within which the action must be instituted to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations. Civ. Code, § 3767, declares that all actions upon promissory notes, bills of exchange, or other simple contracts in writing, shall be brought within six years after the same become due and payable.

A check is said by Mr. Daniel, in the second volume of his work on Negotiable Instruments (section 1566), to be "a draft or order upon a bank or banking house, purporting to be drawn upon a deposit of funds for the payment, at all events, of a certain sum of money to a certain person therein named, or to him or his order, or to bearer, and payable instantly on demand."

Taking this definition to be a correct one, it will be found that the instruments sued on met all the requirements named. They were drawn on the Atlanta National Bank; were payable to the order of John A. Grant, executor; one specified the sum of \$2,800, the other \$40; and by their tenor they were payable at once.

It is said by Mr. Byles in his work on Bills (8th Ed., by Wood), bottom page 55, that "a check on a banker is, in legal effect, an inland bill of exchange." If it is, the period of limitation is fixed at six years; but, as a matter of law, there are several differences between a bill of exchange and a simple check, which are clearly pointed out by Mr. Justice Swayne in the case of *Bank vs. Bank* (10 Wall. 647), where he says: "Bank checks are not inland bills of exchange, but have many of the properties of such commercial paper. The chief points of difference are that a check is always drawn on a bank or banker. No days of grace are allowed. The drawer is not discharged by the laches of the holder in presentment for payment, unless he can show that he has sustained some injury by the default. It is not due until payment is demanded, and the statute of limitations runs only from that time. It is, by its face, the appropriation of so much money of the drawer in the hands of the drawee to the payment of an admitted liability of the drawer."

Judge Nisbet, in the case of *Daniels vs. Kyle* (1 Kelly, 305), said that checks partake somewhat of the nature of bills of exchange, but they also differ from them in several material particulars. But, if a check is not to be treated as a bill of exchange, it must not be understood that no contractual relations exist between the drawer and payee. It is agreed on all sides that the execution and delivery of such a paper assigns to the payee a specified amount represented as belonging to the drawer in the hands of the drawee, and it is really an undertaking that the bank or banker on whom it is drawn will, on demand, deliver to the payee the amount of money expressed. (*Daniel, Neg. Inst.* § 1646.)

It must, therefore, be ruled that a check on a bank, payable on demand, is a written contract coming within the contemplation of the statute, when "simple contracts in writing" are named, and that the period of limitation prescribed in which suit may be instituted on a check is six years. But the demurrer further avers that the petition sets out no cause of action, because it does not allege that the checks sued on have ever been presented for payment, and payment refused. To meet this demurrer, the plaintiff amended his petition, and alleged that no demand was made, because the defendant informed the petitioner and his predecessor that he had no funds in the hands of the drawee with which to pay the checks, and that there were no funds in the hands of the drawee at the time said checks were drawn belonging to the drawer, or to the credit of the drawer, out of which to pay the same.

The general rule that presentation of a check and payment demanded is necessary to bind the drawer is thus stated by Mr. Daniel (section 1646): "A simple check, which is unpaid, and has not been presented for payment, cannot be used as evidence of any indebtedness from the drawer to the payee;

\* \* \* and until demanded the drawer is not bound." There are, however, exceptions to this general rule, and, in order to bind the drawer at the instance of the payee, it is not always necessary that demand shall be made. The same author, in his treatise on Negotiable Instruments (section 1596), says: "There may, however, exist sufficient excuse on the part of the holder for delay or failure in making presentment or giving notice. Thus, if the drawer had no funds in the bank at the time of drawing the check, or subsequently withdrew them, he commits a fraud upon the payee, and can suffer no loss or damage from the holder's delay or failure in respect to presentment and notice. He is, therefore, liable without presentment or notice, and may be sued immediately"—for which he cites a great number of cases in note four on page 608. (See, also, Byles, Bills & N. \*20.) In the case of *Daniels vs. Kyle* (*supra*), Judge Nisbet said: "The drawer has no right to complain of the holder letting it remain in the hands of the drawee, and he has no right to complain of its not being presented for payment, unless, before presentment, the drawee has failed, or in some other way, by reason of the holder's failure to present, he has sustained injury." (See, also, *Patten vs. Newell*, 30 Ga. 271.)

---

*CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT—NECESSITY FOR DEMAND—STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.*

Supreme Court of South Dakota, November 21, 1900.

TOBIN vs. MCKINNEY.

A certificate of deposit, in the usual form, payable upon the return of the certificate when properly indorsed, cannot be sued upon until after demand of payment; and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until demand is made.

---

This was an action upon a certificate of deposit in the following form:

"No. 2,599. McKinney & Scougal, bankers. Yankton, Dakota, July 16, 1899. Certificate of deposit, not subject to check. \$500. Catherine Tobin has deposited in this bank five hundred dollars, payable to the order of herself in current funds on return of this certificate properly indorsed. With interest at six per cent. per annum if left six months. McKinney & Scougal."

CORSON, J. (omitting part of the opinion): The case, as we view it, presents two questions: (1) Was the action barred by the statute of limitations? (2) Did the plaintiff have such dealings with the partnership during its existence as to entitle her to personal notice of its dissolution, and in the absence of such notice enable her to maintain this action?

The first question is substantially disposed of by the decision in *Cornwall vs. McKinney* (12 S. D. 118). In that case this court held, in effect, that an action upon a certificate of deposit issued by a bank in the usual form cannot be maintained until payment of the same has been demanded, adopting the view of Mr. Daniel in his work on Negotiable Instruments. Upon the subject of the statute of limitations Mr. Daniel says: "The better opinion seems to us to be that the statute of limitations only begins to run when there is an actual demand of payment in due form, and that such demand must precede a suit." (Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1707a.)

There is a conflict in the authorities, but the rule as stated by Mr. Daniel is fully sustained by the courts of New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Maryland (*Munger vs. Bank*, 85 N. Y. 587; *Howell vs. Adams*, 68 N. Y. 314; *McGough vs. Jamison*, 107 Pa. St. 336; *Bellows Falls Bank vs. Rutland Co.*

Bank, 40 Vt. 377; *Institution vs. Weedon*, 18 Md. 320), and is, in our opinion, the better rule.

In *Howell vs. Adams (supra)* the Court of Appeals of New York uses the following language: "The defendant insists that the cause of action on the certificate issued in 1863 was barred by the statute of limitations. The action was commenced in 1871, and it is claimed that the right of action accrued immediately upon the issuing of the certificate without previous demand. This question has been settled by authority. (*Downes vs. Bank*, 6 Hill, 297; *Payne vs. Gardiner*, 29 N. Y. 146.)

We think it is in accordance with the general understanding of the commercial community that a bank is not liable to depositors except after a demand of payment. The fact that a certificate is given upon a deposit being made, payable on the return of the certificate, instead of leaving the deposit subject generally to check or draft, does not change the reason of the rule that the banker must be first called upon for payment before an action can be maintained."

As no right of action accrued upon this certificate of deposit before a demand, and the statute of limitations not commencing to run until demand is made, this action was not barred, as no demand was made until a short time prior to the commencement of the action.

---

**PAYMENT OF CHECK—FORGED INDORSEMENT—LIABILITY OF BANK.**

Supreme Court of Rhode Island, March 11, 1901.

**TOLMAN vs. AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK.**

Where one falsely impersonating another procures a check to be drawn to the order of such other person, and indorses it in the name of that person, such indorsement is a forgery; and if the drawee bank pay the check it can not charge the same against the account of the drawee.

This is the rule under the Negotiable Instruments Law.\*

---

**STINESS, C. J.:** The plaintiff sues to recover money paid out by the defendant, on his account, upon his check, under a forged indorsement. Louis Potter, representing himself to be Ernest A. Haskell, went to the plaintiff to get a loan of money, giving the residence and occupation of Haskell as his own. The plaintiff made inquiry, and finding that Haskell was employed, and was living as represented, he agreed to make the loan. Potter, under the name of Haskell, gave his note to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff gave him a check on the defendant payable to the order of Haskell, delivering it to Potter, supposing him to be Haskell. Potter indorsed Haskell's name on the back of the check, and gave it to A. R. Hines, who collected it from the bank. When the note given to the plaintiff became due,

---

\* The law provides that "when an instrument is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person, and such fact was known to the person making it so payable," it is payable to bearer. But the maker or drawer must know the payee to be fictitious, and actually intend to make the paper payable to a fictitious payee. Hence, if the maker or drawer supposes the payee to be an actually existing person (as, for instance, where he is induced by fraud to draw the instrument to the order of a fictitious person whom he supposes to exist), the instrument will not be payable to bearer, and no person can acquire the title thereto by delivery. And where the instrument is a check, or a bill or note payable at a bank, the bank cannot charge the same to the account of its customers, since the instrument is not in such case payable to bearer, and the indorsement is a forgery. (*Crawford's Negotiable Instruments Law*, 18-19).

the fraud was discovered. He thereupon notified the bank, and demanded a return of the amount paid on the check to the credit of his account. At the trial a verdict for the defendant was directed, and the plaintiff petitions for a new trial.

The question is whether the bank is liable for the payment which it made on this check. It is a fundamental rule of banking that, when a bank receives money to be checked out by a depositor, it is to be paid only as the depositor shall order. The bank assumes this duty in receiving the deposit. If, therefore, it pays out money otherwise than according to such order, it is liable to the depositor for the amount so paid. The bank thus assumes the responsibility of seeing that the money gets to the party authorized to receive it. Hence, if it pays money out on a forged signature, the depositor being free from blame or negligence, it must bear the loss. In this case the plaintiff directed the money to be paid to the order of Ernest A. Haskell. It was not so paid. He did not indorse the check. Potter forged his signature. Under these circumstances the plaintiff's right to recover seems to be plain.

But the defendant contends that the man who made the contract received the check; that it was intended for him; that the money went to him, and so there was no forgery, and the bank is not liable. It would seem that upon so plain a proposition the decisions should be unanimous; but it is not so. To say that the money was intended for the one who had committed the fraud is simply to say that the fraud was complete. It is a surprising doctrine that, if A can successfully personate B, he thereby escapes being guilty of forgery in signing B's name on a check of C's. Of course, C intended the money to go to him as an actual person, but only because he supposed that he was the person whom he represented himself to be. Can the imposition upon C justify A's personation and signature of B? If C had sent his check to B by A, and the latter had written B's indorsement thereon, no one would say that it was not forgery. How does it change the case when A gets the check by making C believe that he is B? In one case C sent it to B, and in the other he supposed that he handed it to B directly. In both cases it was intended for B.

The plaintiff's counsel has well said in this case that any decision to the effect that a bank is protected in paying a check to an impostor who has forged the payee's name on the check, upon the ground that it carries out the actual intent of the drawee, is based upon a manifest fallacy. Moreover, of what consequence is the intent of the drawer of the check, when the direction is to pay to the party named? He has the right to assume that the bank will pay to the party as directed. In this case the money was intended for Haskell, because his was the only name suggested. He had been looked up, and found to be responsible. It is a perversion of words to say that it was intended for Potter simply because he had fraudulently impersonated Haskell, and led the plaintiff to believe that he was Haskell. The plaintiff did not intend to let Potter have money. His check showed who was to have it, because it was made payable to Haskell. When, therefore, Potter fraudulently indorsed Haskell's name on the check, it was a typical case of forgery. It was a false signature, with intent to deceive.

The defendant relies on *Robertson vs. Coleman* (141 Mass. 231) where the suit was by a holder against the maker of a check. The payee had assumed the name of another, and obtained the check as the price for stolen property

sold by the defendants as auctioneers. The decision was for the plaintiff, and good ground is given for it in the opinion, in this: that the plaintiff was a *bona-fide* holder without notice, and that the defendants simply supposed the payee to be Charles Barney, of Swanzy, but not from any false representation made to them. Had the opinion stopped there, no case of fraud would have appeared. But the Court put these facts aside as immaterial, and then said: "This was the person intended by the defendants as the payee of the check, designated by the name he was called in the transaction, and his indorsement of it was the indorsement of the payee of the check by that name. The contract of the defendants was to pay the amount of the check to this person or his order, and he has ordered it paid to the plaintiff." No authorities are cited in the opinion, but the case has been cited as an authority since. (See *Bank vs. Shotwell*, 35 Kan. 360; *U. S. vs. National Exch. Bank* [C. C.] 45 Fed. 163; *Land Title & Trust Co. vs. Northwestern Nat. Bank* [Pa. Sup.] 46 Atl. 420; *First Nat. Bank vs. American Exch. Nat Bank*, 49 App. Div. 349.)

These cases lose sight of the distinction between real and fictitious persons. In the latter case there is nobody to inquire about; no one in fact misrepresented; no one in the mind of one party other than the person with whom he is dealing. In the case of a real person, however, one party, having him in mind, satisfies himself about the responsibility of such party, and supposes that he is dealing, not with the person who is in fact before him, but with the one whom he has in mind, and whom the one before him falsely personates. Thus in *Mead vs. Young*, 4 Term R. 28, it was held that, where a bill of exchange got into the hands of one of the same name as the payee, yet such person, knowing that he was not the person in whose favor it was drawn, was guilty of forgery in indorsing it. In *Robarts vs. Tucker*, 16 Q. B. 560, it was held that a banker could not debit his customer with the payment made to one who claimed through a forged indorsement made by the solicitor of the payee. That was not a case of misrepresentation of persons, but it is referred to in *Vagliano Bros. vs. Bank of England* (23 Q. B. Div. 243) as having settled the relations between bankers and customers for many years. This latter case came under the Bills of Exchange Act, and it was held that as the bill was not made to a fictitious or non-existing person, it could not be treated as a bill payable to bearer, and so defendants could not be protected in a payment under a false indorsement. Thus the law is settled in England.

In *Armstrong vs. Bank* (46 Ohio St. 512) it is held that, even where the payee is non-existing, the rule making such paper payable to bearer does not apply where the maker, supposing the payee to be a real person and intending payment to be made to such person, is induced by fraud so to draw it. In *Graves vs. Bank* (17 N. Y. 205) it was held to be forgery for one, not the payee of a bill, but bearing the same name, to indorse and transfer it knowing that he was not intended as the payee. The true rule is well stated in the headnotes of *Rogers vs. Ware* (2 Neb. 29) as follows: "If the bill run to a fictitious payee, it is as if drawn payable to bearer, and indorsement is not necessary. But if it be payable to some person known at the time to exist, and present to the mind of the drawer when he made it, as the party to whose order it was to be paid, the genuine indorsement of such payee is necessary. Nor is the case changed by the circumstance that the party who induced the drawer to make such bill defrauded him in so doing." *Rowe vs.*

Putnam (131 Mass. 281) is to the same effect, but is not referred to in *Robertson vs. Coleman* (141 Mass. 231).

The attention of counsel was called to the Negotiable Instruments Act (Pub. Laws 1899, c. 674, § 31), which is: "Where a signature is forged or made without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against a party thereto, can be acquired through or under such signature, unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up forgery or want of authority." The statute covers this case. We have referred to authorities because the defendant's counsel so earnestly and ably argued that the act did not alter the law merchant that it seemed proper to show that the law in this respect, outside of the act, is in a very unsatisfactory state, and that the act is right. We do not think that the act does alter the law as it was when, a few years ago, it seems to have been switched off on a fallacy in some places. One of the advantages of the act is in settling the question. Waiving the question of forgery, about which the cases we have cited differ, the signature in this case is clearly one "made without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be," and therefore it is "wholly inoperative." This being so, the defendant cannot justify its action under it, there being no evidence of any conduct by the plaintiff to mislead the defendant, and so to estop his present claim. As the case stood, the plaintiff had ordered money paid to Haskell. The bank had not so paid it. The fact that the plaintiff had been imposed upon did not relieve the bank from its duty to see that the money was paid according to order.

The case should have gone to the jury. New trial granted.

---

#### KNOWLEDGE OF DIRECTOR—WHEN NOT NOTICE TO BANK.

Supreme Court of Georgia, February 28, 1901.

ENGLISH-AMERICAN LOAN AND TRUST CO. vs. HIERS.

Notice or knowledge of failure of consideration of a negotiable promissory note, which the director of a bank sells to it before the maturity of the paper, is not imputable to the bank, when in the transaction the seller did not act for it, but exclusively for himself, and the bank was represented by another officer, who alone acted for it.

---

LEWIS, J. (omitting part of the opinion): One ground of the motion for a new trial is that the court erred in the following charge to the jury: "Assuming, as it is not denied, that Shedden is a director in this bank, if you find that Shedden took the note with knowledge of a defense that Dr. Hiers had—in other words, that he had repudiated the contract and refused to pay the note—whether he got the information from publications in the paper, or whether he got it from Bussey and Kraus or in any other way, if you find that he had that knowledge, I charge you that that knowledge of Shedden is imputable to the bank here."

This charge was error. In the first place, it was wholly unauthorized by the evidence. Apart from that, it plainly appears that Shedden, in the sale of the note, was not acting for the plaintiff bank, but apparently for himself individually; for he had acquired the note from the payee long before the sale to the bank was made. The fact that he was a director of the bank would not charge that institution with any knowledge which he might possess of a



defense to the note. His relation to the plaintiff did not prevent him from entering into the transaction in question. He traded directly with the Cashier of the bank, and it is not claimed that the latter had any knowledge of a defect in the note. The bank was not represented by Shedden in this transaction, but by Robinson, its Cashier, and the evidence is uncontradicted that neither Robinson nor any other employee of the plaintiff knew or had ever heard of any defense to the note before its maturity, which was some time after it was acquired by the bank.

The cases relied on by counsel for defendant in error have no application to the case at bar. For instance, in the case of *Brobston vs. Penniman*, 97 Ga. 527, 25 S. E. 350, which is cited with confidence, the ruling is as follows: "Where the President and Cashier of a bank, being also members of a partnership composed of themselves and another person, to the capital stock of which they had, under the partnership articles, agreed to contribute a given sum, without the knowledge or consent of that person, executed and delivered to the bank a promissory note in the name of the partnership for the purpose of raising the money they had so agreed to put into the partnership business, although the money obtained from the bank upon such note was in fact used for the purpose stated, the transaction was one for the private benefit alone of the two members of the partnership who thus raised the money. \* \* \* Under these circumstances, the knowledge of the President and Cashier \* \* \* was the knowledge of the bank itself."

In that case the officers whose knowledge was held to be imputable to the bank were the President and Cashier, whose special duty it was to represent the bank in negotiating loans and discounting paper. In the present case, Shedden, with whose knowledge it is sought to charge the bank, was merely a director, and so far as the record discloses had no active participation in the management of the bank's affairs.

Also, in the case of *Morris vs. Banking Co.* (109 Ga. 12), the officer whose knowledge of a defect in a note was held chargeable to the bank was the Cashier, who had "full authority and control of the discounts of the bank." No such connection between Shedden and the plaintiff bank is shown in the present case.

In the last case cited (on page 24, 109 Ga., page 382), Justice Little uses the following language, which we think is fully in point in the present case: "We concede it to be a sound proposition that where an officer or agent of the corporation, as a party in interest for himself, deals with the corporation, the latter is not charged with notice of the information possessed by such officer or agent so dealing." In the case of *Bank vs. Demere* (92 Ga. 735) it appeared that a third person borrowed money from a bank for the benefit of the Cashier thereof, the Cashier putting up collaterals belonging to himself, and the officers representing the bank in making the loan not being aware that the money was for the use of the Cashier, or that the collaterals belonged to him, and that they did not acquire this information until after the Cashier had fraudulently withdrawn the collaterals and applied them to his own use. It was held that the bank was not accountable for the value of the collaterals in settling its claim against the borrower, and that the agency of the Cashier to assign the assets of the bank of which he was the immediate custodian did not extend to assets held as collateral security for a loan made to another person for his benefit and secured, not by collaterals belonging to that per-

son, but furnished by the Cashier himself. The principle upon which this decision was based was that the Cashier was, as owner of the collaterals, an opposite party in interest to the bank, and his custody of this property for the bank involved a risk which it may not have been willing to assume. On page 739, 92 Ga., the following language is used in this connection: "Under such circumstances the Cashier's knowledge is not the knowledge of the bank, and his fraudulent transfer in its name but in his own behalf of property held in this manner is not the act of the bank. His agency as Cashier to assign its assets, of which he is the immediate custodian, does not cover an act of this kind." There is in the present case, if anything, less reason to hold the bank liable for the knowledge of its director than there was in the Demere case to hold that the act of the Cashier was not the act of the bank.

#### RECEIVING DEPOSIT WHEN BANK INSOLVENT—CRIMINAL LIABILITY.

Supreme Court of Minnesota, February 11, 1901.

STATE *vs.* CLEMENTS.

Under the provisions of chapter 219, General Laws, 1895, which makes it a felony for any one connected with a banking concern, either public or private, to receive deposits while such institution is insolvent, it is not material in what capacity the interested or guilty party is connected with the bank—whether as an ostensible partner, or as a secret conspirator with the actual operator of the same—provided any substantial aid is given by him tending to violate the statute in letter or spirit.

A formal dissolution of a banking firm cannot control the subsequent responsibility of the former partners if it is executed as a sham to relieve one of them, nor exonerate the retiring partner from full accountability for subsequent acts in an unlawful plan to receive deposits during the insolvency of the bank. In such a case the dissolution should be treated as an illegal and fraudulent device.

Evidence of a continual depletion of the resources of a bank partnership, continued for several years, is competent upon the question whether an unlawful scheme existed to wreck the concern in failure, and as showing a motive for a sham dissolution, whereby one of the partners could withdraw therefrom a portion of the funds.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

This was a criminal action against Joseph R. Clements for receiving deposits as a banker knowing the bank's insolvency. The points decided are stated in the official syllabus given above.

#### NATIONAL BANK—LOAN ON REAL ESTATE SECURITY—ENFORCING MORTGAGE.

Supreme Court of Nebraska, March 20, 1901.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF SUTTON *vs.* GROSSHAUS.

A party who has secured a loan from a National bank and given real estate security therefor, cannot be heard to deny the right of the bank to enforce the provisions of the mortgage because of the section of the United States statutes prohibiting the taking of real estate security for a loan negotiated by a National bank.

Where security on real estate has been taken by a National bank on a contemporaneous loan, the same may be enforced, notwithstanding the provisions of the United States statute prohibiting that character of security.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

This was an action by the First National Bank of Sutton, Nebraska, to foreclose a mortgage. Two of the points decided are stated in the official syllabus given above. The other points are not of interest here.

## MEETINGS OF DIRECTORS—PROOF BY PAROL.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin, March 19, 1901.

*In re* BANK OF WEST SUPERIOR, GOODWIN vs. NICHOLS.

Where a written record of the proceedings of the directors of a bank is kept it is the best evidence; but in the absence of such a record the proceedings may be proved by parol. In the absence of such a record the act of the directors in releasing a mortgage may be shown by the testimony of witnesses.

The question involved in this case was whether the Bank of West Superior, a corporation, had released a mortgage.

DODGE, J. (omitting part of the opinion): Objection is made that parol evidence was not admissible to prove the acts of the directors. Doubtless, if a written record was kept of their meeting and action, that would be the best evidence; but, if no record was kept, then parol evidence is as proper to prove the transaction as any other (*Zalesky vs. Insurance Co.* [Iowa] 70 N. W. 187; *Duluth, S. S. and A. R. Co. vs. Douglas Co.* 103 Wis. 75). It may be doubtful whether there is any presumption of the existence of any record of executive acts done by directors, such as negotiating and contracting directly with others, whatever may be the rule as to their procedure when convened as a board for deliberation and legislation as to corporate affairs. In the instant case, however, we may pass that question, for the witness Burhans testified that he did not think the action of the directors as to the Rice matter appeared on the records. This suffices, *prima facie*, to deny the existence of any record, when definite proof on the subject—the record books themselves—were in the control of the adverse party. If Mr. Burhans was mistaken, the defendant could easily have shown that fact, and, in the absence of such showing, cannot complain of admission of parol evidence.

## INSOLVENCY—COLLECTIONS—FOLLOWING TRUST FUNDS.

Supreme Court of Nebraska, January 23, 1901.

STATE vs. BANK OF COMMERCE OF GRAND ISLAND.

1. Money collected by a bank for another on notes or drafts, and retained, is held in trust for the owner, and does not become a part of the assets of the bank; and if the bank thereafter becomes insolvent, and a Receiver is appointed, the one for whom the collection is made is a preferred creditor.
2. Where trust funds are wrongfully converted, the beneficiary is entitled to the funds, or the proceeds thereof, so long as he can definitely trace them, until they reach the hands of an innocent holder.
3. Where trust money has been wrongfully commingled by a trustee with his own, and he makes payment from the common fund, it will be presumed that he paid out his own, and not trust money.
4. The claim of a beneficiary for trust money may be preferred, to the extent of the cash found among the assets of an insolvent trustee at the time of his failure, where it is not affirmatively shown that the cash assets are not part of the trust fund. Rule applied.
5. In a cause brought to this court on appeal, the rulings of the trial court on the admission of testimony cannot be reviewed.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

## ACTION AGAINST STOCKHOLDERS—RECEIVER—KANSAS STATUTE.

Court of Appeals of Kansas, Northern Department, C. D., October 27, 1900.

SIMS vs. BROWN.

Section 55, c. 47, Sess. Laws 1897, does not take away from the creditors of a bank the right to proceed against the stockholders to recover their debt due from the bank, but does impose a condition, in cases where a Receiver has been appointed, that they show to

the satisfaction of the court that the Receiver has not begun suit against the stockholders to enforce their liability.

A Receiver in such case cannot maintain a suit against such creditor for the sole purpose of enjoining him from prosecuting such suit against the stockholders.  
(Syllabus by the Court.)

This was a suit by Evan H. Brown, Receiver of the Citizens' Bank of Kansas City, against John T. Sims.

Brown as Receiver of the Citizens' Bank of Kansas City, sued Sims for an injunction to restrain him from prosecuting certain suits as a creditor of the bank against certain stockholders of the bank.

The point decided is stated in the official syllabus above given.

#### TAXATION OF BANKS—RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF DECISION.

Supreme Court of Mississippi, January 24, 1901.

ADAMS, STATE REVENUE AGENT, *vs.* BANK OF OXFORD.

The decision in *Adams vs. Bank* (75 Miss. 701) will not be given a retroactive effect so as to declare void the act of 1890, prohibiting cities and towns from levying any tax on banks larger than seventy-five per cent. of the State tax.

WELLS, *Special Judge*: This suit was brought by the State Revenue Agent, in the circuit court of Lafayette county, to recover certain balances of municipal taxes claimed to be due by the Bank of Oxford, for the years 1890 and 1891, to the city of Oxford. The Bank of Oxford paid municipal taxes in 1890 and 1891 to an amount equal to seventy-five per cent. of the State tax. It paid municipal taxes for those years in accordance with the provision of the act of the Legislature of 1890.

The effort in this case is to have the act of the Legislature of 1890 (Laws 1890, pp. 8, 9) declared to be in conflict with section 20, art. 12, of the Constitution of 1869, and therefore void.

In the case of *Adams vs. Bank* (75 Miss. 701), this court decided that a similar act of the Legislature, passed in 1894, was violative of section 112, Const. 1890, and was null and void. Counsel for appellant relies upon the opinion in that case; and we are asked to give the views therein expressed a retroactive effect, and to declare the act of the Legislature of 1890 void under the "equality and uniformity clause" of the Constitution of 1869.

We adhere to the decision of the court in the case of *Adams vs. Bank* (75 Miss. 701, 23 South, 395), believing it to be right upon principle and authority; but we decline to give it any retroactive effect, so as to make the views therein expressed apply to actions arising under laws which were passed prior to the adoption of section 112, Const. 1890.

The "uniformity and equality" clause of the Constitution of 1869 has been the subject of repeated judicial interpretation. In a line of decisions beginning with *Daily vs. Swope* (47 Miss. 367) including *Vassar vs. George* (Id. 713), *Mississippi Mills vs. Cook* (56 Miss. 40), *Bank vs. Worrell* (67 Miss. 47) and other cases, the court had gradually come to a judicial expression of the view that "the subjects of taxation may be classified at the discretion of the Legislature, and, if all of the same class are taxed alike, there is no violation of the equality and uniformity required by the Constitution."

The conclusion of the court announced in these cases was accepted and uniformly acted upon prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1890. It

was with the light of the judicial interpretation announced in these cases before it that the Constitutional convention of 1890 adopted section 112, which provides that property shall be assessed for taxes at its true value. Construing this in some respects new section of our organic law, this court, in the case of *Adams vs. Bank*, *supra*, declared that the act of the Legislature of 1894 was void ; but where, in matters of statutory construction, rights have been vested in transactions under the law, as settled by former decisions of this court, they will not be disturbed by departing from such decisions, except in case of clear necessity and positive conviction of error, or where the decisions contravene some fundamental rule of public policy.

It may be observed that in the cases of *Huntley vs. Bank* (69 Miss. 663) and *Alexander vs. Thomas* (70 Miss. 517), the validity of the act in question has been by this court upheld.

It follows from the views above that the judgment of the court below must be affirmed.

#### CONDENSED LEGAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST TO BANKS.

*BANKING CORPORATION—INSOLVENCY—STOCKHOLDERS—INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY—ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION—SIGNATURE—DELIVERY—ESTOPPEL—PUBLIC POLICY—RECORD—PAROL EVIDENCE—ADMISSIBILITY—CREDITORS—AMOUNT OF CLAIMS—MAINTENANCE OF SUIT—EXTENT OF LIABILITY—ADJUSTMENT OF CLAIMS—PROPER PARTIES.*

Rev. St. 1898, § 2024, subsec. 47, provides that stockholders in every banking corporation organized under this act shall be individually responsible to the amount of their respective shares for all its indebtedness and liabilities of every kind. S., the promoter of a bank, secured the signature of W. R. and R. R. to the articles of incorporation, with the understanding that they were not to be liable unless the signature of M. R. would be secured, and his consent that firm of R.'s Sons should take twenty-five shares. M. R. refused to sign the articles, and S., after being informed of such refusal, and without the knowledge of W. R. and R. R. filed the articles of incorporation with their signatures, and subsequently tendered twenty-five shares to the firm, which were refused. In all the reports of the bank to the State Treasurer W. R. and R. R. were returned as stockholders. *Held*, that W. R. and R. R. became stockholders in the bank, and hence were individually liable under the statute, since it would be against public policy to allow them to impeach the record as against the intervening rights of creditors by showing the conditional signature of the articles.

Rev. St. 1898, § 2024, subsec. 18, provides that any number of persons may associate and become incorporated, and subsection 19 declares that such persons shall make a certificate stating the names of the shareholders and the amount subscribed by each, and subsection 47 imposes on stockholders an individual liability for the debts of the corporation to the amount of their shares. *Held*, that the fact that articles of incorporation for a bank were signed by W. R. and R. R., two of the three members of the firm of R.'s Sons, and that the stock was listed in the name of R.'s Sons, and that it was the intention of W. R. and R. R. to bind the firm, did not prevent the enforcement of the individual liability of W. R. and R. R., since as the statute required the articles to be signed by stockholders, and as W. R. and R. R.

could not bind the firm, it will be presumed they intended to bind themselves, and the record cannot be varied by parol evidence of an intention to bind the firm.

Rev. St. 1898, § 2024, subsec. 18, provides that any number of persons may associate and become incorporated, and subsection 19 declares that such person shall make a certificate stating the names of the shareholders and the number of shares subscribed by each, which shall be filed with the register of deeds. Articles of incorporation for a bank were signed by W. R. and R. R. on condition that they were not to be bound unless M. R., the third member of the firm of R.'s Sons, should also sign and agree that the firm should take \$2,500 worth of shares. M. R. refused to sign, and the promoter of the corporation, without the knowledge of W. R. and R. R., filed the articles with their signatures. *Held*, that the fact that the firm refused to accept the shares when tendered was not sufficient to show a rescission of the contract in the absence of evidence that the corporation accepted the rescission, since on the filing of the certificate the contract became an executed one, and hence irrevocable, without the consent of both parties.

Where the claims of plaintiffs against an insolvent banking corporation amounted to only \$2,800 out of a total liability of \$485,000, the contention that plaintiffs could not maintain an action in equity to enforce the individual liability of defendants as the owners of \$2,500 worth of shares in the bank because of the trifling interest of plaintiffs, cannot be sustained, since in theory all creditors are plaintiffs to such an action, and, if the other creditors refused to join in the prosecution of the suit on due notice, defendants were liable to plaintiffs to the full amount of their shares.

Where plaintiffs, who had claims against an insolvent bank to the extent of \$2,800 out of a total liability against the bank of \$485,000, sued defendants to recover their individual liability on \$2,500 worth of shares, and the other creditors on due notice did not join in the prosecution of the action, plaintiffs will be entitled to recover the full amount of \$2,500, since the failure of the other creditors to join in the action makes it a bar to any future action against defendants on the claims of such creditors.

In an action by certain creditors of an insolvent bank to enforce the individual liability of stockholders, the fact that plaintiffs elected to omit certain stockholders because of their insolvency will not preclude the defendants or any other creditors or the court from bringing in the omitted stockholders, since an adjudication in the case will bar all creditors from any demand on the omitted stockholders, and the defendants from any right of contribution against them.

*Rehbein, et al. vs. Rahr, et al.*, 85 N. W. Rep. (Wis.) 315.

---

#### CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT—DEMAND—FINDINGS.

Where a depositor in a bank failed to produce or surrender his certificates of deposit, which had not been lost, on making demand for their payment, and failed to produce them on the trial of an action for the amount of the certificates, he cannot recover, since the bank is not bound to pay the deposits, except on production and surrender of the certificates properly indorsed.

Though certificates of deposit in a bank are payable on demand when properly indorsed, the bringing of an action against the bank for the amount

of such certificates is not a sufficient demand to entitle the depositor to recover, since the demand must be by presentation of the certificates properly indorsed.

Cottle, *et al.* vs. Marine Bank of Buffalo, 59 N. E. Rep. (N. Y.) 736.

---

CORPORATIONS—STOCKHOLDERS' MEETING—NOTICE—CONSTITUTION—STATUTES—BONDS—TRUST DEED—ATTACHMENT—PRIORITIES—BANKS AND BANKING—NATIONAL BANKS—UNLAWFUL ACTS.

All the stockholders of a corporation signed an agreement that the bonded indebtedness be increased to an amount fixed therein at a meeting called for that purpose, expressly waiving all notice of the meeting required by law. The meeting was held, and bonds authorized issued, and secured by deed of trust, and sold for full value. *Held*, that the bonds and deed of trust issued pursuant to such agreement and meeting so held were valid obligations of the corporation, notwithstanding Const. art. 12, § 8, providing that no corporation shall increase its bonded indebtedness except in pursuance of general law, nor without consent of the persons holding the larger amount in value of the stock, first obtained at a meeting called for the purpose on sixty days' public notice, and Rev. St. 1889, § 2499, providing that any corporation may increase its bonded indebtedness with the consent of the persons holding the majority of its stock obtained at a meeting called for that purpose on sixty days' notice; since such provisions for notice are for the benefit of the stockholders, and the notice may be waived by them by express agreement, or by all attending a meeting held without such notice.

The lien of the trust deed was superior to that of attachments subsequently levied on the property of the company.

A National bank to which a corporation was indebted purchased the funding bonds of the corporation secured by a trust deed of its real estate to the amount of its claims and more, and to conform in appearance with Rev. St. U. S. § 5137, authorizing a National bank to take a mortgage only to recover debts previously contracted, and to make it appear that it held the notes of two corporations instead of bonds secured by mortgage, it took the note of another corporation, which was not indebted to it, indorsed by the one issuing the bonds, for the same amount as the bonds. *Held*, that the bonds and mortgage were not held as collateral security for such note, and, as such, subordinate to defendant's lien on the property under an attachment subsequent to the trust deed, since the note did not represent any debt, and defendant could not usurp the province of the Government, and punish the bank for its evasion of the act of Congress.

Riesterer, *et al.* vs. Horton Land & Lumber Co., *et al.* 61 S. W. Rep. (Mo.) 238.

---

JOINT DEPOSIT—OWNERSHIP—INTENTION OF PARTIES—QUESTION FOR JURY—DIRECTION OF VERDICT.

In 1890, deceased, an old man, transferred a bank deposit of \$185 from his own name to the joint account of himself and daughter, the defendant. The deposit was added to from time to time, and at the death of deceased amounted to \$1,538. Deceased's two sons paid him \$12.50 per month, and supported and clothed him, and also paid him \$300 per annum for three years in addi-

tion to his monthly allowance. In 1897 deceased made a will devising \$850 in general legacies, and made defendant his residuary legatee, and had no property other than the bank account. The pass-book was in defendant's possession, and several times deceased requested its return, and defendant promised to do so without asserting any claim to the deposit. *Held*, in an action by deceased's executor to recover the deposit, that the direction of a verdict for defendant at the close of plaintiff's evidence was erroneous, since it was sufficient to justify a finding that the deposit did not belong wholly to defendant, and the intention of the parties in making the transfer and in keeping a joint account was for the jury.

Wood vs. Zornstorff, 69 N. Y. Supp. 241.

---

*FORGED INDORSEMENT OF CHECK—FRAUD—LIABILITY OF BANK.*

A Rhode Island statute declares that a signature to a negotiable instrument, which is made without authority or forged, shall be wholly inoperative, and shall not give a right to enforce payment against a party thereto. A check drawn payable to the order of A. was procured by representations that the person to whom it was given was A., and the indorsement of the latter was forged thereto, and it was paid by the bank. *Held*, that the bank was liable to the drawer for such sum, both at common law and under the statute.

Tolman vs. American Nat. Bank, 48 At. Rep. 480.

---

*GARNISHMENT OF BANK—INSOLVENT DEFENDANT—CHECKS DELIVERED BEFORE SERVICE—PAYMENT—EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT—SET-OFF.*

A check drawn by a wife and delivered to a creditor, in payment of her husband's debt, before the bank on which it was drawn was served with garnishment in a suit against the husband, operated as an equitable assignment of community money of husband and wife in the bank, to the amount of the check, and such bank was authorized to pay the check out of funds in its hands after service of such garnishment.

Where a bank held two notes of a depositor, secured by personal indorsement, and such depositor became insolvent prior to service on the bank of a garnishment in a suit against him, which service was before maturity of the notes, the bank was entitled to set off such notes against the deposit.

Neely, *et al.* vs. Grayson County Nat. Bank, 61 S. W. Rep. (Tex.) 559.

---

*INSOLVENCY—RECEIVING DEPOSITS WITH KNOWLEDGE—EVIDENCE—ACCOMPLICE'S TESTIMONY.*

Under the provisions of chapter 219, Gen. Laws 1895, which makes it a felony for any one connected with a banking concern, either public or private, to receive deposits while such institution is insolvent, it is not material in what capacity the interested or guilty party is connected with the bank,—whether as an ostensible partner or as a secret conspirator with the actual operator of the same—provided any substantial aid is given by him tending to violate the statute in letter or spirit.

A formal dissolution of a banking firm cannot control the subsequent responsibility of the former partners if it is executed as a sham to relieve one of them, nor exonerate the retiring partner from full accountability for subsequent acts in an unlawful plan to receive deposits during the insolvency of



the bank. In such a case the dissolution should be treated as an illegal and fraudulent device.

Evidence of a continual depletion of the resources of a bank partnership, continued for several years, is competent upon the question whether an unlawful scheme existed to wreck the concern in failure, and as showing a motive for a sham dissolution, whereby one of the partners could withdraw therefrom a portion of the funds.

State vs. Clements, 85 N. W. Rep. (Minn.) 229.

---

NATIONAL BANK—CONTRACT—GUARANTY—ULTRA VIRES.

A complaint alleged that defendant, a National bank, by letter agreed that a draft drawn by plaintiff, not to exceed a certain sum on a certain firm, for goods shipped to them by plaintiff, should be paid, and that in consideration of such guaranty plaintiff shipped the goods to such firm, but that the draft had not been paid and defendant refused to pay it. *Held*, that where a corporation has entered into a contract, not illegal, which the other party has performed, it will not be heard to claim *ultra vires* to avoid performance on its part, and, since the National Banking Act does not prohibit such a contract, the complaint stated a cause of action and a demurrer thereto should be overruled.

Hutchins vs. Planters' Nat. Bank of Richmond, 38 S. E. Rep. (N. C.) 252.

---

DECISIONS OF CANADIAN COURTS AFFECTING BANKERS.

[Edited by John Jennings, B. A., LL. D.; Toronto.]

---

ACCOMMODATION BILLS—CORPORATION—ULTRA VIRES—KNOWLEDGE OF  
BY PARTLY DISCOUNTING—LIABILITY.

UNION BANK vs. EUREKA WOOLEN MANUFACTURING CO. (Nova Scotia Reports, volume 33, page 302).

STATEMENT OF FACTS : The defendant carried on a manufacturing business at Eureka, N. S. One W. D. Cameron, a director of the company, was their selling agent at Halifax, and from time to time had drawn on the company *bona fides* in the course of the business. Later, however, and for his own accommodation he discounted with the plaintiffs twelve bills of approximately \$500 each. Of these six were drawn upon the defendants and were accepted on their face by the company through its secretary, J. J. McLennan. The other six bills were drawn on Cameron's brother John, of New Glasgow, by whom they were endorsed (in blank apparently), and McLennan also purported to endorse them with the defendant company's name.

The by-laws of the company provided that the secretary "should discharge such duties as may be prescribed by the board" (of directors).

On the appointment of McLennan as secretary the directors resolved, "That in the future the secretary be authorized to accept any drafts made on the company and to indorse any check for deposit to the company's account."

W. D. Cameron, on asking to have these six bills discounted, told the plaintiff's General Manager that they, like the ones formerly discounted, were for payments on the company's account. They were discounted, forwarded and accepted, and it was only when called upon to pay the first one that the president became aware that these bills were for Cameron's accommodation.

They were at once repudiated, as were the endorsed bills when they also came to the knowledge of the company.

The bank brought action on the twelve drafts in question.

JUDGMENT (HENRY, J.): Upon these facts I hold that no defence has been made out as to the bills accepted by the company. They were accepted by the officer and in the mode authorized by the resolution of the directors (itself authorized by the company's by-law), which resolution was acted upon throughout in the business of the company. Judgment for the plaintiff bank for the amount of these six acceptances.

With respect to the six bills *indorsed* by the company, the bank had notice on their face that they were for the accommodation of Cameron. McLennan's act in indorsing for the company was beyond his authority under the by-laws; the plaintiff bank must fail as to these six bills.

From the latter part of this judgment an appeal was taken by the plaintiff bank, but the appeal was unanimously dismissed by McDonald, C. J. and Graham and Weatherbee, JJ., who held:

The secretary was not authorized to indorse the bills, and even had the directors purported to authorize him to indorse for accommodation, such an act would have been *ultra vires* (*vide* Bryce "On *Ultra Vires*"):

"108. A corporation cannot become surety without an express power given in so many words or words necessarily to be inferred from the general language.

108 a. A corporation may not become party to the negotiable paper of others without an express power in that behalf."

---

BANK DEPOSIT BOOK—GIFT OF IN ANTICIPATION OF DEATH—DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA.

BROWN *vs.* TORONTO GENERAL TRUST CORPORATION (32 Ont. R. 319).

STATEMENT OF FACTS: The plaintiff was a niece and the defendants were the administrators of Benjamin Brown, deceased. Shortly before his death Mr. Brown gave his niece two promissory notes, and a mortgage and his pass-book with the Standard Bank at Brighton, saying that if he did not recover she could collect the same and keep the proceeds as her own. There were other elements in the case, but they are not of interest here. The action was for declaration that the plaintiff was absolutely entitled to (*inter alia*) the money in the Standard Bank to the credit of the deceased, some \$6,500.

JUDGMENT (Sir JOHN BOYD, *Chancellor*): In this case the deposit is represented by the pass-book, No. 143, and it is stipulated that no deposit will be paid unless upon production of the pass-book. The essential terms of the contract of deposit are manifested by the contents of the pass-book, the production of which is requisite to recovery on the contract. The pass-book then comes within the class of instruments which are good subjects of *donatio mortis causa*, and its delivery operates as a transfer of the debt to take effect on death. The gift is incomplete, but the court will intervene to complete it.

[NOTE: The effect of this judgment would not be to justify the bank in paying over moneys on deposit to anyone who after the depositor's death produced the pass-book and claimed the money as *donatio mortis causa*.

The bank should inform the executor or administrator, and if he disputes the claim the bank should apply for an interpleader order and await the judgment of the court on the issue between the claimant and the executors.

The judgment in this case carries the principle further than *Thorn vs. Perry* (*supra*), because here the bank had no knowledge of the claimant in relation to the moneys on deposit prior to the donation, while the fund in the other case was in the name of the donee jointly with that of the donor.]

**SAVINGS BANK DEPOSIT BOOK—DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA—FAILURE TO ADMINISTER ESTATE FORMALLY—TRUST.**

THORN *vs.* PERRY (New Brunswick Equity Reports, Volume 2, page 146).

**STATEMENT OF FACTS:** Mary C. Perry died having at the time of her death a sum of \$1,176 on deposit in the Government Savings Bank at St. John, N. B., which deposit stood in the name of herself and her son, so that either or the survivor could withdraw on the production of the pass-book. On the night preceding her death she gave the pass-book to her son saying, "Here is the pass-book, I want you to pay her \$400 out of the bank—it is Priscilla I mean" (*i. e.* the plaintiff in this action). After her death the defendant refused to pay to the plaintiff the \$400 in question, alleging *inter alia*, that the fund was not the subject of *donatio mortis causa*.

**JUDGMENT (BARKER, J.):** All the requisites of a valid *donatio mortis causa*, are here if the pass-book is properly the subject of such a gift so as to pass the money it represents. In this case the money was in the donee's name jointly with the other deceased, and the handing over of the pass-book clothed him with full power to deal with the money represented by it. The facts therefore establish a complete *donatio mortis causa*, but coupled with a trust to pay the plaintiff \$400. Cases are cited to show that trusts may be coupled to such a gift, and if the gift is upheld the trust attaches and does not fail (as contended here) as being an ineffectual, because informal, testamentary gift.

**REPLIES TO LAW AND BANKING QUESTIONS.**

Questions in Banking Law—submitted by subscribers—which may be of sufficient general interest to warrant publication will be answered in this department.

A reasonable charge is made for Special Replies asked for by correspondents—to be sent promptly by mail. See advertisement in back part of this number.

**PROFITS.**

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

WINONA, Minn., April 18, 1901.

SIR: K indorsed notes and discounted them at a bank for his own benefit in 1888. Within one year prior to June 28, 1892, the notes were surrendered to H who paid them with the proceeds of other notes indorsed by him and discounted by the same bank. Should such notes have been classed as losses and deducted from the actual profits to ascertain the surplus profits as provided by Laws 1893, ch. 696, sec. 26?

D. K.

**Answer.**—No. The new notes were a part of the bank's resources on June 28, 1892, and were not debts owing to the bank, which had remained due without prosecution for more than one year.

**LIABILITY OF OFFICER.**

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

NEW YORK, May 2, 1901.

SIR: Where an officer of a bank negligently loans money to an irresponsible person on inadequate security, is he protected in an action against him by the bank by the fact that he acted in good faith?

COMMERCIAL.

**Answer.**—He is not.

## AUTHORITY OF CASHIER.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

MADISON, Ind., April 14, 1901.

SIR: Has the Cashier of an Indiana State bank, organized under Laws 1890, ch. 26, providing that such a bank shall have power to exercise by its board of directors or duly authorized officers or agents subject to law, all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking, by discounting negotiable promissory notes, bills of exchange, drafts, and other evidence of debt by receiving deposits, etc., authority to borrow money unless it is especially given by the board of directors?

SAVINGS BANK.

*Answer.*—No.

## LIABILITY OF DIRECTOR.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

LANCASTER, Pa., April 2, 1901.

SIR: Directors of a certain bank improperly declared a dividend after having consulted the superintendent of the banking department. Prior thereto they had delivered to the bank their individual notes, given with a memorandum reciting that the notes were given to remove a doubt as to the character of some of the receivables of the bank, and to make such bank unquestionably solvent. The bank failed and the notes came into the hands of a Receiver and were collected by him. There was an excess of the amount necessary to make good the impairment of capital existing when the notes were given, but not sufficient to pay the debts of the bank. Could the excess be held by the Receiver to apply on the amount of dividends improperly declared?

WARREN.

*Answer.*—Yes.

## JOINT DEPOSITS.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

ST. PAUL, Minn., March 31, 1901.

SIR: A husband and wife jointly opened a deposit in a Savings bank to be drawn by either, and in the event of the death of either to be drawn by the survivor. On the husband's death has the administrator any interest whatever in the deposit?

BOOKKEEPER.

*Answer.*—No. The wife is entitled to the deposit absolutely—to the entire account on the husband's death.

## DEPOSIT OF CORPORATION.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

MERIDIAN, Miss., April 3, 1901.

SIR: A corporation having an account with a bank deposited with it the proceeds of insurance on its property. The bank, with knowledge of the facts and the source of the money, accepted checks against such deposit, drawn by the president of the corporation and payable to his order, and applied the proceeds of the checks to the payment of individual notes held by it against the president. This was unauthorized by the corporation and without its knowledge. Can it hold the bank for the amounts wrongfully withdrawn?

MANUFACTURER.

*Answer.*—Yes. The corporation can recover the money, since, as the bank paid the notes with knowledge of the facts, it was bound to know that no part of such funds could be properly applied to the private debts of the president.

## STOCK HELD IN TRUST.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

KANSAS CITY, Kans., April 14, 1901.

SIR: One dying and leaving a will, therein directed that his daughter's share in his estate should remain in the hands of his executors, to be invested by them, and the income paid to the daughter during her life, and at her death the part of the estate held in reserve by the executors should revert to the general estate. The directors set apart as a portion of the daughter's share, certain shares of stock in a National bank, held by decedent, and caused the same to be transferred on the books of the company to themselves as "trustees." The bank became insolvent and it was necessary to levy an assignment upon the stock, when it was found that the executors had made a transfer of the shares. Could they divest themselves of title to the stock by such a transfer so that a suit to recover the assignments could not be brought against them?

W. B.

*Answer.*—The legal title to the shares devolved upon the executors as such, and they could not dodge their liability under the assessment.

## SAVINGS DEPOSIT.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine :*

INDIANAPOLIS, Ind., April 4, 1901.

SIR: Money was deposited in a Savings bank for an infant. A by-law of the bank, printed on the pass-book, was to the effect that, while the bank would endeavor to protect depositors, all payments to persons producing pass-books should discharge the bank. The pass-book was presented by the child's father, to whom the deposit was paid. The beneficiary now threatens suit against the bank for the amount of the deposit. Can she recover? The father claims that the money was so expended as to allow the child's remaining at a certain college a year longer than she otherwise would have done.

ADMINISTRATOR.

*Answer.*—A case very similar to this has recently been decided in New York, and it was held that the very fact that the money was paid to the father of the beneficiary who presented the pass-book should put the bank on its guard, and by paying the deposit it became liable, not having used ordinary care.

## CITY DEPOSITORIES.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine :*

BOSTON, Mass., April 11, 1901.

For a number of years the F— Bank of this city has been designated by resolution of the council as city depository. For some time it was the only bank in the city. During the last year three other banks were established, and at the city election this spring the contest over city treasurer was merely a fight between the banks for control of the deposit. The candidate for city treasurer favorable to sharing the city deposits with all the banks was elected, but the council remained favorable to the old bank. At the first meeting of the council the bond of the new treasurer was presented but on recommendation of the committee was disapproved, not because the sureties were insufficient, but because as recommended by the committee it was deemed wise to insist upon a bond furnished by a regular surety company. Can the council command the city treasurer as to where he shall make his deposits of city money? Can they compel him to furnish a bond from a surety company which will cost him about \$250 per annum?

TREASURER.

*Answer.*—Unless there is special statutory authority in your State the council cannot dictate the place for the deposit of city funds. As to the character of the sureties on the bond we are not so certain, but in any event we doubt the power of the council to compel the treasurer to furnish such a bond unless the city is willing to pay the fee to the surety company.

## PRIORITY OF CLAIMS.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine :*

TOPEKA, Kans., April 16, 1901.

SIR: A bank for its own accommodation ships currency to another bank, and makes a draft against such shipment. The latter bank receives the shipment and fails before the draft arrives. Is this such a transaction as will enable the first-named bank to take priority of regular depositors in recovering the amount of the shipment?

ASSIGNEE.

*Answer.*—No. The bank will share in the assets on the same basis as other general creditors.

## AUTHORITY OF MANAGER.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine :*

LOUISVILLE, Ky., May 1, 1901.

SIR: A by-law of a bank provided that the manager should perform all duties which the bank's interest required, limited only by the by-laws of the bank. The President had for years had entire management of the bank; not reporting his actions to the directors, nor asking ratification thereof, nor obtaining authority before performing particular acts. The bank being threatened with suit, the President executed an agreement in the bank's behalf that if the claimant would refrain for six months from bringing an action against it to enforce a stockholder's liability, the bank would not plead the statute of limitations thereto. Was such an agreement within the authority of the manager and binding on the bank?

SHAREHOLDER.

*Answer.*—Whether within the President's power or not, under the circumstances as set out we feel confident that the bank would be held bound by the agreement.

## INDIVIDUAL DEALINGS WITH CASHIER.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

ELIZABETH, N. J., May 4, 1901.

SIR: I applied to the Cashier of a bank to purchase for me shares of its stock. The purchase was made from S and he retained the stock for some time before sending it to the Cashier. When he did so he sent it with a letter addressed to the Cashier individually. My account was also kept by the Cashier individually. I gave my check for the price of the stock to the Cashier and the transaction did not appear on the books of the bank. On receipt of the stock, the Cashier kept it in his own private drawer of a desk in the bank. The bank was not engaged in buying and selling stock for itself or for others. The Cashier afterwards converted the stock and disappeared. Can I hold the bank liable for the value of the stock.

A. C. F.

*Answer.*—No. The bank is in no way liable.

## FORGED INDORSEMENTS.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

PASADENA, Cal., April 2, 1901.

SIR: A paving company having its principal place of business in New York, opened an account with a bank in Detroit, and transmitted to the bank a power of attorney authorizing the company's local agent in Detroit to indorse and sign checks and deposit money in its name and for its use. From time to time the agent indorsed and deposited checks drawn by the company to its own order on its New York bank, which were credited to his account as cash. The agent forged such a check, indorsed and deposited it in the usual manner, checked out the proceeds and absconded. Could the bank hold the company liable to it on the indorsement for the amount of the check?

SECRETARY.

*Answer.*—We should think so, without any question. The bank was not bound to know the company's New York signature, and that, in the absence of instructions amounting to a notice that the signature was forged, the company was liable to it for the amount of the check.

## TRUST FUNDS.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

MADISON, Wis., April 13, 1901.

SIR: The treasurer of a city, in accordance with an arrangement with the bank in which he kept an account as treasurer, deposited at night funds which had come into his office after banking hours, and which belonged in part to the city and in part to the State, for safe keeping until the next morning, when, as was his custom, he separated out the portion of the funds belonging to the city and had the same placed to his credit on his bank book. One morning this was done before the hour for opening the bank. The bank was insolvent, and known to be so by its officers, and was at the time virtually in possession of the bank examiner, who took formal possession before the time of opening arrived, and the bank was not thereafter opened for business. The Treasurer at once demanded the return of the funds, which were still in the bank, but they were retained by the examiner and subsequently turned over to the Receiver, who credited them to the Treasurer on the bank's books. Did the examiner overstep his powers in so doing?

ASSISTANT CASHIER.

*Answer.*—Yes. Such funds did not become the property of the bank, and are recoverable by the city from the Receiver.

## COUNTY TREASURER—DEPOSIT OF MISAPPROPRIATED FUNDS.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

ANSONIA, Ct., April 26, 1901.

SIR: A county treasurer, who had misappropriated county funds, gave to the bank with which he deposited such funds his demand note, as treasurer, for the amount of misappropriation and procured the entry of a credit for the like sum on this account as treasurer. At the same time he gave to the bank his check, as treasurer, for such sum, payable on the next day. On that day the bank charged up the check, thus balancing the credit, and also canceled the note. On the day the note was given, the bank represented to a committee appointed by the district court to investigate the county's finances, that the treasurer's balance was a certain sum, which included the amount of the note. Did its conduct render the bank liable to the county for the amount of the misappropriation? The treasurer had made a statement to the bank that the county needed the money and would replace it the next day, and the bank only agreed to extend the credit until that time, and claimed that this was the only purpose for which the entry was made.

W. G.

*Answer.*—If the bank relied on the treasurer's representation that the county needed the money and would replace it the next day, and agreed only to extend credit until that time and for that purpose made the entry and canceled the credit, the bank would not be liable as for an unauthorized application of the amount represented by the credit. If, on the other hand, the money was loaned to the treasurer for the purpose of making a deposit of it to the credit of the county, to make good his defalcation, and the note and check were taken simply to enable the bank to apply the money so deposited to the treasurer's individual debt, which the note, in legal effect was, the title of the county would have attached to such deposit, and such an application of it would be unauthorized.

#### DEPOSITS AS OFFSETS.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

CHEYENNE, Wyo., April 6, 1901.

SIR: W made a deposit in a bank which held a note against him, nearly matured. The bank failed before the maturity of the note at a time when W's deposit just covered the face of the note. The resources of the bank were only sufficient to pay half of the liabilities. The Receiver sued W on the note. Can he recover?

CASHIER.

*Answer.*—No. The amount of the deposits would have been good as offsets as against the bank, and the insolvency law does not authorize the Receiver to collect more than was due the bank.

#### REVOCATION OF CHECK.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

CHICAGO, Ill., April 29, 1901.

SIR: A city treasurer takes up a city warrant issued to him by the proper authorities to satisfy a legal claim against the city, and gives his check for the amount of the warrant on the bank where he deposits the moneys out of which it is payable. The bank declines to honor the check on the ground that the treasurer had stopped payment before it was presented. What course should the holder of the check pursue?

A. R. N.

*Answer.*—He should sue the bank. The city treasurer had no power to stop payment of the check. Its delivery operated as an assignment of the fund on which it was drawn for the amount of its face,

#### CHECK—PROTEST FOR NON-PAYMENT.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

BUFFALO, N. Y., April 27, 1901.

SIR: Is it necessary for a bank to protest its own check when there are no endorsers but the payee and the bank sending it? Is not the payee liable to the paying bank whether the check is protested or not? (I mean by the paying bank the bank where he deposited it.)

Suppose after the check is returned to the sender with the notice of "no funds" on it, the sender again mails it and demands payment because it was not protested; then the bank on which the check is drawn protests it. Does not protesting it on its second arrival release the bank? Provided, however, it were necessary to protest it at all, did not the sender make a mistake in sending it the second time if protest were required?

During all this time there were no funds in the bank to cover the check, so nothing was lost in that way.

PRESIDENT.

*Answer.*—A check is usually payable within the State where it is drawn, and is therefore an inland, and not a foreign, bill of exchange; and this is so though the check has been sent to a payee or indorsee outside of the State. It is, therefore, unnecessary that the check be protested for non-payment; for protest is not required, except in the case of foreign bills of exchange; and it is sufficient if the holder or his agent give the indorser notice of dishonor within the time required by the rules of the commercial law. (Bailey vs. Dozier, 6 How. [U. S.] 23; Miller vs. Hackley, 5 Johns. [N. Y.] 384; Bay vs. Church, 15 Conn. 129.)

Nor is it necessary that the person making the presentment for payment

give notice of non-payment to all the indorsers; he may give notice to only the last endorser; and that endorser may then send notice to his immediate endorser, and so on. (*Howard vs. Ives*, 1 Hill [N. Y.] 263.)

In the case cited, H, an endorsee of a bill of exchange, endorsed it to a bank for the mere purpose of collection, and the notary employed by the bank transmitted notice of protest by mail to H on the next business day after presentment, and H on the day after receiving it mailed notice to his endorser. It was held that this was sufficient to fix the liability of such endorser, though, had notice been sent directly to him he would have received it sooner; and that this was so whether the notary was to be regarded as the agent of H or of the bank.

This case appears to be directly in point. When the check mentioned in the inquiry was returned with notice of its non-payment (if this was done by the mail of the next day), the bank to which it was returned had then until the day after its receipt to notify the payee; and such notice would have been sufficient to fix his liability.

Again, it is questionable whether, when a check is sent to a bank on which it is drawn, such bank is to be deemed the agent of the transmitting bank, but is not in the position of any other drawee of whom demand of payment is made, and is under obligation to do anything more than return the check if it has not sufficient funds to the credit of the drawer. (*Indig vs. National City Bank*, 80 N. Y. 100.)

Had protest been necessary, and its omission had discharged the endorser, then the mere return of the check for protest would not have relieved the bank from the consequences of its negligence; but, as we have seen, no such result had followed; and if the payee was discharged, it was the fault of the forwarding bank in not notifying him in due season when it had the opportunity to do so.

#### ASSIGNMENT OF DEPOSIT.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

SCRANTON, Pa., April 29, 1901.

SIR: A debtor to several persons has a sum of money on deposit in a bank and gives to one creditor a check for a particular sum, to be paid out of the funds, and immediately afterwards assigns to another all the funds in the bank to his credit, and the assignment is first presented. Can the assignee hold the bank for the whole amount of the deposit though it first paid to the holder the amount represented by the check?

TELLER.

*Answer.*—No. Not if the assignee at the time of the assignment knew it was the intention of the debtor to assign only the amount left after the payment of the check.

#### CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT AS A DEMAND LIABILITY.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

MADISON, South Dakota, April 16, 1901.

SIR: Would a National bank show the following certificate in a sworn statement as a time or demand certificate of deposit:

"No. 14,764.

MADISON, South Dakota, February 1, 1901.

This certifies that John Doe has deposited in the Fourth National Bank, six hundred dollars (\$600), payable to the order of himself in current funds on return of this certificate properly endorsed, with interest at the rate of three per cent. per annum, if left six months. No interest after maturity.

(Signed) \_\_\_\_\_, Cashier."

Please answer same through the MAGAZINE.

GEO. E. COCHRANE, Cashier.

*Answer.*—The principal of the above certificate is payable on demand, and the holder has the right to demand payment of the same at any time. Hence, we think it should be included among the liabilities of the bank payable on demand.



## OVERDRAFT NOTE.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine :*

ANTWERP, Ohio, May 1, 1901.

SIR: Some time ago in your "Replies to Law and Banking Questions," you spoke of an overdraft note. Kindly answer in your next issue what an overdraft note is. CASHIER.

*Answer.*—We do not recall that the term was ever used in these columns, and do not know that by commercial usage it has any special meaning.

## STOPPING PAYMENT ON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine :*

SEATTLE, Wash., March, 23, 1901.

SIR: I should like your opinion on the question of stopping payment on various forms of negotiable instruments. The question has come to my mind in connection with a certificate of deposit which was presented by an irresponsible person. The paper had not been indorsed and payment had been stopped, the depositor stating it had been stolen or lost. In such a case has the bank the right to retain the paper, or is it its duty to return the paper to the holder? If it retains it, what relation does it assume towards the holder as well as the depositor? If the depositor demands his money afterwards, assuming the bank has retained the check, must the bank pay him without calling in the holder? How would it be with a check, note, sight draft, or draft and promissory note, assuming they have in each case been endorsed in blank? How if they were indorsed specially? CASHIER.

*Answer.*—It is plain that in the case stated there would be no duty upon the part of the bank to retain the certificate, and in doing so, it would act at the risk of being able to prove that the same had been lost or stolen. As it would itself have no title to the paper, it could justify its action only by showing that the paper belonged to its depositor, and that it was acting in his behalf. This risk it could not be required to assume, though, of course, if it should see fit to do so it might so act upon the depositor's request, and upon his agreement of indemnity. Should the paper be retained, the bank would not be in the position of a mere stakeholder, and at liberty to interplead the parties, but would have to defend itself by establishing the title of its depositor.

By the Negotiable Instruments Law now in force in Washington, it is provided that, "A check of itself does not operate as an assignment of any part of the funds to the credit of the drawer with the bank, and the bank is not liable to the holder unless and until it accepts or certifies the check." Under this rule, the bank owes no duty to any one except its customer, and when he orders payment stopped, it should conform to his directions; and it cannot be involved in the controversy between the drawer and the holder in respect to the right of the former to stop the payment.

## CERTIFICATION BY TELEPHONE.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine :*

BATAVIA, N. Y., April 16, 1901.

SIR: Will you please inform me in what States a certification by telephone is not binding? GEO. F. BIGELOW, Assistant Cashier.

*Answer.*—A certification by telephone is not good in any of the States where the Negotiable Instruments Law has been enacted, viz.: Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin. By that statute it is provided that a certification is equivalent to an acceptance (N. Y. act, sec. 323) and that an acceptance must be in writing. (*Id.* sec. 220). Hence, any merely oral acceptance, whether given over the telephone or otherwise, would not be sufficient to bind the bank.

## THE FUNCTIONS OF TRUST COMPANIES.

---

### ATLANTIC TRUST COMPANY.

---

The usefulness of trust companies is now fully established. They have, indeed, become a necessity under modern business methods. For hundreds of years the proposition that banking was a most important factor in the conduct of the world's affairs has been free of doubt; but the trust company is of much more recent origin, and is one of the developments growing out of modern business requirements. Accumulated wealth, seeking investment where safety is the paramount consideration; the vast financial responsibilities incident to present-day corporate enterprises, possible of assumption only by corporations of the largest resources and of known strength; the surety of undertakings beyond the powers of individuals—these and many other necessities that need not be enumerated, brought about the organization of trust companies.

Although a comparatively modern institution, the trust company in its underlying principle embodies no novel idea, but it is simply a recognition of the fact that men can do unitedly what they can not do separately. Whatever novelty there may be lies in the application of the principle in directions that were previously not the object of corporate activities.

#### WHAT THE TRUST COMPANY IS—ITS SAFETY.

The trust company of these days is a trusted and confidential agent in a great variety of capacities and lines of usefulness. It is a bank, and something besides. It receives deposits; it allows interest on them; it lends money like other banks. Its loans, however, being chiefly on quick collaterals and for short periods, are more apt than those of banks to be of an active and liquidatable sort, and are thus betimes more easy to be realized upon in times of panic or stringency. It is noteworthy that, even under pressure, there have been few, if any, trust company failures, and it may be regarded as still more remarkable that these institutions are so constituted that even if they should fail, it would not necessarily in the least impair the trusts committed to their care. An individual trustee is apt to permit trust funds to become so invested as to be more or less dependent upon his own solvency; but a trust company segregates the funds of its respective trusts and so invests them as to assure their value, irrespective of the company's fortunes. Strict legal provisions also further safeguard all trust investments, and the character of the management of most of such institutions is high—for the people who constitute the bulk of their patrons, being of the most conservative classes in every community, demand this.

The trust company, aside from its banking business, acts as executor, guardian and trustee under wills; as a committee for insane persons and depository under reorganizations, as registrar, agent, manager of real estate, trustee for corporate mortgages, and in numerous other useful capacities and

relations. It accepts deposits and the care of properties under judicial direction. It cares for the interests of widows and minor children and other dependent persons. It makes investments and collections for its clients, and is, in fact, fitted and equipped to do any financial business that may be committed to it.

When funds committed to the care of a trust company have been called for by the owners, the trustees have been able to produce them in every case. This was far from being true when it was the universal practice for individuals to perform the functions of executors, trustees, administrators, guardians and sureties.

#### ATLANTIC TRUST COMPANY.

The Atlantic Trust Company, which, on May 1, occupied its new quarters in the Atlantic Building, at Wall and William Streets, New York, is a company at once conservative and progressive. It was organized in 1887, and has made excellent progress, especially during the past half-dozen years, or since the administration of the company came under its present control. It avoids speculative risks, confining itself practically to the business of receiving and loaning money and making judicious investments and to the execution of the great variety of trusts which have been committed to it.

#### ITS SUITABILITY AS A RESERVE DEPOSITORY.

Out-of-town banks keeping their reserves in New York will find the Atlantic Trust Company well prepared to fulfill what should be the prime function of a reserve agent—the ability to furnish the cash when it is wanted. There is no part of a bank's funds that should be more carefully guarded than the reserve, and the greatest care should be taken to place it where it can be had when needed. Savings banks find it necessary to guard against sudden and unexpected demands from depositors, and institutions like the Atlantic Trust Company are proper custodians of whatever sums the Savings banks may consider it necessary to reserve for this purpose. A trust company, from the nature of its organization and the character of its business, is comparatively free from the worst effects of monetary crises, and therefore in a position to respond to calls from its correspondents and to aid them in meeting large and sudden demands on their cash reserves.

#### THE COMPANY'S LOCATION.

A title-page illustration of the Atlantic Building will be presented in the June number of the *MAGAZINE*. The picture will show (better than any description of ours could) the style and dignity of this handsome new eighteen-story building, situated at the southwest corner of Wall and William Streets, and in the very center of New York's great financial district. It is owned by the Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company, a company whose name has been a synonym of honor and good management in New York for more than half a century.

The Trust Company enters its new offices under excellent auspices and with the best possible outlook.

Its offices are larger than were those formerly occupied by it on nearly the same ground, and have been built and arranged with special reference to the company's present and future requirements. There is an entrance from William Street to the office immediately on the ground floor, and there is another entrance through the main hall of the Atlantic Building from Wall Street. Ample provision has been made for the accommodation of depositors and

others having business with the Trust Company in the front and middle of the main office ; the tellers' desks and enclosures and those of the trust department are conveniently placed ; and side rooms will be available, not only for meetings of the trustees and committees, but for clients who desire opportunity for private consultation.

#### FINANCIAL STATEMENT OF THE COMPANY.

The capital of this Trust Company is one million five hundred thousand dollars, and its surplus is one million dollars ; its deposits on May 1 were about eight and three-quarter millions.

The Editor of the BANKERS' MAGAZINE has been invited to examine the statement book and balance of the Atlantic Trust Company. Its situation, as of the first of May, may be summed up (in round figures) as below :

ASSETS.		LIABILITIES.	
Bonds and mortgages.....	\$980,000	Capital stock.....	\$1,500,000
New York State bonds.....	100,000	Surplus.....	1,000,000
New York city bonds.....	1,000,000	Deposits.....	8,700,000
Real estate and other property.....	80,000		
Railroad bonds.....	500,000		
Railroad shares.....	200,000		
Cash.....	1,200,000		
Loans on time and on demand.....	7,000,000		
Bills discounted.....	120,000		
General assets.....	70,000		
Total.....	\$11,200,000	Total.....	\$11,200,000

The Company's loans have been placed with careful discrimination as to the value of the security offered, and the investments are all of a high class. Deposits have steadily grown during the past year as a result of capable and energetic management. There has been no undue solicitation of accounts and no inducements are offered that are not warranted by strict business principles.

#### THE OFFICERS AND MANAGEMENT.

The Atlantic Trust Company was formed by the Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company in combination with other important financial interests, and includes in its management representatives of many of the best-known banking, insurance and mercantile organizations in the city.

Its President, Mr. Lewis V. F. Randolph, had a decade of early training in one of the great banks of the Metropolis—the American Exchange National Bank. Afterwards for many years he was treasurer and director of the Illinois Central Railroad Company. He has also been active in the management of large estates. He has been President of the Atlantic Trust Company for upwards of six years. During that period the Atlantic Trust Company has not lost a dollar on any transaction or in business of any description. This particular record of six years of the Trust Company is in harmony with Mr. Randolph's somewhat unique business experience of the past forty years. In the course of handling, during that period, cash and properties, in many fiduciary capacities, to the extent of hundreds of millions of dollars for persons and corporations, he has never made a single loss—even in the smallest amount.

The Vice-Presidents are Messrs. John L. Riker and William Carpender, whose business activities and successes and high personal character have long been known in financial circles.

The Secretary of the Company, Mr. John Alvin Young, has had considerable banking experience and was formerly an officer of the Brooklyn Wharf and Warehouse Co., and has a large circle of personal friends. The Assistant Secretaries, Messrs. L. M. Jones and Benjamin Strong, Jr., have had the advantages of excellent training and experience, not only as accountants, but also in important positions of trust and usefulness. The Auditor, Mr. Chas. Baker, Jr., who has within a few weeks past joined the Atlantic forces, brings with him the result of a long period of study and work in trust company service—a service in which indeed it may be said he has labored from his earliest days of responsibility. Mr. James F. McNamara, who is at the head of the trust department, has received his entire business training in the Atlantic Trust Company, whose service he entered about the time of the Company's organization in 1887. Mr. Rufus R. Graves is the Company's Loan Clerk and is well versed in the duties appertaining to his position.

Mr. Linder and Mr. Vogler are the French and German correspondents. This branch of the business has had its particular interest and importance for the last five years, the Company having a considerable number of foreign correspondents.

The Real Estate and Mortgage Department will be in care of Mr. John J. Cahill, who has had an extended experience in this line of work.

A corps of valued clerks, always found faithful in the service of the institution, has been gradually developed, so that there is probably no bank or trust company at the present moment more fully or efficiently equipped than is this institution.

The Atlantic Trust Company has the reputation of treating its clients liberally. It meets the market on interest allowances to depositors but without offering rates which an honest concern cannot afford to pay. Its charges for trust responsibilities are universally recognized as moderate, and this branch of its business, as well as its deposit line, has been largely augmented within the past year. While the capital and surplus are both of dimensions suitable to commend public confidence (and this confidence is now so clearly manifested by its deposit and trust business), yet if any additional guaranty were required, it is certainly afforded in the character and standing of its board membership. The Trustees of the Company are as stated below :

Wm. Carpenter,  
D. Crawford Clark,  
John F. Dryden,  
George W. Ely,  
Andrew H. Green,  
John F. Halsted,  
Clifford A. Hand,  
Charles R. Henderson,  
Wm. H. Hollister,  
Wm. B. Isham,  
Martin Joost,  
W. R. T. Jones,

Lewis Cass Ledyard,  
C. D. Leverich,  
Gilbert M. Plympton,  
Anton A. Raven,  
L. V. F. Randolph,  
John L. Riker,  
Otto Sartorius,  
Wm. Schall, Jr.,  
John W. Simpson,  
Francis S. Smithers,  
Frederick Sturges,  
Alfred Wagstaff.

To those who may not be familiar with some of the names enumerated above, their high standing will be more apparent when the representative firms and corporations with which some of them are connected are mentioned.

Mr. Carpender is a member of the firm of W. & J. Carpender, bankers; Mr. D. Crawford Clark is also a banker, being one of the firm of Clark, Dodge & Co. Mr. John F. Dryden is President of the Prudential Insurance Company of America. Mr. Geo. W. Ely was for many years Secretary of the New York Stock Exchange, a position which he resigned some time since to accept the Presidency of the Bankers' Trust Co., which was later absorbed by the Atlantic Trust Co. Hon. Andrew H. Green is one of the well-known men of the State, having been identified with many leading public enterprises as well as having served as Comptroller of New York, a position requiring high financial ability. He was also the prime mover in the plan for consolidating New York, Brooklyn and other contiguous municipalities into "Greater New York," and the success of that movement, resulting in the formation of the second largest city in the world, was largely due to his energy, ability and perseverance. Mr. Halsted is occupied in the management of estates, and Mr. Clifford A. Hand, the company's counsel, is the head of the law firm of Hand, Bonney, Pell & Jones. Mr. Hand is an eminent lawyer, and one of a family highly distinguished in judicial and legal circles in the State of New York.

For its own security, as well as for the safety of the funds entrusted to it, it is advisable that a trust company should have in its service legal talent of a very high order, and in this respect, as in all others, the Atlantic Trust Company has taken proper precautions.

Mr. Charles R. Henderson is a member of the firm of Henderson & Co. He is a trusted confidential adviser also of the managers of the Mutual Life Insurance Co., and is a member of that company's board. Incidentally it may be noted here that the Mutual Life Insurance Co. has for several years held one thousand shares of the stock of the Atlantic Trust Company as a steady investment. The banking interests are further represented by Mr. Wm. H. Hollister, of the firm of Kountze Bros., whose name is familiar to bankers through their connections in New York, Omaha, Denver and elsewhere. Mr. Martin Joost is Vice-President of the Bond and Mortgage Guarantee Co., Mr. W. R. T. Jones is a marine adjuster, and Lewis Cass Ledyard is a member of the firm of Carter & Ledyard, and is a lawyer of prominence and of unusual strength and ability. Mr. C. D. Leverich is a member of the banking firm of C. D. Leverich & Bro., and Mr. Gilbert M. Plympton is the senior of Redmond, Kerr & Co., bankers. Mr. Anton A. Raven holds the very important and responsible position of President of the Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., which owns the Atlantic Building. Mr. John L. Riker is connected with Messrs. J. L. & D. S. Riker, merchants, and is an officer of several banks and other important institutions. Mr. Otto Sartorius is also a merchant, and Mr. Wm. Schall, Jr., belongs to the well-known banking house of Muller, Schall & Co. Mr. John W. Simpson is a member of the legal firm of Messrs. Reed, Simpson, Thatcher & Barnum, of which Hon. Thos. B. Reed, ex-Speaker of the National House of Representatives, is the head.

Mr. Francis S. Smithers represents the banking firm of F. S. Smithers & Co., and Mr. Frederick Sturges, President of the New York Warehouse and Security Company and a Director of the National Bank of Commerce, is also a prominent capitalist of the Metropolis. Col. Alfred Wagstaff is Clerk of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.

The gentlemen above named are prominent in the respective lines of bus-

iness and finance in which they are engaged; their interest in the affairs of the Atlantic Trust Company is active, for they are in touch with the strenuous efforts of modern business, and are men who give a due share of their personal attention to every enterprise with which their names are identified. A result of this management may be seen in the steady advance in the value of the Company's shares; late quotations being about 290 to 300 per share.

#### THE ATLANTIC SAFE DEPOSIT COMPANY.

The Atlantic Safe Deposit Company will occupy about June 1 the vaults beneath the new office of the Atlantic Trust Company, by whose officers and co-workers it has been organized. It has a capital, now all paid in, of \$100,000, and its officers are: L. V. F. Randolph, President; John Alvin Young, Vice-President, and Benjamin Strong, Jr., Secretary. Its directors are:

Anton A. Raven,	L. V. F. Randolph,
Gilbert M. Plympton,	Wilber L. Molyneaux,
James M. Gifford,	Charles R. Henderson,
Duncan D. Parmly,	Edward F. Murray,
Francis S. Smithers.	

These affiliated institutions are in as favorable a location for the transaction of their business as may be found in the city. Bankers, capitalists, investors, merchants and others who may desire to make use of the Company's exceptional facilities in the banking, trust company or other departments, will find the equipment, resources and management equal to the best.

It is well known that nearly all of the trust companies are making money, and this is not due to extravagant charges (for in comparison with the services they perform their remuneration is moderate), but rather to the fact that they fill an actual demand for just such functions as they perform. Fidelity in discharging trusts, in conserving the property of those who may be weak or helpless, coupled with the greater facilities afforded for carrying on business enterprises of large magnitude—these are some of the reasons why the trust companies have been almost uniformly successful. Care in selecting those responsible for the management has been the general rule, and this will doubtless continue to be one of the cardinal principles of the Atlantic Trust Company.

**A Well-Managed Bank.**—Messrs. North & Co., bankers, Unadilla, N. Y., favor the *MAGAZINE* with a copy of their recent statement. Items are as fully given as in the reports of National and State banks, and they make a showing that must be very gratifying to the owners.

The capital is \$25,000, surplus \$13,000 and deposits \$314,242. Included in the resources are \$124,500 loans and discounts, \$104,650 in bonds and \$102,668 cash on hand and in reserve banks, and other items, making an aggregate of \$352,242.

Here are some of the principles on which the bank does business:

"This bank does not pay a high rate of interest or offer a bonus in order to secure deposits.

Safety is the first consideration.

The deposits of a bank constitute in the aggregate only a large trust fund, which should not be jeopardized by speculation or loose business methods.

It is well to remember that high interest and 'special inducements' offered to secure deposits are evidences of a bank's weakness, not of its strength.

We pay no interest on call deposits.

Bonds are registered or deposited in New York for safe-keeping."

**The Ablest and Best.**—Under a recent date, S. K. Sneed, Cashier of the Henderson (Ky.) National Bank, writes as follows: "I consider the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* now, as for years past, one of the ablest and best-edited magazines in this or any other country."

## THE BOOM IN WALL STREET.

---

### A REMARKABLE ERA OF EXPANSION.

---

The phenomena of the present financial situation invite investigation and encourage theorizing. Whatever may be individual opinion regarding the intrinsic value of certain securities, the character of the present buying movement, or the future of the stock market, it is hardly to be disputed that the conditions as they have prevailed for some time past have been responsive to pre-existing causes, the legitimate influence of which those conditions have simply been reflecting.

To apprehend those causes and to ascertain the scope of their influence, investigation must trace its steps far beyond the limits of that era or epoch, the features of which are the cause of present wonder and inquiry. The foundations of the remarkable activity and strength in the securities markets were not laid in the last few years. They have been in course of construction during all those years since the bull movement of 1877-81 came to an end.

Since 1881, while there have been periods of depression and of activity, there have really been no mad speculative movements and no widespread disasters such as those of 1857 and 1873. When a long period is exempt from extreme swings of commercial prosperity or adversity, and during that period there is a gradual weeding out of the weak with no stimulus for the worthless to take root, there is apt to be, as at the present time, a vast sweep of prosperity when favorable circumstances and conditions have accumulated until their optimistic force becomes irresistible.

In tracing the causes which have brought about the extraordinary conditions of to-day, the inquirer would wisely start his retrospect from the failure of Baring Bros., of London, in November, 1890. With that event came a reaction in the financial situation which gave us bad times for a while, but which laid a solid foundation for the good times which came later on. A brief review of the year 1890 and the years following which preceded the present era will furnish a basis for studying the operative influences whose effects have been so prodigious.

During the first half of 1890 the business situation generally was satisfactory. The grain crops of 1889 had been very large, and there was a good export demand for wheat, corn and cotton, particularly of wheat. The yield of cereals in 1890 was very much smaller, however, and the fact caused dependency. Prices of securities fell late in the year and a stringency in money caused the New York Clearing-House banks, as well as those of Boston and Philadelphia, to issue clearing-house certificates. Several failures of Wall Street firms occurred about the time the Baring trouble became known. An event of far-reaching importance was the passage of the Sherman Act on July 14, 1890, which increased the Government purchases of silver to 4,500,000 ounces a month.



In the year 1891 depression prevailed during the first half, and more than \$70,000,000 of gold was exported. Good crops came along in that year, however, and also good prices for our cereals, which made a favorable change in sentiment. Our heavy exports of food products brought gold back in the latter part of the year to the extent of about \$40,000,000.

The first part of the year 1892 was favorably affected by the good crops of the previous year, and business generally was more active than at any previous time. The silver law was causing an inflation of the currency, but we exported nearly \$60,000,000 of gold during the year, neutralizing to a great extent the supposed benefits of silver inflation. The railroads had large earnings as the result of the heavy grain movement, and until it became evident that the yield of cereals this year would be small the general situation was favorable.

The year 1893 developed all the ills that it was possible for silver inflation to produce. Gold went out of the country at the rate of \$10,000,000 or more a month. In the first half of the year more than \$60,000,000 of gold was shipped abroad, while the Treasury reserves began to fall rapidly. The silver-purchase law was repealed by act of Congress, approved November 1, 1893. As far as failures in business and depreciation in values were concerned the year 1893 was one of the worst experienced in a very long period. The grain crops of this year were also exceptionally small.

The legacy 1893 bequeathed to 1894 was depression in nearly every line of trade and industry. The latter year was a year of tramp armies, of which "Coxey's Army" came into most notoriety. The attempt to organize a general strike of employes on all the railroads gave the American Railway Union temporary distinction in that year. The railroads suffered heavy losses in earnings, both gross and net. The revenues of the Government fell off and gold was drawn out of the Treasury, while about \$81,000,000 gold was exported to Europe. The Government was forced to make two issues of bonds of \$50,000,000 each to protect its reserve. The corn crop was almost a failure, wheat fell in price to 55 cents a bushel in New York and corn to 5½ cents per pound. So great was the stagnation in business that money accumulated in the New York banks until a surplus of nearly \$112,000,000 was lodged in those institutions.

The year 1894 was unquestionably the year of darkness before dawn. With its close came a turn in the tide, although it was not until two years later that there came to be general recognition of the fact that an improvement had begun, at least so far as evidence of it was shown in Wall Street affairs. While in each year subsequent to 1894 there has been an accumulation of favoring conditions, the level of prices of securities sunk until in August, 1896, it was nearly ten per cent. lower than in the midst of the Baring panic in November, 1890.

The course of the stock market is shown in the accompanying table, which contains a list of forty representative stocks and the lowest prices reached in November, 1890, and August, 1896, with the highest prices recorded in each of the three years 1898, 1899 and 1900, and the closing prices on April 30 this year. The table shows that the average price of the forty stocks at the time of the Baring panic was \$48.66 per share, while in August, 1896, it had fallen to \$39.75. The market had settled down to the hardest kind of a foundation.

The favorable conditions which began to assert their influence as early as

1895 finally gave an impetus to prices in 1896, and in 1898 the average was raised to \$67.82, in 1899 to \$82.13 and in 1900 to \$86.89. The buoyancy of the market this year is indicated in the further rise to \$104.87 per share up to April 30, representing the closing prices of the stocks named on that day.

	Lowest in Nov., 1890.	Lowest in Aug., 1896.	Highest in year 1898.	Highest in year 1899.	Highest in year 1900.	Closing in year Apr. 30, 1901.
Atchison.....	28½	84	19½	247½	49½	75½
Canadian Pacific.....	67	55	90½	99½	99½	100½
Canada Southern.....	42	40¾	58	70	61½	76
Central of New Jersey.....	90	87½	99	126½	150½	159
Chesapeake and Ohio.....	15	11	26½	31½	42½	48½
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy.....	80	53	125½	149½	144	198½
Chicago and East, Illinois.....	38	37½	66	100½	109	139½
Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul.....	44	50½	120½	186½	149½	175½
Chicago and Northwest.....	101½	85½	143½	173	172½	209½
Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific.....	61½	49½	114½	12½	122½	164½
Chicago, St. Paul, Minn. and Omaha.....	19	30½	94	126½	126	145½
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis.....	55	19½	47½	64½	76	86
Consolidated Gas.....	92	133	205½	223½	201	275½
Delaware and Hudson.....	128½	114½	114½	125½	134½	180
Delaware, Lackawanna and Western.....	123½	138	159	194½	194½	219
Denver and Rio Grande.....	15	10	21½	25½	34½	47
Erie.....	16	10½	16½	16½	27½	43½
Illinois Central.....	85	84½	115½	122	132½	144½
Lake Erie and Western.....	10½	17	23½	24	52	66
Louisville and Nashville.....	65½	87½	65½	88½	89½	109½
Manhattan.....	92	73½	120½	133½	116½	129½
Minneapolis and St. Louis.....	4	12	38½	78	71½	85
Missouri, Kansas and Texas.....	16	9½	14½	14½	17½	32½
Missouri Pacific.....	56	15	48½	52½	72½	109
Mobile and Ohio.....	23	14	32½	52	49	82
New York Central.....	95½	88	124½	144½	145½	162
Norfolk and Western.....	13	8	19½	22½	45½	55
North American.....	7	3½	7½	17½	22½	84
Northern Pacific.....	16½	3½	44½	57½	86½	115
Pacific Mail.....	28½	16½	46	55	57	39½
Pullman.....	168	138	216	207½	204	210
Reading.....	27½	5½	23½	25	26	43½
Southern Pacific.....	22½	16½	35	44½	45½	56½
Texas Pacific.....	13	5	20½	25½	26½	49½
Tennessee Coal and Iron.....	28	14	38½	126	104	66½
Union Pacific.....	42½	4	44½	51½	81½	116½
Wabash.....	8½	4½	9½	8½	14	21½
Western Union.....	74	72½	95½	98½	88½	99½
Wheeling and Lake Erie.....	25½	5½	6½	13	18½	19
Wisconsin Central.....	14½	1½	37½	21	20½	29½
	48.66	39.75	67.82	82.13	86.89	104.87

That the advance from \$39.75 to \$104.87 is extraordinary no one can question, but it will be observed that a large number of stocks mentioned are among the best investment securities known, many of them representing our strongest railroad properties. In some cases the stocks have been made intrinsically more valuable through reorganization, and the issue of new stock for old.

We now return to an investigation of those causes which have contributed to the results shown in the table of prices. It is hardly necessary to discuss each year in detail, for the conditions which existed in one year subsequent to 1894 were largely in evidence in the year following. The year 1895 had some disturbing features, one, the President's message regarding the Venezuelan boundary, nearly plunging the country into a panic. Then the gold in the Treasury was running out and the Government had to buy gold for which it issued \$62,000,000 in bonds.

In that same year, however, pig iron reached its maximum production up to that time, grain crops were large, cotton rose in price and railroad earnings began to increase. The year 1896 witnessed a continuance of these conditions, although in some particulars the year was not prosperous. The gold

standard was in imminent danger, but bankers and foreign exchange dealers came to the relief of the Government and agreed to prevent gold exports. In the meantime another loan of \$100,000,000 had been floated for the purpose of increasing the Treasury gold reserve. The great silver campaign was waged with earnestness in the summer and autumn, resulting in the victory of the gold standard.

With 1896 came "dollar wheat," the famine in India and shortage of crops in Australia giving our wheat market a boom. The influence of our agricultural products now began to be marked, and exports rapidly increased. The improved situation as regarded the railroads was also indicated in the restoration of a number of railroads that had been in financial difficulties to their owners. Among them were the Atchison, the Erie, the Northern Pacific, the Reading, the Oregon Navigation and others.

From 1896 down to the present time there has been an unbroken series of favorable events stimulating confidence and influencing an appreciation in values. These events have been connected with general conditions that have prevailed almost without interruption for several years. The improvement of our public credit, the putting of our currency upon a sounder basis, the large increase in production of gold, influenced to an important extent by the wonderful discoveries in the Klondyke district four years ago, the cessation of tariff legislative agitation, the bountiful harvests continuing through successive years, the growth of our manufacturing interests due largely to the genius of the American producer in inventing and utilizing machinery and methods for the production of commodities at the lowest possible cost, the great increase in our exports of merchandise, the development of banking facilities such as had never before been witnessed, the large increase in our circulating medium, the vast combinations of capital and of concerns intended to cheapen the cost of production, the raising of our railroad systems to the highest level of efficiency and financial credit they ever occupied—these in brief have been the dominant influences for several years past which are still controlling the minds of those who are optimistic as regards the future of values.

To measure the extent of some of the principal causes is all that it is possible to do within the limits of this article. First, however, we may show how the stock market has been affected as regards activity as well as values by presenting the following record of sales at the New York Stock Exchange during the past eight years:

*New York Stock Exchange Transactions.*

CALENDAR YEAR.	Stocks, shares.	Railroad bonds.	Government bonds.	State bonds.
1898.....	81,000,000	\$352,000,000	\$2,100,000	\$3,800,000
1897.....	49,000,000	340,000,000	4,300,000	10,800,000
1896.....	66,500,000	500,000,000	7,500,000	5,800,000
1895.....	54,500,000	363,000,000	26,500,000	2,200,000
<b>Four years....</b>	<b>251,000,000</b>	<b>\$1,555,000,000</b>	<b>\$40,400,000</b>	<b>\$22,600,000</b>
1897.....	77,000,000	\$530,000,000	\$10,400,000	\$2,000,000
1896.....	112,500,000	889,000,000	24,600,000	3,800,000
1895.....	176,500,000	827,000,000	10,600,000	2,000,000
1894.....	138,000,000	589,000,000	7,000,000	2,000,000
<b>Four years....</b>	<b>504,000,000</b>	<b>\$2,815,000,000</b>	<b>\$52,600,000</b>	<b>\$9,800,000</b>

It was not until 1897 that the Stock Exchange showed any signs of activity, so for once Wall Street failed to do any discounting. The increase has been very great since, and the sales so far this year have been greatly in excess of the high record made in 1899.

The two principal factors in the upward movement have been the increase in the supply of money and the great expansion in our foreign trade, and both became operative at about the same time. The changes in the volume of money and in the supply of gold in use as money semi-annually since January 1, 1891, are shown in the accompanying table :

	Money in U. S. Treasury.	Money in circulation.	Money in the country.	Gold in U. S. Treasury.	Gold in circulation.	Gold in the country.
Jan. 1, 1891...	\$185,053,533	\$1,528,736,268	\$1,713,789,801	\$148,972,985	\$555,127,876	\$704,100,861
July 1, "...	176,459,302	1,499,726,705	1,676,186,007	117,667,723	523,924,205	646,591,928
Jan. 1, 1892...	169,903,165	1,598,781,729	1,768,684,894	130,740,631	556,105,299	686,845,930
July 1, "...	147,906,082	1,693,073,338	1,750,979,430	114,342,367	550,008,079	664,345,446
Jan. 1, 1893...	154,252,049	1,610,683,874	1,764,935,923	121,286,663	530,064,099	651,350,762
July 1, "...	138,520,062	1,593,726,411	1,732,246,508	95,483,414	496,603,719	592,086,135
Jan. 1, 1894...	117,143,042	1,729,018,266	1,846,161,308	80,891,600	598,014,990	678,906,590
July 1, "...	141,787,882	1,664,061,232	1,805,849,114	64,873,025	564,218,299	629,091,324
Jan. 1, 1895...	176,422,496	1,626,568,622	1,802,991,088	86,244,445	538,863,285	625,107,730
July 1, "...	214,950,703	1,604,131,068	1,819,082,671	107,512,363	523,636,636	630,168,999
Jan. 1, 1896...	204,202,686	1,579,206,724	1,783,409,410	63,262,268	534,664,996	597,927,254
July 1, "...	288,679,727	1,509,725,200	1,798,404,927	101,669,606	498,449,242	600,118,847
Jan. 1, 1897...	255,367,336	1,650,223,400	1,905,590,736	137,316,544	555,630,608	692,947,152
July 1, "...	261,341,453	1,646,028,246	1,907,369,699	140,790,738	556,432,594	697,223,332
Jan. 1, 1898...	234,135,678	1,721,100,640	1,955,236,318	160,911,647	584,126,049	745,037,696
July 1, "...	231,543,818	1,843,435,749	2,074,979,567	167,004,510	608,790,519	775,781,029
Jan. 1, 1899...	281,747,712	1,897,301,412	2,179,049,124	246,529,176	702,996,896	949,526,073
July 1, "...	273,287,216	1,932,484,239	2,205,771,485	240,737,211	734,716,728	975,453,939
Jan. 1, 1900...	272,735,268	1,980,398,170	2,253,133,438	226,949,230	779,100,627	1,016,049,857
July 1, "...	279,473,684	2,062,425,496	2,341,899,180	220,557,185	815,474,460	1,036,031,645
Jan. 1, 1901...	275,769,122	2,173,251,879	2,449,021,001	246,561,322	861,980,507	1,108,541,829
May 1, "...	288,220,415	2,195,304,235	2,483,524,650	246,767,053	862,500,594	1,129,267,647

On January 1, 1896, there was only \$70,000,000 more money in the country than in 1891, and about \$66,000,000 less than in 1894, while the supply of gold had fallen \$106,000,000 in five years. From January 1, 1896, to May 1, 1901, the supply of money has increased \$700,000,000, and of gold \$531,000,000, the United States Treasury gaining \$84,000,000 money and \$183,000,000 gold, while the amount of money in circulation increased \$516,000,000 and of gold \$348,000,000. The gold supply was increased partly by imports, but largely by domestic production. In the four years ended December 31, 1900, our mines produced nearly \$270,000,000 gold, as compared with \$175,000,000 in the previous four years. The annual production is now about \$75,000,000 as compared with \$32,000,000 in 1890.

The currency and refunding act of March 14, 1900, has caused a considerable increase in National bank circulation in the last year, and the effect of this expansion is seen in the increase of \$141,000,000 in the stock of money in the country between July 1, 1900, and May 1, 1901.

We now turn to the export trade of the country, first taking note of the important influence which the grain crops have had both in swelling that trade and in adding to the wealth of the country.

The grain producer since 1896 has been blessed with good crops and in the main good prices. In the four years 1897-1900 he received \$476,000,000 more for his wheat, \$228,000,000 more for his corn and \$711,000,000 more for his cereals than in the previous four years. The result has been that the farmer has cleared his farm of its mortgage, and he has become an active buyer where before he was compelled to hold aloof. Transportation interests have

also shared in the benefits, as will be indicated further on. The following table shows the yield and value of wheat and corn, and of all cereal crops annually since 1893:

YEAR.	WHEAT.		CORN.		Value of all cereal crops.
	Bushels.	Value.	Bushels.	Value.	
1893.....	396,182,000	\$213,171,070	1,619,498,000	\$501,626,000	\$1,041,789,000
1894.....	460,267,000	225,902,000	1,212,770,000	554,719,000	1,043,007,000
1895.....	467,108,000	237,939,000	2,151,139,000	567,509,000	1,017,316,000
1896.....	427,684,000	810,603,000	2,293,875,000	491,007,000	972,069,000
Four years.....	1,751,186,000	\$987,615,000	7,267,280,000	\$2,204,861,000	\$4,074,181,000
1897.....	530,149,000	\$428,000,000	1,902,968,000	\$501,073,000	\$1,121,296,000
1898.....	675,149,000	362,770,000	1,824,185,000	552,023,000	1,158,509,000
1899.....	547,304,000	319,545,000	2,078,144,000	629,210,000	1,185,915,000
1900.....	522,230,000	823,515,000	2,106,102,000	751,220,000	1,325,117,000
Four years.....	2,274,832,000	\$1,463,830,000	8,010,398,000	\$2,433,526,000	\$4,785,837,000

The expansion of our export trade received its first inspiration from the improved crop conditions, but for some time there had been a steady growth in our manufacturing interests, and together the farmer and the manufacturer have pushed forward into the markets of the world as never before in the history of this or of any other country. We give the eight years' record of our commerce as follows:

YEAR.	DOMESTIC EXPORTS.		Total exports, foreign and domestic.	Total imports.	Net exports.
	Products of agriculture.	Products of manufactures.			
1893.....	\$619,135,633	\$177,347,676	\$876,108,781	\$776,248,624	\$99,859,857
1894.....	573,684,383	177,800,969	825,102,248	676,312,941	148,789,807
1895.....	545,715,881	201,153,663	824,880,136	801,669,347	23,190,789
1896.....	664,955,372	253,661,541	1,005,837,241	861,579,556	324,257,685
Four years.....	\$2,403,491,269	\$809,981,049	\$3,531,908,406	\$2,985,810,768	\$596,097,638
1897.....	\$730,294,762	\$279,616,838	\$1,099,709,045	\$742,565,229	\$357,113,816
1898.....	851,915,762	307,324,904	1,255,548,266	684,964,448	620,581,818
1899.....	782,183,405	380,787,891	1,275,467,971	798,967,410	476,500,561
1900.....	904,658,958	441,406,942	1,477,949,666	829,019,337	648,930,329
Four years.....	\$3,269,002,917	\$1,404,736,725	\$5,108,672,048	\$3,005,516,424	\$2,103,126,524

By comparing the four-year periods, a better view of the situation may be had than in studying the single-year records. The latter half of the eight-year period shows an increase of \$366,000,000 in exports of agricultural products and of \$600,000,000 in manufactures, while the total exports, foreign and domestic, increased \$1,576,000,000. Imports increased only \$70,000,000 but of late have been at the highest point ever reached. In the last four years the exports of merchandise exceeded the imports by \$2,103,000,000 as compared with \$596,000,000 in the previous four years.

The direct effect of this large export movement has been to bring gold from abroad and to establish this country among the banking nations of the world. A large amount of American capital has been invested in the securities of foreign governments and more is being invested at the present time.

The railroads have gained not only from the handling of farm products

but in hauling to the west and south the commodities bought by the farmers and planters. Two representative railroads have published their income accounts for the calendar year 1900 and we show here their gross and net earnings and surplus applicable to dividends on stock for each of the last eight years:

YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31.	CHICAGO AND NORTHWESTERN.			LAKE SHORE.		
	Gross earnings.	Net earnings.	Surplus.	Gross earnings.	Net earnings.	Surplus.
1893.....	\$32,472,219	\$10,719,871	\$4,786,748	\$23,665,982	\$6,562,019	\$3,196,643
1894.....	29,119,362	9,008,634	2,054,834	19,557,870	6,371,102	2,968,329
1895.....	81,558,629	11,804,827	5,085,221	21,016,035	6,447,816	3,028,315
1896.....	32,177,155	10,950,228	4,325,288	20,193,937	6,467,802	3,022,400
Four years...	\$125,327,368	\$42,483,500	\$16,201,586	\$84,453,794	\$25,849,439	\$12,216,297
1897.....	\$33,571,172	\$12,136,018	\$5,798,656	\$20,297,721	\$6,755,220	\$3,745,238
1898.....	37,498,980	13,028,433	6,538,786	20,753,663	6,825,663	4,023,223
1899.....	41,806,761	14,846,023	8,679,116	22,613,946	7,781,801	5,057,286
1900.....	48,061,088	15,144,675	9,510,479	26,466,514	9,158,719	6,658,431
Four years...	\$155,928,001	\$55,185,149	\$30,527,037	\$91,181,864	\$30,521,413	\$19,484,178

Neither of the roads mentioned increased its mileage to any appreciable extent, yet the Chicago and Northwestern reports an increase of \$40,000,000 in gross earnings in the last four years, of \$13,000,000 in net earnings and of \$14,000,000 in surplus earnings, while the Lake Shore reports an increase of nearly \$17,000,000 in gross earnings, of \$5,000,000 in net earnings and of \$7,000,000 in surplus. Both roads earned in 1900 a surplus more than twice as large as in 1896.

For three other roads we show the gross and net earnings for the same period:

YEAR ENDING DEC. 31.	MISSOURI PACIFIC.		PENNSYLVANIA.		NEW YORK CENTRAL.	
	Gross earnings.	Net earnings.	Gross earnings.	Net earnings.	Gross earnings.	Net earnings.
1893....	\$24,018,339	\$5,761,171	\$135,050,788	\$39,568,229	\$46,710,673	\$14,617,851
1894....	21,800,646	5,317,170	120,137,054	35,105,841	41,797,498	14,112,789
1895....	22,672,004	5,650,864	130,319,354	39,425,743	44,338,898	13,893,002
1896....	22,011,900	5,520,636	123,641,268	35,311,939	44,075,023	14,314,580
	\$90,502,949	\$22,249,841	\$509,157,464	\$149,411,752	\$176,921,962	\$57,77,672
1897....	\$24,805,451	7,351,840	\$128,278,087	\$40,637,055	\$45,061,729	\$16,943,251
1898....	26,744,822	7,572,254	136,130,272	41,459,415	45,363,772	16,117,944
1899....	28,079,820	8,447,707	152,220,106	45,672,654	52,162,049	20,000,462
1900....	30,511,313	10,653,147	172,924,739	54,076,557	55,322,135	20,691,635
	\$110,141,406	\$34,024,448	\$589,553,204	\$181,844,683	\$197,950,685	\$73,753,292

The Missouri Pacific earned gross in the last four years nearly \$20,000,000 more than in the previous four years, and \$12,000,000 net, the Pennsylvania \$80,000,000 gross and \$32,000,000 net, and the New York Central \$21,000,000 gross and \$16,000,000 net. Comparing 1900 with 1896 the Missouri Pacific increased its net earnings \$5,000,000 a year, the Pennsylvania \$19,000,000 a year and the New York Central \$6,000,000 a year. These results indicate a state of business far better than any previous records can show, and it is not difficult to understand why railroad securities should have to so large an ex-

tent moved out of the class of speculative footballs into the more respectable investment class. When a few years ago Wall Street took up "Industrials" and made them a fad somewhat like the old mining stocks back in 1880, railroad shares were relegated to a place of comparative retirement. The effect seems to have been good, for railroad properties generally have developed into more respectable propositions than in the old stock-watering days of a quarter of a century ago. This too must be counted as one of the most influential factors in the present campaign of bullish ideas.

It is not an infrequent rule that Wall Street discounts the future, and while it is prosperous or depressed the rest of the country may be experiencing severe conditions. That is not the case at the present time so far as activity is concerned. In fact, the old index of trade, iron production, rather took the lead of Wall Street in developing bullish propensities. Its first big record of recent years was made in 1895, and only for the bad set-back in the last half of 1896 it would have made a new record every year since. Pig iron is not being produced for Wall Street, and its large output shows that the general condition of the country is in sympathy with the conditions existing in the financial center of the country. The record of pig-iron production for eight years is shown here:

	<i>First six months.</i>	<i>Second six months.</i>	<i>Year.</i>
	<i>Tons.</i>	<i>Tons.</i>	<i>Tons.</i>
1891.....	4,562,918	2,561,534	7,124,502
1894.....	2,717,933	3,939,405	6,657,388
1895.....	4,087,558	5,358,750	9,446,308
1896.....	4,976,236	3,646,891	8,623,127
Four years.....	.....	.....	31,851,325
1897.....	4,433,476	5,249,204	9,652,680
1898.....	5,849,703	5,901,231	11,773,934
1899.....	6,289,167	7,331,586	13,620,753
1900.....	7,642,569	6,146,673	13,789,242
Four years.....	.....	.....	48,836,559

In the last four years the output of pig iron reached nearly 49,000,000 tons, an increase of 17,000,000 tons over the corresponding period ended December 31, 1896. The production in 1900 was double that in 1894, a fact quite in harmony with some of the remarkable records made in Wall Street.

*Clearing-House Exchanges.*

<i>YEAR.</i>	<i>New York City.</i>	<i>Outside of New York.</i>	<i>Total United States.</i>	<i>London.</i>
1893.....	\$31,261,000,000	\$23,049,000,000	\$54,310,000,000	\$31,525,000,000
1894.....	24,388,000,000	21,227,000,000	45,615,000,000	30,840,000,000
1895.....	29,842,000,000	23,506,000,000	53,348,000,000	36,961,000,000
1896.....	28,871,000,000	22,304,000,000	51,175,000,000	36,868,000,000
Four years.....	\$114,362,000,000	\$90,086,000,000	\$204,448,000,000	\$136,179,000,000
1897.....	\$23,427,000,000	\$24,039,000,000	\$47,466,000,000	\$36,456,000,000
1898.....	41,972,000,000	24,913,000,000	66,885,000,000	39,406,000,000
1899.....	60,772,000,000	33,231,000,000	93,993,000,000	44,530,000,000
1900.....	52,434,000,000	33,437,000,000	85,871,000,000	43,606,000,000
Four years.....	\$188,595,000,000	\$117,620,000,000	\$306,215,000,000	\$163,997,000,000

Another illustration of the point that Wall Street and the rest of the country have not put a very great distance between them as yet may be

found in the record of bank clearings. We show the annual figures for the City of New York, the rest of the country and the United States, and have added the figures for London as of possible interest. (See preceding table.)

The clearings of the New York banks increased \$74,000,000,000 in four years and of banks in other cities \$27,000,000,000. London gained less than \$28,000,000,000. Naturally New York city has gained in larger proportions than the rest of the country, but with the clearings outside of New York in 1900 showing an increase of fifty per cent. over those of 1896, the evidence of a general activity in business throughout the country is indisputable.

It is not necessary to make any summary of the points suggested in the foregoing review of events and conditions. They indicate that there has been a most remarkable, in fact an unprecedented change, in the character and magnitude of the business and financial operations of this country. To what goal they lead it is not for even the wisest to assert with too great positiveness. That the stock market will not always remain one-sided recent events have shown. Still the plain facts declare that the great appreciation that has occurred in values has not been without justification in those relations which the legitimate interests of the country bear to every movement in Wall Street.

Until human nature changes there will be periods of over-speculation when confidence, born of legitimate conditions, outstrips itself. Unpleasant developments then come when least expected. For these the wise investor will always hold himself in readiness.

#### Knox's History of Banking.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

SIR: In the April number of the BANKERS' MAGAZINE, p. 510, I find some observations which I judge were inspired by a comment of mine in a review of Knox's History of Banking in the January issue of the "American Historical Review." I am sure that you are taking my point too seriously, and that if we could talk it over we should come to substantial agreement.

In the first place, let me say, that as a reviewer for the readers of the "Historical Review," I was in duty obliged to state the limitations of the work under consideration. Expert students—and a large part of the constituency of that "Review" may be so considered—need to be carefully informed in regard to the purpose of a volume in order to know within what limits it will be serviceable for purposes of consultation.

As to your conclusion in the March number, p. 367, that I intend to infer that the task undertaken by Mr. Knox was any less meritorious than the other, I think you must agree after a more careful re-reading, that such a suggestion is quite gratuitous; certainly it is not necessarily adverse criticism to say that a work is limited in its scope.

Now, as to the main point, that is, the desirability of a treatment of the influence of banks in our country upon its social and industrial development, it seems to me that a valuable study can be made, although it may possibly appear to you to be vague. For example, the Southern States since the Civil War have been very inadequately provided with banking facilities; the reasons for this are perhaps not far to seek, being closely involved with the system of agriculture with crop liens which has become so common. So in the West, how far has the development of economic absurdities been due to a lack of proper banking facilities, or to the enactment of bad laws? The whole question of the prohibition of the National Banking Law as to loaning directly on mortgage securities, and the consequent driving of agricultural communities to other forms of credit institutions, is one worthy of study.

I have here suggested simply a few of the questions that were in my mind when I wrote the sentence referred to. The historical student who is interested in movements and forces is looking for just this kind of information; he is probably more interested in this than he is in the formal organization of a bank. I have no doubt that had I been writing this review for a different sort of a journal, I should have had another point of view.

Trusting that you will not consider that this suggestion is another "appearance of wisdom and air of profundity," I am,

Yours very truly,

DAVIS R. DEWEY.

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,  
BOSTON, April 25, 1901.



## RECENT CURRENCY LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

[A Paper read before the London Institute of Bankers on Wednesday, March 6, 1901,  
by DAVID MARSHALL MASON, an Associate of the Institute.]

On February 23, 1900, the Gold Standard and Currency Bill was agreed to by the Currency Committee of the two Houses of Congress.

The passing of this bill marked an important advance in the progress of America towards a sound currency system. Although the act has deservedly met with a considerable amount of adverse criticism on both sides of the Atlantic, it still remains the first really important step forward in currency reform which has taken place since the repeal of the silver bullion purchase clause of the 1890 act, signed by President Cleveland on November 1, 1893. In the following pages I propose to confine myself as much as possible to those sections of the act which appear to be most important, and most likely to lead to an interesting discussion.

I have recently returned from a visit to the United States of America, and at this stage I should like publicly to express my thanks and high appreciation of the courtesy and facilities for obtaining information afforded to me by President McKinley, Mr. Gage (Secretary of the Treasury), Senator Allison, Mr. Dawes (the Comptroller of the Currency), Mr. M. L. Muhleman (Deputy Assistant Treasurer of the Treasury, New York), and other highly-placed officials in Washington.

I feel sure that the interviews which were granted to me by those distinguished gentlemen were due in a large measure to the fact that I was an associate of this institute, and in honoring me they desired to compliment the Institute of Bankers.

My thanks are also due to Mr. W. A. Read, of the New York banking house of Messrs. Vermilye & Co., and to the secretary of this institute, for their valuable aid in the collection of statistics.

According to information supplied by the United States Treasury Department, there are ten different kinds of money in circulation in the United States, *i. e.* gold coins, standard silver dollars, subsidiary silver, gold certificates, silver certificates, Treasury notes (issued under the Act of July 14, 1890), United States notes (also called "greenbacks" and "legal tenders"), National bank notes, and nickel and bronze coins. These forms of money are all available as circulation. While they do not all possess the full legal-tender quality, each kind has such attributes as to give it currency. The status of each kind is as follows:

Gold coin is legal tender at its nominal or face value for all debts, public and private, when not below the standard weight and limit of tolerance prescribed by law, and when below such standard and limit of tolerance it is legal tender in proportion to its weight.

Standard silver dollars are legal tender at their nominal or face value in payment of all debts, public and private, without regard to the amount, except where otherwise expressly stipulated in the contract.

Subsidiary silver is legal tender for amounts not exceeding \$10 in any one payment.

Treasury notes of the act of July 14, 1890, are legal tender for all debts, public and private, except where otherwise expressly stipulated in the contract.

United States notes are legal tender for all debts, public and private, except duties on imports and interest on the public debt.

Gold certificates, silver certificates and National bank notes are not legal tender; both classes of certificates are receivable for all public dues, while National bank notes are receivable for all public dues except duties on imports, and may be paid out by the Government for all salaries and other debts and demands owing by the United States to individuals, corporations and associations within the United States, except interest on the public debt and in redemption of the national currency. All National banks are required by law to receive the notes of other National banks at par.

The minor coins of nickel and copper are legal tender to the extent of twenty-five cents.

Such is the United States currency, which has been well described by Professor Laughlin, of Chicago, as "The greatest aggregation of curiosities ever before exhibited under one canvas in the world."

But reform is now in the air, and the Gold Standard Act is a beginning in the work of providing the United States with a currency which will be stable, elastic and eminently suitable to the needs and commerce of a great country.

The act which we are about to consider is entitled "An act to define and fix the standard of value, to maintain the parity of all forms of money issued or coined by the United States, to refund the public debt, and for other purposes."

#### THE GOLD STANDARD.

Section 1 provides "That the dollar, consisting of twenty five and eight-tenths grains of gold, nine-tenths fine, as established by Section 3,511 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, shall be the standard unit of value, and all forms of money issued or coined by the United States shall be maintained at a parity of value with this standard, and it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to maintain such parity."

This is a most important pronouncement, as in this section it is specifically declared what shall be the standard of value throughout the United State of America. The adoption of the gold standard has been a triumph for the monometallists and sound money party, and its importance can only be fully appreciated by those who are acquainted with the troubles and vicissitudes which have attended the long-drawn-out struggle for the maintenance of the gold standard.

All of us probably remember the controversy which arose over the United States Government coin bonds, which were issued by the Rothschild-Belmont Syndicate in 1895. In these bonds the United States Government only bound itself to repay the bearer in coin, and so great was the distrust then prevailing, owing to the depleted condition of the Treasury, and the uncertainty as to the ability of the Government to maintain gold payments, that it became necessary to form a syndicate to purchase the bonds, and then issue them to the general public. The bonds, bearing four per cent. interest, maturing in or after 1925, were purchased by the Rothschild-Belmont Syndicate from the United States Government at about 104, and then issued to the public in London and New York at 113½. To-day the same bonds are quoted at 140. The rise in price is the best proof, if proof is needed, of the improvement in the credit of the United States Government which has since taken place.

#### THE \$150,000,000 GOLD RESERVE.

Section 2 provides that "United States notes and Treasury notes issued under the act of July 14, 1890 (commonly known as the Sherman Act), when presented to the Treasury for redemption, shall be redeemed in gold coin of the standard fixed in the first section of this act, and in order to secure the prompt and certain redemption of such notes it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to set apart in the Treasury a reserve of \$150,000,000 in gold coin and bullion, which fund shall be used for such redemption purposes only, and whenever, and as often as any, of

the said notes shall be redeemed from the said fund, it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to use said notes so redeemed to restore and maintain such reserve fund in the manner following, to wit :—

First, by exchanging the notes so redeemed for any gold coin in the general fund of the Treasury.

Second, by accepting deposits of gold coin at the Treasury or at any 'Sub-Treasury in exchange for the United States notes so redeemed.'

Third, by procuring gold coin by the use of said notes in accordance with the provisions of section 3,700 of the Revised Statutes of the United States."

Power is also given to the Secretary of the Treasury when the said fund falls below \$100,000,000, to restore the same to the maximum sum of \$150,000,000, by issuing bonds bearing interest not exceeding three per cent., and repayable after one year from date of issue.

This section is intended to meet in some degree the difficulty of what is called the "endless chain," or menace to the Treasury, caused by a large mass of currency represented by the United States notes or "greenbacks," amounting to \$348,000,000, and Treasury notes amounting to about \$150,000,000, being maintained at a parity with gold and liable to be presented to the Treasury at any time for redemption. It was fear of this large mass of Government paper being suddenly presented to the Treasury, and gold being demanded, that created distrust and precipitated panic in the past. But the difficulty is only met in part by this section, for as long as these "greenbacks" and Treasury notes remain in existence, so long will they continue to be a menace to the Treasury. Doubtless, the Treasury is immensely strengthened by the powers herewith provided to meet any such sudden demands which may be made upon it, but the evil remains and consists in there being any Government paper legal-tender currency in existence at all. It is surely not the function of a Government to provide the people of a country with currency, any more than with any other commodity. This function, I need hardly say to you, gentlemen, is essentially that of a banker, and when the United States Government goes out of the banking business it will be a good thing for the credit of the Government, and beneficial to the best interests of the people themselves. The vicious practice of issuing Government paper money has invariably brought trouble and disaster in its train to those nations who gave way to the temptation, and the United States is no exception to the rule. Mere tinkering with the subject is of little avail, the only remedy being to provide for the gradual retirement of this mass of Government paper, and to substitute for it a bank-note currency, which would naturally expand and contract with the needs of the country.

The retirement of this Government paper will be an operation requiring great care and delicacy.

#### LEGAL-TENDER QUALITY OF THE SILVER DOLLAR.

Section 3 provides "That nothing contained in this act shall be construed to affect the legal-tender quality, as now provided by law, of the silver dollar, or of any other money coined or issued by the United States."

Now this section, which practically provides for the legal-tender quality of two or more forms of currency throughout the United States, is essentially unsound, and is quite opposed to the teaching of what is known as the "Gresham Law" in currency.

This law is as follows :—"When two sorts of coin or paper currency are current in the same nation by denomination, but not intrinsically, that which has the least value will be current, and the other as much as possible will be hoarded or exported."

We have had examples of the operation of this law in past years, when the currency, owing to its lack of elasticity, during a period of depressed trade, became

redundant, and that which was of least value, *i. e.*, silver dollars and silver certificates, became current, and the other, *i. e.*, gold, was either hoarded or exported.

During the years 1893 and 1894, when trade was depressed throughout America, and the prices then ruling for the great staple productions of the country were very low, a less amount of currency was required to do the work of moving the crops than formerly. As a consequence the currency became redundant, leading to large gold exports which, in their turn, created distrust and precipitated panic. There can be no question, then, that coincidentally with a provision for the redemption of the Government currency, there should also be a provision limiting the legal-tender quality of all currency other than gold.

#### REFUNDING OF BONDS.

This is provided for in section 11, which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to exchange the old five per cent., four per cent., and three per cent. bonds of the United States into thirty-year two per cent. bonds on a two and one-quarter per cent. basis. This operation will, of course, effect a considerable saving in interest to the United States Government.

#### NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION UP TO PAR OF BONDS.

In section 12 powers are granted to the National banks within certain restrictions to take out circulation against their depositing United States Government bonds with the Comptroller of the Currency, up to the par value of the bonds. Formerly, this was limited up to ninety per cent. of the face value of the bonds.

So far as this goes it is certainly an improvement, and will tend to encourage the National banks to increase their issues, which, it is hoped, will become popular, and gradually take the place of the Government notes. But I doubt if it will be taken advantage of to the extent that is anticipated, owing to the cost to the banks themselves. In the first place, it entails the locking up of a large proportion of the banker's capital, through the purchase of the bonds, and it is rather a clumsy method of providing currency which, it seems to me, ought to be the function of the banks themselves, subject to a few simple restrictions.

#### INTERNATIONAL BIMETALLISM.

This extraordinary theory is referred to in the last section of the act, which provides "That the provisions of this act are not intended to preclude the accomplishment of international bimetallism, whenever conditions shall make it expedient and practicable to secure the same by concurrent action of the leading commercial nations of the world, and at a ratio which shall insure the permanence of relative value between gold and silver."

I do not intend to weary you at this hour in the evening with a dissertation on the evil of bimetallism, which, if I remember rightly, is well described by Shaw in his "History of Currency," as a theory which has been found by experience to be unsound in practice. Sufficient for me to say that we may consider this section practically harmless, as we hope and believe it will be a long time before the leading commercial nations of the world will ever seriously consider so impractical a proposal.

In the foregoing, I have endeavored to draw your attention to what may be regarded as the salient features of the Gold Standard Act, and to criticise them from an impartial point of view. It has not been my intention in any way to presume to dictate to the United States which system of currency laws is best suited to the needs of that country. But, at the same time, in view of the immensity of our commercial relations, and of the large investment of British capital in America, our aim may surely be to criticise impartially, and to suggest such reforms as will tend to increase these commercial relations, and to facilitate the further investment of capi-

tal in so promising a field. There can be no doubt that this desirable state of affairs has been very much hindered in past years by a lingering distrust as to what constituted the standard of values. We therefore welcome this act as containing the first public announcement of the United States Government in favor of the gold standard. It is reasonable to assume that this question has now been finally settled so far as the standard of values is concerned by the re-election of President McKinley to the Presidency for another term of four years.

Amongst the various schemes of banking and currency reform which have been put forward, it has been advocated by some bankers that what is required to give stability to the currency is a central bank or institution similar to the Bank of England, which would maintain a gold reserve for the whole country. Now, I hope I shall not be deemed lacking in a proper respect for that ancient and admirably managed institution, when I state that I do not think such a bank would be at all suitable for the United States of America. Although the system of having a central institution or bankers' bank has worked well enough in this country, there are many authorities to-day who are by no means enamored of the monopoly which it confers on one institution, and who, from a national point of view, are prepared to point out many undesirable features in connection with it. When the question of maintaining larger gold reserves came up for discussion some years ago, I think it was Sir Samuel Montagu who rather aptly likened our present system to that of an inverted pyramid, with the Bank of England at the apex supporting the other banks at the base. At the same time, we have prospered under this system, and any alteration in it would be a matter for very grave consideration. But in the United States of America, where you have a country of enormous area supporting a scattered population of over 77,000,000 of people, engaged in a great diversity of pursuits, it seems to me that it would be unreasonable to expect one central institution to control, or attempt to maintain, a gold reserve which would be commensurate with the needs of the whole country. If such a system was attempted in the United States, I cannot but think it would prove unresponsive to the requirements of that country, and would inevitably lead to disaster.

The only sound method to my mind to aim at is to gradually give the entire control of the currency to the National banks. Let these institutions have full powers, with as few restrictions as possible, commensurate with safety, to issue their own notes repayable in gold on demand. This would compel each bank to maintain its own gold reserve. The currency would thus acquire a stability and elasticity which it lacks at present, and would naturally expand and contract with the needs of the country. The Scotch system of banking seems to me to be the best model for Congress to follow, and although a monopoly so far as the existing banks are concerned, has been of inestimable value in the development of that country.

In 1866 the French Government held an inquiry into the general principles which govern monetary and credit circulation. Among a number of interesting questions which were asked by the Government were the following :—

- (1) Ought the issue of notes to be limited ?
- (2) Ought the issue to be proportionate to the metallic reserve or the capital ?

It was held in reply that there ought to be no limit imposed upon the issue of the notes. If a bank incurred the responsibility of issuing them it should be at all times prepared to pay that proportion of its notes which will daily return upon it. It was further agreed that experience must serve as a guide, and prudence must at all times be exercised. A reserve which may be sufficient in one district of a country may be quite inadequate in another, no definite reserve can therefore be prescribed for all banks alike.

In fact, the more one studies the various systems of banking and currency which prevail throughout the world, the more one is driven to the conclusion that the

simpler the system and the fewer restrictions, the more likelihood of its being a success.

When in New York I was present at a banquet of New York bankers, and heard a most interesting and instructive address by Mr. Gage, on "The Banker in his Public Relations." Mr. Gage is a practical banker himself, having risen from a very humble position to his present position of Secretary of the United States Treasury. According to recognized authorities he is essentially a sound financier, and is a man who commands the respect and confidence of men of all shades of political opinions. Mr. Gage boldly grappled with the subject of currency reform, and referred to the "greenback" as "becoming associated in the sentiment of our people with things sacred. It was 'battle-scarred and blood-stained,' and every effort to throw upon it the light of economic truth was, and still is, in many quarters, resented as a sacrilegious deed." Mr. Gage asked further, "What is the present situation? We have, in circulation among the people, and as a reserve fund in the banks, \$346,000,000 of Government notes. They constitute an enormous public debt payable on demand. We have, or soon shall have, substantially \$600,000,000 of silver, or paper representatives of silver, whose parity with gold value the Government is under obligation to maintain. The ultimate measure of this obligation is the difference between the commercial value of the money metal, and the face value at which it circulates. This difference is not far from \$300,000,000.

We have a system of bank-note currency whose volume is but faintly related to the needs of the community, which a properly constructed bank currency most economically serves. It is, on the contrary, as you all know, controlled as to the volume by the price of interest-bearing United States Government bonds in Wall street.

Our independent Treasury, to which I have already referred, absorbs the circulating medium when active business most requires its use, only to again disburse it when falling revenues—the effect of industrial dullness—bring about an excess in expenditure. Industrial activity increases the public revenue, but it is checked, if not throttled, by its enlarged contributions to the idle fund in the public Treasury."

I have quoted, at considerable length, this speech of Mr. Gage, because, coming from such an authority, it is especially interesting, and secondly, it describes in clear and expressive language the financial situation at the present time.

A plan for emergency circulation, as here set forth, was explained to me by Mr. Charles A. Conant, of Washington. Mr. Conant is probably well known to you as an economist who has written at considerable length on the benefits of a bank-note currency. I understand that it is not unlikely that legislation, framed on this plan, may be proposed at the next session of Congress.

#### PLAN FOR EMERGENCY CIRCULATION.

Permit National banks to issue circulating notes, in addition those now allowed on deposits of bonds, to be known as Guaranty Fund notes, with the approval of both the Comptroller of the Currency and the Secretary of the Treasury, provided that nothing in the act shall be construed as requiring the issue of such notes upon the application of any bank "if, for any reason relating to the condition of the bank making application for such notes, the general state of the circulation or the state of the foreign exchanges, such action shall seem to the Comptroller or the Secretary of the Treasury to be inexpedient." Guaranty Fund notes may be issued:—

To an amount not exceeding ten per centum of paid-up and unimpaired capital, subject to a tax at the rate one-half of one per cent. per year;

To an additional amount not exceeding ten per centum of paid-up and unimpaired capital, subject to a tax at the rate of five per cent. per year.

These privileges may be extended after five years, so that notes may be issued to

the amount of twenty per cent. of capital under the lower tax, and twenty per cent. under the higher, and after ten years so that the limits of each class may be forty per cent.

But the extensions shall be made only "if in the judgment of the Secretary of the Treasury the issue and use of the currency herein authorized and provided for has proved beneficial to industry and commerce."

The tax upon circulation shall be divided into four parts per month, and be paid only upon notes outstanding at such intervals, as arranged by the Comptroller of the Currency.

Banks issuing these notes shall maintain in the Treasury of the United States a guaranty fund in gold equal to five per centum of outstanding guaranty fund notes. This fund shall be used only for redeeming the notes of failed banks, and the fund shall have a lien upon the assets of such banks for the notes redeemed, but the lien shall share equally with other claims, and any deficit in the assets shall be charged permanently against the guaranty fund.

After the fund has been raised to five per cent. by the proceeds of taxes, the taxes thereafter paid above the amount required to maintain the fund shall be covered into the Treasury, but the Treasury shall be liable to the fund for the amounts thus received, for the purpose of keeping the fund constantly equal to five per cent. of the outstanding circulation.

The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to establish redemption agencies for guaranty fund notes at any of the sub-Treasuries of the United States. The tax upon such notes shall cease upon their return to the Treasury or the deposit of lawful money in full for the amount proposed to be retired.

The principal defect of this plan appears to lie in the power given to the Comptroller of the Currency, or the Secretary of the Treasury, to prevent or authorize such an issue. It is as if powers were given to the President of the Board of Trade to limit or extend the trading of the iron industry. Banking is a trade or industry, and its note issue is part of its stock-in-trade, therefore why should any Chancellor of the Exchequer, or Secretary of the Treasury, control the stock-in-trade of a banker any more than the stock-in-trade of an ironmaster?

In conclusion, it seems to me that the aim of all true currency reformers in the United States should be to unwind and straighten out the tangled skein at present existing, rather than to force some entirely new system upon an unwilling people. In these efforts to carry out those reforms which still require to be accomplished, I feel confident they will have with them the best wishes of the Fellows, Associates, and Members of the Institute of Bankers.

#### DISCUSSION ON MR. MASON'S PAPER.

MR. A. S. HARVEY: The predominant feeling which I have whenever United States currency legislation is introduced is that one always wants about two hours to think of what one would wish to say, and then another two hours in which to say it. The truth is that nearly all the problems with which currency legislators have had to deal come up for settlement in the discussion of this legislation in America. It appears to me that the act is a great advance on everything that went before it, but it is probably more important as indicating the necessity for still further legislation than for what it really actually achieves.

I suspect that, having regard to the forces involved in the contest, there has hardly ever been a greater triumph of economic knowledge than in this act. We are proud to hear about the triumph of gold monometallism. I should like to say that I have observed in certain quarters in the discussion of United States currency legislation, on the part of Englishmen, just a taint of an air of patronage, as if somehow or another we had achieved so perfect a system ourselves that we might look down

with compassion upon those who are still wandering in the mazes of error. But the truth is, that when one understands our own currency history, and feels how we were groping before we reached the act of Sir Robert Peel, our attitude towards the United States must be one of heartiest sympathy, sympathy not unmixed with a little apprehension of what will happen to the Old Country when that vast Republic gets the full measure of its enormous resources and energies. At present we feel this, if they had said "We will be silver monometallists," well, they could have done that. Our plea must be that we are gold monometallists. We would say to America, if it were worth our while to say it, and if they would listen to it, "You have such resources that you can be silver "monometallists if you will, so long as you are not bimetallicists; that is all we ask."

Then we get to the question of legal tender. Were I an American, I should be proud of the greenbacks. They represent Mr. Chase's great expedient for carrying on the War, and thus embody in themselves one of the greatest struggles the world has seen. It is, accordingly, only natural that Americans should say that the greenback should be legal tender for everything, and if you admit that, what is to take their place on their abolition, particularly as National bank notes are not legal tender? Now, the doctrine of legal tender does not emerge in any nation so long as credit is first-rate and complete. A man might live in England for many a long year with good bills and checks around him, and it might not occur to him what legal tender was. We know that as practical bankers; but the moment there is a shock to credit in any way whatever, then legal tender emerges. It is, of course, the crux of the whole matter. Can anyone take the National banks of America and give their notes the power of legal tender? They are preparing for it, I think, because of the extraordinary tenacity and insistence with which the national audit of all the National banks is carried on. If you ever take the trouble to look over the reports of the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States I think you will come to the conclusion that no company in England is subject to anything so trying so far as such audit is concerned. Of course, we have our National bank in our Bank of England—we are proud of having an institution like that; but if, in order to do away with that, we should issue our own notes, under restrictions as to audit, etc., like the audit to which the National banks are exposed in the United States, I venture to say that the whole banking community of London would say "Give us our dear old Bank." We had better keep our reserve in one quarter. You notice that all nations that have got one central bank keep it, such as the Bank of France, the Reichsbank, and the Bank of England, but you cannot get a National bank in new countries. You cannot get it in America, and the difficulty therefore arises—how can you safely give the legal-tender attribute to the National bank notes? No doubt Mr. Gage will find his way by some form or another of insisting upon large metal reserves. I venture to think that those of us who have to do with practical currency here will feel that the reserve of coin in the National banks—twenty-five per cent. of liabilities—is hardly a sufficient reserve to allow their notes to have the attribute of legal tender.

As to bimetallicism, with all respect to the reader of this paper, I do not think you have heard the last of bimetallicism in America. I should say that the silver party there is so strong that there will be a constant effort in that direction. You never hear of bimetallicism when times are prosperous. Bimetallicism always comes to the front whenever there is a loss of credit, or a recrudescence of commercial depression. There is one further point I should like to bring home to my hearers, and that is this, that I do not think we sufficiently appreciate the advantage we have got in having removed the whole of our commercial and monetary system in its practical operations away from the Government. Now, think of the Chancellor of the Exchequer having to be responsible every morning of his life for something like \$750,000,000,



kept in Downing street, divided into two great departments—\$150,000,000 of reserve for greenbacks, and another great chest for the daily use of the Government for issues, etc., and for other forms of paper money which have to be redeemed. We have hit upon an admirable arrangement whereby our legal-tender note bears on it the name of the chief Cashier of the National bank, and which has been so well regulated that there is one promise which nobody ever doubts—it is the promise of the Bank of England that they will redeem that note in gold whenever anybody chooses to ask for it. The United States are, at present, in—I use the word with all respect—a semi-barbaric condition in having a Secretary of the Treasury sitting on enormous boxes of coin as our Chancellor of the Exchequer used to do in the Middle Ages. We have got beyond that and we have settled the problem of legal tender, and we shall look forward with great interest to see how the Americans will settle the question of the supply of adequate circulating mediums, and of legal tender.

Mr. HOWELL: I should be glad indeed if I could say anything that would add to the value of the discussion, but it seems to me that the subject of Mr. Mason's paper is one which can only be dealt with by those who, like himself, have had the opportunity of consulting authorities at first hand. I read the other day, I think it was in the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*, of New York, an article in which the writer said that the perfection of their monetary system is in sight, and I think they are taking steps to that end vigorously now. We know that the United States will be satisfied with nothing less than perfection, but how that is to be arrived at remains to be seen. But, of one thing I am quite sure, that necessarily—and especially by those who are in contact with and have business relations in the United States—whatever steps are taken in that direction must be regarded as of the greatest interest here. I think Mr. Mason's paper will certainly enable us on this side to appreciate the efforts made in the United States to bring about a currency reform, and it is due to Mr. Mason that an expression of the kind should be made. I have listened to the paper with the very greatest interest.

Mr. J. HERBERT TRITTON: We have all heard with pleasure the expression of the last speaker, namely, that we have listened to this paper with the greatest interest, and I entirely concur in that remark. Mr. Harvey has pointed out with admirable caution that the act of February 23, 1900, as it is called in the beginning of the paper, but which really received the President's signature on March 14, 1900, and is commonly referred to as the act of March 14, 1900—is but a step in the direction of currency reform. It is not, as was assumed somewhat too hastily, a perfect measure establishing a gold standard in the United States. On the face of it there are reservations. In the very first section there is one. On page 147 of the paper, section 1, is set forth and it provides:—"That the dollar, consisting of twenty-five and eight-tenths grains of gold, nine-tenths fine, as established by section 3,511 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, shall be the standard unit of value." Now, if it had stopped there all well and good, but it goes on "And all forms of money issued or coined by the United States shall be maintained at a parity of value with this standard, and it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to maintain such parity." That second clause indicates that it is far from perfection in the establishment of a gold standard. It is perfectly easy to conceive of a state of things under which such an enactment as that might be about parallel to an enactment providing that the pint pot shall be always equivalent to the quart pot. Then follows another very important qualification. In section 3, on page 149, reference is made to the legal-tender quality of the silver dollar, and the section provides "That nothing contained in this act shall be construed to affect the legal-tender quality as now provided by law, of the silver dollar, or of any other money coined or issued by the United States." In face of the acknowledged fact, as pointed out by Mr. Secretary

Gage, that the value of the silver dollar circulation of the United States is \$300,000,000 less than its face value, we are unable to look upon this act as finally establishing a gold standard. The standard of the United States can only be described, to my mind, as a halting standard at the present moment, and the carrying of \$600,000,000 in silver will, some time or other, give the United States Government a very difficult task if they wish, as I have no doubt they will wish, to maintain its legal-tender quality on a par with gold. Mr. Mason points out on page 150 that "During the years 1893 and 1894 when trade was depressed throughout America and the prices then ruling for the great staple productions of the country were very low, a less amount of currency was required to do the work of moving the crops than formerly. As a consequence the currency became redundant, leading to large gold exports." That is so, but he has not emphasised, as I thought perhaps he was going to emphasise as I read through the paper, the evils of the United States Government being bankers in addition to their other functions, in this way—all amounts due for external duties must be paid in coin into the Treasury. The consequence of this is that when there is a surplus—an excess of income over the expenditure of the Government—the Treasury becomes full, overcharged, and the amount is withdrawn from circulation—automatically withdrawn from circulation. When a series of deficits occur the opposite is the result—that coin from the Treasury and representation of coin, is forced into circulation automatically, and a redundancy occurs. It was that operation in the years 1893 and 1894 which added so largely to their difficulties—the forcing of this redundancy in the Treasury into circulation, and we shall see, I venture to prophesy, without any fear whatever, that the remarkable surpluses which are now accruing for the United States Government month by month will tighten up the money market there by the withdrawal of the circulating medium.

Then I would say one word or two—and with that I will finish—upon the most extraordinary provision which Mr. Mason sets forth on page 151:—"That the provisions of this act are not intended to preclude the accomplishment of international bimetallicism, whenever conditions shall make it expedient and practicable to secure the same by concurrent action of the leading commercial nations of the world, and at a ratio which shall insure the permanence of relative value between gold and silver." I apprehend that that was inserted in the act simply for political purposes and for no other purposes whatever, and, speaking as a very strong monometallist, I am very glad indeed to be of that conviction—that it has no more real meaning, other than a political meaning, than if it was non-existent. Taken as a whole, this act which we have been considering to-night appears to be a long step in the right direction, but possibly in a way which we have not yet seen. It seems to me that behind all the phraseology of it is the hope, if not the intention, that the act will turn out to be practically a funding act, the greenbacks eventually being funded in Government bonds and so withdrawn, and the National bank issue become the only issue of the United States. Whether that is a long process or a short process depends entirely, of course, upon the rapidity with which the managers of the National banks will absorb Government bonds paying this very low rate of interest. If they find it pays them to do so they will hasten the process; if they do not find it will pay they will not be very keen to take advantage of the new act. I am exceedingly grateful to Mr. Mason for his paper, and congratulate the institute that we have had the paper laid before us, and I trust it will enable us to look more intelligently and more carefully into that which concerns every business man in this country, for good or ill—the currency system of so great and prominent a neighbor as the United States of America.

Mr. MASON (in reply): I should like first to express my very sincere thanks for the courteous hearing you have given me to-night, and for the sympathetic remarks which have fallen from the various gentlemen who have taken part in the discussion.

With your permission I would refer to some of these remarks. Mr. Harvey fully agreed that that this act is only a step in currency reform, and drew a parallel with our own history; and it is interesting to remember with reference to the abolition of the double standard in England that this took place so far back as 1816, so that we may fairly hope that before long things in the United States may—I say it with all respect—may approach the position which we occupy to day.

Mr. Harvey made a very pertinent reference to the legal tender quality question, and pointed out that the question or the crux for Mr. Gage and the reformers in the United States is what is to take the place of the greenback which, as you are aware, is legal tender. Now, I venture to think that this can be largely got over by the very important fundamental principle of making the National bank note payable in gold on demand. This is the essence of sound banking—that the note should be made payable in gold on demand—and that would compel the several banks not only to maintain their reserves but to protect themselves automatically against their notes coming back to them and being presented by holders. That is a most important principle which I would like to lay emphasis upon—that a bank note should be made payable in gold upon demand. He also referred to the fact that in this country the Chancellor of the Exchequer does not have that additional burden of thinking and worrying himself over maintaining a reserve for the currency of this country, and I am sure our very much esteemed Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, would certainly agree with Mr. Harvey that if that were added to his present troubles the load would be, I am afraid, too much for him to bear.

A gentleman, a representative of a highly respected American house in this city, was good enough to make sympathetic and kindly references to my paper, and I assure him it was very pleasing to me, and the greatest reward I could have, that any efforts I have made are appreciated. Mr. Tritton kindly endorsed his statement, and I also beg to thank him for the way in which he spoke. He also was of the opinion, which I think is general amongst the various speakers, that while the act is but a step, still, as he has indicated, it is a great step forward, and to that extent we may congratulate ourselves and the United States that it is so. He referred to the qualifications in section 1, namely, that "The United States shall maintain all forms of money issued or coined at a parity of value with this standard." Now, I think, with all respect to what Mr. Tritton has said, that he is, perhaps, inclined to attribute too much importance to this qualification, because it undoubtedly does strengthen the standard, provided they would limit the legal-tender quality. The evil consists in the broad statement that you are going to maintain the parity of all coin and money issued without limiting the legal-tender quality of money other than gold. If the United States, as I have endeavored to point out, according to the teaching of the "Gresham Law" of currency, would put a limit to the legal-tender quality of currency other than gold, there would be no evil whatever. Section 5 is practically a repetition of what Mr. Tritton points out in section 1, only he brings it out more pointedly, namely, the obligation to maintain the parity of the silver dollar which, undoubtedly, if you do not limit the legal-tender quality, is essentially unsound. Then Mr. Tritton referred to the United States Government being engaged in the banking business, and he rather regretted that I did not enlarge more fully upon that particular point, and he rightly makes a very strong point in that. It is unquestionably a very great evil, and one of the greatest evils of the whole currency problem. It is essentially the function of bankers to provide the currency of countries, and not that of the governments, and even when dealing with people of the highest character you cannot provide for the case when men's judgment may fail; whereas by putting your currency in the hands of bankers whose function and whose trade is to provide for currency, although you cannot, in this world, get anything perfect, you are certainly laying the foundation for a more sound and more

perfect system of banking suitable to a country. I would point out, with reference to this, that I did not myself enlarge upon it to a great extent, because it is referred to by Mr. Gage, whom I knew would command great weight with you as an authority, occupying the position he does—if you will look at his speech, in which he refers to that which Mr. Tritton pointed out as a banker, you will see in the last sentence he says "Our independent Treasury to which I have already referred, absorbs the circulating medium when active business most requires its use, only to again disburse it when falling revenues—the effect of industrial dullness—bring about an excess of expenditure." That, as Mr. Tritton has rightly drawn our attention to and complained of, is a very important point, and really is at the root of a great many of the evils which the United States suffers from.

But in conclusion, I think we may, as Mr. Tritton has said, and as Mr. Harvey has said, look hopefully to the fact that the United States are more alive to the evils that exist in their system, and I may say that I was assured in Washington, that the majority of the Republican party, from a census which had been taken, was in favor of further currency reform. Although this act, as Mr. Tritton has said, was in many respects drawn up for political reasons, there is still an underlying feeling that men of influence, such as President McKinley, Senator Allison, Mr. Gage, and others who represent the powers of the Administration, along with many economists and others—are perfectly alive to the evils, but that it takes time to push forward reforms. I am sure every one will bear me out in that; but the fact that they are alive to it is the greatest encouragement, which we must all be glad to recognize.

The chairman having proposed a vote of thanks to the reader of the paper, this was briefly acknowledged by Mr. Mason, and the meeting then adjourned.

**Caught at Last.**—"No system of checks can prevent a dishonest employee from stealing," said a veteran business man and bank director of this city recently, "and the best deterrent I know of is an occasional overhauling of accounts by an outside actuary. If all hands feel that this is liable to happen at any moment, they are very apt to keep straight. The strong point about such examinations should be their unexpectedness. I don't believe in the rotation of bookkeepers or other trusted employees as a check on one another. Good men in the same establishment always have an aversion to tale-bearing, and in nine cases out of ten they will fail to report little things that would at once excite their suspicion in a ledger kept by a stranger. They don't want to run the risk of making a mistake and securing the everlasting enmity of a fellow employee. The man who makes the inspection should be brought, if possible, from another city.

That reminds me, by the way, of a remarkable story of collusion which was related to me lately by a National bank examiner of my acquaintance. One day he was going through the usual inspection of affairs at a solid old bank in a Northeastern city, when the Cashier suddenly toppled over in an apoplectic fit, and died almost instantly. His cash and accounts were found to be absolutely correct. Some months later the inspector dropped in to make an examination of another bank only a few doors away, and the Cashier promptly slipped out a side entrance and disappeared. It developed that he was short a large amount, and, when subsequently caught, a curious story leaked out. It seemed that both Cashiers were defaulters, and had been in the habit of helping each other out with cash to 'make good' when the examiner appeared. At the time the first man dropped dead he had about \$30,000 of the other bank's money, which he had intended to return next day. The tragedy left his friend in a terrible hole, as he had to shoulder both shortages, and when the examiner next arrived there was nothing to do but run. His statement was confirmed by ample extraneous evidence, but I don't believe it was ever given to the public in all its details."—*New Orleans Times-Democrat*.

**An Unfortunate Mistake.**—"That was a terrible typographical blunder your paper made," said the foreign nobleman to the editor.

"What was it?"

"You referred to the heiress I am about to marry as my fiancée!"—*Washington Star*.

## LIFE AND FIRE INSURANCE.

---

### INSURANCE AND CREDITS.

The officers of banks and investors generally are paying more and more attention to the matter of insurance. It has often happened that firms which were rated high in the mercantile reports have been completely ruined by a destructive fire, solely because their property was not properly insured. The amount of insurance and the responsibility of the companies carrying the risks are legitimate subjects of investigation when credit is desired, and yet it is a matter often ignored. If a firm has a large quantity of unincumbered property and assets largely exceed liabilities, the possibility of a conflagration is seldom considered; but the wise man is careful, at all times, to entrench himself against all possible danger.

The merchant should understand that bankers and others from whom they obtain credit feel more confidence in the ability and soundness of those who are at all times well insured against loss by fire. Every statement made by a firm desiring a line of discounts or other forms of credit should include a statement of the fire insurance carried and a list of the companies taking the risks.

---

### EXPANSION OF LIFE ASSURANCE.

This great business will bear favorable comparison in growth with that of finance, of territory and of population, as proven by the figures given below :

	<i>Premium receipts.</i>	<i>Claims paid.</i>
1849.....	\$942,941	\$287,738
1874.....	89,434,996	23,797,859
1899.....	283,038,362	111,788,601

The amount of insurance in force in 1890 was \$4,049,578,567, and in 1899, \$7,774,280,005.

Sixty-nine life insurance companies in the United States possess total assets amounting to \$1,595,208,408.

A short time ago the National banks in the United States, then about thirty-six hundred in number, possessed a paid-up capital, surplus funds and undivided profits amounting to \$956,288,684.

The same life companies reported 5,638,095 policy-holders.

The same National banks reported 1,991,183 depositors.

The entire surplus fund of the thirty-six hundred National banks amounted to \$248,449,234 at the time under consideration.

The life insurance companies in the United States during the past year have paid out in death claims, dividends, surrenders, annuities, etc., a total amount reaching \$263,819,276.

It will thus be seen that in a single year the life companies in this country paid to their policy holders and beneficiaries a sum greater than the entire surplus fund of all the National banks in the United States.

---

### PARTNERSHIP LIFE INSURANCE.

The placing of some exceptionally large life insurance policies upon the lives of members of large firms, payable to the surviving partners in case of the death of

either of the individual members, has attracted attention to this form of adding to the financial strength and credit of partnerships. One of the largest life companies is making a sort of specialty of this class of insurance. The company says:

"Business firms need protection because the death of a partner in many cases brings about a serious financial crisis in the affairs of the partnership. Frequently it means the withdrawal of capital at the very time when additional funds are needed for the settlement of partnership debts or for the purchase of the interests of the heirs.

It often occurs, also, that competing concerns are encouraged by this fact to make onslaughts on the business which has been placed in a critical condition through the withdrawal of one of its main supports, and the business thus attacked will then have need of all its resources.

Few mercantile or manufacturing houses fail to protect their perishable stock and property against the chance of loss by fire, and yet the death of a partner may work much greater disaster than a fire loss, unless protection is secured.

Financial difficulties in which a firm may find itself involved through the death of one of its members may be entirely avoided and often the necessity of dissolution or liquidation may be obviated by partnership life insurance, which thus becomes an important factor in the credit of the firm."

The following letter showing the value of partnership insurance was received by a prominent life insurance company recently :

"In almost all business partnerships the death of either partner is productive of great inconvenience, if not of disastrous results, unless the surplus capital of the firm, not absolutely invested in its daily transactions, is sufficiently large to make the withdrawal of capital a matter of little inconvenience to the survivors. This applies in the majority of cases to men engaged in all active business enterprises, and it is most important in the death of either partner that his life should be insured for such an amount as would compensate the firm in some degree, not only for the necessary withdrawal of his portion of the capital, but also for the loss of the services of the deceased.

Moreover, apart from the investment feature, pure and simple, partnership insurance is an important factor in the credit of a firm. Where partnership insurance is held, the necessity of dissolution or liquidation, in the event of the death of either partner, is very much lessened if not obviated altogether."

### LIFE INSURANCE AND BANKS.

In a circular recently issued by a prominent life insurance company the following comparison is made between the stockholders of banks and policy holders of life insurance companies :

"Insurance companies are as important financial institutions as banks, and represent equally important affairs. We invite your attention to a brief comparison between the stockholders of banks and the policy holders of insurance companies, to emphasize the fact that the policy holder of an insurance company and the stockholder of a bank should be equally interested in the success of their respective corporations.

The stockholder is proud of the good name of his bank, speaks a friendly word in its behalf, adds a customer when able to do so, and is constant and consistent, by effort and influence, to strengthen the institution in which he has invested his money. In short, he labors to build up, not to tear down, and every person expects this from a bank stockholder. Indeed, it is so common a rule, that it is a "take-it-for-granted" business affair. The result of such good judgment and wise action needs no comment. It is apparent in the safety and solidity of the bank, with its increased strength and enlarged reputation. Are we able to make the same statement concerning the interest that a policy holder takes in his insurance company? Are not policy holders and stockholders equally interested in their corporations along the same common lines, and for the same common purpose—their protection and profit?

If the foregoing suggestions regarding stockholders are correct, are they not equally truthful and forceful regarding policy holders? In this connection may we ask you to further consider the brief statement above made, after changing the name of 'stockholder' to 'policy holder' and the name of 'bank' to 'insurance company.' Then read it with the same degree of care that you read the statement referring to your bank, and it will surely awaken a deeper interest on your part, as well as on the part of others who have invested their money in the company, and will cause yourself and other policy holders to practically aid in promoting the success of the insurance company in which you are members."

## ADJUSTMENT OF FIRE LOSSES.

In vetoing a bill passed by the Legislature of Colorado the Governor of that State lays down some general principles regarding fire insurance and the adjustment of losses. The bill provides that the total amount of insurance should be paid—no matter what the value of the property was—if the property was wholly destroyed.

"It is argued, by reason of the fact that insurance companies are often dilatory and many times arbitrary in making proper adjustment with legitimate claimants, that some such means as this is necessary in order to protect policy-holders from being compelled to adjust their losses on the basis offered by the insurers or be compelled to resort to the courts for an adjudication, which adds an increased burden upon the insured and also entails great delay in the adjustment of his claims.

While there is much foundation for an argument of this character, still I am convinced that a measure of this character should not be allowed to become a law and should have no place upon our statute books. We have the advantage of the experience gained by other States where such a law has been enacted and has become operative, and the universal testimony is, and has been, that it has materially increased the rate of insurance and the ratio of losses has become vastly larger, giving rise to the supposition that such a law operates in favor of the incendiary and to the detriment of the honest man, thereby compelling the honest man to pay for the frauds perpetrated by the dishonest man.

In 1900 Governor Shaw of Iowa vetoed a bill of this character, in which he says: 'In order to reduce the loss to the minimum there must be some inducement for the owner of the property to throw water rather than oil on incipient fires. \* \* \* Over-insurance and over-valuation are conducive to fraud, perjury and arson; they breed crime—the most dangerous and demoralizing. Commonwealths which, in obedience to a false public clamor, have engrafted a contrary principle upon their insurance laws, have reaped the whirlwind, and in the end honest insurers have to pay the penalty of increased rates. The experience of our sister and neighboring State of Ohio has been that under the valued policy law the amount of risks written increased rapidly, but the losses increased even more strikingly.'

## LIFE INSURANCE A SCIENCE.

In the Massachusetts Insurance Report for 1892 the importance of a thorough knowledge of life insurance by business men is emphasized as follows:

"Life insurance management is a science, as well as a trade to be learned. In any other as important profession, years of careful study, practice and experience are needed to bring reliable skill, and even these by no means always bring out a successful practitioner.

But every uninstructed idler is sure he knows all about life insurance, and fools rush in where wise men tread with diffidence and frequent misgivings, and in none of the employments in life is it more true than in insurance management that honest ignorance is more fatal and dangerous than designing fraud."

## BANKERS AND LIFE INSURANCE.

A well-informed insurance man recently said: "The average banker is woefully deficient in knowledge concerning life insurance. He shows this both in the way he insures his own life and in the way he treats life policies as collateral for loans and discounts. A properly drawn life or endowment policy on the life of a reputable business man is one of the very best forms of security, and yet only a comparatively few bankers use them for such purposes.

## EXPERT ADVICE ON LIFE INSURANCE.

In a report of the State Insurance Department of Massachusetts attention is called to the necessity of expert advice when contracting for life or endowment insurance. The report says:

"There is, perhaps, no business transacted among men, defined by written terms, that is so one-sided and absolutely blind to one of the parties as the modern life insurance policy. In all cases the contract is drawn up by the shrewdest technical skill. It is filled with terms,

stipulations and conditions which are, and from the nature of the case, must be, a wholly unknown and mysterious tongue to the average applicant. He asks for an ordinary life policy, for instance, and what purports to be such is given him. He doesn't read it, for he knows it would be a waste of time and no use; he could know no better then than before. He relies wholly upon the representations of the agent and reputation of the company, and thousands and thousands of times he has been deceived by the sharp solicitor."

#### REASONS FOR NOT INSURING YOUR LIFE.

1. If you are sure you cannot die there is no use in providing for a contingency when there cannot be one.
2. If you expect to get insurance for nothing, don't insure.
3. If you know you are too careless and indifferent to keep up your insurance, don't insure.
4. If you need your money for tobacco and whisky, and get your support from your family, don't insure.
5. If you are too selfish to wish any comfort for others, because you can't enjoy it yourself, don't insure.
6. If you prefer useless luxuries for yourself to reasonable provision for your family, don't insure.—*Western Economist*.

#### INSURANCE THAT INSURES.

The word "insurance" is in some respects a misnomer, in that to be insured does not guarantee perpetual life nor immunity against fire. But rightly viewed, the tendency of insurance ought to be to reduce the mortality rate and to decrease the number and extent of fires. Perhaps this feature of insurance is too frequently lost sight of. On this point a recent issue of "The Review," of Melbourne, Australia, says:

"On all sides we hear of the beneficent influence of life assurance, but when 'sifted down' it hardly comes up to its claims so fully as it might. We do not deprecate in the least such benefits as provision for the widow and the fatherless which whole-life policies insure, nor the comfort to age which endowments and annuities provide; but we should like to see life assurance doing more to ensure life. Every one who knows anything at all on the subject, knows very well that the average limit of life might be very considerably extended if the world would but set about the task in earnest; and surely the example might be very profitably set by life assurance itself. The result of such endeavors would not be a single profit, or a double profit, but, at least, a treble profit: first, by improved opportunities for investment; second, by a large accession of business and, third, by reduced mortality.

The directions in which improvement might be made are many and various, but it is not necessary either that all these directions be pointed out at once, or that the whole of them be simultaneously undertaken. To give the friends of life assurance something to take serious thought about is rather our present object.

Healthy homes, healthy habits, healthy hopes! These may be set down as the main-springs of longevity, for there are few things really worth having that may not be classed under at least one of these heads.

**HEALTHY HOMES:** In both the previous issues of our present volume we have had something to say on the question of house purchase by life assurance societies, and we are determined to keep this 'great idea' to the front. Life assurance means accumulated funds, and accumulated funds mean, or ought to mean, profitable investment.

Even in the past, and at the present, the methods adopted by life assurance societies for the investment of their funds have been and are by no means of the best, but the same system pursued must be still worse in the future.

Surely it must be patent to all that a society that has all the machinery for collecting money in small sums ought to be able to do much better with its funds than by handing them over in large sums for others to use. There should be as much profit in the employment of the funds collected as in any other branch of life assurance.

In providing healthy homes for the policy-holders, a life society might very easily earn from two to three per cent. better interest than is to be got by loaning its funds in large sums, and at the same time vastly increase its legitimate business of increasing lives. Add to these



advantages the profit resulting from the improved health of the assured lives, and a trio of benefits appear that should be fascinating enough for any life society.

Knowing how greatly health is affected by locality and home surroundings, it is truly remarkable that life societies have not done more to prolong life. With funds waiting for investment, it seems strange indeed that such a chance should be missed.

A further point in favor of making the provision of homes for policy-holders a leading feature of life assurance is that business done under it would be much more likely to last than the average of that now done. Some offices and some actuaries think that lapses are a source of profit, but do they fully realize that it is the healthiest lives who mostly lapse their policies, leaving the delicate men to persevere and become claims? There will, of course, always be some careless people lapsing their policies, and even the fact of a house being partly paid for would not prevent all men from taking their surrender value. In such cases, however, there would be a better profit, and from two causes: a less proportion would disappear in expenses, and there would be a lapsing profit on the property, as well as on the policy.

**HEALTHY HABITS:** As every assurance man must know, there are large numbers of policy-holders whose lives are daily becoming more dangerous risks because of the want of practical acquaintance with the laws of health. They feel that their 'tone' in the matter of health is lowered, and consult a chemist, or cheap doctor, who, at a good profit to himself, furnishes a counter-irritant. Even the best doctors find this plan simpler and more profitable than the vastly more efficacious alternative of discovering and insisting upon the removal of the cause or causes. The plan of 'tinkering' with the constitution of men handsomely pays the doctor and the undertaker, but it is most unprofitable to the life office. Were the medical staff of a life office charged with the healthy up-keep of its policy-holders, a vast improvement would soon be the result. In the first place much more care would be taken in the admission of lives, and in the second place, 'prevention' would largely abolish the need of 'cure.'

There are some shipowners who insist on their captains having a monetary interest in the vessels they command. Surely it would be a comforting thought to a patient to feel that those charged with the care of his health had a pecuniary interest in his longevity. With how much more respect would he be likely to regard the 'hints on health' furnished him by those having much to gain by keeping him healthy. Yet this branch of life assurance—true 'life' assurance—might be one of the most profitable as well as the most humane.

**HEALTHY HOPES:** The provision of healthy homes and the encouragement of healthy habits would do much to stimulate healthy hopes, which, as is well known, powerfully conduce to longevity. In this, however, special suggestions are less easy; but it may be said generally that the life office of the future will be that which makes the postponement of death, rather than the mere provision for it, the chief object of its existence.

It is well known that wives frequently entertain a deep-rooted prejudice against their husbands insuring against the monetary misfortunes usually inseparable from the early death of the breadwinner; but no such prejudice could be found to exist against a society whose main object was the prolongation of life."

**For a National Tax Conference.**—P. I. Bonebrake, President of the Central National Bank of Topeka, Kas., has signed a call with others for a conference to discuss the subject of taxation, to be held at Buffalo, N. Y., May 23 and 24. Other men who have signed are George R. Peck of Chicago, Hon. Charles S. Fairchild of New York, Governor Voorhees of New Jersey, Oscar S. Strauss of New York, Hon. Lawrence Y. Sherman of Illinois, and others of equal fame on the question of economics. The call reads:

"The problem of just taxation is no longer a local problem. It cannot be solved without considering the mutual relations of contiguous States and localities. An unequal tax on the farmer in one State may make it difficult for him to sell his products in the world markets. An unjust tax upon the manufacturer or business man may drive him out of business; an unfair tax on the corporation may cause it to move to another State. Action by any one commonwealth evidently reacts upon its neighbor.

Among the questions pressing for solution and which will be considered at this conference are the following: First, the inter-State taxation of quasi-public corporations; second, the taxation of personal property; third, the taxation of mortgages; fourth, the separation of State and local revenues; fifth, the taxation of the farmer; sixth, the equitable assessment of real property; seventh, the inheritance tax; eighth, taxation of corporations; ninth, the franchise tax; tenth, the income tax. All of these subjects must be considered not in and of themselves, but also in relation to the complications of inter-State taxation."

## THE ETHICS OF ACCOUNTING.

[From the "Accountants' Magazine," Edinburgh.]

"Five great intellectual professions, relating to daily necessities of life, have hitherto existed—three exist necessarily, in every civilized nation—

The Soldier's profession is to *defend* it,

The Pastor's to *teach* it,

The Physician's to *keep it in health*,

The Lawyer's to *enforce justice* in it,

The Merchant's to *provide* for it,

and the duty of all these men is, on due occasion, to *die* for it."

—RUSKIN, "Unto This Last," 12th edition, p. 21.

It may well be doubted whether Ruskin, were he now alive, would yet acknowledge the existence of a sixth "great intellectual profession," but in 1860, when the above words were first published in the "Cornhill Magazine," accounting or accountancy was barely past its infancy, and even the most profession-proud accountant will surely excuse him for having overlooked, at that time, the claims of the youthful calling. The two Scottish Societies of Accountants in Edinburgh and Glasgow were certainly in existence, having been incorporated by Royal Charter in 1854 and 1855 respectively; but at these dates the numerical membership was small, and the conditions enforced upon applicants for admission easily complied with. Not until 1870 did English accountants follow the example of their Scottish neighbors by making a similar effort, in Liverpool, to organize the profession and secure its recognition. Since that date accountancy has progressed rapidly. The qualifications for admission to the great English and Scottish societies have been gradually raised to a high standard, with the result that members of these bodies are now very generally and lawyers in the law or parsons in divinity. Still, accounting as a profession is a justly regarded as being at least as skilled in the science, or art, of accounts as law—modern product; it is only within very recent times that the commercial world has begun to awake to the necessity for the expert accountant's existence. The time may indeed be past when an accountant could be described as a "man who could give no other account of himself;" but a haziness still envelops the public view of an accountant's duty, which has done much to detract from his value as a useful factor in commerce. There is still a tendency on the part of the commercial world to misunderstand the real position of the profession, either regarding it as a sort of carrion-crow of trade (a view very common in Scotland at least), or demanding from it an infallibility which is not as a rule expected from frail humanity. Though therefore accountancy cannot yet be regarded as one of the great "intellectual professions," it has certainly reached that stage in its development at which it will be useful, both to accountants and to the public, to indicate its true function in the economy of commerce.

Accountancy, says a modern encyclopædia, is "a distinct profession, which deals in any required way with mercantile accounts." The most commonly "required way" in which an accountant's services are employed is that which is covered by the term "auditing," and a brief consideration of this branch of an accountant's work will conveniently lead up to the determination of the true function of accounting in commercial life.

The duties and responsibilities of auditors form the subject of considerable discussion, much of it, like the criticisms levelled at generals in time of war, as unin-

formed as it well could be. The responsibility of certifying the absolute accuracy of statements purporting to represent the true financial position of a business has by common consent been laid upon the auditor, though the means which an auditor has at his disposal for so doing are hardly ever considered.

The balance-sheet of a company is the document which contains the statement of its financial position, but it is seldom realized that this statement is nothing more, and never can be anything more, than an estimate. From past experience an insurance company may estimate its probable outstanding liability in respect of the policies in force, or a trading company may place certain prices upon the value of its stock-in-trade. Estimated profits or losses on contracts which are nearly completed at the date of the balance-sheet may be taken, and quite honestly taken, into account, or estimated amounts may be provided for bad debts or depreciation of buildings, plant, machinery, &c. No matter what the business of a company is, there will be found items in the balance-sheet which are, at the best, but carefully calculated estimates. It is not to be supposed that a balance-sheet is in consequence of no value, or that an auditor's powers of checking fraudulent or wildly optimistic estimates are a negligible quantity, but the fact should be recognized, and the circumstances under which the calculations are made should be understood. Thus assuming that these estimates are made with the honest intention of placing a fair and reliable figure upon them, they are almost invariably calculated upon what is known as a "going-concern" basis; that is, they are intended to represent the value to the company itself in its continued existence. If through sudden misfortune the company in question were forced to realize any asset, or its whole business, these estimates would probably be very wide of the mark, and would have to be recalculated on a new basis before they could be considered reliable. It is not until a company is wound up that the difference between these two bases emerges, and it is precisely at that point that ignorant criticism of the value of an audit becomes rampant. For example, if a factory costs £50,000 to build and equip, and by successful management earns substantial dividends for the shareholders, the company is perfectly justified in continuing to enter in its balance-sheet as the value of that asset the cost price less the usual depreciation. If, however, the company falls upon bad times, mismanagement or misfortune results in heavy losses, and the factory is eventually sold for a tenth of its cost price, it must surely be obvious that no amount of auditing could have saved the shareholders from loss. Yet it would be surprising if no member of the public pointed out this factory, which realized £5000, had been "certified" by the auditor at the date of the last balance-sheet as being worth £50,000. It ought to be equally apparent that when a professional accountant holds the office of auditor, as is almost invariably the case, it is unreasonable to expect that he can guarantee a fair statement of such an asset as stock-in-trade. Even an expert valuation of this item would only be an expression of opinion, which might or might not have any real value.

The law courts are of course perfectly versed in the limits within which an auditor can be held responsible, but an accountant's reputation, which is after all his most valuable asset, is more in the hands of the public than of the Court, and reputations are notoriously delicate things. Though an honorable and capable auditor has nothing to fear from the law, he is often forced to suffer unjustly from the contemptuous comments of "the man in the street," and the real value of an auditor's work is obscured by the failure of the public to understand its nature.

In cases of deliberate fraud which have escaped the auditor's vigilance, shareholders and the public may have more cause for complaint; but, as it has been well stated by Lord Justice Lopes in a recent case, "An auditor is not bound to be a detective, or to approach his work with suspicion, or with a foregone conclusion that there is something wrong. He is a watchdog, but not a bloodhound." And

again, "Auditors must not be made liable for not tracking out ingenious and carefully-laid schemes of fraud when there is nothing to arouse their suspicion, and when those frauds are perpetrated by tried servants of the company, and are undetected for years by the directors." If the significance of these *dicta* could be fully grasped by the public there would be an end to misunderstanding and unjust comment. It is not to be doubted that the auditor's position as a "watchdog" is a very potent influence toward the attainment of fairness and honesty in the preparation and presentation of accounts. It behooves every member of the accountant's profession who holds the position of auditor to enforce this truth on the public mind, and to combat the absurd notion that because he is not the possessor of a divining-rod his work is of no value.

"A man embarrassed in his circumstances," says Goethe, "and conducting them imprudently, likes best to continue in the dark; he will not gladly reckon up the debtor entries he is charged with. But, on the other hand, there is nothing to a prudent manager more pleasant than daily to set before himself the sums of his growing fortune." So far so good, but that which formerly had been merely a *pleasure* to the "prudent manager" has now become a *necessity*. The man who keeps no record, or a faulty record, of his business transactions will seldom, if ever, be found among the successful men of business. Further, the pleasure of keeping a reliable record of one's "growing fortune" is not only a necessary ingredient of *successful* trading—it is undoubtedly one of the conditions of honest and straightforward dealing. In devoting his energies, therefore, to developing the best methods of assisting commerce in this respect, and in directing, supervising and advising managers on questions of accounting, the accountant may safely boast that he is aiding his fellow men not only to success but to honorable success.

In the management and supervision of trust and other moneys which are frequently entrusted to accountants, the profession possesses another field of action in which it is well qualified to discharge very valuable services; but as the public, as a rule, duly appreciates the value of the duties involved in such business, and the manner in which they are performed by accountants, it is unnecessary to deal at length with the subject here. Some mists still obscure the public view of a third branch of an accountant's work, however, giving rise to the "carrion-crow" theory, and a brief consideration of this may assist in clearing away the fogs.

This view of the profession's work is, of course, due to the accountant's frequent connection with bankruptcy proceedings. Accountants are commonly represented, by a certain section of the public, as hovering over the battle-field of commerce, waiting and watching for casualties in the fight, and ready to swoop down to pick the bones of the victims. Bankruptcy work is, however, but a side branch of the profession's work; it can hardly be regarded, indeed, as "accounting," in the strict sense of the word, at all. True, the funds placed in trust in a liquidator's hands must be accurately accounted for to creditors and debtor, but in the process of winding-up an estate this forms a small part of the duties involved. Business and legal knowledge are the essentials; accounting an accessory. In accounting proper, the business and legal knowledge are the accessories. The fact that accountants are usually chosen for the office of liquidator, or trustee in bankruptcy, is, therefore, a gratuitous compliment paid to the calling by the public—justified certainly by the careful study the profession has given to the subject, for it argues the belief that accountants can be relied upon to perform the frequently difficult and thankless tasks of realizing, managing and distributing a bankrupt's funds in the most expeditious and advantageous manner possible under the circumstances. The survival of the fittest, and the rooting out of the unfit, seem to be the rules by which trade, like all human activity, progresses. Men, therefore, who by training and experience are capable of carrying out this process by orderly and dependable methods render a

very considerable service to their fellow men. By their means a vast amount of confusion, anxiety and disaster is undoubtedly obviated, and the injurious effect which the failure of any unit of trade may have upon the prosperity of the whole is reduced to a minimum. There may be, doubtless there are, accountants whose one object in winding up an estate is to secure as large a fee as possible for themselves, but the fact that black sheep exist in their flock, as in all others, need not prevent honorable practitioners in this branch of accounting from demanding, nor the public from according them, due recognition as valuable factors in the progress of commerce.

These three forms of activity—namely, accounting proper, which includes the auditor's work and the presentation of accounts in accurate and proper form; the administration of trust and other funds; and the management of bankrupt estates—represent the principal work of the accountant, and, when the extent and intricacy of modern mercantile interests are taken into consideration, it is not too much to say that the existence of a distinct profession for the performance of the duties involved is amply justified. It is hardly necessary to add that in no profession more than in that of accounting are the qualities of sterling honesty and determination to exhibit the truth essential, for the recognition in commerce of the fact that "honesty is the best policy" is the very reason of the accountant's existence. If, therefore, an accountant keeps these ideals ever before him, he will have strong justification for agreeing with the estimable Mr. John Tipp, who, Charles Lamb tells us, thought "an accountant the greatest character in the world, and himself the greatest accountant in it."

HENRY C. ANDERSON.

#### THE MAGAZINE'S PRIZE ARTICLES.

Announcement is made elsewhere of a number of prizes offered by THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE for the best articles on a number of practical banking topics. Great interest is being taken in the matter by bank officers and clerks, as may be seen from the following extracts from a few of the many letters received:

"I have received your circular concerning prize contributions. The idea is a good one, and much valuable information is likely to be imparted by this means."—From D. B. Andrus, Cashier First National Bank, Batavia, Ill.

"Your idea is an excellent one."—From the Manager of the Union Bank of Halifax, Kentville, N. S.

"This work that you have begun is a very commendable one, and we hope to see the interest it richly deserves manifested by the younger banking fraternity throughout America."—From Wyatt H. Ingram, Jr., Trust Officer Farmers' Bank and Trust Co., Henderson, Ky.

"Allow me to express my sympathy with the educational work you have undertaken."—From Darwin G. Jones, Manager Atlanta Clearing-House Association.

"I am glad to see THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE take an interest in the financial and business education of the younger men in the banking business, a matter too much neglected by banking and financial publications."—From W. E. von Bonnborst, Cashier Marine National Bank, Pittsburg.

While many papers have been received on the respective topics, the offer is still open, and all bank officers and clerks are cordially invited to send in their contributions.

Papers must be received by the MAGAZINE not later than July 1, as publication of the series will be commenced in that number.

## AN ANTIPODEAN VIEW.

From "The Review," Melbourne, Australia.

Last month we spoke of the dawn of a more rational conception as to the security requisite for the safety of bank notes, calling attention to some valuable suggestions by Mr. C. A. Conant. Since then, we have further evidence that America is determined not to let this question sleep. As our readers well know, we have no unbounded admiration for the methods of banking in vogue in the United States. There are more than ten times too many banks, and the largest is smaller than the smallest should be, while the small ones are unworthy the name of bank. But, this superlative drawback notwithstanding, the bankers of the United States are awakening to the fact that paper money is as yet to be understood; that people are afraid of it simply because they do not understand it. They are beginning to realize that the true use of a note is not to show that some one holds its face value in metal money, but rather that the holder has performed some service to the nation, or to one or more of its units, and is, therefore, entitled to services in return. Why there should necessarily be a particular metal at the back of such a certificate, is the question that the Americans are beginning to ask, and they are not likely to be put off with an evasive answer. There is no more conservative organ in America than RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING, yet this is how it speaks on the subject of "Credit as a Basis of Currency":

(Here follows a quotation from a MAGAZINE editorial, in which comparisons were made between an individual issuing his credit notes in the form of checks and the bank issuing its notes.)

The case of the trusted individual issuing his notes for the use of a circle of customers is well put, and shows an understanding of the question quite uncommon; but it is not perfect. Too much importance is laid on the point of faith in the individual. Although it is not expressly stated, it is assumed that the issuer of the notes has been able in some way to convince his customers of his ability to pay the notes himself if required, whereas no such confidence is needed. All that is necessary is that the borrowers of the notes shall give reasonable security for their return when demanded, and that the interest shall cover all expenses and losses. There is no need for greater capacity or greater honesty than is essential in any other kind of banking. Securities would be released only on the return of the notes, which could not be re-issued except against fresh security. Only notes returned by way of interest, without in the least affecting the security, could be used for expenses, or for the making good of losses which might occur from the depreciation of securities. It makes not the slightest difference to the banker whether he has lent notes or gold on a bad security, and neither does it to an innocent holder of the bank note, so long as there is a sufficient provision for losses, which would be less rather than more under the new than under the present system, because there would always be a sufficiency of currency to be had against adequate security, which would have the effect of keeping values more stable than they can ever be under a system that enables creditors to demand satisfaction of their claims in one particular and very scarce form of currency.

Once fairly started, matters move rapidly in America. We shall expect great results from this intelligent search for improved systems of banking. Bank amalgamation is one of the great needs of the States. The formation of one solid bank out of every hundred of those that now exist would have a wonderful effect on the banking conditions of America. Her banking institutions would command from the world at large a respect that is now impossible.

## THE WORLD'S INDEBTEDNESS.

---

The recent announcement of a new British loan of \$300,000,000 lends interest to a statement just issued by the Treasury Bureau of Statistics regarding the national debts of the world.

This statement shows in brief that the national debts of the world aggregated more than \$30,000,000,000 at the close of the nineteenth century, or ten times as much as in the closing years of the eighteenth century.

In 1793, at the beginning of the Napoleonic wars, the national debts of the world amounted to approximately two and one-half billion dollars; in 1900 they were, according to the best information obtainable, thirty-one billion dollars.

In general terms it may be said that the world's national indebtedness in 1900 aggregated ten times what it did at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Mean-time population has increased 150 per cent., and gold and silver, which form the basis of the money with which debt payments are made, 300 per cent., though the proportion of the existing gold and silver which is turned into coin is now much greater than at the beginning of the nineteenth century, while the utilization of the various forms of credit as currency may have increased the world's circulating medium quite in proportion to the increase in its national debts.

Whether national wealth has increased as rapidly as national indebtedness is equally difficult to determine, since official estimates of national wealth were made at the beginning of the century in the case of only a few nations. The wealth of the United Kingdom, France, Spain and the United States in 1800 is estimated at \$20,244,640,000, while Mulhall in 1895 estimated their wealth at \$195,759,829,000, or practically ten times that at the beginning of the century. The debts of these four nations in 1793 aggregated but \$1,630,279,000, and in 1900 were \$11,764,000,000, or seven times as much as in 1793. If the rate of growth in wealth which has characterized the four nations whose growth during the century may be also properly applied to the world at large, it may be said that the growth of national wealth has about kept pace with that of national indebtedness, since national wealth in the cases where it can be measured is to-day ten times as great as at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and the national indebtedness, where it can be measured, is to-day about ten times what it was at the beginning of the century, as may be seen from the following table :

*National Indebtedness of the World.*

1793.....	\$2,433,250,000	1872.....	22,410,232,000
1820.....	7,290,750,000	1882.....	26,249,901,000
1848.....	8,419,045,000	1901.....	31,493,749,000
1862.....	13,382,375,000		

This enormous increase in national indebtedness is chiefly the result of wars, standing armies, and works of public utility. To this may be added a tendency in many cases to create an annual deficit by expenditures exceeding revenues made in deference to popular demand, which deficits ultimately take the form of funded or bonded indebtedness. But the bulk of these enormous debts is from war and war preparations and the construction of public works, such as railways, canals, harbors, and the improvement of waterways. Of the railways of the world, whose total cost has been estimated at \$30,000,000,000, about one-third are owned by national gov-

ernments, indicating that approximately one-third of the increase in indebtedness has been applied to works of this character. But the fact that great wars have compelled the nations engaged in them to instantly make enormous additions to their funded indebtedness, clearly identifies this as the principal factor in the great increase in national indebtedness which has characterized the history of national finances in the nineteenth century. In 1748 the debt of England was £76,000,000, while the Seven Years War brought it in 1763 to about £183,000,000. The years of peace intervening between that date and the beginning of the American war somewhat reduced the debt, but at the termination of the war with the American Colonies in 1784 the debt of England was £278,000,000. A reduction followed during the ten years of peace, but the twenty-one years of war from 1794 to 1815 left the total debt at £902,000,000, the highest point which it has ever reached. The thirty-nine years of peace which followed reduced it to £800,000,000, but the Crimean War, which lasted two years, again increased it to £884,000,000, while the South African war at the close of the century recorded another increase of £30,000,000 of funded indebtedness, besides a considerable increase by exchequer bonds, to which may still be added the recent loan of £60,000,000 just announced.

Turning to France, the evidence of increased indebtedness by war is equally apparent. Her national debts at the beginning of the Second Empire are estimated by Baxter at £245,000,000, and by the expenses of the Crimean, Italian, Chinese, Cochinchina, Mexican and German wars, had, according to the same authority, reached £550,000,000 by 1871, while the issuance of securities amounting to 2,277 million francs in 1871 testifies to the cost of her war with Germany.

In our own history the increase of the interest-bearing debt from \$657,000,000 in 1860 to \$2,881,000,000 in 1865, and from \$347,000,000 in 1898 to \$1,046,000,000 in 1899, further evidences the relation of war to the growth of national indebtedness. The relation of war, with its ever-increasing cost, to national indebtedness is further shown by a study of the detailed debt statements of the world at various periods during the century, presented in the preceding table. From 1798 to 1848 national debts only increased from \$2,483,000,000 to \$8,419,000,000. The latter half of the century, however, has experienced great and costly wars, the Crimean, the Civil War in the United States, the Franco-Prussian, the war between China and Japan, and those of the closing years of the century—and accompanying this period the national debts have grown from \$8,419,000,000 in 1848 to \$31,500,000,000 in 1901.

**What a Bucket Shop Is.**—When a customer desires to "buy" a certain stock—it is really to bet on a rise in the price—he gives the Cashier his money, or, theoretically, his "margin," and receives a "ticket," or receipt, wherein the firm acknowledges having purchased a certain number of shares of a certain stock for the customer's account and risk, at the last quoted price. Thus, if you wish to go "long" of five shares of Atchison stock at 45, you deposit \$5, and receive your receipt showing you have purchased the five shares at  $45\frac{1}{4}$ —the fraction representing the bucket-shop commission for buying, which is the same that is charged by members of the New York Stock Exchange. Should the stock rise to 46 you would "cash in," or take your profits—receive the difference between  $45\frac{1}{4}$  and  $45\frac{3}{4}$ , the last eighth being deducted for the selling commission, so that on a one-point rise you make \$3.75 on your five shares. On the other hand, if the price declined  $\frac{1}{4}$  point to  $44\frac{1}{4}$  you are "wiped"; you lose your entire \$5. The commissions for buying and selling are house's "rake-off," and you really have a run of only  $87\frac{1}{2}$  cents for your dollar. In the smaller bucket-shops, where they take orders for two shares—and even for one share—they deduct both commissions at once, so that your ticket would read, "Bought one share of Atchison at  $45\frac{1}{4}$ ," instead of  $45\frac{1}{4}$ , as in the others, or 45, as it would be in a legitimate office. Should the price decline to  $44\frac{1}{4}$  you are "wiped"—the shop allows for a decline of but three-quarters of a point, so that you get only a 75-cent run for your money. Where stocks fluctuate more than a fraction a day—and all active stocks usually do—it is very easy to be wiped out. If you sell a stock "short" the procedure is the same.—*Edwin Lefevre, in Harper's Weekly.*



## LOCKING UP MONEY IN THE GOVERNMENT'S VAULTS.

The injury resulting to business through the locking up of surplus cash in the United States Treasury has been for many years the subject of comment by the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*. From the extracts printed below, it will be seen that the matter has attracted the attention of some of the leading newspapers.

### A NATIONAL BANK.

From The "New York Sun."

If it were announced to-morrow morning that some emergency had arisen which required the Secretary of the Treasury to issue Government bonds to the amount of \$300,000,000, there would be consternation in every business centre in our country. The event itself, whatever it might be, which caused the Government to appear as a borrower of money would be small occasion for uneasiness; but that so large an amount of funds was about to be withdrawn from the country's cash supply and taken into the Treasury would cause every business in the land to halt until it could be seen what the effect of the transfer would be.

Yet the locking up of this sum, or nearly this sum, in our National Treasury has, in fact, proceeded continuously for several years. The great American industrial revival which began with the election of President McKinley in 1896, and which has made our country the most prosperous of any in the world to-day, has been carried on not by any advantages accruing from the operation of our Treasury system, but in spite of enormous disadvantages arising under it. Under this system, the cash reserves of the Government and its surplus revenues as they accumulate are locked up in the vaults of the Treasury, where they are of as little use to the business interests of the country who have contributed them as if they were buried in the ground. In every other civilized country of the world, even in Turkey, such a hoarding of Government funds has not been tolerated for a century. In those countries, the Government funds, apart from the small balance required from week to week as working capital, are deposited in a great National bank or similar institution, where they can be loaned on proper security at the usual rates of interest to merchants for their business needs. If the Government should withdraw these funds from circulation, it would be regarded as a gross and wanton outrage only comparable to a needless doubling or tripling of taxation.

Every schoolboy knows that the Treasury system now prevailing in other countries was that of our own land until Andrew Jackson's political controversy with Mr. Nicholas Biddle and the Bank of the United States resulted in the destruction of the latter institution. It has been the confident belief of all politicians since that day that such were the financial prejudices of our people that any establishment of an institution similar to that of the old Bank of the United States was impossible. Whether this is so or not, no one disputes that the present system is unscientific, improvident, wasteful and in every way harmful to a degree that it is almost impossible to exaggerate. It has caused within the last five years several business panics and, unless history is untrue to itself, it will continue to be the seed of panic so long as it exists.

Of course the only method that our national law-making body has of obviating the evils of this system is so to lay taxes and so order expenditures that there shall always be an even balance between the two and that the surplus deposits in the Treasury shall be reduced to a minimum. If these deposits become large, there is a curtailment of the money supply, rates of interest throughout increase and business enterprises have to be abandoned. If on the other hand, the expenditures of the National Treasury are in excess of the sum derived from revenues, the Treasury tends to a bankrupt condition, which again causes a business alarm fully as great as that presented in the other alternative. The national gold reserve is trenched upon, bonds have to be sold to refill it, and doubt begins to be expressed, no less dangerous because absurd, over the ability of the United States, incomparably the richest and most prosperous country in the world, to meet its promises to pay.

No law-making body in the world can positively arrange a year beforehand such a ratio between Government receipts and expenditures as always to leave a small and harmless balance in its Treasury. The experience of Congress at the last session illustrates this. After all sorts of estimates and calculations by the Secretary of the Treasury and others, the River and Harbor bill, with its hundred-million-dollar and more expenditure, was killed on

the last day of the session, while the subsidence of the war in the Philippines will undoubtedly require a less expenditure there than has been expected. The surplus revenue in the Treasury is, therefore, helping up at the rate of about \$9,000,000 a month.

Happily, we have a Secretary of the Treasury who is alive to this condition of affairs, and there is no doubt that all the resources in his power will be used to avert financial trouble. But there ought not to be an hour's delay on the part of the President of the United States and his advisers in maturing some scheme for presentation to Congress at the next session which shall change the present insensate and barbarous Treasury system of these United States. If the establishment of a National bank is not thought practicable, the excess revenues of the Government can be deposited from week to week or from day to day as has been suggested, in the Government depositaries that now exist or may be additionally created; some other form of security besides Government bonds, if necessary, being taken, or some very low rate of interest being exacted by the Government. There never was a more fitting time for action of this kind. The evils of the present system are as undeniable as they are abominable. It is nonsense to suppose that the people of our country are so ignorant and besotted as not to see that the present Treasury system tends to make money alternately either excessively dear or excessively cheap, and that it is proper that this state of things should be changed. It has always been understood that the great popular demand in this country, so far as money was concerned, was that money should be cheap, and it is hard to see how there could be serious opposition to the plan of distributing the great cash hoards of the Treasury throughout the country.

President McKinley has already done great things for his country. Could he do a greater one than putting the Treasury and banking system of the land on a stable and scientific basis?

## OUR RELICS OF MONETARY BARBARISM.

From The "New York Press."

It is a far cry to the first Monday of December, but there is evidence accumulating that on that day the most emphatic demand from the country will be for the radical and final reform of the antiquated and primitive Treasury system for which intelligent opinion, foreseeing present conditions, has contended for years. The danger of the time is that with the enormous revenues of the nation and the crude provision for their custody the business of the country will be crippled by the tying up of its cash. When the Government's income was only \$400,000,000 the same danger was felt, and the most absurdly desperate measures taken to meet it. Now that that income is \$850,000,000, the necessity of taking simple and effective measures must appeal to every rational public man and private citizen.

In the eighties of the last century we bought bonds at a premium and revised the tariff in order to avoid what politicians thought the political error of depositing the Government's surplus cash in bank and letting it stay there till the Government's debts fell due. We shall not burn down the house to roast the pig this time. The money demagogue is done for—temporarily at least. The most timid party leader can dare to legislate for the country's interests.

These interests will demand the withdrawal of Government funds from the sub-Treasuries and their deposit in banks, where they will be employed, like the funds of the city of New York, the Steel Corporation, the Standard Oil Company and every other great concern except the United States Government, in answering through loans the country's commercial needs. With that demand honored, and every solvent bank made a possible United States depository by the payment of interest on United States funds; with provision for the cancellation of redeemed greenbacks, the redemption of silver dollars in gold and their reissue only as fractional currency; with the beginning of asset banking assured by the passage of the Lowering bill, the financial system of the country will be as sound as its containment of \$600,000,000 of debased metal will permit it to be. And with our sub-Treasury souvenir of wildcat wiles and our greenback reminder of war-time expedients out of the way, we shall have little difficulty with the only other relic of monetary barbarism, the silver-certificated evidence of the period when the gulches of the Rocky Mountains dictated the financial policy of the United States.

**The Best Financial Publication.**—Waiter F. Johnson, of Cleveland, Ohio, writes as follows under date of April 19:

"I have been a reader of *THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE* for over twenty-five years, and I consider it the best of all our financial publications, and I think I know them all."

## CANADIAN BANKING AND COMMERCE.

### QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE BANK RETURNS.

The bank returns for the first quarter of 1901 reflect all that is encouraging from a banker's and business point of view. It is understood to be a comparatively quiet business time, following the heaviest quarter of the year, in which the large grain movement annually takes place.

The March 1901 quarter stands well to the front as to the amount of business transacted during that period, as may be seen by a comparison of the most important items. Specie and Dominion notes show an increase during the quarter of \$267,662 and over the same heading a year ago an increase of \$5,730,639. Notes of and checks on other banks show an increase of \$5,670,851 for the quarter and for the year \$2,052,635. Amounts due from banks and agencies in the United Kingdom show a decrease for the quarter of \$2,105,229 and a reduction of \$4,294,767 for the year. Due from banks and agencies elsewhere than Canada and the United Kingdom shows a reduction of \$2,315,997 during the quarter and a reduction of \$7,179,770 for the year. Canadian municipal securities and British, foreign and colonial public securities other than Canadian were reduced during the quarter \$810,796 and during the year \$5,529,558. Railway and other bonds, debentures and stocks increased \$2,735,781 during the quarter and \$13,736,195 during the year. Call and short loans on stocks and bonds in Canada were augmented during the quarter \$976,621 with an increase for the year of \$4,038,743. Call and short loans elsewhere than in Canada increased \$8,333,968 for the quarter. The increase in current loans in Canada for the quarter is \$4,394,184 and for the year \$1,017,882; elsewhere than in Canada for the quarter shows \$499,209 decrease. Overdue debts show an increase in quarterly and annual headings. Total assets for the quarter increased \$701,405 and for the year \$78,301,813. Capital and reserve show a fair increase, except the former owing to the absorption of the Bank of British Columbia by the Canadian Bank of Commerce in January which accounts for the slight reduction in the paid-up capital. Bank notes in circulation, although showing a reduction for the quarter, over the same date a year ago the increase is \$3,797,049 for the year. Demand deposits have decreased \$18,790,359 during quarter, and for the year a reduction of \$1,206,629 is shown. Deposits after notice show an increase of \$21,553,867 for the quarter, and \$37,096,610 for the year. Deposits elsewhere than in Canada show an increase of \$1,731,190 for the quarter. Total liabilities for the quarter show a decrease of \$601,098; for the year the increase was \$67,665,687. Liabilities of directors show an increase of \$2,600,705, and the greatest amount of bank notes in circulation at any time during the month shows an increase of \$1,129,832 over the figures of a year ago. The figures are upon the whole decidedly favorable and indicate a successful period for the portion of the year to which they relate.

Business conditions are good throughout the country, and the banks are having their due share in the general prosperity. The situation of the Canadian banks is one of quiet strength and steady growth and there is no feature calling for special comment.

The usual comparative quarterly review of the bank returns is presented on the following page.

## STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF CANADIAN CHARTERED BANKS—COMPARISON OF THE IMPORTANT ITEMS.

	Mar. 31, 1901.	Dec. 31, 1900.	Mar. 31, 1900.	<i>Increase and decrease for quarter.</i>	<i>Increase and decrease for year.</i>
<b>ASSETS.</b>					
Specie and Dominion notes.....	\$31,823,171	\$31,568,509	\$33,065,532	Inc.,	\$297,063
Notes of and checks on other banks.....	10,730,708	16,401,559	8,678,078	Inc.,	5,670,861
Loans to other banks in Canada secured, including bills rediscounted.....	1,715,167	1,007,106	.....	Inc.,	107,961
Deposits made with and balances due from other banks in Canada.....	4,082,327	4,402,855	.....	Dec.,	870,528
Due from banks and agencies in the United Kingdom.....	3,144,068	5,249,232	7,438,772	Dec.,	2,103,229
Due from banks and agencies elsewhere than in Canada and United Kingdom.....	9,361,102	11,677,199	16,640,872	Dec.,	2,316,997
Canadian municipal securities and British, foreign and colonial public securities other than Canadian.....	11,490,188	12,290,984	17,609,746	Dec.,	810,796
Railway and other bonds, debentures and stocks.....	28,243,623	25,197,842	14,507,428	Inc.,	2,708,781
Call and short loans on stocks and bonds in Canada.....	23,004,857	33,981,478	23,966,114	Inc.,	976,621
Call and short loans elsewhere than in Canada.....	35,668,757	27,294,789	.....	Inc.,	8,338,968
Current loans in Canada.....	290,041,076	276,646,963	278,023,194	Inc.,	4,394,184
Due from banks and agencies elsewhere than in Canada.....	19,590,461	20,079,290	.....	Dec.,	490,200
Overdue debts.....	2,208,728	1,924,422	1,928,177	Inc.,	284,206
Total assets.....	\$502,243,420	\$501,542,015	\$423,942,107	Inc.,	\$701,406
<b>CAPITAL.</b>					
Capital paid up.....	\$68,690,797	\$67,067,111	\$64,245,727	Dec.,	\$408,314
Reserve fund.....	95,167,067	84,601,849	30,416,762	Inc.,	688,788
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>					
Bank notes in circulation.....	\$47,611,967	\$50,768,246	\$43,814,918	Dec.,	\$3,146,279
Due to Dominion Government.....	2,600,523	4,549,946	2,982,924	Inc.,	1,938,963
Due to Provincial governments.....	3,264,301	2,916,097	8,151,646	Inc.,	446,204
Deposits in Canada payable on demand.....	90,945,676	109,438,085	91,892,305	Dec.,	18,790,359
Deposits in Canada payable after notice.....	210,083,267	186,479,500	172,888,941	Inc.,	21,553,967
Deposits elsewhere than in Canada.....	22,173,575	30,412,385	.....	Inc.,	1,731,190
Loans from other banks in Canada secured, including bills rediscounted.....	1,789,162	1,643,167	.....	Inc.,	145,845
Deposits made by and balances due to other banks in Canada.....	2,626,351	2,823,710	2,871,065	Dec.,	197,359
Due to banks and agencies in the United Kingdom.....	4,314,964	4,100,688	4,428,988	Inc.,	124,328
Due to banks and agencies elsewhere than in Canada and United Kingdom.....	864,826	526,104	1,248,508	Inc.,	288,722
Total liabilities.....	\$397,540,383	\$382,160,491	\$323,863,996	Dec.,	\$601,008
<b>MISCELLANEOUS.</b>					
Directors' liabilities.....	\$12,877,813	\$12,186,948	\$9,777,107	Inc.,	\$188,869
Greatest amount of notes in circulation at any time during month.....	48,409,895	64,460,813	44,280,063	Dec.,	6,050,928

# TAXATION OF BANKS AND TRUST COMPANIES.

---

## THE LAWS RECENTLY ENACTED IN NEW YORK.

---

### STATE AND NATIONAL BANKS.

AN ACT to amend the tax law relating to the taxation of the stockholders of banks and banking associations.

*The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:*

Section 1. Section twenty-three of article two of the tax law is hereby amended to read as follows:

§ 23. The chief fiscal officer of every bank or banking association organized under the authority of this State, or of the United States, shall, on or before the first day of July, in each year, furnish the assessors of the tax district in which its principal office is located a statement under oath of the condition of such bank or banking association on the first day of June next preceding, stating the amount of its authorized capital stock, the number of shares and the par value of the shares thereof, the amount of stock paid in, the amount of its surplus and of its undivided profits, if any, a complete list of the names and residences of its stockholders and the number of shares held by each. In case of neglect or refusal on the part of any bank or banking association to report as herein prescribed, or to make other or further reports as may be required, such bank or banking association shall forfeit the sum of one hundred dollars for each failure, and the additional sum of ten dollars for each day such failure continues, and an action therefor shall be prosecuted by the county treasurer of the county in which such bank or banking association so neglecting or refusing to report is located, and in the city of New York by the receiver of taxes thereof. There shall, in addition to such report, be kept in the office of every such bank or banking association a full and correct list of the names and residences of all stockholders therein, and of the number of shares held by each, and such lists shall be subject to the inspection of the assessors at all times. The list of stockholders furnished by such bank or banking association shall be deemed to contain the names of the owners of such shares as are set opposite them, respectively, for the purpose of assessment and taxation.

§ 2. Section twenty-four of article two of the tax law is hereby amended to read as follows:

§ 24. In assessing the shares of stock of banks or banking associations organized under the authority of this State or the United States, the assessment and taxation shall not be at a greater rate than is made or assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of this State. The value of each share of stock of each bank and banking association shall be ascertained and fixed by adding together the amount of the capital stock, surplus and undivided profits of such bank or banking association and by dividing the result by the number of outstanding shares of such bank or banking association. The rate of tax upon the shares of stock of banks and banking associations shall be one per centum upon the value thereof, as ascertained and fixed in the manner hereinbefore provided, and the owners of the stock of banks and banking associations shall be entitled to no deduction from the taxable value of their shares because of the personal indebtedness of such owners,

or for any other reason whatsoever. Complaints in relation to the assessments of the shares of stock of banks and banking associations made under the provisions of this act shall be heard and determined as provided in article two, section thirty-six, of the tax law. The said tax shall be in lieu of all other taxes whatsoever for State, county or local purposes upon the said shares of stock, and the mortgages, judgments and other choses in action and personal property held or owned by banks and banking associations, the value of which enters into the value of said shares of stock, shall also be exempt from all other State, county or local taxation. The tax herein imposed shall be levied in the following manner: The board of supervisors of the several counties shall, on or before the fifteenth day of December in each year, ascertain from an inspection of the assessment rolls in their respective counties, the number of shares of stock of banks and banking associations in each town, city, village, school and other tax district, in their several counties, respectively, in which such shares of stock are taxable, the names of the banks issuing the same, respectively, and the assessed value of such shares, as ascertained in the manner provided in this act and entered upon the said assessment rolls, and shall forthwith mail to the President or Cashier of each of said banks or banking associations a statement setting forth the amount of its capital stock, surplus and undivided profits, the number of outstanding shares thereof, the value of each share of stock taxable in said county, as ascertained in the manner herein provided, and the aggregate amount of tax to be collected and paid by such bank or banking association, under the provisions of this act. A certified copy of each of said statements shall be sent to the county treasurer. It shall be the duty of every bank or banking association to collect the tax due upon its shares of stock from the several owners of such shares, and to pay the same to the treasurer of the county wherein said bank or banking association is located, and in the city of New York to the receiver of taxes thereof, within fifteen days after the receipt by it of the statement of assessment and tax herein provided for; and any bank or banking association failing to pay the said tax as herein provided shall be liable by way of penalty for the gross amount of the taxes due from all the owners of the shares of stock, and for an additional amount of one hundred dollars for every day of delay in the payment of said tax. Every bank or banking association so paying the taxes due upon the shares of its stock shall have a lien on the shares of stock and on all property of the several share owners in its hands, or which may at any time come into its hands, for reimbursement of the taxes so paid on account of the several shareholders, with legal interest; and such lien may be enforced in any appropriate manner. The tax hereby imposed shall be distributed in the following manner: The board of supervisors of the several counties shall ascertain the tax rate of each of the several town, city, village, school and other tax districts in their counties, respectively, in which the shares of stock of banks and banking associations shall be taxable, which tax rates shall include the proportion of State and county taxes levied in such districts, respectively, for the year for which the tax is imposed, and the proportion of the tax on bank stock to which each of said districts shall be respectfully entitled shall be ascertained by taking such proportion of the tax upon the shares of stock of banks and banking associations, taxable in such districts, respectively, under the provisions of this act as the tax rate of such tax district shall bear to the aggregate tax rates of all the tax districts in which said shares of stock shall be taxable. The said board of supervisors shall issue their warrant or order to the county treasurer on or before the fifteenth day of December in each year, setting forth the number of shares of bank stock taxable in each town, city, village, school and other tax district in said county, in which said shares of stock shall be taxable, the tax rate of each of said tax districts for said year, the proportion of the tax imposed by this act to which each of said tax districts is entitled, under the provisions hereof, and commanding him to collect the same, and to pay to

the proper officer in each of such districts the proportion of such tax to which it is entitled under the provisions of this act. The said county treasurer shall have the same powers to enforce the collection and payment of said tax as are possessed by the officers now charged by law with the collection of taxes, and the said county treasurer shall be entitled to a commission of one per centum for collecting and paying out said moneys, which commission shall be deducted from the gross amount of said tax before the same is distributed. In issuing their warrants to the collectors of taxes, the boards of supervisors shall omit therefrom assessments of and taxes upon the shares of stock of banks and banking associations. All assessment of the shares of stock of banks and banking associations made on or after January first, nineteen hundred and one, and prior to the passage of this act, shall be null and void, and new assessments thereof shall be made agreeably to the provisions of this act. Provided, that in the city of New York the statement of bank assessment and tax herein provided for shall be made by the board of tax commissioners of said city, on or before the fifteenth day of December in each year, and by them forthwith mailed to the respective banks and banking associations located in said city, and a certified copy thereof sent to the receiver of taxes of said city. The tax shall be paid by the respective banks in said city to the said receiver of taxes within fifteen days after the receipt of said statement, and said tax shall be collected by the said receiver of taxes and shall be by him paid into the treasury of said city to the credit of the general fund thereof. This act is not to be construed as an exemption of the real estate of banks or banking associations from taxation.

§ 3. Section fifty-six of article three of the tax law is hereby amended to read as follows:

§ 56. On or before December fifteenth in each year the board of supervisors shall annex to the tax roll a warrant under the seal of the county, signed by the chairman and clerk of the board, commanding the collector of each tax district to whom the same is directed to collect from the several persons named in said roll the several sums mentioned in the last column thereof, opposite their respective names, except taxes upon the shares of stock of banks and banking associations, on or before the first day of the following February, and further commanding him to pay over on or before that date all moneys so collected appearing on said roll to the treasurer of the county, if he be a collector of a city or a division thereof, or if he be a collector of a town:

1. To the commissioners of highways of the town, such sum as shall have been raised for the support of highways and bridges therein.

2. To the overseers of the poor of the town, such sum as shall have been levied, to be expended by such overseers for the support of the poor therein.

3. To the supervisor of the town, all of the moneys levied therein, to defray any other town expenses or charges.

4. To the treasurer of the county, the residue of the money so to be collected.

If the law shall direct the taxes levied for any local or special purpose in a city or town to be paid to any person or officer other than those named in this section, the warrant shall be varied so as to conform to such direction. The warrant shall authorize the collector to levy such taxes by distress and sale, in case of non-payment. The corrected assessment roll, or a fair copy thereof, shall be delivered by the board of supervisors to the collector of the tax district on or before December fifteenth in each year.

§ 4. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.

§ 5. This act shall take effect immediately.

## SAVINGS BANKS.

## CHAP. 117.

AN ACT to amend the tax law, in relation to the taxation of Savings banks.

Became a law, March 16, 1901, with the approval of the Governor. Passed, three-fifths being present.

*The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:*

Section 1. Chapter nine hundred and eight of the laws of eighteen hundred and ninety-six, entitled "An act in relation to taxation, constituting chapter twenty-four of the general laws," is hereby amended by inserting therein a new section to be section one hundred and eighty-seven *b* thereof and to read as follows:

§ 187 *b*. FRANCHISE TAX ON SAVINGS BANKS.—Every Savings bank incorporated, organized or formed under, by or pursuant to a law of this State, shall pay to the State annually for the privilege of exercising its corporate franchise or carrying on its business in such corporate or organized capacity, an annual tax which shall be equal to one per centum on the par value of its surplus, and undivided earnings.

§ 2. Section one hundred and eighty-nine of such chapter is hereby amended by adding thereto a subdivision to be subdivision eight thereof and to read as follows:

8. SAVINGS BANKS.—Every Savings bank liable to pay a tax under section one hundred and eighty-seven *b* of this chapter shall, on or before August first in each year, make a written report to the Comptroller of its condition, at the close of business on June thirtieth preceding, stating the par value of its surplus and undivided earnings, and containing such other data, information or matter as the Comptroller may require.

§ 3. This act shall take effect immediately.

## TRUST COMPANIES.

## CHAP. 132.

AN ACT to amend the tax law, in relation to the taxation of trust companies.

Became a law March 21, 1901, with the approval of the Governor. Passed, three-fifths being present.

Section 1. Chapter nine hundred and eight of the laws of eighteen hundred and ninety-six, entitled "An act in relation to taxation, constituting chapter 24 of the general laws," is hereby amended by inserting therein a new section to be section one hundred and eighty-seven *a* thereof and to read as follows:

§ 187 *a*. FRANCHISE TAX ON TRUST COMPANIES.—Every trust company incorporated, organized or formed under, by or pursuant to a law of this State, and any company authorized to do a trust company business solely or in connection with any other business, under a general or special law of this State, shall pay to the State annually for the privilege of exercising its corporate franchise or carrying on its business in such corporate or organized capacity, an annual tax which shall be equal to one per centum on the amount of its capital stock, surplus and undivided profits.

§ 2. Section one hundred and eighty-nine of such chapter is hereby amended by adding thereto a subdivision to be subdivision seven thereof and to read as follows:

7. TRUST COMPANIES.—Every company liable to pay a tax under section one hundred and eighty-seven *a* of this chapter shall, on or before August first in each year, make a written report to the Comptroller of its condition at the close of business on June thirtieth preceding, separately stating the amount of its capital stock, the amount of its surplus and the amount of its undivided profits, and containing such other data, information or matter as the Comptroller may require.



§ 8. Section one hundred and ninety-four of such chapter is hereby amended to read as follows :

§ 194. PAYMENT OF TAX AND PENALTY FOR FAILURE.—A tax imposed by sections one hundred and eighty-two or one hundred and eighty-six of this chapter, shall be due and payable into the State Treasury on or before the fifteenth day of January in each year. A tax imposed by section one hundred and eighty-four of this chapter on a transportation or transmission corporation, or by section one hundred and eighty-five, on elevated or surface railroads not operated by steam, shall be due and payable into the State Treasury on or before the first day of August in each year. A tax imposed by section one hundred and eighty-seven *a*, one hundred and eighty-seven *b* or one hundred and eighty-seven *c* shall be due and payable into the State Treasury on or before the first day of September in each year. A tax imposed by section one hundred and eighty-eight of this chapter on a foreign banker shall be due and payable into the State Treasury on or before February first in each year. If such tax in any case is not paid within thirty days after the same becomes due, or if the report of any such corporation is not made within the time required by this article, the corporation, association, joint-stock company, person or partnership, liable to pay the tax, shall pay into the State treasury in addition to the amount of such tax, a sum equal to five per centum thereof, and one per centum additional for each month the tax remains unpaid, which sum shall be added to the tax and paid or collected therewith. Every corporation, association, joint-stock company, person or partnership failing to make the annual report required by this article, or failing to make any special report required by the Comptroller, within any reasonable time to be specified by him, shall forfeit to the people of the State the sum of one hundred dollars for every such failure, and the additional sum of ten dollars for each day that such failure continues. Such tax shall be a lien upon and bind all the real and personal property of the corporation, joint-stock company or association liable to pay the same from the time when it is payable until the same is paid in full.

§ 4. Section two hundred and two of such chapter is hereby amended to read as follows :

§ 202. EXEMPTIONS FROM OTHER STATE TAXATION.—The personal property of every corporation, company, association or partnership taxable under this article, other than for an organization tax, shall be exempt from assessment and taxation upon its personal property for State purposes, and the personal property of every corporation taxable under section one hundred and eighty-seven *a* of this article, other than for an organization tax, and as provided in chapter thirty-seven of the general laws, shall be exempt from assessment and taxation for all other purposes, if all taxes due and payable under this article have been paid thereby. The personal property of a private or individual banker, actually employed in his business as such banker, shall be exempt from taxation for State purposes, if such private or individual banker shall have paid all taxes due and payable under this article. Such corporation and private or individual banker shall in no other respect be relieved from assessment and taxation by reason of the provisions of this article. The owner and holder of stock in an incorporated trust company liable to taxation under the provisions of this act shall not be taxed as an individual for such stock.

§ 5. This act shall take effect immediately.

## STATE BANKERS' ASSOCIATIONS.

---

### REPORTS OF RECENT MEETINGS.

---

#### NORTHEAST NEBRASKA BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

---

The Northeast Nebraska Bankers' Association met at Norfolk, Neb., April 22. W. H. Bucholz, President of the Norfolk National Bank, presiding. Mayor elect Koenigstein welcomed the bankers, and John D. Haskell, President of the Farmers and Traders' Bank, of Wakefield, responded. President Bucholz, after reviewing local conditions, concluded his address as follows :

"The banker should insist on an adequate profit. The risks of the business are enormous. The man who engages in it ventures not only his own money and the money of relatives and friends; he puts up an additional asset—one which to a true banker is dearer to him than life itself—his reputation as an honest and competent man.

He who follows the profession should be well equipped by previous training and study. For its risks, its cares and its responsibilities, that he may merit the respect, the confidence and the good will of the community in which he lives."

The Northeast Nebraska Association is the pioneer group association of the State, having been organized at Wakefield three years ago.

The interest aroused by former meetings of the association inspired the formation of several other groups in the State, and aided largely in the revival of the Nebraska State Bankers' Association, which had held no meetings since 1896 until the meeting in Omaha in September, 1900. At that meeting the State was divided into nine groups: Northeastern Nebraska, consisting of the counties of Knox, Cedar, Dixon, Dakota, Pierce, Wayne, Thurston, Madison, Stanton, Cuming and Burt, having seventy-four banks with an aggregate capital of \$2,117,000, and deposits of over \$6,500,000, was designated as group number "Four." The State association invites the Northeast group to ratify this territorial division, and asks it to consent to be known as "Group Four of the Nebraska Bankers' Association."

---

#### ARKANSAS BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

---

The eleventh annual convention of the Arkansas Bankers' Association met at Helena, April 18 and 19. Maj. John J. Hornor, President of the Bank of Helena welcomed the bankers, and J. P. Coffin, Cashier of the Bank of Batesville, responded on behalf of the bankers. President John G. Fletcher, President of the German National Bank, Little Rock, delivered his annual address. He stated that while business conditions were generally good, values were considerably inflated and banks should be careful and be prepared for the inevitable reaction.

After adjournment the members were given a carriage ride, and in the evening the visitors were entertained by Major Hornor, at his residence.

In addition to the reports of the various committees and officers, the following addresses and papers were on the programme :

Address, Judge M. L. Stephenson, of Helena; "Banks of the Twentieth Century," F. T. Rucker, Cashier Bank of Beebe; presentation and reading of prize

papers by bank clerks; "The Country Banker and His Manifold Duties and Responsibilities," R. E. Brown, Cashier Citizens' Bank, Van Buren; "The Relation of Small Depositors to Banks," P. A. Ball, Cashier American National Bank, Fort Smith; "Advertising a Bank and Soliciting Business," Charles McKee, Cashier Bank of Fordyce; "The Proper Functions of Banks," P. A. Douglas, Cashier Bank of Danville; "Woman as a Depositor and Customer," I. J. Stacey, Cashier Bank of Augusta; report of Prof. S. J. McLean, of Fayetteville, on Use of Credit Instruments; report of committee on awarding prizes for best paper presented by bank clerks. For the best paper written by any bank employee in Arkansas, other than President or Cashier, two prizes were offered, the first of \$30 and the second \$20.

After the work of the convention was concluded the members were given a banquet at the Lotus Club,

---

#### NEW YORK STATE BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

---

The eighth annual convention of the New York State Bankers' Association will be held at Buffalo, June 20, 21 and 22. Headquarters will be at the Hotel Niagara.

---

#### NORTH CAROLINA BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

---

The fifth annual convention of the North Carolina Bankers' Association will be held at the Battery Park Hotel, Asheville, June 20 and 21. Special rates have been obtained at the hotel, and reduced railroad fares will be granted. Bankers and others interested in financial matters are cordially invited to attend the convention.

---

#### IOWA STATE BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

---

The fifteenth annual convention of the Iowa State Bankers' Association will be held at Cedar Rapids June 12 and 13. It is expected that Hon. George E. Roberts, Director of the Mint, will be present and deliver an address.

---

#### CALIFORNIA BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

---

May 30, 31 and June 1 are the dates fixed for the next annual meeting of the California Bankers' Association, which will be held at San Jose.

---

#### MINNESOTA BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

---

The Minnesota Bankers' Association has decided to hold its next convention at Duluth on July 23 and 24.

---

#### MISSOURI BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

---

The Missouri Bankers' Association will meet this year at St. Joseph, May 22 and 23.

## BANKING AND FINANCIAL NEWS.

This Department includes a complete list of **NEW NATIONAL BANKS** (furnished by the Comptroller of the Currency), **STATE AND PRIVATE BANKS**, **CHANGES IN OFFICERS**, **DISSOLUTIONS AND FAILURES**, etc., under their proper State heads for easy reference.

### NEW YORK CITY.

—Deputy Assistant United States Treasurer Maurice L. Muhleman recently resigned his position at the sub-Treasury in this city to accept the presidency of the Mutual Mercantile Agency. Mr. Muhleman had been connected with the sub-Treasury in this city since 1888. He is well known as a writer on monetary subjects. George W. Marlor succeeds Mr. Muhleman.

—Bank clerks employed in the banks located in the district between Fourteenth and Seventy-second streets held a meeting at the Berkeley Lyceum April 6 for the purpose of organizing an auxiliary of the American Institute of Bank Clerks. Gen. Thomas L. James, President of the Lincoln National Bank, and A. S. Frissell, President of the Fifth Avenue Bank, made addresses commending the movement in favor of the better education of bank clerks.

—One-eighth of the business done at the clearing-house on April 12 was represented by transactions of the National City Bank, which sent to the clearing-house checks for over \$50,000,000 and received back \$44,000,000, giving it a credit balance of \$6,000,000. This is the second largest clearance by an individual bank, the record being \$53,341,000 by the same bank on May 23, 1890, at the time of the subscription to the shares of the Amalgamated Copper Company.

—The new Jefferson Bank, which opened for business on April 15 at Forsyth and Canal streets, starts with \$200,000 capital and \$50,000 surplus.

—The annual report of the Penny Provident Fund of New York has just been issued. The report shows that when the fund was started on February 1, 1890, it had 11,690 depositors and \$5,568.57 of net deposits. On February 1, 1901, it had 79,010 depositors and \$44,908.59 of net deposits. Among the depositors are the Associated Charities of Evansville, Ind.; Minneapolis, Wilmington, Del.; Wilmington, N. C. and the Charity Organization Societies of Dubuque, Ia.; Grinnell, Ia.; Hartford, Conn., and Lockport, N. Y. In fact, the depositors come from every State in the Union.

—Business men in the upper section of Broadway, Brooklyn, have decided to organize the Empire National Bank, with \$200,000 capital. They will locate the new bank on Broadway between Chauncey and Halsey streets, there being at present no bank in that vicinity.

—Subscriptions to the new British loan of \$300,000,000 were received in this country to an amount estimated at from \$80,000,000 to \$100,000,000 through Messrs. J. P. Morgan & Co. and Baring, Magoun & Co. The loan was largely oversubscribed. Allotments have been announced as follows: \$55,000,000 to the Rothschilds; \$50,000,000 to J. S. Morgan & Co., and \$45,000,000 to the Bank of England. This accounts for but half the issue, the balance going to various other subscribers.

Messrs. J. P. Morgan & Co. announced that subscribers to the loan who placed their subscription through the American agents designated to receive subscriptions would get thirty-five per cent. of their subscriptions. American subscriptions sent to England direct will get an allotment of 12½ per cent.

—Judge Coxe of the United District Court has directed the distribution of \$77,822 among the creditors of the Franklin National Bank. The fee of the Receiver, Charles R. Shaw, is \$6,500 and that of his counsel, Frederick J. Moses, \$8,500.

—The National Park Bank finds that its business is growing to such an extent that additional space is necessary for its accommodation, and the bank will therefore build on property which it owns, on Ann Street, adjoining the present site.

—On April 28 the New York Stock Exchange vacated its building and on the following Monday opened for business in the New York Produce Exchange Building, which will be occupied until the completion of the new Stock Exchange Building.

—Branches of the New York Produce Exchange Bank were opened on May 1 at Madison Avenue near Fifty-ninth Street, and at Columbus Avenue and Ninety-second Street.

—The Century Bank, which will be located at Broadway and West End Avenue, has completed an organization by electing a board of directors, and by choosing Donald Mitchell, President and Edmund Dwight, Jr., Vice-President. For the present the capital will be \$100,000 and the surplus \$85,000; later the capital may be increased to \$200,000. The Mechanics' National Bank has been selected as clearing-house agent.

—Conversion of the Bank of New Amsterdam into the National Bank of New Amsterdam has been approved by the Comptroller of the Currency. This institution is located in the Metropolitan Opera House Building at Broadway and Thirty-ninth Street, and has \$250,000 capital and \$250,000 surplus, and about \$200,000 undivided profits.

—Lord Revelstoke, of the firm of Baring Bros., London, was entertained at luncheon by E. H. Harriman on April 23. Jacob H. Schiff, James Stillman and other prominent capitalists were among the guests.

—On April 20 National City Bank stock sold at 750, the highest price yet paid for those shares. The advance was said to be due to confidence in the plans of its managers and to the general belief in President Stillman's ability to make the institution a still greater power in international finance. A bid of 500 points advance to 3,100 for Fifth Avenue Bank stock failed to bring out any stock.

—On April 23 the Schermerhorn Bank, of Brooklyn, was merged into the Mechanics' Bank, of which it will be operated as a branch in the future. It is understood that a controlling interest in the stock was bought at 170, which is an advance of forty points since President Roberts took charge of the management two years ago.

—Wm. T. Goundle, formerly general manager of the Kings County Elevated Railroad, has been elected a director of the Brooklyn Bank.

—James Dennison has resigned as Cashier of the Irving National Bank to become treasurer of the Bankers' Life Insurance Co.

—The Nineteenth Ward Bank has moved back to its old quarters at Fifty-seventh street and Third avenue, which have been enlarged and remodeled to accommodate its increased business.

—On the evening of April 16 a dinner was given to the trustees of the Eastern District Savings Bank, Brooklyn, by Charles L. Sicardi. A vote of thanks was tendered President L. E. Meeker for the devotion and energy which he had given to the bank's affairs and the remarkable success of the institution was attributed in no small measure to his efforts. Speeches of congratulation were made by the guests present.

—Charles W. Morse, who it has been stated will retire from the presidency of the American Ice Co., has been elected Vice-President of the Bank of the State of New York, succeeding James B. Colgate, who has held the office for twenty-three years and who recently resigned on account of advanced age. Mr. Morse is a heavy stockholder in the bank, and is also a large owner of stock of the National Bank of New Amsterdam, of which he is Vice-President. He is also a Vice-President of the Garfield National Bank, and a director in the Gansevoort, Produce Exchange and Twelfth Ward banks.

—An amendment of the articles of association of the Mechanics and Traders' Bank has been made so as to permit the establishment of branches of the bank. Its first branch is to be at Madison Avenue and Fifty-ninth street.

—On April 9 Gen. James Jourdan, Warner Van Norden, Jonathan B. Currie and Richard L. Edwards were elected additional directors of the North American Trust Co., and the executive committee was increased to seven members. Richard J. Scoles was elected Third Vice-President.

—Owing to retirement of the active members of the firm from business, the Stock Exchange house of Russak Bros. has been dissolved. Mr. Russak recently refused an offer of \$66,000 for his seat in the Exchange, which is \$50,000 more than he paid for it. He expects to reside in Paris in the future.

—On May 6 Edward Roesler was admitted as a partner in the firm of Laidlaw & Co.

#### NEW ENGLAND STATES.

Boston.—At a meeting of about twenty-five Cashiers of Boston banks at the Parker House on the evening of May 2 an organization was formed to be known as the Boston Bank Cashiers' Association. Committees were appointed to draw up a constitution, nominate officers and arrange other details. Preceding the meeting a banquet was served.

J. Adams Brown of the Central National Bank presided. Informal speeches were made by several of those present, urging the benefit of the formation of an association.

Among those present were: N. F. Perkins, Third National; H. K. Hallett, Atlantic National; Joseph L. Foster, Atlas National; Frederick H. Curtiss, Massachusetts National;

W. N. Homer, Fourth National; W. C. Williams, Suffolk National; Charles H. Ramsay, Winthrop National; William J. Mandell, Elliot National, and A. W. Haines, Metropolitan National.

—Frederick D. Carpenter was recently elected a director of the Colonial National Bank.

—It is reported that parties here have been considering the propriety of forming an insurance company to insure holders of National bank stock against assessment. Savings banks of the State hold a considerable amount of National bank shares as investments. Though but few banks have had to assess their shareholders, yet the fact that in case of such a failure the Savings bank not only loses its investment, but a like sum additionally, tends to make National bank stock less desirable than it would be otherwise, hence the suggestion for insuring against this liability.

A similar plan is under consideration in Australia, the proposal being to set aside annually one per cent. of earnings, to be placed in the hands of the Government, the fund to be allowed to accumulate until it equals the reserve liability of shareholders.

—The State Street Trust Company has increased its capital stock from \$300,000 to \$600,000, making its total capital and surplus \$900,000. Among the subscribers to the new stock are New York people identified with the National Park Bank. At a meeting on May 6 directors were elected as follows: J. J. Astor, August Belmont, Stuyvesant Fish, Richard Delafield, A. H. Wiggin, Rodolphe L. Agassiz, Neal Rantoul and W. Cameron Forbes, making the present directors eighteen in all.

**Middlesex Banking Co.**—The Middlesex Banking Company, of Middletown, Conn., during the last eight years has met maturities of principal aggregating more than \$8,000,000, and of interest more than \$3,350,000. The payments of interest were made upon presentation of bonds and coupons and upon call before maturity.

### MIDDLE STATES.

**New Trust Company.**—The Mutual Trust Company of Westchester County was recently incorporated to do business at Portchester, N. Y., with \$250,000 capital.

**Baltimore.**—Michael Jenkins, a well-known capitalist, succeeds the late Benjamin F. Newcomer as President of the Safe Deposit and Trust Co. J. B. Ramsay, President of the National Mechanics' Bank, was recently elected a director of the Safe Deposit and Trust Co.

—On April 10 the Union Trust Co. absorbed the Citizens' Trust and Deposit Co., which was organized about two years ago. It had \$1,500,000 capital and \$500,000 surplus.

—William B. Oliver has retired from Messrs. Middendorf, Oliver & Co. and the name of the firm has been changed to J. W. Middendorf & Co. Offices of the firm are now located in the Continental Trust Building.

—A meeting of the stockholders of the Continental National Bank was called recently to consider the levying of an assessment equal to thirty-two per cent. of the par value of their stock, the capital of the bank having been impaired to the extent of \$80,000. A large portion of the impairment of the capital was due to the financial accommodations extended to one business firm with which a settlement was made recently on terms far from favorable to the bank. The Continental has the protection of the Clearing-House Association, President Rollins having given bond for \$200,000 and the board of directors having also given additional bonds.

—The executive committee of the Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland has recommended that the capital stock of the company be increased from \$1,500,000 to \$2,000,000.

The recommendation, which it is said will be adopted, is to issue the new stock to the present shareholders at \$120 per share, the par being \$50, which will yield \$700,000 additional surplus, of which \$650,000 will be added to the net surplus, increasing it to \$2,500,000, while the other \$50,000 will be added to the undivided profits and reserve requirements, making them \$1,200,000 and increasing the total assets of the company to more than \$5,700,000.

—Stockholders of the International Trust Co. have approved the plan recommended by the directors to reduce the capital stock from \$3,000,000 to \$2,000,000, and the surplus from \$1,500,000 to \$1,000,000.

**Pittsburg.**—Pittsburg bank exchanges for the month of April were the greatest in the history of the Clearing-House Association, and consequently in that of this city. The figures reached the unprecedented total of \$205,853,442.33, an increase over the same month a year ago of \$52,795,000, or thirty-four per cent. The biggest previous month was March last, yet over it April shows a gain of \$30,000,000, or an average of something over \$1,000,000 for each business day. This makes the total for the year to date, four months, \$701,246,000 in round numbers, or an increase over the corresponding period of 1900 of \$175,373,000. This sum about equals the month of March last, so that the year 1901 is an entire month ahead of 1900.

—The Standard National Bank is being organized with \$2,000,000 capital stock.

—A fifteen-story bank and office building will be put up by the Keystone Bank on its present site and property adjoining.

**Niagara Falls, N. Y.**—The Bank of Suspension Bridge has absorbed the business of the Frontier Bank of Niagara. It is understood that Wm. S. Pierce, Cashier of the Frontier Bank of Niagara, will enter the employ of the Bank of Suspension Bridge.

**Philadelphia.**—On April 26 Henry D. McCarthy was elected Assistant Cashier of the Tradesmen's National Bank, a new office. The appointment was in recognition of Mr. McCarthy's long and faithful service to the institution. He has been with the bank nearly twenty-four years.

—Daniel Baird, Jr., teller of the Sixth National Bank, has been appointed Cashier of that bank and chosen a director, to succeed Wm. C. Marshall, deceased.

—At a meeting of the directors of the Philadelphia National Bank on April 26 H. J. Keefer was appointed Assistant Cashier.

—The Fourth Street National Bank recently added \$200,000 to the surplus fund, making the total \$2,000,000.

—Plans have been accepted for the new building for the Manayunk National Bank at Main and Levering Streets. The structure will be of granite with carved granite ornamentation and will measure thirty-eight by sixty-five feet. The vestibule, main banking room, vaults, safety-deposit vaults and President's and Cashier's rooms will be located on the main floor, and the directors' room and ante-room thereto on a mezzanine floor at the second-story height.

**Buffalo, N. Y.**—The Marine Bank is now established in its new home, which was constructed from the bank's former building and an adjoining structure. These two buildings have been entirely remodelled and fitted up in a way that makes them ideal for banking purposes. Among the many improvements introduced are dining-rooms for the bank's employees and a separate banking department for women.

**Change in Title.**—The York Trust, Real Estate and Deposit Co., York, Pa., announces a change in its title to York Trust Company. This company has \$150,000 capital, \$23,837 surplus and profits and \$1,002,283 deposits, including trust funds.

### SOUTHERN STATES.

**New Banks in Georgia.**—On April 23 State Bank Examiner S. G. Turner reported forty more banks in the State than on September 5 last, a total of 177. This increase in the number of banks, Mr. Turner says, has not decreased the business of the older banks. So far this year he has examined fifty of the older banks, and finds that every one of them shows an increase in business over last year. This indicates a greater volume of banking business to be done and is a good indication of the prosperity of the State.

**Bank Examiner for Texas.**—J. Morton Logan has been appointed as National bank examiner in Texas. Mr. Logan has been identified with various Fort Worth banks, and his appointment will be received with pleasure by Texas bankers, among whom he is well known. He was for ten years connected with the Fort Worth National and about five years with the Livestock and the American National Banks as Cashier.

**Richmond, Va.**—Steps have been taken for the organization of the Broad Street Bank, capital, \$200,000.

**Capital to be Increased.**—A special meeting of the shareholders of the People's National Bank, Leesburg, Va., was held April 18, 426 shares out of a total of 500 being represented, and it was voted to increase the capital from \$50,000 to \$100,000.

The bank was established in 1888, and in the past thirteen years has paid on an average over seven per cent. in annual dividends, and has besides accumulated \$61,000, or 122 per cent., in surplus and undivided profits, making the net annual earnings over seventeen per cent. Deposits now amount to \$664,000.

**New Orleans, La.**—It is reported that interests representing the National Park Bank of New York city have secured control of the Union National Bank of this city. It has been understood for some time that the New York bank wanted an agent here and that it thought it best to buy outright a well-established local institution rather than to establish a new one. The Union Bank has a capital of \$300,000 and a surplus of \$42,870. Its business is now in a flourishing condition.

**Birmingham, Ala.**—The interior space available for the transaction of business of the First National Bank has been largely increased, and a complete new set of furniture and fixtures put in place. These changes will add greatly to the conveniences for the public and the employees of the bank.

**Reported Bank Consolidation.**—The Atlantic National Bank and the National Bank of Wilmington, N. C., according to recent report, will be consolidated, the National Bank of Wilmington going into liquidation and transferring its business to the Atlantic National. John S. Armstrong, President of the National Bank of Wilmington, will be Vice-President of the Atlantic National.

### WESTERN STATES.

**Minneapolis, Minn.**—The second annual banquet of the Minneapolis Bank Clerks' Association took place at the West Hotel on the evening of April 27. S. S. Cook, of the National Bank of Commerce, presiding. Jas. B. Forgan, President of the First National Bank, Chicago, was the guest of honor.

—Extensive improvements will be made by the Metropolitan Bank. The present quarters have been found inadequate. In addition to the first floor, which the bank now occupies, the second story will be utilized and the rooms will be remodeled in handsome style. The entrance will be placed at the corner, and the general banking department will remain on the first floor, while the other forces will be placed on the second floor.

**A Prosperous Country Bank.**—The Bank of Hennessey, Okla., reports \$5,000 capital, \$5,000 surplus and \$121,531 deposits. Its loans and discounts amount to \$45,441 and the cash and sight exchange items aggregate \$83,909. The officers are: President, D. A. Espy; Vice-President, Chas. H. Moore; Cashier, Geo. E. Gilmore. A number of well-known bankers in Kansas, Illinois and Missouri are among the stockholders.

**Cripple Creek's Gold Yield.**—Statistics compiled by the Colorado Springs "Gazette" show that from the discovery of gold in 1899 up to the close of April the Cripple Creek (Colo.) district has produced gold valued at over \$100,000,000.

**Indiana Trust Companies.**—On March 30 there were twenty-nine trust companies in Indiana—an increase of one in the past six months. In comparison with the statement issued six months ago the report shows an increase in business to the amount in round numbers of about \$1,800,000. The increase in the amount of loans is about \$1,400,000, and the deposits show an increase of about \$1,500,000. The report shows loans on collateral security amounting to \$1,847,676; loans secured by first mortgage, \$4,386,163; miscellaneous bonds and stock, \$1,600,803; due from banks and cash on hand, \$1,666,040; miscellaneous, \$462,562. Total assets amount to \$12,335,207.

The capital stock paid in, as shown by the statement, amounts to \$3,124,320; surplus and profits, \$410,775; certificates of deposit, \$2,781,953; deposits, \$1,590,453; and due trust department, \$854,524.

**Indiana Banks Prosperous.**—On April 25 the reports of the State banks to the Auditor of State were compiled. They show that the total assets of the banks are \$21,239,850, an increase of over \$700,000 since the January report. Deposits have increased about \$500,000 and surplus about \$40,000. It is one of the best reports ever made by the banks. The combined deposits amount to \$18,206,814.

**Chicago.**—Some changes have been made in the clearing-house association, the form of organization being changed from an incorporated to a voluntary association, and a rearrangement of the numbers of the members has been made so that hereafter they will be numbered consecutively. This change was made necessary by consolidations during the past few years, leaving only sixteen members in the association although the numbers run up to twenty-six.

—On April 11 stockholders of the Continental National Bank received \$1,000,000 of new stock, making the total capital stock \$3,000,000, the former amount being \$2,000,000.

This is one of the growing banks of the city, and the increasing business will give safe and ready employment to the new capital.

**Sedalia, Mo.**—On April 9 the Citizens' National Bank absorbed the Bank of Commerce, and took over its deposits and business.

**Sioux City, Iow.**—The People's Savings Bank was recently organized here with \$50,000 capital. Fred A. Bennett, a State bank examiner, is President.

**Plenty of Money in Kansas.**—State Bank Commissioner Albaugh, in a recent statement said there never was so much money in Kansas as at present. The bank vaults are loaded with the profits from diversified farming. The farmers are raising more wheat and corn every year, more alfalfa, fattening more hogs and cattle, the price of land is increasing and the farmers are getting better prices for everything they have to sell. They are getting more for eggs and butter than ever before. Thousands upon thousands of dollars' worth of implements are being sold to the farmers every season. All values are on the increase, and the banks are full of money.

**Topeka, Kans.**—A controlling interest in the First National Bank, formerly held by L. Z. Leiter, of Chicago, was recently purchased by Chas. J. Devlin, who is also largely interested



in the Central National Bank. There will be no consolidation of the two institutions, however.

Mr. Devlin was for some years prominently associated with the coal-mining industry of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., and is a highly successful business man.

W. H. Rossington succeeds C. W. Snyder as Vice-President of the First National, and E. O. Faulkner succeeds Wm. Henderson as Cashier.

St. Louis, Mo.—The Mechanics' Bank has been converted into the Mechanics' National Bank, with the same capital and surplus as heretofore.

—The Union Trust Company is considering a proposition to increase the capital from \$1,000,000 to \$2,000,000.

—It has been decided to merge the Bank Clerks' Economic Society into the American Institute of Bank Clerks.

—On May 4 the paid-up capital of the Noel-Young Bond and Stock Co. was increased to \$100,000.

Cleveland, Ohio.—Deposits in the National banks of this city now amount to \$49,789,227, a gain of more than \$5,000,000 in the past year.

—Organizers of the Federal Trust Co. and the People's Trust Co. have reached an agreement for consolidation under the title of the former with \$1,500,000 capital. Business will be commenced May 22.

—It is said that the Washington Savings and Banking Co. will be organized here shortly with \$100,000 capital.

Cincinnati, Ohio.—Vice-President Fletcher, S. Heath and the other owners of the Seventh National Bank, New York, have obtained a controlling interest in the Equitable National Bank of this city, and will reorganize the bank.

Hicksville, Ohio.—Well-known local business men have organized the Hicksville National Bank at this place with \$25,000 capital. Its officers are: President, J. M. Ainsworth; Vice-President, I. M. Boon; Cashier, J. L. Bevington. A new building is being erected for the bank.

#### PACIFIC SLOPE.

San Francisco, Cal.—At the recent annual meeting of the Donohoe-Kelly Banking Co. the directors and officers were re-elected, and a satisfactory report of the operations for the past year was presented, two dividends of two and one-half per cent. each having been paid.

—The Italian-American Bank recently called for the payment of an additional \$250,000 of its stock, making the total paid-in capital \$500,000.

Walla Walla, Wash.—W. G. Howland, of Chicago, and others will establish the Home Savings here with \$250,000 capital.

Tacoma, Wash.—Supplemental articles of incorporation were filed recently changing the name of the Scandinavian-American Bank, of this city, to the Lumbermen's State Bank. By its articles of association the bank is authorized to transact a banking, Savings bank and trust company business. Eastern capital has been interested in the bank.

#### TERRITORIAL.

Hilo, Hawaii.—The First Bank of Hilo, Ltd., which has been a private bank since its organization about one year ago, was incorporated under the laws of the territory on March 15.

#### CANADA.

New Branch Established.—A branch of the Royal Bank of Canada has been opened at Dalhousie, N. B.

Bank of British North America.—At the annual meeting of the Bank of British North America held in London, on March 5, the report of the directors to December 31 last showed that the profits for the half-year, including £9,812 0s. 4d. brought forward from last account, amounted to £87,667 5s. 10d., out of which the directors reported the declaration of a dividend of 30s. per share, payable free of income tax on April 4, being at the rate of six per cent. per annum, and the addition of £25,000 to the reserve fund. The sum of £3,000 was appropriated on premises, etc., leaving a balance of £8,913 4s. 7d. to be carried forward. Messrs. H. J. B. Kendall, J. H. Brodie, and R. N. Glyn, the retiring directors, were re-elected.

The charter of the Bank of British North America, which is an imperial one, will expire on July 1, but an application has been made to the Lords of the Treasury for an extension of ten years. The draft of a supplemental charter has been approved, and the Lords have intimated their intention of submitting the draft for ratification to His Majesty-in-Council. The Bank of British North America is now the only bank of British origin in Canada. Hereafter the bank will hold but one meeting of shareholders annually, instead of two semi-annual ones as heretofore.

London, Ont.—W. T. Oliver, for the last five years Manager of the Bank of British North America at Rossland, has been appointed to a similar position here.

## AMERICAN BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

*TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION TO BE HELD AT MILWAUKEE,  
SEPTEMBER 24, 25 AND 26.*

A meeting of the Executive Council of the American Bankers' Association was held in New York city, April 24 and 25. Milwaukee was chosen as the place for holding the next annual convention, and September 24, 25 and 26 have been fixed as the dates. It is understood that the meetings will be held in the Pabst Theatre.

After the conclusion of its business session the three and four-year classes of the council were entertained at dinner at the Union League Club, the hosts being the members of the council who will retire at the Milwaukee convention.

### Failures, Suspensions and Liquidations.

**Indiana**—**INDIANAPOLIS**.—It is reported that the State Bank of Indiana will go out of business, transferring its assets to another bank.

**Iowa**.—On April 17 the Lemars National Bank was placed in the hands of Thomas M. Thornton as Receiver. Thomas F. Ward, the Vice-President and manager, is reported to have embezzled a large amount of the bank's funds. Deposits were about \$100,000.

**New York**.—Brewster's Banking Office, at Hannibal, which had done business since 1838, suspended March 29. Wadsworth J. Brewster, the owner, also conducted a large general store, and was doing an extensive business. His debts are placed at \$61,843 and assets \$43,244.

—The Frontier Bank, of Niagara Falls, organized nine years ago, will be discontinued, transferring its business to another bank. Deposits, amounting to about \$35,000, will be paid in full.

—On April 25 the banking house of Leroy C. Partridge made an assignment to Jonathan Thomas and Benjamin Franklin. It had \$150,000 capital; liabilities are estimated at \$250,000.

**Illinois**—**CHICAGO**.—Jamieson & Co., an old and well-known firm of stock brokers, suspended May 4. It is stated that the firm has strong Eastern connections, and that an early resumption is probable.

**Ohio**—**CLEVELAND**.—The Cuyahoga Savings and Banking Co. suspended May 6. It is reported to have a large amount of very poor paper on hand.

**Oregon**.—Gilbert Bros., bankers at Salem, suspended April 23 owing to litigation.

**Rhode Island**.—On April 28 the Mechanics' Savings Bank, of Westerly, was reported closed. Deposit liabilities are about \$1,000,000, and the securities held, while of a face value of more than this, are said to be considerably depreciated.

**Vermont**.—The Farmers' National Bank, of Vergennes, was placed in the hands of John T. Sullivan, Receiver, April 13. The Cashier is reported about \$90,000 short in his accounts, part of which has been recovered.

**Washington**.—The Chehalis State Bank has gone into voluntary liquidation, turning its accounts over to a local bank.

—The First National Bank of Vancouver was placed in the hands of James W. Maxwell, Receiver, April 20. There is a shortage of over \$81,000 in the accounts. Charles Brown, the President, and E. L. Canby, Cashier, have committed suicide. Deposits were \$230,000 at the date of the last report.

—Under order of the court, Receiver Muir of the Scandinavian-American Bank of Whatcom, has filed a report of its affairs. According to the report, the President, H. St. John Dix, borrowed its entire deposits and \$8,000 of its capital on his unsecured notes. Other officers are the bank's debtors to the extent of \$1,200. The capital stock of the Scandinavian-American Bank was \$25,000. Of the 251 shares, President Dix owned twenty-seven, and Cashier Oleson, fifteen. The bank's nominal assets are \$31,776. Of this \$24,000 is unsecured notes of its President. Among other things, the Receiver asserts that the books were falsified, \$24,000 being carried as cash in the vault, although never there. President Dix of the bank is at present in London. He went under the name of St. John at Whatcom.

## NEW BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, ETC.

### NEW NATIONAL BANKS.

The Comptroller of the Currency furnishes the following statement of new National banks organized since our last report. Names of officers and other particulars regarding these new National banks will be found under the different State headings.

#### NATIONAL BANKS ORGANIZED.

- 5765—First National Bank, Hondo, Texas. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5766—First National Bank, Elk City, Oklahoma. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5767—First National Bank, Weldon, North Carolina. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5768—First National Bank, Cresson, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$35,000.
- 5769—Commercial National Bank, Zanesville, Ohio. Capital, \$100,000.
- 5770—O'Neill National Bank, O'Neill, Nebraska. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5771—First National Bank, Barry, Illinois. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5772—First National Bank, Lidgerwood, North Dakota. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5773—Farmers' National Bank, Lititz, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$60,000.
- 5774—First National Bank, Moody, Texas. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5775—First National Bank, Corwith, Iowa. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5776—Maryland National Bank, Baltimore, Maryland. Capital, \$200,000.
- 5777—First National Bank of Beaver Springs at Adamsburg, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5778—First National Bank, Oelwein, Iowa. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5779—First National Bank, Mondovi, Wisconsin. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5780—First National Bank, Savannah, Missouri. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5781—First National Bank, Sweetwater, Texas. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5782—American National Bank, Mount Carmel, Illinois. Capital, \$53,000.
- 5783—New Amsterdam National Bank, New York, N. Y. Capital, \$250,000.
- 5784—First National Bank, Carmichaels, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5785—Plattsburg National Bank, Plattsburg, New York. Capital, \$103,000.
- 5786—First National Bank, Aspermont, Texas. Capital, \$80,000.
- 5787—First National Bank, Elmwood, Nebraska. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5788—Mechanics' National Bank, St. Louis, Missouri. Capital, \$1,000,000.
- 5789—National Bank of Ionia, Ionia, Michigan. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5790—People's National Bank, Kingfisher, Oklahoma. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5791—Atoka National Bank, Atoka, Indian Territory. Capital, \$30,000.
- 5792—First National Bank, Hartford, Kentucky. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5793—Smith National Bank, St. Edward, Nebraska. Capital, \$25,000.

#### APPLICATIONS TO ORGANIZE NATIONAL BANKS APPROVED.

The following notices of intention to organize National banks have been approved by the Comptroller of the Currency since last advice:

- Columbia National Bank, Indianapolis, Indiana; by Mortimer Levering, *et al.*
- Cumberland National Bank, Plattsburgh, New York; by Alfred Guilboid, *et al.*
- Commercial National Bank, Council Bluffs, Iowa; by Carl F. Keuhle, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Wautoma, Wisconsin; by A. H. Walker, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Friendly, West Virginia; by Hugh Thorn, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Carroll, Nebraska; by Geo. C. Merrill, *et al.*
- American National Bank, Sherman, Texas; by J. P. Withers, *et al.*
- National Bank of Kinsley, Kinsley, Kansas; by C. W. Beeler, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Arcadia, Wisconsin; by John C. Gaveney, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Wadsworth, Ohio; by E. M. Buel, *et al.*
- Llano National Bank, Llano, Texas; by L. C. Smith, *et al.*
- Tishomingo National Bank, Tishomingo, Indian Territory; by J. F. McMurray, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Prescott, Iowa; by Theo. F. King, *et al.*
- Commercial National Bank, Sherman, Texas; by F. Z. Edwards, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Machias, Maine; by Joseph A. Coffin, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Dunbar, Pennsylvania; by C. B. Nemon, *et al.*
- Le Roy National Bank, Le Roy, New York; by Harold B. Ward, *et al.*

First National Bank, Carrolltown, Pennsylvania; by A. W. Buck, *et al.*  
 City National Bank, Granbury, Texas; by J. B. Sikes, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Roby, Texas; by W. B. Elkin, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Sapulpa, Indian Territory; by L. C. Parmenter, *et al.*  
 Citizens' National Bank, Greencastle, Pennsylvania; by A. G. McLanahan, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Glen Rose, Texas; by J. R. Milam, *et al.*  
 City National Bank, La Fayette, Indiana; by W. T. Dobbins, *et al.*  
 Ellwood City National Bank, Ellwood City, Pennsylvania; by H. S. Blatt, *et al.*  
 Thurmont National Bank, Thurmont, Maryland; by Samuel M. Birely, *et al.*  
 City National Bank, Orange, Texas; by Charles M. Rein, *et al.*  
 Citizens' National Bank, Meyersdale, Pennsylvania; by S. B. Philson, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, South Boston, Virginia; by James D. Tucker, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Malta, Illinois; by Frederick B. Townsend, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Maple Park, Illinois; by Frederick B. Townsend, *et al.*  
 National Bank of Clifton, Clifton, Arizona; by T. M. Wingo, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, South Glens Falls, New York; by E. R. Varney, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Ontario, Oregon; by E. H. Teat, *et al.*  
 Monaca National Bank, Monaca, Pennsylvania; by Robert L. Hood, *et al.*  
 Citizens' National Bank, El Reno, Oklahoma; by H. T. Smith, *et al.*  
 American National Bank, Boston, Massachusetts; by E. L. Collins, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Pecatonica, Illinois; by Homer W. Knowlton, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Medford, Oklahoma; by T. T. Godfrey, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Whitesboro, Texas; by H. B. Abney, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Ryan, Indian Territory; by T. J. Lacy, *et al.*  
 Farmers' National Bank, Osborne, Kansas; by C. B. Hahn, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Chelsea, Indian Territory; by Archibald Bonds, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Chicago Heights, Illinois; by Edward R. Davis, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Manilla, Iowa; by A. T. Bennett, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Meeker, Colorado; by John C. Davis, *et al.*  
 Danville National Bank, Danville, Illinois; by C. V. McClenathan, *et al.*  
 People's National Bank, Cambridge, Maryland; by Emerson C. Harrington, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Paulsboro, New Jersey; by E. L. Leonard, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Berlin, Pennsylvania; by Fred Groff, *et al.*  
 Commercial National Bank, Essex, Iowa; by T. K. Elliott, *et al.*

#### APPLICATION FOR CONVERSION TO NATIONAL BANKS APPROVED.

Tonkawa State Bank, Tonkawa, Oklahoma; into First National Bank.  
 Bank of Okeene, Okeene, Oklahoma; into First National Bank.  
 Paulding Deposit Bank Co., Paulding, Ohio; into Paulding National Bank.  
 Gallatin Savings Bank, Gallatin, Missouri; into First National Bank.  
 McCook County State Bank, Salem, South Dakota; into First National Bank.

### NEW BANKS, BANKERS, ETC.

#### ALABAMA.

BIRMINGHAM—City Loan and Banking Co.; capital, \$50,000.—Caldwell & Ward.  
 ENSLEY—Steel City Bank.  
 MOBILE—Merchants' Bank; capital, \$150,000.  
 ROCKFORD—Bank of Rockford (J. P. Batson).

#### ARKANSAS.

SMITHVILLE—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$10,000;  
 Pres., G. L. Carson; Vice-Pres., F. A. Arnold; Cas., L. H. Kaiser.

#### CALIFORNIA.

KERN—First Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., F. W. Samuelson; Cas., V. E. Wilson.

#### CONNECTICUT.

SOUTH NORWALK—South Norwalk Trust Co.; capital, \$50,000; Pres., Frank A. Ferris; Sec., and Treas., Charles E. Hoyt.

#### FLORIDA.

KISSIMMEE—State Bank; capital, \$15,000;  
 Pres., C. A. Carson.

#### ILLINOIS.

BARRY—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000;  
 Pres., Thomas A. Retaillic; Cas., O. Williamson.  
 CHICAGO—Fidelity Trust Co.; capital, \$250,000; Pres., Jos. R. Young; Sec., W. Hately.  
 DU QUOIN—Du Quoin State Bank.  
 INDUSTRY—Bank of Industry; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Albert Eads; Cas., T. D. Sullivan;  
 Asst. Cas., D. D. Bruner.  
 LELAND—Farmers' Bank.—Leland State Bank; capital, \$25,000.  
 MOUNT CARMEL—American National Bank (successor to American State Bank); capital, \$50,000; Pres., J. M. Mitchell; Vice-Pres., Theodore G. Risley; Cas., J. B. Warren; Asst. Cas., Rosalind Keneipp.

#### INDIANA.

CENTERVILLE—City Bank (Evans & Girton); Cas., Alonzo Girton.  
 MANILLA—Manilla Bank; capital, \$10,000;  
 Pres., Thomas K. Mull; Cas., H. O. Gross.

**MEDARYVILLE**—C. H. Guild & Co. (successors to Gerber, Brown & Co.

**NOBLESVILLE**—Wainwright Trust Co.; capital, \$50,000.

**WINCHESTER**—People's Loan and Trust Co.; capital, \$30,000.

#### INDIAN TERRITORY.

**ATOKA**—Atoka National Bank; capital, \$31,000; Pres., J. T. Jeanes; Cas., R. J. Allen.

**OKMULGEE**—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., Samuel Roe; Cas., C. E. Regnier.

**RAVIA**—Bank of Ravia; capital, \$10,000; Pres., C. M. Cade; Cas., L. D. Woods.

**SALLISAW**—Bank of Sallisaw; capital, \$25,000; Pres., W. H. McDonald; Cas., Jno. C. Gardner.

**SOUTH MCALESTER**—Choctaw Trust Co.; capital, \$100,000; J. J. McAlester; Vice-Pres., Edmond McKenna; Sec., A. A. Billingley; Treas., J. H. Maxey, Jr.

#### IOWA.

**CORWITH**—First National Bank (successor to Corwith State Bank); capital, \$25,000; Pres., Thomas A. Way; Cas., H. E. Paul.

**HUMBOLDT**—Safety Savings Bank; capital, \$20,000; Pres., E. A. Wilder; Cas., Norwood Sharp.

**LINEVILLE**—Farmers and Merchants' Bank; capital, \$30,000; Pres., E. Glendenning.

**MANILLA**—Security Bank; Pres., H. Reef; Cas., B. F. Freeman; Asst. Cas., J. O. Reef. —Commercial Bank; Pres., A. T. Bennett; Vice-Pres., F. M. Leet; Cas., W. H. Hart.

**MITCHELLVILLE**—City Bank; Pres., Geo. D. Wood; Vice-Pres., Alex Wood; Cas., O. F. Ecklund.

**NEW HAMPTON**—State Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., John Foley; Cas., W. L. Turner.

**DELWEIN**—First National Bank (successor to Commercial Savings Bank); capital, \$50,000; Pres., T. L. Hanson; Cas., A. Hanson.

**SIOUX CITY**—People's Savings Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., Fred A. Bennett; Cas., A. T. Bennett; Asst. Cas., C. S. Bennett.

**WARE**—Ware Savings Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., B. L. Allen; Vice-Pres., M. T. Nelson; Cas., C. M. Carlson.

#### KANSAS.

**AGRA**—First State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., J. R. Burrow; Cas., W. D. Womer.

**BURLINGAME**—Slaughter & Taylor State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., J. H. Slaughter; Cas., Charles G. Taylor; Asst. Cas., F. H. Goudy.

**HERNDON**—State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., E. S. Kirtland; Cas., F. H. Drath.

**OSAWATOMIE**—Osawatonic State Bank; capital, \$15,000; Pres., J. C. Chestneck; Cas., O. T. Beeson.

**TAMPA**—Tampa State Bank.

#### KENTUCKY.

**PADUCAH**—Paducah Finance & Safety Vault Co.

**EARLINGTON**—Bank of Earlinton; capital, \$15,000.

**HARTFORD**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., T. L. Griffin; Cas., J. C. Riley.

**UPTON**—Davis Banking Co.; Pres., H. Y. Davis.

**WEST POINT**—Kentucky & Indiana Bank; Pres., J. W. A. Myers; Cas., W. F. Ogden.

#### LOUISIANA.

**NAPOLEONVILLE**—Bank of Assumption; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Henry A. Munson; Vice-Pres., P. H. Dansereaux; Cas., Leo Guillot.

#### MARYLAND.

**BALTIMORE**—Maryland National Bank (successor to People's Bank); capital, \$20,000; Pres., J. H. Judik; Vice-Pres., H. S. Platt; Cas., Jos. A. McKellip.

**BOONSBORO**—Boonsboro Bank; Pres., Geo. W. Hoffman; Cas., John C. Alexander.

#### MICHIGAN.

**FRANKENMUTH**—Bank of Frankenmuth.

**FRANKFORT**—Benzie County State Savings Bank (successor to Benzie County Bank); capital, \$20,000; Pres., L. P. Classen; Vice-Pres., Henry F. Robertson; Cas., J. F. Hofstetter. —Citizens' State Bank; capital, \$25,000.

**IONIA**—National Bank of Ionia (successor to Webber Bros.); capital, \$50,000; Pres., H. B. Webber; Cas., C. D. Ransom.

**ISHPEMING**—C. H. Moss & Co.

**NORWAY**—State Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Frank A. Janson; Vice-Pres., L. F. Springer; Cas., Dan. A. Stewart.

**PINCONNING**—Farmers' Bank; (W. S. Fotheringham) capital, \$15,000.

#### MINNESOTA.

**BLACKDUCK**—Bank of Blackduck; capital, \$25,000; Pres., P. A. Hilbert; Vice-Pres., A. J. Gilkinson; Cas., C. E. Oberg.

**COTTONWOOD**—State Security Bank (successor to Bank of Cottonwood); capital, \$15,000; Pres., J. H. Catlin; Cas., Charles Catlin.

**TINTAH**—Bank of Tintah (J. P. Dahlquist).

#### MISSISSIPPI.

**MADISON**—Bank of Madison; capital, \$20,000; Pres., T. N. Jones; Vice-Pres., J. F. McKay; Cas., G. W. Roy.

#### MISSOURI.

**COSBY**—Cosby State Bank; capital, \$10,000.

**KANSAS CITY**—Southwestern Trust Co.; capital, \$50,000; Pres., L. M. Miller; Treas., Wm. H. Livingston; Sec., Wm. H. Woods.

**KING CITY**—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$20,000; Pres., D. Bonham; Vice-Pres., K. McKenny; Cas., A. G. Bonham.

**SAVANNAH**—First National Bank (successor to Commercial Bank); capital, \$25,000; Pres., Andrew M. Lewellen; Cas., Truman D. Parr.

**ST. LOUIS**—Mechanics' National Bank (successor to Mechanics' Bank); capital, \$1,000,000; Pres., R. R. Hutchinson; Vice-Pres., D. K. Ferguson; Cas., C. O. Austin.

**TRENTON**—American Bank; capital, \$50,000;

Pres., W. O. Garvin; Vice-Pres., R. C. Morton; Cas., L. M. Brown.

#### MONTANA.

WIBAUX—Dawson County Bank; Pres., W. A. Orgain; Vice-Pres., J. B. Lawler; Cas., R. F. Smith.

#### NEBRASKA.

BLUE SPRINGS—Blue Springs State Bank (successor to Farmers and Merchants' Bank); capital, \$10,000; Pres., W. W. Black; Cas., I. E. Cameron.

ELMWOOD—First National Bank (successor to Bank of Elmwood); capital, \$25,000; Pres., Edwin Jeary; Cas., Floyd L. Woolcott.

O'NEILL—O'Neill National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., M. Dowling; Cas., James F. O'Donnell.

SPALDING—Spalding State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., S. W. Allerton; Vice-Pres., C. N. Thompson; Cas., Geo. N. Seymour; Asst. Cas., E. F. Page.

ST. EDWARD—Smith National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Pierson D. Smith; Cas., Lon A. Tuttle.

#### NEW HAMPSHIRE.

BERLIN—City Savings Bank; Pres., A. M. Stahl; Cas., Jas. S. Phipps.

#### NEW YORK.

NEW YORK—Century Bank; capital, \$100,000, Pres., Donald Mitchell; Vice-Pres., Edmund Dwight, Jr.—New Amsterdam National Bank (successor to Bank of New Amsterdam); capital, \$250,000; Pres., R. R. Moore; Cas., Geo. J. Baumann.—Jefferson Bank; capital, \$200,000; surplus, \$50,000; Pres., Herman Broesel; Cas., Sebastian Roggemann.—Broadway Safe Deposit Co.

PLATTSBURG—Plattsburg National Bank; capital, \$100,000; Pres., Stephen Moffitt; Cas., James Shaw.

PORTCHESTER—Mutual Trust Co.; capital, \$250,000.

#### NORTH CAROLINA.

FRANKLINTON—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., I. J. Stanton; Vice-Pres., Geo. Winston.

HENDERSONVILLE—Bank of Hendersonville; capital, \$25,000; Pres., J. P. Rickman; Cas., A. J. Jones.

MOCKSVILLE—Bank of Davie.

MOUNT AIRY—Surry Loan and Trust Co.; capital, \$25,000; Pres., J. H. Prather; Vice-Pres., J. M. Fulton; Sec. and Treas., Geo. D. Fawcett.

PITTSBORO—Bank of Chatham.

WELDON—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Wm. H. S. Burgyn; Vice-Pres., Sam T. Patterson; Cas., James T. Gooch.

#### NORTH DAKOTA.

LIDGERWOOD—First National Bank (successor to Movius State Bank); capital, \$50,000; Pres., Emil A. Movius; Vice-Pres., Freder-

ick B. Townsend; Cas., John H. Movius; Asst. Cas., M. O. Movius.

LUNDE—Security State Bank; Pres., J. Roeholt; Cas., H. Rostad.

#### OHIO.

CLEVELAND—Washington Savings and Banking Co.; capital, \$55,000.

COLLINWOOD—Euclid Banking Co. (branch of Euclid); capital, \$25,000; Pres., C. B. Colt; Cas., A. J. Nuhfer.

EDISON—Citizens' Banking Co.; capital, \$10,000; Pres., H. C. Bennett; Vice-Pres., W. G. Lefever; Cas., W. G. Haas.

GRAFTON—Grafton Banking Co.; capital, \$25,000.

HICKSVILLE—Hicksville National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., J. M. Ainsworth; Vice-Pres., I. M. Boon; Cas., J. L. Bevington.

HIGGINSPORT—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., M. H. Shinkle; Vice-Pres., F. R. Kautz; Cas., A. L. Voris.

LAKEWOOD—Lakewood Savings and Banking Co.; capital, \$25,000.

NOTTINGHAM—Nottingham Savings and Banking Co.; capital, \$25,000.

OWEN—Central Ohio Loan and Trust Co.; capital, \$50,000.

ZANESVILLE—Commercial National Bank (successor to Commercial Bank); capital, \$100,000; Pres., J. B. Hunter; Vice-Pres., M. W. Hissey; Cas., Geo. Brown.

#### OKLAHOMA.

AUGUSTA—Oklahoma Bank; capital, \$5,500.

CALUMET—State Bank; capital, \$5,000.

COYLE—People's Bank.

CROPPER—State Bank; capital, \$5,000.

EARLSBORO—Bank of Earlsboro; capital, \$5,000.

ELK CITY—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., E. K. Thurmond; Cas., A. L. Taylor; Asst. Cas., I. C. Thurmond.

GEARY—Farmers' State Bank; capital, \$5,000.

GLENCOE—Farmers' State Bank; capital, \$5,000.

GUTHRIE—Logan County Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., H. H. Hagan; Vice-Pres., P. J. Doerer; Cas., Carl Havigherst.

HOMESTEAD—Bank of Homestead; capital, \$5,000.

KINGFISHER—People's National Bank (successor to People's Bank); capital, \$25,000; Pres., Edwin Hockaday; Cas., F. L. Boynton.

LAHOMA—Bank of Lahoma; capital, \$5,000.

MOUNTAIN VIEW—Mountain View Bank; capital, \$10,000.

WAKITA—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., J. M. Hook; Cas., G. E. Garnett; Asst. Cas., R. Nicholasin.

#### PENNSYLVANIA.

ADAMSBURG—First National Bank of Beaver Springs; capital, \$25,000; Pres., C. O. Greenhoe; Cas., K. C. Walter.

CARMICHAELS—First National Bank; capi-

tal, \$25,000; Pres., F. M. Mitchener; Cas. A. S. Burtnett.  
**CRESSON**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Robert Devereaux; Cas., Edwin Empfield.  
**ELIZABETH**—State Bank; Pres., James M. Nevin; Cas., Hugh Nevin.  
**LITITZ**—Farmers' National Bank; capital, \$30,000; Pres., P. J. Roebuck; Cas., H. H. Gingrich.  
**McKEES ROCKS**—McKees Rocks Trust Co.; capital, \$150,000.  
**OAKLAND**—Oakland Bank; capital, \$50,000—Oakland Trust Co.; capital, \$125,000.  
**SCRANTON**—North Scranton Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., W. J. Lewis; Vice-Pres., James Fitch; Cas., T. M. Symonds.  
**ST. THOMAS**—St. Thomas Bank; Pres., T. M. Mahon; Cas., C. C. Gerwicks.

**SOUTH CAROLINA.**

**BEAUFORT**—Bank of Beaufort; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Wm. H. Lockwood; Cas., B. S. Samis; Asst. Cas., Wm. H. Lockwood, Jr.  
**BRUNSON**—Bank of Brunson; capital, \$25,000; Pres., J. Freed Allen; Vice-Pres., Charles Addison; Cas., D. B. Kendrick.

**SOUTH DAKOTA.**

**GARY**—State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., J. G. Lund; Cas., S. J. Forbes.  
**GAYVILLE**—Bank of Gayville; Pres., E. E. Halstead; Cas., W. H. McMaster.  
**HOSMER**—Hosmer State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., Jacob Gundert; Cas., B. F. Puckett.  
**VEBLIN**—Veblin State Bank; capital, \$6,000; Pres., E. A. Movius; Cas., John Movius; Asst. Cas., Geo. F. Anderson.  
**WATERTOWN**—Watertown State Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., J. G. Lund; Cas., A. G. Matter.

**TENNESSEE.**

**HENNING**—Farmers and Merchants' Bank; capital, \$20,000; Pres., S. M. Roy; Cas., Sam Alston.

**CHANGES IN OFFICERS, CAPITAL, ETC.****ALABAMA.**

**PRATT CITY**—Pratt City Bank; George W. Donaldson, Manager.

**ARIZONA.**

**TEMPE**—Tempe National Bank; A. C. Ozanne, Vice-Pres.

**CONNECTICUT.**

**NEW MILFORD**—First National Bank; Isaac B. Bristol, Pres. in place of A. B. Mygatt, deceased.  
**NORWICH**—Chelsea Savings Bank; Orlando J. Lamb, Vice-Pres., deceased.

**DELAWARE.**

**NEWARK**—National Bank of Newark; S. M. Curtis, Pres. in place of John Pilling; S. M. Donnell, Vice-Pres. in place of S. M. Curtis.

**TEXAS.**

**ASPERMONT**—First National Bank; capital, \$30,000; Cas., William Harvey.  
**HONDO**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Geo. W. Jones; Vice-Pres., Ed de Montel; Cas., Isaac Wilson.  
**MOODY**—First National Bank (successor to Citizens' Bank); capital, \$25,000; Pres., F. F. Downs; Cas., J. C. Reynolds; Asst. Cas., Jno. Donaldson.  
**PALMER**—Palmer Bank.  
**SWEETWATER**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., J. H. Beall; Cas., J. V. W. Holmes.

**VIRGINIA.**

**BEDFORD CITY**—People's Bank; Pres., L. R. Gills; Cas., W. A. Fitzpatrick; Asst. Cas., J. M. Daniels.—Bedford City Branch of the Lynchburg Trust and Savings Bank.  
**RICHMOND**—Broad Street Bank; capital, \$200,000.  
**SOUTH BOSTON**—South Boston Savings Bank.

**WASHINGTON.**

**TACOMA**—Lumberman's State Bank; Pres., R. D. Muser; Vice-Pres., Geo. S. Long; Cas., W. E. Bliven; Asst. Cas., Hans E. Knatvold.  
**TEKOA**—Commercial State Savings Bank; capital, \$40,000.  
**WALLA WALLA**—Home Savings Bank; capital, \$250,000.

**WEST VIRGINIA.**

**BRIDGEPORT**—Dime Savings Bank; capital, \$25,000.

**WISCONSIN.**

**MERRILLAN**—American Exchange Bank (A. S. Trow).  
**MONDOVI**—First National Bank (successor to Bank of Mondovi); capital, \$25,000; Pres., J. W. Whelan; Cas., R. Southworth.

**CANADA.****NEW BRUNSWICK.**

**DALHOUSIE**—Royal Bank of Canada.

**GEORGIA.**

**DALTON**—First National Bank; W. C. Martin Vice-Pres.  
**GAINESVILLE**—First National Bank; J. T. Telford, Asst. Cas.  
**LAVONIA**—Bank of Lavonia; J. O. Morris, Vice-Pres.; J. A. Pruitt, Cas.  
**WEST POINT**—Bank of West Point; capital increased \$25,000.  
**IDAHO.**  
**MOSCOW**—First National Bank; W. L. Payne, Cas. in place of F. N. Gilbert; J. H. Meir, Asst. Cas. in place of W. L. Payne.  
**ST. ANTHONY**—First National Bank; John C. Rice, Vice-Pres.

**ILLINOIS.**

**BENTON**—Benton State Bank; Karl Burkhardt, Cas.; W. F. Spiller, Asst. Cas.

**BUSHNELL**—First National Bank; Charles E. Henry, Asst. Cas.

**CHICAGO**—Continental National Bank: capital increased to \$3,000,000.—N. W. Harris & Co.; Allen Forbes, John W. Edmiston, Isaac Sprague and P. W. Brooks, admitted to general partnership.

**DALLAS CITY**—First National Bank; W. H. Bliss, Cas. in place of Chas. F. Leinbaugh; no Asst. Cas. in place of W. H. Bliss.

**DANVILLE**—Palmer National Bank: M. J. Wolford, Pres. in place of C. J. Palmer; D. M. Fowler, Cas. in place of M. J. Wolford; Herman Bahls, Asst. Cas. in place of D. M. Fowler.

**PEORIA**—Commercial National Bank; Elwood A. Cole, Asst. Cas.

**PETERSBURG**—First National Bank; S. H. Rule, Cas. in place of J. M. Robbins.

**RIDGE FARM**—First National Bank; H. G. Barker, Asst. Cas.

**ST. ANNE**—First National Bank; D. T. Al-lard, Cas. in place of Jno. P. Pallisard.

**SYCAMORE**—Sycamore National Bank; David A. Syme, Pres. in place of Geo. E. Dutton; G. W. Dutton, Vice-Pres. in place of P. M. Alden; C. E. Walker, Cas. in place of P. M. Alden; J. B. Waterman, Asst. Cas.

**TAYLORVILLE**—Farmers' National Bank; W. W. Calloway, Asst. Cas. in place of H. A. Jennings.

#### INDIANA.

**INDIANAPOLIS**—Indiana Trust Co.; Arthur Newby, elected director in place of E. G. Cornelius.—American National Bank: capital increased to \$350,000.—Indianapolis Clearing-House; W. F. C. Golt, Manager, resigned.

**TIPTON**—Tipton County Bank; E. H. Shirk, Cas., deceased.

#### INDIAN TERRITORY.

**HOLDENVILLE**—First National Bank; W. J. Smith, Vice-Pres. in place of A. J. Dunlap; L. D. Allred, Cas. in place of W. J. Smith.

**PAUL'S VALLEY**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of Ralf Goddard.

**SULPHUR**—First National Bank; S. L. Tusley, Vice-Pres.; Royce Oakes, Asst. Cas.

#### IOWA.

**BLOOMFIELD**—Taylor-McGowen Bank; D. M. McFadden, Cas., deceased.

**CLINTON**—People's Trust & Savings Bank; Artemus Lamb, Pres., deceased.

**DES MOINES**—University Bank; Ferdinand Westphal, Act'g Cas. in place of W. S. Jordan, resigned.

**DUBUQUE**—Dubuque National Bank; Joseph G. Bailey, Vice-Pres., deceased.

**DYERSVILLE**—German State Bank; Joseph G. Bailey, Pres., deceased.

**GEORGE**—George Savings Bank; John P. De Neui, Cas. in place of C. T. Tupper.

**INDEPENDENCE**—First National Bank; Z.

Stout, Pres. in place of Richard Campbell, deceased.

**KAMRAR**—Farmers and Merchants' Bank; Geo. S. Neel, Pres.; F. M. Bibler, Vice-Pres. **LINDEN**—Linden Bank; R. W. Blanchard, Asst. Cas., resigned.

**MARATHON**—First National Bank; F. H. Helsell, Vice-Pres. in place of A. A. Wells;

J. E. Allison, Cas. in place of S. T. Goltry.

**MARENGO**—Marengo Savings Bank; L. E. Brown, Asst. Cas.

**OELWEIN**—Aetna State Bank; capital increased to \$50,000.

**RIPPEY**—Bank of Rippey; W. H. McCammon, Pres.; J. M. Woodworth, Vice-Pres.

**SIOUX CITY**—Live Stock National Bank; E. C. Currey, Asst. Cas.

**STANTON**—Farmers' Exchange Bank; Geo. Palmer, Pres.; E. M. Coppage, Cas.

**WEST BEND**—Union State Bank; E. F. Bartlett, Pres. in place of Alex. Younie.

#### KANSAS.

**ATCHISON**—Exchange National Bank; W. P. Waggoner, Vice-Pres. in place of R. L. Pease, deceased.

**COUNCIL GROVE**—Council Grove National Bank; D. C. Webb, Vice-Pres.; A. H. Prater, Asst. Cas.

**GREAT BEND**—Citizens' National Bank; F. A. Moses, Asst. Cas.

**SMITH CENTRE**—First National Bank; J. D. Moesman, Asst. Cas.

**TOPEKA**—First National Bank; W. H. Bessington, Vice-Pres. in place of C. W. Snyder; E. O. Faulkner, Cas. in place of Wm. Henderson.

#### KENTUCKY.

**COVINGTON**—German National Bank; H. W. Percival, Asst. Cas.

**CYNTHIANA**—National Bank of Cynthiana; no Vice-Pres. in place of W. T. McNele, deceased.

**HARTFORD**—Bank of Hartford; John T. Moore, Cas. in place of John C. Riley; Rowan Holbrook, Asst. Cas.

**LOUISVILLE**—Columbia Finance and Trust Co.; L. W. Botta, Sec. in place of Wallace Hill.—German Security Bank; J. F. Kellner, Vice-Pres. in place of W. S. Tafel.

**MUNFORDVILLE**—Hart County Deposit Bank; W. B. Craddock, Pres. in place of Joel T. Price; G. P. Powell, Vice-Pres.

**WILLIAMSTOWN**—Grant County Deposit Bank; capital reduced to \$60,000.—Bank of Williamstown; Fred Elliston, Asst. Cas.

#### LOUISIANA.

**HOUMA**—Bank of Houma; J. F. Chanoin, Asst. Cas.

**SHREVEPORT**—Citizens' National Bank; Jno. M. Tucker, Vice-Pres.

#### MAINE.

**GARDINER**—Oakland National Bank; Josiah S. Maxcy, Pres. in place of Joshua Gray; no Vice-Pres. in place of Josiah S. Maxcy.



**MACHIAS**—Eastern Trust and Banking Co.; Geo. Boynton, Gen. Mgr. in place of J. A. Coffin, resigned.

#### MARYLAND.

**BALTIMORE**—Safe Deposit and Trust Co. of Baltimore; Michael Jenkins, Pres. in place of B. F. Newcomer, deceased; J. B. Ramsay, elected director.—Maryland Savings Bank; Clinton P. Paine, Pres. in place of W. H. Baldwin; Daniel Cloud, Second Vice-Pres.; Wm. W. Cloud, Treas.—Union Trust Co.; E. B. Hunt, elected director.—Continental National Bank; Thornton Rollins, Pres. in place of W. F. Jackson; Geo. W. Moore, Vice-Pres. in place of Thornton Rollins.—Citizens' Trust and Deposit Co.; absorbed by Union Trust Co.—Old Town Bank; E. G. Hipsley, Pres., deceased; also director Savings Bank of Baltimore and Baltimore Trust and Guaranty Association.

#### MASSACHUSETTS.

**BOSTON**—Third National Bank; capital reduced to \$1,000,000.—National Union Bank; Geo. Whitney, Pres., deceased.  
**CONCORD**—Middlesex Institution for Savings; Charles H. Walcott, Pres., deceased.  
**GLOUCESTER**—Cape Ann National Bank; Kilby W. Shute, Act'g Cas. during April and May.  
**LAWRENCE**—Essex Savings Bank; Joseph Shattuck, Jr., Treas. in place of W. W. Spaulding.  
**LYNN**—National Security Bank; Geo. R. Felt, instead of Geo. R. Felt, Jr., Cas.

#### MICHIGAN.

**CHELSEA**—Chelsea Savings Bank; W. J. Knapp, Cas. in place of Geo. P. Glazier, deceased.  
**IRON MOUNTAIN**—First National Bank; Richard S. Powell, Cas. in place of Charles Ewing.

#### MINNESOTA.

**FERGUS FALLS**—Fergus Falls National Bank; P. M. Joice, Pres. in place of R. G. Shumway; J. S. Ulland, Vice-Pres. in place of Thomas W. McLean.  
**HIBBING**—First National Bank; A. D. McRae, Vice-Pres.; S. Macdonnell, Asst. Cas.  
**STEWARTVILLE**—First National Bank; Tobias Hogenson, Cas.; no Asst. Cas. in place of Tobias Hogenson.

#### MISSISSIPPI.

**GULFPORT**—Bank of Gulfport; capital increased to \$25,000; J. T. Jones, Pres. in place of W. W. Bell; A. L. Thornton, Vice-Pres. in place of S. S. Bullis; W. A. King, Cas.; A. C. Purple, Asst. Cas.

#### MISSOURI.

**COLUMBIA**—Exchange National Bank; no Pres. in place of J. H. Wauzh, deceased.  
**SEDALIA**—Bank of Commerce; absorbed by Citizens' National Bank.  
**SPRINGFIELD**—Holland Banking Co.; T. B.

Holland, Pres. in place of C. B. Holland, deceased.

**ST. JOSEPH**—German-American Bank; Ernest V. Harding, Cas., resigned.

#### NEBRASKA.

**LEIGH**—Farmers and Merchants' Bank; P. E. McKillip, Pres.; B. R. Cowdery, Vice-Pres.  
**OMAHA**—Union National Bank; no Pres. in place of William W. Marsh, deceased.—United States National Bank; Clifford W. Smith, director, deceased.  
**WYMORE**—First National Bank; W. T. Auld, Pres. in place of H. A. Greenwood.

#### NEW HAMPSHIRE.

**BERLIN**—Berlin National Bank; Daniel J. Daley, Pres. in place of Daniel J. Dalley.

#### NEW JERSEY.

**JERSEY CITY**—Fifth Ward Savings Bank; John H. Ward, Pres. in place of J. C. Limbeck, deceased.  
**ORANGE**—Orange Savings Bank; Charles B. Storrs, Pres.; Peter Gertert, Vice-Pres.; Edward A. Everitt, Sec. and Treas.; Otto C. F. Brueger, Asst. Treas.

#### NEW YORK.

**BROOKLYN**—Schermmerhorn Bank; absorbed by Mechanics Bank.—Brooklyn Bank; William T. Goundie, elected director.  
**BUFFALO**—Empire State Savings Bank; Edward Gaskin, elected trustee.  
**EAST AURORA**—Bank of East Aurora; Henry H. Persons, Pres. in place of Henry Z. Persons, deceased; Philip S. Persons, Cas.; Richard S. Persons, Asst. Cas.  
**GROTON**—First National Bank; W. B. Gale, Asst. Cas. in place of C. O. Rhodes.  
**HOOSICK FALLS**—First National Bank; Ira J. Wood, Cas. in place of Addison Getty, deceased.  
**HOLLRY**—State Exchange Bank; John Downs, Pres., deceased.  
**LITTLE FALLS**—National Herkimer County Bank; Geo. A. Hardin, Pres., deceased.  
**MECHANICVILLE**—Manufacturers' National Bank; Newton T. Bryan, Cas. in place of Charles D. Thurber.  
**NEW YORK**—National Park Bank; Fred. O. Foxcroft, Second Asst. Cas.—Irving National Bank; no Cas. in place of James Dennison.—Central National Bank; Jas. H. Dunham, director, deceased; also trustee Bowery Savings Bank.—Maitland, Coppel & Co.; Geo. Coppel, deceased; also director Metropolitan Trust Co. and Mercantile Trust Co.—Bank of the State of New York; Chas. W. Morse, Vice-Pres. in place of James B. Colgate.—Mechanics and Traders' Bank; Thomas E. Crimmins, elected director.—Twelfth Ward Bank; T. F. Gilroy, elected director.—New York Security and Trust Co.; Aldace F. Walker, director, deceased.—Fifth National Bank; Horace F. Hutchins n, elected director.—

Tobey & Kirk, removed to 23 Broad Street — Vernam & Co.; Edward N. Bond retired; business continued by Albert H. Vernam & Co. — Watson & Brown; succeeded by Vernon C. Brown & Co. — C. I. Hudson & Co.; Geo. R. Dyer admitted to firm.

**RICHFIELD SPRINGS**—First National Bank; James McKee, Asst. Cas.

**SARATOGA SPRINGS**—First National Bank; James M. Marvin, President, deceased.

**SCHUYLERVILLE**—National Bank of Schuylerville; C. E. Brisbin, Pres. in place of D. A. Bullard, deceased; J. B. Deyoe, Cas. in place of C. E. Brisbin.

### OHIO.

**CANTON**—Central Savings Bank; Austin Lynch, Pres.

**CINCINNATI**—First National Bank; Edward Seiter, Asst. Cas. — National Lafayette Bank; Perin Langdon, elected director. — Provident Savings Bank; L. J. Van Lahr, Cas. — Provident Trust Co.; L. J. Van Lahr, Sec. and Treas.

**CLEVELAND**—Western Reserve Trust Co.; J. V. Painter, elected director.

**DELTA**—Farmers' National Bank; Geo. F. Hult, Cas. in place of A. P. Grisler.

**ELYRIA**—National Bank of Elyria; S. H. Squire, Jr., Asst. Cas. in place of S. W. Henson.

**LEWISBURG**—People's Banking Co.; H. P. Smith, Pres. in place of Lewis F. Parmelee, deceased.

**NILES**—First National Bank; A. J. Leitch, Cas. in place of Wade A. Taylor.

**SMITHFIELD**—First National Bank; Charles McKinney, Cas. in place of E. C. Vermillion.

**WELLSVILLE**—First National Bank; Clayton Vance, Cas. in place of H. B. Nichols.

**ZANESVILLE**—Old Citizens' National Bank; C. H. Abbot, Vice-Pres.

### OKLAHOMA.

**MANGUM**—First National Bank; C. P. Hamilton, Vice-Pres. in place of G. W. Boyd and W. R. Hext.

**OKLAHOMA**—Oklahoma City Savings Bank; C. W. Allen, Cas., deceased.

### OREGON.

**GRANTS PASS**—First National Bank of Southern Oregon; H. L. Giekey, Cas. in place of John D. Fox.

### PENNSYLVANIA.

**BELLE VERNON**—First National Bank; T. G. Brown, Cas. in place of B. F. Taylor.

**BRADFORD**—Bradford National Bank; M. J. Lowe, additional Asst. Cas.

**DELTA**—First National Bank; H. W. Stubbs, Cas. instead of H. M. Stubbs.

**EMPORIUM**—First National Bank; Josiah Howard, Vice-Pres. in place of Wm. Howard, deceased.

**HALIFAX**—Halifax National Bank; Isaac Lyter, Cas. in place of Charles W. Ryan,

deceased; L. W. Ryan, Asst. Cas. in place of Isaac Lyter.

**KANE**—First National Bank; M. W. Moffitt, Pres., deceased.

**MARIENVILLE**—Gold Standard National Bank; A. E. Stonecipher, Vice-Pres.; C. H. Knapp, Asst. Cas.

**MAUCH CHUNK**—Linderman National Bank; James H. Wilhelm, Pres. in place of James I. Blakeslee, deceased; Alonzo P. Blakeslee, Vice-Pres. in place of James H. Wilhelm.

**MILLERSBURG**—First National Bank; John H. Kahler, Cas., deceased.

**PHILADELPHIA**—Independence National Bank; absorbed by Girard National Bank. — John H. McQuillen & Co.; Joseph Button admitted to firm. — Tradesmen's National Bank; Henry D. McCarthy, Asst. Cas. — Sixth National Bank; Daniel Baird, Jr., Cas. and director in place of William Clark Marshall, deceased. — Philadelphia National Bank; H. J. Keiser, Asst. Cas. — Integrity Title Insurance Trust and S. D. Co.; capital increased to \$400,000.

**SCRANTON**—People's Bank; Cyrus D. Jones, Pres.; G. F. Reynolds, Vice-Pres.; Henry M. Ives, Cas.

**WARREN**—Citizens' National Bank; E. T. Hazeltine, Pres. in place of Myron Waters; no Vice-Pres. in place of E. T. Hazeltine.

**YORK**—York Trust, Real Estate and Deposit Co.; title changed to York Trust Co.

### RHODE ISLAND.

**NEWPORT**—Island Savings Bank; Edward A. Brown, Pres. in place of Augustus C. Titus, deceased.

**PROVIDENCE**—Old National Bank; James E. Cranston, director, deceased.

**WARREN**—First National Bank; G. Welch, Pres. in place of John Waterman; no Vice-Pres. in place of G. Welch.

**WESTERLY**—National Phenix Bank; Thomas P. Nichols, Cas. in place of J. Barclay Foster, deceased. — Mechanics' Savings Bank; J. Barclay Foster, Treas., deceased.

### SOUTH CAROLINA.

**BATESBURG**—First National Bank; W. H. Timmermann, Pres. in place of D. P. Hartley; N. A. Bates, Vice-Pres. in place of O. J. Harris; C. M. Asbill, Asst. Cas.

**SUMMERVILLE**—Summerville Savings Bank and Investment Co.; title changed to Bank of Dorchester.

### TEXAS.

**CROCKETT**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of John S. Kennedy.

**DODD CITY**—First National Bank; Geo. A. Preston, Vice-Pres.; W. C. McGee, Asst. Cas.

**GALVESTON**—Island City Savings Bank; R. Waverley Smith, Pres. in place of M. Lasker.

**GRAND SALINE**—National Bank of Grand Saline; N. S. Meeks, Asst. Cas.

**GRAND VIEW**—First National Bank; R. E. Pitts, Asst. Cas. in place of A. J. Pitts.  
**HOWE**—First National Bank; L. M. Tuck Vice-Pres.; Tom Everheart, Cas. in place of S. J. Spotts; G. D. Campbell, Asst. Cas.  
**MCGREGOR**—Citizens' National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of J. B. Naler.  
**WAXAHACHIE**—First National Bank; M. T. Patrick, Pres. in place of C. W. Gibson; J. W. Singleton, Vice-Pres. in place of R. P. Sweatt; Osce Goodwin, Cas. in place of E. A. Du Bose.

**UTAH.**

**OGDEN**—Utah National Bank; no Cas. in place of W. F. Adams; R. F. Hoag, Asst. Cas.  
**SALT LAKE CITY**—Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Co.; Geo. Q. Cannon, director, deceased.

**VERMONT.**

**MANCHESTER CENTRE**—Factory Point National Bank; W. H. Roberts, Asst. Cas.

**VIRGINIA.**

**LEESBURG**—People's National Bank; capital, increased to \$100,000.  
**RICHMOND**—First National Bank; J. C. Joplin, Acting Cas. during absence of H. C. Burnett, Cas.—Southern Trust Co.; John Addison, Pres. in place of John R. Williams, deceased.

**WASHINGTON.**

**FAIRHAVEN**—Citizens' National Bank; E. W. Andrews, Pres. in place of S. M. Bruce.  
**TACOMA**—Scandinavian-American Bank; re-organized as Lumbermen's State Bank.

**WEST VIRGINIA.**

**ELIZABETH**—Wirt County Bank; G. W. Roberts, Cas.; Edgar Carver, Asst. Cas. resigned.  
**POINT PLEASANT**—Point Pleasant National Bank; J. W. Windon, Asst. Cas.  
**SPENCER**—Bank of Spencer; L. V. Guthrie, Pres. in place of Jno. M. Holswade.

**WISCONSIN.**

**MADISON**—German-American Bank; John J. Suhr, Pres., deceased.  
**SHELL LAKE**—Lumbermen's Bank; Artemus Lamb, Pres., deceased.

**CANADA.****BRITISH COLUMBIA.**

**ROSSLAND**—Bank of British North America; W. T. Oliver no longer Manager.

**MANITOBA.**

**BRANDON**—Imperial Bank of Canada; Wilson Bell, Manager.

**NOVA SCOTIA.**

**HALIFAX**—Union Bank of Halifax; A. D. McKee, Manager.

**BANKS REPORTED CLOSED OR IN LIQUIDATION.****INDIANA.**

**INDIANAPOLIS**—State Bank of Indiana.

**IOWA.**

**LE MAR**—Le Mars National Bank; in hands of Thomas M. Thornton, Receiver April 17.

**NEW YORK.**

**HANNIBAL**—Brewster Banking Office.  
**NEW YORK**—Russak Bros.—I. L. Currier & Co.

**NIAGARA FALLS**—Frontier Bank.  
**OVID**—Banking House of Leroy C. Partridge.

**OREGON.**

**SALEM**—Gilbert Bros.

**RHODE ISLAND.**

**WESTERLY**—Mechanics' Savings Bank.

**VERMONT.**

**VERGENNES**—Farmers' National Bank; in hands of John T. Sullivan, Receiver, April 13.

**VIRGINIA.**

**ORANGE**—American National Bank; in voluntary liquidation.

**WASHINGTON.**

**CHEHALIS**—Chehalis State Bank; in voluntary liquidation.

**VANCOUVER**—First National Bank; in hands of James W. Maxwell, Receiver, April 20.

**Pension for Railway Employees.**—On May 3 President Stuyvesant Fish of the Illinois Central Railroad issued a circular announcing a pension plan for the 40,000 employees of the company. The plan, which is to take effect July 1, is said to be more liberal in its provisions than has heretofore been adopted by any other road.

The company starts with a gift of \$250,000, and in addition will each year make an appropriation of an amount not to exceed \$100,000. For each year of service an allowance of one per cent. of the average regular monthly pay received for the ten years preceding retirement will be granted.

Leave of absence, suspension, dismissal followed by reinstatement within one year, or temporary lay-off on account of reduction of force, when unattended by other employment, is not to be considered as a break in the continuity of service.

The system applies to every officer and employee of the road, from the president down to the humblest laborer, except members of the law and surgical departments. All officers and employees who have attained the age of seventy years shall be retired, and such of them as have been ten years in the service of the road shall be pensioned.

# MONEY, TRADE AND INVESTMENTS.

## A REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SITUATION.

NEW YORK, May 3, 1901.

THE BUYING MOVEMENT IN THE STOCK MARKET has been the phenomenon of the month just ended. To the outsider it is a mystery how the machinery of Wall Street is able to cope successfully with the business which has been pouring into the Stock Exchange day after day without sign of diminution, each high record of one day being exceeded by the record of the succeeding day.

It is within the memory of young men in Wall Street when 500,000 shares of stock traded in at the Stock Exchange in a single day was considered a remarkable record. When the total shares went to 600,000 shares the machinery of reporting the transactions was well-nigh paralyzed, and financial writers in their reviews stated that all the operations were not reported because of the lack of facilities to accommodate such an enormous business.

Yet we have witnessed the daily sales increase to 1,000,000 shares, then go to 2,000,000 shares, and on the last day of the month they even exceeded 3,000,000 shares. Of course there has never been anything like it in the history of the "Street." There have been bull movements and extraordinary advances in some respects even rivalling the present upward movement. The advance which occurred after the panic of 1873 had spent its force, and which left prices in 1881 at the highest level ever before reached, will always stand out as an exceptional and extraordinary bull movement. In activity, however, there has never been a period in the previous history of the Stock Exchange to compare with the present. Whatever may be the future of the stock market, there is little doubt that the month of April, 1901, will for many years to come be considered an epoch-making period in the history of Wall Street operations.

The Stock Exchange was closed on three business days, on April 5, Good Friday, and the following day and on April 27, the day the Stock Exchange began to move to its temporary quarters at the Produce Exchange. Business was transacted on only twenty-three days of the month, yet the total sales of stocks in April were 41,764,979 shares, as compared with only 14,644,935 shares in April, 1900. The sales each day were as follows:

DATE.	Sales. Shares.	DATE.	Sales. Shares.	DATE.	Sales. Shares.	DATE.	Sales. Shares.	DATE.	Sales. Shares.
Monday, 1....	1,816,821	8.....	1,691,762	15.....	1,620,663	22.....	2,344,385	29.....	2,663,832
Tuesday, 2....	1,640,360	9.....	1,349,416	16.....	1,763,458	23.....	1,806,233	30.....	3,234,339
Wednesday, 3....	1,940,026	10.....	1,860,046	17.....	1,640,628	24.....	2,006,748		
Thursday, 4....	1,890,332	11.....	1,700,153	18.....	1,677,850	25.....	2,071,453		
Friday, 5.....	.....	12.....	1,401,803	19.....	2,168,925	26.....	1,655,827		
Saturday, 6.....	.....	13.....	761,753	20.....	1,128,996	27.....	.....		

So enormous was the volume of business that an exact record of the sales was impossible, but the figures above given may be accepted as approximately correct. On April 19 the largest record up to that date was made; only once before the total transactions having reached 2,000,000 shares, on January 7 last. Five times in the remaining days of the month the sales exceeded that amount, and on April 30 the new record of more than 3,000,000 shares was made.

The sale of bonds were also of extraordinary magnitude, amounting to more than

\$7,000,000 on April 19, to \$6,000,000 on April 22 and about \$7,000,000 on April 30. During the month the sales of bonds aggregated \$115,000,000, as compared with \$59,000,000 in April last year. In the following table we give approximately the sales of stocks and bonds at the New York Stock Exchange in April and in the first four months of each of the last eleven years :

	STOCKS.		BONDS.	
	April.	Four months.	April.	Four months.
	Shares.	Shares.		
1891.....	6,900,000	19,000,000	\$33,100,000	\$125,000,000
1892.....	6,800,000	34,900,000	42,400,000	232,400,000
1893.....	6,200,000	33,400,000	24,900,000	155,500,000
1894.....	4,000,000	16,500,000	39,100,000	124,100,000
1895.....	5,000,000	16,400,000	51,600,000	134,300,000
1896.....	4,100,000	18,200,000	40,300,000	162,900,000
1897.....	3,500,000	14,700,000	22,100,000	139,600,000
1898.....	6 000,000	34,100,000	28,500,000	270,800,000
1899.....	17,000,000	74,800,000	84,500,000	410,400,000
1900.....	14,600,000	49,200,000	59,600,000	221,100,000
1901.....	41,700,000	120,700,000	115,900,000	446,800,000

It is apparent from the above comparison that the present volume of business transacted at the New York Stock Exchange is wholly without parallel in the previous history of that institution. The trading in individual stocks also exceeded all previous records. In fact the dealings in a single stock on some days equalled or exceeded the largest total transactions in the stock market ever recorded in one day a few years ago. Some of the exceptional records for single stocks last month were : April 22, Southern Pacific, 342,000 shares ; April 24, Union Pacific, 652,000 shares ; April 25, Southern Pacific, 312,000 shares ; April 29, Union Pacific, 360,000 shares, and United States Steel, 418,000 shares ; April 30, Erie, 309,000 shares, and United States Steel, 489,000 shares. The stocks which were dealt in to the extent of more than 1,000,000 shares last month were as follows :

	Shares.		Shares.
Amalgamated Copper.....	1,869,000	Northern Pacific.....	1,553,000
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe....	1,451,000	Southern Pacific.....	1,677,000
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy...	1,609,000	Union Pacific.....	2,189,000
Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul...	1,271,000	United States Steel.....	2,138,000
Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific...	1,061,000	United States Steel pref.....	1,580,000
Erie.....	1,576,000		

The total capital stock represented in the above list of eleven stocks is about \$1,370,000,000, while the par value of the shares sold as recorded above was \$1,984,400,000. The sales last month represented an excess over the entire stock outstanding of more than \$600,000. The sales of Amalgamated Copper were  $2\frac{1}{2}$  times the entire stock, of Atchison 1.4 times, of Burlington 1.4 times, of St. Paul 2.7 times, of Rock Island 2.1 times, of Erie 1.4 times, of Northern Pacific nearly 2 times, and of Union Pacific 3.2 times. About eighty five per cent. of the Southern Pacific's entire stock, and eighty per cent. of the total United States Steel common and forty per cent. of the preferred were sold during the month.

There were many important advances in the prices of securities during the month, and while all the gains were not held up to the close of the month, the general list shows a substantial advance all along the line. Nearly all stocks sold at the highest prices of the year during April, and the advance from the lowest prices, generally recorded in January, were in many cases of almost unprecedented extent. In the following list of forty stocks are shown the extreme advance in April from the closing prices of March and the lowest prices recorded this year prior to April 1 :

	ADVANCE			ADVANCE	
	Since Mar. 31.	From last of year.		Since Mar. 31.	From last of year.
Amalgamated Copper.....	28½	44¾	Delaware and Hudson.....	12	58
American Express.....	3	35	Erie.....	6¾	18¾
American Smelting and Refining	14	23¾	Evansville and Terre Haute.....	12	27
American Sugar.....	12	20½	General Electric.....	17	50¾
Atchison.....	15½	36¼	Louisville and Nashville.....	11¼	27¼
Baltimore and Ohio.....	14¾	25	Metropolitan Street Railway.....	10¾	18¾
Canada Southern.....	13¾	24¾	Missouri, Kansas and Texas.....	10¼	20¼
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy.	24½	61½	"    "    preferred	10¾	25½
Chicago and East. Illinois.....	17¾	44¾	Missouri Pacific.....	8	41¾
Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul.	24½	32¼	New York Central.....	17½	12¾
"    "    preferred	11¼	12	Northern Pacific.....	24¾	42¼
Chicago and Northwest.....	27½	43¾	Pennsylvania.....	7½	19¼
"    "    preferred	32	41	People's Gas and Coke.....	12¾	23¾
Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific	30	48¾	Reading.....	7	18
Chic., St. Paul, Minn. and Omaha	11	20	Southern Pacific.....	11¾	17¾
"    "    preferred	21	21	Tennessee Coal and Iron.....	8¼	20¼
Chicago Terminal.....	13¾	20¼	Texas and Pacific.....	14¾	27¾
"    "    preferred	15¼	24¼	Union Pacific.....	28	41¾
Colorado Fuel and Iron.....	53	68¼	"    "    preferred	13¾	16¾
Consolidated Gas.....	24	51	United States Express.....	10	46

With the activity at the Stock Exchange there has been a most notable increase in the exchanges of the clearing-house banks of the city. During April the total clearings were \$3,637,000,000, an amount far in excess of all previous totals. Several times during the month the daily exchanges broke old records. On April 1 the clearings amounted to \$414,924,431, which was exceeded only once prior to that date, on January 2 last, when the total was \$427,903,262. The highest previous record was \$364,013,290 on December 27, 1900. On April 9 a new record was made, the exchanges reaching \$437,852,980. This was beaten on April 16 when the total amounted to \$445,241,223. On April 23, a week later, the day's exchanges amounted to \$546,937,155. On that day the Bank of Manhattan Company took \$64,598,335 exchanges to the clearing-house and on the same day the Hanover National Bank brought \$58,000,000 exchanges to the clearing house.

The remarkable growth in bank exchanges in recent years is shown in the following table:

APRIL.	New York.	Boston.	Chicago.	Philadelphia.	Total outside of New York.
1895.....	\$2,373,000,000	\$389,000,000	\$358,000,000	\$229,000,000	\$1,882,000,000
1896.....	2,393,300,000	385,000,000	386,000,000	272,000,000	1,909,100,000
1897.....	2,250,000,000	403,000,000	347,000,000	253,000,000	1,856,000,000
1898.....	2,899,000,000	399,000,000	441,000,000	277,000,000	2,110,000,000
1899.....	5,577,000,000	611,000,000	505,000,000	425,000,000	2,706,000,000
1900.....	4,718,000,000	528,000,000	548,000,000	401,000,000	2,757,000,000
1901.....	8,687,000,000	690,000,000	641,000,000	483,000,000	3,870,000,000
FOUR MONTHS, JAN. 1 TO APRIL 30.					
1895.....	8,873,000,000	1,455,000,000	1,421,000,000	1,080,000,000	7,227,000,000
1896.....	9,645,000,000	1,496,000,000	1,468,000,000	1,092,000,000	7,545,000,000
1897.....	9,271,000,000	1,582,000,000	1,225,000,000	1,000,300,000	7,230,000,000
1898.....	13,493,000,000	1,780,000,000	1,720,000,000	1,196,000,000	8,708,000,000
1899.....	21,720,000,000	2,340,000,000	2,118,000,000	1,611,000,000	10,786,000,000
1900.....	19,163,000,000	2,111,000,000	2,216,000,000	1,557,000,000	11,012,000,000
1901.....	28,548,000,000	2,469,000,000	2,382,000,000	1,745,000,000	12,538,000,000

The growth of exchanges not only in New York but in other cities has been very great in the last four years and even greater during the current year than during any

other previous time. This growth is indicative of the marvellous activity in business of all kinds now prevailing throughout the country.

It is not easy to find any single influence potent in the conditions now prevailing. In fact there is little in the way of rumor or of reasoning that is employed to guide the operations of investors or speculators. Confidence seems to be supreme and the evidence of wealth is on every hand.

Never before have so many people from various parts of the country come into the financial district of New York to invest their money in securities. All lines of business are feeling the stimulus of fortunes made in Wall Street.

Few events of exceptional importance have occurred during the month. Probably the one which awakened the most general interest was the placing of the new British loan of \$300,000,000, and the large subscriptions made by New York capitalists. The loan consisted of British consols bearing interest at  $2\frac{3}{4}$  per cent. per annum up to April 5, 1903, and at  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. thereafter. The subscription price was  $94\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., payable at various dates, one installment each month, up to December 5 next. It is figured that the net return upon the investment, after paying the present income tax, will be 2.81 per cent.

The rate yielded by the new consols would hardly seem tempting, yet the fact is that more than \$100,000,000 was subscribed in this country and about \$150,000,000 altogether by American investors here and abroad. About \$50,000,000 it is expected will be allotted here, and the effect upon gold exports is now the subject of conjecture. It was rather a surprising coincidence that about the time the loan was being offered consols fell to the lowest point reached since the Baring panic of 1890.

The most important event in railroad affairs was the completion of an arrangement for the absorption of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad by the Great Northern and the Northern Pacific companies, and the exchange of the stock of the first-named company for four per cent. bonds issued jointly by the other two companies on the basis of \$200 bonds for \$100 stock.

There were many rumors regarding other consolidations and the remarkable activity in Union Pacific was due in part to the rumor of Vanderbilt buying for the purpose of a combination with the St. Paul and the Northwest roads.

The Secretary of the Treasury, while denying the rumor circulated that he intended to buy large quantities of bonds in order to relieve the money market, announced his readiness to purchase the short-term bonds at what seemed to him to be a reasonable price. In pursuance of that idea he accepted about \$8,000,000 of the four per cents. of 1907 during the month and thus prevented any further accumulation of money in the Treasury.

The Department of Agriculture issued its first crop report for the year on April 10, showing the condition of winter wheat on April 1. The average is given as 91.7, as compared with 82.1 in 1900, 77.9 in 1899, and 82.9, the average for the last ten years. The average condition is the highest since 1891. Calculations based upon the reported condition presage a yield of 457,000,000 bushels of winter wheat as against about 331,000,000 bushels in 1900. There will undoubtedly be some shrinkage, but the present outlook is for a very much larger wheat crop this year than that of last year, possibly an increase of 100,000,000 bushels.

**THE MONEY MARKET.**—The strain of the active stock market upon the local money market has not been manifested by any apparent stringency or by a serious advance in rates. The highest point reached by call money in the month was 7 per cent. on April 10, when a Union Pacific payment of \$10,000,000 disturbed the market. Subsequently the range was from  $2\frac{1}{2}$  to 6 per cent. At the close of the month call money ruled at  $3\frac{1}{2}$  @ 6 per cent., averaging about 4 per cent. Banks and trust companies quoted 4 per cent. as the minimum rate. Time money on Stock Exchange collateral is quoted at 4 per cent. for 80 days to 4 months, and  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per

cent. for 5 to 6 months on good mixed collateral, consisting largely of railroad stocks. Loans on industrial collateral were  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for all dates. For commercial paper the rates are 4 @  $4\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. for 60 to 90 days endorsed bills receivable, 4 @  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for first-class 4 to 6 months single names, and 5 @ 6 per cent. for good paper having the same length of time to run.

## MONEY RATES IN NEW YORK CITY.

	Dec. 1.	Jan. 1.	Feb. 1.	Mar. 1.	Apr. 1.	May 1.
	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.
Call loans, bankers' balances.....	3 - 4	$4\frac{1}{4}$ - 6	$1\frac{1}{2}$ - 2	$1\frac{1}{2}$ - $2\frac{1}{4}$	$2\frac{1}{4}$ - 3	$3\frac{1}{4}$ - 6
Call loans, banks and trust companies.....	4 -	5 -	2 -	2 -	2 -	4 -
Brokers' loans on collateral, 30 to 60 days.....	4 -	5 -	3 -	3 -	$3\frac{1}{4}$ -	4 -
Brokers' loans on collateral, 90 days to 4 months.....	4 - $4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$ - 5	3 - $3\frac{1}{4}$	3 -	$3\frac{1}{4}$ - $3\frac{1}{2}$	4 -
Brokers' loans on collateral, 5 to 7 months.....	$4\frac{1}{2}$ - 5	5 -	$3\frac{1}{4}$ -	$3\frac{1}{4}$ -	$3\frac{1}{4}$ -	$4\frac{1}{4}$ -
Commercial paper, endorsed bills receivable, 60 to 90 days.....	4 - $4\frac{1}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$ - 5	3 - $3\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$ -	$3\frac{1}{4}$ - 4	4 - $4\frac{1}{4}$
Commercial paper prime single names, 4 to 6 months.....	$4\frac{1}{4}$ - $4\frac{1}{2}$	5 - $5\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$ - 4	$3\frac{1}{4}$ - $4\frac{1}{4}$	4 - $4\frac{1}{4}$	4 - $4\frac{1}{4}$
Commercial paper, good single names, 4 to 6 months.....	5 - $5\frac{1}{4}$	$5\frac{1}{4}$ - 6	5 -	$4\frac{1}{2}$ - 5	5 -	5 - 6

NEW YORK CITY BANKS.—The local banks, members of the clearing house association, have strengthened their reserves during the month, but were compelled to call in loans to offset losses in deposits. The latter were reduced \$37,000,000 during the first three weeks of April, but increased \$3,500,000 in the last week. Compared with March 2, when deposits were the largest ever recorded, there has been a net decrease of nearly \$42,000,000. Loans decreased during the month \$32,000,000, and are \$34,000,000 below the maximum recorded on March 9 last. The reserves are about \$500,000 larger than they were a month ago, but the surplus reserve has increased to nearly \$17,000,000, as compared with less than \$8,000,000 on March 30, and less than \$6,000,000 on April 6.

## NEW YORK CITY BANKS—CONDITION AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

	Loans.	Specie.	Legal tenders.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Mar. 30...	\$916,840,900	\$186,570,800	\$72,370,500	\$1,004,283,200	\$7,870,500	\$31,635,000	\$1,610,110,800
Apr. 6.....	904,440,600	182,890,500	69,402,800	965,781,300	5,817,975	31,781,700	1,637,734,300
" 13.....	890,356,000	180,642,100	69,618,400	969,289,200	7,968,200	31,479,000	2,148,247,300
" 20.....	882,067,300	185,684,200	71,038,200	967,201,200	14,922,100	31,454,100	2,104,532,900
" 27.....	884,444,900	187,157,800	72,299,600	970,790,500	16,756,775	31,314,900	1,187,473,600

## DEPOSITS AND SURPLUS RESERVE ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

MONTH.	1899.		1900.		1901.	
	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.
January.....	\$823,037,700	\$19,180,975	\$740,046,900	\$11,168,075	\$854,189,200	\$11,235,900
February.....	861,637,500	39,232,025	793,917,300	30,871,275	909,917,500	24,690,825
March.....	910,573,600	30,334,300	829,917,000	13,641,550	1,012,514,000	14,801,101
April.....	898,917,000	15,491,850	807,816,600	9,896,150	1,004,283,200	7,870,500
May.....	883,596,300	25,524,675	852,062,500	21,128,800	970,790,500	16,739,775
June.....	890,061,600	42,710,600	887,964,500	20,122,275	.....	.....
July.....	905,127,800	14,274,550	888,249,300	16,859,375	.....	.....
August.....	862,142,700	10,811,125	887,841,700	27,535,975	.....	.....
September.....	849,793,800	9,191,250	903,486,900	27,078,475	.....	.....
October.....	785,364,200	1,724,450	884,706,800	12,942,600	.....	.....
November.....	761,635,500	2,038,525	841,775,200	5,950,400	.....	.....
December.....	748,078,000	8,536,700	864,410,900	10,865,675	.....	.....

Deposits reached the highest amount, \$1,012,514,000 on Mar. 2, 1901, loans, \$918,790,000 on March 9, 1901, and the surplus reserve \$111,623,000 on Feb. 3, 1894.



## NON-MEMBER BANKS—NEW YORK CLEARING-HOUSE.

DATES.	Loans and Investments.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal tender and bank notes.	Deposit with Clearing-House agents.	Deposit in other N. Y. banks.	Surplus.
Mar. 30.....	\$61,081,400	\$72,468,700	\$3,016,800	\$3,805,400	\$8,713,800	\$3,847,400	\$1,266,225
Apr. 8.....	64,336,100	72,937,100	3,004,200	3,808,200	8,715,400	3,723,000	1,016,525
" 13.....	66,264,600	74,878,000	3,179,000	4,278,400	8,999,600	3,438,100	1,175,600
" 20.....	67,705,600	74,890,800	3,103,600	4,111,900	8,638,700	2,884,400	* 24,100
" 27.....	69,178,000	75,761,700	3,071,000	4,067,800	8,757,500	3,082,600	28,475

\* Deficit.

## BOSTON BANKS.

DATES.	Loans.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Mar. 30.....	\$192,914,000	\$218,189,000	\$13,873,000	\$8,852,000	\$6,154,000	\$196,188,800
Apr. 8.....	193,873,000	222,550,000	14,107,000	8,651,000	6,173,000	154,317,200
" 13.....	196,621,000	228,250,000	14,963,000	8,819,000	6,176,000	167,816,600
" 20.....	197,913,000	230,639,000	14,853,000	9,127,000	6,181,000	156,304,700
" 27.....	196,386,000	224,058,000	14,483,000	9,123,000	6,171,000	161,706,000

## PHILADELPHIA BANKS.

DATES.	Loans.	Deposits.	Lawful Money Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Mar. 30.....	\$171,012,000	\$204,855,000	\$58,027,000	\$9,842,000	\$95,745,400
Apr. 8.....	172,062,000	207,158,000	59,630,000	9,830,000	105,792,500
" 13.....	175,029,000	209,766,000	57,376,000	9,825,000	110,643,900
" 20.....	177,879,000	210,888,000	56,494,000	9,840,000	121,685,700
" 27.....	176,426,000	206,510,000	56,429,000	9,851,000	113,968,300

**MONEY RATES ABROAD.**—The only change in the official rate of discount of any of the leading European banks last month was a reduction by the Bank of Germany from  $4\frac{1}{2}$  to 4 per cent. on April 25. The higher rate had been maintained since February 26. The Bank of Bengal, at Calcutta, on April 4, reduced its rate from 7 to 6 per cent., but advanced to 7 per cent. again on April 22. The Bank of Bombay made a similar reduction on April 11 and advanced on April 25. Discounts of 60 to 90 day bills in London at the close of the month were  $3\frac{3}{8}$  per cent., against  $3\frac{3}{4}$  @  $3\frac{3}{8}$  per cent. a month ago. The open market rate at Paris was  $2\frac{3}{4}$  per cent., the same as a month ago, and at Berlin and Frankfurt  $3\frac{3}{8}$  against 4 per cent. a month ago.

## MONEY RATES IN FOREIGN MARKETS.

	Dec. 14.	Dec. 28.	Jan. 25.	Feb. 15.	Mar. 1.	Mar. 22.
London—Bank rate of discount.....	4	4	5	$4\frac{1}{2}$	4	4
Market rates of discount:						
60 days bankers' drafts.....	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —4	4	$4\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{3}{8}$	$3\frac{3}{4}$	$3\frac{3}{4}$
6 months bankers' drafts.....	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —4	...	$4\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$ — $3\frac{3}{4}$	$3\frac{3}{8}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$ — $3\frac{3}{4}$
Loans—Day to day.....	3	3	$3\frac{1}{2}$	3	3	3
Paris, open market rates.....	3	3	$2\frac{3}{4}$	$2\frac{3}{8}$	$2\frac{3}{4}$	$2\frac{3}{8}$
Berlin, .....	$4\frac{3}{8}$	$4\frac{3}{8}$	$3\frac{3}{8}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{3}{8}$	4
Hamburg, .....	$4\frac{3}{8}$	$4\frac{3}{8}$	$3\frac{3}{8}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{3}{8}$	4
Frankfort, .....	$4\frac{3}{8}$	$4\frac{3}{8}$	$3\frac{3}{8}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{3}{8}$	4
Amsterdam, .....	$3\frac{3}{8}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{3}{8}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$
Vienna, .....	$4\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$	4	$3\frac{3}{4}$	$3\frac{3}{4}$	$3\frac{3}{8}$
St. Petersburg, .....	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$
Madrid, .....	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$
Copenhagen, .....	6	6	6	5	5	5

## BANK OF ENGLAND STATEMENT AND LONDON MARKETS.

	Jan. 16, 1901.	Feb. 13, 1901.	Mar. 13, 1901.	Apr. 10, 1900.
Circulation (exc. b'k post bills).....	£29,119,315	£28,636,425	£28,464,725	£29,629,160
Public deposits.....	7,033,532	8,990,814	12,275,415	7,368,525
Other deposits.....	43,714,740	37,281,782	38,062,353	36,807,305
Government securities.....	18,097,471	18,397,693	12,305,280	13,332,736
Other securities.....	31,062,744	28,377,382	30,851,462	29,729,160
Reserve of notes and coin.....	19,825,016	22,724,011	25,730,207	21,906,519
Coin and bullion.....	31,189,331	33,585,436	36,419,932	33,820,679
Reserve to liabilities.....	387½	487½	507½	467-10½
Bank rate of discount.....	5½	4½	4½	4½
Price of Consols (2½ per cents.).....	96 15-16	96½	96½	96 ¼
Price of silver per ounce.....	29 8-16d.	28d.	28½	27 3-16d.
Average price of wheat.....	.....	26s. 8d.	25s. 6d.	26s. 3d.

EUROPEAN BANKS.—There was a small decrease in the gold holdings of the Bank of England last month, while the Bank of France gained nearly \$12,000,000. The other leading banks of Europe report little change, if any. The Bank of France has nearly \$100,000,000 more gold than it held a year ago.

## GOLD AND SILVER IN THE EUROPEAN BANKS.

	March 1, 1901.		April 1, 1901.		May 1, 1901.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
England.....	£35,858,945		£36,187,865		£35,873,214	
France.....	95,276,043	£43,789,446	93,114,842	£43,964,229	97,498,520	£43,965,297
Germany.....	30,180,000	15,522,000	30,382,000	15,562,000	30,487,000	15,705,000
Austro-Hungary.....	38,765,000	10,445,000	38,923,000	10,699,000	38,694,000	10,821,000
Spain.....	14,001,000	16,495,000	14,002,000	16,590,000	14,002,000	16,616,000
Netherlands.....	5,043,000	5,741,300	5,058,400	5,970,500	5,068,900	5,715,000
Nat. Belgium.....	2,933,000	1,466,000	2,993,000	1,466,000	2,987,000	1,466,000
Totals.....	£222,006,968	£93,438,746	£222,661,107	£94,041,739	£224,566,684	£94,306,437

FOREIGN EXCHANGE.—The market for sterling exchange has been dull throughout the month. There have been various conflicting influences to affect the market.

## RATES FOR STERLING AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

WEEK ENDED.	BANKERS' STERLING.		Cable transfers.	Prime commercial, Long.	Documentary Sterling, 60 days.
	60 days.	Sight.			
Mar. 30.....	4.84½ @ 4.85	4.88 @ 4.88½	4.88½ @ 4.89	4.84½ @ 4.84½	4.83½ @ 4.85
April 6.....	4.84½ @ 4.85	4.88 @ 4.88½	4.88½ @ 4.89	4.84½ @ 4.84½	4.83½ @ 4.85
" 13.....	4.84½ @ 4.84½	4.87½ @ 4.88	4.88½ @ 4.88½	4.84 @ 4.84½	4.83½ @ 4.84½
" 20.....	4.84½ @ 4.85	4.88 @ 4.88½	4.88½ @ 4.89	4.84½ @ 4.84½	4.83½ @ 4.84½
" 27.....	4.85 @ 4.85½	4.88½ @ 4.88½	4.89 @ 4.89½	4.84½ @ 4.84½	4.84 @ 4.85½

## FOREIGN EXCHANGE—ACTUAL RATES ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

	January 1.	Feb. 1.	March 1.	April 1.	May 1.
Sterling Bankers—60 days.....	4.81½—¾	4.84½—¼	4.84—¼	4.84½—5	4.84½—5
" " Sight.....	4.85½—¾	4.88—¼	4.87½—¼	4.88—¼	4.88—¼
" " Cables.....	4.86½—¼	4.88½—9	4.88—¼	4.88½—9	4.88½—9
" Commercial long.....	4.80½—1¼	4.83½—4	4.83½—¾	4.84½—¼	4.84—¼
" Docu'tary for paym't.....	4.80½—82	4.83½—4	4.83—¼	4.83½—5	4.83½—4½
Paris—Cable transfers.....	5.15½—8	5.14½—8	5.16½—¾	5.15—14½	5.15—14½
" Bankers' 60 days.....	5.20—16½	5.18½—17½	5.19½—18½	5.18½—17½	5.18½—17½
" Bankers' sight.....	5.16½—16½	5.15½—1-16	5.17½—10½	5.15½—15½	5.15½—8
Swiss—Bankers' sight.....	5.19½—18½	5.18½—17½	5.18½—¾	5.16½—¼	5.16½—¾
Berlin—Bankers' 60 days.....	94½—¾	94½—¾	94½—¾	94½—5½	95—1-16
" Bankers' sight.....	95—¾	95½—¾	95½—¾	95½—¾	95½—¾
Belgium—Bankers' sight.....	5.17½—8	5.16½—16½	5.18½—17½	5.16½—¾	5.16½—¾
Amsterdam—Bankers' sight.....	40½—3-16	40½—¾	40½—¾	40½—¾	40½—7-16
Kroners—Bankers' sight.....	26½—1½	26½—¾	26½—¾	26½—¾	26½—27
Italian lire—sight.....	5.43½—41½	5.45—42½	5.45—42½	5.43½—41½	5.42½—5.41½

London has been both a buyer and a seller of American securities. Higher rates for money here for a time depressed sterling, but the subscriptions for British consols late in the month caused rates to advance. Some gold went abroad early in the month and some also in the last week.

**GOLD AND SILVER COINAGE.**—The coinage of gold in April was the largest for any month in more than two years and aggregated \$18,958,000. The silver coinage amounted to \$2,633,000 of which \$1,950,000 was silver dollars. There were \$143,660 of minor coins minted.

## COINAGE OF THE UNITED STATES.

	1899.		1900.		1901.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
January.....	\$18,062,000	\$1,642,000	\$11,515,000	\$2,364,161	\$12,657,200	\$2,713,000
February.....	14,848,800	1,598,000	13,401,900	1,940,000	9,230,800	2,242,166
March.....	13,176,715	2,346,557	12,594,240	4,841,376	6,182,152	3,120,580
April.....	7,894,475	2,159,449	12,922,000	3,990,000	18,936,000	2,633,000
May.....	4,808,400	2,879,416	8,262,000	3,171,000	.....	.....
June.....	8,159,680	2,155,019	8,820,770	2,094,217	.....	.....
July.....	5,981,500	794,000	6,540,000	1,827,827	.....	.....
August.....	10,253,100	2,233,636	5,060,000	2,596,000	.....	.....
September.....	6,860,947	2,441,268	2,293,335	3,982,185	.....	.....
October.....	8,220,000	3,313,599	5,120,000	4,148,000	.....	.....
November.....	6,643,730	2,612,000	13,185,000	3,130,000	.....	.....
December.....	7,469,952	1,896,906	4,576,697	2,890,555	.....	.....
Year.....	\$111,344,220	\$26,061,519	\$99,272,942	\$36,295,321	\$47,027,632	\$10,708,746

**SILVER.**—The price of silver in London last month fell to within  $\frac{1}{4}$  penny of the lowest point reached in the last three years, 26 15-16 being recorded on April 3. The extreme range was 26 15-16 to 27 15-16, the final price of the month being 27 3-16d. a decline of  $\frac{1}{2}$ d. for the month.

## MONTHLY RANGE OF SILVER IN LONDON—1899, 1900, 1901.

MONTH.	1899.		1900.		1901.		MONTH.	1899.		1900.		1901.	
	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.		High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.
January..	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{4}$	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	27	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	July.....	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	...	...
February	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{1}{4}$	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	August..	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	...	...
March....	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{1}{4}$	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	Septemb'r	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	29 $\frac{1}{4}$	...	...
April.....	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{1}{4}$	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	26 $\frac{1}{2}$	October..	26 $\frac{1}{2}$	26 $\frac{1}{4}$	30 $\frac{1}{2}$	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	...	...
May.....	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	28	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	...	...	Novemb'r	27 $\frac{3}{4}$	26 $\frac{1}{2}$	30 $\frac{1}{2}$	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	...	...
June.....	28	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	...	...	Decemb'r	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	26 $\frac{1}{2}$	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	...	...

## FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COIN AND BULLION—QUOTATIONS IN NEW YORK.

	Bid.	Asked.		Bid.	Asked.
Trade dollars.....	\$ .60	\$ .65	Twenty marks.....	\$4.78	\$4.78
Mexican dollars.....	.48 $\frac{1}{4}$	.50 $\frac{1}{2}$	Spanish doubloons.....	15.50	15.70
Peruvian soles, Chilean pesos..	.43 $\frac{1}{4}$	.46	Spanish 25 pesos.....	4.78	4.60
English silver.....	4.82	4.87	Mexican doubloons.....	15.50	15.70
Victoria sovereigns.....	4.85	4.87	Mexican 20 pesos.....	19.53	19.68
Five francs.....	.93	.96	Ten guilders.....	3.96	4.02
Twenty francs.....	3.84	3.86			

Fine gold bars on the first of this month were at par to  $\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. premium on the Mint value. Bar silver in London, 27 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per ounce. New York market for large commercial silver bars, 59 $\frac{1}{2}$  @ 60 $\frac{1}{4}$ c. Fine silver (Government assay), 59 $\frac{1}{2}$  @ 60 $\frac{1}{4}$ c. Official price, 59 $\frac{1}{2}$ c.

**NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.**—There was only a slight increase in bank circulation during the month as compared with preceding months, the gain being only \$663,011. The National banks have increased their holdings of bonds to secure circulation by \$312,000 and to secure public deposits by \$1,642,000, making the increase in total holdings \$2,454,000. Nearly \$427,500,000 of Government bonds are thus held by the National banks.

## NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.

	Jan. 31, 1901.	Feb. 28, 1901.	Mar. 30, 1901.	Apr. 30, 1901.
Total amount outstanding.....	\$346,742,186	\$348,575,661	\$350,021,811	\$351,664,822
Circulation based on U. S. bonds.....	315,721,578	319,217,048	320,910,906	321,975,966
Circulation secured by lawful money....	31,020,558	29,358,613	29,110,905	28,708,854
U. S. bonds to secure circulation:				
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	553,250	457,250	317,250	212,500
"        "        1907, 4 per cent.....	6,405,650	6,380,650	6,494,400	6,389,500
Five per cents. of 1894.....	288,900	288,900	283,900	288,900
Four per cents. of 1895.....	3,976,100	3,936,600	3,736,600	3,326,600
Three per cents. of 1898.....	4,126,180	4,096,680	4,077,080	3,950,180
Two per cents. of 1900.....	803,094,900	806,217,750	808,264,750	806,831,200
Total .....	\$318,422,960	\$321,874,830	\$323,176,980	\$323,968,880

The National banks have also on deposit the following bonds to secure public deposits: 4 per cents. of 1907, \$9,519,900; 5 per cents. of 1894, \$723,000; 4 per cents. of 1895, \$12,121,950; 3 per cents. of 1898, \$5,700,300; 2 per cents. of 1900, \$74,999,500; District of Columbia 3.65's, 1924, \$125,000; a total of \$108,459,650.

The circulation of National gold banks, not included in the above statement, is \$79,435.

GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND DISBURSEMENTS.—The Government reports receipts in April nearly \$5,800,000 in excess of expenditures, which is \$1,700,000 better than the record of April, 1900, the receipts being \$2,700,000 larger and the expenditures \$1,000,000 larger. The gain in receipts is almost entirely in internal revenue, customs receipts increasing only about \$370,000.

## UNITED STATES TREASURY RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES.

RECEIPTS.			EXPENDITURES.		
Source.	April, 1901.	Since July 1, 1900.	Source.	April, 1901.	Since July 1, 1900.
Customs.....	\$19,131,719	\$199,355,934	Civil and mis. ....	\$11,285,521	\$104,533,160
Internal revenue...	26,022,311	252,413,906	War.....	10,102,781	124,753,356
Miscellaneous.....	2,613,821	31,115,121	Navy.....	5,272,677	50,273,197
			Indians.....	455,288	9,242,805
Total.....	\$47,767,851	\$482,884,961	Pensions.....	10,196,912	116,741,636
			Interest.....	4,655,123	29,246,552
Excess of receipts...	5,799,605	48,094,255	Total.....	\$41,968,246	\$434,790,706

## UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES AND NET GOLD IN THE TREASURY.

MONTH.	1900.			1901.		
	Receipts.	Expenditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.	Receipts.	Expenditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.
January.....	\$48,012,165	\$39,189,097	\$218,613,617	\$47,520,287	\$40,109,707	\$321,183,644
February.....	45,631,266	37,738,472	232,225,896	45,844,123	38,890,685	231,150,064
March.....	48,726,837	32,188,271	248,358,064	49,891,125	40,732,822	249,046,643
April.....	45,036,326	40,903,927	229,461,962	47,767,851	41,968,246	245,994,770
May.....	45,166,063	40,351,525	218,857,545	.....	.....	.....
June.....	51,435,832	33,540,673	230,557,185	.....	.....	.....
July.....	49,956,161	53,979,653	223,567,476	.....	.....	.....
August.....	49,648,756	50,500,000	218,263,909	.....	.....	.....
September.....	45,304,328	39,169,971	230,131,162	.....	.....	.....
October.....	51,626,067	47,963,637	242,670,174	.....	.....	.....
November.....	48,344,514	41,273,660	243,235,735	.....	.....	.....
December.....	46,846,508	40,204,622	246,561,323	.....	.....	.....

UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.—The Government retired \$6,150,000 of its 4 per cent. bonds of 1907 last month, buying them from the holders at a premium. These apparently came from owners other than the National banks, as these institutions report a decrease in that class of bonds of only \$595,000. The net public debt was reduced about \$4,400,000 during the month, and the cash balance in the Treasury was reduced about \$2,000,000.

## UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.

	Jan. 1, 1901.	Mar. 1, 1901.	Apr. 1, 1901.	May 1, 1901.
<b>Interest bearing debt:</b>				
Loan of March 14, 1900, 2 per cent.....	\$419,879,750	\$445,940,750	\$445,940,750	\$445,940,750
Funded loan of 1907, 4 ".....	287,578,100	270,359,350	270,359,350	264,209,350
Refunding certificates, 4 per cent.....	34,380	83,570	83,570	83,540
Loan of 1904, 5 per cent.....	26,982,100	22,988,400	22,988,400	22,988,400
" 1925, 4 ".....	162,315,400	162,315,400	162,315,400	162,315,400
Ten-Twenties of 1898, 3 per cent.....	104,900,040	99,912,940	99,912,940	99,912,940
<b>Total interest-bearing debt.....</b>	<b>\$1,001,499,770</b>	<b>\$1,001,500,410</b>	<b>\$1,001,500,410</b>	<b>\$995,350,380</b>
Debt on which interest has ceased.....	2,654,070	1,830,660	1,770,140	1,557,840
<b>Debt bearing no interest:</b>				
Legal tender and old demand notes....	346,734,863	346,734,863	346,734,863	346,734,863
National bank note redemption acct....	81,531,532	28,991,227	28,708,555	28,718,918
Fractional currency.....	6,878,410	6,877,462	6,877,462	6,877,462
<b>Total non-interest bearing debt.....</b>	<b>\$385,144,806</b>	<b>\$382,603,553</b>	<b>\$382,315,880</b>	<b>\$382,331,244</b>
<b>Total interest and non-interest debt, Certificates and notes offset by cash in the Treasury:</b>	<b>1,386,644,576</b>	<b>1,385,934,653</b>	<b>1,385,586,430</b>	<b>1,379,239,464</b>
Gold certificates.....	263,629,379	276,040,989	276,704,989	238,441,989
Silver ".....	427,428,000	427,854,000	431,841,000	435,521,000
Certificates of deposit.....	1,560,000	710,000	.....	.....
Treasury notes of 1890.....	61,397,000	55,937,000	53,381,000	51,880,000
<b>Total certificates and notes.....</b>	<b>\$754,012,379</b>	<b>\$760,561,989</b>	<b>\$782,426,989</b>	<b>\$770,842,989</b>
<b>Aggregate debt.....</b>	<b>2,143,311,025</b>	<b>2,146,496,642</b>	<b>2,148,013,419</b>	<b>2,150,082,453</b>
<b>Cash in the Treasury:</b>				
Total cash assets.....	1,181,271,552	1,139,829,028	1,155,399,210	1,160,085,789
Demand liabilities.....	841,164,216	840,913,879	846,955,689	863,591,513
<b>Balance.....</b>	<b>\$290,107,336</b>	<b>\$296,915,149</b>	<b>\$308,443,521</b>	<b>\$306,494,208</b>
Gold reserve.....	150,000,000	150,000,000	150,000,000	150,000,000
Net cash balance.....	140,107,336	148,915,149	158,443,521	156,494,208
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$290,107,336</b>	<b>\$296,915,149</b>	<b>\$308,443,521</b>	<b>\$306,494,208</b>
<b>Total debt, less cash in the Treasury.</b>	<b>1,069,191,310</b>	<b>1,087,019,504</b>	<b>1,077,142,909</b>	<b>1,072,745,256</b>

FOREIGN TRADE.—The exports of merchandise in March aggregated in value nearly \$125,000,000, an increase over February of \$12,000,000, but a decrease of \$9,000,000 compared with March, 1900. The imports of merchandise reached nearly \$76,000,000, an increase over February of \$11,000,000 and a decrease of nearly \$11,000,000 from March, 1900. Again, there is a very large balance of net exports, exceeding \$49,000,000, or almost exactly the same as in February. This makes a balance of \$165,000,000 for the first quarter of 1901, as compared with \$140,000,000 for the corresponding quarter of 1900. For the nine months of the present fiscal year the total exports of merchandise were \$1,140,000,000, the largest ever reported for the same period, exceeding the record year of 1899–1900 by \$86,000,000. The

## EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

MONTH OF MARCH.	MERCHANDISE.			Gold Balance.	Silver Balance.
	Exports.	Imports.	Balance.		
1898.....	\$75,574,184	\$86,455,663	Exp., \$9,118,521	Imp., \$354,956	Exp., \$2,280,668
1897.....	87,282,247	76,351,444	" 10,930,908	" 864,294	" 2,940,388
1896.....	112,620,496	61,562,183	" 51,058,313	" 29,979,613	" 1,518,388
1895.....	104,559,689	72,820,746	" 31,738,943	" 2,077,730	" 1,981,794
1900.....	134,157,225	86,522,456	" 47,634,769	" 839,756	" 2,303,276
1901.....	124,975,744	75,949,088	" 49,026,656	" 1,996,750	" 2,418,453
<b>NINE MONTHS.</b>					
1898.....	678,241,057	607,650,496	Exp., 70,590,561	Exp., 52,039,687	Exp., 23,652,061
1897.....	822,280,460	498,866,878	" 323,413,622	Imp., 65,363,476	" 25,012,008
1896.....	925,905,356	455,253,362	" 470,651,994	" 57,561,112	" 17,431,563
1895.....	947,962,955	500,022,579	" 447,970,376	" 66,893,781	" 20,036,561
1900.....	1,053,630,696	641,776,030	" 411,854,666	" 7,769,846	" 16,774,288
1901.....	1,140,170,728	599,488,391	" 540,682,337	" 23,912,945	" 21,009,067

exports exceeded the imports by \$540,000,000, which is also beyond precedent. We imported about \$26,000,000 gold during the nine months and exported \$21,000,000 silver, so that the net exports of merchandise and specie were \$535,000,000.

**MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.**—The volume of money in circulation was increased last month more than \$3,000,000, the principal changes being increases of \$2,400,000 in gold coin, \$5,000,000 in gold certificates, \$3,000,000 in silver certificates and \$2,500,000 in bank notes, and decreases of \$3,400,000 in silver dollars and \$3,000,000 in Treasury notes of 1890.

#### MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

	Feb. 1, 1901.	Mar. 1, 1901.	Apr. 1, 1901.	May 1, 1901.
Gold coin.....	\$615,576,805	\$628,338,957	\$626,324,954	\$629,240,795
Silver dollars.....	63,457,812	71,076,387	72,299,980	68,846,545
Subsidiary silver.....	81,979,691	81,437,330	80,858,107	80,253,077
Gold certificates.....	275,687,279	257,548,739	248,286,099	253,259,799
Silver certificates.....	424,597,000	422,340,690	427,206,320	430,573,522
Treasury notes, Act July 14, 1890.....	53,091,831	55,857,327	53,728,232	51,795,097
United States notes.....	333,054,404	335,421,722	336,389,481	337,610,118
Currency certificates, Act June 8, 1872..	995,000	.....	.....	.....
National bank notes.....	333,390,391	333,593,012	341,155,427	343,725,232
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$2,190,780,213</b>	<b>\$2,190,609,144</b>	<b>\$2,187,243,580</b>	<b>\$2,195,304,235</b>
Population of United States.....	77,195,000	77,311,000	77,427,000	77,538,000
Circulation per capita.....	\$28.38	\$28.34	\$28.25	\$28.31

**MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.**—While the Secretary of the Treasury used some of the surplus in purchasing bonds last month the net cash in the Treasury was reduced less than \$1,800,000. There was an increase in gross cash of more than \$4,600,000 but a net increase of \$3,400,000 in certificates outstanding accounts for the decrease in net cash.

#### MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.

	Feb. 1, 1901.	Mar. 1, 1901.	Apr. 1, 1901.	May 1, 1901.
Gold coin and bullion.....	\$496,850,923	\$489,638,903	\$497,332,743	\$500,036,852
Silver Dollars.....	447,339,778	441,391,223	441,709,930	447,113,395
Silver bullion.....	54,853,287	53,790,728	52,407,220	50,789,506
Subsidiary silver.....	6,506,826	7,230,550	9,016,799	9,329,307
United States notes.....	13,626,612	11,259,294	9,791,535	9,070,898
National bank notes.....	13,461,480	10,062,244	8,945,979	7,083,975
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$1,082,637,906</b>	<b>\$1,012,432,340</b>	<b>\$1,019,304,256</b>	<b>\$1,023,848,833</b>
Certificates and Treasury notes, 1890, outstanding.....	763,351,110	735,746,756	729,220,651	735,623,418
<b>Net cash in Treasury.....</b>	<b>\$269,336,796</b>	<b>\$276,685,084</b>	<b>\$290,083,605</b>	<b>\$288,225,415</b>

**SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES.**—The stock of money in the country increased more than \$6,000,000 in April, of which \$5,000,000 was in gold, the remainder being the product of silver coinage and of the issue of National bank notes.

#### SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES.

	Feb. 1, 1901.	Mar. 1, 1901.	Apr. 1, 1901.	May 1, 1901.
Gold coin and bullion.....	\$1,112,427,728	\$1,117,032,780	\$1,124,157,897	\$1,129,267,647
Silver dollars.....	510,847,590	512,467,590	514,009,940	515,959,940
Silver bullion.....	54,853,287	53,790,728	52,407,220	50,789,506
Subsidiary silver.....	88,485,517	89,667,880	89,969,906	90,062,284
United States notes.....	346,681,016	346,681,016	346,681,016	346,681,016
National bank notes.....	346,821,871	348,655,256	350,101,406	350,764,257
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$2,460,117,009</b>	<b>\$2,467,295,223</b>	<b>\$2,477,237,185</b>	<b>\$2,482,524,650</b>

Certificates and Treasury notes represented by coin, bullion, or currency in Treasury are not included in the above statement.

# ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.

The following table shows the highest, lowest and closing prices of the most active stocks at the New York Stock Exchange in the month of April, and the highest and lowest during the year 1901, by dates, and also, for comparison, the range of prices in 1900:

	YEAR 1900.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1901.				APRIL, 1901.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.		Lowest.		High.	Low.	Closing.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe.	48¾	185½	70¾	—Apr. 30	42¼	—Jan. 21	78¼	61¾	75¼
" preferred	89¾	58¼	104¾	—Apr. 30	82¼	—Jan. 21	104¾	94	108¼
Baltimore & Ohio	89¾	55¼	108¼	—Apr. 29	81¾	—Jan. 4	108¾	90¾	104¾
Baltimore & Ohio, pref.	90	72¾	94	—Mar. 6	83¾	—Feb. 28	93¾	90	98
Brooklyn Rapid Transit	88¾	47½	88¾	—Apr. 22	72¼	—Feb. 27	88¾	80¾	86½
Canadian Pacific	96¾	84¾	101	—Apr. 30	88¾	—Jan. 18	101	95¼	100¾
Canada Southern	61¼	47½	78¾	—Apr. 19	54¾	—Jan. 4	78¾	61¾	76
Central of New Jersey	150¼	115	180	—Jan. 5	145¾	—Jan. 4	180	154	159
Ches. & Ohio vtg. cfs.	42¾	24	49¾	—Apr. 20	38¾	—Jan. 21	49¾	46	49¾
Chicago & Alton	42	31	50¼	—Apr. 30	36¾	—Jan. 21	50¼	41¾	48¾
" preferred	78¼	68½	82¼	—Apr. 30	72¼	—Jan. 4	82¼	76	81¾
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy	144	119¼	199¾	—Apr. 30	138¼	—Jan. 4	199¾	172¼	198¾
Chicago & E. Illinois	109	88	135¾	—Apr. 29	91	—Jan. 2	135¾	114	133¾
" preferred	125	119¼	136	—Apr. 22	120¾	—Jan. 3	136	133¼	134
Chicago, Great Western	18	8¾	28¼	—Apr. 29	16	—Jan. 8	28¼	22¼	25
Chic., Indianapolis & Lou'ville	29	14	40¾	—Mar. 25	23	—Jan. 21	38¾	36	37¼
" preferred	64	45¼	75¾	—Apr. 2	58¾	—Jan. 21	75¾	70	71½
Chic., Milwaukee & St. Paul	148¼	108¼	175	—Apr. 22	142¾	—Jan. 21	175	151¼	172¾
" preferred	188	160¼	196¾	—Apr. 22	184¾	—Mar. 26	196¾	185½	194¼
Chicago & Northwestern	172¾	150¼	212	—Apr. 11	168¾	—Jan. 21	212	188	209¼
" preferred	220	195¼	248	—Apr. 11	207	—Mar. 1	248	214	235
Chicago, Rock I. & Pacific	122¾	102	165	—Apr. 30	117¾	—Jan. 3	165	135¼	164¾
Chic., St. Paul, Minn. & Om.	126	110	145	—Apr. 11	125	—Mar. 2	145	134¾	142¾
" preferred	175	172	201	—Apr. 11	180	—Mar. 29	201	185	200
Chicago Terminal Transfer	147½	8½	31	—Apr. 16	10¾	—Jan. 19	31	16¾	23¼
" preferred	36¾	28¼	57¾	—Apr. 15	38	—Jan. 18	57¾	40	48¼
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. Louis	76	55	90	—Apr. 19	73¾	—Jan. 25	90	80	85½
Col. Fuel & Iron Co.	58¼	29¼	108¼	—Apr. 30	41¾	—Jan. 21	108¼	55¼	108
Consolidated Gas Co.	201	164	238	—Apr. 15	187	—Jan. 18	238	212	227
Delaware & Hud. Canal Co.	134¼	106¼	185¼	—Apr. 3	128¼	—Jan. 3	185¼	171	180
Delaware, Lack. & Western	194¾	171¼	224	—Apr. 3	183¼	—Jan. 3	224	214	219
Denver & Rio Grande	34¼	16¼	49¼	—Mar. 25	29¼	—Jan. 21	47¼	42¼	47
" preferred	87¼	64¼	100	—Mar. 27	80	—Jan. 21	98¾	93¼	98½
Erie	27½	10¼	43¾	—Apr. 30	24¾	—Jan. 4	43¾	36¼	42¼
" 1st pref.	63¼	30¾	72¾	—Apr. 30	56¾	—Jan. 21	72¾	67¾	71¾
" 2d pref.	43¼	15	61	—Mar. 21	39¼	—Jan. 4	60¾	55	59¼
Evansville & Terre Haute	54¾	38¼	68	—Apr. 12	41	—Jan. 31	68	55	62¼
Express Adams	150	111	165	—Mar. 12	145	—Jan. 8	165	163¼	165
" American	191	142	205	—Apr. 19	170	—Jan. 12	205	198¼	200
" United States	59	45	100	—Apr. 10	53	—Jan. 26	100	73¾	80¾
" Wells, Fargo	140	120	150	—Apr. 30	130	—Jan. 11	150	140	149¼
Great Northern, preferred	191¼	144¾	208	—Mar. 15	188	—Jan. 4	203¼	179	180¼
Hocking Valley	42¾	30	55¾	—Mar. 15	41	—Jan. 3	55¾	49	52¾
" preferred	74¾	58	77¼	—Mar. 25	69¾	—Jan. 21	76¾	74	76
Illinois Central	133	110	148¼	—Apr. 4	127¾	—Feb. 1	148¼	138¼	144¼
Iowa Central	27¾	11¾	35¼	—Apr. 8	21	—Jan. 21	35¼	30	32¼
" preferred	58	39	64¼	—Apr. 10	48	—Jan. 21	64¼	59¼	61¼
Kansas City Southern	17¼	7	25	—Apr. 30	13¼	—Jun. 4	25	18	25
" preferred	43¾	27¼	49	—Apr. 30	35	—Jan. 4	49	42	49
Lake Erie & Western	52	20¼	68¼	—Apr. 19	39¾	—Jan. 21	68¼	61	66
" preferred	115	83¼	130	—Mar. 29	108¾	—Jan. 21	130	127¼	128
Long Island	89	47¼	78	—Mar. 6	67	—Jan. 3	74¼	71¼	72
Louisville & Nashville	89¼	68¾	111¼	—Apr. 30	84¼	—Jan. 4	111¼	98¼	109¼
Manhattan consol.	117	84	131¼	—Apr. 22	111	—Jan. 21	131¼	128¾	129¼
Metropolitan Street	182	143¾	176¼	—Apr. 22	158	—Jan. 21	176¼	164	173¼
Mexican Central	17¾	10¼	25¾	—Mar. 21	12¾	—Jan. 21	25¾	21¼	25¼
Minneapolis & St. Louis	71¼	45¼	80¼	—Mar. 25	67¾	—Jan. 19	87¾	83¼	85
" preferred	104¼	87¼	114¾	—Mar. 21	101¾	—Jan. 7	114¼	112	112¾
Missouri, Kan. & Tex.	17½	9	35¼	—Apr. 20	15	—Jan. 21	35¼	24¼	32¼
" preferred	47¼	25¾	68¾	—Apr. 19	44¾	—Jan. 18	68¾	57	65¼
Missouri Pacific	72¼	38¾	110¾	—Apr. 30	69	—Jan. 4	110¾	100¼	109
Mobile & Ohio certificates	49	35	83	—Apr. 13	79	—Mar. 1	83	80¼	82
N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River	145¾	125¾	161¼	—Apr. 30	139¾	—Jan. 21	164¼	146¼	162

## ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.—Continued.

	YEAR 1900.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1901.				APRIL, 1901.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.		Lowest.		High.	Low.	Closing.
N. Y., Ontario & Western.....	32½	18½	32½	—Apr. 30	23½	—Jan. 21	32½	32½	27½
Norfolk & Western.....	45½	22½	55	—Apr. 30	42	—Jan. 10	55	50	55
" preferred.....	88	67	90	—Apr. 30	82	—Feb. 15	90	86	90
North American Co.....	22½	18½	91½	—Mar. 25	73½	—Mar. 14	89½	85	86
Northern Pacific.....	86½	45½	119½	—Apr. 29	77½	—Jan. 21	119½	93½	115
" pref.....	91½	67	102	—Apr. 30	84½	—Jan. 21	102	92	101½
Pacific Mail.....	57	25½	47½	—Jan. 29	33½	—Mar. 21	42½	35½	30½
Pennsylvania R. R.....	149½	124½	161½	—Apr. 22	142½	—Jan. 21	161½	152	157½
People's Gas & Coke of Chic.	111½	81½	119½	—Apr. 30	96½	—Jan. 21	119½	107	118
Pullman Palace Car Co.....	204	176	217	—Apr. 1	196½	—Jan. 21	217	209	210
Reading.....	26	15	42½	—Apr. 30	24½	—Jan. 4	42½	34½	42½
" 1st preferred.....	71½	49	78½	—Apr. 30	69½	—Jan. 4	79½	74½	77½
" 2d preferred.....	30½	23½	57½	—Apr. 30	38	—Jan. 3	57½	49½	56½
St. Louis & San Francisco.....	24½	8½	50½	—Apr. 30	21½	—Jan. 4	50½	38	49½
" 1st preferred.....	78½	64	88	—Mar. 12	78½	—Jan. 2	88	82	85½
" 2d preferred.....	55	31½	74½	—Apr. 30	52½	—Jan. 4	74½	65	73½
St. Louis & Southwestern.....	18½	8½	30½	—Apr. 30	17	—Jan. 4	30½	35	38½
" preferred.....	45½	21½	68	—Apr. 30	41½	—Jan. 3	68	63½	66½
Southern Pacific Co.....	45½	30½	57½	—Apr. 30	40½	—Jan. 4	57½	44½	56½
Southern Railway.....	23½	10½	32½	—Apr. 30	18	—Jan. 21	32½	26½	28½
" preferred.....	73½	49½	87½	—Apr. 30	67½	—Jan. 21	87½	78	87
Tennessee Coal & Iron Co.....	104	49	69½	—Apr. 16	49½	—Mar. 7	69½	62	66½
Texas & Pacific.....	26½	13½	50½	—Apr. 30	23½	—Jan. 3	50½	35½	49½
Union Pacific.....	81½	44½	120	—Apr. 29	79½	—Jan. 4	120	89½	116½
" preferred.....	85½	70½	98	—Apr. 29	81½	—Jan. 21	98	84½	97½
Wabash R. R.....	14	6½	21½	—Mar. 25	11½	—Jan. 3	21½	19	21½
" preferred.....	27	16	42½	—Mar. 25	23½	—Jan. 4	42½	36½	42
Western Union.....	88½	77½	97	—Mar. 30	81	—Jan. 21	96½	90½	93½
Wheeling & Lake Erie.....	13½	8	21½	—Mar. 29	11½	—Jan. 31	20½	18½	19
" second preferred.....	33½	21½	38	—Mar. 28	27½	—Jan. 21	36½	34½	35½
Wisconsin Central.....	20½	10	24½	—Apr. 29	14½	—Jan. 21	24½	19	22½
" preferred.....	57	30	49½	—Apr. 17	39½	—Jan. 17	49½	43½	47½
"INDUSTRIAL"									
Amalgamated Copper.....	99½	89½	123½	—Apr. 20	83½	—Jan. 21	123½	99½	123½
American Car & Foundry.....	25½	12½	27½	—Mar. 25	19	—Jan. 21	27½	25½	26½
" pref.....	72	57½	83½	—Apr. 4	67	—Jan. 18	83½	78½	80½
American Co. Oil Co.....	37½	30	31½	—Jan. 8	24	—Mar. 8	30	25½	28
American Ice.....	49½	27½	41½	—Mar. 15	34½	—Feb. 21	40½	38	40
Am. Smelting & Refining Co.	56½	34½	69	—Apr. 20	45½	—Feb. 26	69	53½	60½
" preferred.....	99	85	100	—Jan. 16	88	—Feb. 26	99	98½	99½
American Steel Hoop Co.....	50½	17	49	—Apr. 2	23	—Jan. 18	49	46	47½
" preferred.....	86	64½	97½	—Apr. 3	80	—Jan. 18	97½	95	95½
American Steel & Wire Co.....	56½	28½	53½	—Feb. 11	38	—Jan. 14	49½	47	47½
" preferred.....	95	69½	112½	—Apr. 1	82½	—Jan. 17	112½	110½	110½
American Sugar Ref. Co.....	149	95½	152	—Apr. 17	131½	—Jan. 18	152	139½	147½
American Tin Plate Co.....	57½	18	80	—Apr. 2	55	—Jan. 4	80	75	79½
American Tobacco Co.....	114½	84½	130½	—Apr. 17	110½	—Jan. 21	130½	124½	129½
Anaconda Copper Mining....	54½	37½	54½	—Apr. 16	40½	—Jan. 21	54½	45½	51½
Continental Tobacco Co.....	40½	21½	48½	—Apr. 17	39½	—Jan. 4	48½	44	46½
" preferred.....	95	70	108½	—Mar. 15	93½	—Jan. 2	105	103	105
Federal Steel Co.....	58½	28½	59	—Jan. 2	41	—Jan. 29	56	53½	53½
" preferred.....	79½	63½	105½	—Apr. 1	68	—Jan. 21	105½	103½	103½
General Electric Co.....	200	120	234	—Apr. 10	183½	—Jan. 10	234	214	227
Glucose Sugar Refining Co.,	6½	44	60	—Apr. 30	45	—Feb. 16	60	49	53½
International Paper Co.....	267½	14½	28	—Mar. 22	20	—Jan. 22	27½	24	24
" preferred.....	75	58	81	—Mar. 25	69	—Jan. 21	81	76½	78
National Lead Co.....	28½	15½	20½	—Jan. 2	15	—Mar. 14	19½	16½	18
National Steel Co.....	53½	20	60½	—Apr. 2	37	—Jan. 21	60½	57	57
" preferred.....	97	79½	120	—Apr. 2	90	—Jan. 18	120	117	118
National Tube.....	69½	40½	70½	—Feb. 6	51½	—Feb. 28	69	65	67½
Pressed Steel Car Co.....	54½	32½	52	—Jan. 2	30	—Mar. 7	48½	39	45½
Republic Iron & Steel Co.....	27½	8½	22½	—Apr. 2	12½	—Jan. 22	22½	18½	21½
" preferred.....	70½	49	82	—Apr. 1	55½	—Jan. 21	82	74½	78
Standard Rope & Twine Co.,	104½	4½	57½	—Feb. 11	31½	—Mar. 6	51½	4½	44
U. S. Leather Co.....	19	7½	15	—Feb. 9	11	—Jan. 21	14½	12½	14½
" preferred.....	79½	65	79½	—Apr. 16	73	—Jan. 15	79½	75½	76½
U. S. Rubber Co.....	44	21	34	—Jan. 2	18½	—Mar. 11	23½	19	21
" preferred.....	104½	74½	85	—Jan. 2	55	—Apr. 8	65	55	62½



# RAILWAY, INDUSTRIAL AND GOVERNMENT BONDS.

LAST SALE, PRICE AND DATE AND HIGHEST AND LOWEST PRICES AND TOTAL  
SALES FOR THE MONTH.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		APRIL SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ann Arbor 1st g 4's.....1995		7,000,000	Q J	98¾	Apr. 29, '01	99	98	46,000
Atch., Top. & S. F.								
{ Atch Top & Santa Fe gen g 4's.1995	188,082,500	A & O	102¾	Apr. 30, '01	108	101¼		2,345,500
{ " registered.....1995		A & O	102¾	Apr. 22, '01	102¾	102		31,000
{ " adjustment, g. 4's.....1995	43,482,000	NOV	95¾	Apr. 30, '01	96¼	95		1,105,500
{ " registered.....1995		NOV	79¾	Dec. 11, '99				
{ " stamped.....1995	8,246,000	M & N	95¾	Apr. 29, '01	96¼	95¾		219,500
{ " Equip. tr. ser. A. g. 5's.1902	250,000	J & J						
{ " Chic. & St. L. 1st 6's.....1915	1,500,000	M & S						
Atl. Knox. & Nor. Ry. 1st g. 5s..1948	1,000,000	J & D	105	Dec. 4, '19				
Balt. & Ohio prior lien g. 3½s..1925								
{ " registered.....1925	69,798,000	J & J	96¾	Apr. 30, '01	97¾	96¼		376,000
{ " g. 4s.....1948		J & J	95¼	Mar. 18, '01				
{ " g. 4s. registered.....1948	65,963,000	A & O	102¾	Apr. 30, '01	102¾	101¼		932,500
{ " Southw'n div. 1st g. 3½s.1925		A & O	104	Mar. 8, '01				
{ " registered.....1925	41,980,000	J & J	90¼	Apr. 30, '01	90¾	89¾		1,081,500
{ " registered.....1925		Q J						
{ Pitt Jun. & M. div. 1st g. 3½s.1925	11,293,000	M & N	90	Apr. 28, '01	90	90		131,000
{ " registered.....1925		Q Feb						
Monongahela River 1st g. g. 5's.1919	700,000	F & A	104¼	July 1, '92				
Cen. Ohio. Reorg. 1st c. g. 4½'s.1930	1,618,000	M & S	111	Feb. 28, '99				
Buffalo, Roch. & Pitts. g. g. 5's..1937	4,407,000	M & S	116¾	Feb. 4, '01				
{ " deb. 6's.....1947	1,000,000	J & J						
{ " g. 4s. registered.....1938	2,000,000	A & O						
{ Clearfield & Mah. 1st g. g. 5's..1943	650,000	J & J	130¼	Mar. 8, '01				
{ Rochester & Pittsburg. 1st 6's..1921	1,300,000	F & A	130¼	Feb. 28, '01				
{ " cons. 1st 6's.....1922	3,820,000	J & D	130	Feb. 7, '01				
Buffalo & Susquehanna 1st g. 5's.1913	1,058,500	A & O	100	Nov. 18, '99				
{ " registered.....1913		A & O						
Burlington, Cedar R. & N. 1st 5's.1908	6,500,000	J & D	107¾	Apr. 28, '01	108¼	107¾		69,500
{ " con. 1st & col. 1st 5's..1934		A & O	124½	Apr. 30, '01	124½	122¾		47,000
{ " registered.....1934	7,250,000	A & O	117	Nov. 20, '19				
{ Ced. Rap. Ia. Falls & Nor. 1st 5's.1921	1,905,000	A & O	113¼	Dec. 6, '19				
{ Minneap's & St. Louis 1st 7's. g. 1927	150,000	J & D	140	Aug. 24, '95				
Canada Southern 1st int. gtd 5's.1908	14,000,000	J & J	108	Apr. 30, '01	108¼	107¾		102,000
{ " 2d mortg. 5's.....1913		M & S	108¼	Apr. 30, '01	108¾	107¾		45,000
{ " registered.....1913	6,000,000	M & S	106¾	Apr. 17, '01	106¾	106¾		3,000
Central Branch U. Pac. 1st g. 4's.1948	2,500,000	J & D	94	Apr. 19, '01	94	94		7,000
Cent. R. & Bkg. Co. of Ga. c. g. 5's.1937	4,880,000	M & N	103¾	Apr. 23, '01	103¾	102¾		90,000
Central R'y of Georgia, 1st g. 5's.1945								
{ " registered \$1,000 & \$5,000	7,000,000	F & A	120¼	Mar. 25, '01				
{ " con. g. 5's.....1945		F & A						
{ " con. g. 5's. reg. \$1,000 & \$5,000	16,700,600	M & N	107	Apr. 30, '01	108	106¾		342,000
{ " 1st. pref. inc. g. 5's.....1945	4,000,000	M & N	96	Oct. 30, '99				
{ " 2d pref. inc. g. 5's.....1945	7,000,000	OCT 1	70	Apr. 28, '01	71	69¾		172,000
{ " 3d pref. inc. g. 5's.....1945	4,000,000	OCT 1	28	Apr. 30, '01	31	28		620,000
{ " Macon & Nor. Div. 1st	4,000,000	OCT 1	15	Apr. 29, '01	16	13¾		222,000
{ " g. 5's.....1946	840,000	J & J	95	Dec. 27, '99				
{ " Mid. Ga. & Atl. div. g. 5s.1947	413,000	J & J	102	June 29, '99				
{ " Mobile div. 1st g. 5's.....1946	1,000,000	J & J	106	Oct. 24, '19				
Central Railroad of New Jersey,								
{ " 1st convertible 7's..1902	1,167,000	M & N	108	Apr. 9, '01	108	108		3,000
{ " gen. g. 5's.....1937		J & J	133	Apr. 30, '01	134	132		238,000
{ " registered.....1937	43,924,000	Q J	131¾	Apr. 23, '01	132	131		27,000

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		APRIL SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Am. Dock & Improvm't Co. 5's. 1921		4,987,000	J & J	114½	Apr. 29, '01	114½	114½	1,000
Lehigh & H. R. gen. gtd. 5's. 1920		1,062,000	J & J					
Lehigh & W.-R. Coal con. 5's. 1912		2,691,000	Q M	108	Mar. 15, '01			
con. extended gtd. 4½'s. 1910		12,175,400	Q M	102	Apr. 29, '01	102	102½	164,000
N.Y. & Long Branch gen. 4's. 1941		1,500,000	M & S					
Charleston & Sav. 1st g. 7's. 1920		1,500,000	J & J	108½	Dec. 13, '99			
<b>Ches. &amp; Ohio 5's, g., Series A.</b> 1908		2,000,000	A & O	114½	Apr. 10, '01	117	114½	11,000
Mortgage gold 5's. 1911		2,000,000	A & O	116½	Apr. 12, '01	116½	116½	17,000
1st con. g. 5's. 1909		25,858,000	M & N	122	Apr. 30, '01	122	121½	62,000
registered.			M & N	116	Apr. 20, '01	120½	116	7,000
Gen. m. g. 4½'s. 1922		28,810,000	M & S	106½	Apr. 30, '01	106	105½	406,000
registered.			M & S	108	Apr. 18, '01	108	108	4,000
Craig Val. 1st g. 5's. 1940		650,000	J & J	108	Nov. 28, '99			
(R. & A. d.) 1st c. g. 4's. 1940		6,000,000	J & J	107½	Apr. 30, '01	107½	106½	7,000
2d con. g. 5's. 1940		1,000,000	J & J	101½	Feb. 27, '01			
Warm S. Val. 1st g. 5's. 1941		400,000	M & S	101½	Apr. 29, '99			
Eliz. Lex. & B. S. g. 5's. 1922		3,007,000	M & S	101½	Apr. 25, '01	101½	100½	38,000
Greenbrier Ry. 1st gtd. 4's. 1940		2,000,000	M & N					
Chic. & Alton R. R. s. fund g. 5's. 1933		1,671,000	M & N	105½	Jan. 9, '01			
refunding g. 5's. 1949		17,483,000	A & O	90	Apr. 4, '01	90	90	2,000
registered.			A & O					
Miss. Riv. Bdge 1st s. f'd g. 6's. 1912		437,000	A & O	105½	Oct. 30, '95			
Chic. & Alton Ry. 1st lien g. 3½'s. 1950		22,000,000	J & J	85½	Apr. 30, '01	86½	84½	1,271,000
registered.			J & J					
<b>Chicago, Burl. &amp; Quincy con. 7's.</b> 1908		23,197,000	J & J	109½	Apr. 23, '01	109½	109½	58,000
5½, sinking fund. 1901		2,291,000	A & O	100½	Apr. 23, '01	100½	100½	4,000
Chic. & Iowa div. 5's. 1905		2,320,000	F & A	104½	Apr. 11, '99			
Denver div. 4's. 1922		5,479,000	F & A	102½	Apr. 22, '01	102½	102	28,000
Illinois div. 3½'s. 1949		20,214,000	J & J	109½	Apr. 26, '01	109½	109½	27,000
registered.			J & J					
(Iowa div.) sink. f'd 5's. 1919		2,640,000	A & O	114	Apr. 12, '01	114	114	1,000
4's. 1919		8,544,000	A & O	104½	Apr. 18, '01	104½	104½	4,000
Nebraska extens'n 5's. 1927		25,467,000	M & N	113	Apr. 18, '01	113	112½	18,000
registered.			M & N	112½	Apr. 17, '01	112½	112½	50,000
Southwestern div. 4's. 1921		2,960,000	M & S	100½	Oct. 15, '99			
convertible 5's. 1903		1,802,000	M & S	196½	Apr. 25, '01	196½	183½	86,500
5's, debentures. 1913		9,000,000	M & N	112½	Apr. 23, '01	112½	111½	19,000
Han. & St. Jos. con. 6's. 1911		8,000,000	M & S	121	Apr. 19, '01	121	121	5,000
<b>Chicago &amp; E. Ill. 1st s. f'd c'y. 6's.</b> 1907		2,969,000	J & D	114½	Apr. 30, '01	114½	113½	5,000
small bonds. 1907			J & D	112	Apr. 2, '98			
1st con. 6's, gold. 1904		2,658,000	A & O	138½	Apr. 18, '01	138½	138½	3,000
gen. con. 1st 5's. 1907		12,996,000	M & N	127	Apr. 30, '01	127	124	116,000
registered.			M & N	115	Aug. 28, '99			
Chicago & Ind. Coal 1st 5's. 1906		4,626,000	J & J	125	Apr. 23, '01	125	123½	40,000
Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville.								
refunding g. 6's. 1947		4,700,000	J & J	124	Apr. 19, '01	124	123½	14,000
ref. g. 5's. 1947		3,542,000	J & J	110	Apr. 12, '01	111	110	8,000
Louisv. N. Alb. & Chic. 1st 6's. 1910		3,000,000	J & J	117	Apr. 26, '01	117	117	24,000
<b>Chicago, Milwaukee &amp; St. Paul.</b>								
Mil. & St. Paul 1st 7's & g. R.d. 1902		1,463,500	J & J	102½	Apr. 23, '01	102½	102½	1,000
1st 7's & g. 1902			J & J	172½	Apr. 10, '99			
1st C. & M. 7's. 1903		1,157,000	J & J	190	Jan. 28, '01			
Chicago Mil. & St. Paul con. 7's. 1905		5,072,000	J & J	198	Apr. 30, '01	194	189½	131,000
terminal g. 5's. 1914		4,748,000	J & J	115½	Apr. 17, '01	115½	114½	3,000
gen. g. 4's, series A. 1909		23,676,000	J & J	113½	Apr. 24, '01	113½	113	4,000
registered.			Q	106½	Feb. 19, '98			
gen. g. 3½'s, series B. 1909		2,500,000	J & J					
registered.			J & J					
Chic. & Lake Sup. 5's. 1921		1,360,000	J & J	121	Apr. 13, '01	121	121	1,000
Chic. & M. R. div. 5's. 1926		3,083,000	J & J	121½	Apr. 9, '01	122½	121½	6,000
Chic. & Pac. div. 6's. 1910		3,000,000	J & J	118½	Apr. 1, '01	118½	118½	5,000
1st Chic. & P. W. g. 5's. 1921		25,340,000	J & J	121	Apr. 22, '01	121	120½	23,000
Dakota & Gt. S. g. 5's. 1916		2,856,000	J & J	116½	Mar. 2, '01			
Far. & So. g. 6's assu. 1924		1,250,000	J & J	137½	July 18, '98			
1st H't & Dk. div. 7's. 1910		5,680,000	J & J	126½	Apr. 13, '01	126½	126½	20,000
1st 5's. 1910		990,000	J & J	110½	Jan. 15, '01			
1st 7's, Iowa & D. ex. 1908		2,230,000	J & J	188	Apr. 9, '01	188	188	2,000
1st 5's, La. C. & Dav. 1919		2,500,000	J & J	118½	Apr. 29, '01	119	118½	6,000
Mineral Point div. 5's. 1910		2,840,000	J & J	110½	Apr. 4, '01	110½	110½	5,000
1st So. Min. div. 6's. 1910		7,432,000	J & J	118½	Apr. 25, '01	118½	118½	19,000
1st 6's, Southw'n div. 1909		4,000,000	J & J	117½	Apr. 9, '01	117½	117½	1,000
Wis. & Min. div. g. 5's. 1921		4,755,000	J & J	120	Feb. 27, '01			
Mil. & N. 1st M. L. 6's. 1910		2,155,000	J & J	119	Mar. 21, '01			
1st con. 6's. 1913		5,062,000	J & D	121½	Mar. 12, '01			

# BOND SALES.

779

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highs and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		APRIL SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Chic. & Northwestern con. 7's...1915		12,832,000	Q F	142½	Apr. 17 '01	142½	142½	6,000
gold 7's.....1902		7,663,000	J & D	108	Apr. 15 '01	108	108	1,000
registered gold 7's.....1902			J & D	108	Apr. 12 '01	108	108	4,000
extension 4's.....1886-1923		18,632,000	F A 15	112	Mar. 20 '01			
registered.....			F A 15	107	Mar. 7 '19			
gen. g. 3½'s.....1937		11,994,000	M & N	110	Apr. 26 '01	110¼	110	10,000
registered.....			Q F	103	Nov. 19 '98			
sinking fund 6's...1879-1929		5,878,000	A & O	116½	Mar. 8 '01			
registered.....			A & O	111	Oct. 18 '19			
sinking fund 5's...1879-1929		6,962,000	A & O	108½	Apr. 23 '01	109¼	108½	21,000
registered.....			A & O	107	Dec. 18 '19			
deben. 5's.....1919		5,900,000	M & N	110½	Apr. 29 '01	110¼	110½	14,000
registered.....			M & N	108½	Apr. 17 '01	108½	108½	8,000
deben. 5's.....1921		10,000,000	A & O	117	Apr. 10 '01	117	117	2,000
registered.....			A & O	107	Nov. 20 '95			
sinking f'd deben. 5's...1933		9,800,000	M & N	124	Apr. 8 '01	124	124	7,000
registered.....			M & N	122½	Jan. 15 '01			
Des Moines & Minn. 1st 7's.....1907		600,000	F & A	127	Apr. 8 '84			
Milwaukee & Madison 1st 6's.....1905		1,600,000	M & S	113	Jan. 23 '01			
Northern Illinois 1st 5's.....1910		1,500,000	M & S	111	Mar. 20 '01			
Ottumwa C. F. & St. P. 1st 5's...1909		1,000,000	M & S	111¼	Apr. 24 '19			
Winona & St. Peters 2d 7's.....1907		1,562,000	M & N	120¼	Nov. 10 '19			
Mil. L. Shore & We'n 1st g. 6's...1921		5,030,000	M & N	141¼	Apr. 19 '01	141¼	141¼	5,000
ext. & impt. a.f.d g. 5's...1929		4,148,000	F & A	127	Apr. 16 '01	127	127	12,000
Ashland div. 1st g. 6's...1925		1,000,000	M & S	143½	Apr. 8 '19	143½	143½	6,000
Michigan div. 1st g. 6's...1924		1,281,000	J & J	143	Apr. 12 '10	143	142½	7,000
con. deb. 5's.....1907		436,000	F & A	107½	Feb. 21 '01			
incomes.....1911		500,000	M & N	113	Apr. 25 '01	113	113	6,000
Chic., Rock Is. & Pac. 6's coup...1917		12,100,000	J & J	180½	Apr. 19 '01	180½	180½	4,000
registered.....1917			J & J	132½	Mar. 27 '01			
gen. g. 4's.....1938		64,581,000	J & J	108½	Apr. 30 '01	108½	108	208,000
registered.....			J & J	106	Apr. 25 '19	106	106	30,000
Des Moines & Ft. Dodge 1st 4's...1905		1,200,000	J & J	99½	Feb. 20 '01			
1st 2½'s.....1905		1,200,000	J & J	88¼	Aug. 25 '19			
extension 4's.....		672,600	J & J	98	Dec. 19 '19			
Keokuk & Des M. 1st mor. 5's...1923		2,750,000	A & O	110¼	Apr. 12 '01	110¼	110¼	8,000
small bond.....1923			A & O	100	Apr. 15 '97			
Chic., St. P., Minn. & Oma. con. 6's...1930		14,338,000	J & D	140¼	Apr. 22 '01	140¼	140¼	3,000
Chic., St. Paul & Minn. 1st 6's...1918		2,079,000	M & N	140¼	Mar. 11 '01			
North Wisconsin 1st mort. 6's...1930		796,000	J & J	140	Mar. 22 '01			
St. Paul & Sioux City 1st 6's.....1919		6,070,000	A & O	130¼	Apr. 24 '01	130¼	130	23,000
Chic., Term. Trans. R. R. g. 4's...1947		18,585,000	J & J	95½	Apr. 30 '01	97¼	95	1,630,000
Chic. & Wn. Ind. 1st s'k. f'd g. 6's...1919		478,000	M & N	108	Oct. 4 '99			
gen'l mortg. g. 6's.....1932		1,868,000	Q M	120	Apr. 23 '01	120	120	5,000
Chic. & West Michigan R'y 5's.....1921		5,753,000	J & D	100	Oct. 28 '93			
Choc., Oklahoma & Gif. gen. g. 5's...1919		4,800,000	J & J	103	Jan. 17 '19			
Cin., Ham. & Day. con. s'k. f'd 7's...1905		996,000	A & O	115	Dec. 14 '19			
2d g. 4½'s.....1937		2,000,000	J & J	113	Oct. 10 '19			
Cin., Day. & Ir'n 1st gt. dg. 5's...1941		3,500,000	M & N	115	Mar. 15 '01			
Clev., Cin. & St. L. gen. g. 4's...1933		12,634,000	J & D	104¼	Apr. 30 '01	105	104	117,000
do Cairo div. 1st g. 4's...1939		5,000,000	J & J	99	Jan. 10 '01			
Cin., Wab. & Mich. div. 1st g. 4's...1991		4,000,000	J & J	102	Apr. 30 '01	104¼	102	55,000
St. Louis div. 1st col. trust g. 4's...1990		9,750,000	M & N	105½	Apr. 9 '01	105½	105½	3,000
registered.....			M & N	99	May 4 '99			
Sp'gfield & Col. div. 1st g. 4's...1940		1,035,000	M & S	100	Apr. 2 '01	100	100	4,000
White W. Val. div. 1st g. 4's.....1940		650,000	J & J	83	Nov. 22 '99			
Cin., Ind., St. L. & Chic. 1st g. 4's...1936		7,685,000	Q F	104½	Feb. 20 '19			
registered.....			Q F	95	Nov. 15 '94			
con. 6's.....1920		689,000	M & N	107¼	June 30 '98			
Cin., S'dusky & Clev. con. 1st g. 5's...1923		2,571,000	J & J	115	Mar. 1 '01			
Clev., C., C. & Ind. con. 7's.....1914		3,991,000	J & D	136	Feb. 21 '01			
sinking fund 7's.....1914			J & D	119½	Nov. 19 '99			
gen. consol 6's.....1934		3,205,000	J & J	136¼	Mar. 21 '01			
registered.....			J & J					
Cin., Sp. 1st m. C. C. C. & Ind. 7's...1901		1,000,000	A & O	101¼	Dec. 7 '19			
Ind. Bloom. & West. 1st pfd 4's...1940		981,500	A & O					
Ohio, Ind. & W., 1st pfd. 5's.....1938		500,000	Q J					
Peoria & Eastern 1st con. 4's.....1940		8,103,000	A & O	97	Apr. 26 '01	98	95	141,000
income 4's.....1990		4,000,000	A	63	Apr. 30 '01	65	61	369,000

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		APRIL SALES.			
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.	
Clev., Lorain & Wheel'g con. 1st 5's 1933		5,000,000	A & O	111	Sept. 5, 19'	....	....	....	
Clev., & Mahoning Val. gold 5's. 1932		2,990,000	J & J	130	May 8, 19'	....	....	....	
registered.....			Q J			....	....	....	
Col. Midl Ry. 1st g. 2-3-4's.....1947		7,500,000	J & J	85½	Apr. 30, '01	87½	83	800,000	
1st g. 4's.....1947		1,446,000	J & J	85	Apr. 30, '01	87	83½	238,000	
Colorado & Southern 1st g. 4's.....1929		18,060,000	F & A	89½	Apr. 30, '01	89½	87	1,282,000	
Conn., Passumpsic Riv's 1st g. 4's. 1943		1,400,000	A & O	102	Dec. 27, '93	....	....	....	
Delaware, Lack. & W. mtge 7's.....1907		3,067,000	M & S	120½	Apr. 10, '01	120½	120½	10,000	
Morris & Essex 1st m 7's.....1914		5,000,000	M & N	120½	Apr. 16, '01	120½	120½	10,000	
7's.....1871-1901		4,991,000	A & O	101½	Apr. 23, '01	101½	101½	6,000	
1st c. gtd 7's.....1915		12,151,000	J & D	140½	Apr. 9, '01	140½	140½	2,000	
registered.....			J & D	140	Oct. 26, '98	....	....	....	
N. Y., Lack. & West'n. 1st 6's.....1921		12,000,000	J & J	136½	Apr. 23, '01	136½	136½	5,000	
const. 5's.....1923		5,000,000	F & A	118½	Mar. 5, '01	....	....	....	
term. imp. 4's.....1923		5,000,000	M & N	102½	Oct. 15, 19'	....	....	....	
Syracuse, Bing. & N. Y. 1st 7's. 1905		1,996,000	A & O	118½	Nov. 15, 19'	....	....	....	
Warren Rd. 1st rfdg. gtd g. 3½'s. 2000		906,000	F & A	....	....	....	....	....	
Delaware & Hudson Canal.									
1st Penn. Div. c. 7's.....1917		5,000,000	M & S	145½	Mar. 19, '01	....	....	....	
reg.....1917			M & S	150	Feb. 15, '01	....	....	....	
Albany & Susq. 1st c. g. 7's.....1906		3,000,000	A & O	117	Feb. 7, '01	....	....	....	
registered.....			A & O	122	June 6, '99	....	....	....	
6's.....1906		7,000,000	A & O	112	Dec. 4, 19'	....	....	....	
registered.....			A & O	112½	Feb. 15, '01	....	....	....	
Bens. & Saratoga 1st c. 7's.....1931		2,000,000	M & N	151	Mar. 1, '01	....	....	....	
1st r 7's.....1921			M & N	151	Jan. 17, '01	....	....	....	
Denyer & Rio G. 1st con. g. 4's.....1936		28,650,000	J & J	102½	Apr. 30, '01	102½	101½	147,500	
con. g. 4½'s.....1936		6,382,000	J & J	109½	Apr. 24, '01	110	109½	15,000	
impt. m. g. 5's.....1923		8,104,500	J & D	110½	Apr. 24, '01	111	110	122,500	
Des Moines Union Ry 1st g. 5's. 1917		623,000	M & N	111	Feb. 28, '01	....	....	....	
Detroit & Mack. 1st lien g. 4s.....1905		900,000	J & D	91½	Mar. 26, '01	....	....	....	
g. 4s.....1905		1,250,000	J & D	89	Feb. 27, '01	....	....	....	
Duluth & Iron Range 1st 5's.....1937		6,734,000	A & O	112	Apr. 30, '01	113	112	22,000	
registered.....			A & O	101½	July 23, '89	....	....	....	
2d l m 6s.....1913		2,000,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....	
Duluth, Red Wing & S'n 1st g. 5's. 1923		500,000	J & J	92½	Feb. 11, '98	....	....	....	
Duluth So. Shore & At. gold 5's. 1937		4,000,000	J & J	115	Apr. 22, '01	115	115	3,000	
Elgin Joliet & Eastern 1st g 5's. 1941		7,852,000	M & N	112½	Apr. 18, '01	112½	112½	5,000	
Erie 1st ext. g. 4's.....1947		2,482,000	M & N	118½	Jan. 28, '01	....	....	....	
2d extended g. 5's.....1919		2,149,000	M & S	120½	Apr. 13, '01	120½	120½	4,000	
3d extended g. 4½'s.....1923		2,926,000	M & S	116	Apr. 23, '01	116	116	5,000	
4th extended g. 5's.....1920		4,618,000	A & O	123½	Mar. 6, '01	....	....	....	
5th extended g. 4's.....1923		709,500	J & D	106½	Feb. 24, 19'	....	....	....	
1st cons. gold 7's.....1920		15,890,000	M & S	140	Apr. 26, '01	140	140	22,000	
1st cons. fund g. 7's.....1920		3,699,500	M & S	135½	Mar. 20, '01	....	....	....	
Erie R. R. 1st con. g. 4s prior bds. 1906		33,452,000	J & J	98½	Apr. 30, '01	99½	98½	830,000	
registered.....			J & J	93½	May 25, '99	....	....	....	
1st con. gen. lien g. 4s. 1906		33,857,000	J & J	87½	Apr. 30, '01	90	87	3,267,000	
registered.....			J & J	....	....	....	....	....	
Buffalo, N. Y. & Erie 1st 7's.....1916		2,380,000	J & D	136½	Apr. 3, '01	136½	136½	1,000	
Buffalo & Southwestern g. 6's. 1908		1,500,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....	
small.....			J & J	....	....	....	....	....	
Chicago & Erie 1st gold 5's.....1932		12,000,000	M & N	123	Apr. 11, '01	123	122½	37,000	
Jefferson R. R. 1st gtd g. 5's.....1909		2,900,000	A & O	105	Apr. 10, '01	105	105	4,000	
Long Dock consol. g. 6's.....1935		7,500,000	A & O	138½	Apr. 15, '01	138½	138	26,000	
N. Y. L. E. & W. Coal & R. R. Co.									
1st gtd. currency 8's.....1922		1,100,000	M & N	....	....	....	....	....	
N. Y. L. E. & W. Dock & Imp.									
Co. 1st currency 6's.....1913		3,396,000	J & J	118	Sept. 27, 19'	....	....	....	
N. Y. & Greenw'd Lake gt g 5's. 1946		1,452,000	M & N	109	Oct. 27, '98	....	....	....	
small.....									
Midland R. of N. J. 1st g. 6's.....1910		3,500,000	A & O	117½	Apr. 25, '01	117½	116	18,000	
N. Y., Sus. & W. 1st rfdg. g. 5's. 1937		3,750,000	J & J	116½	Feb. 15, '01	....	....	....	
2d g. 4½'s.....1937		453,000	F & A	94	Feb. 11, '01	....	....	....	
gen. g. 5's.....1940		2,548,000	F & A	105½	Apr. 30, '01	106	105	38,000	
term. 1st g. 5's.....1943		2,000,000	M & N	113	Apr. 27, 19'	....	....	....	
registered.....\$5,000 each			M & N	....	....	....	....	....	
Wilkesb. & East. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		3,000,000	J & D	110½	Apr. 4, '01	110½	110½	1,000	

# BOND SALES.

781

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		APRIL SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Eureka Springs R'y 1st 6's, g.....1933		500,000	F & A	85	Nov. 10, '97	....	....	.....
Evans. & Terre Haute 1st con. 6's. 1921		3,000,000	J & J	123½	Mar. 25, '01	....	....	.....
" 1st General g 5's.....1942		2,223,000	A & O	111	Mar. 19, '01	....	....	.....
" Mount Vernon 1st 6's.....1923		375,000	A & O	110	May 10, '93	....	....	.....
" Sul. Co. Bch. 1st g 5's.....1930		450,000	A & O	95	Sept. 15, '91	....	....	.....
Evans. & Ind'p. 1st con. g g 6's.....1923		1,591,000	J & J	108	Feb. 21, '01	....	....	.....
Florida Cen. & Penins. 1st g 5's.....1918		3,000,000	J & J	100	Sept. 6, '99	....	....	.....
" 1st land grant ex. g 5's.....1930		423,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
" 1st con. g 5's.....1943		4,370,000	J & J	80½	May 14, '98	....	....	.....
Ft. Smith U'n Dep. Co. 1st g 4½'s. 1941		1,000,000	J & J	105	Mar. 11, '98	....	....	.....
Ft. Worth & D. C. cfs. dep. 1st 4's.....1921		8,176,000	....	109½	Apr. 30, '01	109½	104	978,000
Ft. Worth & Rio Grande 1st g 5's. 1923		2,863,000	J & J	88	Apr. 25, '01	88½	83	563,000
Galveston H. & H. of 1882 1st 5s.....1913		2,000,000	A & O	102½	Jan. 26, '01	....	....	.....
Geo. & Ala. Ry. 1st pref. g. 5's.....1945		2,280,000	A & O	106	Dec. 12, '88	....	....	.....
" 1st con. g 5s.....1945		2,922,000	J & J	98½	Nov. 27, '19	....	....	.....
Ga. Car. & N. Ry. 1st gtd. g. 5's.....1927		5,380,000	J & J	99½	Jan. 22, '19	....	....	.....
Hock. Val. Ry. 1st con. g. 4½'s.....1909		10,237,000	J & J	106½	Apr. 26, '01	106½	105½	179,000
" registered		....	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
" Col. Hock's Val. 1st ext. g. 4's. 1848		1,401,000	A & O	106½	Feb. 6, '01	....	....	.....
Illinois Central, 1st g. 4's.....1951		1,500,000	J & J	115½	Apr. 8, '01	115½	115½	4,000
" registered		....	J & J	113½	Mar. 12, '19	....	....	.....
" 1st gold 3½'s.....1951		2,499,000	J & J	107½	Apr. 15, '01	107½	107½	2,000
" registered		....	J & J	102½	Apr. 15, '98	....	....	.....
" 1st g 3s sterl. £500,000.....1951		2,500,000	M & S	92½	July 18, '98	....	....	.....
" registered		....	M & S	....	....	....	....	.....
" total outstg. ....\$13,960,000		....	....	....	....	....	....	.....
" collat. trust gold 4's.....1952		15,000,000	A & O	104	Apr. 12, '01	104	104	10,000
" regist'd.....		....	A & O	104½	Jan. 30, '99	....	....	.....
" col. t. g. 4s L. N. O. & Tex.....1953		24,679,000	M & N	106	Apr. 22, '01	106	105½	23,000
" registered		....	M & N	109½	Dec. 13, '99	....	....	.....
" Cairo Bridge g 4's.....1950		3,000,000	J & D	123	May 24, '99	....	....	.....
" registered		....	J & D	102½	Apr. 29, '01	102½	102½	9,000
" Louisville div. g. 3½'s. 1953		14,320,000	J & J	88½	Dec. 8, '99	....	....	.....
" registered		....	J & J	95	Dec. 21, '99	....	....	.....
" Middle div. reg. 5's.....1921		600,000	F & A	90½	Apr. 17, '01	90½	90½	5,000
" St. Louis div. g. 3's.....1951		4,989,000	J & J	101½	Jan. 31, '19	....	....	.....
" registered		....	J & J	102½	Apr. 18, '01	102½	102½	10,000
" g. 3½'s.....1951		6,821,000	J & J	101½	Sept. 10, '95	....	....	.....
" registered		....	J & J	100	Nov. 7, '19	....	....	.....
" Sp'gfield div 1st g 3½'s. 1951		2,000,000	J & J	124	Dec. 11, '99	....	....	.....
" registered		....	F & A	114½	Mar. 25, '01	....	....	.....
" West'n Line 1st g. 4's. 1951		5,425,000	F & A	101½	Jan. 31, '19	....	....	.....
" registered		....	J & D	121	Aug. 8, '19	....	....	.....
Belleville & Carodt 1st 6's.....1923		470,000	J & D	105	Jan. 22, '19	....	....	.....
Carbondale & Shawt'n 1st g. 4's. 1932		241,000	M & S	106	Jan. 22, '19	....	....	.....
Chic., St. L. & N. O. gold 5's.....1951		16,555,000	J & D	127½	Apr. 17, '01	129½	127½	6,000
" gold 5's, registered.....		....	J & D	123½	Feb. 14, '01	....	....	.....
" g. 3½'s.....1951		1,352,000	J & D	100½	Nov. 14, '19	....	....	.....
" registered		....	J & D	108½	Aug. 17, '99	....	....	.....
" Memphis div. 1st g. 4's. 1951		3,500,000	J & D	106½	Sept. 10, '19	....	....	.....
" registered		....	J & D	121	Feb. 24, '99	....	....	.....
St. Louis, South. 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1951		538,000	M & S	102½	Nov. 16, '19	....	....	.....
Ind., Dec. & West. 1st g. 5's.....1935		1,824,000	J & J	105	Mar. 20, '01	....	....	.....
" 1st gtd. g. 5's.....1935		933,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Indiana, Illinois & Iowa 1st g. 4's. 1950		4,500,000	J & J	99½	Apr. 25, '01	99½	99½	25,000
Internat. & Gt. N'n 1st 6's, gold. 1919		7,964,000	M & N	126½	Apr. 23, '01	126½	125½	34,000
" 2d g. 5's.....1906		6,593,000	M & S	99½	Apr. 26, '01	100	99½	175,000
" 3d g. 4's.....1921		2,725,000	M & S	71½	Apr. 23, '01	71½	71½	5,000
Iowa Central 1st gold 5's.....1933		7,650,000	J & D	117	Apr. 25, '01	117½	116½	11,000
Kansas C. & M. R. & B. Co. 1st gtd g. 5's.....1929		3,000,000	A & O	70	Apr. 30, '01	70	69½	497,000
Kansas City Southern 1st g. 3's.....1950		26,197,000	A & O	63½	Oct. 16, '19	....	....	.....
" registered.....		....	A & O	....	....	....	....	.....
Lake Erie & Western 1st g. 5's.....1937		7,250,000	J & J	124½	Apr. 3, '01	124½	124½	1,000
" 2d mtge. g. 5's.....1941		3,625,000	J & J	118½	Mar. 20, '01	....	....	.....
" Northern Ohio 1st gtd g 5's.....1945		2,500,000	A & O	115½	Jan. 9, '01	....	....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		APRIL SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Lehigh Val. (Pa.) coll. g. 5's.....1907		8,000,000	M & N	104	Aug. 8, '98	....	....	....
" registered.....			M & N	.....	.....	....	....	....
Lehigh Val. N. Y. 1st m. g. 4½'s.1940		15,000,000	J & J	111½	Apr. 9, '01	111½	111	17,000
" registered.....			J & J	111	Mar. 25, '01	....	....	....
Lehigh Val. Ter. R. 1st gtd g. 5's.1941		10,000,000	A & O	112	July 9, '19	....	....	....
" registered.....			A & O	100½	Oct. 18, '99	....	....	....
Lehigh V. Coal Co. 1st gtd g. 5's.1938		10,280,000	J & J	103½	Nov. 21, '99	....	....	....
" registered.....			J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
Lehigh & N. Y., 1st gtd g. 4's.....1945		2,000,000	M & S	98	Apr. 29, '01	99	98	12,000
" registered.....			M & S	.....	.....	....	....	....
{ Elm., Cort. & N. 1st g. 1st prd 6's.1914		750,000	A & O	.....	.....	....	....	....
{ Elm., Cort. & N. 1st g. 1st prd 6's.1914		1,250,000	A & O	101½	Sept. 1, '99	....	....	....
Long Island 1st cons. 5's.....1931		3,610,000	Q J	123	Jan. 10, '01	....	....	....
1st cons. g. 4's.....1931		1,121,000	Q J	101	Nov. 22, '99	....	....	....
{ Long Island gen. m. 4's.....1938		3,000,000	J & D	104½	Apr. 23, '01	104½	104	19,000
Ferry 1st g. 4½'s.....1923		1,500,000	M & S	102½	Mar. 20, '01	....	....	....
" g. 4's.....1923		335,000	J & D	102½	May 5, '97	....	....	....
" unified g. 4's.....1949		5,685,000	M & S	99½	Apr. 29, '01	100	99½	25,000
" deb. g. 5's.....1934		1,135,000	J & D	95	Feb. 15, '01	....	....	....
{ Brooklyn & Montauk 1st 6's.....1911		250,000	M & S	.....	.....	....	....	....
1st 5's.....1911		750,000	M & S	110	Aug. 3, '96	....	....	....
N. Y. B'kin & M.B. 1st c. g. 5's.....1935		1,601,000	A & O	107	Jan. 31, '99	....	....	....
N. Y. & Rock'y Beach 1st g. 5's.1927		883,000	M & S	105	May 4, '19	....	....	....
Long Isl. R. R. Nor. Shore Branch						....	....	....
1st Con. gold garnt'd 5's.1932		1,425,000	QJAN	113	Dec. 28, '19	....	....	....
{ Louis. & Nash. gen. g. 6's.....1930		9,380,000	J & D	120	Apr. 30, '01	120½	120	31,000
gold 5's.....1937		1,764,000	M & N	113	Apr. 11, '01	112½	113	22,000
Unified gold 4's.....1940		22,494,000	J & J	108	Apr. 30, '01	108½	102½	262,000
" registered.....1940			J & J	83	Feb. 27, '98	....	....	....
collateral trust g. 5's.1931		5,120,000	M & N	113½	Apr. 8, '01	112½	113½	20,000
coll. tr 5-20 g. 4's.1909-1918		11,500,000	A & O	99½	Apr. 29, '01	100	99	197,000
Cecilian branch.7's.....1907		380,000	M & S	106	Dec. 31, '19	....	....	....
E. Hend. & N. 1st 6's.1919		1,825,000	J & D	116	Apr. 9, '01	116	116	1,000
L. Clin. & Lex. g. 4½'s.1931		3,258,000	M & N	103	Jan. 18, '98	....	....	....
N. O. & Mobile 1st g. 6's.1930		5,000,000	J & J	120½	Feb. 11, '01	....	....	....
2d g. 6's.....1930		1,000,000	J & J	117	Oct. 1, '19	....	....	....
Pensacola div. g. 6's.....1920		580,000	M & S	115	Dec. 5, '19	....	....	....
St. Louis div. 1st g. 6's.1921		3,500,000	M & S	120½	Jan. 22, '01	....	....	....
2d g. 8's.....1930		3,000,000	M & S	63½	Oct. 1, '19	....	....	....
Ken. Cent. g. 4's.....1937		6,742,000	J & J	99½	Apr. 29, '01	100	99½	20,000
L. & N. & Mob. & Montg						....	....	....
1st g. 4½'s.....1945		4,000,000	M & S	110½	Mar. 28, '01	....	....	....
N. Fla. & S. 1st g. g. 5's.1937		2,086,000	F & A	112	Jan. 7, '01	....	....	....
Pen. & At. 1st g. g. 6's.1921		2,650,000	F & A	113	Apr. 18, '01	113	111½	3,000
S. & N. A. con. gtd. g. 5's.1936		3,673,000	F & A	110	Feb. 28, '01	....	....	....
So. & N. Ala. sl'fd. g. 6's.1910		1,942,000	A & O	92½	Sept. 30, '96	....	....	....
Lo. & Jefferson Bdg. Co. gtd. g. 4's.1945		3,000,000	M & S	100	Mar. 19, '01	....	....	....
Manhattan Railway Con. 4's.....1930		28,065,000	A & O	105½	Apr. 22, '01	105½	103½	507,000
Metropolitan Elevated 1st 6's.....1908		10,818,000	J & J	117½	Apr. 30, '01	117½	117	23,000
Manitoba Sw. Coloniza'n g. 5's.1934		2,544,000	J & D	.....	.....	....	....	....
Mexican Central.						....	....	....
con. mtge. 4's.....1911		62,643,000	J & J	84½	Apr. 30, '01	84½	83	1,046,000
1st con. inc. 3's.....1939		20,511,000	JULY	32½	Apr. 30, '01	34	30½	9,174,000
2d 3's.....1939		11,310,000	JULY	20½	Apr. 30, '01	20½	16½	6,580,000
equip. & collat. g. 5's.....1917		850,000	A & O	.....	.....	....	....	....
2d series g. 5's.....1919		915,000	A & O	.....	.....	....	....	....
Mexican Internat'l 1st con g. 4's.1942		4,635,000	M & S	84	Apr. 30, '01	84	83	174,000
Mexican Nat. 1st gold 6's.....1927		10,955,000	J & D	103½	Apr. 19, '19	....	....	....
2d inc. 6's "A" 1917 coup. due		12,265,000	M & S	86	Apr. 23, '01	86	85½	2,000
Sept. 1, 1898, stamped 1½% paid						....	....	....
2d inc. 6's "B".....1917		12,265,000	A	17	Apr. 25, '19	....	....	....
Northern 1st g. 6's.....1910		1,182,000	J & D	105	May 2, '19	....	....	....
" registered.....			J & D	.....	.....	....	....	....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		APRIL SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Minneapolis & St. Louis 1st g. 7's. 1927		950,000	J & D	147½	Feb. 15, '01	....	....	.....
" Iowa ext. 1st g. 7's. 1906		1,015,000	J & D	122	Mar. 19, '01	....	....	.....
" Pacific ext. 1st g. 6's. 1921		1,382,000	J & A	124½	Nov. 14, '19	....	....	.....
" Southw. ext. 1st g. 7's. 1910		638,000	J & D	122½	Feb. 7, '01	....	....	.....
" 1st con. g. 5's. 1934		5,000,000	M & N	118½	Feb. 27, '01	....	....	.....
" 1st & refunding g. 4's. 1949		7,600,000	M & S	104½	Apr. 26, '01	104½	103	219,000
Minneapolis & Pacific 1st m. 5's. 1936		3,206,000	J & J	102	Mar. 28, '87	....	....	.....
" stamped 4's pay. of int. gtd.								
Minn., S. S. M. & Atlan. 1st g. 4's. 1926		8,280,000	J & J	108½	Apr. 3, '01	108½	102	26,000
" stamped pay. of int. gtd.				89½	June 18, '91	....	....	.....
Minn., S. P. & S. S. M. 1st c. g. 4's. 1938		6,710,000	J & J	98	Apr. 3, '01	98	98	1,000
" stamped pay. of int. gtd.								
Missouri, K. & T. 1st mtge g. 4's. 1990		39,718,000	J & D	98½	Apr. 30, '01	99½	98	923,000
" 2d mtge. g. 4's. 1990		20,000,000	F & A	82½	Apr. 30, '01	83½	80½	1,599,000
" 1st ext gold 5's. 1944		1,498,000	M & N	105½	Apr. 29, '01	106	103	329,000
" Booneville Bdg. Co. gtd. g. 7's. 1946		510,000	M & N	100½	Nov. 22, '99	....	....	.....
" Dallas & Waco 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1940		1,340,000	M & N	100	Mar. 5, '01	....	....	.....
" Mo. K. & T. of Tex 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1942		3,235,000	M & S	105½	Apr. 26, '01	106	104½	150,000
" Sber. Shreveport & Solist gtd. g. 5's. 1943		1,689,000	J & D	105½	Apr. 24, '01	105½	103	103,000
" Kan. City & Pacific 1st g. 4's. 1990		2,500,000	F & A	90	Apr. 10, '01	90	89	15,000
" Tebo. & Neosho 1st 7's. 1998		187,000	J & D					
" Mo. Kan. & East'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1942		4,000,000	A & O	109½	Apr. 26, '01	109½	107	16,000
Missouri, Pacific 1st con. g. 6's. 1920		14,904,000	M & N	123½	Apr. 30, '01	125	123½	144,000
" 3d mortgage 7's. 1906		3,828,000	M & N	116½	Apr. 15, '01	117	116½	52,000
" trusts gold 5's stamp'd 1917		14,376,000	M & S	106½	Apr. 30, '01	106½	105½	343,500
" registered			M & S					
" 1st collateral gold 5's. 1920		9,636,000	F & A	106½	Apr. 26, '01	107	105½	85,000
" registered			F & A					
" Leroy & Caney Val. A. L. 1st 5's. 1926		520,000	J & J	100	Mar. 14, '01	....	....	.....
" Pacific R. of Mo. 1st m. ex. 4's. 1938		7,000,000	M & S	107½	Dec. 20, '19	....	....	.....
" 2d extended g. 5's. 1938		2,573,000	F & A	115	Mar. 26, '01	....	....	.....
" St. L. & I. g. con. R.R. & I. gr. 5's. 1931		35,716,000	A & O	115½	Apr. 30, '01	117	115	245,000
" stamped gtd gold 5's. 1981		6,945,000	A & O	114½	Apr. 3, '01	114½	114½	8,000
" unify'g & rtd'g g. 4's. 1929		23,090,000	J & J	95½	Apr. 30, '01	95½	94½	807,000
" registered			J & J					
" Verdigris V'y Ind. & W. 1st 5's. 1926		750,000	M & S					
Mob. & Birm. prior lien, g. 5's. 1945		374,000	J & J	109	Aug. 31, '19	....	....	.....
" small		228,000	J & J					
" inc. g. 4's. 1945		700,000	J & J					
" small		500,000						
Mob. Jackson & Kan. City 1st g. 5's. 1946		1,000,000	J & D	131½	Apr. 29, '01	132	131½	29,000
Mobile & Ohio new mort. g. 6's. 1927		7,000,000	J & J	126	Mar. 20, '01	....	....	.....
" 1st extension 6's. 1927		974,000	J & D	126	Mar. 20, '01	....	....	.....
" gen. g. 4's. 1936		9,472,000	Q & J	96	Apr. 22, '01	96	95	73,000
" Montg'mry div. 1st g. 5's. 1947		4,000,000	F & A	116½	Apr. 23, '01	116½	115½	40,000
" St. Louis & Cairo gtd g. 4's. 1931		4,000,000	M & S	101½	Apr. 24, '19	101½	101½	1,000
Nashville, Chat. & St. L. 1st 7's. 1913		6,300,000	J & J	128½	Apr. 30, '01	128½	128½	8,000
" 1st cons. g. 5's. 1928		7,412,000	A & O	113½	Apr. 29, '01	113½	113½	78,000
" 1st g. 6's Jasper Branch. 1923		371,000	J & J	123	Mar. 28, '01	....	....	.....
" 1st 6's McM. M.W. & Al. 1917		750,000	J & J	108	Mar. 24, '96	....	....	.....
" 1st 6's T. & Pb. 1917		300,000	J & J	110	Dec. 20, '99	....	....	.....
N. O. & N. East. prior lien g. 6's. 1915		1,320,000	A & O	108½	Aug. 13, '94	....	....	.....
N. Y. Cent. & Hud. R. 1st c. 7's. 1903		18,445,000	J & J	107½	Apr. 13, '01	107½	107½	2,000
" 1st registered			J & J	107½	Apr. 8, '01	107½	107½	20,000
" g. mortgage 3½'s. 1997		37,709,000	J & J	110	Apr. 26, '01	110½	110	10,000
" registered			J & J	110	Aug. 27, '19	....	....	.....
" debenture 5's. 1894-1904		4,648,000	M & S	105	Apr. 30, '01	105	104½	17,000
" debenture 5's reg.			M & S	105	Apr. 30, '01	105	105	5,000
" reg. debent. 5's. 1899-1904		649,000	M & S	103½	Apr. 30, '01	....	....	.....
" debenture g. 4's. 1890-1906		5,379,000	J & D	103½	Apr. 30, '01	103½	103½	8,000
" registered			J & D	102½	Jan. 16, '01	....	....	.....
" deb. cert. ext. g. 4's. 1906		3,677,000	M & N	103½	Apr. 30, '01	103½	103½	1,500
" registered			M & N	106½	Sept. 28, '99	....	....	.....
" Lake Shore col. g. 3½'s. 1998		90,578,000	F & A	96	Apr. 30, '01	97½	95½	381,000
" registered			F & A	96	Apr. 23, '01	96½	95	77,000
" Michigan Central col. g. 3½'s. 1998		18,900,000	F & A	94½	Mar. 30, '01	95½	94	118,000
" registered			F & A	97	Jan. 11, '01	....	....	.....
" Beech Creek 1st gtd. 4's. 1936		5,000,000	J & J	111	Mar. 1, '01	....	....	.....
" registered			J & J	106	June 17, '98	....	....	.....
" 2d gtd. g. 5's. 1936		500,000	J & J					
" registered			J & J					

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		APRIL SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Carthage & Adiron. 1st gtd g. 4's 1981		1,100,000	J & D					
Clearfield Bit. Coal Corporation, 1st s. f. int. gtd. g. 4's ser. A. 1940		770,000	J & J	95	July 28, '98			
small bonds series B.		33,100	J & J					
Gouv. & Oswega, 1st gtd g. 5's 1942		300,000	J & D					
Mohawk & Malone 1st gtd g. 4's 1991		2,500,000	M & S	107½	July 6, '19			
inc. 5's. 1992		3,900,000	Sept.					
N. Jersey Junc. R. R. g. 1st 4's 1966		1,850,000	F & A	102	Feb. 3, '97			
reg. certificates			F & A					
N. Y. & Putnam 1st con. gtd g. 4's 1963		4,000,000	A & O	108	May 22, '96			
Nor. & Montreal 1st g. gtd 5's. 1918		130,000	A & O					
West Shore 1st guaranteed 4's 2361		50,000,000	J & J	114½	Apr. 25, '01	115½	114½	165,000
registered			J & J	115	Apr. 30, '01	115	118½	27,500
Lake Shore con. 2d 7's. 1903		8,428,000	J & D	110½	Mar. 9, '01			
con. 2d registered. 1903			J & D	110½	Mar. 8, '01			
g 3½'s. 1997		40,780,000	J & D	110	Apr. 29, '01	110	110	19,000
registered.			J & D	110½	Mar. 17, '19			
Detroit, Mon. & Toledo 1st 7's 1906		924,000	F & A	117	Feb. 13, '01			
Kal. A. & G. R. 1st gtd c. 5's. 1938		840,000	J & J					
Mahoning Coal R. R. 1st 5's. 1924		1,500,000	J & J	130	Dec. 17, '19			
Pitt McK'port & Y. 1st gtd 6's. 1932		2,250,000	J & J	146½	Apr. 12, '01	146½	146½	100,000
2d gtd 6's. 1934		900,000	J & J					
McKspt & Bell. V. 1st g. 6's. 1913		600,000	J & J					
Michigan Cent. 1st con. 7's. 1902		8,000,000	M & N	109½	Apr. 18, '01	106½	106½	13,000
1st con. 5's. 1902		2,000,000	M & N	108½	Mar. 11, '01			
6's. 1909		1,500,000	M & S	118½	Apr. 19, '01	118½	118½	5,000
coup. 5's. 1981		3,676,000	M & S	130½	Apr. 12, '01	130½	130½	75,000
reg. 5's. 1981			Q M	127½	Nov. 8, '19			
mort. 4's. 1940		2,600,000	J & J	110	Mar. 8, '01			
mtgc. 4's reg. 1989		476,000	J & J	108½	Nov. 26, '19			
Battle C. Sturgis 1st g. g. 3's. 1900			J & D					
N. Y. & Harlem 1st mort. 7's c. 1900		11,444,000	M & N	109½	Mar. 13, '19			
7's registered. 1900			M & N	109½	Apr. 6, '19			
N. Y. & Northern 1st g. 5's. 1927		1,200,000	A & O	122	Jan. 30, '01			
R. W. & Og. con. 1st ext. 5's. 1922		9,081,000	A & O	125½	Apr. 30, '01	127½	125½	31,000
coup. g. bond currency		400,000	F & A					
Oswego & Rome 2d gtd gold 5's 1915		375,000	M & N	113	Apr. 13, '94			
R. W. & O. Ter. R. 1st g. gtd 5's 1918		1,800,000	J & J	110	Oct. 15, '19			
Utica & Black River gtd g. 4's 1922								
N. Y., Chic. & St. Louis 1st g. 4's. 1987		19,425,000	A & O	107½	Apr. 29, '01	107½	108	173,000
registered			A & O	107	Apr. 8, '01	107	107	2,000
N. Y., N. Haven & H. 1st reg. 4's 1905		2,000,000	J & D	102	Feb. 28, '01			
con. deb. receipts. \$100		15,007,500	A & O	198½	Apr. 23, '01	198½	196	20,000
small certifs. \$100		1,430,000		196	Feb. 21, '01			
Housatonic R. con. g. 5's. 1937		2,838,000	M & N	136	Mar. 12, '01			
New Haven and Derby con. 5's. 1918		575,000	M & N	115½	Oct. 15, '94			
N. Y. & New England 1st 7's. 1905		6,000,000	J & J	114	Jan. 5, '19			
1st 6's. 1905		4,000,000	J & J	110	Apr. 12, '01	110	110	1,000
N. Y., Ont. & W'n. ref'ding 1st g. 4's 1992		16,987,000	M & S	104½	Apr. 29, '01	105½	104½	41,000
registered. \$5,000 only.			M & S	101½	Nov. 30, '98			
Norfolk & Southern 1st g. 5's. 1941		1,350,000	M & N	112½	Mar. 23, '01			
Norfolk & Western gen. mtg. 6's 1981		7,233,000	M & N	134½	Apr. 4, '01	136	134½	3,000
imp'ment and ext. 6's. 1934		5,000,000	F & A	139½	Apr. 23, '01	139½	139½	5,000
New River 1st 6's. 1932		2,000,000	A & O	131½	Apr. 20, '01	131½	131	72,000
Norfolk & West. Ry 1st con. g. 4s 1996			A & O	101½	Apr. 30, '01	102	100½	470,500
registered.		30,704,600	A & O	97½	July 18, '99			
small bonds.			A & O					
C. C. & T. 1st g. t. g. 5's 1922		600,000	J & J	107	Nov. 26, '19			
Sci'o Val & N.E. 1st g. 4's 1969		5,000,000	J & N	106½	Apr. 4, '01	106½	106½	1,000
N. P. Ry prior in ry. & id. gtd. g. 4's. 1997		94,007,500	Q J	105½	Apr. 30, '01	106	104½	614,000
registered.			Q J	105	Apr. 18, '01	105	105	9,000
gen. lien g. 5's. 2047		56,000,000	Q F	73½	Apr. 30, '01	73½	73	1,626,000
registered.			Q F	70½	Dec. 10, '19			
St. Paul & Duluth div. g. 4's. 1996		9,215,000	J & D					
registered.			J & D					
St. Paul & N. Pacific gen. g. 6's 1923		7,985,000	F & A	131½	Feb. 18, '01			
registered certificates.			Q F	132	July 23, '98			
St. Paul & Duluth 1st 5's. 1951		1,000,000	F & A	125½	Feb. 13, '01			
2d 5's. 1917		2,000,000	A & O	112	Apr. 16, '01	112½	111½	36,000
1st con. g. 4's. 1968		1,000,000	J & D	102	Feb. 16, '01			
Washington Cen. Ry 1st g. 4's. 1948		1,538,000	Q MCH	88½	May 31, '19			
Nor. Pacific Term. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1933		3,787,000	J & J	115½	Apr. 18, '01	116½	115½	6,000



## 785

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

10

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		APRIL SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Rio Grande June'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1939		1,850,000	J & D	105	Feb. 27, '01	....	....	....
Rio Grande Southern 1st g. 4's. 1940		2,243,000	J & J	83	Apr. 25, '01	84	82½	45,000
" guaranteed.....		2,277,000	.....	93½	Mar. 22, '01	.....	.....	.....
Salt Lake City 1st g. sink fu'd 6's. 1913		297,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Jo. & Gr. Isl. 1st g. 2.342.....1947		3,500,000	J & J	95	Apr. 20, '01	95½	94½	22,000
St. L. & Adirondack Ry. 1st g. 5's. 1906		800,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" 2d g. 6's.....1906		400,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis & San F. 2d 6's. Class A. 1906		530,000	M & N	112½	Feb. 14, '01	.....	.....	.....
" 2d g. 6's. Class B.....1906		2,638,000	M & N	113½	Apr. 25, '01	113½	112½	28,000
" 2d g. 6's. Class C.....1906		2,369,000	M & N	113½	Apr. 25, '01	113½	113½	12,000
" gen. g. 6's.....1931		7,807,000	J & J	133	Apr. 30, '01	133	132	42,000
" gen. g. 5's.....1931		12,222,000	J & J	117½	Apr. 20, '01	118	117½	42,000
" 1st Trust g. 5's.....1937		1,099,000	A & O	102½	Oct. 17, '19	.....	.....	.....
" 1st g. 6's P. C. & O.....1919		1,020,000	F & A	118	May 23, '32	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis & San F. R. R. g. 4's. 1906		6,388,000	J & D	101½	Apr. 23, '01	101½	99½	141,000
" Central div. 1st g. 4's. 1929		1,962,000	A & O	109	Apr. 29, '01	100	99½	25,000
" N. W. div. 1st g. 4's.....1930		1,100,000	A & O	98	Apr. 29, '01	99	97	6,500
" S. W. div. g. 5's.....1947		1,500,000	A & O	100	June 19, '19	.....	.....	.....
Kansas, Midland 1st g. 4's.....1937		1,008,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis S. W. 1st g. 4's Bd. ctfs., 1939		20,000,000	M & N	99½	Apr. 30, '01	100	98½	518,000
" 2d g. 4's Inc. Bd. ctfs., 1939		10,000,000	J & J	83½	Apr. 30, '01	81½	79½	2,957,000
Gray's Point, Term. 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1947		339,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul, Minn. & Manito'a 2d 6's. 1909		7,927,000	A & O	118½	Feb. 20, '01	.....	.....	.....
" 1st con. 6's.....1933		13,344,000	J & J	141½	Apr. 25, '01	141½	140½	10,000
" 1st con. 6's, registered....		20,827,000	J & J	137½	Feb. 23, '99	.....	.....	.....
" 1st c. 6's, red'd to g. 4½'s....		.....	J & J	116½	Apr. 12, '01	116½	116½	1,000
" 1st cons. 6's register'd....		.....	J & J	115½	Apr. 15, '01	116½	116½	30,000
" Dakota ext'n g. 6's.....1910		5,676,000	M & N	120½	Mar. 14, '01	.....	.....	.....
" Mont. ext'n 1st g. 4's.....1937		7,907,000	J & D	106½	Apr. 11, '01	106½	106½	3,000
" registered.....		.....	J & D	104	Jan. 27, '99	.....	.....	.....
Eastern N. Y. Minn. 1st g. 5's. 1906		4,700,000	A & O	107½	Apr. 29, '01	107½	107½	10,000
" registered.....		.....	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Minn. N. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		5,000,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....		.....	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Minneapolis Union 1st g. 6's.....1922		2,150,000	J & J	128	Apr. 4, '19	.....	.....	.....
Montana Cent. 1st 6's Int. gtd. 1937		6,000,000	J & J	136½	Mar. 12, '01	.....	.....	.....
" 1st 6's, registered.....		.....	J & J	115	Apr. 24, '97	.....	.....	.....
" 1st g. g. 5's.....1937		2,700,000	J & J	121	Apr. 22, '01	121	121	1,000
" registered.....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Willmar & Sioux Falls 1st g. 5's. 1938		3,625,000	J & D	120	Apr. 11, '99	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....		.....	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
San Fe Pres. & Phoe. Ry. 1st g. 5's. 1942		4,940,000	M & S	104	Jan. 11, '01	.....	.....	.....
San Fran. & N. Pac. 1st a. f. g. 5's. 1919		3,872,000	J & J	112	June 9, '19	.....	.....	.....
Sav. Florida & Wn. 1st c. g. 6's.....1934		4,056,000	A & O	129½	Jan. 13, '19	.....	.....	.....
" 1st g. 5's.....1934		2,444,000	A & O	112	Mar. 17, '99	.....	.....	.....
" St. John's div. 1st g. 4's. 1934		1,350,000	J & J	94½	Feb. 15, '01	.....	.....	.....
Alabama Midland 1st gtd. g. 5s. 1928		2,800,000	M & N	108½	Feb. 25, '01	.....	.....	.....
Brunsw. & West. 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1938		3,000,000	J & J	87	Jan. 12, '01	.....	.....	.....
Sil. S. Oc. & G. R. R. & Ig. gtd. g. 4's. 1918		1,107,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Seaboard & Roanoke 1st 5's.....1926		2,500,000	J & J	104½	Feb. 5, '98	.....	.....	.....
Carolina Central 1st con. g. 4's. 1949		2,847,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Sodus Bay & Sout'n 1st 5's, gold. 1924		500,000	J & J	105	Sept. 4, '86	.....	.....	.....
Southern Pacific Co.								
" 2-5 year col. trust g. 4½'s. 1905		15,000,000	J & D	103½	Apr. 30, '01	101	100½	222,000
" g. 4's Central Pac. coll. 1949		28,818,500	J & D	94	Apr. 30, '01	94½	91½	2,320,000
" registered.....		.....	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Cent. Pac. 1st refund. gtd. g. 4's. 1949		58,036,500	F & A	100½	Apr. 30, '01	101½	100%	346,000
" registered.....		.....	F & A	99½	June 1, '19	.....	.....	.....
" mtge. gtd. g. 3½'s.....1929		19,488,000	J & D	88½	Apr. 30, '01	89½	88	484,000
" registered.....		.....	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Gal. Harrisb'gh & S. A. 1st g. 6's. 1910		4,756,000	F & A	111	Apr. 24, '01	112½	111	14,000
" 2d g. 7's.....1905		1,000,000	J & D	107½	Feb. 26, '01	.....	.....	.....
" Mex. & P. div. 1st g. 5's. 1931		13,418,000	M & N	106½	Apr. 30, '01	106	105	374,000
Houst. E. & W. Tex. 1st g. 5's. 1933		501,000	M & N	106½	Feb. 26, '01	.....	.....	.....
" 1st gtd. g. 5's.....1933		2,199,000	M & N	104½	July 13, '19	.....	.....	.....
Houst. & T. C. 1st g. 5's Int. gtd. 1937		6,394,000	J & J	111½	Apr. 30, '01	112	111½	18,000
" con. g. 9's Int. gtd. 1912		3,161,000	A & O	111½	Apr. 30, '19	111½	110½	12,000
" gen. g. 4's Int. gtd. 1921		4,287,000	A & O	94	Apr. 9, '01	94	94	1,000

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		APRIL SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Morgan's La & Tex. 1st g 6's....1920		1,494,000	J & J	125	Feb. 28, '01	.....	.....	.....
1st 7's.....1918		5,000,000	A & O	126	Apr. 29, '01	136	136	15,000
N. Y. Tex. & Mex. gtd. 1st g 4's.1912		1,485,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Nth'n Ry of Cal. 1st gtd. g. 6's.1907		3,964,000	J & J	94	Nov. 30, '97	.....	.....	.....
gtd. g. 5's.....1927		4,751,000	A & O	113	Jan. 4, '01	.....	.....	.....
Oreg. & Cal. 1st gtd. g 5's.....1927		19,521,000	J & J	107½	Mar. 23, '01	.....	.....	.....
San Ant. & AranPasstgtdg 4's.1943		18,900,000	J & J	85½	Apr. 30, '01	86½	81½	681,000
Tex. & New Orleans 1st 7's.....1916		1,847,000	F & A	110	Apr. 11, '01	110	110	1,000
Sabine div. 1st g 6's.....1912		2,575,000	M & S	108½	Nov. 17, '97	.....	.....	.....
con. g 5's.....1943		1,620,000	J & J	108½	Apr. 30, '01	109½	107¾	361,000
South'n Pac. of Ariz. 1st g 5's.1908-1910		10,000,000	J & J	111	Apr. 22, '01	111	110½	2,000
of Cal. 1st g 6's ser. A.1906		.....	APR.	108½	Jan. 21, '01	.....	.....	.....
ser. B.1905		30,217,500	OCT.	106½	Apr. 22, '01	106½	106½	5,000
ser. C & D.1906		.....	A & O	111½	Jan. 30, '01	.....	.....	.....
ser. E & F.1902		.....	A & O	114½	Nov. 3, '99	.....	.....	.....
1912		.....	A & O	120	Feb. 15, '01	.....	.....	.....
1st con. gtd. g 5's.1937		6,809,000	M & N	107	Nov. 27, '19	.....	.....	.....
stamped. 1905-1937		20,420,000	.....	109½	Apr. 4, '01	109½	109½	8,000
Austin & Northw'n 1st g 5's.....1941		1,920,000	J & J	106	Apr. 30, '01	106	104½	281,000
So. Pacific Coast 1st gtd. g. 4's.1937		5,500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
of N. Mex. C. 1st g 5's.1911		4,180,000	J & J	110	Apr. 22, '01	110	110	4,000
Gila Val. G. & N'n 1st gtd g 5's.1924		1,514,000	M & N	107	Mar. 4, '01	.....	.....	.....
Southern Railway 1st con. g 5's.1904		33,223,000	J & J	116½	Apr. 30, '01	118	116	389,000
registered.....		.....	J & J	108	Aug. 3, '19	.....	.....	.....
Memph. div. 1st g. 4-4½ 5's.1906		5,983,000	J & J	109	Apr. 24, '01	110½	109	10,000
registered.....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Alabama Central 1st g 5's.....1918		1,000,000	J & J	120	Mar. 25, '01	.....	.....	.....
Atlantic & Danville 1st g. 4's. 1948		3,175,000	J & J	95½	Apr. 25, '01	95½	94½	123,000
Atlantic & Yadkin 1st gtd g 4s.1949		1,500,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Col. & Greenville, 1st g 5's.....1916		2,000,000	J & J	120	Mar. 29, '01	.....	.....	.....
East Tenn., Va. & Ga. div. g 5's.1930		3,108,000	J & J	120	Apr. 28, '01	120½	120	7,000
con. 1st g 5's.....1936		12,770,000	M & S	121	Apr. 23, '01	121	120	89,000
reorg. Hen g 4's.....1938		4,800,000	M & S	114½	Apr. 29, '01	114½	114½	8,000
registered.....		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ga. Pacific Ry. 1st g 5's.....1922		5,660,000	J & J	127	Mar. 21, '01	.....	.....	.....
Knoxville & Ohio, 1st g 6's.....1923		2,000,000	J & J	129	Apr. 11, '01	129	127½	24,000
Rich. & Danville, con. g 6's.....1915		5,597,000	J & J	123	Apr. 30, '01	123½	123	18,000
equip. sink. f'd g 5's.1900		815,000	M & S	101½	July 20, '19	.....	.....	.....
deb. 5's stamped.....1927		3,368,000	A & O	109	Apr. 10, '01	109	109	3,000
Rich. & Mecklenburg 1st g. 4's.1948		15,000	M & S	83	Dec. 10, '19	.....	.....	.....
South Caro'a & Ga. 1st g. 5's.....1919		5,250,000	M & S	108	Feb. 19, '01	.....	.....	.....
Vir. Midland serial ser. A 6's.....1906		600,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
small.....		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
ser. B 6's.....1911		1,900,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
small.....		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
ser. C 6's.....1916		1,100,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
small.....		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
ser. D 4-5's.....1921		950,000	M & S	102	Oct. 13, '99	.....	.....	.....
small.....		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
ser. E 5's.....1926		1,775,000	M & S	109	Jan. 12, '99	.....	.....	.....
small.....		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
ser. F 5's.....1931		1,310,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Virginia Midland gen. 5's.....1936		2,392,000	M & N	115½	Mar. 14, '01	.....	.....	.....
gen. 5's gtd. stamped.1926		2,466,000	M & N	113½	Dec. 14, '19	.....	.....	.....
W. O. & W. 1st cy. gtd. 4's.....1924		1,025,000	F & A	91½	Sept. 14, '99	.....	.....	.....
W. Nor. C. 1st con. g 6's.....1914		2,531,000	J & J	119	Apr. 29, '01	119	119	4,000
Spokane Falls & North. 1st g. 6's.1939		2,812,000	J & J	117	July 25, '19	.....	.....	.....
Staten Isl. Ry. N. Y. 1st gtd. g. 4½ 5's.1943		500,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ter. R. R. Assn. St. Louis 1g 4½ 5's.1939		7,000,000	A & O	116	Mar. 18, '99	.....	.....	.....
1st con. g. 5's.....1904-1944		4,500,000	F & A	115½	Mar. 12, '01	.....	.....	.....
St. L. Mers. big. Ter. gtd g 5's.1930		3,500,000	A & O	115	Mar. 6, '01	.....	.....	.....
Tex. & Pacific, East div. 1st g's. 1905		3,178,000	M & S	104	Feb. 15, '19	.....	.....	.....
fm. Texarkana to Ft. Worth		.....	J & D	119½	Apr. 30, '01	120	119	97,000
1st gold 5's.....2000		21,822,000	MAR.	95	Apr. 30, '01	100	99	25,000
2d gold income, 5's.....2000		937,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Toledo & Ohio Cent. 1st g 5's.....1935		3,000,000	J & J	117	Apr. 11, '01	117	117	20,000
1st M. g 5's West. div.....1935		2,500,000	A & O	115½	Jan. 14, '01	.....	.....	.....
gen. g 5's.....1933		2,000,000	J & D	107½	Apr. 28, '01	107½	106½	9,000
Kanaw & M. 1st g. 4's.1930		2,466,000	A & O	96	Apr. 25, '01	96	97	14,000

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		APRIL SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Toledo, Peoria & W. 1st g 4's....1917		4,400,000	J & D	93½	Apr. 30, '01	93½	93¼	7,000
Tol., St. L. & Wn. prior lien g 3¼'s. 1925		9,000,000	J & J	91½	Apr. 8, '01	91½	91¼	3,000
registered.....			J & J					
50 years g. 4's.....1925		6,500,000	A & O	84½	Apr. 30, '01	84½	82¾	1,078,000
registered.....			A & O					
Toronto, Hamilton & Buff 1st g 4s. 1946		3,280,000	J & D	90½	Apr. 13, '01	90½	98	27,000
Ulster & Delaware 1st c. g 5's....1925		1,852,000	J & D	108	Apr. 12, '01	108	108	1,000
Union Pacific R. R. & 1d g 4s....1947		99,543,000	J & J	105½	Apr. 30, '01	106½	105½	1,204,500
registered.....			J & J	106½	Apr. 30, '01	106½	104	103,000
Oreg. Ry. & Nav. 1st s. f. g. 5's. 1906		547,000	J & J	110	Apr. 25, '01	110	110	2,000
Oreg. R. R. & Nav. Co. con. g 4's. 1946		19,634,000	J & D	105	Apr. 24, '01	105½	104½	114,000
Oreg. Short Line Ry. 1st g. 5's. 1922		13,851,000	F & A	128½	Apr. 25, '01	129	129½	25,000
Oreg. Short Line 1st con. g. 5's. 1946		10,337,000	J & J	117½	Apr. 30, '01	118	119½	73,500
non-cum. inc. A 5's....1946		649,000	SEPT.	106	Jan. 21, '01			
Utah & Northern 1st 7's....1906		4,963,000	J & J	119	Mar. 1, '01			
g. 5's.....1926		1,877,000	J & J	113	Mar. 7, '01			
Wabash R. R. Co., 1st gold 5's....1939		31,664,000	M & N	120½	Apr. 30, '01	120½	119	122,000
2d mortgage gold 5's....1939		14,000,000	F & A	110	Apr. 25, '01	110½	110	50,000
deben. mtg series A....1939		8,500,000	J & J	100½	Apr. 16, '01	103½	100	9,000
series B....1939		25,740,000	J & J	64½	Apr. 30, '01	66½	61½	8,644,000
1st g. 5's Det. & Chi. ex. 1940		3,411,000	J & J	111	Mar. 18, '01			
Des Moines div. 1st g. 4s. 1939		1,800,000	J & J	98	Apr. 26, '01	98	97½	15,000
St. L., Kan. C. & N. St. Chas. B. 1st 6's.....1906		1,000,000	A & O	112	Feb. 25, '01			
Western N. Y. & Penn. 1st g. 5's....1937		10,000,000	J & J	121½	Apr. 25, '01	121½	121½	95,000
gen g. 3-4's.....1943		9,789,000	A & O	99	Apr. 16, '01	100	99½	71,000
inc. 5's.....1943		10,000,000	Nov.	40	Mar. 21, '01			
West Va. Cent'l & Pitts. 1st g. 6's. 1911		3,250,000	J & J	115	Apr. 24, '01	115½	115	31,000
Wheeling & Lake Erie 1st g. 5's. 1926		2,000,000	A & O	116	Mar. 29, '01			
Wheeling div. 1st g. 5's. 1928		894,000	J & J	114½	Mar. 26, '01			
exten. and imp. g. 5's....1930		343,000	F & A	108	Sept. 12, '19			
Wheel. & L. E. RR. 1st con. g. 4's. 1949		10,211,000	M & S	98½	Apr. 30, '01	93½	91	1,284,000
Wisconsin Cen. R'y 1st gen. g. 4s. 1949		24,635,600	J & J	91½	Apr. 30, '01	91½	89½	1,350,000
<b>STREET RAILWAY BONDS.</b>								
Brooklyn Rapid Transit g. 5's....1945		6,625,000	A & O	107	Apr. 24, '01	108	107	32,000
Atl. av. Bkn. Imp. g. 5's. 1934		1,500,000	J & J	110	Jan. 20, '99			
City R. R. 1st c. 5's 1916. 1941		4,373,000	J & J	115	Apr. 17, '01	115	115	8,000
Qu. Co. & Sur. con. gtd. g. 5's.....1941		2,253,000	M & N	105	Apr. 25, '01	106½	105	5,000
Union Elev. 1st. r. 4-5s. 1950		12,860,000	F & A	94	Apr. 30, '01	101½	101	382,000
Kings Co. Elev. R. R. 1st g. 4's. 1949		7,000,000	F & A	94	Apr. 30, '01	95	93	1,062,000
Nassau Electric R. R. gtd. g. 4's. 1951		10,474,000	J & J					
City & Sub. R'y, Balt. 1st g. 5's....1922		2,490,000	J & D	105½	Apr. 17, '95			
Denver Con. T'way Co. 1st g. 5's. 1933		730,000	A & O	97½	June 13, '19			
Denver T'way Co. con. g. 5's....1910		1,219,000	J & J					
Metropol'n Ry Co. 1st g. 6's. 1911		913,000	J & J					
Grand Rapids Ry 1st g. 5's.....1916		2,500,000	J & D					
Louisville Railway Co. 1st c. g. 5's. 1930		4,800,000	J & J	109	Mar. 19, '98			
Market St. Cable Railway 1st 6's. 1913		3,000,000	J & J					
Metro. St. Ry. N. Y. g. col. tr. g. 5's. 1907		12,500,000	F & A	120	Apr. 24, '01	120½	120	50,000
B'way & 7th ave. 1st con. g. 5's. 1943		7,650,000	J & D	121	Apr. 26, '01	121	120½	15,000
registered.....			J & D	119½	Dec. 3, '19			
Columb. & 9th ave. 1st gtd g 5's. 1903		3,000,000	M & S	123½	Apr. 4, '01	123½	123½	2,000
registered.....			M & S					
Lex ave & Pav Fer 1st gtd g 5's. 1903		5,000,000	M & S	123	Apr. 25, '01	123	122	20,000
registered.....			M & S					
Third Ave. R. R. 1st c. gtd. g. 4's. 2000		35,000,000	J & J	104½	Apr. 23, '01	104½	104	30,000
registered.....			J & J					
Met. West Side Elev. Chic. 1st g. 4's. 1938		10,000,000	F & A	101½	Apr. 17, '01	101½	101½	1,000
registered.....			F & A					
Mil. Elec. R. & Light con. 30 yr. g. 5's. 1926		6,500,000	F & A	108	Oct. 27, '99			
Minn. St. R'y (M. L. & M.) 1st con. g. 5's.....1919		4,060,000	J & J	110	Apr. 9, '01	110	110	1,000
St. Paul City Ry. Cable con. g. 5's. 1937		2,480,000	J & J	111½	Jan. 24, '01			
gtd. gold 5's.....1937		1,138,000	J & J	112	Nov. 28, '99			
Third Avenue R'y N. Y. 1st g 5's. 1937		5,000,000	J & J	124	Apr. 30, '01	124	123½	20,000
Union Elevated (Chic.) 1st g. 5's. 1945		4,387,000	A & O	109½	Dec. 14, '99			
West Chic. St. 40 yr. 1st cur. 5's. 1928		3,989,000	M & N					
40 years con. g. 5's....1936		6,031,000	M & N	99	Dec. 28, '97			

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

## MISCELLANEOUS BONDS.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		APRIL SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Adams Express Co. col. tr. g. 4's. 1948		12,000,000	M & S	106	Apr. 29, '01	106	104½	79,500
B'klyn Ferry Co. of N. Y. 1st g. 5's. 1948		6,500,000	F & A	80¼	Apr. 25, '01	91¼	89	146,000
B'klyn W. & W. Co. 1st g. tr. cts. 5's. 1945		17,084,000	F & A	77¾	Apr. 30, '01	77¾	72	85,000
Chic. June. & St'k Y'ds col. g. 5's. 1915		10,000,000	J & J	111	Mar. 7, '01	....	....	.....
Det. Mack. & Mar. Id. gt. 3½ S. A. 1911		3,021,000	A & O	32	Apr. 30, '01	35	31½	340,000
Hackensack Wtr Reorg. 1st g. 5's. 1923		1,000,000	J & J	107¼	June 3, '92	....	....	.....
Hend'n Bdg Co. 1st s'k. f'd g. 6's. 1931		1,681,000	M & S	113	Nov. 14, '90	....	....	.....
Hoboken Land & Imp. g. 5's. .... 1910		1,440,000	M & N	102	Jan. 19, '94	....	....	.....
Iron Steamboat Co. 6's. .... 1901		500,000	J & J	75¼	Dec. 4, '95	....	....	.....
Madison Sq. Garden 1st g. 5's. .... 1919		1,250,000	M & N	102	July 8, '97	....	....	.....
Manh. Beh H. & L. lim. gen. g. 4's. 1940		1,300,000	M & N	55	Aug. 27, '95	....	....	.....
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock 5's. .... 1890-1900 {		2,000,000	J & J	94	May 21, '94	....	....	.....
N. Y. & Ontario Land 1st g 6's. .... 1910		443,000	F & A	90	Oct. 3, '99	....	....	.....
St. Louis Term. Station Cupples. & Property Co. 1st g 4½'s 5-20. 1917		3,000,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	.....
So. Y. Water Co. N. Y. con. g 6's. 1923		478,000	J & J	101	Feb. 19, '97	....	....	.....
Spring Valley W. Wks. 1st 6's. .... 1906		4,975,000	M & S	113¼	Dec. 18, '19	....	....	.....
U. S. Mortgage and Trust Co. Real Estate 1st g col tr. bonds.								
Series D 4½'s. .... 1901-1916		1,000,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
" E 4's. .... 1907-1917		1,000,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	.....
" F 4's. .... 1908-1918		1,000,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	.....
" G 4's. .... 1903-1918		1,000,000	F & A	100	Mar. 15, '19	....	....	.....
" H 4's. .... 1903-1918		1,000,000	M & N	....	....	....	....	.....
" I 4's. .... 1904-1919		1,000,000	F & A	....	....	....	....	.....
" J 4's. .... 1904-1919		1,000,000	M & N	....	....	....	....	.....
Small bonds. ....		....	....	....	....	....	....	.....
Vermont Marble, 1st s. fund 5's. 1910		400,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	.....
<b>BONDS OF MANUFACTURING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS.</b>								
Am. Bicycle Co. sink. fund deb. 5's. 1919		9,000,243	M & S	82	Apr. 25, '01	82	79	316,000
Am. Cotton Oil deb. ext. 4½'s. .... 1915		2,919,000	....	101¼	Mar. 28, '01	....	....	.....
Am. Hide & Lea. Co. 1st s. f. 6's. .... 1919		8,375,000	M & S	95¾	Apr. 30, '01	96¼	95	135,000
Am. Spirit Mfg. Co. 1st g. 6's. .... 1915		1,800,000	M & S	81	Apr. 22, '01	81	78½	20,000
Am. Thread Co. 1st coll. trust 4's. 1919		5,798,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Barney & Smith Car Co. 1st g. 6's. 1942		1,000,000	J & J	105	Jan. 10, '19	....	....	.....
Gramercy Sugar Co., 1st g. 6's. .... 1923		1,400,000	A & O	90¾	Apr. 30, '01	100	90	484,000
Illinois Steel Co. debenture 5's. .... 1910		6,200,000	J & J	99	Jan. 17, '99	....	....	.....
" non. conv. deb. 5's. .... 1910		7,000,000	A & O	100	Apr. 1, '01	100	100	5,000
Internat'l Paper Co. 1st con. g 6's. 1918		9,229,000	F & A	108¼	Apr. 22, '01	109	108¼	127,000
Knick'r'ker Ice Co. (Chic) 1st g 5's. 1928		2,000,000	A & O	93	Aug. 25, '19	....	....	.....
Nat. Starch Mfg. Co., 1st g 6's. .... 1920		3,002,000	J & J	109¼	Apr. 26, '01	109¼	109	2,000
Nat. Starch. Co's fd. deb. g. 5's. .... 1925		3,724,000	J & J	93¾	Apr. 25, '01	93¾	93	21,000
Standard Rope & Twine 1st g. 6's. 1946		2,835,000	F & A	59	Apr. 22, '01	61	59	51,000
" inc. g. 5's. 1946		7,500,000	....	8	Apr. 25, '01	10	8	480,000
U. S. Env. Co. 1st sk. fd. g. 6's. .... 1918		2,000,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
U. S. Leather Co. 6½ g s. fd deb. .... 1915		5,280,000	M & N	114	Apr. 24, '01	115	114	3,000
<b>BONDS OF COAL AND IRON COMPANIES.</b>								
Colo. Coal & Iron 1st con. g. 6's. 1900		2,766,000	F & A	103	Apr. 20, '01	103¾	103	133,000
Colo. C'l & I'n Devel. Co. gtd g. 5's. 1909		700,000	J & J	55	Nov. 2, '19	....	....	.....
" Coupon off. ....		....	....	....	....	....	....	.....
Colo. Fuel Co. gen. g. 6's. .... 1919		1,043,000	M & N	106¼	Feb. 14, '01	....	....	.....
Col. Fuel & Iron Co. gen. sf g 5's. 1943		2,303,000	F & A	103	Apr. 25, '01	103	100	165,000
Grand Riv. Coal & Coke 1st g. 6's. 1919		949,000	A & O	....	....	....	....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

MISCELLANEOUS BONDS—Continued.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		APRIL SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Jefferson & Clearfield Coal & Ir.								
1st g. 5's.....1928	1,777,000	J & D	105½	Oct. 10, '98				
2d g. 5's.....1928	1,400,000	J & D	80	May 4, '97				
Pleasant Valley Coal 1st g. s. f. 5's. 1928	1,213,000	J & J	105	Oct. 24, '19				
Koch & Pitts. Cl. & Ir. Co. pur my 5's. 1946	1,042,000	M & N						
Sun. Creek Coal 1st sk. fund 6's. 1912	879,000	J & D						
Ten. Coal, I. & R. T. d. 1st g. 6's. 1917	1,244,000	A & O	105¼	Apr. 30, '01	105¼	104	25,000	
Blr. div. 1st con. 6's. 1917	3,580,000	J & J	111	Apr. 29, '01	111	108	48,000	
Cab. Coal M. Co. 1st gtd. g. 6's. 1922	1,000,000	J & J	105	Feb. 10, '19				
De Bard. C & I Co. gtd. g. 6's. 1910	2,771,000	F & A	101	Apr. 29, '01	102	100½	3,000	
Wheel L. E. & P. Cl Co. 1st g 5's. 1919	846,000	J & J	82	Jan. 15, '19				
GAS & ELECTRIC LIGHT CO. BONDS.								
Atlanta Gas Light Co. 1st g. 5's. 1947	1,150,000	J & D						
Post. Un. Gas tct cts s'k f'dg. 5's. 1939	7,000,000	J & J	80½	Feb. 20, '01				
B'klyn Union Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's. 1945	14,210,000	M & N	119	Apr. 29, '01	119½	118	26,000	
Columbus Gas Co., 1st g. 5's. 1932	1,215,000	J & J	104½	Jan. 28, '98				
Detroit City Gas Co. g. 5's. 1923	5,808,000	J & J	102¾	Apr. 29, '01	108	101½	126,000	
Detroit Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's. 1918	881,000	F & A	102	Apr. 8, '99	102	102	10,000	
Equitable Gas Light Co. of N. Y.								
1st con. g. 5's. 1932	3,500,000	M & S	104	Feb. 14, '01				
Gas. & Elec. of Bergen Co. c. g. 5's. 1949	1,146,000	J & D	102	Apr. 24, '01	102½	101	52,000	
General Electric Co. deb. g. 5's. 1922	953,000	J & D	185½	Apr. 9, '01	185½	181	8,000	
Grand Rapids G. L. Co. 1st g. 5's. 1915	1,225,000	F & A	107½	Dec. 17, '19				
Kansas City Mo. Gas Co. 1st g. 5's. 1922	3,750,000	A & O						
Kings Co. Elec. L. & Power g. 5's. 1937	2,500,000	A & O						
Edison El. Ill. Bkln 1st con. g. 4's. 1939	5,000,000	J & J	96½	Dec. 4, '19				
Lac. Gas L't Co. of St. L. 1st g. 5's. 1919	10,000,000	Q F	102	Apr. 17, '01	110	108	24,000	
small bonds.....			97½	Nov. 1, '95				
N. Y. Gas EL. H. & P. Colstool tr g 5's. 1948	11,500,000	J & D	115¼	Apr. 26, '01	115¼	114½	74,000	
registered.....		J & D						
purchase my col tr g 4's. 1949	20,389,000	F & A	97½	Apr. 30, '01	97½	96½	248,000	
Edison El. Illu. 1st conv. g. 5's. 1910	4,312,000	M & S	107½	Apr. 19, '01	107½	106½	11,000	
1st con. g. 5's. 1935	2,156,000	J & J	121½	Apr. 23, '01	121½	121½	10,000	
Paterson & Pas. G. & E. con. g. 5's. 1949	3,317,000	M & S						
Peop's Gas & C. Co. C. 1st g. g. 6's. 1904	2,100,000	M & N	107	July 13, '19				
2d gtd. g. 6's. 1904	2,500,000	J & D	104	Mar. 29, '01				
1st con. g. 6's. 1943	4,900,000	A & O	125	Mar. 11, '01				
refunding g. 5's. 1947	2,500,000	M & S	108	Dec. 16, '98				
Chic. Gas Lt & Coke 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1937	10,000,000	J & J	109	Apr. 18, '01	109	108½	2,000	
Con. Gas Co. Chic. 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1936	4,346,000	J & D	107	Mar. 25, '01				
Eq. Gas & Fuel, Chic. 1st gtd. g. 6's. 1905	2,000,000	J & J	104½	Apr. 16, '01	104½	104½	2,000	
Mutual Fuel Gas Co. 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1947	5,000,000	M & N	105	Mar. 29, '01				
registered.....								
Trenton Gas & Electric 1st g. 5's. 1949	1,500,000	M & S	109	Feb. 8, '01				
Utica Elec. L. & P. 1st s. f'd g. 5's. 1950	500,000	J & J						
Western Gas Co. col. tr. g. 5's. 1933	3,905,500	M & N	107½	Jan. 16, '01				
TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CO. BONDS.								
Commercial Cable Co. 1st g. 4's. 2397.	11,387,500	Q & J	102	Jan. 11, '01				
registered.....		Q & J	108¼	Oct. 8, '19				
Total amount of lien, \$20,000,000.								
Erie Telegr. & Tel. col. tr. s. f'd 5's. 1928	3,905,000	J & J	109	Oct. 7, '99				
Metrop. Tel. & Tel. 1st s'k f'd g. 5's. 1918	2,000,000	M & N	108	Feb. 17, '99				
registered.....		M & N						
N. Y. & N. J. Tel. gen. g. 5's. 1920	1,261,000	M & N	112	Nov. 27, '95				
Western Union col. tr. cur. 6's. 1933	8,502,000	J & J	114	Apr. 25, '01	114½	114	25,000	
fundg. & real estate g. 4½'s. 1950	10,000,000	M & N	109	Apr. 1, '01	109	109	5,000	
Mutual Union Tel. s. fd. 6's. 1911	1,987,000	M & N	114	Apr. 30, '01	114	114	2,000	
Northwestern Telegraph 7's. 1904	1,250,000	J & J						

## UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	YEAR 1901.		APRIL SALES.		
				High.	Low.	High.	Low.	Total.
United States con. 2's registered...1980			Q J	108½	106½	108½	108	9,000
" con. 2's coupon.....1980			Q J	106½	106½	106½	106½	51,700
" con. 2's reg. small bonds.1980		445,940,750	Q J					
" con. 2's coupon small bds.1980			Q J	105½	105½			
" 3's registered.....1908-18			Q F	111½	109½			
" 3's coupon.....1908-18		99,912,940	Q F	112	110	112	111½	88,500
" 3's small bonds reg.....1908-18			Q F					
" 3's small bonds coupon.1908-18			Q F	112	110	111	111	4,000
" 4's registered.....1907		270,350,350	J A J&O	114½	113	113½	113½	24,500
" 4's coupon.....1907			J A J&O	115	113½	114	114	20,000
" 4's registered.....1925		162,315,400	Q F	138	137½			
" 4's coupon.....1925			Q F	139½	137½	139½	138½	82,000
" 5's registered.....1904		22,938,400	Q F	111½	111½			
" 5's coupon.....1904			Q F	113½	110½	112½	111½	34,000
District of Columbia 3-65's.....1924		14,224,100	F & A	125	125	125	125	1,000
" small bonds.....			F & A					
" registered.....			F & A					
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.								
Quebec 5's.....1908		3,000,000	M & N					
U. S. of Mexico External Gold Loan of 1899 sinking fund 5's			Q J	96	96	96	96	15,000
Regular delivery in denominations of £100 and £200.....		£22,555,720						
Small bonds denominations of £20.....								
Large bonds denominations of £500 and £1,000.....								

## BANKERS' OBITUARY RECORD.

**Adams.**—John Adams, who was at one time Cashier of the Indiana State Bank, Jeffersonville, Ind., and later Cashier and President of its successor, the Citizens' National Bank, died March 30. He was born in Ireland seventy-five years ago.

**Allen.**—C. W. Allen, Cashier of the Oklahoma (Okla.) City Savings Bank, died April 6.

**Bailey.**—Joseph G. Bailey, President of the Dyersville (Ioa.) German State Bank, and Vice-President of the Dubuque National Bank, died April 9.

**Blakeslee.**—James I. Blakeslee, President of the Linderman National Bank, Mauch Chunk, Pa., and prominently associated in several railway enterprises, died March 31, in his eighty-seventh year.

**Bullard.**—Daniel A. Bullard, founder, and principal owner of the Schuylerville (N. Y.) Paper Co., and President of the National Bank of Schuylerville, died April 8.

**Coppell.**—George Coppell, senior member of the firm of Maitland, Coppell & Co., New York city, died April 19. Mr. Coppell was born in England sixty-four years ago, but came to this country at an early age. Thirty years ago he became connected with the firm of Maitland, Phelps & Co., one of the oldest houses in Wall Street. In 1836 Mr. Coppell became senior member, and some years later the style was changed to Maitland, Coppell & Co. Mr. Coppell was prominently identified with railway management and reorganization and was a director in numerous railway companies and other corporations.

**Downs.**—John Downs, President of the State Exchange Bank, Holley, N. Y., and a successful merchant of that place, died April 4, aged fifty-five years.

**Fosdick.**—Hiram Fosdick, until recently Cashier of the Salamanca (N. Y.) National Bank, died March 30.

**Foster.**—J. Barclay Foster, Cashier of the National Phenix Bank, Westerly, R. I., and also Treasurer of the Mechanics' Savings Bank, died April 7. He was born at Westerly in 1841, and in early life entered the bank of which his father was Cashier, and in 1863 succeeded him. He became Treasurer of the Mechanics' Savings Bank in 1882.

**Hardin.**—Geo. A. Hardin, President of the National Herkimer County Bank, Little Falls, N. Y., died April 16, aged sixty-nine years. He had represented the Herkimer-Otsego dis-

trict in the State Senate, and in 1894 was appointed presiding justice of a department of the supreme court, holding that office till his retirement from the bench in 1899.

**Heard.**—Wm. A. Heard, formerly National Bank Examiner for Maine and New Hampshire, and later Receiver of the National Bank of the Commonwealth, Manchester, N. H., died April 15.

**Hipsley.**—Enoch G. Hipsley, President of the Old Town Bank, Baltimore, Md., and one of the city's old and well-known merchants, died April 26, aged about eighty years.

**Lamb.**—Artemus Lamb, President of the People's Trust and Savings Bank, Clinton, Ia., and President of the Lumbermen's Bank, Shell Lake, Wis., died April 24. He was not only a successful banker but was identified with many other important enterprises.

**Lamb.**—Orlando J. Lamb, Vice-President of the Chelsea Savings Bank, Norwich, Ct., died March 13, aged twenty-five years.

**Marshall.**—Wm. Clark Marshall, Cashier of the Sixth National Bank, Philadelphia, died April 2, at the age of seventy. He first obtained a position with the Southwark National Bank, and was afterwards paying teller of the Corn Exchange National Bank. About thirty years ago he became paying teller of the Sixth National, and about five years ago was appointed Cashier.

**Marvin.**—Hon. James M. Marvin, who represented the Saratoga district in the Thirty-eighth, Thirty-ninth and Fortieth Congresses, died April 26, at the age of ninety-two. He was President of the First National Bank, of Saratoga Springs, N. Y., at the time of his death.

**McFadden.**—D. M. McFadden, Cashier of the Taylor & McGowen Bank, Bloomfield, Ia., died April 23. He was born in Ohio in 1847, and removed to Iowa in 1855. In 1884 he was elected county treasurer and held the office for eight years.

**Moffitt.**—M. W. Moffitt, President of the First National Bank, Kane, Pa., died April 21, aged seventy years.

**Moody.**—Volney D. Moody, formerly President of the First National Bank, Oakland, Cal., died March 27.

**Mygatt.**—Hon. Andrew B. Mygatt, for twenty-three years President of the First National Bank, New Milford, Ct., died March 30, aged eighty years. He was born at New Milford, had always resided there, and was long a leader in religious affairs, in business and in politics. In 1861 he was appointed State Bank Commissioner, and in 1865 was appointed National Bank Examiner for Rhode Island and Connecticut, serving in that capacity for twenty-two years, resigning in 1887, after which time he gave his attention to the bank, of which he had been chosen President in 1878.

**Newcomer.**—Benjamin F. Newcomer, President of the Safe Deposit and Trust Co., of Baltimore, Md., and a director of several banks, died March 29. He was largely interested in railway and shipping enterprises, and was one of the wealthiest men in Baltimore.

**Pease.**—Robert L. Pease, an old and respected citizen of Atchison, Kans., and Vice-President of the Exchange National Bank of that city, died March 28. Before the building of the railway to the Pacific Coast he was in charge of the Overland express line, running stages from Atchison to California.

**Reed.**—Lathrop E. Reed, formerly President of the Capital Bank, St. Paul, Minn., died April 5.

**Shirk.**—E. H. Shirk, part owner and Cashier of the Tipton County Bank, Tipton, Ind., for twenty-three years, died April 12.

**Suhr.**—John J. Suhr, President of the German-American Bank, Madison, Wis., died April 11. Mr. Suhr was born in Germany sixty-three years ago, and had lived at Madison since he was seven years of age. He opened the German-American Bank in 1871.

**Walcott.**—Charles H. Walcott, a well-known lawyer of Concord, Mass., and President of the Middlesex Institution for Savings, died recently. He was born November 13, 1848. In 1886 he was appointed a member of the State Board of Arbitration, and in 1889 was made chairman, continuing to serve in that capacity until last year.

**Whitney.**—George Whitney, President of the National Union Bank, Boston, for nineteen years, died April 29. As a member of the firm of Whitney Bros., he was for some time engaged in the East Indian trade, and later became President of the North National Bank, and afterwards President of the National Union Bank.







*Atlantic Building, Corner Wall  
and William Streets, New York.*

HOME OF ATLANTIC TRUST COMPANY.

# BANKERS' MONTHLY

RHEGLES JOURNAL OF BANKING and THE BANKERS 7.

FIFTY-FIFTH YEAR.

JUNE, 1901.

**T**HE FINANCIAL SOCIETY of the approach of winter were sent out, some to Wall Street, but they predicted it do not, although there were much talk of it. The wild speculation was at its height, and was followed through the blind overconfidence of the speculators as the consequence of a quarrel between the directors of the control of a line of railroad. The society was divided into protectors and friends of the company, and the interest by which they were connected was the same as themselves in mutual antagonism. The society was divided in the barbaric and primitive manner.

Of late the beneficent effect of the war on the understandings among those who are not yet harped on ; but it appears that the same old spirits are yet possible. I am sure that the magnates of the money market are not the margined speculator. The latter frequently follows these overvalued securities to the shrinkage of values and a consequent loss of the giants of the market. The stability of the markets need not be prevented if possible, but it is not to show signs of weakness. The market has over the period of discussion shown many instances of combination and manipulation in the foundations of the new market. But in the course whose greatest interests are at stake the market engaged in a struggle.



*Atlantic Trust Company Building  
600 Broadway Street, New York*

HOME OF ATLANTIC TRUST COMPANY.

# THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE

*RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING and THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE Consolidated.*

---

FIFTY-FIFTH YEAR.

JUNE, 1901.

VOLUME LXII, No. 6.

---

THE FINANCIAL STORM, of the approach of which many warnings were sent out, came to Wall Street, but the prophets who predicted it do not, after all, deserve much credit for their foresight. The wild speculation culminating in panic did not manifest itself through the blind over-confidence of the public, but was the direct consequence of a quarrel between two sets of capitalists for the control of a line of railroad. The men who had been looked upon as protectors and friends of the public because of the enlightened self-interest by which they were presumed to be influenced, arrayed themselves in mutual antagonism, and made a display, unequalled even in the barbaric and primitive days when JIM FISK was in his glory.

Of late the beneficent effect of combinations and mutual good understandings among those who control great capital has been much harped on ; but it appears that serious discords among the ruling spirits are yet possible. Panics and financial crises are not pleasant to the magnates of the money market, any more than to the narrow-margined speculator. The general depression of business which frequently follows these overtures and explosions causes an unpleasant shrinkage of values and a cessation of enterprise. It is to the interest of the giants of finance to preserve as far as possible a condition of the markets nearly approaching equilibrium. Great failures must be prevented if possible. Enterprises of critical importance that seem to show signs of weakness must be bolstered up and carried safely over the period of difficulty. The last decade has witnessed several instances of combinations to prevent failures that would shake the foundations of the market were they permitted to take their natural course. But in the case of the Northern Pacific corner, the men whose greatest interest would seem to be to have peace in the market engaged in a struggle in which policy and reason seem to have

been dispensed with and human nature exhibited itself uninfluenced by modern financial culture.

It has been said that if you scratch the professor you find the Tartar, and it seems that when the modern suave financial magnate, brimful of plans for the public benefit, is touched on the quick, in a contest for supremacy, he is apt to act very much as JIM FISK did in a more primitive time.

But it must be said that after a display of passion and power that shook the whole financial fabric, and disturbed all the haunters of the money market and its purlieus, reason asserted itself at length and that, in a shame-faced way, those who caused the mischief set out to repair damages, as far as this could be done.

The general business of the country did not suffer from the struggle of the giants in Wall Street any more than the ocean at large is ruffled or agitated by the sports or combats of a school of whales, although the smaller fish who happened to be in the vicinity or were attracted by the commotion might imagine that a great storm was happening.

The men who control the world of business, who are at the head of the great combinations of capital that are now so much in evidence, are not easily ruffled. They are so accustomed to the great game that seldom goes against them that they can smile the inscrutable smile of Buddha, at all ordinary provocations of existence. An occasional break-out, like the Northern Pacific corner, shows that there are points of resemblance; that these representatives of financial power are still like unto other men. Given a dangerous interference of the orbits in which they revolve, and the temptation to quarrel is as great as it is when lesser men become rivals.

It is to be hoped that this exhibition is one that will teach its lessons to those who caused it, and that the losses which must have been incurred, and the imperfect conclusion reached, will prevent the recurrence of such crude rough-and-tumble methods of settling difficulties. As far as the public is concerned, there is very little moral to be drawn from the incident. It is useless to say don't speculate, because people always will speculate. Those who make their living around the exchanges will always be dragged in when the great controllers of capital quarrel. They are innocent spectators, but even less safe for that very reason.

---

THE MODERN STRIKE is an institution which seems to upset all the calculations of old-time economists. Since the days of slavery there never has been much doubt of the right of a man to refuse to work. If he did so, he was left to the natural punishment that overtakes those who rebel against earning their daily bread by the sweat

of their brows. The school of economists who advocate the let-alone policy insist that everything would be regulated by supply and demand. If the demand for labor was great, the price would be raised and attract more laborers. If the supply of labor was greater than the demand, wages would regulate themselves accordingly. All this is undoubtedly as generally true to-day as it ever was, but only within very large limits. Within these limits there seems to be room for all kinds of irregularity.

Combinations of capital interfere with the free play of the laws of supply and demand which govern under competition, and combinations of labor are not only stronger than the unwritten laws of supply and demand, but they often seem to be stronger than the laws of the land. Where business is carried on by great corporations of any kind there are fewer fluctuations from the dullness of hard times to the activity of prosperity. Consequently the rate of profits and of wages is more uniform. A corporation that is not making money is apt to endeavor to increase its profits by reducing wages, although it is coming to be a belief among the managers that all other possible economies should be resorted to before wages are touched. On the other hand when a corporation is making money, it is correspondingly slow in raising the rate of wages, to meet the ideas of their employees who desire to share in the general prosperity. This seems to be the explanation of the epidemic of strikes which has recently broken out all over the country. For months past the newspapers have been full of the growth of the wealth, and of the prosperity which seemed to prevail in every business. According to the politicians this prosperity is largely due to the votes of the majority of the people at the last national election. The majority of voters are wage-earners. Prosperity has come, but the only way they can partake of it is by the raising of wages. Otherwise they would be worse off than before, because prosperity has caused a perceptible increase in the cost of living. If it be true that the claims of the great improvement in all sorts of business are well founded, then it was but just that wages should be raised and that labor as well as capital should have a share of the good things.

The recent strike in Albany and vicinity is a case in point. From all that appears the corporations seemed to think that some rise in wages would be expected by their employees who were chiefly members of a union. Apparently to stave this demand off, the corporation began to employ men outside the union, as if to show that the supply of labor was at least sufficient. The union employees made their demand for higher wages and at the same time for the discharge of the non-union men. The one demand was apparently just and the latter unjust, but probably the injustice of this last demand was pal-

liated by the belief that the employment of non-union men was a pretense to prevent the consideration of a just demand for higher wages. The corporations and the labor unions locked horns, and a strike was the result.

Every one knows by this time, notwithstanding the supposed natural right of employers to hire whom they choose or discharge whom they choose, that a corporation employing large numbers of men has practically no such right. If the labor market is well supplied, and two men offer to hire in place of every striker, the corporation exercises its alleged natural right at its peril. There is an *esprit de corps* among the strikers turned out in a body which will not permit them to stand quietly by and see their places taken by strangers. Violence is resorted to and the running of cars prevented. If cars are run under the guard of soldiers, no one likes to risk riding on them, so that as a matter of business they might as well not be run at all. After a few days of turmoil and rioting until each party begins to reflect on the money he or they is losing, a compromise is reached.

It seems impossible to discover any remedy for this evil except arbitration and arbitration is very uncertain and unsatisfactory. Suppose the case in Albany had been brought before the full bench of the Court of Appeals, the highest court of the State, and the court had decided, as it might have done, against the strikers. Suppose the militia had been called out to enforce the judgment, as it probably would have been, arbitration would not have bettered the situation but rather made it worse in that it would have been more difficult to effect a compromise.

It is becoming evident that in the United States, where votes control, the employers of large bodies of men, who by organization become a disciplined and united force, cannot look for much actual protection from the laws of the land. Even military force furnished freely by the State does not accomplish the end. While the strike is on, whether soldiers protect the cars or not, the public either from sympathy or fear is precluded from riding on them. Money is lost on both sides and the public is sorely inconvenienced. Public opinion is above the law and in many cases does not warrant the enforcement of law and order by the extreme measures which would be necessary to support the natural right of employers to hire or discharge whom they please.

The attitude of great corporations towards their employees must necessarily be influenced by the knowledge that the law cannot be enforced to any advantage. The agreement between these corporations will depend more and more on nicely adjusted compromises, which can not be enforced any longer than both parties are willing.



THE VALUE OF EDUCATION is universally admitted, but there is still much difference of opinion as to the value of certain kinds of education. There seem to be two forces at work in the business world, one of them in favor of greater opportunities for the education of the body of employees from whom the leaders of the industrial army must be finally drawn, and the other opposed to this movement. Probably both sides agree as to the desirability of as much practical education as possible. The educational party, however, believe more in the desirability of what may be called theoretical or book knowledge to supplement the teachings of practical experience.

At bottom all methods of education are one and the same thing. Every man learns either by his own experience or the experience of others. When he learns by his own experience we call it practical. When he learns by watching the work of others, and fixes the knowledge by immediate application, it is still practical. When he learns by reading in books the record of the experience of others, the knowledge thus acquired is called theoretical. But this theoretical knowledge becomes practical when the learner personally applies it.

The man who learns from others only as he sees them at work has no doubt an immediate advantage in the understanding of the tools or machinery used, but he is apt to be weak on the underlying principles which produce the tools and machinery. On the other hand the man who secures his knowledge from books has the advantage of a much wider experience of the ideas of others, but it may be impossible for him to have at hand the apparatus to apply it. To make his knowledge more useful, he is obliged to learn principles which are a sort of universal key to such apparatus as he may encounter. Every trade or business or profession which requires for its fullest development personal dexterity of body or mind is something of a mystery. A man may know exactly how a juggler performs his feats and yet he cannot imitate them without a long apprenticeship. So it is with all work done by man. The one who has acquired mental or bodily dexterity cannot impart it directly; only by showing by word of mouth or by example can he lay out the path in which the neophyte must exercise his own faculties and muscles.

The ambitious man who has acquired what may be called the technique of a trade or business, however practically—that is, apart from books—he may have acquired it, sees more quickly than others the value of theoretical knowledge. He finds that it is only by rising to a higher plane in the knowledge of principles, not only of a particular business or trade, but of life generally, the greater the chance of rising to a real superiority acknowledged by his fellows.

This knowledge of the philosophy of life, and the habitual and proper application of it, constitute what is known as conduct, and

result in the formation of character. It was this that was meant when the study of what are called the humanities was insisted upon. This idea is the basis of what is known as a college education. The college education is usually cited as the type of the purely theoretical education, and yet in the rules that guide the formation of character it is most practical. The successful practical business man who has risen without the education of the schools is often heard to lament the lack of opportunity in his early life to secure the ideas of dealing with his fellow men, which he has acquired more tardily by actual personal experience. In the case of an individual it is impossible to tell whether he would have been better off had his experience or opportunities been different. There are so many circumstances differing in each case that no comparison can be made between the results of individual lives. On the other hand it is almost equally difficult to determine the particular value of each kind of education by the comparison of classes of men.

Successful examples and dismal failures can be pointed out under all systems of education.

The tendency of modern life is to the greatest possible speed in the preparation for life's actual duties. It is this haste in preparation that increases the tendency to taking up special studies to the exclusion of others. The increase of technical schools and of special courses in colleges and universities are an evidence of this fact. There is no doubt that the intense application of all the faculties of body and mind on one or two points makes men very skillful in the specialties selected; but this also tends to diminish the faculty for the wider humanities. It tends to lessen the number of individuals who are fitted to guide and lead the race.

Taking the college-bred man as the type of the wider training of all the faculties, there is no doubt that when he comes in contact with those who have had a purely practical training he is at a disadvantage. This disadvantage arises from a natural jealousy of one who comes as it were by a side-path and not through the straight and narrow way of a special training. This jealousy when a college-bred man seeks to enter a business outside of the professions which are recognized as legitimately open to him, is fostered by a secret feeling of a possible superiority—mysterious and impalpable—which the practically trained man does not know how to deal with. He dreads the condescension and patronage of the college-bred man, although it would be difficult to prove that any such thing existed. Although there are no recognized castes in the United States, yet the difference between educated and uneducated men in business is in reality one of caste. The successful practical man often stands in awe of the college-bred man, who may be inferior to him in every particular, just

because he imagines the college education has given some occult ideas which the practical man does not comprehend.

This feeling of antagonism to college men who enter trade and business, on the part of those who are self-educated, is much less than it once was. The growth of educational facilities for those in business and trade has given an opportunity to almost every one to acquire at least a superficial knowledge of what is usually taught in the colleges. The university extension lectures and institutions like Chautauqua have done much to dispel the mystery as to the kind of studies pursued in college. Political life, too, is a great educator in the art of dealing with other men. But as business has grown in its proportions, as the corporation and trust have succeeded the private firm, the enlarged scope of business requires a wider theoretical knowledge even among so-called practical men. The organization of a large business requires men at numerous important points who must have character and judgment as well as technique. All kinds of business are recognizing the value of a higher and more general knowledge of the kind that forms character in their employees. The American Bankers' Association has recognized the value of the education of those who work in banks. It is not only the knowledge acquired, it is the exercise of mind and will in acquiring that knowledge that makes the man more valuable. It raises his plane of thought above the frivolities that tend to dissipation and relieves the strain from the too intense pursuit of a specialized business.

---

THE INDEPENDENT TREASURY SYSTEM of the United States is at last attracting the attention of the newspapers, and the discussion of the subject once started cannot fail to enlighten the minds of the business men of the country as to the disadvantage that they periodically suffer from the maintenance of so antiquated a system of dealing with the immense revenues of the Government.

For years THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE, supported by the best financial authorities, has pointed out the independent Treasury as the great source of the periodical financial irregularity which causes temporary and unforeseen squeezes in the money market, which may and frequently do seriously affect every kind of business throughout the land. The squeezes are like the ill wind which, while it blights the generality of people, blows some advantage to the few. There is no doubt that many speculators count on the recurrence of these disturbances in the monetary circulation and base their schemes for profit upon them. From these it must be expected will come opposition to propositions for the adoption of a more modern and scientific system. No doubt, as is always the case, opposition will come from the bureaucracy which

has been established so many years and to which is entrusted the execution of the independent Treasury law. Mr. KNOX in his History of Banking refers to the effect of the Treasury bureaus in maintaining the existence of the legal-tender note. In all countries and under all governments old abuses receive the principal part of the support necessary to their maintenance from the officials and clerks whose occupation would be gone were the defective system abolished. Under our form of government, when any change of system is advocated in Congress, the Representatives and Senators go to the departments for information and for a supply of argument. The keepers of the archives are always well supplied with precedents and arguments against any innovation. Any important change of law at once threatens the importance of some Government office, and that of the officials it contains.

The MAGAZINE has pointed out frequently before, that although the establishment of the gold standard was of paramount importance, that this alone would not perfect the monetary system of the country and enable money to circulate without periodical obstruction. It has stated over and over again, that until the Government deposited its money with the banks, as business men do, instead of hoarding it in the independent Treasury, there could be no cessation of sudden changes in the quantity of money available for business. Of course, the opinion of one periodical can only slightly affect the minds of the general public, but when an important matter of reform is taken up by the daily papers there is great encouragement that some result may be accomplished.

The light that has lately dawned on the politicians that party success or failure in ordinary times depends upon the degree of industrial contentment, and that this in turn depends largely upon monetary conditions, will make them more than willing to substitute some plan that will equalize the flow of money and at the same time increase the convenience of Government receipts and expenditures.

As to what shall be substituted for the independent Treasury, every one at once thinks of a great Bank with branches similar in organization to the old Bank of the United States. It is believed, however, that the day of great banks specially chartered for the service of the State is passed. When ordinary banks were weak or non-existent it was necessary for the Government to institute the machinery it needed. In some countries it is perhaps still necessary. The independent Treasury system itself was adopted by Congress because there were no very large and strong banks then in the country, and because political antagonisms prevented the charter of a special bank to handle Government funds. But for over half a century the banks of the country have grown stronger and stronger on

the anti-monopoly system. This increase of strength has been due to the increase of private business. The banks to-day keep and pay out as required the money of corporations and trusts whose receipts and payments are little short of those of ordinary governments. These banks, while nominally independent of each other, are virtually pledged to each other in the strongest bonds of mutual protection. They hold with safety private deposits far surpassing the usual funds of the Government. There is no reason why the existing banks or such of them as may conform to necessary regulations should not do the Government business as well as any single bank, and with advantages for the distribution of funds which no single bank could possess. It would be better to try the system which has grown up in response to American ideas, and has been strengthened by expedients approved by experience, than to revert to that time-rusted and antiquated piece of machinery, a Bank of the United States.

---

THE CONSOLIDATION OF RAILROADS is one of the most important signs of progress in the United States. The late contest for the control of territory furnished with transportation by the great trans-continental lines is a repetition of what has been going on from time to time in the East. When the lines to the Pacific coast were first put through they were obliged to rely chiefly on the through traffic. As the settlement of the country progressed the main lines began to interfere with each other and the evils of competition gradually became oppressive, and the processes of consolidation of interests similar to those in the Eastern half of the territory of the United States are now commencing in the Western. When this process commenced in the East it was a new one. There were no special statutes to control the methods adopted, and many of the proceedings indulged in by those who sought control of different lines were apparently above and beyond the control of law. While statutes have since been made which are supposed to restrain operations of this kind and to protect the rights of investors, the struggle for supremacy among great corporations often involves actions which seem to be incompatible with the safety of individual rights.

These convulsions of great power which seem so dangerous to ordinary surroundings are somewhat like the great convulsions of nature which, destructive as they sometimes are, have after all a certain utility. When the transportation of an extensive territory is under one management the benefits of the aggregate service to the public are no doubt better averaged and distributed. A great combination of railroads having exclusive control within a given territory can afford to take the risk of extending transportation facilities into

parts of that territory that would not warrant as yet the building of an independent line. Thus the resources of the whole territory are more equally developed. There may often be discriminations in rates that appear unfair to some of the better developed portions. But these may be only temporary and be compensated for in the end by the broader extent of resource opened for exploitation. The apparent evils of great consolidations are no doubt necessary concomitants of the improvement of the whole territory involved.

The process of railroad consolidation west of the Mississippi has apparently just begun. The struggle for the division of territory will not very likely be settled during the next decade. It may possibly result in the union of all railroad interests in that section under one general management. This would be an immense combination, but nothing seems too large to be undertaken in the beginning of this new century. What is more probable, however, is that the country will eventually be divided into several zones or belts, within which one railroad management will be supreme. The struggle which recently convulsed Wall Street was not, however, on such a line, but was rather an attempt to confuse two zones within each of which one of the contending parties has hitherto had virtual control. Therefore it does not seem that this contest has settled anything permanently, but that it will continue, until either the whole territory west of the Mississippi is under one control, or until a *modus vivendi* is arrived at by means of which the separate continental lines will mutually agree to refrain from competition within the natural zone of the others. This contest may perhaps not be waged hereafter with the reckless violence recently manifested. Each has in this realized the strength of the other. It will be a field more fitted for arts of diplomacy such as settle the differences between great governments that are afraid to test each other's full strength, knowing that such a test may mean destruction to one if not both of the contestants. Corporations and nations may like individuals become too corpulent to risk actual fighting to a finish.

---

RECENT CURRENCY LEGISLATION in the United States, was the subject of a paper read before the London Institute of Bankers by DAVID MARSHALL MASON, an associate of the Institute. This paper (which will be found in the May number of the MAGAZINE) was prepared by Mr. MASON after careful personal investigation of the subject when on a recent visit to this country. He acknowledges his indebtedness to the President, Mr. GAGE and other high officials for the facility afforded him in obtaining information.

One is struck with the care with which this paper has been prepared, how it covers all important points, and notwithstanding its

thoroughness, with its conciseness, considering the complications of the subject.

He mentions that among the various schemes of banking and currency reform which have been put forward it has been advocated by some bankers that what is required to give stability to the currency is a central bank or institution similar to the Bank of England. Strange to say Mr. MASON does not think such an institution would do at all in the United States. He says: "If such a system were attempted I cannot but think it would prove unresponsive to the requirements of that country and would inevitably lead to disaster," and gives his reasons for saying so. In this opinion he agrees with the views on this subject hitherto expressed in this MAGAZINE.

Mr. MASON recognizes generally the peculiar conditions surrounding banking in the United States, although in recommending to Congress the Scotch system of banking he does not seem to be aware that in the early day what was virtually the Scotch system was tried and abandoned in many of the States, not because of serious defects, but because of the unpopularity of special charters. However, it would not be impossible to graft some of the best features of the Scotch system on the National banks.

The independent Treasury comes in for its share of adverse criticism both in the paper itself and in the discussion of it. In fact Mr. MASON's paper gave to the members of the London Institute of Bankers a wonderfully lucid and intelligent account of the currency situation in the United States. The suggestions for improvement are made with great courtesy and they are generally in accord with the proposals of those who have made the most careful study of the subject in this country. There does not, however, seem to be any great chance of any immediate or radical change in the method of issuing National bank notes, until the Government legal-tender notes and other Government currency are placed on the road to retirement. As long as these notes are in circulation there is not room enough for the National bank note.

If the revenues of the United States are sufficient to retire a considerable portion of the debt within the next few years, the premium on bonds will probably again cause the retirement of bank circulation to an uncomfortable extent, and if so a demand for a freer bank note may make itself effectually heard. But Congress could continue the present secured circulation some time longer by allowing issues on premium or market value of the bonds. This expedient will probably be tried before security circulation is altogether abandoned.

Some of the remarks made in the discussion of Mr. MASON's paper by Mr. A. H. HARVEY, on bimetallism in America, were striking. He said: "I do not think you have heard the last of bimetallism in

America. You never hear of bimetallism when times are prosperous. Bimetallism always comes to the front when there is a loss of credit or a recrudescence of commercial depression." There is no doubt that with the return of hard times, which we hope may be long averted, there would be a renewal of fallacious financial projects.

Such a paper as Mr. MASON's gives a hint of what might be prepared to increase the interest of the conventions of the American Bankers' Association. Many of our bankers go abroad. It would be well for some of them to investigate the financial systems of the countries they visit and prepare to enlighten the delegates as Mr. MASON has enlightened his associates in the London Institute of Bankers.

---

THE STOCKS OF GOLD held by the great commercial nations as reserves were never so great as they are to-day. They are the visible margins put up for the security of international trade. At the same time the use of gold as actual money in circulation among the people grows less and less. For all sums above those required for change, the convenience of paper money is recognized. This recognition of paper money rests on a different basis than it assumed shortly after its first introduction. The goldsmiths of England and their customers, when receipts for deposits of gold first began to be used as money, understood perfectly that the paper was only a representative of value. It remained for JOHN LAW and promoters of his type, either innocently or with design, to vitiate the originally clear ideas of the public and to inculcate the confusion resulting from the plausible suggestion that government by decree could give value to paper as it did to coin by placing the stamp of the sovereign upon it. The belief in the divinity of sovereigns was something of a reality in those days, and naturally helped on the notion that something could be made out of nothing. Government paper money was thoroughly tried, disasters followed, but these did not destroy the vitality of the fallacy of the power of the government fiat. Comparatively exploded in England and France, it was taken up in their colonies. Nowhere did the idea of the value of paper money issued by government take so strong a hold as in this country before the Revolutionary War. But experience with Continental notes once more seemed to scotch the idea, and the country came out of the Revolution well content to let such experiments alone. France, driven by necessity, encountered a recrudescence of the idea during its revolution, but Napoleon on his accession to power made short work of it. In the Civil War the United States, as well as the opposing Confederacy, again yielded to the supposed necessity, but rather to the easy device of resorting to the printing press for money to meet expenses. The phenomenal



resources of the North enabled it to struggle back to a solid financial basis, and by success to vindicate an erroneous idea to such an extent that a large share of her citizens became imbued with confidence in the possibility of fiat money. They had before them, too, the example of the Confederacy and the utter collapse into worthlessness of its fiat money. But they reasoned that there would have been a different outcome had the Confederacy been successful, and pointed out that interest-bearing bonds met no better fate than fiat money. It only proved that the fiat of a government having resources was stronger than that of a government whose resources were exhausted. It would probably have made no difference if there had been a different result in the contest. If the South had conquered the right to be set off by itself as a separate nation, the bills with which it carried on the war would probably have been permitted to die in the hands of a patriotic people as did the Continental money of the Revolutionary War.

It is hard to decide whether the upholding of the legal-tender notes by the resources and credit of the North was really a blessing or not. If they too had expired without redemption as did the Confederate money, and been looked on as simply a patriotic contribution to the cost of the war, a better monetary system might now be flourishing. It will probably not be disputed that the successful appreciation of the greenbacks after the war, until gold redemptions, is the greatest argument that ever appeared to bolster up the cause of fiat money and other financial heresies.

On the other hand the question would probably never have been threshed out with the thoroughness it has been. The cause of fiat money, both real and disguised, has been as ably represented in court as it possibly could be. It has had the fairest kind of a hearing and its cause has been lost. The trial, it may be said, has been an expensive and tedious one, but it has been conclusive and is probably worth all it cost.

The preference for paper money to-day rests on an entirely different basis. Whether formulated or not it is felt by every one that the value of a paper note rests on the fact that it is a document representing a fixed share of property of some kind deposited in a known place, or of property the titles to which are so deposited. It is known that apart from this it has no intrinsic value. This definition may not at first sight apply to a Government note, because the security for the note consists of the Government revenues and accumulated treasure. The revenues, however, represent a part of the property of the country, and though a more vague security are yet practically, as long as a Government lasts, equally sound as far as security is concerned. Satisfied that there is something represented by the note, it becomes a

title, as far as it goes, that can be passed from hand to hand and carried about with more secrecy, convenience and safety than can an equal amount of coined money.

The difference between a bank note and a Government note is that the former has some specific property set aside to secure it of which the bank is merely the trustee, while the latter depends on the condition of the revenues and the strength of the Government. Practically to the ordinary holder there is little difference. The reserves of gold afford tangible evidence to the holders of paper money that there is a margin sufficient to adjust all temporary differences that may occur between the aggregate amount of notes and the aggregate security for ultimate redemption. These reserves give a confidence to the use of the paper money which might be lacking if the ultimate security were the only one, although this last is the real dependence, and alone without any reserve more than equals the face denominations of the notes in circulation.

---

A CANADIAN MINT is provided for by an act recently passed by the Dominion Parliament. It will be a branch of the Royal Mint and will be located at Ottawa. The building and equipment will cost \$300,000 and the annual running expenses are estimated at \$65,000. Besides making all the gold, silver and copper coins required in Canada, British sovereigns will be manufactured.

The bankers of Canada have not generally favored the establishment of a mint, as they believe it will be a useless expense. American gold coins are practically the basis of the currency now, though sovereigns are also a lawful tender. To the extent that gold circulates, it will tend to drive out bank notes; or if the gold accumulates in the banks, it will be a hardship to those institutions, since of whatever reserve they may keep, forty per cent. must be in Dominion notes.

It is doubtful if the establishment of a mint will greatly increase the circulation of gold. For some years the country having the greatest per capita gold circulation was Hawaii, yet it had no mint.

From an economic standpoint it would seem to be unwise to seek to displace the bank notes with coin. The notes are a much less expensive form of currency and are more convenient. Their safety is also unquestioned, and they have so admirably met the trade requirements of the country that it would be a public misfortune if their usefulness should be curtailed.

The arguments in favor of a mint appear to have been convincing to the people's representatives. Possibly the adverse effect on the bank circulation may not materialize.

## PERMITTING BANKS TO USE THEIR CREDIT.

---

The weight of financial authority both in this country and Europe agrees that the ideal paper money is a bank currency issued freely on the credit of the bank, redeemable on demand in the standard gold coin. Of course the actual redemption in gold coin of the notes of a well-managed bank bears but small proportion to the total amount issued. The great bulk of the notes is settled by the exchange of the notes paid out on loans and deposits for the notes received in payment of loans and for credit to depositors' accounts. What occurs in this way in one bank is virtually repeated when there are a number of banks doing business with each other. The banks among themselves offset their respective debits and credits by the exchange of notes. But while the actual redemption of notes in gold is usually comparatively small, the potential redemption in times of panic may be much larger and apart from this any note is a possible demand on the gold reserve.

Everyone will agree that the difficulties of the banking business would be simplified were the banks permitted the full use of their credit by means of their notes, in the same manner as individuals are permitted to use their credit. But this free use of bank credit in note issues has not yet been proposed in this country. The freest propositions yet made are very much restricted by the limitation of the issue to certain proportions of capital. The Baltimore plan, typical of all these propositions, restricts the issue on general assets, as it is called, to fifty or sixty per cent. of capital, and the plan of the Monetary Commission makes the amount of the free issue of notes dependent on the amount of circulating notes taken out on the basis of bond security.

The phrase "notes secured by general assets" is one invented to make the new system conform in the minds of the public with the present system by which the public has been trained to look upon some tangible and material security as the most important feature of a solvent circulation. It was too bold a step to say outright that notes should be issued on the general credit of a banking institution. This general credit is a complicated thing to define, and it is more convincing to use the term general assets. To most people the phrase general assets means the tangible and visible resources of a bank as shown by its balance-sheet. They include loans, real estate, cash, bonds and all sorts of valuable negotiable paper and the liability of the stockholders. But the credit of a bank represents more than this. It rests also on the skill and character of its managers, on its methods of business and on its record of success in previous operations. In fact in the ordinary business of issuing and paying out notes which serve the community as money in the exchange of property, the general assets are not very much involved. A bank's business represents a constant play of exchanges which usually have a certain sequence. When notes are issued by a well-managed bank they are not necessarily issued against any asset then in the bank but against a new asset which comes in. When a depositor draws a check against his deposit

account and receives notes in exchange, the bank has not increased its liability but has merely exchanged one liability already existing for another. When these notes are paid out by the depositor in due course of circulation they are redeposited in the bank and the liability is changed back to its old form. When notes are paid out for loans equal or greater value comes into the bank as security. The reserve is merely called upon to meet temporary differences between the output and the income of notes.

As it is now the banks without the free privilege of using notes do most of their business with the checks of their depositors. A depositor places his money or his securities in a bank. Instead of drawing bank notes on one check to a sufficient amount to make such payments and purchases as he finds necessary, he writes a multitude of little checks, each one exactly paying some debt or bill. These checks are again deposited by those who receive them in some bank, and eventually move to the bank on which they are drawn. Were there only one bank these checks would all represent some book account kept there and the checks would all be settled by a transfer of accounts. As there are many banks the checks are deposited with the most convenient one, and become all mixed up as to the locality of their deposit. By means of exchanges and clearing-houses, all the banks act to a great extent as one bank, and the checks are balanced against each other, the result in the end being the same as if there were but one bank, that is a transfer of credits on the books of the several institutions.

Now, the question is whether this custom and habit of transferring accounts by means of checks in which the public has been educated by the lack of free note issues, is not a substitute for such issues, even if it be not a device for the use of bank credits in actual business superior to bank notes. In settling balances and in making small payments, pay-rolls, etc., the use of bank notes is undoubtedly the superior device. It can readily be understood that if free note issues were permitted it would bring about many changes in the manner of doing business. It is no doubt a fact that the local scarcity of currency which the present system often entails has forced the use of checks in situations where they are much inferior to currency. Thus, wage-earners who have been paid in checks have made frequent complaint of the inconvenience of using these checks, and of the advantage taken of those who have had to cash them after banking hours. In some States laws have been passed forbidding the payment of salaries and wages by means of checks.

This use of checks also entails inconvenience on the banks as well as the public. But while the free issue of bank notes would no doubt obviate this difficulty, there is danger that it might make inroads on a part of the check field where the checks are really safer and more convenient both for the banks and the public than notes substituted for them would be. Let alone the fact that notes are more easily lost or stolen, there is the greater difficulty of counting and making change in the case of notes. Also when a payment is made by check, the check always remains as *prima facie* evidence of payment and obviates in many cases the necessity of giving receipts.

It seems probable that the banks are generally content with the present system, and do not make any strenuous efforts for a free issue of notes, dreading not only the disadvantage adverted to above but also the danger that opportunity would be given for some degree of wilcatting.

The increase of National bank circulation under the new law does not positively show any great desire on the part of the banks to issue notes for their own sake. The new law gave especially good opportunities for the exchange of bonds, and as the banks saw that they must hold the bonds, they might as well have the small additional profit there is in taking circulation. But when these bonds command a sufficient premium it is probable that they will be retired and circulation reduced. At least the importance of the notes in their business is not the main consideration that induces National banks to take out circulation under the present law. That this is so is further proved by the fact that as a rule well-established State banks in all parts of the country have not been induced to convert to National banks as they would have done under the exceptionally favorable conditions of the new law, if the issue of circulation yielded any great advantage in carrying on business.

Those who are hopeful that there will be any great change in the bank currency laws of the country in the near future should carefully note the obstacles in the way and consider how they may be removed or turned to advantage. The first and chief obstacle is the legal-tender note. Undoubtedly there appears to be some weakening in the sentiment in favor of the legal-tender note, and perhaps if it were proposed to retire them by funding opposition would be less than it was at the last session of Congress. As the precedents favor the increase of National bank notes in proportion to the retirement of greenbacks, the retirement of the latter might be used as an argument for increased bank issues, and *vice versa*.

Another obstacle to the development of National bank circulation is the immense stock of gold and silver held by the Government, against which certificates are outstanding. Gold certificates will always afford a convenient method of transferring gold reserves. Whether under an ideal system there is any special advantage in the Government holding the gold, may be a question. It is no doubt a convenience and saves much expense to the banks who otherwise would have to provide their own storage vaults and print their own certificates. But if the banks had control of the matter they would probably issue the certificates in a manner more appropriate for their business. The small gold certificates fill a space that had better be occupied by bank notes.

A more serious obstacle than either the legal-tender notes or the gold certificates are the silver certificates. These indeed are from all points of view the stumbling-block of the monetary system. No one has yet proposed any plan for retiring them that is perfectly satisfactory. The simplest plan, if it could be carried out, would be to sell the silver, which now forms part of the security for their full value, for what it will bring, and then place the certificates on the same basis with the legal-tender notes and retire them either by funding or redemption or both combined. The gold in the Treasury would thus be transferred to the holders of both kinds of notes, would be placed in the custody of the banks and form the reserve for the bank notes as it now does for Government notes. But no one expects that so radical a proposition will be carried into effect. As it is the silver certificates are of the very denominations that fill the circulation space in which bank notes are most useful. In fact, they are to-day about the only available means of carrying on such portions of the banking business as require cash payments. Another

obstacle is the hesitation of politicians to interfere with the monetary question, with which they in fact have very little practical acquaintance. In dealing with this question Congressmen rely very much on the advice of capitalists and bankers among their constituents.

There are in the United States ten kinds of money, each issued on different principles. There are almost as many kinds of banks with diverse interests. Some are content with present conditions, others are not. A Representative may well pause when he is aware that some of his constituents supposed to have practical acquaintance with monetary subjects hold one view, while others, equally influential, hold another. If the views of the bankers of the United States were uniform in favor of any measure it would be carried. But it will take some time to secure this necessary uniformity. In conclusion it does not appear that there is much hope of any radical change in the laws regulating the issue of National bank currency in the near future, although eventual success will only be reached by continued agitation of the matter.

---

**THE SUB-TREASURY SYSTEM.**—The bad effect of the present plan by which the Government locks up money when it may be badly needed, and pours it out when it may not be needed, is arousing criticism. In a recent issue of "Money," New York, Raymond E. Dodge says:

"The Sub-Treasury system is not merely an antiquated piece of financial machinery, which has served its purpose and remains an opportunity for political schemers to urge all sorts of financial delusions by way of reform in its features or expansion of paper money volume. It is a positive menace to business interests and the stability of prices at all times. It is a gigantic engine of contraction of the money of the people and the source of all of the currency troubles and disasters to trade which have occurred during the past sixty years. Well did Abraham Lincoln say in the campaign of 1840:

'Of the Sub-Treasury, as contrasted with a National bank, I lay down the following proposition, to wit:

First, It will injuriously affect the community by its operation on the circulating medium.

Second, It will be a more expensive fiscal agent.

Third, It will be a less secure depository of the public money.

By the Sub-Treasury the revenue is to be collected and kept in iron boxes until the Government wants it for disbursement; thus robbing the people of the use of it, while the Government does not itself need it, and while the money is performing no nobler office than that of rusting in iron boxes. The natural effect of this change of policy, every one will see, is to reduce the quantity of money in circulation.'

This is precisely what the Sub Treasury system is doing to-day. It deprives the business interests of the use of a large part of the money of the country, it contracts the quantity of money in circulation."

---

**CONVENTIONS OF BANKERS.**—This is the season when the bankers of the country, organized into associations in the various States, are holding their annual meetings. Membership in these organizations is now regarded as almost indispensable to every well-managed bank. These State associations are by no means rivals of the American Bankers' Association, but tend to stimulate interest in it.

## THE CLOSING OF FAILED NATIONAL BANKS.

---

Among the duties of the Comptroller of the Currency is that of taking possession of the wrecks of National banks that fail, turning the remaining assets into money, and distributing the sum secured among the creditors, the bank-note holders, the depositors and the stockholders. The note holders are preferred creditors by law, and by the decision of the Supreme Court the only preferred creditors. The depositors come next. They are paid in full with interest from the date of the failure of the bank to the date of last payment, if there is enough realized for the purpose, if not the sum realized is distributed among them *pro rata*, according to the amounts of their several claims. The stockholders come last and if there is anything left after note holders and depositors are paid in full, it is distributed among the stockholders or made over to them for their own management. The stockholders, moreover, are liable, if the assets found in the bank by the Comptroller are not sufficient to pay note holders and depositors in full, to pay in an amount sufficient to make good the deficiency, provided such deficiency does not exceed the par value of their stock.

While, as stated, the note holders are preferred creditors and the only preferred creditors of a National bank, they do not in practice deprive the depositors of any portion of the assets found in the bank. This is because they are secured by the United States bonds which every bank must deposit with the Treasurer of the United States before it can take out circulating notes. These bonds when placed on the market always sell for more than enough to redeem the notes in full as they are presented. The surplus from the proceeds of the bonds, after providing for the redemption of the outstanding bank notes, becomes a part of the general fund to be applied to the payment of other debts.

Some banks do not take out circulation, but whether they do or not all National banks are required to put up some bonds before they can commence business. If there is no circulation outstanding when a bank fails these bonds become a part of the fund relied on to pay the claims of all kinds against the bank. These bonds are more of a resource than might be believed. The funds from the assets of all the failed banks collected by the Receiver are sent to the Comptroller, and by him deposited with the Treasurer of the United States. Of course the Comptroller keeps a separate account for each failed bank, but these separate funds are all in one account kept with the Treasurer. Some time often elapses in the case of any particular bank before enough money is paid in to make a dividend, and when there are a number of such accounts there is usually a respectable total in the hands of the Treasurer. The bonds bear interest, and as the notes do not come in for redemption all at once the Comptroller, instead of selling the bonds, often redeems the notes out of the general fund, or, in other words, borrows out of the non-interest-bearing fund in order to retain as long as possible an interest-bearing security. Some gain is thus made for the insolvent bank's creditors in this way, and if the collection of other assets drags

the saving may be considerable. This use of the general fund also enables the Comptroller to select the best conditions of the market for the sale of bonds, and thus they always realize the highest premium possible. The preference of note holders thus works no disadvantage to depositors, but on account of the special bond security is practically to their own advantage.

When the Comptroller is notified of the prospective failure of a bank, if an examiner is not already on the ground, he sends one there. In either case, the examiner, as representative of the Comptroller, takes charge. He draws up careful schedules of all the valuables found in the bank—the cash, the securities and the notes and bills, as well as of other property, real estate, furniture and fixtures. These schedules are intended to include every item of value. Sufficient time is then given to determine the probable value of these assets so that the impairment of capital may be approximately known. Then usually the directors and stockholders are given an opportunity of making up the deficit. If they do not, or can not, the Comptroller appoints a Receiver who takes charge, relieving the examiner, receiving from him the various items shown by the examiner's schedules, for which, after verification, he gives a receipt to the examiner. The Receiver is required to give a bond to the Comptroller for the performance of his duties. After the Receiver takes charge he makes out a full statement of all he has received to the Comptroller, and gives his estimates of the value of the assets, dividing them in his schedules, according to their collectibility, into good, doubtful and bad. He sends all cash to the Comptroller with the exception of enough for immediate expenses. His salary is fixed by the Comptroller and usually paid from the Comptroller's office. Often there are liens on some of the assets which the Receiver has to clear off before he can tell what part remains for the bank. The assets are collected as far as possible in full, but many settlements have to be made with desperate debtors. These settlements are always made under order of a court of competent jurisdiction after a full hearing. Of course many debtors under various pleas, and often pretenses, dispute the claims of the bank against them. Thus arises the necessity of considerable litigation. While the Receiver thus gives his attention to the collection of assets, he at the same time issues notice by publication to those who have claims against the bank to present and prove their claims. Most of these are generally easily verified by the bank's books, but some are doubtful, and such the Receiver does not allow until they have been determined in the courts. From this source much additional litigation often arises. With the claims presented and the assets carefully estimated the Receiver can now form a pretty clear idea of the probable deficiency in the assets to meet the claims. He furnishes such a statement to the Comptroller, who assesses the stockholders of the bank a sufficient percentage on their shares to make good the deficiency, to the full par value of their stock if necessary. It is no vitiation of the Comptroller's action if he shall have, as events prove, made too great an assessment, because any excess is returned to the shareholder. When the claims are all presented and enough cash has been collected to pay a satisfactory dividend on all the claims, both those proved and those in dispute, the dividend is calculated and declared, the checks are made out and signed by the Comptroller, and are then sent to the Receiver to be distributed. He pays out the dividends on proved claims and retains the checks for those unproved, accounting to the Comptroller by re-



ceipts for the checks paid out. The percentage of the first, as well as subsequent dividends, varies according to circumstances. Thus if collections are easy and the assets good and the failure not a bad one, the first dividend may be fifty, seventy-five, or even one hundred per cent. On the contrary it may be as low as five. The idea is to give as much cash as possible and as quickly as possible to the creditors. A great portion of the assets may be easily collectible, but there may be a portion requiring careful nursing or which is dependent on litigation. Creditors may thus receive a part of their claim very quickly, but have to wait years for the remainder. As long as there is a possibility of collecting more money, or until the creditors receive payment in full, the Receivership is kept open. If the remaining assets are worthless, or at least uncollectible by any means known or discoverable by the Receiver, and the creditors are not yet paid in full, the assets are sold at auction under order of court, and the whole business is considered finally closed. If the creditors are paid in full and assets of value still remain, the Comptroller notifies the stockholders to hold a meeting and elect an agent to whom the remaining valuables of all kinds may be turned over to the Comptroller and Receiver. Often the stockholders are so pleased with the management of the affairs of the bank by the Comptroller's office that they decline to elect an agent and wish the Comptroller to close up the whole business for them. Or they may select the Receiver as their agent. If they elect a new agent everything is turned over to him, and the Comptroller washes his hands of that job.

The Third National Bank, of Chicago, failed and was placed in the hands of a Receiver in 1877, nearly twenty-five years ago. The redemption of its notes was provided for and all claims against the bank were paid, principal and interest, by 1883. The stockholders preferred to have the old Receiver manage the remaining assets for them. Recently it has been announced that the stock of this bank is now above par. The secret of this is that among the assets of the bank was real estate in the environs of Chicago, taken as a last resource as the only possible payment of bad debts. In the course of a quarter of a century, this real estate has become of sufficient value to reimburse the stockholders the full amount of stock, and perhaps to repay their losses from the lack of dividends during the period since the bank failed.

In the litigation which occurs in the settlement of failed National banks many important questions arise as to banking practice and the construction of banking law. What these are can be seen by consulting any report of the Comptroller of the Currency. These questions are usually in the end carried to the Supreme Court of the United States where they are often argued by the most distinguished lawyers in the United States. A curious point came up in the settlement of the affairs of the Cook County National Bank, of Chicago. This bank was a United States depository and at the time of its failure held large sums of public money. This deposit was according to law secured by United States bonds the bank had placed with the Treasurer of the United States. It seems, however, that outside of the regular deposits of the Government, there were certain post-office funds in the bank deposited by McArthur, the postmaster of Chicago. These amounted to \$20,000, and the proceeds of the bonds protecting Government deposits paid all but this \$20,000. The Government proved up its claim for this as an ordinary creditor to whom the bank paid only a little over fourteen per cent. For the balance which the bank did not pay the Government sued McArthur's bonds-

men who were bound to make good the deficit. The bondsmen obtained permission to sue the Receiver in the name of the United States, claiming that, standing in the shoes of the United States, they were entitled to a preference over other creditors under an old statute of the year 1797, which provided that when the estates of insolvent debtors were settled a debt of the United States should be satisfied from their estates before the debts of any other creditors. In the lower court the case was decided favorably to the bondsmen. It was taken to the United States Supreme Court on appeal. The point was a very important one as a number of similar cases had arisen in the settlement of other failed National banks. The Comptroller retained Roscoe Conkling, who had just resigned from the Senate on account of his quarrel with Garfield, and who afterwards was on bad terms with Arthur. The bondsmen retained Mr. Goudy, a celebrated Chicago lawyer. Previous to the calling of the case, and while preparing his brief, Mr. Conkling was frequently in the office of the Comptroller of the Currency. The windows of this office look directly towards the east side of the White House. Conkling would spend much time looking out of these windows in the direction of the President's residence. One day, gazing in this manner, he drew himself up to his full height and, scowling fearfully, was heard to mutter, "Poor old omnibus horse!" No one who witnessed the performance could mistake the intended application to President Arthur.

Conkling prepared his brief himself and had it printed in due course. The day came for the argument. Conkling walked to the Capitol with a springy stride worthy of one of Ouida's heroes. He was in fine physical condition, and his height and golden hair made him conspicuous as he strode along. Mr. Goudy was a very dark man with straight, black hair, and the contrast between the two, as they sat before the rail, was very marked. Conkling spoke first. He held his brief in his hand, did not read from it or refer to it, but explained its purport with a brevity and arrangement and a force, covered by an air of winning courtesy, that held fixed the attention of the court as well as that of the spectators who had flocked in to hear the fallen Senator. The points of his argument were strong. He had a good case, his manner and personality made it overwhelming. When he sat down there was a pause after which Mr. Goudy rose to reply. He seemed entirely overslaughed, and stuttered and stammered along for some sentences. The judges asked him some questions which showed plainly that they coincided with the main point of Mr. Conkling's argument, that the provision in the National Bank Act, making note holders the only preferred creditors, superseded the statute of 1797 on which the bondsmen relied. Mr. Goudy, though embarrassed and beaten on his brief, showed that his reputation as a lawyer was not without foundation. He quickly recovered himself and brought up a new point not in either brief. This was that in the case of the Cook County Bank there was a surplus of proceeds of the bonds to secure circulation over the amount required to redeem the circulation. This was in the hands of the United States at the time of failure and had been ever since. "Is not this," asked Mr. Goudy, "a case for set-off? Cannot the United States set off its own debt to the bank against the debt of the bank to the United States?" This struck the court, as it well might. They ordered a rehearing on this point. The court, however, finally decided against Mr. Goudy. Nevertheless it was a brave and nearly successful effort to snatch victory from apparent defeat.

## \* MODERN BANKING METHODS.

---

*A NEW SERIES ON PRACTICAL BANKING—HELPFUL HINTS DERIVED  
FROM EXPERIENCE.*

---

### WHY BANKS FAIL.

The same general conditions will produce a failure in a bank as in other business. That is, when a bank, from whatever cause, is unable to meet its liabilities, it fails. The failure may be permanent, or temporary, the latter generally being called a suspension.

A bank may have sufficient assets to meet all its liabilities, yet, in consequence of a stringency in the money market, and an inability to realize upon a large proportion of its assets, it may be forced to close its doors. A severe stringency in the money market is apt to be followed by a great depreciation in values. Such a condition, if continued for any considerable period, will be apt to cause failures in banking circles.

In times like these the greatest care is necessary, and it is then that the effect of good management is felt. It is comparatively easy to steer the ship through the smooth waters of flush and easy times, but it is in just such times, when he is making money, that the careful banker prepares for the troublous times that are sure to come. He prepares by keeping a very close watch of his loans, recognizing that here is the principal point of weakness; reducing the single-named paper to the lowest minimum. He will accept as collateral only such securities as are of high standing and can be marketed readily. He will endeavor, as far as possible, to keep the lines of his borrowers drawn to the legitimate limit, realizing that it is far safer to have the loans well distributed in comparatively small amounts among many borrowers, than in large sums among a few.

If the bank is in or near a city where the market reports of securities are published daily, he will carefully watch these as regards the value of the securities held by him as collateral, and should any depreciation take place, reducing the value of the security below the amount of the loan, or below a safe margin, he will at once call for more security.

More than one bank has been wrecked by the unwise plan of "putting too many eggs into one basket," also by extensive investments in real estate, hoping through the prospective "boom" to make immense profits.

Many banks have been wrecked by the making of excessive loans to their officers and directors. These gentlemen enter into some schemes, led into them possibly by an oily "promoter;" not having the necessary money, they call upon the bank, borrowing the money upon their individual paper. These schemes are generally more or less speculative, and the element of risk is heavy, but they seem to forget that as sworn officers of the bank their first

---

\* Continued from the May number, page 667. This series of articles commenced in the *MAGAZINE* for August, 1898, page 249.

duty is to look out for its interests, and they have no right to use the funds of other people, in the care of the bank, for their own speculative enterprises, to the endangering of the bank. Whatever profit would be derived from these schemes would not benefit the bank, the institution only receiving the usual interest for the loans, while the actual loss, if any, would be sustained by the bank. Such action has frequently been denominated a misapplication of the funds, and as such is punishable.

Injudicious banking is the cause of many failures. This covers of course want of judgment in making loans, and careless and imprudent methods of transacting business, among which is the permitting of heavy overdrafts unsecured.

There are certain conditions existing in some sections of our country where it seems necessary to adopt methods that would in other sections be looked upon as reckless; for instance, in some sections of the far West loans are frequently made to the owners of large herds of cattle or sheep, the security being the live stock. This live stock is moving over the plains and may be many hundreds of miles away when the notes become due. The notes often become past due because of the impossibility of the payer reaching the bank.

This character of loans is generally made in the spring and in the fall when the live stock is sold the notes are paid, and the loans are made largely upon the personal knowledge of the honor of the payer. Protesting in such cases is seldom resorted to. In a time of stringency this class of loans would be of very little use to a bank as collateral, and might be the cause of a failure.

The accumulation of bad debts and the paying of unearned dividends has been the cause of more than one failure. A bank sustains heavy losses through bad loans; it manages to have the loans apparently renewed every three or six months, the new notes being signed by bankrupts or former officers of failed concerns, and made with interest added, this interest being credited to their profit and loss account and dividends declared in consequence. The bank receives nothing, but continually pays out; failure is bound to appear in time. Probably the most trying cause of failure is dishonesty. When one has shown every confidence in bank officials, and has had it rudely shaken by frauds or defalcations, it is apt to breed a feeling of bitterness which cannot be blamed.

According to the report of the Comptroller of the Currency for 1900 there have been 390 complete failures of National banks since 1863. The chief causes of these failures, with the number of banks to each cause, are reported as follows:

	<i>Banks.</i>
Defalcations of officers.....	30
Fraudulent management.....	93
Wrecked by Cashier.....	18
Excessive loans to officers, directors and others.....	71
Depreciation of securities.....	15
Investments in real estate and mortgages.....	14
Failure of large debtors.....	7
Injudicious banking and imprudent methods.....	98
General stringency in the money market and shrinkage in values.....	49
Total.....	<u>390</u>

It will be seen by this that if we take the first three causes it makes 136 banks, or more than one-third, and if we add to it the fourth cause, we have 207, nearly all of which might be considered in the category of dishonesty.

Of course, the great majority of those engaged in banking, including clerks as well as officers, are absolutely honest, and comparatively few banks fail from this cause; but it should be the constant study of those charged with bank management to seek to reduce the number of these failures, whether due to dishonesty or other causes.

#### WHAT TO DO WHEN THE BANK GETS IN DEEP WATER.

In all the previous chapters the bank has been considered chiefly in the light of prosperity, but troublous times come, business depression followed by financial panic, and naturally the question arises what is to be done under those conditions?

A general financial panic, such as this country went through in 1837, 1857, 1873 and 1893, does not come suddenly, but is the result of certain business conditions that have been gradually growing, like a coming storm. Mills close for want of orders, collections are hard to make, thousands are out of work, thus taking millions of dollars out of circulation, promissory notes cannot be met, then comes the feeling of uncertainty, the want of confidence, which always precedes the panic.

The careful banker will make mental note of the gradually approaching storm, and if he has been a careful manager through the period of prosperity he has comparatively little to fear.

The old maxim, "in time of peace prepare for war," applies as well for banks as for anything else. The man who is careful and cautious in the making of his loans, and who keeps his assets in a readily available condition, remembering that "every dollar a bank loans above its capital and surplus it owes for;"\* is in a well-fortified position. On the other side, however, the man who has taken great risks in making loans, considering more the high rate of interest he expects to make rather than the security of the principal, has much to fear. Such a man finds it impossible to shorten his lines of discounts without producing the very disturbing element he is trying to avoid. His sudden change in his business methods will be considered an exhibition of weakness by his customers, which may result in a run on his bank.

In times of panic courage is of the greatest importance. The mere fact of keeping up a strong, cheerful, hopeful front is of great assistance in allaying that feeling of want of confidence. Much judgment must be displayed towards borrowers, for many really good customers will need assistance in the shape of renewals of loans, and it would be unwise to attempt to push them to the wall and thus produce a failure, and only add fuel to the fire.

If a run upon a bank should occur, the main thing is to quiet the panicky feeling among the depositors. Obtain all the currency possible, especially coin, and exhibit it on the counters inside the bank. In paying the checks of depositors drawing their balances do it with great deliberation, examining the account in every instance before payment, and taking advantage of every plea for time. By this means the payment goes on very slowly, and after a few days the depositors, seeing the bank continuing business, recover from their fright and the run is stopped.

The disposition among banks to help each other out of the tight places is a great security. In our cities in the trouble of 1893 the action of the clearing-houses in coming to the assistance of the banks and issuing certificates

\* Hon. Hugh McCulloch, "Suggestions to Managers of Banks."

that could be used by the banks in their settlements, saved many from going to the wall. In some cities the clearing-house issued certificates in small denominations and these passed current in general business, giving great assistance to all. The United States Treasury Department endeavored to take some action taxing this issue the ten per cent. according to law, but nothing was done, as it was considered only a temporary measure to relieve the local stringency, and under the circumstances would have been an unwise move on the part of the Government.

#### GENERAL SUGGESTIONS REGARDING MANAGEMENT.

Banking, like any other business, cannot be carried on without some necessary expenses, such as taxes, insurance, repairs, salaries, stationery and many incidentals. The taxes may be considered in the light of one of the fixed charges. To banks that rent a banking room the only insurance necessary is for their furniture, counters, etc., which of course would be trifling, but these being the property of the stockholders the management should certainly take every means to protect them against loss by fire.

It is wise for a bank to own its building, and if constructed with well arranged office apartments above the banking room it can be made a good source of income upon the investment. A poorly constructed building with poorly arranged offices for renting, like anything else poorly done, will not pay. "Whatever is worth doing is worth doing well." Repairs should be attended to promptly, like the "stitch in time that saves nine." Nothing deteriorates so rapidly as real estate or fixtures looking dingy and out of repair, and it has a bad effect upon the standing of a bank. The live banker will keep everything around him looking bright and in good condition.

It is poor economy to pay poor salaries. In no business is it more important to have the best of service and the most trustworthy employees, and good service, like anything else that is good, is worth its price. The bank that takes an interest in its employees may be sure that they will take an interest in its affairs, and a mutuality of that kind *pays*.

Some banks, besides paying fair salaries, when doing a successful business, give each employee at the close of the year five per cent. or ten per cent. of his salary in addition. Thus the man receiving \$1,500 a year salary would receive at the end of the year \$75 or \$150. Other banks give inducements to their employees to become stockholders, receiving payment for the stock in monthly installments. Each of these methods makes the employees feel a personal interest in the success of the bank.

Another poor economy, which is too often seen, is poor stationery. A bank is often judged by a stranger by the character of its stationery, and the few dollars more expended for that which is nice and first class often makes such a good impression that it will be found a paying investment. The books used in a bank should be well made, for they have much handling, and it is very troublesome to have them come to pieces from poor and cheap binding.

There are of course progressive and non-progressive banks, as there are people of these two classes. The first keeps up with the times, takes the best journals treating of the business, obtains the best new ideas and appliances to aid in transacting the business, in fact is wide awake. The public appreciate this and show it by their preference.

Progressive banks never stand still but are ever seeking to increase their

business by all legitimate methods. They do every thing to encourage thrift among their customers, for success of the business of the public means success to the bank.

A banker is of necessity in a measure a public man, and he should be broad-minded and public-spirited, but I would not advise him to be a politician. The bank deals with people of all political parties, and while the banker has a right to his political ideas, still it is seldom wise for him to enter the field as a politician.

#### GROWTH OF THE CO-OPERATIVE SPIRIT.

The spirit of co-operation is growing among banks, as elsewhere. The old spirit of exclusiveness is fast passing away, although some of it still exists, and there is yet room for improvement. Much has been done to open the gates by the various State associations of bankers and the American Bankers' Association. By attending these meetings and coming in contact with each other, the "rough corners" are rubbed off, new thoughts and ideas are exchanged, and the former weary banker returns to his labors refreshed in mind as well as body. Bankers get into ruts as well as other people, and the meetings of these associations are one of the best means to help one out of the rut. It would be a wise move if there was a bankers' association in every State, and if every bank in the State was represented at its meetings. And every State should be well represented at the conventions of the American Bankers' Association.

#### FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF BANKING.

There are certain fundamental principles that it is well to keep in view, and no one has stated them better than the Hon. Hugh McCulloch, the first Comptroller of the Currency and twice Secretary of the Treasury. They are as follows:

"The capital of banks should be real not fictitious.

The managers should not be the chief borrowers, nor should loans be made to stockholders merely because they are stockholders.

A certain amount of the annual profits should be carried to the surplus; the larger the surplus the better, not only for the safety of the stockholders, liable as they are, under the bank act, but for the protection of depositors.

Banks should be kept strong in their cash reserves, as times frequently occur when the strongest stand in need of them. Nothing in the long run pays better than a goodly amount of idle money, especially when specie is the only legal money.

As banks are commercial institutions, created for commercial purposes, preference in discounts should always be given to paper based upon actual commercial transactions. Banks are not loan offices. It is no part of their business to furnish their customers with capital, nor should loans be made under any circumstances for speculative operations in stocks.

Renewals should only be permitted to secure doubtful debts, or in cases in which more time is required than was anticipated when the loans were made, to complete the transaction upon which they were based.

Such salaries should be paid to officers and clerks as will relieve them from the temptation to dishonest practices; and the services of those whose expenditures exceed their salaries should be promptly dispensed with.

Let no loans be made that are not secured beyond a reasonable doubt. Give facilities only to legitimate and prudent transactions. Make your discounts on as short time as the business of your customers will permit. Never renew a note or bill merely because you may not know where to place the money with equal advantage if the paper is paid. In no other way can you properly control your discount line, or make it at all times reliable.

Distribute your loans rather than concentrate them in a few hands. Large borrowers are apt to control the bank, and when this is the relation between a bank and its customers it is not difficult to decide which in the end will suffer.

Treat your customers liberally, bearing in mind the fact that a bank prospers as its customers prosper, but never permit them to dictate your policy.

If you doubt the propriety of discounting an offering, give the bank the benefit of the doubt and decline it. If you have reason to distrust the integrity of a customer, close his account. Never deal with a rascal under the impression that you can prevent him from cheating you. The risk in such cases is greater than the profits.

In business know no man's politics. Manage your bank as a business institution, and let no political partiality or prejudice influence your judgment or action in the conduct of its affairs.

Bank managers should bear in mind that they are not only trustees of the stockholders, but that they owe something to the public—that their whole duty is not performed when good profits are made and when solvency is secured, but that they should do all in their power to encourage morality in business and to elevate credit, especially commercial credit, to the highest standard."

A. R. BARRETT.

---

### THE MAGAZINE'S PRIZE ARTICLES.

While there has been a large response to the invitation to the bank clerks and officers of the United States and Canada to contribute papers in competition for the prizes offered by THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE, it would be gratifying to the publishers to receive many additional articles on the several practical banking topics.

There is still room for all who desire to contribute, and no intending competitor need fear of being barred out because of lack of space.

Junior bank officers and clerks are especially invited to participate in this competition, even though they may not have written for publication heretofore.

The conditions of this contest are not exacting, and the rewards offered by the publishers of the MAGAZINE are liberal—the total prizes being \$1,050. A prize of \$100 will be awarded for the best paper on each of the several topics, and \$50 for the next best. There will thus be seven first prizes and seven second prizes. From present indications the number of competitors does not promise to be so large but that all will have a good chance of winning.

The papers already in hand are of a high order of merit, and it is not too much to say that when all the contributions are published they will constitute the most complete and valuable collection of suggestions, ideas and practical forms for actual bank work ever brought together.

By contributing a paper on some feature of the work in his department a clerk or junior officer not only has before him the possibility of the reward in the form of the prize itself, but there is an added distinction to be gained in winning in a contest where so many bright minds are in competition. Besides, one gains the faculty of putting ideas in a form to be valuable to others, thereby making a helpful contribution to banking knowledge.

A carefully-prepared paper is also a good recommendation in the eyes of superior officers, and often hastens promotion.

The time in which articles may be sent in is limited to July 1, as the publication of the articles will be commenced in the July number. Every reader of the MAGAZINE—officer, clerk, or bookkeeper in a bank or trust company—whether a subscriber or not, is cordially invited to compete for these prizes.

Managing officers of banks will confer a substantial favor on their employees, and advance the interests of the bank as well, by calling the attention of every one engaged in the bank's work to the MAGAZINE's liberal offer.



## THE AMERICAN BANKING SYSTEM.

---

Commenting on Secretary Gage's suggestions for uniting the banks of the United States through the clearing-houses, "The Review," of Melbourne, Australia, says:

"It seems strange that the Americans should so dread a monopoly. One would think that there are no parts of the world where there are comparatively a few large banks with a multiplicity of branches, from whose experience America might gain a few hints. In Australasia the system has been in vogue throughout the entire history of banking in this part of the world, yet no one has ever heard of any monopoly. The banks have their associations, and combine to some extent for the common good, but as for a monopoly in any objectionable sense, the very thought of it is absurd. The people who need the banks are in reality masters of the situation, and any attempt to treat those people unfairly would be met in a way that would soon end monopoly. Bankers know that they have the business of the community because they have the respect of the community. Viewing the conditions and methods of American banking from this distance, and with Australasian experience, it is indeed hard to conceive of there being a chance of a monopoly of banking in America. Still, there is nothing objectionable in the idea of the banks being associated after the manner outlined by Mr. Secretary Gage. Any kind of combination would be better than the present system. The Three Giants are great financial powers in America, but we never hear of any monopoly being dreaded. If America had three large banks on a scale like the Three Giants of Assurance, the small bank trouble would soon be at an end, and America would have a banking system equal to any in the world.

However, the fact that America is dissatisfied with things as they are is a matter of much importance. Reforms come quickly there, when once their need is established. The gain to the whole world as a consequence of an improved system of banking in America would be very great."

With all its imperfections, the American banking system is probably the best in the world. If the thousands of small independent banks were made appendages of a few large city banks, they might be made stronger, but it is not likely that they would have the same value to their respective localities as now. A bank owned and operated by local shareholders becomes a powerful factor in building up the business interests of a community, and it is not too much to say that this feature of American banking has had much to do with the rapid growth of American towns and cities.

That a system of central banks with branches is a necessity in this country, does not appear to have been proven. Because the Bank of France has been satisfactory to the French people, or the banking systems of Canada and Scotland to the people of those countries, it does not necessarily follow that a system similar to these would operate with equally good results in the United States. Our banks are being gradually strengthened by better laws and management, by the general increase of wealth, and by closer co-operation in various ways, also by affiliation with the great banks in the various financial centers. It seems to accord with American ideas that banks should be owned and managed by the people of the towns where they are located, and though adherence to this principle may result in the banks being somewhat less stable than they would be if they were branches of a central institution, this is not, in the opinion of many, a sufficient reason for giving up

the numerous advantages which independent banks have as compared with those operated as branches.

It is natural that the financial writers of countries accustomed to the aggregation of banking capital in large banks should criticize the system of banking in the United States. In last month's *MAGAZINE* we quoted from a writer in "The Review," of Melbourne, the same paper from which the above extract is taken. To him it appears that we have "ten times too many banks, and that the largest is smaller than the smallest should be."

Although he does not directly say so, yet this writer appears to think that this is the reason why the people of the United States do not enjoy the advantages that can be obtained from the use of a bank-note paper currency. It is no doubt true that the comparative weakness of individual banks has prevented the full use of bank credit in proportion to the resources which the banks in the aggregate hold. But perhaps there are compensations afforded by the system that recommend it to the people and induce them to give it the political support that would not be given to a system of chartered banks like that prevailing in Great Britain and its dependencies and colonies.

In this country every business that savors of monopoly or that can even plausibly be called a monopoly is at once the subject of political attack. These attacks often result in legislation that cripples or destroys the business, and many things have to be abandoned for the sake of a quiet life.

If chartered banks had never been tried in the United States, it might be said that the fear that it would be impossible to change the present system for one more analogous to the Canadian or Australian system is not well grounded. But the second Bank of the United States, through political influences at work against it, was a lamentable failure, and almost invariably the States which started out with systems of banks with special charters have changed them for free banking systems, which are productive of the small local bank. The National Banking Law was merely the adaptation to the whole country of the free banking laws forced by political agitation in the States. The insecurity of the bank note under the free banking system was early recognized, and out of this grew the device of depositing a part of the bank's capital as security for the notes issued.

The principle of the bank note is well understood here, and theoretically there is no reason why it should not flourish in perfection under a system of small banks as under a system of large banks. Practically many small banks have at one time or another issued notes with as much safety as any of the great foreign banking institutions. As this writer from the antipodes remarks, all that is necessary is that the borrowers of the notes shall give reasonable security for their return when demanded, and that the interest be sufficient to cover expense and loss. In other words, an institution issuing notes to circulate as money for the convenience of the public must not issue a note unless it takes in return a sufficient margin of security. Considering the circumstances under which it does business, this taking of sufficient security is just the difficult point. A small bank issuing few notes might require a greater margin of security than a large one, because a small amount of notes might be returned for payment in greater proportions than when a large amount was customarily circulated. In the old wildcat banking days George Smith's Bank in Wisconsin issued notes in the form of certificates of deposit that furnished a circulating medium for the whole western territory.

These notes were always redeemed when presented because the managers of that bank always demanded ample security for every note that was loaned to a borrower or paid to a depositor. Many alleged bankers, however, foisted their notes on the public in support of enterprises of their own and they looked on each note so paid out as clear profit.

The fault of the free banking system and even of the chartered systems in the United States in early days was that the so-called banks were often not banks at all but only schemes for the profit of their managers at the expense of the public. Even at the present time, both under the free banking laws of the States as well as under the National Banking Law, there are numbers of men who manage banks who are not bankers and who are incompetent to manage a banking business. This is the real defect of the system of small banks developed under free banking laws. But the percentage of ignoramuses is steadily decreasing under the system of bank examinations prevailing under the National Banking Law and most of the State laws.

One advantage of the small bank system, where competently managed, is that the value of the security offered within a given territory is thoroughly understood by the managers, probably more thoroughly than it could be by the managers of a large bank working through branches. The consequence is that many people are assisted with loans who would not be trusted by a bank coming into less close contact with them. The comparative expense of the small bank system is another drawback, but although the profits of banking are not so large as they have been in the United States they are still sufficient to bear this extra expense which is due to the larger force of men employed in handling a given amount of capital. Neither are the small banks of the United States as weak as might seem from the mere statement of their resources. There has grown up a system of mutual assistance and support in panicky times, so that an honestly-managed bank can generally secure the assistance that it needs. There is not the rivalry among the small institutions or the aloofness that seems to prevail among the large foreign chartered banks. But when the rate of banking profit falls so that expenses have to be carefully scrutinized it is highly probable that there will be consolidation of small banks. The rates of profit vary so in different parts of the country that no general change in this direction can be expected for a long time. Nevertheless symptoms of consolidation and increase of the size of individual banks are visible in all the money centers of the country.

If there is any radical change in the American system it will come from the bankers themselves. The bankers of the money centers understand fully the advantages of a bank-note circulation, but they would hesitate to recommend any general plan under which the free privilege might be granted to all who under the present laws could organize a bank. They remedy the defects of the system due chiefly to our political ideas by various palliative devices which work very well and by which they successfully carry out financial operations of as much magnitude as are undertaken by banks in any part of the world. It seems to be a fact that the most conservative and experienced bankers of the country are not especially enthusiastic about the extension of the bank-note issue privilege. They are accustomed to the present system, are aware of its defects and know how to remedy them. The small bank system here has been a growth adapting itself by degrees to the political institutions and the business needs of the country. Theoretically it has some defects and some deficiencies. But it seems better to improve it by degrees on its natural lines of development than to attempt to tear it up by the roots, even if it could be done, and substitute a system more perfect in theory, but in practice perhaps not so well adapted to the conditions of the country.

## BUDDHA'S LEGACY TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY.

---

The opening month of the twentieth century saw strange sights in the "Yuen Min Yuen," the summer palace of the Dowager Empress of China. This old woman, with her boundless ambition, had made life a burden and a terror to the young Emperor. She was now feeling the pangs of exile. The dreaded blow had fallen. For the first time in the long history of the Celestial Empire the white man was swaggering amid the barbaric splendors of her august dwelling places.

Soldiers from sunny Italy were there. Everywhere they swarmed supreme and the yellow men had vanished before them. These Europeans, born in the home of art and music, flower of a Christian culture, were just the men to appreciate the noble scenes around them, and reverence the treasures of the Eastern world. Not a bit of it. The representatives of the land of the Cæsars have turned from organ-grinding to playing soldier, and are ruthlessly looting the beautiful palace. It is true, noble and self-denying men and women had come from that land and other lands to teach the heathen Chinese the better way, the gentle and sweet fruits of culture and civilization.

The white man, in his arrogance, deemed himself the possessor of all true culture and progress. Yet Buddha might have something to teach the Christian worth knowing. For, in spite of centuries of ethical and æsthetic development, the beast in him was still very much alive.

The vandals of the north wrecked the sacred treasures of ancient Italy, and had no respect for the thing of beauty which is a joy forever. They, however, were savages and worshippers of hideous idols, in their pagan ignorance. These dwellers from beneath the very shadow of the Vatican, vandals still after nearly two thousand Christmas days, and crazy with a brute passion to lay their hands on everything that came their way, looted and raged, the incarnation of anarchy and hateful chaos. Drunk with lust and mad with rapine, on that January day it was not, "Why do the heathen rage?" but behold these "foreign devils" blind with fury.

They seized everything they could carry away. Beautiful works of art in bronze, jade and crystal, chinaware of priceless value and treasures in antiques, furniture and rugs. What they could not carry away, with senseless idiocy they went to work systematically to wreck.

Mirrors were smashed with iron hammers, beautiful carvings and statues shivered to fragments, and rugs cut and torn to bits.

That devastation was a sorry sight. An American officer who happened to be present through it all, on account of his ability to speak Italian, relates that in all his army experience he saw that day the most devilish and wanton deeds he had ever witnessed.

Near the summer palace, on a little hill, stood a pagoda, a gem of Chinese art, in which was a statue of Buddha. To the invaders there was nothing sacred in the sphinx-like effigy, and it went down in the general sweep of destruction.

· Chinese Treasury Note, A.D. 1367. ·  
*Probably the oldest piece of Paper Money in existence.*



*Issued by the Board of Revenue of the Emperor Hung Wu in the year 1367. — Its value is 250 Taels (about 167) and is redeemable in silver syce (bullion). — it was found January 1901 in a Bronze Statue of Budha, destroyed in a Temple within the enclosure of the Summer Palace of the Dowager Empress of China.*



Now a most curious and interesting thing developed. The soldiers knocked out the hollow base of the statue and began to explore the interior. Here they found that the Chinese had a custom when dedicating a god analogous to ours when laying the corner stone of a public edifice. Just as we are wont to place within a cavity of the stone articles of current and historical interest, so these ancient heathen, hundreds of years ago, did as we now do, when they set up this statue to Buddha.

Within the bronze the Italians discovered much ancient wadded cotton, almost in dust; then rice and lentils and lotus-seed; rolls of prayers; deeper in were bags of old coin, gold, silver and brass, with much brass cash (the Chinese coin with a square hole in the middle of it).

Above this was a war-club covered with Sanscrit characters, and still above this several rolls of paper money.

Some of this paper money was obtained by the officer mentioned above. The find proved to be of intense interest. One of these notes was submitted to the author of "Chinese Characteristics," Dr. Smith, who is considered the most learned man now in China. He translated the lettering on the bills with the utmost facility, although it proved to be so ancient.

There can be no doubt of its authenticity. The oriental scholar found it to be "a Treasury note," and "issued by the Board of Revenue of the Emperor Hung Wu in the year of 1367;" further it is stated, that "the value is 250 taels," and it is "redeemable in silver syce" (bullion).

This is not an engraved note, but one printed with some sort of movable type. Right at once we are confronted with a most fascinating bit of history. Here is printing from movable types, also paper of soft silky texture in an excellent state of preservation. So carefully were these guarded by the ancient god, as to clearly demonstrate an advanced degree of Chinese art and civilization, more than a hundred years before the German Gutenberg had performed his successful experiments.

The claims recently set forth for Gutenberg at the five hundredth anniversary of his birth can in justice be allowed only in a limited sense. He was born in 1410. His first successful experiments in taking impressions from movable type were produced about 1456. He cannot be called the father of printing, as Homer is the father of epic poetry, and Morse the father of the electric telegraph. The Chinese were printing from movable types as far back as the eleventh century, and there is a Corean book in the British Museum which saw the light of day in 1337.

Now we have here a Treasury note printed on paper much more than five hundred years old. What a revelation of progress it is—paper to make books, the type to print them and the art in a flourishing condition.

Naturally one will ask, who was the old Emperor whose notes were concealed in the statue of the Buddha, when it was first set up, and have remained hidden for centuries?

Hung Wu was the son of a Chinese workingman. He was the child of fortune and the brilliant product of a successful rebellion. He had the good luck to end one dynasty and set up another.

The "Yuen" dynasty which he overthrew was founded by the great Mongol conqueror, Genghis Khan, who and all his house were famous makers of paper money. They were not the first, however, to learn the trick.

The history of paper money in China may be traced to a very remote

period. As early as 140 B. C. there is the first record of the issue of paper money, that is, a sort of paper money, in the reign of Wu-ti. This was nearly three centuries before coins covered with leather or parchment were current as money in Carthage.

According to Klaproth these Chinese bills were called P'i pi, or skin notes, because made of white stag skin. They were a Chinese foot square, each note representing 40,000 chuen, or Chinese "cash."

Del Mar, in his interesting volumes on money, states that as early as 960 A. D., during the reign of Tai-tsu (Sung dynasty) the imperial Treasury was made a bank of deposit from which notes were issued on deposits of silver, precious articles and other merchandise, in Government warehouses. In the early part of the eleventh century iron chuen were in circulation. At first they were largely overvalued, and being issued redundantly fell to their commodity value. It was to represent these coins that the first notes of true felted paper, we are told, were issued in China. They were emitted by a private banker in Sze-chuen province, and made payable in three years. Each note was for 1,000 chuen, or one tael of pure silver.

The example of the Sze-chuen banker was soon followed by fifteen others, and 1,256,340 nominal taels of these notes put in circulation. Then the bankers all found it convenient to fail, but the notes continued in circulation.

In 1131 bills were issued by the Government for military supplies. These proved a great convenience, as the Emperor found himself hard pressed for cash. It is marvellous what a value these pieces of paper, with the mysterious symbol of the imperial celestial authority, had on the minds of the common people.

During this same period a new sort of paper money, called Hwui-tsz, or exchanges, was put in circulation. These notes were at first redeemable. They were in denominations of 1,000 chuen each. Afterwards of lower denominations, five hundred, two hundred and one hundred. These emissions continued during the reign of Hiao-tsung, who came to the throne in 1163. For the five years ending with 1167, 28,000,000 taels of paper currency crowded upon the Empire. And so the work went on. The craze for paper currency seemed to gather force with the years, and Klaproth declares that in a wonderfully short period 43,600,000 taels had been issued. But the climax was reached. The bag of inflation was blown up to its utmost capacity. The Sung dynasty was in troubled waters. The shadow of the end was approaching. Thinking to clear its shoulders of a load of responsibility that had become too great for its feeble frame to carry, the Government suspended metallic payment, and the notes issued became irredeemable.

The Sung dynasty was soon in the throes of dissolution. To support its military operations and efforts to repel the Mongolian and meet the demands of its Treasury, it continued the issues of paper money.

Steadily, at first slowly, then with rapid and brilliant movements, the Mongol Tartars advanced until they had completely subdued the native emperors. But all the while the hopeless struggle was going on, the Sung dynasty kept up issuing this fiat money. Its depreciation was something terrible. Let the advocate of fiat money study its history in these dark days in China. He cannot say either, if he studies history to any advantage, that its deplorable failure was due to the fact that the Chinese were simply barbarians and did not know anything about the arts and customs of civilization.



The Empire was rapidly attaining to the zenith of her splendor, according to the bent of her peculiar and distinct genius. Because she is oriental and not occidental does not militate against the remarkable development of the racial life she was destined to attain. It has been too long a custom for the Anglo-Saxon to underrate the Chinese type of character, and belittle their civilization as the efflorescence of barbarism.

Genghis Khan, the Emperor of the Mongol Tartars, entered China and took Peking in 1215. From that time began the most brilliant age of Chinese history. Her glory reached its zenith and culminated under the sceptre of Kublai Khan, the grandson of the mighty conqueror. He was a great soldier and a far-seeing statesman. The country conquered was raised by him to a very high state of civilization. The arts and industries flourished. The whole country was brought beneath his powerful and civilizing sceptre. The great canal system of 1660 miles was completed, and even Burmah and Cochin-China lent lustre to his sway.

In the "History of Money in Ancient Countries" by Alexander Del Mar, published in 1886, the currency of the Mongol conquerors is divided into three distinct issues.

The first series was in 1260-63; the second between 1264-90. Both the first and second issues were unlimited in number and consequently depreciated in value, and lost their purchasing power. In thirty-four years 249,654,290 taels had been issued. A tael really meant 1,000 copper cash or chuen (Tsien). Depreciation became very rapid until 1287 when the issues were simply enormous. But before this wholesale inflation occurred, the notes of the first issue had been exchanged for those of the second issue at the rate of five of the former for one of the latter.

It is these notes of the second series which are described in the pages of the redoubtable Marco Polo's wonder book, "Concerning the Kingdoms and Marvels of the Far East." Yet only two hundred years ago, curious as it may seem, the missionary Magaillans utterly denied the truth of Marco Polo's statement about Chinese paper currency. The old traveller must needs be made out a liar, because he saw the joke in the kin, or golden dynasty, taking to paper as fish take to water, in spite of their metallic title.

In 1309 the third Mongol series of paper moneys was begun and the notes of the second issue were exchanged for those of the third. The Mongols, however, were always looked upon as foreigners. Many of their works perished with them, and among them their paper money.

In 1280 \* Kublai Khan first assumed complete jurisdiction as Emperor of the whole of China. From the frozen sea to the Straits of Malacca he reigned undisputed. All the Mongol princes as far as the Dnieper brought to him regularly their tribute.

It was in his reign that Marco Polo visited the East, and described in such terms the glories of the "great Khan" as to call down upon his head the

\* The name of Kublai Khan recalls the poem by Coleridge, bearing the title of the great Emperor. One day the poet fell asleep, and while in that state composed a beautiful poem which he immediately wrote out on awakening. The first stanza of this dream-poem follows:

"In Xanadu did Kubla Khan  
A stately pleasure-dome decree,  
Where Alph, the sacred river, ran  
Through caverns measureless to man,  
Down to a sunless sea."

maledictions of those who thought the traveller was working his imagination for the deception of a too credulous Europe.

When the great Emperor died his passing was without regret to the Chinese, who never ceased to regard him as a foreigner and a barbarian. Timur and Woo-tsung, who succeeded him, were really great rulers, but most of the Yuen dynasty only repeated in the far East what the Cæsars had illustrated in the West. Effeminacy, vice and incompetency caused the star of the Yuen dynasty to descend. Nero, Caligula and Heliogabulus seemed to find their counterparts in the Orient. The oneness of humanity is exemplified both in the universal virtues and vices of the race.

Each reign grew more troublesome and hateful to the Chinese than the last. Hated foreigners were all the reigning house. Though the emperors came of a line of Chinese wives that the first Mongol conquerors had taken to themselves, the Chinese never forgot the pain and humiliation of the conquest. When, at last, in the person of Shun-te, all the faults and vices of his predecessors were summed up, the end came. Local rebellion burst into a volcano that convulsed China in its throes. The mighty Emperor and scion of a long line was compelled to flee before the son of a poor laborer, who as a Buddhist priest and general headed a successful insurrection. The people rallied around him because he was a Chinese. The dethroned ruler died and in him perished the Yuen dynasty. Choo-Yuen-chang met with little opposition in his victorious march. In 1355 his success had become so great that he captured Nan-king and proceeded to announce himself the Duke of Wu. He actually reigned many years before he assumed the title of Emperor, and in all this time he was very careful not to adopt the insignia of royalty. Although he had taken the capital, and was really master of all the governmental forces of the Empire, Emperor in deed and in fact, he did not assume the full title until 1368. This will account for what may be deemed a discrepancy between the time of Hung-Wu's assumption of the throne and the date of the Treasury note which is the subject of this sketch, and a *facsimile* of which is published in this issue.

Once seated upon his throne, the founder of the Ming (bright) dynasty, by his generous conduct to his enemies and his constant regard for the welfare of his people, proved himself a wise and capable ruler.

The new Emperor was a quondam Buddhist priest, consequently he did much to favor that religion, and exalt it over the formerly popular Taoism. The priests of the latter, by their effeminacy and vice, reflecting the characteristics of the reigning house, and the practice of the black art of magic in their search for the fabled philosopher's stone, had become contemptible in the eye of all but the very lowest of the populace. It was an easy matter in this condition of the religious life of the people for this Buddhist Emperor to become a patron of the gentle god.

The Buddhist priests were naturally Hung Wu's staunchest adherents. Consequently it is not a matter of wonder that on the eve of his declaring himself the rightful possessor of all regal honors and emoluments, at the time of the dedication of this new statue to the god, set up nearly seventeen generations ago, a great roll of specimens of the new sovereign's money should be placed in the mysterious cavern of the venerated statue.

Colonel Henry Yule, in his splendid edition of Marco Polo's work says: "I have never heard of the preservation of a single note of the Mongols, but

some of the Ming survive, and are highly valued as curiosities in China. In accord with the stability of family life in that strange land, they have been handed down from generation to generation and most carefully preserved."

In the Western world only three of these notes were known to exist. From their trade with China Englishmen who appreciated the value of such ancient monuments to the civilization and greatness of the Celestial Empire, regarding whose history Europe was so long in stupid ignorance, had been able to secure a few rare specimens. One of these came into the possession of an English nobleman, Sir G. T. Staunton. Dr. Lockhart formerly had two, but he gave one of them to Sir Harry Parkes.

The bill that Yule used in making the engraving for his notable book was the property of Dr. Lockhart. Yule states that through the kindness of the Doctor he was able to give in his book a *facsimile* of that note, but the engraver found it a difficult task on account of the dimness of the imprint, and resort was had to "Some restoration of the seals of which on the original there was the barest indication remaining."

So dark was the paper on which these notes were printed, that Marco Polo was certainly justified in describing it as black.

In 1883 Del Mar was shown the other Ming note by its owner, Sir Harry Parkes. He comments on its fine and silky texture, and expressed the wonder that it should have resisted the ravages of Time's relentless tooth, and been preserved in as good condition as he then found it. But the printing on it was very faint, and parts of it had vanished altogether.

These, however, were the only samples known to the Western world, until a short time ago, when two Treasury notes of this venerable Ming Emperor came to New York. One of them is the property of Mr. Joseph T. Brown, Vice-President of the Knickerbocker Trust Company, and it is a *facsimile* of this note that is presented in the accompanying illustration. The reddish-brown characters represent the seal. The note is of the same color as the paper used in the illustration, but the original note is considerably larger than the reproduction.

Buddha kept the secret of these notes well. They seem perfect. There is no sign of "Time's effacing finger" about them except in the faintness of the impression of the red seal. On account of the flimsy character of the soft silky paper, the printing does not stand out upon them in as sharp relief as modern printing on our up-to-date paper; still, they are clear and beautiful specimens of the art in the age in which they were executed.

It will be seen that the claim that these notes belong to the oldest issue of paper money of which any remains are extant in the world to-day cannot be very far from the exact truth.

After its long seclusion in the "infernals" of a god, one of them has gotten back to something like its proper environment, and under a glass protection, is destined to look out upon the world from the walls of an American banking house, where it will see quantities of paper money, issued by the Government, and secured by gold and silver, going in and out every day at the little windows of the teller and Cashier.

Thus the god Buddha has left a legacy, in the shape of these Treasury notes, which proclaim the greatness and progress in civilization of his devotees of the long past.

FRANCIS EDWARD MARSTEN.

NEW YORK.

# BANKING LAW DEPARTMENT.

---

## IMPORTANT LEGAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST TO BANKERS.

---

All the latest decisions affecting bankers rendered by the United States Courts and State Court of last resort will be found in the *MAGAZINE'S* Law Department as early as obtainable.

Attention is also directed to the "Replies to Law and Banking Questions," included in this Department.

---

### NATIONAL BANK—INCREASE OF CAPITAL STOCK—LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDER.

Supreme Court of the United States, April 25, 1901.

GEORGE H. SCOTT vs. PARRY L. DEWEESE, RECEIVER OF THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF SEDALIA, MO.

Where one subscribes to an increase of the capital stock of a National bank, and receives the certificates therefor, and is paid the dividends thereon, and enjoys the benefits of a stockholder, he cannot escape liability as such by showing that the whole amount of the new capital was not paid in, and that the increase was a scheme to conceal the frauds of the officers of the bank.

---

In error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to review a decision affirming a judgment establishing the liability of a shareholder in a National bank. Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court:

This case went off in the circuit court upon a motion for a judgment in favor of the plaintiff upon the pleadings. The motion was sustained and judgment was entered in accordance with the prayer of the petition. That judgment was affirmed in the circuit court of appeals, Judge Sanborn, dissenting. (33 C. C. A. 1, 14, 60 U. S. App. 720, 743, 89 Fed. Rep. 843, 856.) The case is here upon writ of error sued out by the defendant Scott.

The case made by the petition is substantially as follows:

The First National Bank of Sedalia, Missouri, was organized on October 30, 1865, with a capital stock of \$100,000 and thereafter, until October 24, 1885, continued to do a banking business.

On the day last named the bank, pursuant to the provisions of the act of Congress approved July 12, 1882 (22 Stat. at L. 162, chap. 290), extended the period of its succession for a term of twenty years from and after October 30, 1885; and on October 24, 1885, the Comptroller of the Currency issued his certificate stating that the bank had complied with the provisions of the act of Congress in thus extending the period of its existence, and was authorized to have succession until the close of business on October 30, 1905.

On September 6, 1890, the bank increased its capital stock in the sum of \$150,000; and on January 17, 1891, the Comptroller of the Currency certified that it had increased its stock to the above extent in accordance with the provisions of the act of May 1, 1886 (24 Stat. at L. 18, chap. 23), and that such increase was approved; also, that the increase had been duly paid in as part of the capital stock of the company.

The bank continued to do a banking business upon the basis of a capital stock of \$250,000 until May 4, 1894, on which day it became insolvent, closed its doors, and ceased to do business.

On May 10, 1894, the original plaintiff, W. A. Latimer, was duly appointed Receiver of the bank by the Comptroller of the Currency under the laws relating to National banking associations. The defendant in error, Deweese, was after that date substituted in his place as Receiver.

In winding up and settling the affairs of the bank the Comptroller of the Currency determined that it was necessary to enforce the individual liability of stockholders and to collect from them an amount equal to seventy-five per cent. of their stock at par value; and on April 13, 1895, that officer made an assessment and requisition upon shareholders for the sum of \$187,500, to be paid by them ratably on or before May 15, 1895, and made demand upon the defendant Scott for \$75 upon every share of the capital stock of the bank held or owned by him at the time of the failure of the bank as above stated, payable on or before May 15, 1895. The Receiver was directed to enforce against shareholders the payment of the amounts assessed against them.

At the time of the failure and suspension of the bank the defendant Scott was the owner and holder of fifty shares of its capital stock of the par value of \$100 each. The amount ratably due by him as such shareholder under the above assessment was \$3,750.

On April 17, 1895, the Receiver of the bank notified the defendant of the assessment and requisition and demanded payment of the same; but he did not pay that sum or any part thereof. Hence this action.

Judgment was asked for the sum of \$3,750, with interest from May 15, 1895, as well as for costs of suit.

The defendant in his answer admitted the organization of the bank and the extension of the period of its incorporation as alleged; also that the bank continued to do a banking business as set out in the petition, and that it had become insolvent and closed its doors. He also admitted the appointment and qualification of the Receiver and the allegations of the petition as to the order of the Comptroller of the Currency.

Further answering, he alleged, that on September 6, 1890, the bank, by a vote of the owners of two-thirds of its capital stock, voted to increase that stock in the sum of \$150,000; that it notified the Comptroller that the whole amount of such increase had been paid in; that on January 17, 1891, that officer—then knowing that more than the entire capital of the bank was loaned, directly and indirectly, to its President, and that the amount so loaned had been steadily increased for several years up to the date just named by adding the interest which was not paid to the notes evidencing the loans or the renewals thereof, and who based his action wholly upon the notification from the bank—issued a certificate stating that the amount of the increase of capital was \$150,000, that the same was paid in, and that such increase was approved; that thereafter, until May 24, 1894, the bank continued to do business with a pretended capital of \$250,000.

That "in September, 1890, the officers of said bank informed and represented to the defendant as follows: That said bank contemplated increasing its capital stock from \$100,000 to \$250,000; that said intended increase of capital was made desirable on account of the increasing business of said bank; that said bank was in a flourishing condition and earning large dividends upon

its capital stock, and then had a surplus of \$50,000 over and above its capital stock and all liabilities; that from said surplus such dividends would be declared as would make each of the 2,500 shares of stock worth the sum of \$108."

That relying upon such representations the defendant—never having held or owned any stock in the bank—subscribed for fifty shares of the proposed increase of \$150,000, and in October, 1890, deposited in the bank the sum of \$5,400.

That it was the understanding between the defendant and the bank that that sum was to be held by it and applied in payment of defendant's subscription for fifty shares, when all of the proposed increase was subscribed and the money therefor paid into the bank, "and the issues of the shares of said increase could be legally made."

That the bank gave to the defendant a receipt for said sum of \$5,400, and about October 25, 1890, delivered to him a certificate for fifty shares of "its said pretended increase of capital;" and—

That the "bank then, falsely and fraudulently and with intent to deceive defendant, represented to defendant that the said increase of capital had been lawfully made, and that the full amount thereof had been subscribed for and paid in in full, and defendant, deceived by said representations, and relying thereon, accepted and retained said certificate, and that defendant held and claimed as owner said certificate thereafter and until the closing of said bank, and in the years 1891 and 1892 received and retained alleged dividends aggregating eighteen per cent. of the par value of said certificate; that said alleged dividends were paid out of the money paid as aforesaid by defendant to said bank."

The defendant further alleged that in September, 1890, and for many months prior thereto and afterwards, the bank was in fact wholly insolvent, had no surplus whatever, and at the time of the increase of the stock all of its capital had been lost—its liabilities irrespective of its capital stock and alleged surplus exceeding its assets—and it was earning no dividends upon its capital;

That said pretended increase of stock was never of any value or validity whatever; that only about two-thirds of the increased stock was ever paid; that the officers of the bank made false entries in its books and records for the purpose of showing an apparent surplus, and declaring a dividend to themselves therefrom, turning the dividends into the bank in pretended payment for a large part of the increased stock;

That the whole transaction was a sham for the purpose of bolstering up an insolvent institution by obtaining large sums of money from the subscribers for the increased stock, and for the further purpose of "watering" its capital stock and permitting its officers to appropriate to themselves, without paying anything therefor, a large part of such pretended increase, of all of which defendant had no knowledge whatever until long after the bank had closed its doors on May 4, 1894, nor had defendant any information whatever that could in any way have created a suspicion thereof;

That the books and records of the bank during all the time after October 25, 1890, had shown, and it had been made by them to appear, that all of the pretended increase of capital was paid in; and that from a time prior to the last-named date until the bank closed, its books and records were systemati-

cally, skillfully and cunningly falsified by its officers, and so kept that the defendant could not by the utmost diligence have ascertained the true condition of the bank; and,

That as soon as he discovered that the increased stock was not fully paid in, defendant disclaimed and denied that he was or ever had been a stockholder of the bank.

Such being the case made by the pleadings, we are to inquire whether there was error in giving judgment against the defendant.

By sec. 5151 of the Revised Statutes, "the shareholders of every National banking association shall be held individually responsible, equally and ratably, and not one for another, for all contracts, debts and engagements of such association, to the extent of the amount of their stock therein, at the par value thereof, in addition to the amount invested in such shares."

Within the meaning of that section, was the defendant, in view of the facts stated in the pleadings, to be deemed a shareholder of the bank when it suspended and was put into the hands of a Receiver?

The defendant admits in his answer that he held, and for three years and more previous to that date had held, a certificate for fifty shares of the bank's stock, and exercised the rights of a shareholder by receiving dividends for the years 1891 and 1892, aggregating eighteen per cent. of the par value of the stock standing in his name on the books of the association. He thus enjoyed the privileges of a shareholder.

The defendant, however, contends that although he may have exercised the rights of a shareholder in holding a certificate of shares and in receiving and retaining dividends, he was not a shareholder within the meaning of sec. 5151 so as to become individually liable, to the extent prescribed by that section, for the contracts, debts and engagements of the bank.

That position is supposed to be justified by sec. 5142 of the Revised Statutes declaring that "any association formed under this title may, by its articles of association, provide for an increase of its capital from time to time, as may be deemed expedient, subject to the limitations of this title. But the maximum of such increase to be provided in the articles of association shall be determined by the Comptroller of the Currency; and no increase of capital shall be valid until the whole amount of such increase is paid in, and notice thereof has been transmitted to the Comptroller of the Currency, and his certificate obtained specifying the amount of such increase of capital stock, with his approval thereof, and that it has been duly paid in as part of the capital of such association." That section was modified, in some respects, by the act of May 1, 1886, chap. 73, which provided that any National banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, by the vote of shareholders owning two-thirds of the stock of such association, increase its capital stock, in accordance with existing laws, to any sum approved by the said Comptroller, notwithstanding the limit fixed in its original articles of association and determined by said Comptroller; and no increase of the capital stock of any national banking association either within or beyond the limit fixed in its original articles of association shall be made except in the manner herein provided." Under this last statute the bank proceeded when by the vote of two-thirds of its shareholders it determined to increase its stock by \$150,000. (24 Stat. at L. 18, sec. 1.)

The defendant lays great stress on the words in sec. 5142, "no increase of

capital shall be valid until the whole amount of such increase is paid in," and until the Comptroller shall certify that the amount of the proposed increase "has been duly paid in as part of the capital of such association." But does it follow that one who claimed to be a shareholder in respect of an increase of the bank's capital, and who was recognized as such by the bank, particularly if he held a formal certificate stating that he was a shareholder, can escape liability, under sec. 5151, by simply proving, after the bank has suspended and has been placed into the hands of a Receiver, that the whole amount of the proposed increase was not in fact "paid in" as required by sec. 5142, although the contrary was certified by the Comptroller upon the bank's report to that officer? We think not.

The literal construction insisted upon by the defendant might produce results which we cannot suppose were ever contemplated by Congress. Referring to that construction the Court below well said: "If this contention is well founded, then, as already said, it follows that if all the shares but one had been subscribed and paid for, nevertheless the holders of the certificates for the full-paid shares could not be heard to assert that they were the owners of valid shares, which would be a most unjust result. If this is the true meaning of the statute, it is made possible for parties in control of a National bank, with the approval of the Comptroller, to authorize the increase of the capital stock, to obtain subscription and payment in full for all the shares but one or two and then, if that be desirable, to deny to the holders of these full-paid certificates any participation in the control of the bank, or, in case the bank becomes insolvent, to shield these holders of certificates from liability to creditors. Certainly a construction of the statute having such results should not be adopted unless the statute as a whole imperatively demands it."

The primary object of the provision that "no increase of capital shall be valid until the whole amount of such increase is paid in" was to prevent the "watering" of stock, that is, prevent banking business being done upon the basis of an increased capital which did not in fact exist. If this prohibition be disregarded by a National bank, the conduct of its business could no doubt be controlled by the representatives of the Government so far as might be necessary to compel obedience to the law. (Rev. Stat. sec. 5205.)

But the statute does not, in terms, make void a subscription or certificate of stock based upon increased capital stock actually paid in, simply because the whole amount of any proposed or authorized increase has not in fact been paid into the bank. Certainly, the statute should not be so applied in behalf of a person sought to be made liable as a shareholder, when, as in the present case, he held, at the time the bank suspended and was put into the hands of a Receiver, a certificate of the shares subscribed for by him; enjoyed by receiving and retaining dividends, the rights of a shareholder; and appeared as a shareholder upon the books of the bank which were open to inspection, as of right, by creditors. (Rev. Stat. sec. 5210.)

As between the bank and the defendant, the latter having paid the amount of his subscription for shares in the proposed increase of capital, was entitled to all the rights of a shareholder, and therefore, as between himself and creditors of the bank, became a shareholder to the extent of the stock subscribed and paid for by him. That the bank, after obtaining authority to increase its capital, issued certificates of stock without the knowledge or approval of the Comptroller and proceeded to do business upon the basis of such increase



before the whole amount of the proposed increase of capital had been paid in, was a matter between it and the Government under whose laws it was organized, and did not render void subscriptions or certificates of stock based upon capital actually paid in, nor have the effect to relieve a shareholder, who became such by paying into the bank the amount subscribed by him, from the individual liability imposed by sec. 5151.

In *Union Nat. Bank vs. Matthews*, 98 U. S. 621, 629, 25 L. ed. 188, 190, it appeared that a National bank had made a loan of money, the repayment of which by the borrower was in part secured by a deed of trust on real estate. The borrower insisted that the taking of the deed of trust as security was in violation of the act of Congress. This court conceded that the statute by clear implication forbade a National bank from making a loan on real estate security, but held that the violation of the statute by the bank was a matter of which the borrower could not complain, saying: "We cannot believe it was meant that stockholders, and perhaps depositors and other creditors, should be punished and the borrower rewarded, by giving success to this defense whenever the offensive fact shall occur. The impending danger of a judgment of ouster and dissolution was, we think, the check, and none other, contemplated by Congress. That has been always the punishment prescribed for the wanton violation of a charter, and it may be made to follow whenever the proper public authority shall see fit to invoke its application. A private person cannot, directly or indirectly, usurp this function of the Government." The doctrine of the *Matthews Case* has been often reaffirmed. (*Whitney vs. Wyman*, 101 U. S. 392, 397, 25 L. ed. 1050, 1052; *Jones vs. New York Guaranty & Indemnity Co.* 101 U. S. 622, 628, 25 L. ed. 1030, 1035; *Fritts vs. Palmer*, 132 U. S. 282, 291, 33 L. ed. 317, 320, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 93; *Logan County Nat. Bank vs. Townsend*, 139 U. S. 67, 76, 35 L. ed. 107, 111, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 496; *Thompson vs. St. Nicholas Nat. Bank*, 146 U. S. 240, 251, 36 L. ed. 956, 961, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 66.)

By sec. 5201 of the Revised Statutes it is provided that "no association shall make any loan or discount on the security of the shares of its own capital stock, nor be the purchaser or holder of any such shares, unless such security or purchase shall be necessary to prevent loss upon a debt previously contracted in good faith; and stock so purchased or acquired shall, within six months from the time of its purchase, be sold or disposed of at public or private sale; or, in default thereof, a Receiver may be appointed to close up the business of the association." "While this section," this Court said in *First Nat. Bank vs. Stewart*, 107 U. S. 676, 677, 27 L. ed. 592, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 778, 779, "in terms prohibits a banking association from making a loan upon the security of shares of its own stock, it imposes no penalty, either upon the bank or borrower, if a loan upon such security be made. If, therefore, the prohibition can be urged against the validity of the transaction by anyone except the Government, it can only be done before the contract is executed, while the security is still subsisting in the hands of the bank. It can, then, if at all, be invoked to restrain or defeat the enforcement of the security. When the contract has been executed, the security sold, and the proceeds applied to the payment of the debt, the courts will not interfere with the matter. Both bank and borrower are in such case equally the subjects of legal censure, and they will be left by the courts where they have placed themselves."

These principles are, in our judgment, applicable to the case before us.

The defendant alleged that he subscribed for the fifty shares of the proposed increase of the bank's capital and deposited in the bank the amount necessary to pay for the stock, upon an understanding with the bank that the amount so deposited should be applied in payment of his subscription when all of the proposed increase of capital had been subscribed for and paid in, so that shares based upon such increase could be legally issued. But this does not present the whole case. The defendant, having paid in the amount subscribed, subsequently accepted a certificate for the shares subscribed for by him, knowing, as he must be conclusively presumed to have known, that the money paid in by him was the basis of such certificate. He assumed the position, and claimed and exercised the rights, of a shareholder. He drew money from the bank as dividends upon his stock.

No understanding which the defendant may have had with the officers of the bank prior to his completed subscription of stock could, under the circumstances disclosed, relieve him of the liability attaching to him as a shareholder, after he had, in the most unequivocal manner, claimed and was accorded by the bank the rights of a shareholder. It may be—although upon this question we express no opinion—that the defendant, by proper proceedings instituted in good faith and in due time before the suspension of the bank, could have had his subscription cancelled upon the ground that the whole amount of the proposed increase of capital had not in fact been paid in, although according to the pleadings the contrary was certified by the Comptroller. But immediately upon the failure of the bank the rights of creditors attached under sec. 5151, and a shareholder who was such when the failure occurred could not escape the individual liability prescribed by that section upon the ground that the bank had issued to him a certificate of stock before, strictly speaking, it had authority to do so. We concur with the Circuit Court of Appeals in holding that under sec. 5142, as modified by the act of May 1, 1886, each subscription for portions of increased capital “when paid up in full becomes valid and binding until the maximum is reached, and the statute does not incorporate into such subscriptions a condition that the subscriber paying his subscription in full can not become a holder of valid stock unless the maximum amount of the proposed increase is subscribed and paid for.” If this be a sound view, as we think it is, it follows that one holding stock in a National bank which is so far valid as to entitle him to enjoy, and who is accorded the right to enjoy, the privileges of a shareholder as against the bank, is a shareholder upon whom assessments may be made in conformity with sec. 5151.

The present suit is primarily in the interest of creditors of the bank. It is based upon a statute designed not only for their protection, but to give confidence to all dealing with National banks in respect of their contracts, debts and engagements, as well as to stockholders generally. If the subscriber became a shareholder in consequence of frauds practised upon him by others, whether they be officers of the bank or officers of the Government, he must look to them for such redress as the law authorizes, and is estopped, as against creditors, to deny that he is a shareholder, within the meaning of sec. 5151, if, at the time the rights of creditors accrued, he occupied and was accorded the rights appertaining to that position.

Although this question has not arisen in any former case in the precise

form in which it is here presented, the views we have expressed are in line with former adjudications.

[The Court then examined the cases of *Aspinwall vs. Butler*, 133 U. S. 596, 607; *Pacific Bank vs. Eaton*, 141 U. S. 227; *Thayer vs. Butler*, 141 U. S. 234; *First National Bank vs. Hawkins*, 174 U. S. 364, and *California Nat. Bank vs. Kennedy*, 167 U. S. 362.]

---

**CASHIER—RELEASE OF LIENS—SET-OFF.**

Supreme Court of Rhode Island, April 3, 1901.

**ELLIS, et al. vs. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF WOONSOCKET.**

The Cashier of a bank has no authority as such to release or surrender a lien which the bank has upon the deposit of a customer.

Where the Cashier is an officer of another corporation, and an indorser upon notes of such corporation held by the bank, he has no power to bind the bank by an agreement to transfer the deposit of such corporation into the name of its assignee, where this will defeat a lien of the bank upon such deposit for the amount of the notes.

Under the laws of Rhode Island a bank has no lien upon the deposit of a customer for the amount of an unmatured note of the depositor held by the bank, even though the maker is insolvent.

---

**ROGERS, J.:** This is a petition by the plaintiffs for a new trial of an action of assumpsit for a bank deposit in a jury trial waived case.

On February 10, 1899, the plaintiffs accepted the positions of assignees under a deed of assignment made February 6, 1899, by the American Worsted Company, a Rhode Island corporation, for the benefit of its creditors, the said assignor having become insolvent.

On said February 10, 1899, there was on deposit in the defendant bank in the name and to the credit of said American Worsted Company the sum of \$28,213.19, and at that same time the defendant bank was the holder and owner in its own right of three promissory notes made by said American Worsted Company, duly signed in its name by R. G. Randall, its treasurer, payable to the order of R. G. Randall, and by him indorsed. The first of said notes was for \$2,500, dated June 27, 1893, payable six months after date, and interest thereon had been paid up to December 20, 1898; the second was for \$3,700, dated June 30, 1898, payable six months after date; and the third was for \$2,500, dated September 5, 1898, and was also payable six months after date.

On said February 10, 1899, the plaintiffs, after having accepted said deed of assignment, and having deposited said deed for record, proceeded to the defendant bank and interviewed the Cashier thereof, informing him that they had accepted the trust, and that John W. Ellis, one of their number, was authorized to draw checks in their names. They obtained from him a statement of the amount of the deposit in the bank to the credit of the American Worsted Company, and the Cashier agreed to honor the checks drawn by Mr. Ellis, and directed the Assistant Cashier and the clerks to honor Mr. Ellis' checks.

There is some contradiction in the testimony, some of the witnesses swearing that the Cashier said that the bank would transfer the account to the assignees, and that it would be unnecessary to draw a check in the name of the company and redeposit it in the name of the assignees. The Cashier denies this, but admits that he did agree to honor Mr. Ellis' checks, and did notify his assistant and the clerks to honor them. At said interview no refer-

ence was made to the promissory notes above referred to, nor to any lien or claim for lien on the deposit. The justice presiding at the trial of the case found as a fact, from the evidence, that the Cashier did agree to transfer the account to the assignees.

On said February 10, 1899, the assignees made a deposit in said defendant bank upon a deposit ticket made out in their names as assignees, and the clerk of the bank receiving the deposit gave them a pass-book with the balance to the credit of the American Worsted Company as the first credit, and with the assignees' deposit of that day as the second credit, thereon; and thereafter, from time to time, several deposits made by the assignees were entered by the bank officials on that pass-book. In said book, when issued by the clerk of the bank, the place for the depositor's name was left blank, it being understood that the clerk of the assignees should stamp in the name with a rubber stamp, and the assignees' names were stamped in when the assignees' clerk returned to his office; but the bank clerk swore that the name to have been stamped in was that of the American Worsted Company, and not those of the assignees. Both the Cashier and the Assistant Cashier of the bank denied all knowledge of such a pass-book ever having been issued by the clerk, and swore that they never authorized any such issue.

The American Worsted Company's account was not changed on the books of the defendant bank, but on March 2, 1899, by direction of the Assistant Cashier, an account starting with an overdraft was opened with the assignees on the bank's books, and, four days later (March 6), that assignees' account was changed back again to the American Worsted Company's account, which during all this time had a large balance to its credit. On March 10, 1899, two days after the maturity of the last note held by the defendant bank, the assignees drew a check for the whole amount standing to the credit of the American Worsted Company on the books of the bank, but to their own credit on said pass-book, and payment was refused. Subsequently, on June 23, 1899, the bank allowed the sum of \$17,123.70 to be drawn from that account by the assignees, leaving still standing on the bank's books to the credit of the said company \$8,754.41, that being the amount of the three aforesaid notes, with interest, and which amount the bank claimed by way of set-off against said notes.

Is the bank entitled to hold, as against said assignees, all or any of said last-named balance? The situation in brief seems to have been as follows: Mr. Randall was treasurer of the American Worsted Company, was also Cashier of the defendant bank, and individually was indorser upon the notes signed by him as treasurer, which were discounted by the bank of which he was Cashier, and where his treasurer's bank account was kept. He knew the maker was insolvent, for he, as treasurer, had in its name just executed a deed of assignment for the benefit of its creditors to the plaintiffs. He knew that two of said notes were past due, and that the other would become due in about a month, to wit, on March 8, for he had signed the notes for the maker, had indorsed them as an individual, and then held the manual possession of them as Cashier of the defendant bank. He knew that the bank of which he was Cashier was entitled to a lien upon the very ample deposit of the American Worsted Company to secure all notes made by said company that were past due.

As indorser, one would suppose his interest would be best subserved by

the bank's keeping the American Worsteds Company's deposit in such name and condition as would enable the bank to get its full pay out of the maker's funds by way of set-off, so that he would not be called on as indorser. It may be, however, that he thought that, if the bank gave up its right to a lien on the deposit of the maker of the note, that would release the indorser.

When one was acting in so many diverse capacities, it is difficult to say which interest and what considerations might have affected him most; and the question certainly becomes very pertinent, how far he could act as the representative of one interest to its detriment in connection with the affairs of his other interest. "The general control and government of all the affairs and transactions of the bank," says Morse in his work on Banks and Banking (volume I, sec. 116), "rest with the board of directors. \* \* \* Organic banking laws and charters customarily confer upon the board the general power to conduct and manage the corporate business. But this language is practically only a recognition of the functions which the board would be entitled and called upon to exercise by the rules of the common law, and does not operate to enlarge those functions, or to designate them with any greater particularity. Neither can the duty thus conferred be construed as a requisition upon the directors to undertake the performance, in person, of all the acts called for by the daily routine of the business of the bank. \* \* \* Though it has been said that powers of a public character given by the Legislature to any body of individuals can never be sub-delegated by the recipients, yet this doctrine has never been allowed to prohibit bank directors from appointing agents and endowing them with sufficient powers for executing the resolutions of the board, and carrying on, without specific authority in each individual case, the ordinary transactions of daily business."

The general authority of the Cashier of a bank is thus given by the United States Supreme Court, speaking by Swayne, J., in *Merchants' Nat. Bank vs. State Nat. Bank* (10 Wall. 604, 649): "It is his duty to receive all the funds which come into the bank, and to enter them upon its books. The authority to receive implies and carries with it authority to give certificates of deposit and other proper vouchers. Where the money is in the bank, he has the same authority to certify a check to be good, charge the amount to the drawer, appropriate it to the payment of the check, and make the proper entry on the books of the bank. This he is authorized to do *virtute officii*. The power is inherent in the office. The Cashier is the executive officer, through whom the whole financial operations of the bank are conducted. He receives and pays out its moneys, collects and pays its debts, and receives and transfers its commercial securities. Tellers and other subordinate officers may be appointed, but they are under his direction—as it were, the arms by which designated portions of his various functions are discharged." Says the Court in *Bank vs. Kohner*, 58 How. Prac. 267, 270: "It appears to be conceded by all writers on this important subject of banks and banking that a Cashier is the business officer of a bank, not only in the sense of one who transacts, and not of one who regulates or controls its affairs. His duty has reference to daily routine business, and not to matters involving discretionary authority, which belongs, unless delegated, to the board of directors. As has been quaintly said, 'They are the mind, and he is the hands, of the corporation.' Another likens the directors to the judges, and the Cashier to the clerk of a court. The former adjudicate and direct; the latter executes their mandate. Such an

officer, publicly acknowledged as such, is invested with such power as judicial sanction or banking usages have recognized and acknowledged as belonging to the office he holds, and it is for the court to decide whether or not any particular duty is within his authority." "Cashiers of a bank are held out to the public," says the United States Supreme Court, speaking by Clifford, J., in *Case vs. Bank* (100 U. S. 446, 454), "as having authority to act according to the general usage, practice and course of business conducted by such institutions; and their acts, within the scope of such usage, practice and course of business, will in general bind the bank in favor of third persons 'possessing no other knowledge.' (Minor vs. Bank, 1 Pet. 46). \* \* \* Such an officer is *virtute officii* intrusted with the notes, securities and other funds of the bank, and is held out to the world by the bank as its general agent for the transaction of its affairs, within the scope of authority, evidenced by such usage, practice and course of business."

In *Olney vs. Chadsey* (7 R. I. 224), the supreme court of this State, speaking through Ames, C. J., said: "The President of a bank in Rhode Island has no authority, as such, to surrender or release the claims of the bank against any one, and, if he possesses such authority, it is not *virtute officii*, but must be derived, as the jury were instructed, from the board of directors, by their vote, or from their assent, express or implied." In that case the President was also the manager of the bank, but we see no reason why the above statement is not equally applicable to a Cashier, who is also the manager, or executive officer, of a bank.

The authorities conclusively show that, under ordinary circumstances, the Cashier of a bank is authorized to allow a bank balance to be drawn out. He can, of course, receive deposits, and the deposit slips or tickets accompanying the deposit show on what account such deposits are received, and how they are to be credited. In this case all deposits after the first one (with a single exception, where a deposit ticket of the American Worsted Company was used by mistake), were made by the plaintiffs in the defendant bank upon a ticket in their names as assignees, and were entered in a pass-book issued by the bank's clerk, though such entry, it is declared, was without the knowledge of the Cashier. The Cashier knew, however, that deposits were so made on deposit tickets, or he should have known, as he had abundant opportunity of knowing. He swore that he authorized the assignees to draw from the account of the American Worsted Company in their names, and the finding of the trial justice was that the Cashier had agreed to the transfer of the whole account to the assignees' names, so that such action by the Cashier, together with the possession of a pass-book in their names which appeared to have been duly issued, undoubtedly led them to believe that the account stood on the books of the bank just as it stood on the pass-book.

There is no question that the account was not transferred from the name of the American Worsted Company to the names of the assignees by check, though the finding of the trial justice establishes the fact that the Cashier did agree to transfer the account, which finding of fact was correct, we think, from the weight of the evidence; and, as said by the Supreme Court of Indiana in *McEwen vs. Davis*, 39 Ind. 109, 112: "The banks may pay the money upon an oral order, or transfer it from one account to another, and such oral order will be a sufficient authority and justification for so doing." (See, also, *Neff vs. Bank*, 89 Mo. 581.)

We have already referred to the equivocal position of Randall in this matter. Let us briefly scan the position of the assignees. The plaintiffs, as assignees of the American Worsted Company, knew, of course, that Randall was the treasurer of the insolvent company, for it held an assignment just executed by him as such. They knew also that he was the Cashier of the defendant bank. They must have known, as it seems to us, for they had ample opportunity to know, that the bank held the assignor's notes indorsed by Randall.

We say must have known, for they had possession of the assignor's books, and the evidence discloses that the former clerk of the assignor became their clerk, the assignor's treasurer was on friendly terms with them, and, naturally, if they did not already actually know what of the assignor's paper was held by the bank, they, as business men, would have inquired, when seeking to take possession of the assigned property that properly belonged to them; and they knew that, as to any paper made by the assignor that was due, the bank would be entitled to a lien *pro tanto* on its bank deposit to secure the same, for, of the three assignees present at the defendant's bank on February 10, 1899, one was a trained lawyer, and then, too, they took with them another well-known lawyer as their legal adviser. The assignees took only what the assignor could have taken, and, if it was necessary to bring suit to reduce the bank deposit to their own possession, they must have brought suit in the name of the American Worsted Company. Knowing all these things, as they must have known them, they also must have known that Randall, being treasurer of the American Worsted Company and an indorser on its paper, was not a proper person to represent the bank in dealing with that company's deposit.

For a Cashier, representing the interests of the bank, to surrender, or agree to surrender, the deposit of a maker of overdue paper known to be insolvent, would have been an astonishing act for a disinterested Cashier to perform; but such an act for a Cashier with the environments of this one to be guilty of rouses a strong suspicion that his other interests outweighed in his mind the interests of the bank, that he was in duty bound to look out for, if assuming to be then acting for the bank. It was his duty, as Cashier, to protect the claim of the bank. If he, as treasurer, had drawn a check for more money than he was entitled to demand, and, as Cashier, had paid it, knowing that it was drawn for a larger sum than the bank was under legal obligation to pay, the transaction would have been a fraud of the plainest kind, and the money could have been recovered from any one who took it with notice of the fraud; and yet Randall's action in allowing so much of the assignor's deposit as the bank could properly claim a lien upon to be drawn out, would be just as injurious to the bank. However it might have been as to the note not then due, yet as to the two notes then overdue the assignees would be in no worse position than they were before, if they do not recover the amount of those two overdue notes, for they have been guilty of no breach of duty as to the assigned estate, and they will suffer no loss by not getting what they had no right to expect to get. A Cashier, according to the authorities, has no right to surrender security without the direction of the board of directors; and though, technically, paying checks on a bank deposit may not be surrendering security, as giving up the possession of bonds or other collateral security or releasing indorsers would be, yet the result is the same when the depositor has become so notoriously insolvent as to have made

an assignment for the benefit of its creditors, and its assignees apply for the whole of the deposit for the very purpose of thwarting claims for liens, and of removing the administration of the whole estate from the hands of the assignor.

As said by the Supreme Court of the United States, through Clifford, J., in *Case vs. Bank*, *supra*: "Authorities to show that the acts of a Cashier or other officer of a bank, within the scope of the general usage, practice, and course of business of banking institutions, are binding on the corporation in favor of third persons transacting business with it, are quite numerous, provided it appears that the persons dealing with the officer did not know at the time that he was transcending his authority. (*Lloyd vs. Bank*, 15 Pa. 172; *Bank vs. Warren*, 7 Hill, 91; *Bank vs. Steward*, 37 Me. 519, 522.")

Whatever the relative weight of the argument as to whether, under ordinary circumstances, turning the deposit in question over to the assignees would not be technically a surrender of security, yet in the extraordinary circumstances of this case we think the assignees, with their knowledge, must be held to have known that Randall was transcending his authority, and hence they were not justified in dealing with them as Cashier, but should have resorted to the directors, who, it appears by the existence of this suit, repudiate any action of their Cashier tending to release the deposit from claim of lien.

We do not think the plaintiffs are entitled to recover as to so much of said bank deposit as is required to pay the notes of the American Worsted Company held by the defendant bank that were overdue on said February 10, 1899. We think, however, the case was different as to the note not then due. It was the plain duty of the Cashier, as it would have been of the directors of the bank, to have allowed the transfer of the deposit so far as said note not due on or before February 10, 1899, was concerned, for the bank then had no claim for lien on the deposit for that note, and could not have pleaded that note as a set-off, for Gen. Laws, c. 239 sec. 11, provides that the demand a defendant may set off must be one "which existed at the time of the commencement of the action and then belonged to the defendant in his own right and for which he might maintain a suit in his own name." (See, also, *Nightingale vs. Chafee*, 11 R. I. 609, 620.)

It was the duty of the plaintiffs, as assignees, under the deed of assignment, to reduce the assets of the assigned estate into possession, and the way to do it as to this deposit was either to withdraw the deposit from the defendant bank, or else to have it transferred out of the name of the assignor and into their own names, so as to have prevented the accruing of liens upon it. (*Tobey vs. Bank*, 9 R. I. 236, 239.)

The action of the Cashier in leading them to believe, until after the maturity of the third note, that said deposit had been transferred to their names, prevented their suing the bank for it when it had no lien upon the deposit for the amount of that note, whereby the assignees, or the creditors of the estate they represented, suffered loss.

While we think that the wrongful act of the Cashier should not be allowed to inure to the injury of the bank in regard to overdue notes, we also think that the bank should not be allowed to reap any advantage by their repudiation of the conduct of their Cashier so far as such conduct was proper and did not militate against the bank's interests, and which repudiation would inure to the detriment of the plaintiffs as assignees. If the directors themselves, on



February 10, 1899, had refused to transfer the deposit so far as the unmatured note was concerned, the bank could have been compelled to pay said deposit, *pro tanto*, by a suit brought against it in the name of the American Worsted Company, and what it would have been the plain duty of the directors to have done in regard to said deposit cannot be repudiated now because done by the Cashier, his action as to so much of said deposit not being in dereliction of his duty.

In our opinion, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover a sum equal to the amount of the note made by the plaintiffs' assignor and held by the defendant bank on February 10, 1899, but which had not then matured, with interest thereon from said last-mentioned date.

Judgment for the plaintiffs for \$2,817.09, with costs.

---

*FORGED CHECKS—KNOWLEDGE OF DEPOSITOR—FAILURE TO NOTIFY BANK.*

Appellate Court of Indiana, April 28, 1901.

NEAL vs. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LEBANON, IND.

Where a husband learns that his wife has forged his signature to checks which have been paid, and he examines the checks and pass-book, but fails to notify the bank, he cannot dispute the validity of other checks afterwards forged in the same way.

---

This was an action to recover the amount of an alleged balance with the defendant. The sum in dispute was the amount the bank had paid out on checks forged by the plaintiff's wife. The court found that it had been the practice for more than a year for plaintiff's wife to write all his checks; that during this period several checks had been drawn by her without his authority and paid by the bank, and that these vouchers had been returned by the bank to the plaintiff with the statement of his account, and had come to the knowledge of the plaintiff. The checks which caused the dispute were drawn by the wife subsequent to this time.

HENLEY, C. J.: The relation and relative obligations which arise between a bank and its depositing customers are, in general, simply those of debtor and creditor. The deposits are regarded as loans to the bank without interest, and the money goes into the general fund, and is used by the bank for its own benefit in its usual financial operations. The bank thus gets the benefit of the loan of the depositor's money, and as a compensation to the depositor there is an implied obligation on the part of the bank to honor and pay on presentation the checks and drafts of the customer until his deposit is exhausted. The deposit creates a debt which is discharged *pro tanto* by the payment of the depositor's checks. (See *Boyden vs. Bank*, 65 N. C. 13; *Himstedt vs. Bank*, 46 Ark. 537; *Perley vs. Muskegon Co.* 32 Mich. 132; *McLain vs. Wallace*, 103 Ind. 562, 5 N. E. 911.)

The rule of law that a bank is presumed to know the signatures of its depositors, and that it pays forged checks at its peril, is too well settled to need the citation of authorities to sustain it. But, if the depositor's attention is called to the forgery, and he fails to complain, and acquiesces in the action of the bank, he, to all intents and purposes, makes the forger his agent, and relieves the bank from liability as to all amounts paid out after the attention of the depositor had been called to the action of the bank. The reason of

this rule is that the depositor owes some duty as such to the bank. If his laches or negligence is the cause of the bank paying out of his account, which it would not have paid had it been in possession of the facts known to him, and of which he negligently omitted to put it in possession, the loss then must fall upon the depositor.

*Bank vs. Allen*, 100 Ala. 476, 14 South. 335, 27 L. R. A. 426, was an action against a bank to recover a deposit. The money had been paid out upon forged checks signed by the depositor's clerk. The forgeries covered a period of six months. The depositor was furnished each month with a statement of his account and all the checks which had been paid returned to him with the statement. It was therein held that the bank was only liable to the depositor for the payments made before the furnishing of the first monthly statement.

In *Bank vs. Morgan*, 117 U. S. 96, 6 Sup. Ct. 657, 29 L. Ed. 811, it is held that the pass-book of a depositor, balanced at intervals by the bank, and returned to him, is only an account stated, and is not conclusive; but that, where he omits to examine the charges therein, and canceled checks returned as vouchers with the pass-book, and by so doing fails to discover that the amounts of a number of checks have been raised by his clerk, to whose care he has intrusted his account with the bank, and he is thus enabled to give timely notice of the frauds to the bank, he is guilty of such negligence that, in an action by him to recover the amounts paid out on altered checks, it is error for the court to direct a verdict in his favor.

Much stronger facts are presented in the case at bar. Here the checks and pass-book were examined by appellant, or, at least, the fact that the forgeries had been committed were brought to his attention. Yet he wholly failed to notify appellee of such facts, and by so doing he in fact acquiesced in appellee's action in paying the checks.

In *Wind vs. Bank*, 39 Mo. App. 72, it was held that, where checks of a depositor on a bank are paid by the bank on forged indorsement of the payees, if the depositor, when his bank book is returned to him, balanced, with the canceled checks as vouchers, having knowledge of the circumstances from which by reasonable inquiry he could discover the forgeries, fails to exercise such reasonable care and inquiry, and the bank thereby suffers loss, or is placed in a worse position than if such inquiry had been made, and the facts ascertained, and communicated to it within a reasonable time, the depositor loses his recourse against the bank.

In *Weinstein vs. Bank*, 69 Tex. 38, 6 S. W. 171, it was held in an action against a bank to recover money on forged checks, that the instruction was not misleading which charged that the bank would be liable unless plaintiff had neglected to examine his account and report the forgeries for such a length of time as worked an injury to the bank; that the bank was injured if, by reason of plaintiff's negligence, it lost the means of recovering the money, which it would have had if notified within a reasonable time; and that if, by reason of plaintiff's delay, the opportunity of protection is lost, plaintiff would not be entitled to recover. (See, also, *Morse, Banks*, Sec. 472.)

What we have said disposes of the question raised upon the demurrer to the answer, and also upon the question raised by the exception to the conclusion of law stated upon the special finding of facts.

We find no error. Judgment affirmed.

## CONDENSED LEGAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST TO BANKS.

---

*ACTION BY NATIONAL BANK—JURISDICTION.*

A suit in a Federal court by a National bank located in another State will not lie where declaration fails to show diverse citizenship, and the record nowhere supplies the omission, as by Act July 12, 1882, Sec. 4 (22 Stat. 163, c. 290), National banks were deprived of the right, by virtue of their National character, to sue in the Federal courts.

Thomas, *et al.* vs. National Bank of D. O. Mills, 106 Fed. Rep. (U. S.) 438.

---

*BANK OFFICERS—DEBTS TO BANK—INSOLVENCY—SET-OFF.*

Where the Vice-President and attorney of an insolvent bank was indebted to it on notes secured by mortgage, he was estopped to set up claims arising from a liability accruing against him as surety on an attachment bond, and for money which he borrowed on his personal credit and gave to the bank's Cashier, as a set-off against his liability on the debt due the bank; and hence he was not entitled to maintain a bill to restrain the Receiver of the bank from foreclosing the mortgage.

Chapman, *et al.* vs. Cutrer, 29 So. Rep. (Miss.) 467.

---

*BANKRUPTCY—PAYMENT TO GENERAL ASSIGNEE THROUGH MISTAKE.*

An insolvent firm made a general assignment, and afterwards, on the same day, gave its check to the assignee for the amount to its credit in bank. The bank, in ignorance of the assignment, issued its due-bill for the amount, payable through the clearing-house, but afterwards, learning the facts, proposed to stop payment, and it was stipulated that the amount should be placed on deposit subject to the bank's rights, to be thereafter determined. The bank held unmatured notes of the firm for an amount in excess of the deposit. The firm was subsequently adjudged a bankrupt, and the estate came into the hands of its trustee. *Held*, that as the bank was misled into issuing its due-bill on the check of a depositor who no longer had title to the fund, it was entitled to a restoration of the money, and to hold the same under the bankruptcy act as an offset to the notes of the bankrupt, although it would not have been entitled to so hold it as against the assignee under the laws of the State, since the assignment was in itself an act of bankruptcy, which gave the bank the right to have the estate administered in a court of bankruptcy.

*In re Meyer, et al.* 107 Fed. Rep. (U. S.) 86.

---

*BILLS AND NOTES—BANK CASHIER'S MISREPRESENTATIONS.*

Defendant signed notes payable to a bank for the accommodation of the Cashier, and after maturity was told that they were not paid, whereupon he executed other notes for similar amounts, intended by him as renewals of the prior notes. *Held*, in an action by the bank on the last notes given, that the bank was not chargeable with misrepresentations made by the Cashier, as he was acting in his own interests, and adversely to those of the bank.

State Sav. Bank of Ionia vs. Montgomery, 85 N. W. Rep. (Mich.) 879.

*CASHIER'S DUTIES—INSOLVENCY OF DEPOSITOR—LIENS AGAINST DEPOSITS.*

Plaintiffs were the assignees of a corporation which had a considerable deposit with the defendant bank. At the time of the assignment the defendant held three of the corporation's notes, which defendant's Cashier, who was treasurer of the corporation, had personally indorsed. On the assignment the plaintiffs informed defendant's Cashier of the same, who agreed to transfer the deposit account of the corporation to plaintiffs, and to honor the checks of one of them. *Held*, in an action to recover the balance of the deposits retained by the bank as payment for the unpaid notes, that the defendant's Cashier was not the proper bank officer with whom the plaintiffs should have dealt, because of his interest in the affairs of the corporation, and hence the agreement to transfer the deposit, being repudiated by the directors, was void.

Where a bank depositor made an assignment, having at the time a considerable deposit in the bank, which held three of its notes, two of which had matured and had not been paid, the bank could only retain from the deposit a sum sufficient to pay the two notes matured at the time of the assignment; the unmatured note not being a set-off under Gen. Laws, c. 239, sec. 11, providing that a set-off must be a demand which existed at the time of the commencement of the action.

*Ellis, et al. vs. First Nat. Bank of Woonsocket*, 48 At. Rep. (R. I.) 936.

*CLEARING-HOUSE—NOTES—CUSTOM—VALIDITY.*

In an action by one bank against another to recover the amount of a note paid as an alleged conditional payment through a clearing-house, a ruling that a custom which fixed the time within business hours when the conditional payment of a note, made by the note having gone through a clearing-house, became absolute, would be invalid, was error.

In an action by one bank against another to recover the amount of a note paid as an alleged conditional payment through the clearing-house, a finding that a certain clearing-house rule "had not been established by a universal, uniform, and general custom" was not a finding that no such custom existed as a fact; and hence an erroneous instruction in regard to the custom constituted reversible error.

*Atlas Nat. Bank vs. National Exch. Bank*, 60 N. E. Rep. (Mass.) 121.

*COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY—POWER TO MAKE SUCCESSIVE ASSESSMENTS.*

The decision of the Comptroller of the Currency that it is necessary to collect, and his requisition of a certain percentage of the liability of the shareholders of a National bank, in order to pay its debts, is not a decision that a larger percentage will not be necessary, and he has plenary power to make successive assessments until the full liability of the shareholder is exhausted.

*Deweese vs. Smith, et al.* 106 Fed. Rep. (U. S.) 438.

*COLLECTIONS—TRUST FUND—EVIDENCE.*

Where a check is sent to a bank for collection, and such bank, after collection, retains and uses the proceeds of the check in its general business, it

will be deemed to be an agent and trustee of the owner of the check, and the money so wrongfully retained and used to be a trust fund, which the owner may follow and reclaim if it can be identified and the rights of no innocent third parties have intervened. If the trust fund has been mingled with other assets of the trustee and it appears that such assets have been thereby appreciably augmented and bettered, a trust will be impressed on such assets, and the *cestui que* trust will be entitled to have the trust fund reclaimed and taken out of the assets with which it is mingled.

Kansas State Bank vs. First State Bank of Marion, *et al* 64 Pac. Rep. (Kan.) 634.

---

DEPOSITORS IN SAVINGS BANKS—INSOLVENCY—ATTORNEY'S FEES.

To charge a party with notice of the dishonor of a bill or note because notice was given to another person as his agent, it must be shown that it was within the scope of the agent's authority to receive such notice.

Depositors in Savings banks organized under the laws of this State are creditors of the bank, and have the same rights as depositors in other banks.

Where a party indebted to a bank after it becomes insolvent purchases from certain depositors their deposits in the bank, and the amounts of such deposits so purchased are by the bank officials entered as credits on the debt owing by such party, such payments are invalid, under Sec. 2193, Rev. St., and will not be binding on a Receiver subsequently appointed, who sues to recover the debt owing by said party.

Robinson vs. Aird, 29 So. Rep. (Fla.) 633.

---

DEPOSIT IN BANK—GIFT—POWER OF ATTORNEY.

A gift of money in a bank, on deposit in the donor's name, may be legally executed by the person making such gift, although the credit of the deposit is not changed on the books of the bank, but continues in the name of the donor, provided, in the absence of fraud, there is some substantial act of the donor giving the donee the right to have such money and appropriate it.

A power of attorney to the donee from the owner of such deposit, giving a right to draw the same from the bank in the name of the donor, but with a purpose not expressed in the instrument to confer dominion over such deposit to the donee, may effectuate such gift and consummate the same, under the facts as found in this case.

Murphy, *et al.* vs. Bordwell (Lumberman's Nat. Bank, Garnishee), 85 N. W. Rep. (Minn.) 915.

---

INSOLVENCY—STOCKHOLDERS' LIABILITY—LIMITATION.

The liability of a stockholder of a National bank to respond to an assessment on his stock in case of insolvency of the bank is contractual, though founded on the National Banking Act (Rev. St. Sec. 5151), making shareholders individually liable for all debts of the bank to the extent of the par value of their stock therein, since an assent to the liability attached to the ownership of bank stock is implied by his voluntary act of acquiring it; and if he is a resident of Washington, and the bank is located there, a suit to enforce such liability is governed by Ballinger's Ann. Codes and St. Sec. 4800, subd. 3, which provides that an action on a contract or liability, express or

implied, which is not in writing, and does not arise out of any written instrument, may be commenced within three years after the cause of action shall have accrued.

*Aldrich vs. McClaine*, 106 Fed. Rep. (U. S.) 791.

---

*JOINT DEPOSIT—JOINT PROPERTY OF HUSBAND AND WIFE.*

A husband deposited money in a bank, and took the certificate jointly in the names of himself and wife, and stated to the banker that he did so to enable the wife to draw the money on his death. He was informed by the banker that the latter would pay either husband or wife. The husband gave the certificate to the wife to keep, but there was no evidence that he intended to part with the title thereto. *Held*, not sufficient to show a gift to the wife, and hence would not prevent one-half of such sum from passing to the executor of the husband.

*In re Brown's Estate*, 85 N. W. Rep. (Iowa) 617.

---

*STOCKHOLDERS' LIABILITY—LOSS BY RECEIVER—ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT.*

Under the National Banking Act (Rev. St. Sec. 5151), requiring that the shareholders of every National bank shall be held individually responsible, equally and ratably, and not one for another, for all debts of the bank to the extent of the amount of their stock, at the par value thereof, in addition to the amount invested in such stock, a stockholder cannot be required to make good the failure of another stockholder to pay his assessment; and, where an assessment has been made, it must be considered, for the purpose of making a second assessment, as if the entire assessment had been paid.

Where stockholders of a National bank have paid an assessment to a Receiver of the bank, the Receiver becomes the trustee of the creditors; and any loss he may sustain by investments, in endeavoring to save the debts of the bank, cannot be charged to the shareholders, and made the subject of an additional assessment.

*Lease vs. Barschall, et al.* 106 Fed. Rep. (U. S.) 762.

---

*MORTGAGE—RELEASE—ACTS OF DIRECTORS.*

A mortgage to a bank is released, without being delivered up, where the directors of the bank pass a resolution releasing it, holding the personal security only, to enable the mortgagor to improve the property, and he does so and conveys the property, and no claim is made on the mortgage till ten years later, and then by the bank's assignee.

The act of the directors of a bank in releasing a mortgage by resolution may be proved by parol; witness testifying that he did not think this action appeared on their records, and there being no evidence that it did so appear.

*In re Bank of West Superior*, 85 N. W. Rep. (Wis.) 501.

---

*MORTGAGE TO NATIONAL BANK.*

Where security on real estate has been taken by a National bank on a contemporaneous loan, the same may be enforced, notwithstanding the provisions of the United States statute prohibiting that character of security.

*First Nat. Bank of Sutton vs. Grosshans, et al.* 85 N. W. Rep. (Neb.) 542.

*NATIONAL BANKS—OWNING CORPORATE STOCK.*

As incidental to the power of loaning money on personal security, a National bank, in the usual course of business, may accept stock of another corporation as collateral, and by the enforcement of its rights as pledgee it may become the owner of the collateral, and subject itself to liability as other stockholders.

Fulton vs. National Bank of Denison, 62 S. W. Rep. (Tex.) 85.

*PAYMENT OF CLAIMS—PRIORITY.*

To entitle a claimant to a priority over other creditors of an insolvent bank on the ground that he is a *cestui que* trust, and not a creditor, as to the proceeds of drafts sent by him to the bank for collection, and collected by the bank, but not remitted, he must show that such proceeds, in some form, have gone into the assets of the bank; and, if he fails to do so, he must share ratably with other creditors in the distribution of the assets.

White vs. Commercial and Farmers' Bank of Rockhill, *et al.* 38 S. E. Rep. (S. C.) 453.

*RECEIVER'S JUDGMENT FOR ASSESSMENT ON ESTOPPEL AS TO SUBSEQUENT ASSESSMENT.*

A judgment in favor of the Receiver of an insolvent National bank for the recovery of an assessment made by the Comptroller upon a shareholder does not estop him from maintaining a second action against the same shareholder for another assessment which had been made or was not due when the first action was commenced.

Deweese vs. Smith, *et al.* 106 Fed. Rep. (U. S.) 438.

*TERMS OF CONTRACT OF NATIONAL BANKS.*

The contract of the shareholder of a National bank with the bank and its creditors regarding its debts is that, to an amount not exceeding the par value of his shares of stock, and not exceeding his equal and ratable proportion, he will pay, at such times and in such amounts as the Comptroller of the Currency shall demand, the debts and obligations of his bank.

Deweese vs. Smith, *et al.* 106 Fed. Rep. (U. S.) 438.

*USURY BY NATIONAL BANK—LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.*

The inclusion of usurious interest as principal in notes given to a National banking association does not constitute a payment of the interest within the meaning of U. S. Rev. Stat. Sec. 5196, 5198, so as to start the running of the statute against a right of action to recover twice the amount of the interest paid; but "the usurious transaction" from the date of which the statute begins to run is the time when the usurious interest is actually paid.

National Bank of Daingerfield, Plff. in Err., vs. G. W. Ragland, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. (U. S.) 536.

## DECISIONS OF CANADIAN COURTS AFFECTING BANKERS.

[Edited by John Jennings, B. A., LL. B.; Barrister.]

*SECURITY FOR GOODS—SOLE BOND OF CHARTERED BANK.*

ONTARIO BANK vs. MERCHANTS' BANK OF HALIFAX (Ontario Law Reports, Vol. 1, 235).

**STATEMENT OF FACTS:** The Merchants' Bank of Halifax (now the Royal Bank of Canada) obtained a judgment in the High Court of Justice against the Ottawa Cold Storage and Freezing Company, and seized certain goods under execution, which were afterwards claimed by the Ontario Bank. Upon the application of the sheriff, an interpleader order was made by a local judge at Ottawa directing the trial of an issue in the High Court of Justice between the Ontario Bank and the Merchants' Bank of Halifax, and providing that the goods should be retained by the Ontario Bank upon their giving security therefor to the satisfaction of the deputy clerk of the Crown at Ottawa. The Ontario Bank filed its own bond as security, and the deputy clerk approved of it. The Merchants' Bank of Halifax applied to the local judge to disallow the bond, but he also approved of it, at least so far as to hold that there was no necessity for sureties on it.

The appeal was heard by Sir John Boyd, Chancellor, at the Ottawa Weekly Court, March 8, 1901.

**DECISION:** The usual interpleader order was made requiring, "security to be given at the satisfaction" of the deputy clerk of the Crown at Ottawa; that officer had approved of the sole bond of the claimants, the Ontario Bank, and his ruling is affirmed by the learned local judge. The appeal is on the ground that the bond should be entered into by sureties in addition to the bank and that both the bank and the sureties should file affidavits of justification.

By the order nothing is said as to the form of security. It has been usual to give the security in the shape of a bond with one or more sureties, but the addition of another person besides the claimant is not inherent in the meaning of the term "security." The deputy clerk possesses the ordinary knowledge of the community as to the financial standing of public banks and does not need to call for affidavits in order to satisfy himself of their substantial condition. In the absence of all legal evidence one way or the other and having regard to the conclusion of the registrar and the local judge, the bond of the bank should be accepted as sufficient security for the value of this property.

Bond allowed and appeal dismissed with costs.

*CHOSE IN ACTION—ASSIGNMENT OF—NOTICE OF—NOT BOUND BY EXECUTION UNTIL SEIZURE—RIGHT OF CREDITOR SUING INDIVIDUALLY TO IMPUGN SECURITY AS CONTRARY TO THE BANK ACT.*

RENNIE vs. QUEBEC BANK (Ontario Law Reports, Volume 1, page 303).

**STATEMENT OF FACTS:** In the year 1886 one Hugo Block became a special partner, under the act respecting limited partnerships, in the firm of Reid, Taylor & Bayne, and continued so to be until February 4, 1896, on which date he assigned to the defendants, the Quebec Bank, his special capital of \$20,000 in the firm of Reid, Taylor & Bayne, together with a certain sum



claimed to be the profits accrued to him as a partner in the said business. This assignment was given to the bank as security for an indebtedness from him to wit. Notice of the assignment was not given to the firm until July 28, 1896.

In the meantime John Rennie, one of the plaintiffs herein, obtained judgment against Hugo Block for \$4,000 and on July 10, 1896, before notice of the assignment to the bank had been given, placed execution in the hands of the sheriff.

Nothing appears to have been done either on the execution or the assignment until in 1898 the firm of Reid, Taylor & Bayne was ordered by the court to be wound up. After the winding up order the sheriff sold and conveyed to the plaintiff M. J. Rennie (wife of the judgment creditor) all the shares and interest of Hugo Block exigible under execution in the partnership assets of the business. M. J. Rennie thereupon notified the liquidator of the defunct firm that she claimed to be entitled to whatever sum was found to represent the interest of Hugo Block as ascertained in the winding up; but this sum, \$16,000, was notwithstanding paid by the liquidator to the Quebec Bank under the assignment of February 4, 1896.

The claims of the joint plaintiffs were separate and somewhat inconsistent, John Rennie claiming to have the transfer of 1896 set aside as a transaction fraudulent against creditors as giving an undue and fraudulent preference to the Quebec Bank. M. J. Rennie claimed (1) that no title passed to the bank under this assignment until notice thereof was given to the firm of Reid, Taylor & Bayne; (2) that the execution under which her conveyance was made was in the sheriff's hands before such notice was given and therefore bound all the interest of Hugo Block in the partnership; (3) and that if such notice was not necessary then the bank took no title under the assignment, because it was contrary to the provisions of the Bank Act, Sec. 64, 74, 75.

JUDGMENT: The case was tried before Sir William Meredith, C. J., and was argued on appeal before the Divisional Court composed of Sir John Boyd, C., and Robertson, J., who sustained the original judgment.

The claim of the male plaintiff that the assignment was void as being an undue preference and fraudulent against creditors was dismissed summarily on the evidence which showed that at the time the assignment was made there was nothing to show insolvency, actual or impending, by the judgment debtor, Hugo Block. As to M. J. Rennie's first contention it was held that under the statute governing assignments of choses in action in 1896 no notice was necessary to perfect the transfer. On the second point it was held that "that intangible thing, the interest of the judgment debtor in partnership assets, cannot be sold by the sheriff under an execution. He cannot sell the book debts; he cannot sell the good will; he has a right to seize the tangible property of the partners and to sell the interest of the judgment debtor in these assets. He could have seized his partnership stock-in-trade and have sold the interest of Block in that, whatever difficulty there might have been in working out the rights of the purchaser under such bill of sale." The sheriff, however seized nothing tangible and attempted to sell the intangible interest of the judgment debtor in the partnership assets, which he could not lawfully do. Further, a chose in action is not bound by the putting of a writ of execution in the sheriff's hands but only by actual seizure thereunder.

On the branch of the case that the bank took nothing under the assign-

ment, because it was contrary to the Bank Act (1890) Sec. 64, 74, 75, the point was not decided on the merits; the court sustained an objection that such a question cannot be raised by a separate creditor suing not on behalf of all but seeking preferential payment out of the security assigned and held by the bank for a valid debt.

The action was dismissed with costs.

**NOTE:** The sections of the Bank Act (1890) referred to in the judgment are those which prohibit a bank from lending money on the security of goods, wares and merchandise except to wholesale manufacturers, when the security is to be taken in the special form provided by the statute and is taken contemporaneously with the advance and not, as in this case, to secure an overdue indebtedness.

(By chapter 51, R. S. O. (1897) an absolute assignment by writing shall be effectual in law to pass and transfer the legal right to a debt or chose in action only from the date of notice in writing to the debtor, trustee, or other person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to receive or claim the debt or chose in action.)

*WILL—CONSTRUCTION OF IN QUEBEC—GIFT OF LAND INALIENABLE AND UNSEIZABLE—SEIZURE OF BY BANK UNDER EXECUTION.*

LA BANQUE JACQUES CARTIER vs. TOZER (10 Quebec King's Bench Reports, p. 81).

**STATEMENT OF FACTS:** The plaintiff bank was judgment creditor of one William Tozer, whose father had died in the year 1869 leaving him considerable real property in the Province of Quebec. By the terms of the will the property was not to be alienated for fifteen years after the testator's death and was expressed to be unseizable. The bank directed the sheriff to seize this property upon its execution, whereupon the defendant disputed the right of the bank to do so in the courts.

**JUDGMENT:** It was held that the French Civil Code in force in Quebec governs the interpretation and consideration of wills made in that Province even though, as in this case, the testator was an Englishman and his will was drawn in the English language. As the French Civil Code permits the bequest of property on condition of its being unalienable and unseizable, and the court holding the terms of the will to mean that the property in question could not be voluntarily alienated for fifteen years, nor taken in execution by a creditor at any time, the bank's execution was held to be illegal and was vacated.

*RECOVERY OF STOLEN MONEY—RIGHT OF PERSON AIDING IN RECOVERY TO REWARD—REMUNERATION FOR DANGER INCURRED.*

WARK vs. THE PEOPLE'S BANK OF HALIFAX (Quebec Superior Court Reports Vol. 18, p. 486.)

**STATEMENT OF FACTS:** In February, 1900, the Danville branch of the defendant bank was entered by five thieves who stole therefrom \$5,000 in cash; the alarm was quickly given and the thieves pursued. At Windsor Mills the bank's manager instructed one Duchesneau to pursue and capture the thieves if possible.

Duchesneau organized a band of twelve men, among whom was Wark, the plaintiff, and they were successful, after pursuing the thieves into the forest and maintaining a hazardous running fight with them, in capturing them all and securing the return to the bank of \$4,000. Wark demanded from the

bank \$35 for his services, claiming to be recompensed for the grave danger he had undergone. The bank asserted that Wark had acted voluntarily and not from request and therefore, if he were entitled to anything, that \$5 was sufficient remuneration and that sum was tendered to him.

JUDGMENT: LEMIEUX, J., from whose graphic French the above statement is curtailed, in an exhaustive judgment held that a man *voluntarily* undertaking work requiring skill and courage can only charge a reasonable sum for his time if successful and that courage and pertinacity cannot be valued in money and therefore they cannot be taken into consideration in fixing the value of *voluntary* services. Wark, as a volunteer, may not have been entitled to recover anything had he been unsuccessful, but where a large sum was recovered partly through his efforts the maxim, "one must not be allowed to gain gratuitously at the expense of another" applies. The sum of \$5 was found sufficient to recompense Wark for the few hours spent in the pursuit, and his action was dismissed with costs.

---

## REPLIES TO LAW AND BANKING QUESTIONS.

---

Questions in Banking Law—submitted by subscribers—which may be of sufficient general interest to warrant publication will be answered in this department.

A reasonable charge is made for Special Replies asked for by correspondents—to be sent promptly by mail. See advertisement in back part of this number.

---

### FORGED CHECKS.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

CHICAGO, Ill., June 3, 1901.

SIR: A is a depositor in the bank B; C is in his employ and forged A's name to a check for \$375; D cashed the check for C without knowledge of the forgery, and presenting it to the bank for payment was given credit for the amount thereof, the bank at the time of the payment not discovering the forgery. Afterwards discovering the forgery it charged D with the amount thereof on its books and refused to honor D's check for an amount which D's deposit would have covered if the amount of the forged check had not been charged to D. Did the bank have a right to appropriate from D's deposit the amount that it had credited him with when the bank accepted the forged check?

BOOKKEEPER.

*Answer.*—No; A being a depositor in the bank, the bank is supposed to be familiar with his signature and where it pays a forged check to an innocent holder it cannot recover therefor.

---

### USURY—LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

CEDAR RAPIDS, Iowa, May 12, 1901.

SIR: Is a suit to recover usurious interest from a National bank commenced too late when commenced within two years of the maturity of the note but not within two years of its execution, the usurious interest being included in the face of the note?

A. R. T.

*Answer*—The United States law (Rev. St. Sec. 5198), covering this point says the action must be commenced within two years "from the time when the transaction occurred," and it has been held that the usurious transaction occurs when the note including the usury is executed, and that the action is therefore barred.

---

### NEGLIGENCE OF NOTARY.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

MACON, Ga., May 31, 1901.

SIR: Is a bank liable to the payee of a check under the following circumstances: A, in payment for a consignment of cotton gave his check to B, who deposited it in a Savannah bank for collection; the bank with which the check was deposited presented it to the bank on which it was drawn and the latter bank refused to pay for want of funds of the drawer

in its possession with which to pay it. The first bank then placed the check in the hands of a notary for protest, but through the negligence of the notary no notice of the dishonor of the check was sent to the payee and he did not discover that the check was not paid until some days thereafter. In the meantime the drawer of the check had become insolvent although at the time of the presentment of the check and for a couple of days thereafter he continued to conduct his business.

CASHIER.

*Answer.*—Under the laws of Georgia the bank could not be held liable for the negligence of the notary, unless it could be shown that the bank was grossly negligent in the selection of the notary. A different rule of construction prevails in New Jersey and some other States.

#### LIABILITY OF BANK FOR COLLECTIONS.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

SAN JOSE, Cal., May 3, 1901.

SIR: A draft was deposited with a bank for collection, the person on whom the draft was drawn being a resident of a distant town. The bank receiving the draft for collection forwarded it to its correspondent, a bank in the town in which the person resided on whom the draft was drawn. Through negligence of the latter bank the draft was not collected. Can the person who drew the draft hold the bank with which it was originally deposited responsible for the failure of its correspondent to collect the same?

PRESIDENT.

*Answer.*—In Minnesota he can do so; and this seems to be the rule supported by the best authority and is followed in most of the States. In Massachusetts, Illinois, Iowa and several other States it is held, however, that the drawer must look to the correspondent bank for reimbursement where the loss was occasioned by the fault of the latter.

#### TRACING DEPOSITS.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

EMPORIA, Kas., May 19, 1901.

SIR: A, a couple of days before it closed, deposited with a bank \$3,000 in one-thousand-dollar bills. At the time of the deposit the bank was in an insolvent condition and known by its officers to be so. There was not at the time of A's deposit nor at any subsequent time any other one-thousand-dollar bills on deposit in the bank and A's deposit was among the assets of the bank when it passed into the hands of the Receiver. Can A recover from the Receiver the three one-thousand-dollar bills deposited by him?

ASST. CASHIER.

*Answer.*—Yes; where officers of a bank knowing the bank to be insolvent receive deposits without informing the depositor, they perpetrate a fraud on the depositor; and the latter may follow the deposit so long as he can trace it or the proceeds thereof, but not after it has become indistinguishably mingled with the other funds of the bank.

#### CASHIER'S CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

BENTON HARBOR, Mich., May 24, 1901.

SIR: The Cashier of a bank issued a certificate of deposit to himself for \$5,000 on the bank of which he was Cashier. He afterwards disposed of the certificate, for value, to a third party. The Cashier became insolvent and the bank refused to honor the certificate of deposit, claiming that the Cashier did not have the money on deposit in the bank and that the certificate was wrongfully issued. Can the bank be made to pay the certificate?

*Answer.*—No; by issuing a certificate to himself the Cashier was representing both sides of the same transaction, which he is not permitted to do, and any one taking the certificate issued by himself to himself would be held to assume the risk of the truth of the recitals in the certificate.

#### PREFERENCES OF DIRECTORS.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

BUFFALO, N. Y., June 2, 1901.

SIR: Where a director in a bank, who is also director in a corporation having deposits in a bank, informs the officer of the incorporation that the bank is in a failing condition, and

acting upon such advice the corporation withdraws its deposit and immediately thereafter, on the same day the bank closes its doors, can the corporation be made to refund the amount so withdrawn?

STOCKHOLDER.

*Answer.*—No; the section of the corporation laws of New York, prohibiting the bank from transferring its property to its members for other than a full cash value, and from making an assignment preferring creditors, does not prevent the depositing corporation from withdrawing its deposit even though it acted upon the advice of a director who was also a director of the bank.

#### ACCEPTANCE OF CHECK.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

DENVER, Colo., May 13, 1901.

SIR: Our bank received from a Chicago bank a draft for collection against A. Upon presentation of the draft A gave in payment his check upon another bank and our bank remitted to the bank from which the collection was received the amount thereof. Upon presentation of the check next morning, payment was refused for want of funds and we immediately telegraphed the Chicago bank withdrawing remittance and notifying them of our failure to collect the draft. This telegram reached Chicago before our letter of advice. Can the Chicago bank hold us for the collection?

CASHIER.

*Answer.*—Your bank having accepted the check and surrendered the draft took the risk of the check not being good and is responsible for the amount thereof.

#### NEGLIGENCE IN PRESENTING DRAFT.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

INDIANAPOLIS, Ind., May 22, 1901.

SIR: A draft was received by a bank for collection on Monday against a groceryman residing in the town in which the bank was located. It failed to present the draft for payment until Friday, when the drawee refused payment; in the meantime the bank which had forwarded the draft for collection had credited the amount thereof to the drawer and permitted him to check out the amount thereof. When the notice of protest reached the forwarding bank the drawer had become insolvent. Is the bank that received the draft for collection responsible to the forwarding bank for the amount of the draft?

ENQUIRER.

*Answer.*—Yes.

#### CREDITS ACCORDED ON BILLS OF LADING.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

WHEELING, West Va., May 1, 1901.

SIR: Where a produce man has arranged with a bank for credit to the amount of a draft drawn on his consignee in New York for the value of purchase, accompanying his draft with a bill of lading of goods purchased, and has given checks on the bank for the purchase price of the produce shipped, is the bank compelled to pay the unpaid checks after receiving notice of the protest of the draft for non-payment?

A. C.

*Answer.*—As the bank gave the produce buyer credit on the draft with the understanding that the amount received was to be checked out for the payment of the produce, bill of lading of which was delivered to the bank, the bank cannot withdraw the credit to the prejudice of holders of the checks drawn upon the fund.

#### STOPPED CHECKS.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

SPRINGFIELD, Ill., June 2, 1901.

SIR: J. A. B. was a depositor in the bank, having about \$500 on deposit. Claiming a legal reason for not paying the same, he notified the bank not to pay a certain check for \$200 that he had given to B. The check was presented to the bank for payment by C who had cashed it for B. In accordance with instructions the bank refused to honor the check and later J. A. B. withdrew his deposit from the bank. C claims that the bank is liable for the amount of the check and it has been agreed to leave the matter to you for decision as to the mutual rights.

A. R. F.

*Answer.*—C being an innocent purchaser, for value, of the check, the presentation thereof to the bank made him the absolute owner of that part of

the deposit of J. A. B. that was covered by the check and the bank is liable to C therefor.

#### GRATUITOUS BANK DEPOSITS.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

EVANSVILLE, Ind., May 31, 1901.

SIR: I desire information as to the liability of a bank under the following circumstances: A kept a box containing papers and unregistered U. S. bonds in a National bank at C; the box was kept in the bank vaults, but the Cashier advised that they be taken from the box and given to him to place in the safe kept in the vault of the bank, telling the depositor that the bonds would be safer there. Afterwards the bank failed by reason of the embezzlement of the Cashier, and it was found that the bonds had been hypothecated by the Cashier. The owner of the bonds was not paying anything to the bank for the custody of them, but he was a customer of and depositor in the bank. Is the bank liable to the owner of the bonds for the value thereof?

DEPOSITOR.

*Answer.*—Yes.

#### APPLICATION OF DEPOSIT TO NOTE.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

ROCHESTER, N. Y., June 4, 1901.

SIR: Can a bank hold an indorser on a note for the amount thereof when at the time the note matured its maker had more than enough money in the bank on general deposit to pay the same, but thereafter withdrew the money and became insolvent?

B. C.

*Answer.*—Yes, unless there had been an express understanding or agreement that the money of maker of the note on deposit in the bank at the time or subsequent to its maturity should be applied to the discharge of the note; as, in the absence of such understanding or agreement it was optional with the bank whether or not it would apply the deposit in payment of the note.

#### UNEARNED DIVIDENDS.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

ERIE, Pa., May 8, 1901.

SIR: The directors of a bank declared a dividend at a time when there was no surplus out of which to pay the same and the dividend was paid out of the working capital of the bank; thereafter the bank made an assignment. (1) Has the Receiver a right to recover from the directors the amount illegally paid out by the bank as dividends? (2) If so, can the directors recover from the stockholders the amounts paid them as dividends?

J. C.

*Answer.*—(1) The directors are personally liable for the amounts illegally paid out of the bank's funds, as dividends. (2) The stockholders had a right to believe the dividend legally declared and are not bound to refund the amounts received by them.

#### PROCEEDS OF FORGERY.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

KANSAS CITY, Mo., May 5, 1901.

SIR: A is a bank engaged in a general banking business in this city; B was the book-keeper and confidential employee of C, who does business and keeps a deposit with A. B, on a check to which C's signature was forged, drew \$1,500 from the bank A and deposited it together with another forged check of \$4,000 in the bank D, in which B had an individual account. B then checked out all of his money in bank D and deposited \$1,500 to the credit of C in bank A to make good the amount of his original forgery. B then absconded. Now, can the bank D attach and recover the \$1,500 deposited in bank A to cover B's original forgery, as a part of the proceeds of the \$4,000 forged draft?

PRESIDENT.

*Answer.*—No; the money has passed from the control of B and of the bank A; it is under the control of C, a third person who had a legal claim against it. The rule of law is that when money has been received by a person in good faith in the usual course of business and for a valuable consideration, it cannot be pursued into his hands by one from whom it has been obtained through fraud of a third person. The bank A has placed it to the credit of C, and the latter can retain it.

## PROTEST OF NOTES AND CHECKS.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

ROCHESTER, N. Y., May 28, 1901.

SIR: An answer to one of your correspondents in the Banking Law Department of the May issue of your MAGAZINE says that where the check is an inland bill of exchange it is not necessary to protest the same for non-payment. Will you kindly tell me if it applies to every check payable in the State where it is drawn, no matter what number of endorsers it may have? I would like to know, moreover, if the bank that sends us the check for payment can force us to protest it if we do not care to do so: and why protest is so often resorted to if it is in most cases unnecessary? In the case of a note, however, as I understand it, protest is necessary. I would further like to know if there is a decision in this State making it necessary to present a demand note for payment within twenty-four hours after its delivery in order to hold the endorser? I am told there is such a decision, but I cannot find it, and should be greatly indebted to you for enlightening me on this matter as well as on the question of protest.

VICE-PRESIDENT.

*Answer.*—The Negotiable Instruments Law provides: "An inland bill of exchange is a bill which is, or on its face purports to be, both drawn and payable within this State. Any other bill is a foreign bill. Unless the contrary appears on the face of the bill the holder may treat it as an inland bill." (Sec. 213.) And the Law further provides: "A check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand. Except as herein otherwise provided, the provisions of this act applicable to a bill of exchange payable on demand apply to a check." The effect of these provisions is that where a check on a bank in this State appears to have been drawn within the State (and this is so in nearly all cases, for checks are usually dated at the place in which the bank is located) it may be treated as an inland bill, and under section 189, formal protest dispensed with. The indorsements have nothing to do with this question, and the negotiation of the check outside of the State does not affect its character as an inland bill. But while protest is not necessary, it is allowed in the case of checks which are inland bills, as well as in the case of foreign bills. (Sec. 189.) And it is usually resorted to because it affords the most satisfactory and convenient mode of proving that the instrument was presented for payment, and notice of dishonor given to the drawer and indorsers. Hence, if a bank is directed to protest a check for non-payment, it should comply with the direction. In the case of promissory notes protest is not required, though it is allowed, and is desirable as preserving the necessary evidence of due presentment and notice. We know of no decisions in this State that a demand note must be presented within twenty-four hours in order to charge an indorser.

## CERTIFIED CHECK—STOPPING PAYMENT.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

ATLANTA, Ga., May 20, 1901.

SIR: I will esteem it a favor if you will enlighten me on the question of stopping payment of certified checks; for instance, A draws his check on the bank, payable to himself, has it certified by the Cashier or paying teller of the bank with the usual rubber stamp "good for \$100 when properly endorsed"; he then takes the check to another bank and pays a draft, bill of lading attached, with it, the bank remitting for the draft to their customer; A then, the next morning, calls at the bank on which he drew the check and orders payment of the check stopped. Has he the right to stop payment on the check after it had been certified and had gone into the hands of an innocent third party?

CASHIER.

*Answer.*—By certifying a check a bank obligates itself to pay the amount therein named to the holder on demand. (Merchants' Bank vs. State Bank, 10 Wall. 648; Cooke vs. State National Bank, 52 N. Y. 96.) The bank at once becomes primarily liable for the payment of the check. In contemplation of law the amount thereof is immediately charged to the account of the drawer, and as to him the effect is the same as if the bank had paid the money

upon the check. The bank, therefore, ceases to be indebted to the depositor as to the amount specified in the instrument, and the amount thereof passes to the credit of the holder, and is specifically appropriated to pay the check when presented. (*First National Bank vs. Leach*, 52 N. Y. 350.) It follows from these principles that a depositor has no power to stop payment of a certified check, at least after it has passed into the hands of a *bona fide* holder for value.

#### RESTRICTIVE ENDORSEMENTS—CLEARING-HOUSE RULES.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

SAVANNAH, Ga., May 14, 1901.

SIR: In June, 1896, the New York Clearing-House Association adopted certain resolutions and sent circular letters to their correspondents touching qualified or restrictive endorsements (see page 700 *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*, June 1896). Under this notice the Savannah Clearing-Association adopted the following resolution: "Resolved, That after this date the members of this association will accept from each other without special guarantee all items bearing the following endorsements:

For deposit (in or with).

For deposit only.

Pay to order of —.

Pay to — Bank or order."

We would thank you to favor us with an expression of your opinion as to whether or not the following endorsement would require a special guarantee under the above resolution: "For deposit only in Bank of — to account of John Smith & Co.; or If For deposit (in or with) or For deposit only, means and is the same as For account of."

W. M. DAVANT, *Cashier*.

*Answer.*—We think that the endorsement mentioned is within the terms of the clearing-house resolution, and would not require a special guaranty. The point of the resolution is that indorsements in the forms specified are not deemed restrictive, and do not indicate that the bank to which the paper is so indorsed is a mere agent of the indorser; and hence that the rules applicable to restrictive indorsements do not apply. The effect of the indorsement "for deposit only" is not changed by the addition of the name of some particular bank, and the account to which it is to be credited, and this addition does not bring the indorsement within the class known as restrictive indorsements, which is the only class to which the reason of the rule requiring a special guaranty has any application.

#### DRAFT ATTACHED TO SHIPMENT.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

GLASGOW, Ky., April 6, 1901.

SIR: Will you please give me an answer to the following, through the columns of your *MAGAZINE*:

A sells B forty law books, which he ships to C, with draft attached, together with instructions to "allow B ten days' examination." B, who lives at a town twenty-five miles from where C lives, writes to C that it would be very inconvenient for him to go where C lives to make an examination of the books, as it would require some time to examine all of the books, and requests that they be forwarded to his town, where he could get the benefit of the "ten days' examination." C ships the books to B as requested. B fails to pay for the books and refuses to return them. C notifies A, who writes several letters to B, urging him to either pay the draft or return the books, but at the end of two or three months A decides to look to C for his pay, and so notifies C.

Is C liable for the books under the law? Would like to have one or two decisions of the courts cited.

S. T. YOUNG, *Assistant Cashier*.

*Answer.*—In shipping the books to B at another place C probably departed from his authority (though this could not be determined accurately without an examination of the letter of advice) and in such case he would be liable to A, his principal, for the value of the books. (*McMorris vs. Simpson*, 21 Wend. 610, 614; *Galbreath vs. Epperson*, [Tenn.] 1 S. W. Rep. 157; *Scott vs. Rogers*, 31 N. Y. 676.) But the action of C could be ratified by A; and in entering into a correspondence with B, and not immediately repudiating the action of C, the right of action against him which A otherwise would have had may have been lost. But the decision of both of these questions must depend upon all the facts of the case.



## SAVINGS BANKS ASSOCIATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

---

The eighth annual meeting of the Savings Banks Association of the State of New York was held at the rooms of the Chamber of Commerce, New York city, May 8, Andrew D. Mills, President of the Dry Dock Savings Institution, New York, presiding. In his opening address President Mills referred to the decline in the percentage of surplus of Savings banks, compared with deposits, and expressed the hope that the Legislature would not further tax this fund. He thought that the use of the word "surplus" was hardly correct, and characterized this fund as a guaranty for the safety of deposits.

John D. Hicks, President of the Bowery Savings Bank, New York, discussed the matter of dividing a portion of the surplus among depositors, in certain contingencies. Mr. McMahon, President of the Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, New York, also spoke on the same subject. He stated that the law permitted Savings banks to accumulate a surplus equal to fifteen per cent. of deposits, but that any surplus in excess of this amount must be distributed among depositors once every three years. He thought that the law contemplated that dividends paid must be earned, and that it was not proper to pay dividends from the surplus. Hon. F. D. Kilburn, Superintendent of the State Banking Department, also concurred in this opinion. J. Harsen Rhoades, President of the Greenwich Savings Bank, New York, declared that the surplus was a sacred fund, not to be used except in great emergencies or under extraordinary conditions.

Mr. Rhoades also discussed legislation affecting Savings bank investments, and suggested that the members of the association should act unitedly in regard to such measures.

Charles G. Miller, Vice-President of the Savings Bank of Utica, read a paper on the subject of restricting Savings bank deposits. He suggested the enactment of a law providing that Savings banks should be prohibited from receiving deposits from persons having deposits in other banks (unless such other deposits were made prior to May 1, 1902).

Several members spoke on the subject, the general opinion being that the public had an exaggerated idea of the extent to which Savings banks were being used by capitalists. J. Harsen Rhoades thought that great care should be taken to limit the services of the banks to those for whom they were created; otherwise he predicted that there would be additional taxation of the Savings banks.

Charles F. Hulbert, Treasurer of the Yonkers Savings Bank, spoke on dormant accounts. He thought that by exercising a little vigilance the banks could in many cases prevent such conditions.

David Cromwell, President of the Home Savings Bank, White Plains, offered the following resolution, which was adopted:

*"Resolved, That it is the sense of this Association of the Savings Banks of the State of New York that every bank should discourage and absolutely refuse all deposits where they are satisfied that the depositor is entirely capable of caring for his investment and is really caring for his investment, according to the true intent of the law."*

Votes of thanks were tendered the Chamber of Commerce for the use of the rooms, also to George Wilson, Secretary of the Chamber.

## FIDELITY INSURANCE BONDS.

---

There have been published in the previous issues of the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* several reports of the committee appointed by the American Bankers' Association to investigate the subject of fidelity insurance, with especial reference to the bonding of bank officers and employees. Mr. A. C. Anderson, chairman of the committee, also presented the matter fully and ably in the *MAGAZINE* for January, 1900, page 216. The report of the committee on fidelity insurance made at the Richmond convention was published in full in the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* for October, 1900, page 560. The report of the committee at the Cleveland convention and the form of bond recommended will be found in the *MAGAZINE* for October, 1899, page 542. So far as these reports have been affected by the point of view of those making them, they have been most favorable to the bankers' side of the question. Mr. Anderson also, very naturally and justly, wrote from the same standpoint. It is not assumed that the interests of the banks and the surety companies are necessarily hostile; on the contrary the banks and the properly managed companies are agreed upon the main thing desirable—"protection that protects." But on some of the details of this protection their views diverge, and there can hardly be any possibility of making the banks and the companies absolutely agree on the rates—for the reason that one party is a buyer and the other a seller of insurance.

Having fully given the views of the committee on fidelity insurance, in order that the matter may be presented fairly in all its aspects, the *MAGAZINE* reprints a portion of a letter addressed to Mr. Anderson, the chairman of the committee, by John R. Bland, President of the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., of Baltimore.

Mr. Bland starts out with the statement that while he has the utmost respect for the committee, he believes its report made at the Richmond convention was based upon too hasty an examination of facts. He contends that the reduction in rates has been due to competition and not to the efforts of the committee. Continuing, Mr. Bland says:

"At the convention of 1900, the committee made the following suggestion: 'The plan of the English companies, which operate on a mutual basis, and the possibility of such a plan for our members,' and 'the adoption by the association of a similar plan,' and 'the successful inauguration of it, would involve possibly an incorporation of some kind.' These references and recommendations indicate to the mind of the writer an extraordinary lack of knowledge on the part of your committee as to what the 'incorporation of some kind' must perform in the various States of the Union before it is qualified to do business, or else it indicates a degree of unfriendliness to the surety companies of the country which is hard to understand.

The writer trusts he may be pardoned in this connection in expressing the opinion that the American Bankers' Association was not formed to protect surety companies or launch corporations of any kind, not to say those based upon vague or eccentric ideas, and he ventures to predict that the day it attempts to inaugurate them will be the beginning of the end of the usefulness of the American Bankers' Association.

Please do not understand that this is written because we fear competition, or because we desire to prevent any man or set of men from starting a new company. Such an idea on our part, we know, would be regarded as silly in the extreme. The States of the great American Republic are open to those who can obtain responsible financial backing and are willing to qualify and conform to the laws of the respective States. The writer believes in healthy competition, but there is a great difference between competition and opposition, and it is against the latter that he objects; and for the American Bankers' Association, with its great influence, to inaugurate and foster such a movement, in view of all the facts, is regarded by many as ill advised and fraught with great danger to the future influence of the association."

Exception is also taken as to the committee's estimate of profits in furnishing surety bonds for banks, and it is alleged that such estimates must have been based on insufficient investigation.

After citing the strict laws regulating surety companies, the requirement of special deposits of considerable amounts in the respective States in order to be permitted to do business, Mr. Bland says :

"In the writer's opinion a rate of forty cents is not too high on bank business; at a thirty-cent rate the surety companies would about come out even, and at a twenty-five cent rate they would lose about as much as they would make at a forty-cent rate.

In the eyes of the world those at the head of banking institutions and those associated with them occupy a very exalted position, both from a business and a moral standpoint. From its elevated position the American Bankers' Association can work great good or evil, and the writer respectfully submits that it should bend its efforts to instill into the members of its association and the banking fraternity at large those attributes which the association expects and demands from others—equity, justice and truthfulness.

With reference to the bank form of bond, drawn up at much expense and trouble by your committee, it has, as you are doubtless aware, been adopted by this company, together with three other forms which we offer our clients, and we give them the opportunity to take their preference. The company finds that the attorneys of the bank to whom all these forms are generally submitted, like doctors, differ as to which is the best form for the bank to use; some prefer one, some another. The writer was informed by the President of the American Surety Company of New York, that his company had persistently declined to adopt your form, claiming that it contained provisions that were unfair to the surety companies—in which we agree.

Personally, the writer begs frankly to state that this company adopted your form of bond by reason of the competition offered by some of the smaller companies, which seemingly adopted it without due consideration of the conditions contained therein, thus forcing this company to meet another form of competition no less destructive, although our better judgment was against it.

The banking fraternity throughout the country should require the surety companies, to which they pay an annual premium, and with which they do business, to give them an itemized statement of their financial condition, properly drawn up, duly signed by the President, Secretary and auditor, and attested by a notary. These statements should be demanded by the banks, and, when received, they should be carefully and critically examined. They should be filed with the bonds of the surety company, and the officers of the surety company making the statement should be held by the bank personally, officially and, if necessary, criminally responsible for any false statements so made.

It appears to the writer that the financial responsibility of a surety company which insures the prompt payment of all liability to the full amount of its bond should, within reasonable limits, make the question of the rate of premium one of secondary importance. Therefore when you say (alluding to information to be obtained by you, and to the suggestion that the American Bankers' Association take part in the formation of a mutual company) 'when this is done we feel that our members will, as a rule, pay less than they are now paying for their insurance,' your committee attempts to use its great official influence to further demoralize the rates and thereby cripple seriously the surety companies of the country—and this based upon a superficial knowledge of the facts.

On the other hand, it appears to the writer that bank officials in every part of the country should be actuated by principles the reverse of what your committee suggests. The interests of the banks and the surety companies are identical. They should endeavor, by every means in their power, to strengthen the surety companies, and from self-interest they should encourage them to be managed upon sound business principles. It is known as a fact that out of all the personal bonds given, where losses have been sustained, sixty-five per cent. are bonds of straw, and that certain loss or expensive litigation follows the other thirty-five per cent.

The enormous benefits derived by the citizens of the United States from the introduction of corporate surety appear to have been overlooked by your committee. From the moment a surety company of good financial standing undertook to assume obligations theretofore assumed by individual citizens it became a great blessing to the community. There is no branch of business or act in professional life that does not come, some time or other, in touch with a surety company.

Consider the thousands of bank men who have been relieved from embarrassment by the surety companies. Consider the persons who have been made the prey of their acquaintances, the mainstay of their relations, the last resort of officeholders and trusted employees. Think

of those who have passed through the valley of the shadow of debt, who have served as security on bonds which they have had to pay. Consider the men at the head of promising business enterprises who have been ruined, their homes attached and chattels sold, and of the countless thousands who have impoverished themselves as a result of having acted as personal bondsmen. Think of the thousands of widows and orphans who, under the old order of things, were made penniless, but who now rest in security. And is it not true, whenever a man of means or substance goes on a bond and becomes personally liable, he places his estate in danger of loss or expensive litigation, and that, if he had insisted upon corporate suretyship, his estate would have been saved endless loss and trouble?

Consider the vast enterprises that have been successfully launched by individuals, firms and corporations all over the United States, only made possible of accomplishment by having the guarantee of the surety company behind them.

But for the surety company thousands of capable, honest and industrious men would not be able to acquire positions in banks, trust companies, railroads, etc., and there are thousands of others, equally worthy, who could not qualify for the official position to which they have been elected, such as United States Government officials and employees, clerks of courts, treasurers of States, cities and counties.

Is it not, therefore, the duty of so important an association as yours to lift up and conserve, rather than to pull down and destroy, the institutions with which the banking interests are so closely allied and which are daily becoming more and more indispensable to business safety?

The writer therefore fully agrees with your further statement that 'the paramount object, after all, is to secure protection that protects,' and begs that, while you are recommending to your association a coercive measure to secure *that* protection at the lowest minimum rate, you be not unmindful of the fact that your protection lies directly in the strength of the surety companies, which can only be accomplished by conceding a rate that will meet the expense of writing the business and leave a fair margin of profit above all losses, otherwise the grim specter of receivership may loom up before the companies and destroy that protection and their usefulness as well.

Much more could be said in criticism of the recommendations and conclusions of the committee, but to do so would extend this letter to an unreasonable length. In conclusion the writer again desires to impress the fact that what has been herein written is entirely impersonal, and that there has been no purpose to unfairly criticize the recommendations and conclusions of your committee. The main object which the writer has had in mind has been to enlighten the committee to the real facts with which surety companies have to contend in their practical every-day work. If he has succeeded in accomplishing this desirable end he will feel that his efforts have not been entirely in vain."

**Warning to Bankers.**—In his report on the present condition of State and private banking institutions of Wisconsin State Bank Examiner E. I. Kidd gives warning to those bankers who are tempted by speculation. He says:

"In my judgment, the present speculative era may be productive of harm, as there are many temptations and incentives for bankers to loan money upon securities which are speculative in character and likely to prove harmful to the safety of institutions which do not exercise a proper degree of caution. There is a strong temptation at the present time for bankers to handle a class of securities which in the recent past they did not hesitate to reject. Bankers should use great caution at this time."

His report shows that the condition of the private and State banks of Wisconsin at the close of business on April 24 was most gratifying. In commenting upon the reports received from these institutions the examiner says: "The increase in loans and discounts since December 13 last (the time of the previous report) is \$2,220,107.01; increase in deposits, \$5,380,813.37, which is the greatest increase in deposits in the same length of time since the formation of this department. Another notable feature of the statements is the marked decrease in the amount of liabilities represented by bills payable and bills rediscounted. The call of December 13 showed \$433,963.37. The present call shows \$122,802.60, a decrease of \$311,070. The cash reserve is thirty per cent."

**A Saving in Postage.**—The Neostyle "Sealed-Yet-Open" envelopes are ingeniously made so that while having the appearance of a sealed envelope the contents may be easily examined by the post-office inspectors, and may be sent through the mails for one cent. This means a saving of ten dollars per thousand on postage alone.

The Neostyle "Sealed-Yet-Open" envelope marks an epoch in the history of the time and labor-saving inventions, being one of those little things the value of which impresses at sight. The Neostyle Envelope Company has facilities which enable it to manufacture and deliver these envelopes in remarkably quick time, and at an astonishingly low price, and as they are of superior quality and excellent finish, one may well consider that the use of same is a decided advantage, when postage is taken into consideration.

They are made by the Neostyle Envelope Company, the general offices of which are located at 52, 54, 56 and 58 Duane street, New York city.

## LIFE AND FIRE INSURANCE.

### ASSURANCE POLICIES AS COVER FOR BANKING LOANS.

[From the London "Bankers' Magazine."]

With the older type of banker, the assurance policy was not wont to rank high as an instrument of security. There were two reasons for this—the existing sufficiency of lending demands of a good commercial character, supported by personal and other security, and the disinclination of bankers to lock up their money in securities which could only be realized at death. The latter reason contains the root principle of banking, viz., a recognition of the fact that money deposited with a bank is repayable on demand, or at short notice, and, therefore, should be so invested as to be readily repaid to the depositor under these conditions. Theory and practice are, however, two very different things. Theory is often the ideal of life—the unattainable—the poetic steep up which it is given but few to climb. It comes in betimes to correct the concrete in its vagaries, and to point out a goal that seems to the latter to be hopelessly out of reach. On the other hand, stern actuality says to theory: it is all very well to spin your gossamer webs as if life were all a summer's day; your fabrics are not at all suited to a rough-and-tumble world; they must be respun for common use. In this way the ideal and the real jostle one another, but, like the centripetal and the centrifugal forces of nature, manage to maintain between them a working equipoise.

Bankers may lay down rules, but they are often powerless to effect conditions. In such cases they have to accept the inevitable, and make the most of it. They find financial forces at work which completely alter the situation, and these forces are in constant movement, and are the controlling agent for the time being. Each advance in science and art, in general intelligence, in commercial expansion, in national and international intercourse, a state of war or a condition of peace, act as factors in the great problem of how and on what terms bankers should lend their money. With their liability to repay depositors at once, they may not look too far ahead, because to play for a long calculated investment would be rather dangerous. They are bound to take a from day to day view of things, though not in the superficial sense of the term. Theory strictly demands that they shall have all their money ready at call, but in practice such an idea is simply ridiculous. There is a tacit understanding between the public and the banks that deposit money shall be employed so that it bear interest, and at same time recoup the banks for the trouble of keeping it. To employ it is a work of time, and while so engaged it must necessarily be out of the bank's hands. Apart from this implied permission to use it, the banks know from experience the amount of money which they require to keep in their coffers to meet deposit demands.

It is only within the last decade or two that insurance policies have come into prominence as security for advances. The falling off in the demand for loans, and the corresponding growth in the resources at the disposal of the banks, have made them not indisposed to look at securities from which they would have shrunk in other circumstances. Necessity has no law, and thus risks are now assumed which would have been refused, say, twenty or thirty years ago. The connection between banking and insurance is now of an intimate character, and is daily growing stronger. The commercial value of a policy being recognized by the banking community, it

follows that the public will act on a knowledge of that fact, and take it into account.

In assuring for a loan purpose, the first point is to select a good office, and preferably a home office. The reason for this is obvious. If anything goes wrong, there is a board of directors within hail before whom you can carry your complaints. But if one were to be involved in a long and tedious correspondence with persons far distant from these shores, the result might be as unsatisfactory as the process. The methods of an office should also be considered. There are some which cast off a member if he does not pay his premiums promptly, and they do not allow days of grace. They hold that by non-payment at the stated time, the bargain is broken.

The commercial value of a policy is its surrender value—sometimes one-third and sometimes one-half of the premiums paid. Up to that sum the offices lend to their policyholders at a reasonable rate of interest. It is difficult to appraise a policy outside this calculation. It may unexpectedly become a claim through the merest accident. In any case it is a good stand-by to a banker, and it gives him more confidence in dealing with his customers. The better class of policy is undoubtedly the endowment one, of which the premiums are limited in number, and the time of payment of the policy not too far distant. This policy is now much in evidence with borrowers, who freely give it in pledge against advances in the way of business.

There are many men who have found life assurance the best means of raising money. They have had to put so much capital into a certain concern, and they have insured their lives for good amounts and asked a bank advance on the security of the life policies. A banker so lending naturally asks guarantees for the due payment of the interest and premiums, *i.e.*, if he does not hold security for the main advance itself. By insuring in this way a borrower is creating a fund for the redemption of the debt. No doubt there is outlay in the transaction, for both premium and interest have to be met, but then it is the function of profits to come to his rescue. Instead of spending all his business earnings on himself, he sets aside so much of them as will meet these demands upon him for premiums payable to the insurance company, and for interest and principal sum due to the bank. Insurance and banking thus go halves in the transaction, the former supplying the platform on which the latter rears its lending structure. This, of course, is not the only form of borrowing, but it is cited as one of the most legitimate types. More than one partner, for example, may stand in need of capital, and in this case a partnership policy would secure the same result, with this difference, that the policy money would be paid on the death of the first of the partners insured.

The advantage of borrowing against a policy is two-fold—the amount assured can be proportioned to the ability of the policyholder to meet his obligations to the company and to the bank; and next, the borrower is more likely to get security for the due payment of his insurance premiums and bank interest than if he asked his friends to guarantee full payment of the sum of the credit allowed him. One might be in a position to pay £100 or £200 annually, who could not suddenly disburse £1,000 to £2,000. The lending bank takes care to hold a policy or policies much in excess of the sums lent. This is only natural, and it is as much in the interest of the guarantors as of the bank, because it means that, so long as the policies subsist, the debt will be fully and instantly met when these policies merge into claims. It is also more satisfactory from the family point of view, because the members of it are interested in the reversion of the surplus money.

As to the duration of such loans, it has been already suggested that they should have a time limitation. The most satisfactory method is to have a periodical review of them and a revising of the security, the holder's means, etc. So long as everything is going well banks never dream of disturbing an account, especially if the instalments are coming in with regularity. It is to the bank's advantage to get good loans and a fair rate of interest, and the more so that good commercial loans are

shrinking in amount, thanks to the direct borrowing from the public by limited liability companies, which, as private concerns, would have applied to the banks for the necessary capital. A year's loan is good enough business, especially when there is a tacit understanding that it will be renewed if all goes well. If the loan is to be called up it will be for sufficient reason, and after timely notice. In the absence of any complaint the assumption will be that there is no need to disturb it, and the holder may thus rest secure.

The guarantee form of loan against life policies is creeping into common use when security is provided. The amount of security to be exacted must depend on the circumstances of each case, and upon whether the applicant is or is not a man of means. Even in dealing with the former some security should be asked, because a loan should not rest on the power to pay of one man alone. The worth of the guarantors is naturally an important matter, and there should be two as a rule. The amount to be advanced must be largely dependent on the quality of the sureties; and it is a matter how far they should be bound for the due payment of the premiums, the interest, and, if necessary, of the principal instalments, should such be stipulated for with a view to reduction of the debt.

The instrument of guarantee is not the simple document it used to be. It has the advantage of requiring only a 6d. stamp, but it is very binding in character. The insertion of the clauses now found in it is due to the decisions which have been given from time to time in the courts relative to guarantees. There are persons who would fain wriggle out of guarantees if they could, and the object of framing a stringent form is to leave no loophole open to such individuals. Besides making the guarantors, if there are more than one, liable individually and collectively, so that any one of them can be proceeded against for the full debt, without impairing the liability of the others to make good the balance, the guarantors are bound, in the event of the borrower's insolvency, to permit the bank to rank on his estate for the amount of the debt before the persons bound can claim any relief for themselves.

There are individual guarantees binding persons for the payment of so much only. One individual may become sponsor for the premium on one policy only, another for another, and one may stand good for the interest only. One important point stands out in connection with all guarantees, and this is the danger of giving them a time limit. A limit in amount they must have, at least as regards principal; but it is dangerous to fix a limit of duration. A guarantee letter would be good only up to the termination of the period named, either in the letter itself or in anything expressed verbally or in writing which interpreted the guarantee or circumscribed its action. Guarantees are always construed strictly, and anything which throws light on them would be taken into account if an action were raised in court. In short, if there were a time limit, no bank would be justified in advancing money after the expiry of the limit—if a bank did, it would be at its own risk.

Next comes the assignment of the policy to the bank. The deed must express the consideration received, and this consideration fixes the amount of the stamp duty payable. The policy bears to be assigned to the bank, but the execution of the deed, its date and terms, must be notified to the company concerned before the transaction can be said to be complete. When due acknowledgment is made of the assignment, priority is given to it in the order of the date of the assignment. It may not be amiss to state that the mere possession of a life policy is not sufficient proof that it is in force, production of the premium receipt being necessary in all cases. It is just possible that a duplicate policy might have been issued, but the opening for fraud is, happily, not great, as all good life offices are very careful in the matter of duplicate policies. They prefer instead to prepare a statement to the effect that such and such a policy is entered on their books. The letter of guarantee is made to cover the varying rates of premium, arising, no doubt from the chance of foreign

residence entailing an extra premium, or from the state of rates or terms of the policy necessitating any such increase.

It is conceivable to imagine questions arising from the want of due payment of the premiums, and it is largely because of this that banks prefer to deal with home insurance companies. When business is transacted with persons or companies whom one knows and respects, then the path of business is made smooth and the fear of devious ways is no longer before one's eyes. There are companies and companies; and if questions do not emerge at an early stage they may at a later stage. Where there is a disposition to be captious, and when it pays to indulge it, then only the opportunity is wanting to put it in practice. The days of grace offer a problem all their own. British offices recognize them as part of the insurance bargain, but it is understood that American offices stipulate that the premium be paid on the very day it falls due, failing which the policy will be void. It will readily be seen how such a power, if used, would affect a premium guarantee. It is true that the thirty days of grace allowed by home companies mark only a time limit, just as the year or half-year does; still it is a period to come and go upon, within which, the premium being actually due, the person who has to pay it can be asked for the amount. There is, besides, the superior feeling of dealing with a liberal company. Suppose then the premium is unpaid, the one company may say that the policy has lapsed and refuse to revive it, while the other may freely take payment of the belated premium on easy terms.

The bank's course would be, in the case of a premium in default, to give due intimation thereof to the guarantors, pay the amount, and fall back on the latter in terms of their guarantee. There might be only the default to pay one premium until funds were to hand, but a matter of that kind would not be difficult of adjustment. Of course it might be suggestive of a complete default. In such a case the same measure would be necessitated as that caused by the death of a guarantor whose place could not be supplied. The loan would have to cease and determine, and the value of the obligation contracted would fall to be made. If the premiums alone were guaranteed, then the obligation resting on the guarantors would be to find such a sum of money as would redeem all the premiums due on the policy assigned. The debt would thus depend on the number and value of the payments to be made, whether on the limited endowment principle, or for a whole life term. Any liability for interest would, of course, be for the actual amount due so long as the loan was in existence.

It will be seen that for loan purposes the limited payment form is the better one. More money is needed to meet the premiums, but, on the other hand, the capital amount of the policy is sooner touched, because it is payable at a certain term or at death, if that event occur sooner. Such policies should also be non-forfeitable, indisputable, and world-wide. Then an important matter is if they carry bonuses or not. The bonus-laden policy is, of course, the better security, but one has to see that the bonus is a real bonus, and is not dependent on conditions difficult, or at times impossible, of fulfilment. Thus some bonuses in temperance companies are dependent on the insured being an abstainer, and if he ceases to be so he is bound to notify it to the company, as by that act he steps into a different category of bonus. From the temperance section he falls to the general section, where the bonuses are presumably smaller, since abstainers are singled out for the distinction of being in a class by themselves. The premium payment is usually identical in both classes, but if the one works out better than the other in respect of death claims and expenses of working, then its bonuses are proportionately greater. It may be asked how a bank would stand in respect of a loan on a temperance policy which contained a false declaration of abstinence. No worse than with any other policy founded on knowingly-made wrong statements. As an onerous assignee of the policy, the bank



should stand to get payment of its debt out of the policy. But the position of the policyholder in respect of the claim would be different. He could not in law demand the amount if the company proved that his declared statements were knowingly false.

In closing it may be mentioned that another class of policies is not in favor, viz., those of foreign or colonial companies having no registered office in this country. These companies could only be sued for debt at a great distance from home, and the prospect of having to sue them is by no means an alluring one. Also, as already stated, to have any troublesome correspondence with them over points in dispute means a loss of time, trouble and money. It so happens, however, that the necessity for being represented on this side has been recognized by most of the leading colonial and other companies, and that some are even now contemplating coming to Britain. Finally, policies, with their terms and conditions, if tendered for loans in excess of their surrender value, should be well scrutinized, and the standing of the companies be enquired into as well. The status and *bona fides* of the persons tendering them should be put to the test, and no man of character and substance would object to such an ordeal.

---

### CAPITAL VS. RESPONSIBILITY.

The average bank official has surely had too much experience to rate the responsibility of an insurance company by its advertised capital and surplus. It is the surplus of available resources over liabilities which should be considered. There seems to be a race among the larger companies to see which can roll up the largest capital and surplus, and write the greatest number of policies in a given time. It is, however, a fact that some of the more conservative companies are writing proportionally just as much good business and have more assets to cover their probable liabilities than companies which show such phenomenal increases in their business.

---

### GOLD BONDS.

The fad for the time being in life insurance is the so-called gold bonds. In considering these bonds the fact should be borne in mind that they do not differ essentially from the ordinary forms of endowment policies. They are in some cases a good form of investment, but have few points of superiority over ordinary term life insurance. The substance of the contract has been summed up about as follows: "A promise to issue a four per cent. gold bond for a given amount at the death of the insured, or upon the payment of premiums for a term of years. In other words a life endowment policy payable in a gold bond."

---

**LEADING HOTELS IN AMERICA.**—It is the intention of the publishers to devote considerable space in *THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE* to the cards of the leading hotels, or at least the hotels which are best suited for the accommodation of bankers and brokers in the chief cities of America and Europe. One of the first patrons of this page is the Lenox Hotel of Boston, Mass. The Lenox is one of the finest and best located hotels in Boston, and the fact that it is managed by Uriah Welch, formerly of the St. Nicholas Hotel, of New York city, is sufficient guaranty as to the character of the cuisine and service. It is only a few minutes from the Back Bay station.

---

**A RELIABLE DICTIONARY.**—In these days when important lawsuits are often decided by the definition of words, it is of the greatest importance that a reliable dictionary should be handy. A copy of Webster's International Dictionary should therefore be in every banking room in the United States.

## THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BUILDING.

---


The Chamber of Commerce building, shortly to be erected on the site of the old Real Estate Exchange, corner of Liberty street and Liberty Place, New York city, will be built of white Vermont marble with a white granite base. As may be seen from the accompanying illustration, the design is classical, and considering the limitations of the site and requirements, is dignified and monumental in character, free from eccentricity and caprice, and promises to look like a Chamber of Commerce, and not like a bank, clearing-house, stock exchange or office building.

The first floor, which will be some five steps above the street level, is designed to be used as a banking room, and is already rented to the Central Realty Bond and Trust Company. This part of the building will have a separate entrance, and will be handsomely finished with mahogany fittings and marble mosaic floor. One of the largest vaults in the city (excepting those of safe deposit companies) will be one of the features. The main entrance to the building will be at the left or Broadway side of the Liberty street facade, and opens into a large vestibule, which in turn admits past the elevators into a monumental hall, and stairway, twenty feet wide and eighty feet long, extending through two stories. It will be built of Cæn stone and marble, and will have a gallery at one end overlooking it, on which the elevators land. The main room or Chamber of Commerce opens directly off this gallery and also from the platform at the head of the stairway. It will occupy the entire second floor, except the space taken by the stairway, and will be a room of magnificent proportions, ninety feet long, sixty feet wide and thirty feet high. There will be no windows in the lower part of the room, the light being admitted through an enormous skylight in the ceiling, which opens into a court of equal dimensions extending through to the roof. There will also be windows high up in the walls, some twenty feet above the floor. This somewhat unusual treatment was demanded by the large wall space necessary for hanging the magnificent collection of portraits which the Chamber has been collecting for many years.

The President's desk will be at the side of the room opposite the entrance doors, and high above the doors, corresponding to the windows on the other sides of the room, will be the openings to the visitors' gallery, which may be reached by both elevators and main stairway. The Chamber will be wainscoted with fixed seats, the walls above them covered with paintings, and above them the lighted and decorated cove and handsomely paneled ceiling with its decorations. The wood used will be Italian walnut. The floor will be of white marble, in varying shades, and is intended to be covered with rugs.

The third story will be occupied by the executive and committee rooms of the Chamber, and will be fitted up into handsome offices for their exclusive use. Mahogany trim, parquet floors and all the accessories of modern office comfort and use will be provided. The fourth and last story will be one large room, divided into alcoves and used as a reading room, club room and commercial library for the use of the members. It will be finished in brown oak, and will have a small kitchen and serving room opening off, from which a light luncheon may be served.

The architect is James B. Baker, and the builder Charles T. Wills.



**CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.**  
**The new building now being erected at Liberty street and Liberty Place.**

## REDEMPTION OF PAPER MONEY.

---

Paper money, whether bank notes or Government notes, is only representative of value and is redeemable in something which in itself has a value. It is put into circulation and should be governed by such laws as will result in what is known as current redemption.

The bank check is also a representative of value, and is drawn payable to a certain person or persons the same as bank drafts.

The bank bill is paid over the bank counter to satisfy a demand upon the bank.

The Government note is issued to pay a debt only. The check or draft goes into the channels of trade and finds its way home to the bank upon which it is drawn, through the machinery of banking exchanges which are provided by banking laws. The Government note has no permanent home. A debt has to be contracted before one can be put into circulation, and then if presented for redemption in quantities larger than the reserve required to be kept for the redemption of said notes, a permanent debt (in the way of an issue of bonds) has to be created in order to supply the deficiency.

The Government has undertaken to do a banking business with no available assets to do business with.

Current redemption of all representatives of value is something that is not taken into consideration in the discussion of the currency question by many.

Had our Government retired the notes issued during our Civil War, or if the law of April 12, 1866, had not been repealed, the Greenback Party would never have been in existence. The greenbacks were issued as a necessity during our Civil War. Those who favored their issue at that time never recommended them as a system for the permanent issue of paper money by the Government. It was understood at the time of the passage of the act of February 25, 1862, when Congress authorized the issue of \$150,000,000, that they were issued for temporary purposes only, and it was so stated in the bill presented in the House of Representatives by Mr. Spaulding, January 7, 1862. This may be seen from the enacting clause: "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled, That for temporary purposes the Secretary of the Treasury be, and is hereby, authorized to issue on the credit of the United States, etc."

Many plans for a system of paper money circulation by the National banks of this country have been presented, but our best-informed writers and legislators have been handicapped by being compelled (on account of politics) to follow on the lines of ideas of a misinformed public on this question. The greenback craze took a deep hold on the public; a large number of our people had been educated to believe that the fact of the imprint of the Government on its notes was all that was required to make the system a perfect one. Not enough consideration was given to the question of redemption, as it is the most important part in the discussion of the issue of paper money, and a subject never taught in the school of inflation.

To read the speeches of the members of Congress on this question at the time of the passage of the act authorizing the issue of paper money, one will see how far we have been led astray on the subject of paper money circulation.

Congress should retire all paper money issued by the Government and pass an act similar to the one proposed at the Baltimore convention of the American Bankers' Association—a body of men well qualified to present recommendations relating to this subject.

There are certain well-defined laws that govern all obligations of promises to pay that should be strictly adhered to; and if they are kept in view our legislators will see the importance of providing for what is called current redemption. Then all paper money put into circulation by the banks will be governed by the law of supply and demand, and with clearing-houses located in different sections of our country the demand for paper money, when needed, will cause it to circulate; and at such other times, when not required for actual business demands, it will find its way to the clearing-houses, and from there be distributed and sent home to each bank for redemption. Under such a system the country will have a well-defined and proper system of issuing paper money.

F. C. HAVILAND.

HUDSON, N. Y., May 29, 1901.

## BANKING AND FINANCIAL NOTES.

---

### REVIEW OF THE WORLD'S MONETARY PROGRESS.

---

#### THE BANK OF FRANCE.

How adequately this institution supplies the banking needs of the French people, particularly those of moderate capital, is well illustrated by the following extract, which appeared in "The Statist" (London) in its issue of May 4:

"We would advise all readers who are interested in banking to obtain a copy of the report of the Bank of France for last year and to study it carefully. We venture to promise them that they will read it with great interest, that they will receive much instruction, and that in particular they will be struck by the extraordinary contrast between the part played by the Bank of England in this country and that played by the Bank of France at the other side of the Channel.

The Bank of France is the real banker of the French people, and it thinks no business too small for its attention. It gives full accommodation to the very humblest. During the year 1900 the discounts at the head office and at all the branches and agencies were of the total nominal value of 12,247,555,500 francs, or £489,902,220, and the number of bills representing this vast sum was 16,784,993. So that the average value of the bills was 729 francs, or very little more than £29 of our money.

It will be objected, no doubt, that trade in France differs altogether from trade in this country; that France is a land of small peasant proprietors; that the great towns are few; that the manufactures are not greatly developed and are very restricted in number; and that the export and the import trades are quite small compared with ours.

Granting that there is much truth in the statement, yet it is remarkable that the average value of the bills discounted by the great State Bank of the country but slightly exceeded £29 of our money during the whole of last year. And the smallness of the individual bills becomes all the more remarkable when we turn from an inspection of the operations of the Bank of France all over the Republic to the statement showing what was done in Paris alone. The total number of bills discounted in Paris was 6,029,500. Of these, the bills exceeding 100 francs, or £4 of our money, numbered 3,701,200, and the bills of less value than £4 numbered 2,328,800. Of bills ranging in value between £2 and £4 there were discounted last year 1,105,400. Of bills ranging in value between ten francs and fifty francs, that is, between 8s. and £2 of our money, there were 1,153,500. And bills between five and ten francs, that is, between 4s. and 8s., actually numbered 69,400. Furthermore, there is a steady increase in the number of very small bills.

The report states that, compared with 1899, there was an increase last year of 226,470 bills of less value than £4. Evidently the very small trader—the market gardener, the small poultry keeper, and the like—is very much better catered for in France than in England. And doubtless to this largely is due the inability of our own people to compete with the small growers in France.

Is there not room in this country for an institution which would cater directly for this class of small business? Or are the ideas of our people so grandiose that discounting for people who can draw bills only from 4s. up to £4 is looked upon with contempt? Yet the position of the Bank of France shows that the business is a very profitable one. And the more one studies the report, the less one is surprised at the extraordinary hold which the Bank of France has upon the people of France, and the unswerving confidence which they have in its notes. As a matter of course, a Bank which lays itself out for giving accommodation to the very humblest of the population has also to provide for them in issuing its notes.

Accordingly, we find that of the 34,604,458 notes outstanding at the end of the year, no more than 1,449,448 were for 1,000 francs—that is, £40 and upwards. Only 603,458 notes were from £20 to £40. But there were as many as 21,515,050 ranging in value from £4 up to £20. It will be seen, that is, that about two-thirds of the notes were for £4 and under £20, and evidently were intended for the class who hold Bank of England notes in this country. Then there were 10,813,836, or roughly about one-third, of £2 and less than £4; there were 15,713 of £1 and less than £2; 67,679 of 16s. and less than 20s.; and as many as 139,224 of five francs, or 4s., and less than 16s."

#### SAN SALVADOR BANK REPORT.

According to the January (1901) report of the board of directors of the Banco Salvadoreño of San Salvador, the bank has an authorized capital of \$6,000,000. Of this amount, \$4,200,000 has been subscribed, and \$2,500,000 paid in. The reserve fund is \$500,000. The net profits for the half-year ending December 31, 1900, were \$44,230.36, \$42,000 of which amount was applied to the payment of dividends and \$2,230.36 to the reserve fund.

#### THE SPANISH CURRENCY.

In its issue of May 25 "The Statist" (London) discusses in an interesting way the present condition of the Spanish currency.

On April 27 the note circulation of the Bank of Spain amounted to 1,618,244,350 pesetas, or very nearly £64,750,000, taking the peseta at its nominal value, although as a matter of fact the purchasing power of the peseta is about twenty five per cent. of its nominal value.

At the end of 1886 the note circulation of the Bank of Spain was only a little over £21,000,000, and the London journal states that this amount fairly represented the business needs of the country. By the middle of July, 1892, however, the circulation rose to £34,250,000, or an increase of about sixty-three per cent. This large increase and the additions made in the subsequent years were due in the main to Government borrowings from the Bank, the total of which now amounts to £63,322,969, according to "The Statist." As the Bank finds it profitable to lend to the Government, and the latter in turn finds it easier to borrow from the Bank than elsewhere, the prospect for an immediate reduction of the debt does not appear to be promising.

While the note circulation of the Bank of Spain is almost £64,750,000, the gold held amounts to only a little over £14,000,000; about £16,500,000 silver is held (nominal value), the actual value being only about one-half of this sum.

The new Finance Minister, as a preliminary step to other reforms, has stopped the purchase of silver and the coinage of legal-tender silver pieces.

#### THE NEW RUSSIAN LOAN.

Subscriptions for a Russian Government loan, amounting to 424,000,000 francs, were opened at Paris on May 25, the price of the loan being 98½. It was a great success, and was subscribed for several times over.

#### IRISH RURAL BANKS.

These organizations, says the London "Bankers' Magazine," known as co-operative credit associations, constitute a most hopeful feature of the time for Ireland. The first of these institutions, which are practically rural banks to advance money to their members, was established in 1894. They now number seventy-five, and the membership grew from fifty in 1895 to 2,461 in 1899. The net loss on loan transactions amounting to £9,000 was only £1. 9s. 3d. Borrowers are punctual in making payments; out of 536 loans granted members of one of the largest societies in 1898, only twelve members were one week late in repayment. The management is gratuitous.

## STATE BANKERS' ASSOCIATIONS.

---

### RECENT AND PROSPECTIVE MEETINGS.

---

#### MISSOURI BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

---

The eleventh annual convention of the Missouri Bankers' Association was held at St. Joseph May 22 and 23. After an address of welcome by the Mayor, President Harrison delivered his address, devoting a considerable part of it to currency matters. He said in part:

"A circulating medium whose issue depends upon the amount of Government bonds held by the banks of issue lacks the innate element of growth, and can never be elastic enough to meet the varying demands upon it.

An increased commerce, bringing with it increased Government revenue, demands an increased circulating medium; an increase of Government revenue should result in a reduction of bonded indebtedness; a reduction of bonded indebtedness reduces the basis of National bank issue; the reduction of the basis of issue forces a contraction of the circulating medium. Hence the result, with an increasing commerce under our present system we actually find our basis of circulation naturally growing smaller, or should do so, instead of expanding to meet increased demands.

Such a condition would be more than regrettable. Some other plan, some other basis of issue, must be adopted.

In seeking a plan upon which to base our issue of circulating medium, one that would suit our methods of doing business and at the same time insure the safety of the issue as well as its elasticity, the Canadian system appears the best—a bank issue based upon assets, and not upon Government bonds. This plan, with modifications, has been presented to Congress by the introduction in February last of the Lovering Currency Bill."

Secretary J. S. Calfee made a very satisfactory report.

The present paid membership of the association is 582, the largest in the history of the association. This is a gain of forty-two members over a year ago. The membership represents a banking capital of \$70,275,036, or over ninety-five per cent. of the banking capital of the State. At this time there are only four banks in the State with a capital of not more than \$50,000 which have no representation in the association.

In the State only one member of the association was successfully robbed by burglars during the year. For the arrest and conviction of these burglars rewards amounting to \$950 have been offered. The burglars have not been apprehended. Arrangements have been made with the National Surety Company of New York to furnish fidelity bonds to members of the association.

The treasurer reported \$5,638.77 on hand.

After the reading of the reports of the secretary and treasurer the various committees were appointed.

An interesting report was made by the committee on taxation, appointed at the previous session. A summary of this report follows:

"Ninety-two counties reporting, eleven classes of property reported upon, average assessment forty-four per cent. The average assessment of bank stock, as you know, is sixty-three per cent. Since the money of all the banks of the State is invested in one or more of the various classes of property named, it is difficult to see how in justice banks can be assessed at one-third more than any of the other kinds of property in the State, whether it be from prejudice in the minds of our assessors and board of equalization, which we are slow to believe,

or from lack of proper information that this unjust apportionment is made, we are at a loss to know, but that it is unjust must be apparent to every unprejudiced mind. We regret that we cannot report some relief for this year, but hope this information may be of some assistance to our successors on the committee.

Another set of blanks was prepared and sent out to the various States, the replies showing a great variety of assessment, ranging from twenty per cent. on capital stock and surplus in Nebraska to 100 per cent. on capital stock and surplus, and real estate assessed in addition in Kentucky. Considerable correspondence has been had in regard to the working of the mortgage tax law in California."

Charles O. Austin, Cashier of the Mechanics' National Bank, St. Louis, read a paper at the second day's session on "Duties of Bank Directors." He referred to the practice in England and Canada of making complete reports to the stockholders every year. He suggested that banks should each year make an investigation regarding the habits and character of their employees.

Judge Richard Field, President of the Morrison-Wentworth Bank, Lexington, Mo., read a valuable paper giving the law relating to chattel mortgages.

The purposes of the American Institute of Bank Clerks were explained to the convention by Wm. C. Cornwell, of Buffalo, N. Y.

"Property Statements by Borrowers" were discussed by G. W. Garrels, President of the Franklin Bank, St. Louis; William C. Harris, President Callaway Bank, Fulton, and Frank P. Hays, of St. Louis.

Officers were elected as follows:

President—Gordon Jones, President St. Joseph Stock Yards Bank.

Vice-President—Charles O. Austin, Cashier Mechanics' National Bank, St. Louis.

Secretary—Joseph S. Calfee, Cashier Citizens' Bank, Windsor.

Treasurer—F. W. Stumpe, Cashier Bank of Washington.

Delegates to Convention of the American Bankers' Association—Gordon Jones, President St. Joseph Stock Yards Bank; Geo. B. Harrison, Jr., Cashier Glasgow Savings Bank; C. O. Austin, Cashier Mechanics' National Bank, St. Louis; J. B. Thomas, Cashier Bank of Albany; J. C. Dawson, President Citizens' Bank, Grant City; Jno. A. Cragin, Cashier First National Bank, Joplin; W. C. Harris, President Callaway Bank, Fulton; H. M. Rubey, Cashier State Exchange Bank, Macon; E. F. Swinney, President First National Bank, Kansas City; J. G. Schneider, President St. Joseph Clearing-House Association; J. S. Calfee, Cashier Citizens' Bank, Windsor; M. P. Cayse, Cashier Bank of Farmington.

---

#### TEXAS BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

---

The seventeenth annual convention of the Texas Bankers' Association was held at Houston, May 14 and 15. Mayor John D. Woolford made the address of welcome, and G. A. Levi, of Victoria, responded. President Downs next delivered the annual address. After referring to the prosperous conditions generally existing, he said:

"While we as a nation have been rapidly advancing, we as a State and a part of that great nation have been steadily gaining the long deserved recognition due our Lone Star. And although in the early fall our coast country was visited by one of the most appalling catastrophes of modern times, when many lives were lost and much valuable property destroyed, yet by the kindly sympathy and helping hand of our sister States, we have rallied bravely to the situation and trust that ere long we may see our own fair country restored to its former glory.

Not many days since has it been that our State was honored by the presence of some of the most influential men in the business and social worlds of two great cities, to which we point with pride, namely, New York and St. Louis. They expressed their surprise and pleasure at our rapid progress and predicted a wonderful future for our great commonwealth.

The past year it has been our pleasure to acknowledge the reception of fifty-one new



members in our association, the largest number ever admitted. This gives us a membership of 290."

For various reasons the district plan of organization had not proved very successful.

President Downs continued :

"At our meeting last year the old form of reciprocal draft was superseded by the bank money order. A special committee recommended that 25,000 folders, 2,500 card posters and 250 rubber stamps be ordered and distributed among the banks of the State. This was approved, and the above amount, including an additional supply, was used and found very helpful. We believe it has been the means of securing several new members this year, for many of the interior banks have found it especially convenient when desirous of drawing on different points where they had no correspondent. Our assistant secretary has received flattering letters regarding the efficacy of this method. If the banks would use these bank-money orders more freely, or charge on the express orders when presented at their counters, it is my firm belief that the patrons would soon realize they were paying double for their express money orders and also discover that the express was not the best means of transmitting money. Then by co-operation, which is just as essential in banking as in any other part of the commercial world, and by close observance of the use of the bank money orders, the banks could soon solve the express problem.

The gratitude and thanks of the entire convention are due the legislative committee, composed of Messrs. A. P. Wooldridge, Lewis Hancock, W. B. Wortham, W. R. Hamby and Dr. E. P. Wilmot, for their untiring efforts in behalf of our association. We should be especially indebted to them for their valor and conscientious work during the exciting times of the Colquit tax bill. Our committee went before the tax committee of the Twenty-third Legislature and found them men of sound sense and reason, and after thorough discussion of the different clauses that committee reported adversely on the bill. I regret that at the urgent request of the legislative committee for personal assistance the past year but few responded: and had it not been for the earnestness of the chairman, Colonel Wooldridge, we might not now be rejoicing over the complete victory. The legislative committee appropriated \$100 for the expenses of the private bankers who were desirous of defeating the occupation tax on private banks. I am glad to report that although this committee was not entirely successful in gaining the repeal of the bill, they did succeed in securing a one-half reduction.

It is to be regretted that some of the private bankers thought the association not liberal enough in appropriating funds in their behalf. One private banker thought the association should appropriate \$750 for the purpose of defraying the expenses of lobbyists, but he soon discovered that such appropriations were beyond the jurisdiction of any presiding officer. However, he was assured that the legislative committee would do all in its power to assist. I would advise that in the future a strong legislative committee from the city of Austin be continued, and it is to be hoped, that should this committee request outside help, the members will respond promptly in person, and vigorously co-operate in any measure tending to the advancement and protection of our interests.

And now, in conclusion, while not in the spirit of censure, have I made my criticisms regarding the district chairmen, yet it behooves me as a presiding officer to urge upon you that in the growing developments of our State, our great banking system shall be second to no other enterprise. With our vast fields now being opened up, our many factories in construction or contemplation, and which are bringing in an excellent class of people and capital, added to our already great cattle and farming industry, we, as the medium of their financial communication with the outside world, cannot afford to approve dereliction of duty that will jeopardise our advancement. We point with pride to what has been accomplished by the banks of our State. In the northern portion, many of them too far removed to be affected by the misfortunes of the coast country, have trebled their deposits.

So let us not forget that in 'unity there is strength,' and 'in the multitude of counsel there is safety,' and in this beautiful city, made renowned by its historic association, and near the battlefield where Texas won her freedom, let us resolve to emancipate ourselves from the yoke of former customs, and with rapid and vigorous strides enter the foremost ranks of the great army of American financiers."

Ewing Norwood read his report as treasurer as follows :

Received from former Treasurer E. Rotan.....	\$872.57
Three hundred and two drafts, covering membership fees.....	1,510.00
	<u>\$2,382.57</u>
Less amounts paid as per vouchers attached.....	1,094.69
Balance.....	<u>\$1,287.88</u>

G. A. Levi, of Victoria, read a resolution, which was adopted, petitioning the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to devise some method for cancelling imprinted stamps on bank stationery without destroying the stationery.

There was an extended discussion of the matter of surety bonds for banks and the rates charged by the various companies.

Secretary G. W. Voiers, who was detained in reaching the convention, read his report at the second day's session. He reported the present membership at 291, an increase of thirty-two in the past year, and of ninety-nine in the three years he had held the office of secretary.

Colonel A. P. Wooldridge of Austin, chairman of the legislative committee, reviewed at length the work of his committee during the last session of the Legislature and recited its efforts in behalf of legislation that is needed by the banking interests. Colonel Wooldridge's report showed that the legislative committee has been most watchful and active in behalf of the association, and the influence of the members of the committee had at all times been directed toward the best interests of the members of the association.

The question of the liability of banks in handling bills of lading with drafts attached was again introduced by a member who was under the impression that Col. Wooldridge's committee was the one which had been charged with the investigation of the matter at a former meeting.

Colonel Wooldridge explained that it was not the duty of the legislative committee to make judicial investigations, and said that the duty had been delegated to a special committee appointed at the San Antonio meeting of the association. However, he was familiar with the status of the matter in the courts of the State, and after explaining the situation, stated that under the latest rulings the purchaser of the bill of lading became the guarantor of its contents, and urged that bankers should be prudent in regard to the character of men with whom they dealt in this branch of their business.

Edwin Chamberlain, of San Antonio, being the only member of the association who attended the last annual convention of the American Bankers' Association, made a report on that meeting. He said it was both a pleasant and profitable convention, and that many able papers were read. He mentioned the \$5,000 appropriated by the association to the Texas storm sufferers and of the generous and sympathetic impulses that prompted the donation. In concluding Mr. Chamberlain suggested that the thanks of the Texas association should be returned, and on motion of D. A. Duncan of Beaumont, a resolution expressive of the gratitude of the Texas association for the munificent gift of the American Bankers' Association was adopted.

Colonel Wooldridge, the Texas member of the executive council of the American Bankers' Association, reported upon the meeting of the council from which he had only recently returned. He took occasion to thank the Texas association for elevating him to that position in the banking interests of the country and gratified the members present by announcing that he had accepted an invitation to address the next convention of the general association, which will be held in Milwaukee in September, on the subject of "Assets Currency."

T. J. Groce, of Galveston, spoke on the great disaster which lately visited that city, telling how the people were gradually recovering, so far as possible, from its devastation.

Thomas H. Franklin, of San Antonio, read a valuable paper "Legislative and Business Interests."

A. V. Lane, Cashier of the National Exchange Bank, Dallas, read a paper on "Methods Fatal to Conservative Banking." He said :

"Conservative banking is not necessarily slow, illiberal or unprogressive. The conservative banker may be an up-to-date, liberal minded, progressive citizen, alive to the needs of his community and a potent factor in its upbuilding. But he keeps ever before him the safety of his bank's condition as a primary consideration in all of his transactions; he is jealous of its good name; he is careful to conserve or preserve its assets from all danger of loss or even diminution. He fully realizes that, in loaning \$10,000 for sixty days, there is a great disparity between the amount he risks and the profit for which he risks it. He therefore shuts his eyes to the profit he might make, until he settles to his own entire satisfaction the question of whether or not he runs any undue risk of not getting his principal back again; for, of course, he understands that one must take some risk in all business transactions. But these he reduces to a minimum by carefully considering the above question in all of its phases and rejecting all loans which will not fully meet this requirement, knowing that he can do without the profit on a loan under consideration, but can not afford to lose the principal.

But are all losses made only in loans? Not all, but very nearly all. Occasionally a bank is crippled by a burglary or embezzlement or the failure of some other institution with which it has a considerable amount of its funds on deposit; but, generally speaking, banks fail through bad loans. Such loans, of course, are not made knowingly, but through the inherent shortcomings of human judgment. 'The one man bank' is not a safe one. There should be more than one active executive officer, so that the bank may have the benefit of the wisdom and experience of two or more officials and, as often as practicable, that of its board of directors also, for it will need them all.

A study of the circumstances which tend to warp the judgment of the executive officer is therefore well worth our attention. Undoubtedly one of the most dangerous influences is that of self-interest, and, closely related to it, that of personal friendship. Hence no officer should pass upon a loan in which he is directly or indirectly interested, and it is doubtful if even his fellow officers can consider it with that unbiased deliberation which the circumstances demand.

For this reason we find the United States comptrollers repeatedly pointing out, as a lesson drawn from the history of bank failures in recent years, that excessive loans to officers and directors are too often the cause of such failures, and proposing legislation designed to throw additional safeguards around such loans—a most excellent move if so made as not to be too drastic in its results, for these loans often constitute a considerable portion of the bank's best assets and carry with them profitable accounts. But the officer should not be led astray, as he sometimes is, by the idea that, because he knows a man so well and is sure that he is absolutely acquainted with the exact status of his business, he can therefore afford to go up to or even beyond the danger line by loaning him an amount equal to or greater than forty per cent. of his assets, even though he owe no one but the bank, a condition which is itself often given undue weight.

'*Poeta nascitur, non fit*,' but the banker is both born and made—born with a natural aptitude for the profession, made fit by education, training and contact with his fellow man in the ofttimes devious ways of the world.

The banker who never solicited an account is growing scarce in these days of active competition: at any rate, he is not so much in evidence as he was. But the soliciting of accounts is none the less a matter requiring the exercise of much judgment and moderation. For a bank officer is but human after all, and the promise made or implied, or the reciprocity urged by his new customer, often gets him into trouble. The banker cannot be expected to be, and indeed should not be, entirely devoid of sentiment. But loans or investments made wholly or partially on this basis should be small and under such circumstances that they can properly be regarded as donations or for value received, even if previously and indirectly so received. If they will not adapt themselves to this definition he should refuse them or guarantee them himself.

It need hardly be said that the boomer should be shunned, and anything which even resembles his methods carefully avoided—from that seductive little blast on his own particular trumpet 'See how we grow!' to the hardened sinner paraphrasing the advice of Iago to Rodrigo—"Get business for your bank; properly if you can, but—get business for your bank."

When the National banker, taken to task by the Comptroller for non-compliance with some requirement of the National Bank Act, tries to justify himself with a statement that he has a larger interest in his bank than the Comptroller has, it may sound well, but will hardly stand the test of dispassionate judgment, for the provisions of that act are founded in financial wisdom and have stood the test of time. They are therefore not lightly to be disregarded; and all methods which run counter to their teachings may be pretty safely set down as coming under the inhibition of our subject.

But the safety of each particular loan is not the only matter to be guarded. The total

loans must at all times bear a proper proportion to the amount of deposits. No banker should, without need and merely for the sake of present profits, use his credit to its limit; he should always have a safe margin available for unexpected demands of depositors, coming sometimes so generally, as in 1893, that it is almost a case of '*Sauve qui peut!*' No two years are exactly alike and the banker must each year sail his little craft upon a new and untried sea, whose rocks and shoals are uncharted, whose winds and currents are unknown; where storms, gales and hurricanes arise almost without warning; so that, like the prudent mariner, he must never get too far from shore or carry too much sail.

In a word, he must see that his loans are safe and their total not too great."

The new officers chosen for the ensuing year appear below :

President—H. P. Hilliard, Cashier Austin National Bank.

First Vice-President—J. E. McAshan, Cashier South Texas National Bank, Houston.

Second Vice-President—A. V. Lane, Cashier National Exchange Bank, Dallas.

Secretary—J. W. Butler, Cashier Farmers and Merchants' Bank, Clifton.

Assistant Secretary—Nathan Adams, Assistant Cashier National Exchange Bank, Dallas.

Treasurer—H. C. Davis, President Farmers' Bank, Sanger.

Delegates to Convention of American Bankers' Association—W. W. Lipscomb, chairman, Luling; Thomas H. Franklin, San Antonio; M. B. Loyd, President First National Bank, Fort Worth; J. E. Longmoor, Cashier First National Bank, Rockdale; J. J. Gannon, Cashier Commercial National Bank, Houston; A. J. Baker, San Angelo; F. F. Downs, President First National Bank, Temple; W. R. Hamby, Cashier American National Bank, Austin; T. J. Groce, Galveston.

There was an excursion to the Beaumont oil fields, and various entertainments provided by the Houston bankers.

Next year's convention will be held at Galveston.

#### WEST VIRGINIA BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

The eighth annual convention of the West Virginia Bankers' Association met at Wheeling May 15. There was a good attendance of bankers from various parts of the State.

President H. R. Warfield, Cashier of the Elkins National Bank, called the convention to order, and H. M. Russell, President of the Wheeling Title and Trust Co., made the address of welcome on behalf of the Wheeling bankers. J. T. Carskadon, Cashier of the Keyser Bank, responded in the name of the association. Mayor Andrew T. Sweeney also welcomed the bankers to Wheeling.

In his annual address President Warfield stated that practically all the progressive banks in the State belonged to the association. Out of 148 banks doing business, 114 are members.

The annual report of Secretary Charles W. Robinson was read, showing the rapid increase in the banking business of West Virginia, new banks being organized at the rate of one a month. The report is as follows :

"Mr. President and Gentlemen of the West Virginia Bankers' Association: It affords me much pleasure to meet you in this, the eighth annual convention of the West Virginia Bankers' Association. The cordial welcome extended the association by the bankers and business men of this prosperous city is a complete fulfillment of the promises made at our last convention by Messrs. Wagner, Bayha and our former president, Mr. Sands, when they invited the association to meet here.

Every true West Virginian has an admiration for our State's chief city, Wheeling. Having met many of the bankers here assembled in their several places of business, I reveal no secret when I state that we are glad that this city was made the convention city for the year 1901.

To the outside world West Virginia is now blossoming as the rose. Capital now seeks and finds the most profitable investment within the borders of our mountain State. To her own

people she has become as a land flowing with milk and honey. Her boundless forests, her productive soil, her abundance of fine building and limestone, her inexhaustible supply of coal, her oceans of oil and her never-failing supply of natural gas, constitute a diversity of natural resources unknown to any other State of this great Union of States. The increased market for our natural products, resulting from wise laws, is the open portal for the people of our State to wealth. And they are availing themselves of these present conditions. This is evidenced by the fact that all over this State the banks' deposits are growing, notwithstanding the fact that eighteen new banks have been organized and commenced business within the State since January 1, 1900.

Bankers of other States frequently ask me for an explanation of how the banks in this State, even in the small towns, secure such large deposits. This mystery is solved when one has traversed the State and beheld the wonderful development of our natural wealth.

I congratulate the bankers of the State on your present prosperity, and venture the assertion that there is not a bank in the State that was doing business at the time of our last convention, May 15, 1900, but can show an increase in the volume of business anywhere from twenty per cent. to 100 per cent. Yes, and their profits have been larger and losses fewer.

This is truly a golden age. The prosperity of the banks of our State is but the proof of the prosperity of the masses of the people. Banks grow on the people's money.

You will pardon these preliminary remarks. They are given to prepare you for the prosperity of the West Virginia Bankers' Association as evidenced by the following:

At the present time eighty per cent. of the banks of the State are members of the association. And ninety per cent. of the banking capital is represented by the members of the association.

Membership April 1, 1900.....	73
New members to May 15, 1900 (date of last meeting).....	21
Membership May 15, 1900 (date of last meeting).....	94
New members from May 15, 1900 to May 1, 1901.....	20
Present membership.....	114
Increase in fourteen months.....	41

Our association is now entitled to two representatives in the American Bankers' Association.

Balance of cash on hand May 15, 1900.....	\$324.94
Dues and membership fees received.....	576.00—\$899.94
Expenses paid as per vouchers in my hands.....	430.46
Balance on hand May 16, 1901.....	\$469.48

All bills have been paid to date."

State Bank Commissioner M. A. Kendall made an address, devoted principally to the new banking law which recently went into effect in West Virginia. He said that the new law was a great improvement on the old one.

Robert Shriver, president of the Maryland Bankers' Association, made an address, in which he referred to the early days of banking. He said, in part:

"Those were the days when the banks issued currency 'based upon the bank's assets.' When 'western paper,' which included all west of the Ohio River and some east of it, was rated anywhere from one or two per cent. to forty or fifty per cent. discount in the eastern cities. When you could hardly buy your breakfast with local currency a hundred miles from the place of its issue; and if by chance it got so far from home, a broker was needed to exchange it (at a shave, of course) for some other kind that would 'go.' Days when brokers fattened at the public expense on the discounts of so-called 'uncurrent money,' which they purchased at a heavy shave and sold again at a better rate or presented to the issuing bank for redemption in gold. Days of active redemption, when it was fashionable to organize 'branch' banks for the chief object of securing the use of a large circulation and to locate the branch at an inaccessible place so as to frustrate the broker's practice of demanding redemption and with the result of still larger 'shave' at the money centers, to be borne by the public, who might be the unfortunate possessor of it.

It was during such days that some bright mind, in order to stop a run upon the bank, conceived and carried out the idea of heating the coin paid out, before passing it over the counter to the unsuspecting creditor, who handled it with peculiar care. The trick worked and worked well, for it is also related that the innocent public were convinced of the solidity of the bank, for how could a bank break that was making the coins right along in the back room as fast as it was wanted and paying them out before they had time to cool off!

And also that the western banker, who meant to protect his institution from such raids

in his own way, placed at the entrance to his bank, on one side, a big fat bag, marked 'Feathers,' and near it a large whitewash brush alongside a covered bucket labelled 'Tar,' and on the other side, a dangerous looking fence rail, bearing a placard with the significant inscription:

'NARY GOLD FOR NARY BROKER.'

The broker's agent coming that way did not take the trouble to ask explanations of this ominous display, but, satisfied with a glance at it, proceeded at once to look after important business calling him elsewhere.

It must not be supposed that the currency of those days was all of the character that you might infer from what I have said; on the contrary, there were many banks of the highest reputation, whose circulating notes stood at the top notch of high credit, some of which banks, without suspension, safely weathered panics which caused many others to suspend specie payments, or to close their doors finally.

According to THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE of August, 1846, there were established in the United States from 1781 to 1812, inclusive, 124 banking institutions. Of these, six are strong banks, still doing business 'at the old stand' under the same name they bore at that time. These were:

	<i>Established.</i>
The Bank of North America, Philadelphia.....	1781
Union Bank, New London, Conn.....	1792
Farmers' Bank, Dover, Del.....	1807
Hagerstown Bank, Hagerstown, Md.....	1807
Mechanics and Farmers' Bank, Albany, N. Y.....	1811
Bank of America, New York.....	1812

Two are still in operation as State banks under changed names. Forty-six are operating as National banks, succeeding to the business of the original banks. About fifteen are supposed to have been converted and are operating as National banks. Five of them had failed before 1846, and the remainder, forty-eight in number, have closed since that year, cause unknown. This is a pleasing record, and such were the earlier banks of the land.

It was the long list of banks that appeared after that date which furnished the style of business and species of currency that gave rise to the well-deserved nicknames 'shinplaster,' 'wildcat,' 'red-dog,' 'bogus,' etc."

In the evening addresses were made by James H. Willock, President of the Pennsylvania Bankers' Association, and by Col. John L. Vance, President of the Ohio Valley Improvement Association.

At the second day's session an exhibition was given of the practical workings of the Wheeling Clearing-House Association, the day's clearings being made in the convention hall in the presence of the visitors, who showed great interest in the transaction.

Among the subjects discussed were the State license tax on banks, uniformity of discount rates in the same town, uniformity of checks and other bank stationery. A resolution on the latter subject was in the following terms:

"Resolved, That we adopt a uniformity as to bank stationery and suggest that bank officers who cannot write employ a typewriter."

The call of counties was responded to very encouragingly, all the delegates reporting prosperity in their respective localities.

The nominating committee reported the following officers, who were unanimously elected:

President—James T. Carskadon, of Keyser, Cashier Keyser Bank.

Vice-Presidents:

First District—George W. Eckhart, Jr., Cashier People's Bank, Wheeling.

Second District—O. C. Crane, Cashier Terra Alta Bank.

Third District—John L. Dickinson, Cashier Kanawha Valley Bank, Charleston.

Fourth District—Edward Nelly, Cashier Wood County Bank, Parkersburg.

Fifth District—Isaac T. Mann, Cashier Bank of Bramwell.

Secretary and Treasurer—Robert L. Archer, Assistant Cashier First National Bank, Huntington.

Delegates to American Bankers' Association—H. R. Warfield, Cashier Elkins

National Bank ; J. William Gilkeson, Cashier South Branch Valley National Bank, Moorefield ; C. W. Robinson, Fairmont ; John B. Finley, Secretary Citizens' Trust and Guaranty Company, Parkersburg.

Charleston invited the association to hold its 1902 convention at the State capital, and the invitation was accepted unanimously.

After the conclusion of the business of the convention, the delegates visited the numerous industrial establishments in Wheeling and vicinity, and in the evening were tended a banquet by the bankers of Wheeling.

---

#### NORTH CAROLINA BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

---

The fifth annual convention of the North Carolina Bankers' Association will be held at Asheville June 20 and 21. A special rate of \$2 50 per day has been made by the Battery Park Hotel to delegates and visitors to the convention.

Reduced railroad rates will also be obtained.

This will afford a good opportunity for bankers, whether residents of North Carolina or not, to visit this attractive resort.

Information may be obtained by addressing the president, J. P. Sawyer, of Asheville, or the secretary, Jno. M. Miller, Jr., of Charlotte.

---

#### MISSISSIPPI BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

---

The Mississippi bankers held their convention at West Point on May 9. Among those who addressed the meeting were Hon. Geo. W. Wilson, of Lexington, and T. F. Davis, of Yazoo City.

The following officers were elected : B. L. Roberts, of Canton, president ; J. W. Keys, West Point, vice-president ; B. W. Griffith, Vicksburg, secretary and Treasurer. The vice-presidents for the different congressional districts are as follows : First district, J. C. Stanley, Booneville ; second, B. T. Kimbrough, Oxford ; third, James Robertshaw, Greenville ; fourth, Arthur Dugan, West Point ; fifth, C. H. Williams, Yazoo City ; sixth, W. M. Lampton, Magnolia ; seventh, J. W. Person, Port Gibson. McComb City was selected as the next place of meeting.

---

#### SOUTH CAROLINA BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

---

An organization was effected by the bankers of South Carolina at a meeting held at Columbia May 8.

The meeting was held at the club house of the Merchants and Manufacturers' Club and about fifty bankers, representing every section of the State, were in attendance.

By-laws and rules under which the association will work were adopted, and an election of officers resulted in the choice of the following :

President—W. A. Law, Spartanburg.

First Vice-President—E. H. Pringle, Charleston.

Second Vice-President—E. W. Robertson, Columbia.

Secretary and Treasurer—Joseph Norwood, Greenville.

Members of the Executive Committee—R. G. Rhett, Charleston ; W. J. Roddey, Rock Hill ; E. Nicholson, Union ; W. J. Montgomery, Marion, and John M. Kinard, Newberry.

After the officers had been chosen many impromptu speeches of a practical nature were made.

The question of a State bank examiner was discussed somewhat, some of the

bankers being in favor of the State having such an official, while others were opposed to it as being unnecessary.

The association begins with a membership of fifty, which is considered a flattering start. When the North Carolina association was formed it was organized with only fifteen members. It is expected that in a short time every banker in South Carolina will be a member of the State association.

John M. Miller, of Charlotte, secretary of the North Carolina Bankers' Association, was present by invitation, and gave the bankers much valuable information. Mr. Miller was at one time a National bank examiner.

---

#### KANSAS STATE BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

The fourteenth annual convention of the Kansas State Bankers' Association met at Lawrence May 28, C. Q. Chandler, President of the Citizens' State Bank, Medicine Lodge, presiding. In his annual address President Chandler, after reviewing the great agricultural progress of the State, said :

"The Kansas banks have also kept pace. Only nine failed to show earnings in 1899, of which seven were new banks. In 1900 no National banks and only two private banks went into Receiver's hands. The total deposits of the Kansas banks are \$70,118,286, an increase of forty-five per cent. in two years."

Secretary Thornton Cooke, of Herington, read a complete report of the past year's work, dwelling upon the great benefits of organization and co-operation among the bankers. The insurance and bond features, which are conducted from the secretary's office, have proven very satisfactory during the short time which they have been in operation. The membership of the association has increased from 210 to 315 banks, of which eighty-seven are National and 210 State and private banks.

Hon. James H. Eckels, former Comptroller of the Currency, and now President of the Commercial National Bank, Chicago, was one of the principal speakers.

---

#### PENNSYLVANIA BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

The seventh annual meeting of the Pennsylvania Bankers' Association will be held at Erie, Pa., July 10 and 11, 1901.

As the Pan-American Exposition at Buffalo means a trip of only a few hours from Erie, it is expected that an unusually large number of bankers will arrange to enjoy both the convention and the exposition.

---

#### GEORGIA BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

The tenth annual convention of the Georgia Bankers' Association met at Old Point Comfort, Va., June 4 and 5.

President F. P. Hardwick, of Dalton, Ga., member of the firm of C. L. Hardwick & Co., one of the oldest banking houses of the State, presided, and in his opening address called attention to the fact that the prosperity wave had not reached Georgia, but had originated there, and was there to stay this time. He reviewed the banking interests of the State, and said that the financial outlook from every part of the State was never brighter. The convention was also addressed by Ellis H. Roberts, United States Treasurer; William C. Cornwell, President of the City National Bank of Buffalo, and John M. Miller, Jr., Cashier Farmers and Merchants' Bank of Charlotte, N. C., and secretary of the North Carolina Bankers' Association.

The delegates and their families were entertained on an excursion given by John L. Williams & Co., the Richmond railroad and banking firm, and were banqueted by the Newport News and Hampton Clearing-House Association.



The newly-elected officers of the association are : President, Percy L. May, Cashier National Exchange Bank, of Augusta ; first vice-president, S. B. Brown, President Exchange Bank, of Albany, Ga. ; secretary, L. P. Hillyer, Cashier American National Bank, of Macon ; treasurer, George H. Plant, Vice-President First National Bank, of Macon.

---

At the close of the convention over one hundred delegates, with members of their families, took a steamer for New York, arriving in this city on June 6. After interviewing their correspondents, and participating in various entertainments, many of the visitors went to Buffalo to see the Pan-American Exposition, and on June 14 they left for their homes in the South.

---

#### VIRGINIA BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

---

The eighth annual convention of the Virginia State Bankers' Association was held at Roanoke, May 30, C. D. Fishburne, Cashier of the Bank of Albemarle, at Charlottesville, presiding. Judge Woods welcomed the association and John Stewart Bryan, of Richmond, responded.

After the usual routine business the following officers were elected : President, George J. Seay, of Petersburg ; vice-presidents, George W. Moore, Jr., of Lynchburg ; H. E. Jones, J. R. Jopling, Danville ; W. M. Hablston, Richmond ; J. B. Fishburne, Roanoke ; Henry Schmeltz, Hampton ; E. D. Newman, W. H. Taylor, Norfolk ; Rufus A. Ayres ; secretary, H. A. Williams ; executive committee for three years, O. J. Sands, J. W. Bell and J. A. Willett.

O. J. Sands, President of the American National Bank, Richmond, made a brief address. He referred to the subject of taxation and to the issuance by banks of drafts and money orders.

The following committees were appointed : Taxation, Judge John D. Horsley, of Lynchburg ; J. S. Ellet, of Richmond, and George A. Smeltz, of Newport News. On the matter of bank drafts or money orders, Messrs. H. E. Jones, of Bristol ; O. L. Parker, of Onancock, and N. L. Adamson, of Manchester.

The following delegates and alternates to the American Bankers' Association were elected : Delegates, Judge John D. Horsley, of Lynchburg, and William M. Hillis, of Richmond. Alternates, Edward Stone, of Roanoke, and J. R. Jopling, of Danville.

The association adjourned to meet next year in Lynchburg. The members then went on a trolley ride and carriage drive, which was followed by a banquet at the Hotel Roanoke.

---

#### NEW YORK STATE BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

---

Secretary B. W. Wellington has sent out a very attractive illustrated souvenir of the Pan-American Exposition, and calling attention to the eighth annual convention of the New York State Bankers' Association to be held at Buffalo, Thursday, Friday and Saturday, June 20, 21 and 22.

Among those who will make addresses are Wu Ting-fang, the Chinese Minister, and Hon. W. I. Buchanan, Director-General of the Pan-American Exposition, and one or more prominent officials of the South American republics.

The committee of arrangements is composed of A. D. Bissell, of the People's Bank, Buffalo ; Charles Adsit, First National Bank, Hornellsville ; E. A. Groesbeck, National Commercial Bank, Albany ; H. H. Persons, Buffalo Commercial Bank ; Walter E. Frew, Corn Exchange Bank, New York.

## WHAT BECOMES OF OUR TRADE BALANCE.

"What has caused so much produce, merchandise and specie of the United States to go out of the country without the ordinary corresponding return?" is a question recently propounded to the Treasury Bureau of Statistics by Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, an Indian gentleman residing in London.

Mr. Naoroji in his inquiry addressed to the Bureau of Statistics quotes the recent figures showing a large excess of exports of merchandise and specie over the net imports of merchandise and specie, and says:

"In India a heavy net excess always takes place because the system of government of India compels a heavy tribute, i. e., compels a large drain of the produce of India to England without any material return of merchandise or specie. But America is not under such a draining system of an alien foreign government: and I therefore desire to know the causes, and their extent, of such heavy net excess of exports of America's wealth or produce, and how this large 'balance of trade' is expected to be settled."

The following is an extract from the reply of the Chief of the Bureau of Statistics:

"During the period immediately following our Civil War great internal development of our railways and manufacturing occurred. Much foreign capital was brought into the United States for use in this development, and during that time and in subsequent years railroad and other securities were largely marketed abroad. The commercial results of this development of railways and manufacturing establishments, including the opening of new fields of production, was an enormous increase in the exportations and a disposition to relatively decrease the importations because the development of manufacturing was making it practicable to produce at home from our own materials much which was formerly brought in from abroad. Thus the great business development of the years 1870 to 1890 had a tendency to stimulate production and exportation, but discouraged importation, and, as a consequence, exports exceeded imports in a constantly increasing ratio. The fact, however, that large sums had been borrowed abroad for the internal developments above alluded to required payments of large sums for the annual interest charges, and thus absorbed a part of the proceeds of the surplus exports. The earnings of foreign capital invested in great enterprises in this country, other than that obtained by the sale of bonds or by direct loans, also require considerable sums for the payment of the dividends and profits of the enterprises in which it was invested. The further fact that internal commerce and investments in internal developments were extremely profitable, reduced and temporarily suspended shipbuilding in the United States, and, as a consequence, the increasing traffic came to be carried more and more in foreign ships, and the payment of the freights thereon, especially the freights upon imports, again absorbed a large additional amount of the proceeds of the excess of exports.

Another factor to be considered is that of the money expended by Americans travelling abroad who usually take their funds in the form of letters of credit, and draw from time to time for such sums as they require, and this, of course, proves an offset to that extent against the balance which would otherwise be returned to the United States in the form of cash.

Until recently these four great factors—(1) the payment of interest on American securities held abroad; (2) the payment of earnings of foreign capital invested in business enterprises in the United States; (3) the payment of foreign freights carried in foreign vessels, especially freights on goods imported into the United States; and (4) the expenditures of Americans travelling abroad, have been considered the chief cause of the fact that the exports of merchandise so much exceeded the combined imports of merchandise, specie and bullion. Within the last two or three years, however, three further factors have apparently been added—(1) the cancellation of American indebtedness abroad, including a return to the United States of the railroad and other securities thus held; (2) the sale of foreign securities in the United States, such as the German, British and Russian securities which were placed upon the markets here during the last year, and in most cases quickly taken to the amount of probably \$100,000,000 in the year; and (3) the credits which now stand abroad in favor of our exporters, and which are permitted to so stand because better interest rates could thus be realized than by insisting upon their immediate payment.

The sums of money represented by these various factors, which presumably about equal the excess of exports over imports, have been variously estimated, and up to the present time no means of obtaining more than estimates have been devised. These estimates usually put the amount paid to foreign vessels as freights on imports at about \$50,000,000; interest on, and earnings of foreign capital, \$75,000,000 to \$100,000,000; money expended abroad by Americans, \$75,000,000 to \$100,000,000; American funds invested in foreign securities in 1900, about \$100,000,000; and credits permitted to stand abroad in 1899 and 1900, each \$75,000,000 to \$100,000,000; to which must be added the amount of our foreign indebtedness actually cancelled by the return of securities for which no definite estimate has, so far as I am aware, been made."

# THE MODIFIED WAR REVENUE ACT.

IN EFFECT JULY 1, 1901.

## PRESENT LAW REPEALED.

*(These Items have been repealed outright.)*

Bank checks, 2 cents.  
Bills of lading for export, 10 cents.  
Bonds of indemnity and bonds not otherwise specified, 50 cents. (Repealed except as to bonds of indemnity.)  
Certificate of damage, 25 cents.  
Certificates of deposit, 2 cents.  
Certificates not otherwise specified, 10 cents.  
Charter party, \$3 to \$10.  
Chewing gum, 4 cents each \$1.  
Commercial brokers, \$20.  
Drafts, sight, 2 cents.  
Express receipts, 1 cent.  
Insurance—Life, 8 cents on each \$100; marine, inland, fire,  $\frac{1}{4}$  cent on each \$1; casualty, fidelity, and guaranty,  $\frac{1}{4}$  cent. on each \$1.  
Lease, 25 cents to \$1.  
Manifest for Custom-House entry, \$1 to \$5.  
Money orders, 2 cents for each \$100.  
Mortgage or conveyance in trust, 25 cents for each \$1,500.  
Perfumery and cosmetics,  $\frac{1}{4}$  cent for each 5 cents.  
Power of attorney to vote, 10 cents.  
Power of attorney to sell, 25 cents.  
Promissory notes, 2 cents for each \$100.  
Proprietary medicines,  $\frac{1}{4}$  cent for each 5 cents.  
Protest, 25 cents.  
Telegraph messages, 1 cent.  
Telephone messages, 1 cent.  
Warehouse receipts, 25 cents.

## PRESENT LAW MODIFIED.

*(These Items have been modified.)*

Beer, \$2 per barrel and  $7\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. discount, changed to \$1.80 per barrel, and  $7\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. discount repealed.  
Bills of exchange, foreign, 4 cents for each \$100; changed to 2 cents for each \$100.  
Cigars weighing more than 3 pounds per 1,000, \$3.80 per 1,000; changed to \$3 per 1,000.  
Cigarettes weighing not more than 3 pounds per 1,000, \$1.50 per 1,000; changed to, valued at not more than \$2 per 1,000, 18 cents per pound; valued at more than \$2 per 1,000, 86 cents per pound.  
Cigars weighing not more than 3 pounds per 1,000, \$1 per 1,000; changed to 18 cents per pound.  
Conveyance, 50 cents for each \$500; now exempted below \$2,500; above \$2,500, 25 cents for each \$500.  
Legacies—Law modified so as to exclude from taxation legacies of charitable, religious, literary or educational character.  
Passage ticket, \$1 to \$5; now exempted below \$50 in value.  
Sales of products at exchanges: 1 cent for each \$100 retained, but sales of merchandise in actual course of transportation exempted from tax.  
Tobacco and snuff, 12 cents per pound; now, discount of 20 per cent.

## PRESENT LAW RETAINED.

*(These Items have not been changed.)*

Bankers' capital and surplus, \$50 for \$25,000, and \$2 for each additional \$1,000.  
Bonds, debentures, certificates of indebtedness, etc., 5 cents for each \$100.

Brokers' contract, 10 cents.  
 Certificates of profits, 2 cents for each \$100.  
 Certificates of stock, original issue, 5 cents for each \$100.  
 Certificates of stock, transfers, 2 cents for each \$100. (Amended to include bucket-shops.)  
 Cigarettes weighing more than 3 pounds per 1,000, \$3.60 per 1,000.  
 Custom-House brokers, \$10.  
 Dealers in leaf tobacco, \$6 to \$24.  
 Dealers in tobacco, \$12.  
 Drafts, time, or bills of exchange, inland, 2 cents for each \$100.  
 Entry of goods at Custom-House for consumption, 25 cents to \$1.  
 Entry for withdrawal, 50 cents.  
 Freight receipts or domestic bills of lading, 1 cent.  
 Manufacturers of cigars, \$6 to \$24.  
 Manufacturers of mixed flour, \$12 per annum.  
 Manufacturers of tobacco, \$6 to \$24.  
 Mixed flour, 4 cents per barrel.  
 Pawnbrokers, \$20.  
 Petroleum and sugar refineries,  $\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. gross receipts in excess of \$250,000.  
 Proprietors of bowling alleys or billiard rooms, \$5 for each alley or table.  
 Proprietors of circuses, \$100.  
 Proprietors of other public exhibitions, \$10.  
 Proprietors of theatres, museums and concert halls, \$100.  
 Sleeping and parlor car tickets, 1 cent.  
 Sparkling or other wines, 1 pint, 1 cent; more than 1 pint, 2 cents.  
 Stockbrokers, \$50.  
 Tea, customs duty of 10 cents per pound.

### HOME OF THE ATLANTIC TRUST COMPANY.

A representation of the home of the Atlantic Trust Company, at the corner of Wall and William streets, New York city, is presented in this issue of *THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE* as a title illustration.

The May number of the *MAGAZINE* contained an article on "The Functions of Trust Companies," and the subject was illustrated with facts in the experience and progress of the Atlantic Trust Company.

We are informed by Mr. L. V. F. Randolph, the President of the Atlantic Trust Company, that since the removal of the company to its new quarters its activities have continued to enlarge. Increased business has come to its trust department, and its deposit line has advanced up to a point approximating ten millions.

Its situation is certainly favorable for continued growth, and its banking room is one of the most agreeable and convenient of the new banking offices of the Metropolis.

The Wall Street district contains the finest buildings of any similar area in any city of the world, and the building shown in our illustration is a worthy addition to the many notable structures in that part of the city.

**THE NATIONAL BANKS.** — An unequaled record of bank loans and deposits is afforded by the complete returns of the National banks on April 24. Loans and discounts stand at \$2,911,526,276, about \$345,000,000 higher than on April 26, 1900. Individual deposits stand at \$2,898,665,449, which is about \$445,000,000 above the amount in April, 1900. The increase in loans and discounts since the last previous reports, on February 5, is about \$97,000,000 and the increase in individual deposits is \$140,000,000. The specie holdings of the banks are \$886,773,692, of which about \$315,000,000 is in gold coin and gold certificates. This is an increase of \$28,000,000 over the specie holdings of a year ago, but a fall of about \$18,000,000 since the February reports. The aggregate resources of the National banks stand at \$5,680,794,367. This is about \$195,000,000 beyond the amount on February 5, 1901, and is \$819,000,000 above the total of April 26, 1900.

## BANKING AND FINANCIAL NEWS.

---

This Department includes a complete list of NEW NATIONAL BANKS (furnished by the Comptroller of the Currency), STATE AND PRIVATE BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, DISSOLUTIONS AND FAILURES, etc., under their proper State heads for easy reference.

---

### NEW YORK CITY.

—It is announced that the Empire State Bank will shortly begin business in the Empire Building at 71 Broadway. The new bank's hours, it is reported, will be from 9 to 5 o'clock.

—The Nassau Trust Company, of Brooklyn, is now located in its new \$200,000 building at Broadway and Bedford Avenue.

The building is five stories high, of plain but attractive architecture, and is built of Indiana limestone, and each of the three entrances is set off with two pillars of polished granite. It is supplied with an elevator of the latest design and the hallway leading to the offices on the floors above is tiled with marble, as well as the walls.

The new building has a frontage on Broadway of seventy-five feet and 102 feet on Bedford Avenue. The building is supplied with all the modern improvements in the way of light and heat. The ground floor will be entirely occupied by the bank. The floor is also tiled and the joiner work is all in highly polished hard wood. On this floor are provided offices for the President, Secretary and other officers. The interior is well lighted by large plate-glass windows and desks in keeping with the rich interior have been provided along the side wall for patrons.

The Nassau Trust Company has had a remarkably successful career since its formation in 1888. The first President of the company was the late A. D. Wheelock, formerly city treasurer. After his death former Postmaster Andrew T. Sullivan, in July, 1897, was chosen his successor. Since assuming the head of the institution he has brought about an era of prosperity which has been notable in financial circles. The institution commenced business with a capital stock of \$500,000 and there was no paid-in surplus. It has since been paying six per cent. to its shareholders and has accumulated beside a surplus of about \$400,000. The deposits at the present time exceed \$4,500,000. In all there are at present 2,400 depositors who keep accounts with the company. Outside of this financial business the bank acts as trustee, guardian, committee and executor of estates.

Almost from the outset the present quarters were found inadequate for the business, which increased at a rapid rate. In connection with its banking business the company has arranged and provided for modern safe-deposit vaults.

The officers of the company are: Andrew T. Sullivan, President; William Dick, John Truslow, Vice-Presidents; Harry F. Burns, Secretary, and Francis Weekes, Assistant Secretary. The trustees are William Dick, John Loughran, A. D. Baird, Henry Seibert, E. B. Tuttle, O. F. Richardson, Charles H. Russell, Jost Moller, William F. Garrison, Herbert F. Gunnison, John Truslow, Andrew T. Sullivan, William E. Horwill, William Lamb, F. W. Wurster, F. D. Mollenhauer, Dittmas Jewell, James A. Sperry, Edward T. Hulst and Robert P. Lethbridge.

—Charles W. Sackett, Vice-President and Cashier of the North Side Bank, Brooklyn, having resigned in order to become Vice-President of the Union National Bank of New Orleans, Paul E. Bonner was on June 1 appointed Cashier to succeed Mr. Sackett.

—The Atlantic Trust Company has removed its offices to the magnificent and newly constructed Atlantic Building, corner Wall and William streets. The company is located on the ground floor and has beautiful and spacious offices.

A title illustration presented in this issue of the MAGAZINE shows the appearance of the exterior of the building.

—Ex-Mayor Thomas F. Gilroy recently assumed the duties of President of the Twelfth Ward Bank, to which position he was elected some time ago.

—Arthur S. Luke, treasurer of the United States Steel Corporation, is a new director of the Liberty National Bank.

—Henry P. Davison was recently elected President of the Liberty National Bank, succeeding Henry C. Tinker, resigned. Frederick P. McGlynn has been appointed Assistant Cashier.

Mr. Davison is only thirty-four years of age, and has advanced rapidly to his present position. He began his banking career in his native town, Bridgeport, Ct., coming to New York in 1892 to accept a position as paying teller of the Astor Place Bank. He was elected Assistant Cashier of the Liberty National in 1894, Cashier in 1895 and Vice-President in 1900.

—A very artistic circular has been issued by the Western National Bank, calling attention to the remarkable growth in the bank's business. The present enviable position of this institution may be seen from the statement of April 24:

RESOURCES.		LIABILITIES.	
Loans and discounts.....	\$32,352,530.88	Capital stock paid in.....	\$2,100,000.00
United States and other bonds.	2,861,720.18	Surplus and undivided profits,	
Real estate.....	618,373.53	net.....	2,148,102.57
Cash and exchanges.....	19,216,459.26	Circulation.....	49,997.50
Due from banks.....	1,518,165.72	Deposits.....	52,272,149.95
Total.....	\$56,570,249.62	Total.....	\$56,570,249.62

—Joseph W. Harriman was elected a director of the Merchants' National Bank on June 6.

—Richard Delafield, President, and Stuyvesant Fish, Vice-President of the National Park Bank, were recently elected trustees of the American Surety Co.

—Officials of the Continental National Bank have issued a formal notice to depositors and stockholders stating that the bank is liquidating its affairs. A controlling interest in the Continental was recently acquired by the Hanover National Bank, which will absorb it.

—President Robert D. Kent, of the Domestic Exchange National Bank, recently issued a circular to correspondents, in which he says:

"After more than a year's work in our specialty of collecting out-of-town checks it is found that sufficient support in it has not been given to us to compensate us proportionately to the labor expended and the capital invested. It is, therefore, determined that after the close of the current month our energies will be devoted to banking in the usual lines, and such collections as we make will be upon the same terms as are prescribed by the clearing-house rules on the subject.

A large interest in our stock has recently been acquired by Mr. C. W. Morse, who is identified as Vice-President with a number of the banks of this city, and it is arranged that on June 1 he will assume the office of Vice-President of this bank.

After our practice as to charges is made to conform to that of the other banks of this city, it will be arranged to have this bank represented in the clearing-house."

—Owing to the large increase in its business, the Seaboard National Bank will greatly enlarge and otherwise improve its banking rooms.

—The Hanover National Bank has taken title from the Continental National Bank to Nos. 5 and 7 Nassau street for a consideration of \$1,000,000. The property fronts 49.7 feet on the street and is of irregular depth.

—The National Exchange Bank, which was the first institution of its kind in the State to take out a charter as a National bank, recently celebrated its semi-centennial by entertaining more than 150 of its depositors and other friends at a dinner at the Waldorf-Astoria.

—It was announced recently that Joseph W. Harriman would on July 1 retire from the service of the Merchants' National Bank, of which he has been Cashier for the last six years, to enter the banking and brokerage firm of Harriman & Co. The present members of the firm are William M. Harriman and Oliver Harriman, Jr., with Nicholas Fish as special partner.

—On the evening of May 4 a complimentary dinner was given at Sherry's to Wm. L. Moyer, the new Vice-President of the Western National Bank, by Jules S. Bache and Wm. J. Wollman. The guests included some of the best known bankers of the city.

—The regular annual meeting of the New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants was held at the Waldorf-Astoria on the evening of May 13, President Charles W. Haskins presiding. There was a large attendance. President Haskins reported great interest in the movement to secure a more uniform system of municipal accounting and said that when the city of Chicago recently called for bids for an investigation of the special assessment accounts it was specified that bids would only be considered from public accountants with qualifications equal to those of certified public accountants practicing under the laws of the State of New York.

The following officers were elected for the ensuing year: President, Charles W. Haskins; vice-presidents, Henry R. M. Cook and Farquhar J. MacRae; treasurer, James N. Kelly.

—On May 14, H. K. Pomroy was elected vice-president of the Stock Exchange, to succeed J. T. Atterbury.

—At a regular meeting of the board of directors of the National Citizens' Bank on June

7, Henry Disme was appointed Cashier to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of Edwin S. Schenck, as Cashier. Mr. Schenck will continue as Vice-President.

### NEW ENGLAND STATES.

**Maine Bank Returns.**—Bank Examiner Timberlake recently completed a tabulation of the statements showing the condition of the Savings banks and trust and banking companies of Maine on April 27. Fifty-one Savings banks reported deposits amounting to \$69,179,900, and total resources \$73,196,320—an increase of about \$2,000,000 in each of the items since October 27, 1900. Seventeen trust and banking companies report deposits amounting to \$11,171,702 and \$14,380,575 total resources.

**Boston.**—The American National Bank was organized May 4 with \$200,000 capital. It will occupy the banking rooms at 214 Devonshire street, corner of Franklin. Its officers are President, S. E. Blanchard; Vice-Presidents, Henry Wells and A. H. Eastman; Cashier W. A. Faulkner.

—A pleasing entertainment was given by the Bank Officers' Association in Paul Revere Hall on the evening of May 15, nearly 500 members being present. President George W. Johnson presided. The association has a permanent fund of nearly \$29,000. Charles L. Burrill of the Second National Bank, was chosen president for the ensuing year.

—The National Bank Cashiers' Association held its annual meeting and dinner at the Parker House on the evening of May 16, Joseph F. Gibbs presiding. About forty-five members were present.

The topic of discussion was: "Shall We Form an Association for the Mutual Protection of Ourselves and Save our Stockholders from Assessment in Case of Losses?"

The following officers were elected: President, B. A. Robinson, of Hingham; first vice-president, J. P. Hamilton, of Worcester; second vice-president, George S. Parker, of Watertown; treasurer, N. A. Very, of Salem; secretary, E. H. Kennedy, of North Easton; executive committee, C. Fay Heywood, of Concord, W. B. Tenney, of Fitchburg, and F. G. Newhall, of Brighton.

—The members of the Boston Clearing-House Association, at a meeting on June 6, voted to declare all checks or drafts drawn on banks in New England, stamped "payable in Boston or New York exchange" or "Boston and Albany exchange" at current rates, to be non-negotiable. It was voted also that checks and drafts stamped with this or any similar phrase shall not be received on deposit or collected by the members of the association, or any institution clearing through any of the members.

**Taxing a Bank's Real Estate.**—Judge Thayer, in the superior court at Middletown, Ct., recently decided, substantially, that where a bank paid taxes on its stock, the value of the real estate not being exempted, it could not be taxed on the real estate separately and in addition to the tax on the stock.

**Pan-American Banking Co.**—It is reported that the Legislature of Connecticut will grant a charter to the International Company, which will do a banking business in several American countries, also in the Philippines, Cuba and Porto Rico. It will start with \$500,000 capital, which will be increased later.

### MIDDLE STATES.

**Baltimore.**—Jacob W. Hook, formerly Vice-President of the Old Town Bank, succeeds the late E. G. Hipsley as President of the bank.

—The growing financial importance of this city is referred to as follows in a recent issue of "The American:"

"The opening for business of the great building of the Continental Trust Company, one of the largest structures of its kind in the South, naturally directs attention to the remarkable development of Baltimore as a center of financial operations and the magnificent accommodations that are now provided for the transaction of business. This fine structure makes a notable addition to the list of Baltimore's sky-scrapers of the most approved pattern, in which millions of dollars have been invested.

The business that is conducted in these enormous structures covers a multitude of branches of human industry, and sometimes the operations there carried to a successful issue involve the outlay of almost fabulous sums of money. Great schemes are no strangers here now. The whole South looks to Baltimore first of all for the capital required for that development that is rapidly pushing it into the position of one of the richest portions of the country. The capital which, through individuals and corporations in this city, has gone South within the last few years makes a fabulous sum, and from nearly all of it have come sufficient returns to warrant continued investments in the same direction."

**Pittsburg.**—Stockholders of the Monongahela National Bank met on May 15 and voted to increase the capital stock of the bank from \$250,000 to \$500,000. The premium realized will make the surplus and profits about \$500,000 additional.

—A meeting of the stockholders of the Safe Deposit and Trust Co. will be held July 18 to vote on a proposition to increase the capital from \$500,000 to \$1,000,000.

—The stockholders of the Keystone Bank will meet in July and vote on a proposition to increase the capital stock from \$300,000 to \$500,000 and largely add to the present surplus. This has already been decided upon by the directors, and, as in the case of other banking institutions, the action of the directors will be sustained.

The 2,000 shares of the increase will be sold to the stockholders at \$300 a share. This will give \$300,000 increase for the capital and allow \$400,000 to be added to the surplus fund. The surplus now amounts to \$300,000, and the bank after the meeting will have a total capital and surplus of \$1,200,000. The stock of the bank has been selling at \$225 a share, and the stockholders will receive this much advantage.

—Recently the National banks of Pittsburg reported deposits of over \$100,000,000. "The Banker," of this city, says:

"The percentage of gain in deposits and loans and discounts of the National banks of Pittsburg is larger than that of any one of the five leading cities in the country. During the period covered from October, 1895, to February, 1901, the percentage of increase has been as follows:

	<i>Deposits, per cent.</i>	<i>Loans, per cent.</i>
New York.....	110.71	74.18
Boston.....	26.43	6.19
Philadelphia.....	73.39	32.73
Chicago.....	103.37	59.98
Pittsburg.....	147.29	77.47
St. Louis.....	168.42	72.34

In Pittsburg this increase is all the more noteworthy because of the fact that this period has witnessed a remarkable increase, not only in the organization of new State banking institutions, particularly of trust companies, but the increase in the capitalization of the older companies, while the net increase in National banks has been but three per cent.

—The Prudential Trust Co. recently organized by prominent business men of the East End, with \$200,000 capital, has opened for business in its new quarters at Penn and Center avenues.

—There is a boom in local banking shares. On the Stock Exchange on May 28 Second National Bank stock was bid up to \$725, being \$125 a share above the best previous bid. Only one lot was offered for sale and it was held at \$750.

Fidelity Title and Trust made a new record by advancing to \$425 a share, one small transaction being made at that figure after an opening at \$415. American Trust sold at \$166.50 and later advanced to \$170.50 bid, which is the highest price ever quoted for the stock. Real Estate Trust was wanted at \$225 bid, Pennsylvania Trust at \$210 bid, Pittsburg Trust at \$590 bid and Prudential Trust at \$132 bid. Tradesmen's National Bank sold at \$152½, which is an advance of 2¼, and First National Bank advanced to \$406 bid.

The advance in this class of stocks is based upon the earnings of the local institutions, as revealed in the official statements, and also upon the various propositions which will be submitted to stockholders for increasing the capital stock.

—Application was made recently to the Comptroller of the Currency for a charter for the Standard National Bank, with \$2,000,000 capital, one-half of which is said to have been subscribed in advance.

**Joke on a Bank.**—As the result of a joke on a country bank in New York, the bank was flooded with 1901 cents and letters requesting a remittance of \$19 for each cent. Recently a paper in a spirit of facetiousness announced that the bank "would pay \$19 for 1901 pennies," and many who failed to see the point began collecting the coins and sending them in. One individual mailed four pennies of this year's date, with a request that \$75.96 be returned to him, and the bank officials were for a time kept busy trying to explain the joke.

**Philadelphia.**—The Manayunk National Bank has selected plans for its new building, which will be erected on the site of the Bowker buildings, Main and Levering streets, Manayunk. It will be of granite, one story in height and highly ornamented. It will have a frontage of thirty-two feet on Main street and of sixty feet on Levering street. Entrance will be had through an arched double doorway in the center of the Main street front. The building, which will be fireproof, will be completed, it is thought, during the present year. All the interior furnishing will be of polished marble and mahogany, with ornamented plaster and marble floors. The cost will be about \$25,000.



**The Taxation Conference.**—The taxation conference of the National Civic Federation, which met at Buffalo, adjourned May 24. Most of the work of the conference and the sense of its delegates in matters of taxation are contained in the following resolutions, drafted by Professor Seligman, of New York, which with the exception of the last paragraph, were unanimously adopted:

**Resolved**, That it is the sense of this conference that a permanent organization be effected for the promotion of inter-State comity in taxation and of tax reform in general, and to that end that a committee of fifteen be appointed by the chair to act as an executive committee until another meeting of this conference; and that the executive committee be authorized to select a general committee of one hundred, with at least one member from each State.

**Whereas**, The problem of just taxation cannot be solved without considering the mutual relations of contiguous States,

**Resolved**, That this conference recommends to the States the recognition and enforcement of the principles of inter-State comity in taxation. These principles require that the same property should not be taxed at the same time by two State jurisdictions, and to this end that, if the title deeds or other paper evidences of the ownership of property or of an interest in property are taxed, they shall be taxed at the sites of the property and not elsewhere. These principles should also be applied to any tax upon the transfer of property in expectation of death or by will or under the laws regulating the distribution of property in case of intestacy.

**Resolved**, That the State and local revenues should be so separated as to methods and subjects of taxation as to give to the counties and municipalities the largest powers of local option in taxation."

This last paragraph of the resolution was referred back to a committee, which will report on the resolution at the next meeting of the conference.

**Bank Consolidation.**—It is reported that the Bank of Jamaica, N. Y., has absorbed the Far Rockaway Bank, and that a branch of the latter, also under control of the Bank of Jamaica, will be opened at Rockaway Beach early in July.

**Saratoga Springs, N. Y.**—The Adirondack Trust Company is being organized here with \$100,000 capital and \$50,000 paid-in surplus. Charles T. Barney, President of the Knickerbocker Trust Company, and other New York capitalists, are interested in the new company.

### SOUTHERN STATES.

**New Orleans, La.**—The recent defalcation of an employee of the Hibernia National Bank is of interest chiefly for the method employed. Samuel Flower, Jr., paying teller of the bank, was recently told to take a vacation, without previous notice, and following the usual custom an examiner was put in charge of his books. A shortage of \$36,000 was discovered, and as the bank holds a fidelity bond for \$25,000, the loss will be \$11,000. The only effect of this will be to reduce the surplus of the Hibernia National from \$618,000 to \$602,000. Here is the way the money was taken:

"Expecting an examination Mr. Flower in order to prepare for it sent to another bank in this city a Government sealed package said to contain \$40,000 and received in exchange for it \$40,000 gold clearing-house certificates, of denominations of \$5,000 each.

His cash having been counted by the National examiner the evening before and found correct and thinking he had escaped detection he returned the clearing-house certificates to the bank from which he borrowed them and received in return his unbroken Government package said to contain \$40,000. This package was received by the Hibernia National Bank from the New Orleans Sub-Treasury in March last and contained \$4,000 in \$1 bills. He had carefully preserved a label from an old Government package that did contain \$40,000 in denominations of \$10 each, which he pasted on the package which only contained \$4,000 in \$1 bills, thereby making it a \$40,000 package to all appearances. This package was opened and counted after his departure from the bank, and the shortage discovered."

**Atlanta, Ga.**—The records of the Atlanta Clearing-House show that there has been a marked increase in the volume of business transacted in Atlanta this year, as compared with the same period of last year.

The clearings of the Atlanta banks for January, February, March and the first eleven days of April show a big increase.

Darwin G. Jones, Manager of the clearing-house, says the clearings for the first three months of this year increased \$4,231,159 over the clearings of the same three months of last year.

For the first eleven days of April of this year the clearings increased \$336,000 over those of the first eleven days of 1900.

The total increase of clearings since January 1 up to the close of business April 11 were \$4,567,859 over the period from January 1 last year up to the close of business a year ago.

This great increase of clearings shows that Atlanta is enjoying a splendid trade season and that spring business is far beyond what it was last year although the weather this spring has, for the most part, been unfavorable to good business.

Merchants confirm the records of the clearing-house and many state that their business has increased to a marked degree this spring over that of last spring and the early winter months.

At the present rate of increase in clearings the total increase of 1901 over 1900 would be something like \$20,000,000. It is now running more than \$1,400,000 per month.

Mr. Jones is confident the present rate of increases will continue for some time yet and that the outlook for the year is very promising.

**Bank Doubles Its Capital.**—The People's National Bank, of Leesburg, Va., recently increased its capital from \$50,000 to \$100,000—a step deemed necessary to meet the demands of its growing business. This term "growing business" is by no means an empty phrase, as may be seen from the following table, showing the deposits on January 1 of the years named:

1899.....	\$64,072	1894.....	\$250,669	1899.....	\$473,126
1890.....	92,948	1895.....	267,371	1900.....	563,345
1891.....	145,691	1896.....	285,353	1901.....	615,796
1892.....	178,906	1897.....	328,943	and on May 1.....	698,000
1893.....	251,808	1898.....	363,416		

**Suspended Bank Resumes.**—On April 30 the banking house of Josiah Morris & Co., of Montgomery, Ala., which suspended the latter part of January, resumed business under the management of F. M. Billing. Depositors will be paid in installments in several periods extending to July 1, 1903.

#### WESTERN STATES.

**Cleveland.**—Application has been filed for an increase of the capital stock of the Coal and Iron National Bank from \$500,000 to \$1,000,000. The bank now has \$70,000 surplus, and the premium on the new shares is expected to increase this to about \$412,000.

—The shareholders of the Lake Shore Banking and Savings Company have voted to increase the capital from \$100,000 to \$200,000, putting \$40,000 into the surplus fund.

—Stock of the Colonial National Bank is to be increased from \$500,000 to \$2,000,000, which, with the premium will make the capital and surplus \$2,800,000.

—The Dime Savings and Banking Company will increase its capital from \$300,000 to \$500,000.

**Moline, Ill.**—A fine new building is being erected here for the First National Bank and the People's Savings Bank, to cost between \$40,000 and \$50,000.

**St. Louis.**—The Lincoln Trust Company is about to increase its capital from \$1,000,000 to \$2,000,000, the directors having approved the proposition on May 7. A meeting of the shareholders will be held on July 9 to consider the question.

At the annual meeting in January the number of Vice-Presidents was increased to three. The present surplus and undivided profits of the company amount to over \$400,000.

—Thirty-three members of the St. Louis chapter of the American Institute of Bank Clerks attended the first annual banquet at the West End Hotel on the evening of May 18. After the banquet a number of live topics relating to banking were discussed.

—Work is progressing on the new building of the Mercantile Trust Company, which promises to be a tasteful and handsome structure. The building is to be constructed of light-colored Maine granite, and will occupy a frontage of eighty feet on Locust street and 120 feet on Eighth street. The fittings and furnishings will be in keeping with the elegance of the building.

**Waukesha, Wis.**—The Waukesha National Bank, one of the oldest banks in the State, and also one of the largest outside of Milwaukee, is erecting a handsome two-story fire-proof bank and office building, which it is expected will be completed by October. This bank has \$150,000 capital, about \$75,000 surplus and profits and over \$1,500,000 deposits. Its officers are: President, Andrew J. Frame; Vice-Presidents, Richard Weaver and F. H. Putney; Cashier, H. M. Frame; Assistant Cashier, E. R. Estberg.

**Chicago.**—John T. Webber, formerly Cashier of the Farmers and Merchants' State Bank, Jamestown, North Dakota, has taken a position as auditor with the Continental National Bank, of this city. Mr. Webber has contributed valuable articles to *THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE* on bank accounting, and has a high reputation for his practical knowledge of the subject. He is a nephew of Mr. John Farson, of the well-known firm of Farson, Leach & Co., Chicago and New York.

—It is announced that several of the title insurance companies have united into a new organization having \$5,000,000 capital.

—Deposits of the National banks of the city on April 24 amounted to \$258,065,022 compared with \$244,113,658 on February 5.

The State banks on May 14 reported total deposits of \$172,451,487, compared with \$166,984,672 on February 25.

—About July 1, Homer W. McCoy, Cashier of the Commercial National Bank, Peoria, will locate in this city, becoming a member of the firm of W. J. MacDonald & Co., the title of which will be changed to MacDonald, McCoy & Co.; the offices will be at 284 La Salle street. Mr. McCoy is one of the well-known and successful bankers of the State, with thorough experience in banking and corporation affairs. He is a member of the executive council of the American Bankers' Association, and first vice-president of the Illinois Bankers' Association.

—The Chicago National Bank is now located in its new building (an illustrated description of which has been given in a previous issue) on Monroe street near La Salle. The Home Savings Bank and the Equitable Trust Co. also have offices in the building.

**Indianapolis, Ind.**—The new Columbia National Bank, it is reported, takes over the business of the State Bank. James R. Henry, Cashier of the latter bank, will become Manager of the clearing-house, succeeding W. F. C. Golt, who becomes Cashier of the Columbia National.

—On April 24 the National banks of this city reported deposits aggregating \$23,582,874 and total resources of \$28,403,976. On December 1, 1898, deposits were only \$14,877,502 and resources \$18,242,028. This gain has not all been due, however, to the ordinary increase of business, but is in part due to the designation of the city as a reserve point for National banks. But aside from this, there has been a substantial and healthy expansion of banking and trust company business here in the past few years.

—On June 3 the clearings of this city amounted to \$1,816,965, the highest previous day's record being \$1,647,620.

—The directors of the Security Trust Company recently voted to increase the capital from \$500,000 to \$600,000. This company was organized only a short time ago, and the stock was taken up so rapidly that the directors deemed it expedient to make the increase.

—The Columbia National Bank opened for business on June 3, and the first day's deposits were \$508,301.50, which is said to beat the State's record of any new bank's first day's business. Mortimer Levering is President.

**Kansas City, Mo.**—A new building will be put up by the United States Trust Company at Tenth street and Baltimore avenue.

—The deposits in Kansas City National banks have continued during the past three months the rapid growth they have been making for the past two or three years. The statements of April 24 show a gain of over \$5,500,000 since the publication of the statement of February 5. The aggregate deposits in the seven National banks on April 24 were \$67,597,651. This is nearly \$20,000,000 more than the figures a year ago, and almost double those of three years ago.

The aggregate spring deposits of Kansas City National banks for the past five years were as follows:

April 24, 1901.....	\$67,597,651	May 5, 1898.....	\$34,091,000
April 26, 1900.....	48,357,000	May 14, 1897.....	23,190,000
April 5, 1899.....	39,798,000		

The above statement shows that the deposits at the present time are nearly three times what they were five years ago.

Aggregate resources of the National banks have now risen to over \$75,000,000.

**Peoria, Ill.**—Homer W. McCoy recently resigned as Cashier of the Commercial National Bank and has been succeeded by Elwood A. Cole, formerly Assistant Cashier. Mr. McCoy will become a member of the Chicago banking house of W. J. MacDonald & Co., the title being changed to MacDonald, McCoy & Co. He will continue to be related to the Commercial National Bank in the capacity of Second Vice-President and director.

### PACIFIC SLOPE.

**Economizing on Postage.**—A well-known California banker writes as follows:

"Some of the largest banks in the country are sending canceled checks by mail at a cost to themselves of only two cents for each package.

This is under Section 479 of the Postal Laws and Regulations, which prescribes as follows:

'First-class matter, exceeding one ounce (not exceeding four pounds) when prepaid two cents, shall be dispatched with the deficient postage rated thereon, and the latter is collected on delivery at the address.' "

Perhaps this is a way some of the big city banks have for getting even with their country correspondents for minor delinquencies, real or fancied.

**San Francisco.**—There are now five National banks in San Francisco. The Comptroller of the Currency at Washington recently called on these banks for a statement of their condition on April 24. As published these statements show deposits and resources as follows:

	<i>Deposits.</i>	<i>Resources.</i>
Crocker-Woolworth.....	\$5,392,563	\$8,744,763
First.....	4,678,412	11,046,919
Nevada.....	3,892,338	12,736,874
San Francisco.....	1,272,161	2,318,498
Western.....	167,172	417,243
Total.....	\$15,402,646	\$35,254,292

In addition the First National has United States deposits of \$468,026. The Western National is the latest organized of the city Nationals. It was formerly known as the Bank of Commerce.

—On April 20 the seventeen commercial banks of the city reported \$53,000,000 deposits and \$78,061,000 total resources.

—At a recent meeting of the board of directors of the Union Trust Co., it was voted to increase the capital from \$750,000 to \$1,000,000.

**San Bernardino, Cal.**—W. S. Boggs, formerly Assistant Cashier of the San Bernardino National Bank, together with John L. Oakey, recently of Newton, Ill., and other local capitalists are organizing a new bank at this place.

### CANADA.

**New Bank Authorized.**—Parliament recently passed a bill to incorporate the Sovereign Bank of Canada.

**Canada's Foreign Trade.**—Canada's aggregate trade on the basis of goods entered for consumption and export exclusive of coin and bullion for the ten months ended April 30, shows a satisfactory gain as compared with that of the previous year. The actual figures were \$302,567,352, as against \$283,517,230, showing an advance of \$19,050,112. The imports totalled \$142,942,420, for the ten months, as against \$143,308,759 in 1900, a falling off of \$361,339. The diminution is accounted for by the fact that the dutiable goods were less by \$1,064,708 than in 1900. The free goods were \$703,369 in excess of the same class of imports for last year. For the month of April the imports of dutiable and free goods were \$322,423 ahead of the same period of last year. The increase was wholly in free goods. The exports, reckoning both foreign and domestic produce, amounted to \$159,024,932, as compared with \$140,213,480 for the preceding ten months.

For the month of April last the exports, including foreign and domestic, show a betterment of \$1,622,414, as compared with the same month of last year.

**Branch of the Royal Mint.**—Provision has been made for the establishment of a branch of the Royal Mint at Ottawa. The building and equipment will cost over \$300,000, and it will require \$65,000 a year to keep it running. The mint will make all the gold, silver and copper coins required in Canada, and in addition will manufacture British sovereigns.

This action of the Government is not universally approved, as may be seen from the following extract from the "Shareholder and Insurance Gazette," of Montreal:

"The benefits which will be conferred by the establishment of a mint will accrue not to the people generally but to the gold miners, and it is a question which time alone will settle whether the benefits to be conferred upon them will compensate the country for the expenditure which its establishment and maintenance will involve. It is possible that any material benefit to the miners will indirectly affect those engaged in general business, and should this benefit be equivalent to the cost to the country, there will be little to complain about on that score. It must be borne in mind that should the circulation of gold be increased that of bank notes will be correspondingly decreased, and thus these institutions will be deprived of another source of profit. Under all these circumstances we conclude that while a Canadian mint may be an object of national pride, it will prove a costly luxury."

**Government Savings Banks.**—The deposits in the twenty-four Government Savings banks for April were \$230,283, and the withdrawals \$265,724, making an excess of \$36,441 in withdrawals over deposits. The balances at the credit of the depositors, which were \$15,755,040 on March 31 last, were reduced on April 30 to \$15,689,599. Compared with the same date last year, when the number of branches was the same as at present, there is an increase of \$479,253.

**Circulation of Dominion Notes.**—In the statement of the public debt on April 30 the issue of Dominion notes is shown at \$28,271,462, but a later statement, that of circulation and specie, issued by the Comptroller of Dominion Currency, shows the issue at the close of the

month to have been \$27,816,388, or \$455,074 lower than that shown in the former statement. This is a contraction from March of \$382,181. At the same time it is an expansion of \$3,201,970 over the amount in issue at the corresponding date of last year.

**Prosperity of the Banks.**—In a recent issue the Toronto "Globe" says:

"The splendid statements of the business of the past year issued by the Bank of Montreal and the Dominion Bank this month give some indication of what may be expected from the statements of other leading banks shortly to be given to the shareholders. Both in the case of the Dominion and the Bank of Montreal the net profits were the largest in the history of those institutions. Semi-annual dividends have been announced by all the banks, and in the majority of cases in the Provinces of Quebec and Ontario they are payable the first week in June. The total dividend distribution the coming month will be considerably larger than in any previous year. In some cases there are increased amounts of paid-up capital upon which dividends have to be paid, the increases in capital having been made necessary by the expansion of the business of the country. In others there have been increases in the dividends declared. In a few cases the increased dividend distribution is due to both increased capital and to increased dividends. The total paid-up capital of the banks in the two Provinces which pay dividends in June is now \$48,030,000, against \$43,785,000, and the total aggregate sum to be distributed in dividends the first week in June amounts to \$1,918,800, against \$1,724,325 last year. The total paid-up capital of all of the banks in the two Provinces, however, including those whose financial year ends in other months than June, now amounts to \$58,585,000, against \$53,666,000 a year ago.

Four banks out of sixteen in the two Provinces have made increases in their current rates of dividends over the amounts paid for the corresponding dividend periods a year ago; one bank has reduced its rate of dividends. Of the same sixteen banks, half of them show increases in paid-up capital over this time a year ago."

**The Bank of Montreal.**—The annual statement of the Bank of Montreal, issued May 14, is the most satisfactory in its history, and with such a conservatively managed institution shows the general trade of the country to be in the most gratifying condition. The net profits to April 30, 1901, after deducting charges of management, etc., were \$1,537,522, as compared with \$1,524,388 last year, and \$1,350,583 in 1899. The bank, therefore, on its capital of \$12,000,000 earned 12.81 per cent., as compared with 12.70 in 1900, and 11.25 per cent. in 1899. Deducting the half-yearly dividends of five per cent., one paid in December, 1900, and one on June 1, a total of \$1,200,000, there is left \$764,703 to be carried to profit and loss, compared with \$427,180 last year. Last year a million dollars was taken from this account and added to "rest," increasing the latter to \$7,000,000, or seven-twelfths the total paid-up capital.

Comparing the details of business in this statement with those of the last, it is found that notes of the bank in circulation show a slight increase. The current loans and discounts have increased from \$53,430,000 to \$58,850,000, showing an increase of over \$5,000,000 in the bank's share in the general mercantile activity of the country. The deposits not bearing interest as well as those bearing interest have jumped up enormously since the last statement. For the present year the deposits not bearing interest amount to \$18,184,000, as compared with \$10,708,000 last year. The interest-bearing deposits the present year amount to \$54,501,000, as compared with \$41,936,000 last year. The total assets of the bank now amount to \$99,582,000, as compared with \$78,865,300 last year. The market price of the Bank of Montreal stock on April 30, 1901, was 258, as compared with 262 the same date last year.

#### Failures, Suspensions and Liquidations.

**Ohio—CLEVELAND.**—On May 6, the Cuyahoga Savings and Banking Company closed, and a week or so later the President, H. N. Pollock, committed suicide at Seattle, Wash. While the bank is reported to have made unfortunate loans, Mr. Pollock is not charged with applying any of the funds to his own use.

**South Dakota.**—The Canton State Bank suspended May 11, owing to a bad loan made some time ago. Deposits are said to be about \$60,000.

**Alabama.**—The Shelby County Bank, of Montevallo, suspended May 24.

**Illinois—CHICAGO.**—W. F. Furbeck & Co., brokers, suspended May 8.

**Nebraska.**—The People's State Bank, of Gothenburg, was closed by the State Banking Board on May 28. Loans amount to \$72,000, a considerable part being reported as worthless.

**North Carolina.**—S. H. Loftin, of Kinston, who had been in business thirty years, assigned May 22.

Results are the sole object of your advertising effort. You get these results in a large and conservative way when using Rice's "PRACTICAL BANK ADVERTISING." Perhaps you'd like to know more about this valuable book. If so, address your inquiry to the

FREMONT PUBLISHING COMPANY, FREMONT, OHIO.

## NEW BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, ETC.

### NEW NATIONAL BANKS.

The Comptroller of the Currency furnishes the following statement of new National banks organized since our last report. Names of officers and other particulars regarding these new National banks will be found under the different State headings.

#### NATIONAL BANKS ORGANIZED.

- 5794—Paris National Bank, Paris, Missouri. Capital, \$70,000.
- 5795—First National Bank, Glen Rose, Texas. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5796—First National Bank, Medford, Oklahoma. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5797—Lufkin National Bank, Lufkin, Texas. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5798—First National Bank, Cando, North Dakota. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5799—First National Bank, Lebanon, Kansas. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5800—First National Bank, Ryan, Indian Territory. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5801—Second National Bank, Meyersdale, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$65,000.
- 5802—Hicksville National Bank, Hicksville, Ohio. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5803—Commercial National Bank, Essex, Iowa. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5804—First National Bank, Watonga, Oklahoma. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5805—Bankers' National Bank, Cleveland, Ohio. Capital, \$500,000.
- 5806—Citizens' National Bank, Arlington, Texas. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5807—First National Bank, Abbeville, Louisiana. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5808—City National Bank, Granbury, Texas. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5809—First National Bank, Tishomingo, Indian Territory. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5810—National Bank of Kinsley, Kinsley, Kansas. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5811—Mangum National Bank, Mangum, Oklahoma. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5812—Danville National Bank, Danville, Illinois. Capital, \$100,000.
- 5813—First National Bank, Stronghurst, Illinois. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5814—First National Bank, Friendly, West Virginia. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5815—First National Bank, Malta, Illinois. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5816—National Exchange Bank, Castleton, New York. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5817—Farmers' National Bank, Odebolt, Iowa. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5818—First National Bank, Barnesboro, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5819—American National Bank, Barberton, Ohio. Capital, \$100,000.
- 5820—First National Bank, Idaho Falls, Idaho. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5821—First National Bank, Clifton, Arizona. Capital, \$80,000.
- 5822—First National Bank, Ontario, Oregon. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5823—First National Bank, Berlin, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5824—First National Bank, Crandall, Texas. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5825—American National Bank, Beaumont, Texas. Capital, \$100,000.
- 5826—First National Bank, Redwood Falls, Minnesota. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5827—First National Bank, Gallatin, Missouri. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5828—First National Bank, Wadsworth, Ohio. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5829—Thurmont National Bank, Thurmont, Maryland. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5830—First National Bank, Covina, California. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5831—Citizens' National Bank, Westernport, Maryland. Capital, \$40,000.
- 5832—Citizens' National Bank, Waynesboro, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$50,000.
- 5833—Citizens' National Bank, Meyersdale, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$65,000.
- 5834—Farmers' National Bank, Osborne, Kansas. Capital, \$25,000.
- 5835—First National Bank, Donora, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$75,000.

#### APPLICATIONS TO ORGANIZE NATIONAL BANKS APPROVED.

The following notices of intention to organize National banks have been approved by the Comptroller of the Currency since last advice:

- People's National Bank, Hoosick Falls, New York; by D. Runkle, *et al.*
- Union National Bank, Dixon, Illinois; by F. E. Stiteley, *et al.*
- Afton National Bank, Afton, Indian Territory; by Jas. F. McGannon, *et al.*
- First National Bank, Newton, Illinois; by E. W. Hersh, *et al.*

First National Bank, Orrville, Ohio; by A. W. Blackburn, *et al.*  
 Citizens' National Bank, Dublin, Texas; by F. M. Browne, *et al.*  
 City National Bank, Beaumont, Texas; by W. B. Dunlap, *et al.*  
 United National Bank, Providence, Rhode Island; by Charles Warren Lippitt, *et al.*  
 National Commercial Bank, Appleton, Wisconsin; by John McNaughton, *et al.*  
 Citizens' National Bank, Houghton, Michigan; by Charles H. Moss, *et al.*  
 Chelsea National Bank, Atlantic City, New Jersey; by D. B. Ingersoll, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Swissvale, Pennsylvania; by C. B. Judd, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Wappanucka, Indian Territory; by R. L. Williams, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Muenster, Texas; by J. W. Powers, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Georgetown, Delaware; by John L. Thompson, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Buffalo, Texas; by Sam R. Burroughs, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Warren, Minnesota; by F. W. Flanders, *et al.*  
 Cherokee National Bank, Vinita, Indian Territory; by W. H. McGeorge, *et al.*  
 National Bank of Crandall, Crandall, Texas; by G. B. Davidson, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Eufaula, Indian Territory; by J. T. Crane, *et al.*  
 Home National Bank, Thorntown, Indiana; by L. H. Christ, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Ruthton, Minnesota; by M. J. Evans, *et al.*  
 Unaka National Bank, Johnson City, Tennessee; by Samuel C. Williams, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Harrison, New Jersey; by Edward Nugent, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Waldron, Arkansas; by Charles H. Bell, *et al.*  
 Citizens' National Bank, Beaumont, Texas; by W. L. Murphy, *et al.*  
 Citizens' National Bank, Monaca, Pennsylvania; by John T. Taylor, *et al.*  
 Wadsworth National Bank, Wadsworth, Ohio; by J. K. Durling, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Billings, Oklahoma; by C. B. Winsborough, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Fredericktown, Pennsylvania; by John L. Miller, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Thorndale, Texas; by H. Y. Allen, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Wolcott, New York; by E. S. Scott, *et al.*  
 Lake Charles National Bank, Lake Charles, Louisiana; by Paul A. Sompayroe, *et al.*  
 Hyde Park National Bank, Hyde Park, Massachusetts; by Charles F. Jenney, *et al.*  
 Merchants' National Bank, Houston, Texas; by John J. Gannon, *et al.*  
 United States National Bank, Johnstown, Pennsylvania; by Francis J. O'Connor, *et al.*  
 Fort Sill National Bank, Fort Sill, Oklahoma; by M. H. Moynihan, *et al.*  
 Commercial National Bank, Eufaula, Indian Territory; by J. Burdett, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Valley Junction, Iowa; by J. W. Mullane, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Houston, Pennsylvania; by John L. Hockins, *et al.*  
 First National Bank, Jennings, Louisiana; by E. F. Rowson, *et al.*

## APPLICATION FOR CONVERSION TO NATIONAL BANKS APPROVED.

Hackensack Bank, Hackensack, New Jersey; into Hackensack National Bank.  
 Citizens' Bank, Los Angeles, California; into Citizens' National Bank.  
 Steele County Bank, Hope, North Dakota; into First National Bank.  
 Bank of Cleveland, Cleveland, Oklahoma; into First National Bank.  
 Capital City Bank, Montgomery, Alabama; into Fourth National Bank.  
 State Bank, Lowell, Indiana; into State National Bank.  
 Central Dakota Bank, Arlington, South Dakota; into First National Bank.

## NEW BANKS, BANKERS, ETC.

## ALABAMA.

ANNISTON—U. S. Endowment & Trust Co.; organizing.  
 WYLAM—Bank of Wylam.

## ARIZONA.

CLIFTON—First National Bank (successor to Bank of Clifton); capital, \$30,000; Pres. J. G. Lowdon; Vice-Pres. Alexander T. Thomson; Cashier, Charles P. Rosecrans; Asst. Cas., W. E. Arnold.

## ARKANSAS.

DUMAS—Bank of Dumas; capital, \$25,000; Pres., X. J. Pindall; Vice-Pres., W. H. Burnett; Secretary and Treas., J. M. Kitley.

## CALIFORNIA.

COVINA—First National Bank (successor to

Covina Valley Bank); capital, \$50,000; Pres., C. H. Ruddock; Cas., F. M. Douglass.

NEEDLES—Monaghan & Murphy Company; capital, \$200,000.

## COLORADO.

BURLINGTON—Stock Growers' Bank; Cas., W. D. Selder.

COLORADO SPRINGS—Citizens' State Bank; capital, \$30,000; Pres., M. T. Burwell; Cas., John V. McDowell.

PAONIA—Fruit Exchange Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., W. T. Bættjer; Cas., F. W. Simonds.

## FLORIDA.

FORT MYERS—Citizens' Banking & Trust Co. (Branch of Tampa); Cas., J. E. Foxworthy.

**GEORGIA.**

**MCRAB**—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., J. F. Cook; Vice-Pres., T. J. Smith; Cas., Olin Pharr.  
**SANDERSVILLE**—Sandersville Bank; capital, \$30,000; Pres., D. P. Hale; Vice-Pres., L. B. Holt; Cas., C. Whitehurst.

**IDAHO.**

**IDAHO FALLS**—First National Bank (successor to Anderson Bros. Bank); capital, \$25,000; Pres., W. F. Adams; Cas., R. Anderson.

**ILLINOIS.**

**DAHLOREN**—Dahlgren Bank.  
**DANVILLE**—Danville National Bank (successor to State Bank); capital, \$100,000; Pres., E. X. Le Seure; Cas., C. V. McClenathan; Asst. Cas., J. A. Foster.  
**EAST ST. LOUIS**—Illinois State Trust Co.  
**HUNTLEY**—Bank of Huntley (M. D. Hoy & Sons); successor to Farmers' Exchange Bank.  
**MALTA**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Frederick B. Townsend; Cas., Joseph C. Pierce.  
**OTTAWA**—Ottawa Trust & Savings Bank; capital, \$100,000.  
**STRONGHURST**—First National Bank (successor to State Bank of Henderson County); capital, \$25,000; Pres., H. M. Allison; Vice-Pres., I. F. Harter; Cas., E. H. Allison.  
**WEST POINT**—State Bank; capital, \$25,000.

**INDIANA.**

**CLOVERDALE**—Bank of Cloverdale; capital, \$10,000; Pres., John Laughlin.  
**KNOX**—Farmers' State Bank (successor to Farmers' Bank); capital, \$10,000; Pres., Austin P. Dial; Cas., Isaac C. Templin.  
**ROMNEY**—Romney Bank; capital, \$25,000.

**INDIAN TERRITORY.**

**RYAN**—First National Bank (successor to Bank of Ryan); capital, \$25,000; Pres., T. J. Lacy; Vice-Pres., D. T. Lacy; Cas., L. S. Noble.  
**TISHOMINGO**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., A. Byron Dunlap.

**IOWA.**

**DE WITT**—De Witt Savings Bank.  
**DEXTER**—Dexter Savings Bank; capital, \$15,000; Pres., H. H. Holmes; Vice-Pres., R. McCalman; Cas., C. E. Bales.  
**ESSEX**—Commercial National Bank (successor to Commercial State Bank); capital, \$50,000; Pres., R. A. Sanderson; Cas., T. K. Elliott.  
**FAIRFIELD**—Jefferson County State Bank; capital, \$100,000.  
**HARTWICK**—Farmers' Savings Bank; capital, \$12,000.  
**HUXLEY**—Bank of Huxley.  
**LEHIGH**—Bank of Lehigh; Pres., J. C. Cheney; Cas., C. E. Richards.  
**MCCALLSBURG**—McCallsburg Savings Bank; Pres., W. F. Swayze; Vice-Pres., E. C. Dillon; Cas., B. M. Rasmussen.

**MELVIN**—Bank of Melvin; capital, \$10,000; Pres., H. L. Emmert; Cas., Geo. A. Romey.  
**ODEBOLT**—Farmers' National Bank (successor to Farmers' Savings Bank); capital, \$50,000; Pres., R. W. Sayre; Cas., S. Ben Sayre.

**REDFIELD**—Redfield Savings Bank.

**RICKETTS**—Farmers' Bank; Cas., A. F. Kadoch.—Bank of Ricketts (branch of First National Bank, Charter Oak).

**WAPELLO**—Louisa County Savings Bank; capital, \$10,000.

**KANSAS.**

**ABBYVILLE**—State Bank; capital, \$5,000.  
**BISON**—Bison State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., F. W. Longacre; Cas., D. M. Rothweiler.  
**KINSLEY**—National Bank of Kinsley; capital, \$25,000; Pres., C. W. Beeler; Vice-Pres., Calvin Hood; Cas., G. D. Griffith; Asst. Cas., G. E. Wilson.  
**LEBANON**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., J. R. Burrow; Cas., J. D. Mosman.  
**OSBORNE**—Farmers' National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Cas., C. B. Hahn.  
**UNIONTOWN**—Union State Bank; capital, \$5,000.

**KENTUCKY.**

**BRADFORDSVILLE**—Rolling Fork Bank; Pres., J. C. Yates; Cas., Roy C. Smith.

**LOUISIANA.**

**ABBEVILLE**—First National Bank (successor to Bank of Vermillion); capital, \$25,000; Pres., Severin Le Blanc; Cas., A. J. Golden.  
**ALEXANDRIA**—City Savings Bank; capital, \$25,000.  
**BREAUX BRIDGE**—Breaux Bridge Bank; Pres., C. Melancon; Vice-Pres., Felix Bienvenue.  
**GUEYDAN**—Bank of Gueydan; capital, \$15,000; Pres., Worthy Quereau; Cas., Jno. G. Neelis.  
**MANSFIELD**—Bank of De Soto; capital, \$20,000; Pres., C. E. Jenkins; Cas., C. R. Brown.

**MARYLAND.**

**BALTIMORE**—Geo. H. Stanley & Co.  
**THURMONT**—Thurmont National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Samuel M. Birely.  
**WESTERNPORT**—Citizens' National Bank; capital, \$40,300; Pres., Joseph T. Laughlin; Cas., Howard Dixon.

**MASSACHUSETTS.**

**BOSTON**—American National Bank; capital, \$200,000; Pres., S. E. Blanchard; Henry Wells and A. H. Eastman, Vice-Pres.; Cas., W. A. Faulkner.

**MICHIGAN.**

**ALMA**—Alma State Savings Bank; capital, \$25,000.  
**COOPERSVILLE**—Oakes & Moore (successor to D. C. Oakes).  
**SANILAC CENTRE**—Sanilac Centre State Bank.



**TRENTON**—Bank of Trenton; capital, \$10,000; Pres., D. H. Power; Cas., M. A. Losee.

#### MINNESOTA.

**BALATON**—First State Bank (successor to Bank of Balaton); capital, \$10,000; Pres., M. Lauritsen; Cas., C. W. Candee.

**BEMIDJI**—Lumbermen's Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., W. R. Baumbach; Cas., W. R. Brooks.

**BOYD**—First State Bank (successor to Bank of Boyd); capital, \$15,000; Pres., Ole Iversen; Cas., E. P. Johnson.

**FERTILE**—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Lewis Larson; Vice-Pres., E. F. Larson; Cas., M. T. Dalquist; Asst. Cas., B. E. Dalquist.

**KIMBALL**—State Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., H. C. Bull; Vice-Pres., Eliel Peck; Cas., C. W. Dixon.

**HANLEY FALLS**—Bank of Hanley Falls; capital, \$10,000; Pres., G. S. Gilbertson; Cas., H. M. Hanson; Asst. Cas., W. E. Hanson.

**LAKE WILSON**—Farmers' Bank; Pres., G. R. Whitmer; Cas., G. W. McFarland.

**LE SUEUR CENTER**—Bank of Le Sueur Center; capital, \$10,000; Pres., D. B. Allen; Cas., J. E. Dempster.—Le Sueur Center Bank; Cas., S. H. Whitney.

**PROCTOR-KNOTT**—Missaba Bank (F. Blackmarr); capital, \$10,000.

**REDWOOD FALLS**—First National Bank (successor to Redwood County Bank); capital, \$25,000; Pres., August C. Burmeister; Cas., Herbert A. Baldwin.

**SHELLY**—State Bank (successor to Bank of Shelly); capital, \$10,000; Pres., John S. Tucker; Cas., J. W. G. Anderson.

**ST. HILAIRE**—First State Bank (successor to Bank of St. Hilaire).

**TRIUMPH**—Triumph Bank.

#### MISSISSIPPI.

**CARROLLTON**—People's Bank; capital, \$25,000.

#### MISSOURI.

**CABOOL**—Bank of Cabool; capital, \$7,000; Cas., H. Parmenter.

**GALLATIN**—First National Bank (successor to Gallatin Savings Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., James Tuggle; Cas., P. J. Clevenger.

**PARIS**—Paris National Bank (successor to National Bank of Paris); capital, \$70,000; Pres., David H. Moss; Cas., Anderson D. Buckner.

**SEDALIA**—Sedalia Trust Co.; capital, \$100,000; Pres., O. A. Crandall; Vice-Pres., W. H. Powell; Sec.-Treas., C. C. Evans.

#### NEBRASKA.

**ALVO**—Farmers and Merchants' Bank.

**BOONE**—Bank of Boone; capital, \$5,000; Pres., J. E. Dack; Cas., E. R. Dack.

**MCLEAN**—McLean State Bank (successor to Bank of McLean); capital, \$10,000; Pres., F. M. Hopkins; Cas., A. R. McConnell.

**VIRGINIA**—Citizens' State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Cas., Mrs. O. O. Thomas.

#### NEW JERSEY.

**NEWARK**—Roseville Banking and Trust Co.  
**PLAINFIELD**—Plainfield Mercantile Trust Co.; capital, \$500,000.

#### NEW YORK.

**CASTLETON**—National Exchange Bank (successor to National Bank of Castleton); capital, \$25,000; Pres., James R. Downer; Cas., Osborn Earing.

**NEW YORK**—Empire State Bank.

**SARATOGA SPRINGS**—Adirondack Trust Co.; capital, \$100,000.

#### NORTH CAROLINA.

**ASHEVILLE**—Asheville Savings Institution.

**MOCKSVILLE**—Bank of Davie; capital, \$10,000; Pres., W. A. Bailey; Cas., Thomas J. Byerly.

**PINE BLUFFE**—Pine Bluff Banking Co.

#### NORTH DAKOTA.

**CANDO**—First National Bank (successor to Towner County Bank); capital, \$25,000; Pres., C. J. Lord; Cas., Harry Lord.

**KATHRYN**—Cheyenne Valley Bank; capital, \$6,000; Pres., H. J. Haskamp; Vice-Pres., H. Thien; Cas., K. O. Abrahamsen.

**KNOX**—State Bank.

**LUNDE**—Security State Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., J. Rosholt; Cas., H. Rostad.

**YORK**—York State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., De Archy McLarty; Cas., J. E. McCarthy.

#### OHIO.

**AKRON**—Dollar Savings Bank Co.; capital, \$50,000.

**ATHENS**—Security Savings Bank; Pres., D. H. Moore; Asst. Cas., L. M. Bingham.

**ALEXANDRIA**—Rusler & Ashbrook; Cas., C. B. Buxton.

**BARBERTON**—American National Bank; capital, \$100,000; Pres., Wm. A. Johnston; Cas., H. B. Houghton.

**BELLAIRE**—Farmers and Merchants' Bank Co.; capital, \$50,000.

**CLEVELAND**—Central Trust Co. (successor to Permanent Savings and Loan Co.) capital, \$1,000,000; surplus, \$200,000.—Bank of Cleveland Company; capital, \$100,000.—Caxton Savings and Banking Co., capital, \$200,000.

**COLLINWOOD**—Collinwood Savings Bank Co.; capital, \$50,000; Pres., J. S. Wood; Cas., F. H. Houghton.

**METAMORA**—Metamora Savings and Banking Co.; capital, \$25,000.

**SHILOH**—Shiloh Savings Bank Co. (successor to Shiloh Exchange Bank); capital, \$25,000; Pres., Jerry Wolf; Cas., A. W. Firestone.

**SWANTON**—Farmers and Merchants' Deposit Co.; capital, \$12,500; Pres., L. W. Pilliod; Cas., Geo. R. Ackerman; Sec., L. D. Boyer.

**THORNVILLE**—Thornville Banking Co. (successor to Thornville Bank); capital, \$25,000; Pres., G. W. Garrison; Cas., A. O. Garrison.

**TOLEDO**—State Savings Bank; capital, \$40,000; Cas., F. C. Hoehler.

**WADSWORTH**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., J. B. Wright; Cas., L. S. Werts.

#### OKLAHOMA.

**CARROLL**—Bank of Carroll, capital, \$5,000.

**EDMOND**—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$100,000.

**EL RENO**—Inter-State Bank.

**HOMESTEAD**—Exchange Bank.

**MANGUM**—Mangum National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., T. C. Phillips; Cas., J. M. Norton.

**MEDFORD**—First National Bank (successor to Medford State Bank); capital, \$25,000; Pres., John T. Stewart; Cas., T. T. Godfrey.—Citizens' State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., J. P. Becker; Cas., F. J. Dibble.

**ODELL**—Pottawatomie State Bank; capital, \$5,000.

**WATONGA**—First National Bank (successor to Bank of Watonga); capital, \$25,000; Pres., W. R. Kelly; Cas., Charles H. Naah.

#### OREGON.

**GRANT'S PASS**—Josephine County Bank; capital, \$25,000.

**ONTARIO**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., John D. Daly; Cas., Edgar H. Test.

#### PENNSYLVANIA.

**BARNESBORO**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., J. S. Miller; Cas., E. O. Hartshorne.

**BERLIN**—First National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., W. A. Garman; Cas., Fred Groff.

**BUTLER**—Guaranty Safe Deposit and Trust Co.

**DONORA**—First National Bank; capital, \$75,000; Pres., John W. Alles.

**FRANKLIN**—Franklin Trust Co. (successor to International Bank); capital, \$500,000; Pres., O. D. Bleakley; Treas., E. Bleakley.

**MCKEE'S ROCKS**—McKee's Rocks Trust Co.; capital, \$100,000; Pres., Charles Holmes; Cas., H. W. Sutton.

**MEYERSDALE**—Second National Bank; capital, \$65,000; Pres., C. W. Truxal; Cas., E. M. Beachly.—Citizens' National Bank (successor to Citizens Bank); capital, \$65,000; Cas., S. B. Philson.

**MONONGAHELA**—Monongahela City Trust Co.; capital, \$50,000.

**PITTSBURG**—Prudential Trust Co.; capital, \$200,000; Pres., Thomas A. Watkins; Cas., C. C. Herr; Asst. Cas., J. M. Durbin.

**WAYNESBORO**—Citizens' National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., S. B. Rinehart; Cas., Frank Zimmerman.

#### SOUTH CAROLINA.

**KINGSTREE**—Bank of Kingstree; capital, \$15,000.

**SPARTANBURG**—Bank of Spartanburg; capital, \$100,000.

#### SOUTH DAKOTA.

**COLTON**—Farmers' Bank.

**DAVIS**—Bank of Davis; capital, \$4,000.

**EVARTS**—Bank of Evarts (James A. Caley).

**HUMBOLDT**—State Bank (successor to Bank of Humboldt); capital, \$7,500; Pres., E. O. Hanson; Cas., John Biegger, Jr.; Asst. Cas., F. B. Lockwood.

**LEAD**—Bank of Black Hills.

**LILY**—Bank of Lily.

**NORTHVILLE**—Bank of Northville.

**WENTWORTH**—Wentworth Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., A. J. Harrington; Cas., T. F. Harrington.

#### TENNESSEE.

**GASSAWAY**—Bank of Gassaway.

**JOHNSON CITY**—Bank of Johnson City; capital, \$40,000; Pres., S. L. Howard; Vice-Pres., J. M. Buck; Cas., Samuel T. Willard; Asst. Cas., Leonard L. Howard.

#### TEXAS.

**ARLINGTON**—Citizens' National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., Thomas Spruance; Cas., W. M. Dugan.

**BEAUMONT**—American National Bank; capital, \$100,000; Pres., J. P. Withers; Cas., F. P. Clements.—Beaumont Trust Co.; capital, \$100,000.

**CRANDALL**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., M. Spellman; Cas., W. D. Morrow.

**GLEN ROSE**—First National Bank (successor to Bank of Glen Rose); capital, \$25,000; Pres., J. R. Milam; Vice-Pres., J. R. Counts and W. D. Carter; Cas., C. A. Milam.

**GRANBURY**—City National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., T. H. Hiner; Vice-Pres., W. H. Eddleman; Cas., J. B. Sikes.

**HONDO**—Schmidt & Steinhart.

**LUFKIN**—Lufkin National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., E. A. Frost.

**ROCK ISLAND**—Lundy Bank.

#### VIRGINIA.

**WISE**—Wise County Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., R. A. Ayers; Vice-Pres., E. M. Fulton; Cas., J. B. Ayers.

**GLOUCESTER C. H.**—L. E. Mumford Banking Co.

#### WASHINGTON.

**FAIRHAVEN**—Bank of Fairhaven.

**LIND**—Bank of Lind; Cas., J. M. Moulton.

**SEATTLE**—Occident Trust Co.

**SPRAGUE**—Bank of Sprague.

#### WEST VIRGINIA.

**ADDISON**—Webster County Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., P. F. Duffy; Cas., B. C. Conrad; Asst. Cas., H. W. Showalter.

**BLUEFIELD**—State Bank; capital, \$30,000; Pres., David E. Johnston; Cas., W. H. Wheelwright.

**COTTAGEVILLE**—Union Bank; Pres., B. E. Harrison; Cas., E. E. McKinley.

**FARMINGTON**—Bank of Farmington; capital,

tal, \$25,000; Pres., J. F. Campbell; Vice-Pres., W. J. Rowland; Cas., Oscar C. Wilt.  
**FRIENDLY**—First National Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres. Hugh Thorn.  
**LITTLETON**—Bank of Littleton; capital, \$6,000; Pres., J. A. Connelly; Cas., B. A. Pyles.

**WISCONSIN.**

**ALMOND**—Portage County Bank; capital, \$1,000; Pres., O. A. Crowell; Vice-Pres., David Hicks; Cas., C. E. Webster.  
**DALE**—First State Bank; capital, \$25,000;

Pres., Peter Hurth; Vice-Pres., F. G. Drews; Cas., Jacob T. Jagodnigg.  
**LAWSON**—Bank of Lawson; Cas., James E. Schow.  
**SPOONER**—State Bank.

**CANADA.****ONTARIO.**

**TORONTO**—Sovereign Bank of Canada.

**NOVA SCOTIA.**

**DARTMOUTH**—Bank of Nova Scotia.  
**GLACE BAY**—Bank of Montreal.

**CHANGES IN OFFICERS, CAPITAL, ETC.****ALABAMA.**

**EUTAW**—First National Bank; E. C. Meredith, Jr.; Cas., in place of James Murphy, deceased.  
**MONTGOMERY**—Josiah Morris & Co.; resumed.  
**TUSCALOOSA**—Merchants' National Bank; T. W. Palmer, Vice-Pres. in place of H. F. Hill, deceased.

**CALIFORNIA.**

**SAN FRANCISCO**—Union Trust Co.; capital increased to \$1,000,000.  
**SANTA ANA**—First National Bank; C. S. Crookshank, Cas. in place of R. F. Chilton.

**COLORADO.**

**GLENWOOD SPRINGS**—First National Bank; Louis Schwartz, Vice-Pres. in place of J. H. Fealer; J. K. Wallis, Asst. Cas.

**CONNECTICUT.**

**PUTNAM**—First National Bank; John F. Carpenter, Asst. Cas.

**GEORGIA.**

**WASHINGTON**—Washington Loan & Banking Co.; T. J. Barksdale, Asst. Cas.

**IDAHO.**

**MOSCOW**—First National Bank; A. N. Bush, Pres. in place of A. T. Gilbert.

**ILLINOIS.**

**BENTON**—Benton State Bank; capital increased to \$50,000.

**DANVERS**—P. H. Vance & Sons; Peter H. Vance deceased.

**EAST ST. LOUIS**—First National Bank; John J. McLean, Cas.

**EDWARDSVILLE**—Bank of Edwardsville; William H. Krome, Pres. in place of W. F. L. Hadley, deceased.

**HILLSBORO**—Montgomery County Loan and Trust Co.; Joel K. McDavid, Pres. in place of James P. Glenn; John F. Glenn, Vice-Pres.

**NEWTON**—Bank of Newton; J. M. Hicks, Cas.

**PEORIA**—Commercial National Bank; Homer W. McCoy, 2d Vice-Pres.; Elwood A. Cole, Cas. in place of Homer W. McCoy; William Hazzard, Asst. Cas. in place of Elwood A. Cole.

**WILMINGTON**—First National Bank; A. J. McIntyre, Vice-Pres.; M. N. M. Stewart, Cas. in place of James Whitten.

**INDIANA.**

**ALBANY**—Albany State Bank; James Wright Wingate, Pres., deceased.

**INDIANAPOLIS**—Indianapolis Clearing-House; James R. Henry, Manager in place of Walter F. C. Golt. — Security Trust Co.; capital increased to \$800,000.

**TELL CITY**—Tell City National Bank; Clay Switzer, Vice-Pres.; W. F. Huthstiner, Asst. Cas.

**INDIAN TERRITORY.**

**DUNCAN**—First National Bank; G. H. Connell, Pres. in place of Wade Atkins; Frank Jones, Vice-Pres. in place of J. W. Weaver; A. L. Overton, Cas. in place of J. T. Jeanes; no Asst. Cas. in place of R. J. Allen.

**WYNNWOOD**—First National Bank; Jno. D. Dougherty, Cas. in place of Charles Bohnke.

**IOWA.**

**BLOOMFIELD**—Taylor-McGowen Bank; H. C. Leach, Cas.

**CLINTON**—People's Trust and Savings Bank; G. E. Lamb, Pres. in place of Artemus Lamb, deceased.

**CORWITH**—First National Bank; Thomas Daylor, Vice-Pres.; A. A. Miller, Asst. Cas.

**DES MOINES**—Iowa National Bank; H. S. Butler, Pres.; H. T. Blackburn, Vice-Pres. in place of H. S. Butler; Leland Winslow, Cas. in place of H. T. Blackburn; no Asst. Cas. in place of Geo. A. Dismore.

**DUBUQUE**—Second National Bank; J. K. Deming, Pres. in place of Geo. R. Burch, deceased; W. H. Day, Vice-Pres.; Herman Eschen, Cas.

**ESSEX**—First National Bank; H. I. Foskett, Vice-Pres.; J. P. Nye, Asst. Cas.

**MOUNT PLEASANT**—First National Bank; T. J. Van Hon, Pres. in place of E. L. Penn, deceased; no Vice-Pres. in place of T. J. Van Hon.

**OLIN**—Citizens' Savings Bank; capital increased to \$20,000.

**SPENCER**—First National Bank; C. P. Buckley, Cas. in place of M. P. W. Albee.

**WASHINGTON**—First National Bank; Wm. Blair, Pres. in place of A. H. Wallace; C. M. Keck, Vice-Pres. in place of Wm. Blair.

**KANSAS.**

**BLUE RAPIDS**—State Bank; Fred. A. Stocks, Pres., deceased.

**LEBO**—State Bank; capital increased to \$25,000.

**OSBORNE**—Exchange National Bank; John A. Morton, Vice-Pres. in place of E. F. Robinson, deceased; M. E. Smith, Asst. Cas.

**SENECA**—National Bank of Seneca; no Asst. Cas. in place of R. A. Thompson.

**TOPEKA**—First National Bank; C. E. Hawley, Cas. in place of Wm. Henderson.

#### KENTUCKY.

**FRANKFORT**—State National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of H. P. Mason.

**FRANKLIN**—G. A. McGoodwin Banking Co.; capital reduced to \$15,000.

**HARTFORD**—First National Bank; G. B. Likens, Vice-Pres.

**LEXINGTON**—Union Savings Bank; capital reduced to \$15,000.

**LOUISVILLE**—Fidelity Trust and Safety Vault Co.; Joshua F. Speed, Treas.

**NEWPORT**—Newport National Bank; R. W. Nelson, Vice-Pres.

**NEW CASTLE**—Bank of New Castle; Isaac W. Kelly, Pres. in place of L. M. Sanford.

#### LOUISIANA.

**LAKE CHARLES**—First National Bank; N. E. North, Cas. in place of A. L. Williams; W. H. Simmons, Asst. Cas.

#### MAINE.

**BATH**—First National Bank and People's Safe Deposit and Savings Bank; John R. Kelley, Pres., deceased.

**PORTLAND**—Portland Savings Bank; James P. Baxter, Pres. in place of Franklin R. Barrett; A. A. Montgomery, Asst. Treas.

#### MARYLAND.

**BALTIMORE**—Middendorf, Oliver & Co.; succeeded by J. W. Middendorf & Co. — Fidelity & Deposit Co.; capital increased to \$2,000,000. — Old Town Bank; Jacob W. Hook, Pres. in place of E. G. Hipsley, deceased. — International Trust Co.; capital reduced to \$2,000,000; surplus reduced to \$1,000,000. — Continental National Bank; shareholders voted to reduce capital from \$250,000 to \$200,000.

**CHESTERTOWN**—Chestertown National Bank; E. S. Sprague, Act. Cas.

**OAKLAND**—First National Bank; R. E. Sliger, Cas. in place of U. G. Palmer, resigned.

**SANDY SPRING**—First National Bank; John Bready, Vice-Pres.; Geo. F. Nesbitt, Jr., Cas.; H. H. Miller, Asst. Cas.

#### MASSACHUSETTS.

**BOSTON**—J. Ransom Bridge elected member Boston Stock Exchange. — State Street Trust Co.; capital increased to \$600,000.

**CHELSEA**—Chelsea Savings Bank; Thomas Strahan, Pres. in place of Otis Hinman.

**EASTHAMPTON**—First National Bank; capital reduced to \$100,000.

**LAWRENCE**—Arlington National Bank; Franklin Butler, Vice-Pres. in place of Wm. W. Spalding.

**LEOMINSTER**—Leominster National Bank Alfred L. Burditt, Cas., deceased; also Treas. Leominster Savings Bank.

**WORCESTER**—Mechanics' National Bank; A. H. Stone, Cas. in place of Geo. E. Merrill.

#### MICHIGAN.

**ADRIAN**—Commercial Savings Bank; William J. Cocker, Pres., deceased.

**DETROIT**—Preston National Bank; William H. Elliott, director, deceased; also director State Savings Bank and Union Trust Co.

**GRAND RAPIDS**—Grand Rapids National Bank; Edwin F. Uhl, Pres. and director, deceased; also director Fifth National Bank.

**TEKONSHA**—Exchange Bank; Charles H. Childs, Cas., deceased.

**THREE RIVERS**—First State Bank; A. S. Arnold, Asst. Cas.

**YALE**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of G. E. Beard.

#### MINNESOTA.

**LAKE BENTON**—First National Bank; Chas. E. Lavesson, Cas. in place of J. B. Sullivan; no Asst. Cas. in place of Chas. E. Lavesson.

**MARSHALL**—First National Bank; C. C. Guernsey, Asst. Cas., resigned.

**MINNEAPOLIS**—Industrial Savings Bank; title changed to Savings Bank of Minneapolis.

**NEW PAYNESVILLE**—Bank of Paynesville; E. M. Elliott, Cas., resigned.

**PIPESTONE**—First National Bank; Hugh Dimock, Asst. Cas.

#### MISSISSIPPI.

**BILOXI**—Bank of Biloxi; J. Edward Park, Asst. Cas., deceased.

**CARROLLTON**—Bank of Carrollton; William Ray, Pres., resigned.

**HATTIESBURG**—First National Bank; J. M. Kennedy, Vice-Pres. in place of P. E. Blalack.

**VICKSBURG**—Merchants' National Bank; Geo. B. Hackett and Conway M. Lawrence, Asst. Cas.

#### MISSOURI.

**FARMINGTON**—St. Francois County Bank; J. E. Cover, Cas. in place of J. S. Towl.

**HUNNEWELL**—Hunnewell Bank; W. F. Blackburn, Cas., deceased.

**SAVANNAH**—First National Bank; E. M. Norris, Vice-Pres.; A. M. Wellen, Asst. Cas.

**ST. LOUIS**—Missouri Trust Co.; O. A. Crandall, Pres., resigned. — Mechanics' National Bank; D. K. Ferguson, Vice-Pres.; Edward Buder, Second Asst. Cas. — State National Bank; William Nichols, director, deceased. — Noel-Young Bond and Stock Co.; capital increased to \$100,000.

#### MONTANA.

**BILLINGS**—First National Bank; M. A. Arnold, Cas. in place of S. F. Morse.

**NEBRASKA.**

**ELMWOOD**—First National Bank; Samuel S. Johnson, Vice-Pres.; J. F. Paddleford, Asst. Cas.

**OMAHA**—Union National Bank; G. W. Wattles, Pres. in place of W. W. Marsh, deceased; W. A. Smith, Vice-Pres. in place of G. W. Wattles; Charles Marsh, Asst. Cas.

**NEW HAMPSHIRE.**

**SOMERSWORTH**—Great Falls National Bank; John W. Bates, Vice-Pres.

**TILTON**—Citizens' National Bank; Wm. T. Cass, Pres., deceased; also Treas. Iona Savings Bank.

**NEW JERSEY.**

**MILLVILLE**—Mechanics' National Bank; Joseph H. Henry, Cas. in place of Jere H. Nixon, resigned; V. E. Edwards, Asst. Cas.

**NEW MEXICO.**

**LAS VEGAS**—First National Bank; A. B. Smith, Vice-Pres. in place of J. W. Zollars, resigned; E. D. Raynolds, Cas.; Hallett Raynolds, Asst. Cas.

**NEW YORK.**

**BROOKLYN**—Seventeenth Ward Bank; W. H. Webster, Cas., resigned.

**CANASTOTA**—First National Bank; Edom N. Bruce, Vice-Pres., deceased.

**HOLLEY**—Slate Exchange Bank; Michael Kennedy, Pres.

**NEW YORK**—Domestic Exchange National Bank; F. J. Van Order, Cas. in place of Charles H. Spencer.—Ninth National Bank; H. H. Nazro, Cas., resigned.—Liberty National Bank; Henry P. Davidson, Pres. in place of Henry C. Tinker, resigned.—Trust Company of America; Wm. E. Spier, director, deceased.—American Surety Co.; Richard Delafield and Stuyvesant Fish elected trustees.—Matthews & Co.; John Clinton Gray, Jr., admitted to firm.—Douglas & Jones; succeeded by Jones & Kendall.—Cahone & Wescott; Wm. P. Wescott, retired.—Strong, Sturgis & Co.; Wm. E. Strong, special partner.—Laidlaw & Co.; Edward Roeler admitted to firm.—Garfield National Bank; James McCutcheon, 2d Vice-Pres.

**OSWEGO**—First National Bank; Henry H. Lyman, Vice-Pres., deceased.

**RED HOOK**—First National Bank; John N. Lewis, Vice-Pres.

**NORTH CAROLINA.**

**WILMINGTON**—Atlantic National Bank and National Bank of Wilmington consolidated under former title.

**OHIO.**

**ALLIANCE**—First National Bank; no Asst. Cas. in place of W. P. Sharer.

**BRIDGEPORT**—First National Bank; F. W. Henderson, Cas. instead of Act. Cas.; no Asst. Cas.

**CINCINNATI**—National Lafayette Bank; S. R. Burton, Vice-Pres. in place of J. V.

Guthrie, resigned.—Brighton German Bank Co.; capital increased to \$200,000.

**CLEVELAND**—Federal Trust Co.; J. C. Gilchrist, Pres.; Frank W. Hart and F. M. Osborn, Vice-Pres.; Geo. L. Clewell, Sec. and Treas.—Lake Shore Banking and Savings Co.; capital increased to \$200,000.—Colonial National Bank; capital increased to \$2,000,000.—Dime Savings and Banking Co.; capital increased to \$500,000.

**GALLIPOLIS**—First National Bank; Jasper C. Ingels, Second Vice-Pres.

**KENT**—City Banking Co.; D. L. Rockwell, Pres., deceased.

**MOUNT VERNON**—Knox County National Bank; C. B. Curtis, Asst. Cas.

**NILES**—First National Bank; E. J. Job, Cas. in place of Wade A. Taylor.—City National Bank; A. G. Webb, Pres. in place of T. C. Robbins; T. E. Thomas, Vice-Pres.

**WELLSVILLE**—First National Bank; W. P. Sharer, Cas. in place of Clayton Vance.

**WARREN**—Warren Savings Bank Co.; H. C. Deitz, Sec. and Treas. in place of Oscar Caldwell, resigned.

**OKLAHOMA.**

**KINGFISHER**—People's National Bank; G. H. Logan, Vice-Pres.; J. M. Speice, Asst. Cas.

**OKLAHOMA**—Oklahoma City Savings Bank; L. C. Parmenter, Cas.

**SHAWNEE**—Shawnee National Bank; J. F. Pedigo, Cas. in place of C. J. Benson; Joe Bowers, Asst. Cas. in place of H. L. Quiett.

**WEATHERFORD**—First National Bank; Frank Hohne, Pres., deceased.

**OREGON.**

**ASHLAND**—First National Bank; J. K. Van Sant, Vice-Pres.

**PENNSYLVANIA.**

**BELLEFONTE**—Center County Banking Co.; Thomas A. Shoemaker, Pres.; John L. Kurtz, Vice-Pres.

**CALIFORNIA**—People's Bank; Oliver F. Piper, Cas. in place of L. Z. Birmingham.

**DELTA**—People's National Bank; H. S. Merryman, Pres. in place of S. J. Whiteford; H. J. Evans, Cas. in place of R. S. Parke, deceased.

**HAZLETON**—First National Bank; Henry W. Heidenreich, Vice-Pres. in place of D. Clark.

**JEANNETTE**—Jeannette National Bank; H. C. Zellers, Pres. in place of J. R. Morrow; no Vice-Pres. in place of John S. Shumaker.

**KANE**—First National Bank; C. H. Kemp, Pres. in place of M. W. Mofitt, deceased; C. H. Heim, Vice-Pres. in place of C. H. Kemp.

**PHILADELPHIA**—City Trust, Safe Deposit and Surety Co.; Charles H. Laird, Jr., Asst. Sec. and Treas.—Fourth Street National Bank; surplus increased to \$2,000,000.—Girard National Bank; R. L. Austin, Vice-Pres.; Theo E. Wiedersheim, 2d Vice-Pres.;

Joseph Wayne, Jr., Cas. in place of J. G. Whiteman; no Asst. Cas. in place of Joseph Wayne, Jr.—Charles Smith & Son; Edward I. Smith, retired.

**PITTSBURG**—Third National Bank; Bernard Wolff, Jr., director, deceased; also trustee Dollar Savings Bank.—City Deposit Bank; Wm. H. Denniston, director, deceased.

**SCHUYLKILL HAVEN**—First National Bank; C. C. Leader, Pres. in place of E. H. Baker; no Vice-Pres. in place of C. C. Leader.

**STROUDSBURG**—Stroudsburg National Bank; B. S. Jacoby, Cas. in place of J. S. Fisher; no Asst. Cas. in place of R. S. Jacoby.

**WILKES-BARR**—First National Bank; Francis Douglas, Cas. in place of P. M. Carhart, deceased; no Asst. Cas. in place of Francis Douglas.

#### RHODE ISLAND.

**PASCOAG**—Pascoag National Bank; E. D. Steere, Cas. in place of P. O. Hawkins.

#### TENNESSEE.

**GAINESBORO**—Bank of Gainesboro; F. A. Kelly, Pres.; Marlon Harris, Vice-Pres.

**GALLATIN**—People's National Bank; F. F. Pierce, Vice-Pres., resigned.

**JACKSON**—Jackson Banking Co.; R. S. Fletcher, Sec.

**KNOXVILLE**—Third National Bank; Greg J. Ashe, elected director.

**MANCHESTER**—First National Bank; J. C. Ramsey, Jr., Cas. in place of T. B. Clark; no Asst. Cas. in place of J. C. Ramsey, Jr.

#### TEXAS.

**MEXIA**—First National Bank; W. L. Murphy, Vice-Pres. in place of M. E. Roberts; J. M. Long, Cas.; James B. Long, Asst. Cas.

**CAMERON**—Citizens' National Bank; T. G. Sampson, Vice-Pres. in place of J. T. Sneed; no Asst. Cas. in place of J. T. Sneed, Jr.

**COMANCHE**—Comanche National Bank; J. B. Chilton, Pres. in place of T. J. Holmsley.

**HOUSTON**—Commercial National Bank; John A. Wilkins, additional Asst. Cas.

**KILLEEN**—First National Bank; J. W. Pace, Vice-Pres.; J. R. Shepard, Asst. Cas.

**MOODY**—First National Bank; J. B. Young, Vice-Pres.; J. W. Donaldson, Asst. Cas.

**SAN ANTONIO**—Lockwood National Bank; E. W. Richardson, 2d Asst. Cas.

#### BANKS REPORTED CLOSED OR IN LIQUIDATION.

##### ALABAMA.

**MONTEVALLO**—Shelby County Bank.

##### ILLINOIS.

**CHICAGO**—W. F. Furbeck & Co.

##### NEBRASKA.

**GOTHENBURG**—People's State Bank.

##### NORTH CAROLINA.

**KINSTON**—S. H. Loftin.

##### OHIO.

**CLEVELAND**—Cuyahoga Savings and Banking Co.

#### UTAH.

**SALT LAKE CITY**—Commercial National Bank; A. H. Peabody, Asst. Cas.

#### WEST VIRGINIA.

**MORGANTOWN**—Second National Bank; W. E. Arnett, Cas. in place of S. W. Hare; no Asst. Cas. in place of W. E. Arnett.

**SHINNISTON**—Farmers' Bank; Thos. Hawker, Pres.; John Lowe, Sec.

#### WISCONSIN.

**ASHLAND**—Ashland National Bank; W. R. Durfee, Vice-Pres. in place of John H. Knight.

**MONDOVI**—First National Bank; S. G. Gilman, Vice-Pres.; Dutee A. Whelan, Asst. Cas.

**OSHKOSH**—Commercial National Bank; Leander Choate, Pres.; Tom R. Wall, Vice-Pres.; Thomas Daley, Cas.; E. R. Williams, Asst. Cas.

**SHELL LAKE**—Lumbermen's Bank; W. R. Bourne, Pres. in place of Artemus Lamb, deceased.

#### CANADA.

##### ONTARIO.

**ALMONTE**—Bank of Montreal; K. Eardley-Wilmot, Mgr.

**BELLEVILLE**—Bank of Montreal; A. G. Parker, Mgr.

**BROCKVILLE**—Bank of Montreal; R. W. Traversa, Mgr. in place of Neil McLean.

**HAMILTON**—Bank of Montreal; Geo. Dean, Mgr.

**KINGSTON**—Bank of British North America; A. G. Frey, Mgr. in place of Adam Harley.

**TORONTO**—Imperial Bank of Canada; Bernard Jennings, Mgr. Wellington St.—Leader Lane branch, deceased.

##### NEW BRUNSWICK.

**CHATHAM**—Bank of Montreal; R. B. Crombie, Mgr.

**FREDERICTON**—Bank of British North America; Adam Harley, Mgr.

##### NORTHWEST TERRITORY.

**REGINA**—Bank of Montreal; A. F. Angus, Mgr.

**PRINCE ALBERT**—Imperial Bank of Canada; Richard Davidson, Mgr. deceased.

##### PRINCE EDWARD'S ISLAND.

**CHARLOTTETOWN**—Bank of Nova Scotia; G. S. Wallace, Mgr. in place of W. D. Ross.

**THURMAN**—Centreville National Bank; in voluntary liquidation May 10.

##### PENNSYLVANIA.

**PHILADELPHIA**—Independence Nat. Bank; in voluntary liquidation May 3.

##### SOUTH DAKOTA.

**CANTON**—Canton State Bank.

##### WYOMING.

**GUERNSEY**—First National Bank; in voluntary liquidation May 1.

## NATIONAL BANK RETURNS—RESERVE CITIES.

By the courtesy of the Comptroller of the Currency at Washington, the **BANKERS' MAGAZINE** has been favored with the complete returns of the National banks in all the reserve cities, at the date of the call on April 24, 1901. These are published below in conjunction with the two preceding statements of December 13, 1900, and February 5, 1901. In this form the figures become much more valuable by reason of the comparison. In this complete shape the returns of National banks in the reserve cities are published in the **BANKERS' MAGAZINE** exclusively.

### NEW YORK CITY.

RESOURCES.	Dec. 13, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Apr. 24, 1901.
Loans and discounts.....	\$344,371,588	\$683,755,065	\$681,200,751
Overdrafts.....	370,727	22,684	150,748
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	31,710,000	32,485,000	32,425,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	38,896,100	34,027,600	34,664,600
U. S. bonds on hand.....	502,200	2,097,130	1,020,280
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	1,856,224	1,995,068	1,940,977
Stocks, securities, etc.....	74,069,324	76,481,416	78,268,942
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	15,800,605	15,867,912	15,929,068
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	1,637,197	1,661,964	1,670,202
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	45,976,858	40,538,935	43,572,189
Due from State banks and bankers.....	6,461,171	5,746,609	5,761,547
Due from approved reserve agents.....	.....	.....	.....
Checks and other cash items.....	3,240,166	3,245,127	5,306,786
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	125,605,568	178,964,339	221,395,276
Bills of other National banks.....	835,809	1,211,780	898,155
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	85,923	63,709	70,269
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:	.....	.....	.....
Gold coin.....	8,991,881	9,189,412	9,271,650
Gold Treasury certificates.....	49,535,450	79,849,330	70,920,180
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	75,895,000	73,120,000	68,385,000
Silver dollars.....	87,693	87,106	89,402
Silver Treasury certificates.....	7,913,542	14,096,599	15,104,408
Silver fractional coin.....	609,016	606,129	715,429
Legal-tender notes.....	39,234,216	47,799,772	49,327,888
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	150,000	.....	820,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	1,557,497	1,616,747	1,605,947
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	1,067,029	1,108,407	1,384,276
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$1,071,580,790</b>	<b>\$1,255,847,877</b>	<b>\$1,291,853,913</b>

LIABILITIES.	Dec. 13, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Apr. 24, 1901.
Capital stock paid in.....	\$62,800,000	\$62,800,000	\$63,850,000
Surplus fund.....	47,390,000	47,401,154	47,848,475
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	28,957,102	29,746,076	32,411,649
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	31,055,890	31,516,320	31,505,225
State bank notes outstanding.....	16,542	16,542	16,542
Due to other National banks.....	236,148,939	285,094,297	283,431,105
Due to State banks and bankers.....	130,319,916	191,046,348	184,873,817
Dividends unpaid.....	91,368	116,096	91,499
Individual deposits.....	478,501,534	559,150,857	598,130,815
U. S. deposits.....	32,180,220	32,252,385	32,726,010
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	294,114	338,898	322,007
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	16,825,193	16,369,101	17,149,165
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$1,071,580,790</b>	<b>\$1,255,847,877</b>	<b>\$1,291,853,913</b>
Average reserve held.....	26.06 p. c.	26.90 p. c.	26.13 p. c.

\* Total lawful money reserve..... \$182,356,799    \$224,738,338    \$214,643,908

		ALBANY, N. Y.		BALTIMORE, MD.		BOSTON, MASS.	
		Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Apr. 24, 1901.	Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Apr. 24, 1901.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>							
Loans and discounts.....	\$12,063,394	\$11,150,759	\$12,697,662	\$30,294,257	\$38,297,716	\$41,451,069	\$167,243,449
Overdrafts.....	4,964	2,089	3,789	53,123	61,505	56,043	43,141
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	680,000	680,000	680,000	4,297,000	3,752,000	3,492,500	6,477,500
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	222,100	222,100	222,100	2,382,000	2,382,000	2,382,000	4,131,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	10,000	10,000	10,000	70,300	70,300	63,000	500,000
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	1,243,870	1,421,080	1,594,877	107,228	104,959	110,204	197,312
Stocks, securities, etc.....	256,707	256,707	1,594,877	4,110,568	4,064,538	4,343,128	7,822,444
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	94,097	94,097	256,707	2,479,926	2,457,353	2,528,387	2,107,199
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	3,023,305	3,040,237	2,976,750	131,449	104,746	164,238	104,188
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	1,011,575	1,401,671	1,666,823	4,661,109	4,424,261	4,780,176	13,745,068
Due from State banks and bankers.....	2,298,510	3,102,715	2,582,063	6,072,251	5,823,383	5,319,724	1,967,471
Due from approved reserve agents.....	45,914	114,067	184,173	180,720	194,306	194,306	26,657,775
Checks and other cash items.....	46,817	46,817	184,173	2,528,300	2,572,679	4,277,662	12,018,944
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	46,817	46,817	184,173	2,528,300	2,572,679	4,277,662	12,018,944
Bills of other National banks.....	5,081	5,081	184,173	2,528,300	2,572,679	4,277,662	12,018,944
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	5,081	5,081	184,173	2,528,300	2,572,679	4,277,662	12,018,944
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	5,081	5,081	184,173	2,528,300	2,572,679	4,277,662	12,018,944
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	5,081	5,081	184,173	2,528,300	2,572,679	4,277,662	12,018,944
Lawful money reserve in bank, viz:.....							
Gold coin.....	516,336	471,411	462,297	565,947	574,129	680,021	1,728,050
Gold Treasury certificates.....	867,000	378,000	382,297	1,204,920	1,277,870	1,204,920	4,984,070
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	40,013	40,013	40,013	980,000	980,000	980,000	3,805,000
Silver dollars.....	43,341	43,341	43,341	16,366	16,366	16,366	16,366
Silver Treasury certificates.....	41,426	41,426	41,426	1,222,937	1,161,617	1,500,294	3,140,701
Legal-tender notes.....	775,942	775,942	775,942	1,055,649	1,055,649	1,055,649	1,055,649
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	81,960	81,960	81,960	1,598,068	1,579,562	2,715,733	8,905,066
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	81,960	81,960	81,960	210,000	210,000	210,000	210,000
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	81,960	81,960	81,960	200,875	197,600	187,600	310,475
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$22,858,407</b>	<b>\$23,428,664</b>	<b>\$25,402,513</b>	<b>\$71,852,907</b>	<b>\$71,852,907</b>	<b>\$76,784,408</b>	<b>\$367,878,476</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>							
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,550,000	\$1,550,000	\$1,550,000	\$11,508,280	\$11,508,280	\$11,508,280	\$37,400,000
Surplus fund.....	1,575,000	1,575,000	1,575,000	4,069,260	4,457,000	4,400,000	14,306,400
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	294,544	321,522	320,664	2,007,848	1,715,797	1,873,587	5,982,489
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	619,397	628,647	614,567	4,261,860	3,675,860	3,690,710	6,111,360
State bank notes outstanding.....	8,121,104	8,208,580	8,917,932	11,989,941	12,658,871	12,658,871	47,104,519
Due to other National banks.....	8,443,556	8,699,750	2,797,788	7,051,451	8,593,441	7,381,947	29,773,787
Due to State banks and bankers.....	4,484,484	4,484,484	4,484,484	6,094,081	6,094,081	6,094,081	40,980,792
Dividends unpaid.....	6,282,215	7,315,415	9,619,141	39,543,615	27,124,411	32,413,400	121,781,898
Individual deposits.....	201,339	201,339	201,339	2,306,574	2,281,115	2,281,115	119,521,898
U. S. deposits.....	10,206	10,206	10,206	7,016	7,016	7,016	8,768,866
Notes of U. S. disbursing officers.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	108,164
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	86,865
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$22,858,407</b>	<b>\$23,428,664</b>	<b>\$25,402,513</b>	<b>\$71,852,907</b>	<b>\$71,852,907</b>	<b>\$76,784,408</b>	<b>\$367,878,476</b>
Average reserve held.....	27,471,000	27,471,000	27,471,000	27,471,000	27,471,000	27,471,000	27,471,000
% Total lawful money reserve.....	117.7%	117.7%	117.7%	117.7%	117.7%	117.7%	117.7%



	BROOKLYN, N. Y.			CHICAGO, ILL.			CINCINNATI, OHIO.		
	Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Apr. 24, 1901.	Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Apr. 24, 1901.	Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Apr. 24, 1901.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$11,584,376	\$11,065,980	\$11,983,489	\$180,473,078	\$148,784,680	\$154,810,246	\$30,098,908	\$31,588,081	\$31,061,389
Overdrafts.....	8,230	8,247	8,682	72,647	68,374	102,747	14,963	18,748	16,439
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	642,000	642,000	642,000	5,247,000	6,240,000	6,240,000	3,975,000	4,585,000	4,585,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	200,000	200,000	200,000	1,610,000	1,600,000	1,600,000	4,084,000	4,084,000	3,877,500
U. S. bonds on hand.....	9,000	9,000	9,000	172,000	187,900	89,710	301,910	301,910	271,280
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	2,828,449	2,811,983	2,852,189	10,473,999	11,818,116	18,983,944	9,272,459	11,087,595	11,790,723
Stocks, securities, etc.....	580,370	580,370	580,370	277,432	277,432	278,748	445,870	445,870	486,823
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	83,301	83,301	83,301	373,686	347,012	184,114	173,799	173,799	182,435
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	140,901	140,901	140,901	37,233,084	41,281,233	41,842,332	4,872,221	4,872,221	4,242,015
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	2,371,248	2,389,614	2,575,062	11,262,161	8,613,498	8,664,373	6,604,695	7,017,188	6,182,103
Due from State banks and bankers.....	181,611	181,611	181,611	454,143	151,000	224,001	6,584,588	8,118,613	6,184,173
Checks and approved cash items.....	980,943	1,117,297	89,743	8,217,670	7,490,403	7,470,049	180,711	138,069	74,673
Exchanges for clearing house.....	140,574	1,317,477	1,114,588	1,419,805	1,401,993	1,412,591	278,953	691,184	230,866
Bills of other National banks.....	14,208	173,000	184,000	1,412,591	1,401,993	1,412,591	282,710	844,597	263,119
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	428,048	447,371	489,280	42,244	23,418	20,170	6,251	4,816	5,314
Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	440,800	440,800	440,800	12,581,887	12,987,770	13,110,980	693,800	741,473	693,430
Gold Treasury certificates.....	14,060	14,060	14,060	14,064,720	14,060,220	12,562,800	1,645,000	2,005,040	1,865,000
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	308,997	464,448	457,088	230,389	238,162	183,693	183,693	183,693	183,693
Silver Treasury certificates.....	63,052	63,052	63,052	8,832,183	4,878,322	6,073,088	513,715	590,404	498,947
Silver fractional coin.....	766,894	710,815	812,003	913,158	104,640	103,483	27,443	18,364	27,639
Legal-tender notes.....	32,100	32,100	32,100	17,308,680	19,463,673	20,515,687	3,258,949	4,068,469	3,075,538
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	27,600	27,600	27,600	140,000	304,560	260,000	230,000	230,000	230,000
Five per cent redemption fund with Treas.....	.....	.....	.....	391,347	804,560	310,947	198,750	220,249	220,249
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	.....	.....	.....	106,002	80,702	113,152	9,000	570	7,100
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$21,423,719</b>	<b>\$21,197,758</b>	<b>\$22,404,375</b>	<b>\$385,712,613</b>	<b>\$381,324,429</b>	<b>\$390,968,149</b>	<b>\$97,843,663</b>	<b>\$74,115,890</b>	<b>\$71,193,490</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,352,000	\$1,352,000	\$1,352,000	\$17,250,000	\$17,250,000	\$18,250,000	\$7,700,000	\$7,700,000	\$7,700,000
Surplus fund.....	1,900,000	1,900,000	1,900,000	8,180,000	8,210,000	8,210,000	2,775,000	2,775,000	2,775,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	572,430	572,430	572,430	4,699,709	4,699,709	4,699,709	1,590,137	1,590,137	1,590,137
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	642,000	642,000	642,000	6,989,359	6,989,359	6,989,359	4,367,447	4,367,447	4,367,447
State bank notes outstanding.....	1,846	1,846	1,846	5,199,510	5,199,510	5,199,510	4,367,447	4,367,447	4,367,447
Due to other National banks.....	888,291	888,291	888,291	78,008,106	87,193,057	88,664,138	11,134,594	13,372,455	11,881,706
Due to State banks and bankers.....	3,628,374	4,149,056	3,811,120	41,066,575	46,616,916	47,856,094	6,928,738	7,578,590	6,794,772
Dividends unpaid.....	12,541,625	12,104,123	13,596,471	14,061,978	14,061,978	14,061,978	6,935	6,935	2,750
Individual deposits.....	172,696	168,825	167,066	109,898,497	109,898,497	116,189,539	20,897,366	31,084,865	30,568,041
U. S. deposits.....	24,515	24,515	24,515	1,193,284	1,243,627	1,308,965	3,782,068	8,707,188	8,508,241
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	.....	.....	.....	198,964	121,865	74,258	.....	.....	.....
Deposits of bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Notes and bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	51,397	51,397	51,397	252,508	.....	.....	1,878,199	1,860,496	1,778,600
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$21,423,719</b>	<b>\$21,197,758</b>	<b>\$22,404,375</b>	<b>\$385,712,613</b>	<b>\$381,324,429</b>	<b>\$390,968,149</b>	<b>\$97,843,663</b>	<b>\$74,115,890</b>	<b>\$71,193,490</b>
<b>Average reserve held.....</b>	<b>29.11 p. c.</b>	<b>29.77 p. c.</b>	<b>29.35 p. c.</b>	<b>28.55 p. c.</b>	<b>28.36 p. c.</b>	<b>27.07 p. c.</b>	<b>29.52 p. c.</b>	<b>31.76 p. c.</b>	<b>26.25 p. c.</b>
<b>* Total lawful money reserve.....</b>	<b>\$2,136,761</b>	<b>\$2,102,565</b>	<b>\$2,222,575</b>	<b>\$48,956,687</b>	<b>\$48,443,757</b>	<b>\$52,154,104</b>	<b>\$9,199,098</b>	<b>\$7,479,029</b>	<b>\$5,986,185</b>

CLEVELAND, OHIO.		COLUMBUS, OHIO.		DENVER, COLORADO.	
Dec. 15, 1907. Feb. 5, 1901. Apr. 24, 1901.		Dec. 15, 1907. Feb. 5, 1901. Apr. 24, 1901.		Dec. 15, 1907. Feb. 5, 1901. Apr. 24, 1901.	
<b>RESOURCES.</b>					
Loans and discounts.....	\$41,157,983	\$40,974,746	\$45,154,712	\$7,964,977	\$8,581,189
Overdrafts.....	72,815	95,171	12,139	14,671	8,794
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	3,260,000	3,690,000	504,000	614,000	1,700,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	600,000	600,000	275,000	275,000	1,000,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	30	30	34,410	225,850	241,270
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	43,980	43,173	47,595	20,955	62,350
Stocks, securities, etc.....	1,978,496	2,260,726	2,535,040	2,028,710	4,580,981
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	450,872	464,062	473,813	204,940	70,350
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	119,670	128,970	108,673	89,239	305,942
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	4,652,152	4,443,711	3,980,717	1,267,156	1,831,419
Due from State banks and bankers.....	1,820,438	2,018,568	2,268,763	1,775,497	2,465,682
Due from approved reserve agents.....	5,188,559	6,731,853	5,922,850	1,730,155	7,864,651
Checks and other cash items.....	139,093	171,430	179,553	157,025	47,204
Exchanges for clearing houses.....	604,299	582,668	544,953	58,431	60,782
Bills of other National banks.....	185,671	251,496	129,752	124,014	613,089
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	5,229	12,188	218,793	145,296	689,106
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			2,067	3,400	2,060
Gold coin.....	1,675,007	1,802,977	435,982	441,637	2,827,585
Gold Treasury certificates.....	721,100	762,010	82,500	176,500	290,000
Gold clearing-house certificates.....					
Silver dollars.....	106,612	202,822	78,315	68,659	118,561
Silver Treasury certificates.....	181,820	268,500	149,080	162,882	205,000
Silver fractional coin.....	47,102	79,949	17,988	17,886	28,118
Legal-tender notes.....	2,170,888	2,478,496	700,228	681,081	1,065,000
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....					
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	159,453	172,400	24,475	19,475	85,000
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	38,500	43,482	8,500	2,000	2,184
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$65,381,468</b>	<b>\$68,244,664</b>	<b>\$71,028,068</b>	<b>\$16,400,889</b>	<b>\$41,421,790</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>					
Capital stock paid in.....	\$10,400,000	\$10,775,000	\$2,060,000	\$2,060,000	\$1,700,000
Surplus fund.....	2,760,100	2,768,000	491,000	525,675	450,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	798,516	790,326	104,528	184,023	476,000
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	3,253,197	3,667,800	604,000	604,000	1,662,460
Due to other National banks.....	9,104,296	9,322,013	908,682	1,265,216	1,687,915
Due to State banks and bankers.....	6,864,183	11,063,940	1,567,607	1,794,644	6,847,915
Dividends unpaid.....	2,429	2,406	1,641	1,684	3,967,561
Individual deposits.....	30,186,614	28,236,861	29,000,069	10,104,043	25,910,670
U. S. deposits.....	411,785	427,819	468,651	322,014	238,088
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	24,818	26,860	13,433	6,075	167,400
Notes and bills rediscounted.....			10,000	11,719	651,189
Bills payable.....	800,000	40,000			
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	1,589,784	1,848,176	46,000	83,000	
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$65,381,468</b>	<b>\$68,244,664</b>	<b>\$71,028,068</b>	<b>\$17,488,539</b>	<b>\$40,421,790</b>
Average reserve held.....	25.36 p. c.	26.19 p. c.	29.58 p. c.	29.50 p. c.	43.56 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$4,903,519	\$5,539,443	\$4,897,161	\$1,514,469	\$5,017,155
					\$5,813,800
					\$6,392,351

	DES MOINES, IOWA.			DETROIT, MICH.			HOUSTON, TEXAS.		
	Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Apr. 24, 1901.	Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Apr. 24, 1901.	Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Apr. 24, 1901.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$3,478,080	\$3,015,035	\$5,951,154	\$15,593,904	\$15,399,586	\$14,856,211	\$2,049,142	\$2,994,702	\$3,982,032
Overdrafts.....	33,736	41,888	28,988	7,540	20,727	20,727	1,450,804	967,497	443,352
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	405,000	405,000	405,000	1,450,000	1,450,000	1,450,000	380,100	380,100	380,100
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	810,000	810,000	810,000	750,000	750,000	750,000	.....	.....	.....
U. S. bonds on hand.....	1,800	17,400	33,987	37,000	240	135,312	19,980	20,639	20,225
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	25,019	17,400	33,987	135,312	135,312	135,312	19,980	20,639	20,225
Stocks, securities, etc.....	291,427	205,662	223,081	1,727,997	1,005,639	1,752,908	21,912	22,960	22,494
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	112,541	112,541	112,541	24,258	25,538	23,788	188,700	188,371	188,865
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	78,270	78,151	55,654	828,298	320,013	816,116	84,210	84,138	122,318
Due from National banks (not reserve agents)	602,618	732,358	632,136	1,557,796	1,067,298	1,706,615	1,004,517	1,171,630	2,138,430
Due from State banks and bankers.....	75,125	63,268	147,181	1,501,899	871,175	612,113	1,171,630	1,171,630	1,171,630
Due from approved reserve agents.....	747,408	1,493,580	1,961,628	3,812,570	2,728,506	1,012,789	1,228,459	1,228,459	1,228,459
Checks and other cash items.....	9,614	17,522	22,381	17,646	18,498	8,677	8,677	8,677	8,677
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	63,746	66,781	64,894	290,650	458,166	298,630	122,097	122,097	40,795
Bills of other National banks.....	74,851	67,800	99,928	268,084	290,639	110,097	110,097	296,379	167,051
Fractional paper currency in bank, viz.:	2,245	1,965	3,412	8,359	7,253	8,174	2,924	2,924	4,440
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	123,765	103,625	89,079	1,157,787	1,103,587	1,045,717	338,622	304,820	291,875
Gold Treasury certificates.....	75,800	22,000	6,340	171,990	171,990	840,360	840,360	891,280	345,950
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....	.....	.....	70,000	10,100	95,000	.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....	44,847	39,170	35,683	108,347	105,699	97,915	97,915	141,455	93,881
Silver Treasury certificates.....	57,930	52,881	174,213	218,157	154,697	182,298	227,726	227,726	208,088
Silver fractional coin.....	11,753	12,484	14,698	73,543	53,983	52,915	28,428	32,548	38,143
Legal-tender notes.....	408,807	809,187	494,515	877,350	648,078	734,379	519,598	638,056	603,638
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	8,200	20,277	22,780	72,080	70,450	72,500	18,575	17,372	18,875
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$9,995,635</b>	<b>\$9,223,515</b>	<b>\$11,083,902</b>	<b>\$38,704,858</b>	<b>\$38,699,793</b>	<b>\$27,351,050</b>	<b>\$3,880,430</b>	<b>\$9,328,855</b>	<b>\$10,074,185</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$300,000	\$300,000	\$300,000	\$3,300,000	\$3,300,000	\$3,300,000	\$1,100,000	\$1,100,000	\$1,100,000
Surplus fund.....	220,500	240,000	240,000	616,000	616,000	616,000	610,000	615,000	615,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	32,454	37,016	74,585	383,932	323,780	374,586	242,087	221,248	280,980
National bank notes issued, less amt'n on hand	387,547	402,997	453,000	1,403,480	1,394,630	1,415,700	355,000	376,000	350,350
Due to other National banks.....	1,849,380	2,001,225	3,297,624	3,294,141	3,383,443	3,104,688	1,560,461	1,821,724	2,292,981
Due to State banks and bankers.....	2,624,074	2,900,482	3,298,019	5,431,145	5,909,543	5,798,905	698,015	641,788	594,060
Dividends unpaid.....	6,059	771	523	220	508	980	4,409	5,283	4,749
Individual deposits.....	2,710,068	2,465,521	2,774,650	13,532,415	13,012,293	12,026,455	4,380,987	4,628,565	4,874,918
U. S. deposits.....	283,640	293,315	294,005	628,378	636,070	633,409	.....	.....	.....
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	11,859	12,184	11,494	63,130	53,163	80,983	.....	.....	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	75,000	59,796	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$3,995,635</b>	<b>\$3,223,515</b>	<b>\$11,083,902</b>	<b>\$38,704,858</b>	<b>\$38,699,793</b>	<b>\$27,351,050</b>	<b>\$3,880,430</b>	<b>\$9,328,855</b>	<b>\$10,074,185</b>
<b>Average reserve held.....</b>	<b>\$2,322 p. c.</b>	<b>\$0.31 p. c.</b>	<b>\$3.54 p. c.</b>	<b>29.55 p. c.</b>	<b>29.64 p. c.</b>	<b>27.23 p. c.</b>	<b>46.02 p. c.</b>	<b>55.05 p. c.</b>	<b>66.98 p. c.</b>
<b>* Total lawful money reserve.....</b>	<b>\$720,902</b>	<b>\$539,247</b>	<b>\$904,466</b>	<b>\$2,599,932</b>	<b>\$2,531,054</b>	<b>\$2,323,653</b>	<b>\$1,453,249</b>	<b>\$1,725,925</b>	<b>\$1,698,475</b>



	LINCOLN, NEB.			LOS ANGELES, CAL.			LOUISVILLE, KY.		
	Dec. 13, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Apr. 24, 1901.	Dec. 13, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Apr. 24, 1901.	Dec. 13, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Apr. 24, 1901.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$2,188,204	\$2,273,907	\$2,373,407	\$4,706,690	\$4,722,195	\$4,722,195	\$13,618,857	\$13,585,156	\$14,290,408
Overdrafts.....	13,913	21,670	22,142	61,613	50,621	80,242	34,643	34,643	25,407
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	250,700	250,700	250,700	1,153,000	1,153,000	1,153,000	3,555,000	3,555,000	3,961,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	60,000	60,000	60,000	150,000	150,000	150,000	2,296,200	2,296,200	2,296,200
U. S. bonds on hand.....	1,000	1,000	1,000	6,540	8,480	11,500	204,000	204,000	1,500
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	13,986	13,148	13,083	2,382	2,382	2,613	120,433	122,305	127,665
Stocks, securities, etc.....	201,455	167,035	138,358	357,650	458,112	385,437	2,053,797	2,044,184	1,458,074
Banking house, furniture and fixture.....	78,154	77,389	77,389	231,517	230,200	228,960	210,327	210,278	211,349
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	29,893	29,797	15,782	145,777	125,502	62,905	44,486	44,486	124,363
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	461,024	694,263	673,185	235,641	418,515	649,889	1,650,424	1,441,380	1,353,314
Due from State banks and bankers.....	165,875	100,280	192,450	189,107	249,021	215,312	849,918	763,438	730,377
Due from approved reserve agents.....	422,711	492,191	585,967	663,372	597,155	1,238,701	2,611,863	2,803,688	3,622,217
Checks and other cash items.....	65,403	29,307	88,173	28,498	25,650	33,012	34,703	34,703	20,960
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	34,997	29,030	39,182	128,759	73,854	155,342	280,176	280,176	156,847
Bills of other National banks.....	7,022	7,145	12,552	69,615	62,915	50,986	153,521	153,521	112,584
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	1,291	1,466	2,339	1,146	1,818	1,179	6,508	6,508	3,000
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	90,350	98,185	130,680	537,310	587,610	680,110	604,190	714,107	819,175
Gold Treasury certificates.....	14,000	.....	.....	13,500	16,000	38,430	124,000	63,000	145,000
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....	.....	.....	164,000	119,000	130,000	.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....	7,798	11,525	9,496	17,797	31,646	21,308	46,131	48,688	38,456
Silver Treasury certificates.....	296	51	631	63,913	53,946	64,363	42,414	10,905	20,000
Silver fractional coin.....	7,320	2,080	10,761	39,599	47,653	27,032	32,461	28,752	28,589
Legal-tender notes.....	87,400	59,478	62,194	74,376	49,551	82,327	1,005,876	848,232	1,065,390
U. S. certificate of deposit for legal-tenders.....	12,085	12,595	12,595	57,650	57,650	57,650	155,290	177,750	192,470
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	12,400	5,800	5,000
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$4,215,054</b>	<b>\$4,388,068</b>	<b>\$4,723,073</b>	<b>\$9,193,877</b>	<b>\$9,630,739</b>	<b>\$10,240,049</b>	<b>\$30,315,706</b>	<b>\$30,416,797</b>	<b>\$30,717,842</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$400,000	\$400,000	\$400,000	\$1,300,000	\$1,300,000	\$1,300,000	\$4,645,000	\$4,645,000	\$4,645,000
Surplus fund.....	44,000	48,000	55,000	950,000	950,000	950,000	1,807,500	1,807,500	1,807,500
Undiv. profits less expenses and taxes paid.....	37,724	31,648	30,392	332,397	332,335	332,390	297,500	297,500	385,376
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	290,290	290,290	290,290	1,027,465	1,027,035	1,101,645	3,452,000	3,452,000	3,857,750
Due to other National banks.....	500,658	522,673	664,293	1,900,441	1,902,013	224,026	3,688,247	3,688,247	4,083,440
Due to State banks and bankers.....	780,885	873,155	1,010,603	422,330	431,314	457,630	3,302,175	3,544,088	3,398,610
Dividend deposits.....	.....	.....	.....	41,111	45,155	45,155	11,962	12,092	12,092
Individual deposits.....	2,090,397	2,146,697	2,282,180	5,453,491	5,795,630	6,353,435	8,848,274	8,685,951	9,177,295
U. S. deposits.....	43,500	46,500	45,500	62,890	63,814	41,144	1,953,154	1,968,281	1,977,421
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	.....	.....	.....	80,048	97,166	101,445	317,455	317,455	291,377
Notes payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	45,000	45,000	45,000
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	20,100	20,100	20,100
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	85,140	148,612	118,380
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$4,215,054</b>	<b>\$4,388,068</b>	<b>\$4,723,073</b>	<b>\$9,193,877</b>	<b>\$9,630,739</b>	<b>\$10,240,049</b>	<b>\$30,315,706</b>	<b>\$30,416,797</b>	<b>\$30,717,842</b>
Average reserve held.....	22.33 p. c.	21.61 p. c.	26.50 p. c.	30.14 p. c.	32.01 p. c.	33.63 p. c.	28.46 p. c.	28.65 p. c.	34.41 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$207,665	\$176,314	\$213,672	\$615,535	\$604,408	\$1,183,650	\$1,855,072	\$1,712,734	\$2,198,990

	MILWAUKEE, WIS.			MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.			NEW ORLEANS, LA.		
	Dec. 13, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Apr. 24, 1901.	Dec. 13, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Apr. 24, 1901.	Dec. 13, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Apr. 24, 1901.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$22,110,921	\$22,662,785	\$22,662,785	\$14,182,753	\$13,362,790	\$13,362,790	\$15,571,256	\$15,571,256	\$15,794,056
Overdrafts.....	27,486	365,562	267,346	9,170	3,878	10,661	1,542,963	1,542,963	1,127,464
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	900,000	900,000	900,000	772,000	772,000	772,000	1,400,000	1,400,000	1,400,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	600,000	600,000	600,000	380,000	380,000	380,000	450,000	450,000	450,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	14,960	18,710	18,750	940	1,000	2,000	40,046	40,046	40,046
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	4,411	4,253	4,253	18,710	18,750	18,750	63,636	63,636	63,636
Stocks, securities, etc.....	2,009,812	2,847,147	2,813,774	1,164,394	1,164,118	675,354	1,678,228	1,678,228	2,796,979
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	124,008	100,910	100,910	2,000	2,000	2,000	618,434	618,434	620,477
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	114,000	118,763	113,714	312,158	297,128	145,000	117,108	117,108	103,868
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	1,061,319	1,061,638	1,061,135	1,062,257	1,061,797	1,061,797	1,274,058	1,274,058	1,261,664
Due from State banks and bankers.....	1,024,787	1,064,600	1,064,600	869,944	869,944	869,944	1,523,568	1,523,568	1,523,568
Due from approved reserve agents.....	4,290,883	4,778,136	4,778,136	2,118,972	2,340,077	2,340,077	2,452,044	2,452,044	2,541,254
Checks and other cash items.....	80,036	28,891	16,212	42,808	29,913	38,318	29,062	46,172	27,864
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	698,099	428,979	778,787	830,242	617,347	597,449	2,358,673	1,670,967	1,417,798
Bills of other National banks.....	40,213	47,483	103,955	103,955	38,869	91,458	76,204	76,204	240,677
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	8,839	15,111	10,863	6,971	7,843	8,747	25,261	25,261	27,082
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	1,428,430	1,571,460	1,573,080	698,483	778,902	816,427	144,072	222,178	222,167
Gold Treasury certificates.....	675,000	675,000	670,000	45,000	40,180	35,000	1,582,140	1,608,080	454,350
Gold clearing-house certificates.....							473,000	270,000	690,000
Silver dollars.....	77,370	90,068	86,619	65,893	67,510	28,753	76,944	185,644	121,586
Silver Treasury certificates.....	90,000	90,000	100,000	58,500	10,700	16,500	162,881	604,968	682,328
Silver fractional coin.....	29,977	29,980	44,483	42,015	17,818	44,061	46,276	220,570	216,051
Legal-tender notes.....	1,246,886	1,337,835	1,368,845	772,241	299,081	683,540	678,286	968,966	1,064,471
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....									
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	42,500	45,000	47,500	38,600	38,600	38,100	70,600	70,600	73,000
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	14,600	6,000	11,200	14,000	.....	1,100	1,500	34,500	5,000
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$37,451,438</b>	<b>\$39,727,313</b>	<b>\$40,390,591</b>	<b>\$24,485,663</b>	<b>\$21,562,190</b>	<b>\$21,284,915</b>	<b>\$31,848,025</b>	<b>\$33,199,351</b>	<b>\$32,482,596</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$3,250,000	\$3,250,000	\$3,250,000	\$4,000,000	\$3,750,000	\$3,250,000	\$2,300,000	\$2,600,000	\$2,600,000
Surplus fund.....	737,500	880,000	860,000	697,000	725,000	640,000	2,645,000	2,880,000	2,880,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	567,163	404,421	505,417	320,543	317,046	242,961	715,062	489,969	655,715
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	845,050	889,800	980,600	755,960	766,000	718,250	1,332,945	1,339,045	1,372,165
Due to other National banks.....	3,608,171	4,317,909	3,935,824	3,972,391	3,776,559	3,498,070	2,749,298	3,040,063	2,706,456
Due to State banks and bankers.....	2,759,697	4,000,739	3,515,771	2,772,804	2,773,040	3,004,249	2,691,298	3,016,649	2,502,157
Dividends unpaid.....		2,280	1,650	1,188	2,286	2,802	10,068	30,753	8,152
Individual deposits.....	23,067,640	25,391,192	23,647,389	10,381,657	8,981,219	9,052,752	18,894,524	19,598,979	19,398,987
U. S. deposits.....	462,546	497,264	484,615	298,056	278,163	283,372	313,368	313,913	313,970
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	163,828	154,256	139,973	28,015	10,925	22,497	.....	.....	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	362,094	.....	200,000	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$37,451,438</b>	<b>\$39,727,313</b>	<b>\$40,390,591</b>	<b>\$24,485,663</b>	<b>\$21,562,190</b>	<b>\$21,284,915</b>	<b>\$31,848,025</b>	<b>\$33,199,351</b>	<b>\$32,482,596</b>
Average reserve held.....	\$7,47 p. c.	\$7,28 p. c.	\$7,03 p. c.	\$23,453,083	\$21,562,180	\$21,284,915	\$31,848,025	\$33,199,351	\$32,482,596
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$3,556,165	\$3,772,283	\$3,849,977	\$1,675,044	\$1,172,141	\$1,583,238	\$3,065,549	\$4,064,804	\$3,881,717

	—OMAHA, NEB.—			—PHILADELPHIA, PA.—			—PITTSBURG, PA.—		
	Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Apr. 24, 1901.	Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Apr. 24, 1901.	Dec. 15, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Apr. 24, 1901.
<b>RESOURCES.</b>									
Loans and discounts.....	\$13,950,000	\$13,171,006	\$14,304,684	\$128,692,511	\$128,170,633	\$138,560,986	\$77,240,558	\$78,305,618	\$85,062,901.
Overdrafts.....	208,438	174,288	123,223	7,652	19,897	46,317	46,317	46,317	95,965
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	1,850,000	1,850,000	1,850,000	10,133,500	10,589,500	10,899,500	6,873,250	6,983,250	7,063,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	900,000	900,000	900,000	4,488,000	4,504,000	4,504,000	1,453,000	1,363,000	1,363,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	200	3,600	3,800	309,700	9,700	120,480	411,760	550,400	550,400
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	90,546	76,273	76,232	615,620	431,068	414,087	120,450	125,437	198,640
Stocks, securities, etc.....	1,297,976	1,508,109	1,338,066	24,111,425	27,019,223	28,858,306	11,482,065	12,654,084	15,312,090
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	815,776	814,212	814,212	3,740,654	3,738,811	3,891,866	3,757,086	3,757,086	3,757,086
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	342,554	322,458	343,529	708,868	708,731	695,235	603,887	645,388	690,911
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	1,890,261	1,547,665	1,624,446	14,325,868	14,042,465	16,621,402	8,453,493	4,978,483	6,449,478
Due from State banks and bankers.....	598,443	1,037,889	1,090,862	2,642,400	3,094,496	2,976,751	641,715	517,022	6,449,478
Due from approved reserve agents.....	2,890,389	2,855,179	3,253,532	27,367,202	35,165,570	33,483,298	10,384,550	13,482,732	12,575,561
Checks and other cash items.....	97,490	94,804	170,127	1,333,206	1,383,168	1,191,077	446,402	298,230	298,230
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	517,432	528,365	618,114	12,901,751	13,653,850	16,983,189	3,278,076	4,180,015	6,789,710
Hills of other National banks.....	278,507	209,025	184,812	587,615	812,259	449,839	508,558	651,755	598,277
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	7,215	7,478	7,844	60,141	56,304	47,820	20,571	22,963	22,963
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	1,016,210	964,860	753,115	1,829,448	1,663,664	1,862,769	4,122,716	4,329,981	4,013,561
Gold Treasury certificates.....	192,000	215,000	190,000	3,853,310	5,231,960	3,529,580	2,685,000	2,732,500	2,881,700
Gold clearing-house certificates.....				10,125,000	10,400,000	8,485,000			
Silver dollars.....	110,360	131,961	136,841	254,418	298,056	295,304	293,226	334,051	295,793
Silver Treasury certificates.....	297,149	216,415	287,754	4,228,319	3,641,446	4,255,163	2,131,175	2,472,246	2,472,246
Silver fractional coin.....	60,708	72,644	68,024	411,510	331,297	349,076	128,226	155,694	123,113
Legal-tender notes.....	965,921	935,042	1,201,119	3,421,132	3,421,516	3,339,174	4,097,099	3,881,413	4,363,602
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....									
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	88,750	92,250	91,251	493,665	624,175	519,225	331,575	348,735	352,067
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	11,233	5,019	2,000	178,910	151,950	211,820	108,698	30,788	71,012
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$28,888,136</b>	<b>\$28,882,066</b>	<b>\$29,753,289</b>	<b>\$265,375,991</b>	<b>\$290,155,682</b>	<b>\$283,838,347</b>	<b>\$194,290,340</b>	<b>\$142,531,676</b>	<b>\$156,862,708</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$3,650,000	\$3,650,000	\$3,650,000	\$19,905,000	\$19,905,000	\$19,905,000	\$13,250,000	\$13,350,000	\$13,900,000
Surplus fund.....	417,500	417,500	417,500	17,680,000	17,680,000	17,680,000	10,345,000	10,665,000	10,765,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	242,834	194,158	259,775	2,612,789	3,001,403	3,588,299	4,294,125	4,394,125	4,858,205
National bank notes issued, less amt. on hand.....	1,804,850	1,830,000	1,850,000	9,601,242	10,478,442	10,298,560	6,682,245	6,783,666	6,994,545
Due to other National banks.....	5,442,184	5,638,909	9,997,301	56,893,905	59,987,740	65,901,588	19,544,645	17,329,857	20,030,041
Due to State banks and bankers.....	4,549,924	4,338,451	4,713,172	31,483,646	37,581,297	38,671,567	8,045,591	10,088,696	13,517,718
Dividends unpaid.....				47,374	35,653	22,225	60,745	64,076	55,029
Individual deposits.....	11,439,949	11,980,613	11,984,589	112,555,543	123,011,077	74,211,963	78,755,133	84,905,297	84,905,297
U. S. deposits.....	651,273	605,981	588,976	4,063,085	4,064,809	1,094,944	1,194,707	1,163,202	1,163,202
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	197,121	244,367	294,454				128,614	145,883	119,695
Notes and bills rediscounted.....									
Bills payable.....									
Liabilities other than those above stated.....				214,389	32,063	64,878			250,000
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$28,888,136</b>	<b>\$28,832,598</b>	<b>\$29,753,289</b>	<b>\$255,375,991</b>	<b>\$290,155,682</b>	<b>\$283,838,347</b>	<b>\$124,290,340</b>	<b>\$142,531,676</b>	<b>\$156,862,708</b>
<b>Average reserve held.....</b>	<b>29,232 p. c.</b>	<b>29,102 p. c.</b>	<b>30,232 p. c.</b>	<b>29,07 p. c.</b>	<b>32,50 p. c.</b>	<b>29,59 p. c.</b>	<b>29,27 p. c.</b>	<b>29,54 p. c.</b>	<b>25,28 p. c.</b>
<b>* Total lawful money reserve.....</b>	<b>\$2,642,349</b>	<b>\$2,535,972</b>	<b>\$2,640,883</b>	<b>\$22,876,138</b>	<b>\$24,967,970</b>	<b>\$23,554,457</b>	<b>\$13,398,442</b>	<b>\$13,905,865</b>	<b>\$13,999,309</b>

RESOURCES.	PORTLAND, ORE.			ST. JOSEPH, MO.			ST. LOUIS, MO.		
	Dec. 13, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Apr. 24, 1901.	Dec. 13, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Apr. 24, 1901.	Dec. 13, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Apr. 24, 1901.
Loans and discounts.....	\$3,614,467	\$3,463,232	\$3,600,777	\$3,130,382	\$3,175,096	\$3,000,723	\$50,945,438	\$52,361,035	\$54,519,732
Overdrafts.....	67,625	68,310	132,632	9,387	18,284	10,866	139,745	79,852	62,319
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	625,000	625,000	625,000	164,500	164,500	165,000	2,490,000	2,490,000	2,490,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	500,000	500,000	500,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	2,925,000	2,925,000	2,925,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	101,800	101,800	101,800	30,060	28,800	28,800	270,600	136,600	20,000
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	906	906	906	.....	.....	.....	190,250	211,855	213,490
Stocks, securities, etc.....	2,462,635	2,527,496	2,630,212	52,549	62,218	76,137	4,051,730	5,118,312	6,157,744
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	210,549	215,556	215,556	72,000	72,000	72,000	736,000	736,000	730,600
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	151,065	151,448	152,784	665,165	714,560	714,130	176,130	176,130	166,861
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	442,238	490,918	492,079	100,000	108,643	125,439	17,060,412	20,259,262	13,498,067
Due from State banks and bankers.....	272,950	250,810	247,000	1,534,058	1,750,345	1,457,433	3,474,373	4,939,130	4,490,960
Due from approved reserve agents.....	618,521	817,947	969,606	22,404	67,253	67,253	143,753	159,105	149,084
Checks and other cash items.....	30,552	27,448	47,447	66,744	69,603	130,164	1,797,474	2,005,567	2,005,567
Exchanges for clearing house.....	60,577	64,805	61,082	160,019	13,875	33,756	111,239	111,239	206,170
Bills of other National banks.....	5,620	7,726	7,726	38,045	13,676	1,066	4,062	3,367	3,359
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	1,564	3,072	2,405	775	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:									
Gold coin.....	1,580,620	1,306,347	1,016,515	124,642	115,802	145,882	1,890,890	1,913,935	2,197,715
Gold Treasury certificates.....	.....	.....	.....	30,060	29,020	17,870	4,967,400	3,974,940	6,475,500
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....	9,100	12,307	13,244	23,679	24,978	39,394	61,913	45,696	58,648
Other Treasury certificates.....	11,865	10,627	7,758	222,188	168,929	245,039	1,290,286	1,550,454	1,906,260
Silver fractional coin.....	60,381	80,551	28,898	5,898	5,774	5,468	24,164	16,317	22,310
Legal-tender notes.....	47,616	20,361	20,349	215,496	154,447	216,477	4,463,177	5,312,498	6,631,434
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas.....	81,250	81,250	31,250	8,235	8,235	8,250	397,101	472,500	472,500
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	450	.....	.....	5,700	6,000	7,160	22,400	1,650	30,750
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$10,931,394</b>	<b>\$10,810,696</b>	<b>\$10,902,961</b>	<b>\$4,794,744</b>	<b>\$4,697,702</b>	<b>\$7,280,341</b>	<b>\$104,457,561</b>	<b>\$112,060,442</b>	<b>\$124,409,857</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>									
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,100,000	\$1,100,000	\$1,100,000	\$350,000	\$350,000	\$350,000	\$11,400,000	\$11,400,000	\$12,400,000
Surplus fund.....	185,000	187,500	187,500	112,700	112,700	112,700	2,400,000	2,400,000	3,350,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	760,270	646,288	652,242	78,180	90,670	108,630	2,964,007	3,191,744	3,456,777
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	620,350	603,560	565,770	164,500	164,500	165,000	8,527,597	9,289,497	9,877,997
Due to other National banks.....	867,596	812,022	1,030,114	1,282,411	1,340,373	1,571,038	25,188,062	27,680,091	31,136,449
Due to State banks and bankers.....	794,627	810,190	620,704	1,846,418	1,897,463	1,969,276	16,067,719	19,294,235	23,240,187
Dividends unpaid.....	.....	456	180	.....	.....	.....	9,911	4,040	9,168
Individual deposits.....	.....	6,173,261	6,223,265	2,583,963	2,765,285	2,868,996	33,901,151	35,235,909	38,689,474
U. S. deposits.....	.....	109,269	63,461	85,918	85,904	94,910	2,749,800	2,769,172	2,880,004
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	.....	370,048	433,062	.....	.....	13	.....	.....	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	6,187,622	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	34,941	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	461,046	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$10,931,394</b>	<b>\$10,810,696</b>	<b>\$10,902,961</b>	<b>\$4,794,744</b>	<b>\$4,697,702</b>	<b>\$7,280,341</b>	<b>\$104,457,561</b>	<b>\$112,060,442</b>	<b>\$124,409,857</b>
Average reserve held.....	\$1,081,394	\$1,010,626	\$1,002,961	\$4,794,744	\$4,697,702	\$7,280,341	\$104,457,561	\$112,060,442	\$124,409,857
	31.36 p. c.	30.69 p. c.	27.43 p. c.	43.07 p. c.	43.78 p. c.	36.35 p. c.	23.33 p. c.	23.17 p. c.	24.40 p. c.
* Total lawful money reserve.....	\$1,700,068	\$1,446,268	\$1,087,054	\$682,089	\$614,761	\$666,312	\$12,488,705	\$12,898,705	\$17,191,490



RESOURCES.

	ST. PAUL, MINN. Dec. 13, 1900, Feb. 5, 1901, Apr. 24, 1901.	SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. Dec. 13, 1900, Feb. 5, 1901, Apr. 24, 1901.	SAVANNAH, GA. Dec. 13, 1900, Feb. 5, 1901, Apr. 24, 1901.
Loans and discounts.....	\$12,281,484	\$12,123,495	\$13,088,875
Overdrafts.....	6,551	1,000	10,673
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	683,000	1,003,000	2,550,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	777,000	418,000	574,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	.....	.....	700,000
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	.....	.....	.....
Stocks, securities, etc.....	2,002,223	2,015,277	51,811
Banking houses, furniture and fixtures.....	683,218	1,865,842	1,431,311
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	139,011	683,450	311,100
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	1,083,450	84,369	61,186
Due from State banks and bankers.....	383,219	836,510	782,708
Due from approved reserve agents.....	3,493,018	210,189	3,321,719
Checks and other cash items.....	115,948	2,953,603	1,407,980
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	236,186	116,842	363,713
Bills of other National banks.....	123,801	1,081,232	577,720
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	6,245	307,845	54,380
Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	1,687,851	1,875,608	3,603,585
Gold Treasury certificates.....	49,600	23,727	383,420
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....	44,750	552,000
Silver dollars.....	62,257	106,440	250,170
Silver Treasury certificates.....	14,015	149,352	745,000
Silver fractional coin.....	22,112	71,915	65,775
Legal-tender notes.....	383,860	127,693	67,149
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....	34,560	20,140	17,874
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treas. Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	34,120	32,301	62,007
	.....	842,389	7,688
	.....	67,910	13,723
	.....	112,840	118,000
	.....	600	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$24,900,420</b>	<b>\$25,424,794</b>	<b>\$34,891,054</b>
			<b>\$35,304,262</b>
			<b>\$2,962,582</b>
			<b>\$2,968,432</b>
			<b>\$2,842,065</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$3,800,000	\$3,800,000	\$3,800,000
Surplus fund.....	667,000	720,000	750,000
Undiv. profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	648,307	514,612	225,000
National bank notes issued, less amt on hand.....	648,280	653,220	124,472
Due to other National banks.....	3,083,083	3,020,140	197,795
Due to State banks and bankers.....	2,318,886	2,694,223	107,595
Dividends unpaid.....	.....	1,501	130,610
Individual deposits.....	13,008,449	13,007,047	236,475
U. S. deposits.....	443,723	470,410	1,380
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	801,253	270,253	883,028
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	81,409
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	33,938
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	43,000
	.....	.....	850,000
	.....	.....	845,000
	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$24,900,420</b>	<b>\$25,424,794</b>	<b>\$34,891,054</b>
			<b>\$35,304,262</b>
			<b>\$2,962,582</b>
			<b>\$2,968,432</b>
			<b>\$2,842,065</b>
<b>Average reserve held.....</b>	<b>33.25 p. c.</b>	<b>36.98 p. c.</b>	<b>29.16 p. c.</b>
<b>* Total lawful money reserve.....</b>	<b>\$2,377,198</b>	<b>\$2,321,752</b>	<b>\$2,300,422</b>

RESOURCES.	WASHINGTON, D. C.		
	Dec. 13, 1900.	Feb. 5, 1901.	Apr. 24, 1901.
Loans and discounts.....	\$11,868,618	\$11,968,240	\$12,306,309
Overdrafts.....	9,095	8,077	12,616
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	1,170,000	1,219,000	1,219,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	451,000	451,000	451,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	206,060	157,700	155,800
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	58,964	58,173	58,502
Stocks, securities, etc.....	1,095,709	1,182,781	1,305,409
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	1,187,680	1,197,680	1,273,183
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	88,874	88,874	101,544
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	1,965,489	1,988,016	2,184,819
Due from State banks and bankers.....	324,086	306,170	356,840
Due from approved reserve agents.....	2,561,297	3,040,788	3,865,351
Checks and other cash items.....	293,034	279,878	161,110
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	389,378	383,788	189,874
Bills of other National banks.....	12,025	4,055	6,070
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	9,986	7,429	7,148
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	95,481	50,844	54,222
Gold Treasury certificates.....	1,360,460	1,146,290	1,285,980
Gold clearing-house certificates.....			
Silver dollars.....	10,891	6,377	6,683
Silver Treasury certificates.....	569,340	680,720	708,428
Silver fractional coin.....	42,621	32,618	31,131
Legal-tender notes.....	1,116,377	1,195,716	1,240,575
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tenders.....			
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	53,500	54,092	55,950
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	2,500		40
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$24,834,600</b>	<b>\$25,456,292</b>	<b>\$27,009,550</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$2,775,000	\$2,775,000	\$2,775,000
Surplus fund.....	1,321,700	1,492,500	1,592,500
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	785,442	558,938	520,377
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	1,080,055	1,080,065	1,086,755
State bank notes outstanding.....			
Due to other National banks.....	233,591	299,463	369,737
Due to State banks and bankers.....	829,880	1,069,464	1,033,324
Dividends unpaid.....	3,678	6,958	4,811
Individual deposits.....	17,330,160	17,738,878	19,202,965
U. S. deposits.....	399,661	395,873	373,346
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	55,211	30,446	50,432
Notes and bills rediscounted.....			
Bills payable.....			
Liabilities other than those above stated.....			
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$24,834,600</b>	<b>\$25,456,292</b>	<b>\$27,009,550</b>
Average reserve held.....	33.59 p. c.	84.90 p. c.	37.29 p. c.
*Total lawful money reserve.....	\$3,196,370	\$3,112,565	\$3,327,019

YOKOHAMA SPECIE BANK.—At the half-yearly ordinary general meeting of the shareholders of the Yokohama Specie Bank, Limited, held at the head office in Yokohama March 9, the following report of profit and loss account for the half-year ending December 31, 1900, was submitted:

"The gross profits of the bank for the past half-year, including yen 163,695 brought forward from last accounts, amount to yen 5,972,848, of which yen 4,218,009 have been deducted for current expenses, interests, etc., leaving a balance of yen 1,754,838. The directors now propose that yen 180,000 be added to the reserve fund, raising it to yen 8,310,000. From the remainder the directors recommend a dividend at the rate of thirteen per cent. per annum, which will absorb yen 780,000 on old shares and yen 390,000 on new shares, making a total of yen 1,170,000. The balance, yen 404,838, will be carried forward to the credit of next account."

Deposits of the bank amount to 52,978,953 yen, and the total resources are 152,603,634 yen.

# MONEY, TRADE AND INVESTMENTS.

## A REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SITUATION.

NEW YORK, June 3, 1901.

THE PANIC IN WALL STREET and the corner in Northern Pacific will always be remembered as the "great events" in the month of May, 1901. That there was a panic there is no question, and while it was a record-breaker in the matter of wiping out fortunes that had only a "paper" foundation, it is also true that it was seemingly the most innocuous of panics so far as the wrecking of financial institutions was concerned. In one respect, the very fury of the panic limited its power for mischief. Had the declines which occurred in the short space of a couple of hours been spread over a couple of weeks, the losses would have been more general and more serious. The drop was so fast that people who held stocks on margin did not have time to sell out or be sold out before the recovery set in.

The stock market for some time had been shaping for a set-back. It had accelerated its pace until something had to check it. We gave last month the record of daily sales of stocks at the New York Stock Exchange during April. In that month the sales on every full business day exceeded 1,000,000 shares, on five days they exceeded 2,000,000 shares a day and on the last day of April they went above 3,200,000 shares, making the total for the month nearly 42,000,000 shares. We expressed the view that April, 1901, would hereafter "be considered an epoch-making period in the history of Wall Street operations," and the prediction is apparently in course of verification.

The activity in the stock market continued through the first week of May until the catastrophe of May 9—now called "Blue Thursday"—brought the market down to a slower movement. A comparison of daily transactions during the early and latter part of the month will best serve to show the character of the change which was produced by the panic of May 9:

### SALES OF STOCKS.

	<i>Shares.</i>		<i>Shares.</i>
May 1.....	2,620,862	May 22.....	767,068
" 2.....	2,841,309	" 23.....	860,199
" 3.....	2,910,471	" 24.....	744,476
" 4*.....	944,014	" 25*.....	284,687
" 5.....	2,257,337	" 27.....	520,247
" 7.....	2,020,013	" 28.....	681,578
" 8.....	2,449,485	" 29.....	869,220
" 9.....	3,071,805	" 31.....	1,442,590
Total 7½ days.....	19,315,816	Total 7½ days.....	6,110,055

\* Saturday, Stock Exchange open only two hours.

There has certainly been a very great falling off in the volume of business at the Stock Exchange since the memorable ninth of May, yet there has not been a day during the month on which the transactions were not so large that until recently they would have been considered exceptionally extensive. Until within a few years a half million shares a day was looked upon as a very active business, so the stock market is by no means inactive, although many operators of recent growth have retired from business.

The disaster to the stock market is generally admitted to have come via the Northern Pacific. A squeezing of the shorts in Northern Pacific common stock was the immediate cause of a bull panic in other stocks. The disaster which developed on May 9 gave premonitory symptoms of its coming several days ahead. Northern Pacific, which was down to 45¾ last September, had closed at 115 on April 30. It was down to 108 on Saturday May 4, but advanced to 133 on May 6 and to 149¾ on May 7. On that day the general market began to weaken but Northern Pacific continued to advance, touching 180 on May 8. On the next day the stock rapidly climbed, while the rest of the market went tumbling down like a house of cards. Northern Pacific went to 700 regular and 1,000 cash, but closed regular way at 325.

It is not necessary to make more than general reference to the cause of the startling advance in that stock. Two large banking houses had bought the stock to control it and short sellers had given the two firms more stock than there was in existence. Both wanted stock and not cash and the shorts in their effort to get the stock sacrificed everything else. Only that the firms interested agreed upon a settlement worse disaster would have been the consequence.

The extent of the decline may be best measured by a comparison of the lowest prices reached on May 9 with the highest recorded on May 7, two days before. The following is the list of the most important declines shown by such a comparison, with recovery from the lowest price on May 9 at the close of May :

	De- cline.	Recom- try.		De- cline.	Recom- try.
Atchison.....	44½	40½	Reading.....	14½	9½
" preferred.....	37½	31½	" 1st preferred.....	15	12
Baltimore and Ohio.....	29	21¾	" 2d preferred.....	19	15¼
Brooklyn Rapid Transit.....	16¼	9	St. Louis Southwestern.....	22	19
Canadian Pacific.....	30½	18	" preferred.....	18½	14¼
Chesapeake and Ohio.....	22	20½	Southern Pacific.....	27½	26¼
Chicago and Alton.....	21	16	Southern.....	13¾	13¾
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy..	20½	17¾	" preferred.....	11	10
Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul.	58	28½	Texas and Pacific.....	24½	20½
" " preferred.....	30½	9½	Union Pacific.....	54½	32½
Chicago and Northwestern.....	19	9½	" preferred.....	13	5¼
Chicago, Rhode Island and Pacific	44	31	Wabash, preferred.....	19	19½
Delaware and Hudson.....	74	68½	Wheeling and Lake Erie, 1st pref.	11	6½
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western	25½	40½	" " 2d pref.....	10½	8
Erie.....	17½	17½	Amalgamated Copper.....	33½	29½
Evansville and Terre Haute.....	18½	10	American Smelting and Refining.	20½	17½
Great Northern, preferred.....	20½	18	American Sugar.....	16½	12
Hocking Valley.....	15½	13½	American Tobacco.....	30	38
Illinois Central.....	21	17	Anaconda Copper.....	13½	12¼
Lake Erie and Western.....	12½	—	Colorado Fuel and Iron.....	18	12½
" " preferred.....	13½	—	Consolidated Gas.....	31	27½
Louisville and Nashville.....	38½	29½	General Electric.....	29	30½
Manhattan.....	44½	34½	Glucose Sugar.....	12½	11½
Metropolitan Street.....	20½	19½	International Power.....	22	30½
Minneapolis and St. Louis.....	13	18½	Pacific Mail.....	10½	6½
Missouri, Kansas and Texas.....	11½	9½	People's Gas, Chicago.....	19	16½
" " " preferred.....	29	24½	Pullman.....	11½	10
Missouri Pacific.....	44½	37½	Tennessee Coal and Iron.....	12½	10½
New York Central.....	25	16½	United States Steel.....	29	24½
New York, Ontario and Western.	14½	10½	" " preferred.....	31½	28½
Pennsylvania.....	16½	11	Western Union.....	14	9½

Never in the previous history of Wall Street was there so extensive a fall in prices in so short a time. There are sixty-two stocks in the above list, not one of which failed to decline more than ten per cent., while Delaware and Hudson led with a drop of seventy-four points. Nearly all the stocks recovered most of their

loss and about half a dozen of the above list sold higher at the close of the month than they did on May 7 before the panic.

While the panic proceeded money was bid up to seventy-five per cent., that rate being named on May 9. President Tappen, of the Gallatin Bank, secured the co-operation of a number of the banks and \$20,000,000 of money was offered at market rates. On the day following the panic, however, loans were made at as low as three per cent., while most of the call loans were made at six per cent.

The situation since the upheaval in Wall Street has seemingly been improved. Prices of securities are strong and there is a general impression prevailing that the market is secure against any big break for some time to come.

In the last few weeks there have occurred a number of strikes among employees, but the demands made by labor in connection with the strikes indicate the prevalence of good times. In most cases the demand is for higher wages or fewer hours of labor. This implies a generally prosperous condition of business, or the striking workmen would be more contented with their lot.

That the general trade of the country in all directions is expanding and increasing in volume admits of no denial. At the present time the returns of the clearing-houses have not been completed for the month of May, but the weekly gains over 1900 outside of New York have been as follows:

For the week ended May 4.....	19.3 per cent.
" " " " 11.....	27.1 " "
" " " " 18.....	28.6 " "
" " " " 25.....	21.9 " "
" " " June 1.....	*15.0 " "

\*Approximate.

In New York city the gains were, of course, much larger as the result of the extraordinary speculation. For the week ended May 4, the increase was 112.7 per cent.; May 11, 186.5 per cent.; May 18, 111.5 per cent.; May 25, 53.5 per cent., and June 1, 43.42 per cent. These are extraordinary increases, as the clearings last year were exceptionally large, not only in New York, but in other cities.

Since the flurry in Wall Street there have been further notable changes in the statements issued by the New York banks. Deposits, which on April 20 had fallen to \$967,000,000, a decrease of \$37,000,000 from March 30, increased \$10,000,000, to \$977,000,000 on May 11, but in the two weeks following fell off \$36,000,000, to \$941,000,000. In the last week of the month, however, they increased \$11,000,000. Loans followed a similar course and increased \$15,000,000 from April 20 to May 11, then dropped \$39,000,000 in the two weeks ended May 25, but increased \$7,500,000 in the week ended June 1. A decrease of nearly \$40,000,000 in loans and deposits in two weeks is one of the significant signs of the present magnitude of financial affairs.

The Government finances still present a favorable aspect, the ordinary receipts running in excess of expenditures more than \$10,000,000 last month. The Secretary of the Treasury continues to buy bonds offered at a price acceptable to the Government, but the offers are fewer than the Treasury surplus could take care of. A department circular dated June 1, giving the market prices and investment values of Government bonds in May, is a flattering testimonial to the high credit of our Government obligations. The averages for the month as given in the circular are:

BONDS.	Rate of interest.	Date of maturity.	Market price flat.	Net price.	Investment value.
	Per cent.				Per cent.
Consols of 1980.....	2	April 1, 1980	106.4575	106.2118	1.727
Loan of 1908-18.....	3	Aug. 1, 1908-18*	109.6800	109.5100	1.601
Funded loan of 1907..	4	July 1, 1907	113.7350	113.2438	1.718
Loan of 1925.....	4	Feb. 1, 1925	138.4200	138.2000	1.975
Loan of 1904.....	5	Feb. 1, 1904	109.4450	109.2450	1.514

\* Treated as maturing August 1, 1908.

Our foreign trade continues to make the most remarkable records. The export movement of merchandise continues so large that balances which at one time, and not many years ago either, were considered exceptional for an entire year, are now piled up in the space of a few months. From January 1 to April 30 this year the exports exceeded the imports by \$208,000,000. Until 1897 there were very few years in which twelve months' net exports reached such a figure. The excess of exports of merchandise over imports for the month of April and for the four and ten months ended April 30 each year since 1891 is shown in the following table:

## NET EXPORTS OF MERCHANDISE.

	<i>Month of April.</i>	<i>Four months ended April 30.</i>	<i>Ten months ended April 30.</i>
1891.....	\$10,368,120	\$16,537,636	\$69,363,621
1892.....	*236,487	53,546,885	26,996,009
1893.....	*17,140,855	*57,552,160	*7,487,967
1894.....	4,034,775	58,534,441	227,194,319
1895.....	*3,494,317	8,720,854	84,024,089
1896.....	12,442,168	55,106,505	83,062,729
1897.....	*23,673,620	50,438,737	299,740,002
1898.....	43,368,406	193,968,483	514,020,400
1899.....	21,896,645	146,255,962	471,557,021
1900.....	43,362,318	188,190,177	455,116,984
1901.....	44,022,008	208,080,996	584,212,306

\*Net imports.

In the month of April the exports exceeded the imports by \$44,000,000. This beats both the years 1898 and 1900 and is approximated by no other year. For the four months the excess of exports was \$208,000,000, exceeding the previous high record made in 1898 by more than \$14,000,000. For the ten months of the fiscal year which will end June 30 the net exports aggregate \$584,000,000, or \$70,000,000 more than in the banner year 1898. There is a strong probability that the balance for the full year ending this month will be about \$650,000,000 while shipments of gold will cause the specie movement to show an export balance.

It is an interesting fact that while for years prior to 1897 exports averaged only about \$70,000,000 a month, and excepting in the four months October, 1891, to January, 1892, never reached \$100,000,000 in a single month until late in 1896, they have exceeded that figure every month, since July, 1899. That is for twenty-one consecutive months the exports of merchandise have amounted to more than \$100,000,000 a month in value while the aggregate for that entire period has been \$2,560,000,000, or an average of about \$121,000,000 per month.

The magnitude of the figures suggests a comparison with other periods, so we have compiled a statement of both merchandise and specie movements for the twenty-one months from August 1, 1899, to April 30, 1901, and for two similar periods ending April 30, 1899, and 1897 respectively. The results are shown as follows:

	<i>August 1, 1895, to April 30, 1897.</i>	<i>August 1, 1897, to April 30, 1899.</i>	<i>August 1, 1899, to April 30, 1901.</i>
Exports of merchandise.....	\$1,725,994,595	\$2,197,166,190	\$2,560,006,160
Imports of merchandise.....	1,306,888,372	1,127,805,702	1,466,076,332
Net exports of merchandise.....	\$419,106,223	\$1,069,360,488	\$1,093,929,778
Exports of gold.....	\$131,809,730	\$24,508,026	\$83,369,458
Imports of gold.....	115,752,988	202,231,375	102,635,457
Net exports of gold.....	\$16,056,742	*\$177,223,349	*\$19,235,999
Exports of silver.....	\$108,237,822	\$98,439,292	\$108,093,702
Imports of silver.....	51,833,046	55,015,618	64,232,963
Net exports of silver.....	\$56,404,776	\$43,423,674	\$43,860,740
Exports merchandise and specie	\$1,986,042,147	\$2,320,113,508	\$2,751,444,320
Imports merchandise and specie	1,474,474,306	1,384,852,095	1,632,944,301
Net exports mdse. and specie	\$491,567,841	\$935,261,413	\$1,118,499,519

\*Net Imports.

It will be noticed that the record period covered by the table was one in which there was a very heavy import movement of gold. In the latest period the exports of gold exceeded the imports. The total exports of merchandise in the twenty-one months ended April 30, 1901, were \$2,560,000,000, exceeding the total in the earliest period by \$384,000,000, while the net exports were nearly \$1,094,000,000, an increase of \$674,000,000.

Without considering the table in detail it is sufficient to invite attention to the fact that in the twenty-one months of the period just ended our net exports of merchandise, gold and silver exceeded \$1,118,000,000, while in the corresponding period in 1897-99 they were only \$935,000,000 and in 1895-97 only \$491,000,000, an increase over the two periods of \$183,000,000 and \$627,000,000 respectively.

**THE MONEY MARKET.**—The local money market gave premonitory symptoms of the coming trouble in the stock market, for on May 1 the rate for call loans advanced to 6 per cent., on May 4 to 8 per cent., on May 6 to 10 per cent., on May 8 to 25 per cent. and on May 9 to 75 per cent. The following day loans fell to 3 @ 15 per cent. and afterward did not go above 8 per cent. Late in the month rates for money were in a normal condition. At the close of the month call money ruled at 3 @  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., averaging about  $3\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. Banks and trust companies quoted 3 per cent. as the minimum rate. Time money on Stock Exchange collateral is quoted at 4 per cent. for 30 to 90 days and 4 @  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for 4 to 6 months on good mixed collateral, consisting largely of railroad stocks. For commercial paper the rates are  $3\frac{3}{4}$  @ 4 per cent. for 60 to 90 days endorsed bills receivable, 4 @  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for first-class 4 to 6 months single names, and 5 @ 6 per cent. for good paper having the same length of time to run.

#### MONEY RATES IN NEW YORK CITY.

	Jan. 1.	Feb. 1.	Mar. 1.	Apr. 1.	May 1.	Jan. 1.
	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.
Call loans, bankers' balances.....	$4\frac{1}{4}$ —6	$1\frac{1}{4}$ —2	$1\frac{1}{4}$ — $2\frac{1}{4}$	$2\frac{1}{4}$ —3	$3\frac{1}{4}$ —6	8 — $8\frac{1}{4}$
Call loans, banks and trust companies.....	5 —	2 —	2 —	2 —	4 —	3 —
Brokers' loans on collateral, 30 to 60 days.....	5 —	3 —	3 —	$3\frac{1}{4}$ —	4 —	4 —
Brokers' loans on collateral, 90 days to 4 months.....	$4\frac{1}{4}$ —5	3 — $3\frac{1}{4}$	3 —	$3\frac{1}{4}$ — $3\frac{1}{2}$	4 —	4 — $4\frac{1}{2}$
Brokers' loans on collateral, 5 to 7 months.....	5 —	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —	$3\frac{1}{4}$ —	$3\frac{1}{4}$ —	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —	4 — $4\frac{1}{2}$
Commercial paper, endorsed bills receivable, 60 to 90 days.....	$4\frac{3}{4}$ —5	3 — $3\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$ —	$3\frac{1}{4}$ —4	4 — $4\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$ —4
Commercial paper prime single names, 4 to 6 months.....	5 — $5\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$ —4	$3\frac{1}{4}$ — $4\frac{1}{4}$	4 — $4\frac{1}{4}$	4 — $4\frac{1}{2}$	4 — $4\frac{1}{2}$
Commercial paper, good single names, 4 to 6 months.....	$5\frac{1}{4}$ —6	5 —	$4\frac{1}{4}$ —5	5 —	5 — 6	5 — 6

**NEW YORK CITY BANKS.**—The banks of this city passed through troublous times during the past month, and added to the reputation for sagacity and strength which they previously possessed. Again they came to the relief of a very serious situation by offering to lend money at a time when would-be borrowers were bidding up the rate on themselves. The action of the banks resulted in causing rates for call loans to fall from 75 per cent. on one day to 3 per cent. on the next. The effect of the panic

#### NEW YORK CITY BANKS—CONDITION AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

	Loans.	Specie.	Legal tenders.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
May 4....	\$890,450,400	\$182,202,700	\$1,955,300	\$973,111,600	\$10,980,100	\$31,182,900	\$2,464,025,100
" 11....	897,716,900	179,780,700	72,739,500	977,490,900	8,127,475	31,081,100	2,853,085,400
" 18....	873,512,100	176,889,100	74,317,500	951,628,700	13,299,925	31,109,000	2,129,416,300
" 25....	858,872,600	180,067,200	76,501,000	941,118,900	21,288,975	31,104,700	1,481,315,100
June 1....	886,314,700	181,190,000	78,162,600	952,398,200	21,253,050	31,068,600	1,177,423,200

is somewhat reflected in the heavy decrease in loans and deposits in the two weeks following, but both these items show substantial gains in the last week of the month, while the surplus reserve, after falling to about \$8,000,000, has increased again to \$21,000,000.

**DEPOSITS AND SURPLUS RESERVE ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.**

MONTH.	1899.		1900.		1901.	
	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.
January.....	\$823,637,700	\$19,180,975	\$740,046,900	\$11,168,075	\$854,180,200	\$11,525,900
February.....	861,637,500	39,232,025	795,917,300	30,871,275	969,917,500	24,838,825
March.....	910,573,600	30,334,900	829,917,000	13,641,550	1,012,514,000	14,801,100
April.....	898,917,000	15,494,850	807,816,600	9,836,150	1,004,283,200	7,870,500
May.....	883,505,300	25,524,675	852,062,500	21,128,300	970,790,500	16,739,775
June.....	860,061,600	42,710,600	887,954,500	20,122,275	952,398,200	21,233,050
July.....	906,127,800	14,374,550	888,249,360	16,859,375	.....	.....
August.....	862,142,700	10,811,125	887,841,700	27,535,975	.....	.....
September.....	849,793,800	9,191,250	903,486,900	27,078,475	.....	.....
October.....	785,364,200	1,724,450	884,706,800	12,942,600	.....	.....
November.....	761,635,500	2,038,525	841,775,200	5,950,400	.....	.....
December.....	748,078,000	8,536,700	864,410,900	10,865,675	.....	.....

Deposits reached the highest amount, \$1,012,514,000 on Mar. 2, 1901, loans, \$918,789,600 on March 9, 1901, and the surplus reserve \$11,623,000 on Feb. 3, 1894.

**NON-MEMBER BANKS—NEW YORK CLEARING-HOUSE.**

DATES.	Loans and Investments.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal tender and bank notes.	Deposit with Clearing-House agents.	Deposit in other N. Y. banks.	Surplus.
May 4.....	\$70,325,900	\$77,662,700	\$3,013,400	\$4,015,300	\$3,830,600	\$3,261,800	* \$794,475
" 11.....	69,884,100	79,759,000	3,108,000	4,180,300	10,089,100	2,973,900	* 419,550
" 18.....	70,184,200	77,063,100	3,037,300	4,169,600	8,665,400	2,784,100	* 614,375
" 25.....	70,252,100	76,893,400	3,091,000	4,179,600	8,106,000	2,699,100	* 1,623,650
June 1.....	70,537,000	77,076,900	3,063,300	4,069,300	8,562,400	2,643,000	* 971,225

\* Deficit.

**BOSTON BANKS.**

DATES.	Loans.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Circulation.	Clearings.
May 4.....	\$195,241,000	\$222,696,000	\$14,663,000	\$3,499,000	\$6,136,000	\$181,364,500
" 11.....	195,607,000	221,783,000	15,789,000	3,890,000	6,160,000	163,755,800
" 18.....	193,377,000	220,975,000	16,590,000	3,565,000	6,161,000	165,793,900
" 25.....	193,228,000	214,881,000	16,297,000	3,699,000	6,154,000	140,096,000
June 1.....	195,576,000	214,701,000	15,893,000	3,065,000	6,148,000	109,271,100

**PHILADELPHIA BANKS.**

DATES.	Loans.	Deposits.	Lawful Money Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
May 4.....	\$176,451,000	\$212,063,000	\$58,848,000	\$9,851,000	\$123,294,000
" 11.....	175,994,000	208,698,000	58,137,000	9,861,000	115,764,500
" 18.....	173,115,000	205,645,000	55,162,000	9,844,000	121,046,100
" 25.....	172,308,000	203,936,000	55,760,000	9,845,000	101,198,500
June 1.....	172,140,000	206,372,000	56,783,000	9,833,000	92,837,100

**MONEY RATES ABROAD.**—There were no changes in the posted rates of discount of the European banks last month. While the London money market was troubled for a while by the Northern Pacific "corner," it has since righted itself and discount rates are somewhat lower than they were a month ago. Discounts of 60 to 90 day bills in London at the close of the month were  $3\frac{1}{2}$  @  $3\frac{3}{4}$  per cent., against  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per



cent. a month ago. The open market rate at Paris was  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., against  $2\frac{3}{4}$  per cent. a month ago, and at Berlin and Frankfort  $3\frac{1}{2}$  @  $3\frac{1}{4}$  against  $3\frac{3}{8}$  per cent. a month ago.

## MONEY RATES IN FOREIGN MARKETS.

	Jan. 25.	Feb. 15.	Mar. 1.	Mar. 22.	Apr. 26.	May 17.
London—Bank rate of discount.....	5	$4\frac{1}{2}$	4	4	4	4
Market rates of discount:						
60 days bankers' drafts.....	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{3}{4}$	$3\frac{3}{4}$	$3\frac{3}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{3}{4}$
6 months bankers' drafts....	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$ $\frac{5}{8}$	$3\frac{3}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$ $\frac{3}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$ $\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{3}{4}$ $\frac{1}{2}$
Loans—Day to day.....	$3\frac{1}{2}$	3	3	3	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$
Paris, open market rates.....	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{3}{4}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{3}{4}$	$2\frac{3}{4}$	$2\frac{3}{4}$
Berlin, .....	$3\frac{3}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{3}{4}$	4	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{3}{4}$
Hamburg, .....	$3\frac{3}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{3}{4}$	4	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{3}{4}$
Frankfort, .....	$3\frac{3}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{3}{4}$	4	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{3}{4}$
Amsterdam, .....	$3\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{3}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{3}{4}$	$3\frac{3}{4}$
Vienna, .....	4	$3\frac{3}{4}$	$3\frac{3}{4}$	$3\frac{3}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$
St. Petersburg, .....	..	..	..	..	..	..
Madrid, .....	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$
Copenhagen, .....	6	5	5	5	5	5

## BANK OF ENGLAND STATEMENT AND LONDON MARKETS.

	Feb. 13, 1901.	Mar. 13, 1901.	Apr. 10, 1901.	May 15, 1901.
Circulation (exc. b'k post bills).....	£28,636,425	£28,464,725	£29,629,180	£29,663,780
Public deposits.....	8,969,814	12,275,416	7,868,525	6,004,961
Other deposits.....	37,281,782	33,032,353	39,807,305	46,423,757
Government securities.....	13,397,693	12,805,280	18,352,736	13,758,206
Other securities.....	25,377,332	30,851,432	29,729,160	38,970,941
Reserve of notes and coin.....	22,724,011	25,730,207	21,966,519	23,209,700
Coin and bullion.....	33,585,436	36,419,332	34,820,079	35,153,430
Reserve to liabilities.....	$48\frac{1}{2}\%$	$50\frac{1}{2}\%$	46 7-10%	$49\frac{1}{2}\%$
Bank rate of discount.....	$4\frac{1}{2}\%$	4%	4%	4%
Price of Consols ( $2\frac{1}{4}$ per cents.).....	$96\frac{1}{2}$	$96\frac{1}{4}$	$96\frac{1}{2}$	$94\frac{1}{2}$
Price of silver per ounce.....	28d.	$28\frac{1}{2}$	27 8-16d.	27 9-16d.
Average price of wheat.....	26s. 8d.	26s. 9d.	26s. 8d.	27s. 8d.

EUROPEAN BANKS.—There was only a slight increase in the gold holdings of the Bank of England last month, but that institution has nearly \$15,000,000 more gold than it had a year ago. The Bank of Germany gained about \$10,000,000 last month. Other changes were unimportant.

## GOLD AND SILVER IN THE EUROPEAN BANKS.

	April 1, 1901.		May 1, 1901.		June 1, 1901.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
England.....	£36,187,865	.....	£35,873,214	.....	£36,069,386	.....
France.....	95,114,842	£43,964,229	97,493,520	£43,965,897	98,399,044	£44,491,069
Germany.....	30,382,000	15,652,000	30,487,000	13,705,000	32,611,000	16,799,000
Austro-Hungary...	38,923,000	10,699,000	38,694,000	10,821,000	38,791,000	10,284,000
Spain.....	14,002,000	16,590,000	14,002,000	16,616,000	14,002,000	16,804,000
Netherlands.....	5,058,400	5,670,500	5,056,900	5,715,800	5,364,600	5,744,500
Nat. Belgium.....	2,993,000	1,496,000	2,987,000	1,493,000	2,954,000	1,477,000
Totals.....	£222,661,107	£94,041,729	£224,598,634	£94,306,437	£228,191,080	£95,599,569

FOREIGN EXCHANGE.—The rates for sterling are the same as they were a month ago although during the greater part of the month they were lower. The sales of

## RATES FOR STERLING AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

WEEK ENDED.	BANKERS' STERLING.		Cable transfers.	Prime commercial, Long.	Documentary Sterling, 60 days.
	60 days.	Sight.			
May 4.....	$4.84\frac{1}{2}$ @ $4.84\frac{1}{2}$	$4.87\frac{3}{4}$ @ 4.88	$4.88\frac{1}{2}$ @ $4.88\frac{3}{4}$	4.84 @ $4.84\frac{1}{2}$	$4.83\frac{1}{2}$ @ $4.84\frac{1}{2}$
" 11.....	$4.84\frac{1}{2}$ @ $4.84\frac{1}{2}$	$4.87\frac{1}{2}$ @ $4.87\frac{3}{4}$	$4.88\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.89	$4.83\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.84	$4.83\frac{1}{2}$ @ $4.84\frac{1}{2}$
" 18.....	$4.84\frac{1}{2}$ @ $4.84\frac{1}{2}$	4.88 @ $4.88\frac{1}{2}$	4.89 @ $4.89\frac{1}{2}$	4.84 @ $4.84\frac{1}{2}$	$4.83\frac{1}{2}$ @ $4.84\frac{1}{2}$
" 25.....	$4.84\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.85	$4.88\frac{1}{2}$ @ $4.88\frac{1}{2}$	4.89 @ $4.89\frac{1}{2}$	$4.84\frac{1}{2}$ @ $4.84\frac{1}{2}$	$4.83\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.85
June 1.....	4.85 @ $4.85\frac{1}{2}$	$4.88\frac{1}{2}$ @ $4.88\frac{1}{2}$	4.89 @ $4.89\frac{1}{2}$	$4.84\frac{1}{2}$ @ $4.84\frac{1}{2}$	4.84 @ $4.85\frac{1}{2}$

Northern Pacific and other securities abroad for New York account and the placing of the Russian loan of 420,000,000 francs in Paris have tended to advance foreign exchange. Nearly \$10,000,000 gold was shipped to Europe in the five weeks ended June 1.

**FOREIGN EXCHANGE—ACTUAL RATES ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.**

	Feb. 1.	March 1.	April 1.	May 1.	June 1.
Sterling Bankers—60 days .....	4.84½ — ¼	4.84 — ¼	4.84½ — 5	4.84½ — 5	4.85 — ¼
"    "    Sight .....	4.88 — ¼	4.87½ — ¼	4.88 — ¼	4.88 — ¼	4.88½ — ¼
"    "    Cables .....	4.88½ — 9	4.88 — ¼	4.88½ — 9	4.88½ — 9	4.89 — ¼
"    Commercial long .....	4.83½ — 4	4.83½ — ¾	4.84½ — ¼	4.84 — ¼	4.84½ — ¾
"    Docu'tary for paym't. ....	4.83½ — 4	4.83 — ¼	4.83½ — 5	4.83½ — 4½	4.84 — 5½
Paris—Cable transfers .....	5.14½	5.16½	5.15 — 14½	5.15 — 14½	5.15½ — 15
"    Bankers' 60 days .....	5.18½ — 17½	5.19½ — 18½	5.18½ — 17½	5.18½ — 17½	5.18½ — 17½
"    Bankers' sight .....	5.15½ — 1-16	5.17½ — 16½	5.15½ — 15½	5.15½ — 15½	5.15½ — 15½
Swiss—Bankers' sight .....	5.18½ — 17½	5.18½	5.16½ — ¼	5.16½ — ¼	5.16½ — ¼
Berlin—Bankers' 60 days .....	94½ — ¼	94½ — ¾	94½ — 5½	95 — 1-16	94½ — 5
"    Bankers' sight .....	95½ — ¾	95½ — ¾	95½ — ¾	95½ — ¾	95½ — ¾
Belgium—Bankers' sight .....	5.16½ — 15½	5.18½ — 17½	5.16½ — ¾	5.16½ — ¾	5.16½ — ¾
Amsterdam—Bankers' sight .....	40½ — ¾	40½ — ¾	40½ — ¾	40½ — 7-16	40½ — 7-16
Kroners—Bankers' sight .....	26½ — ¾	26½ — ¾	26½ — ¾	26½ — 27	26½ — 27
Italian lire—sight .....	5.45 — 42½	5.45 — 42½	5.43½ — 41½	5.42½ — 5.41½	5.42½ — 41½

**GOLD AND SILVER COINAGE.**—The coinage at the Mint in May amounted to \$12,788,424 of which \$9,825,000 was gold, \$3,266,000 silver and \$147,424 minor coin. There were \$2,584,000 of silver dollars coined during the month.

**COINAGE OF THE UNITED STATES.**

	1899.		1900.		1901.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
January .....	\$18,082,000	\$1,642,000	\$11,515,000	\$2,364,161	\$12,657,200	\$2,713,000
February .....	14,848,800	1,508,000	13,401,900	1,940,000	9,230,360	2,242,166
March .....	12,176,715	2,346,557	12,506,240	4,341,376	6,182,152	3,120,580
April .....	7,804,475	2,159,449	12,922,000	3,930,000	18,958,000	2,633,000
May .....	4,803,400	2,879,416	8,252,000	3,171,000	9,325,000	3,266,000
June .....	8,159,630	2,155,019	3,820,770	2,004,217	.....	.....
July .....	5,981,500	794,000	6,540,000	1,827,827	.....	.....
August .....	10,253,100	2,233,636	5,050,000	2,536,000	.....	.....
September .....	6,800,947	2,441,268	2,203,335	3,932,185	.....	.....
October .....	8,220,000	3,313,569	5,120,000	4,148,000	.....	.....
November .....	6,643,700	2,612,000	13,185,000	3,130,000	.....	.....
December .....	7,400,952	1,880,605	4,576,697	2,880,555	.....	.....
Year .....	\$111,344,220	\$26,061,519	\$99,272,942	\$36,295,321	\$56,352,652	\$13,974,746

**SILVER.**—The price of silver in London advanced to 27½d. per ounce last month, recovering a part of the decline in April. It closed at 27 7-16d., a net advance for the month of ¼d.

**MONTHLY RANGE OF SILVER IN LONDON—1899, 1900, 1901.**

MONTH.	1899.		1900.		1901.		MONTH.	1899.		1900.		1901.	
	High	Low.	High	Low.	High	Low.		High	Low.	High	Low.	High	Low.
January..	27½	27¼	27½	27	29½	27½	July.....	27½	27½	28½	27¾	...	....
February	27½	27¾	27½	27½	28½	27½	August..	27½	27½	28½	27½	...	....
March....	27½	27¾	27½	27½	28½	27½	Septemb'r	27½	28½	28½	28½	...	....
April.....	28½	27½	27½	27½	27½	28½	October..	28½	28½	30½	28½	...	....
May.....	28½	28	27½	27½	27½	27½	Novemb'r	27½	28½	28½	28½	...	....
June.....	28	27½	28½	27½	...	...	Decemb'r	27½	28½	29½	28½	...	....

**NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.**—The amount of circulating notes of the National banks was increased last month \$818,000, making an increase in twelve months of \$15,000,000. The circulation based on bonds increased about \$1,600,000

in the month, and the deposits of bonds to secure circulation increased nearly \$2,000,000.

## NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.

	Feb. 28, 1901.	Mar. 30, 1901.	Apr. 30, 1901.	May 31, 1901.
Total amount outstanding.....	\$348,575,661	\$350,021,811	\$350,684,822	\$351,582,500
Circulation based on U. S. bonds.....	319,217,048	320,910,906	321,975,888	323,589,217
Circulation secured by lawful money....	29,358,613	29,110,905	28,708,934	28,044,273
U. S. bonds to secure circulation:				
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	457,250	317,250	212,500	112,500
" 1907, 4 per cent.....	6,890,650	6,494,400	6,599,500	6,319,500
Five per cents. of 1894.....	286,900	283,900	286,900	286,900
Four per cents. of 1895.....	3,993,600	3,736,600	3,596,900	3,186,600
Three per cents. of 1898.....	4,095,690	4,077,080	3,950,180	3,935,180
Two per cents. of 1900.....	806,217,750	808,264,750	809,581,200	812,106,600
Total.....	\$321,374,830	\$323,176,980	\$323,988,880	\$325,928,280

The National banks have also on deposit the following bonds to secure public deposits: 4 per cents. of 1907, \$9,229,900; 5 per cents. of 1894, \$988,000; 4 per cents. of 1895, \$12,146,950; 3 per cents. of 1898, \$5,828,300; 2 per cents. of 1900, \$77,903,000; District of Columbia 3.65's, 1924, \$625,000; a total of \$106,261,150.

The circulation of National gold banks, not included in the above statement, is \$79,375.

GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND DISBURSEMENTS.—The Government reports a surplus of nearly \$10,500,000 for the month of May, making the total for the eleven months of the current fiscal year nearly \$59,600,000 as compared with \$63,800,000 for the corresponding period last year.

## UNITED STATES TREASURY RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES.

RECEIPTS.			EXPENDITURES.		
Source.	May, 1901.	Since July 1, 1900.	Source.	May, 1901.	Since July 1, 1900.
Customs.....	\$21,021,429	\$220,377,962	Civil and mis.....	\$9,744,028	\$114,278,069
Internal revenue...	27,668,708	290,062,609	War.....	9,697,556	184,650,912
Miscellaneous.....	3,999,306	35,054,430	Navy.....	5,650,509	55,923,706
Total.....	\$52,629,440	\$535,514,401	Indians.....	603,170	9,935,975
Excess of receipts...	10,492,879	58,587,134	Pensions.....	13,525,295	130,236,990
			Interest.....	2,625,108	81,871,655
			Total.....	\$42,136,561	\$476,927,267

## UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES AND NET GOLD IN THE TREASURY.

MONTH.	1900.			1901.		
	Receipts.	Expenditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.	Receipts.	Expenditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.
January.....	\$48,012,185	\$39,189,097	\$218,613,617	\$47,520,287	\$40,109,707	\$221,183,644
February.....	45,631,265	37,738,472	232,225,396	45,844,123	38,890,835	231,150,064
March.....	48,726,837	32,188,271	248,358,064	49,891,125	40,762,862	249,046,643
April.....	45,039,326	40,903,927	229,481,962	47,767,851	41,968,246	245,994,770
May.....	45,166,063	40,351,525	218,857,545	52,629,440	42,136,561	244,432,245
June.....	51,435,832	33,540,673	220,557,185			
July.....	49,955,161	53,979,653	223,567,376			
August.....	49,648,756	50,500,000	218,283,969			
September.....	45,304,326	39,169,971	230,131,162			
October.....	51,626,067	47,968,637	242,670,174			
November.....	48,344,514	41,278,680	243,235,735			
December.....	46,846,508	40,204,622	246,561,322			

UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.—There was a decrease in the net public debt less cash in the Treasury last month of more than \$10,000,000 representing the excess of revenues over disbursements. The total debt was reduced about \$4,000,000 and the net cash balance was increased nearly \$6,000,000. The debt statement shows that \$3,325,900 of bonds were retired of which \$2,883,060 were 4 per cents of 1907, \$441,600 were 5 per cents of 1904 and \$1,240 8 per cents of 1898.

## UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.

	Jan. 1, 1901.	Apr. 1, 1901.	May 1, 1901.	June 1, 1901.
<b>Interest bearing debt:</b>				
Loan of March 14, 1900, 2 per cent.....	\$419,679,750	\$445,940,750	\$445,940,750	\$445,940,750
Funded loan of 1907, 4 .....	287,578,100	270,859,340	264,309,350	261,326,250
Refunding certificates, 4 per cent.....	34,380	33,570	33,540	32,460
Loan of 1904, 5 per cent.....	26,962,100	22,938,400	22,938,400	22,496,800
" 1905, 4 .....	162,315,400	162,315,400	162,315,400	162,315,400
Ten-Twenties of 1896, 3 per cent.....	104,900,040	99,912,940	99,912,940	99,911,700
<b>Total interest-bearing debt.....</b>	<b>\$1,001,499,770</b>	<b>\$1,001,500,410</b>	<b>\$995,350,380</b>	<b>\$992,024,480</b>
Debt on which interest has ceased.....	2,654,070	1,770,140	1,557,840	1,456,120
<b>Debt bearing no interest:</b>				
Legal tender and old demand notes.....	346,734,863	346,734,863	346,734,863	346,734,863
National bank note redemption acct..	81,531,532	28,703,535	28,718,918	27,723,088
Fractional currency.....	6,878,410	6,877,462	6,877,462	6,876,411
<b>Total non-interest bearing debt.....</b>	<b>\$385,144,806</b>	<b>\$382,315,860</b>	<b>\$382,331,244</b>	<b>\$381,334,363</b>
<b>Total interest and non-interest debt.</b>	<b>1,386,644,576</b>	<b>1,383,816,270</b>	<b>1,377,681,624</b>	<b>1,373,358,843</b>
<b>Certificates and notes offset by cash in the Treasury:</b>				
Gold certificates.....	263,629,379	276,704,969	293,441,969	294,951,789
Silver .....	427,426,000	431,841,000	435,521,000	435,928,000
Certificates of deposit.....	1,500,000	.....	.....	.....
Treasury notes of 1890 .....	61,397,000	53,881,000	51,880,000	49,784,000
<b>Total certificates and notes.....</b>	<b>\$754,012,379</b>	<b>\$762,426,969</b>	<b>\$770,842,969</b>	<b>\$770,663,789</b>
<b>Aggregate debt .....</b>	<b>2,143,811,025</b>	<b>2,146,013,419</b>	<b>2,150,062,453</b>	<b>2,145,478,732</b>
<b>Cash in the Treasury:</b>				
Total cash assets.....	1,131,271,552	1,155,309,210	1,160,085,789	1,170,073,436
Demand liabilities.....	841,164,216	846,955,689	853,591,581	857,734,969
<b>Balance .....</b>	<b>\$290,107,336</b>	<b>\$308,443,521</b>	<b>\$306,494,208</b>	<b>\$312,338,469</b>
Gold reserve.....	150,000,000	150,000,000	150,000,000	150,000,000
Net cash balance.....	140,107,336	158,443,521	156,494,208	162,338,469
<b>Total .....</b>	<b>\$290,107,336</b>	<b>\$308,443,521</b>	<b>\$306,494,208</b>	<b>\$312,338,469</b>
<b>Total debt, less cash in the Treasury.</b>	<b>1,099,191,310</b>	<b>1,077,142,909</b>	<b>1,072,745,255</b>	<b>1,062,476,494</b>

**FOREIGN TRADE.**—The returns of our foreign trade for the month of April show exports of merchandise aggregating nearly \$121,000,000, the largest ever reported for the same month in any year. For twenty-one consecutive months the monthly exports have exceeded \$100,000,000, while for six out of the last seven months the total has exceeded \$120,000,000 a month. The imports of merchandise in April were valued at about \$77,000,000, the largest for any month in more than a year and larger than for any corresponding month since 1897. The net exports over imports were \$44,000,000 for the month, the largest ever recorded for that month. This with net exports of gold \$2,600,000 and silver \$2,600,000, makes almost \$50,000,000 of a balance for the month.

## EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

MONTH OF APRIL.	MERCHANDISE.			Gold Balance.	Silver Balance.
	Exports.	Imports.	Balance.		
1896.....	\$71,091,747	\$58,649,579	Exp., \$12,442,168	Imp., \$2,512,524	Exp., \$3,010,969
1897.....	77,648,786	101,322,406	Imp., 23,673,620	" 5,669,710	" 2,714,917
1898.....	99,314,816	55,946,410	Exp., 43,368,406	Imp., 31,256,184	" 2,006,095
1899.....	88,794,873	65,206,228	Exp., 23,588,645	" 1,330,387	" 2,238,336
1900.....	118,772,580	75,510,262	" 43,262,318	" 1,427,233	" 798,235
1901.....	120,780,560	76,750,982	" 44,029,608	Exp., 2,604,359	" 2,612,886
<b>TEN MONTHS.</b>					
1896.....	749,332,804	686,800,075	Exp., 83,032,729	Exp., 54,552,191	Exp., 26,663,070
1897.....	899,929,246	600,186,244	" 299,743,002	Imp., 59,708,776	" 27,726,225
1898.....	1,025,220,172	511,199,772	" 514,020,400	" 88,817,246	" 19,439,658
1899.....	1,039,787,828	585,230,307	" 471,557,021	" 68,214,148	" 22,369,897
1900.....	1,172,403,276	717,286,292	" 455,116,984	" 9,179,079	" 17,582,523
1901.....	1,200,449,248	676,236,942	" 524,212,306	" 23,218,566	" 28,621,443

**MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.**—There was a decrease in the amount of money in circulation in May of nearly \$11,000,000, the loss being in all classes of money. There was a decrease of \$3,000,000 in gold coin and certificates, of \$3,000,000 in silver, \$2,000,000 in Treasury notes and \$3,000,000 in United States notes.

**MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.**

	Mar. 1, 1901.	Apr. 1, 1901.	May 1, 1901.	June 1, 1901.
Gold coin.....	\$628,393,957	\$626,824,954	\$629,240,795	\$628,021,296
Silver dollars.....	71,078,887	72,299,980	68,846,545	68,124,348
Subsidiary silver.....	81,437,330	80,853,107	80,253,077	79,943,209
Gold certificates.....	257,548,739	248,286,099	253,259,799	251,285,329
Silver certificates.....	422,340,690	427,206,320	430,573,522	429,620,818
Treasury notes, Act July 14, 1890.....	55,857,327	53,728,287	51,795,097	49,677,284
United States notes.....	335,421,722	336,889,481	337,610,118	334,483,382
Currency certificates, Act June 8, 1872.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
National bank notes.....	338,593,012	341,155,427	343,725,282	343,421,224
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$2,190,609,144</b>	<b>\$2,187,243,580</b>	<b>\$2,195,304,235</b>	<b>\$2,184,576,890</b>
Population of United States.....	77,311,000	77,427,000	77,536,000	77,647,000
Circulation per capita.....	\$28.34	\$28.25	\$28.31	\$28.13

**MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.**

	Mar. 1, 1901.	Apr. 1, 1901.	May 1, 1901.	June 1, 1901.
Gold coin and bullion.....	\$488,658,803	\$497,332,743	\$500,028,852	\$493,717,575
Silver Dollars.....	441,391,228	441,709,980	447,113,395	450,369,592
Silver bullion.....	53,790,726	52,407,220	50,769,506	48,890,894
Subsidiary silver.....	7,230,550	9,016,799	9,829,207	10,553,103
United States notes.....	11,259,294	9,791,535	9,070,898	12,197,684
National bank notes.....	10,062,244	8,945,979	7,038,975	8,240,741
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$1,012,432,840</b>	<b>\$1,019,204,256</b>	<b>\$1,023,648,833</b>	<b>\$1,025,969,589</b>
Certificates and Treasury notes, 1890, outstanding.....	735,748,756	729,220,351	735,628,418	730,583,431
<b>Net cash in Treasury.....</b>	<b>\$276,686,084</b>	<b>\$290,083,005</b>	<b>\$288,220,415</b>	<b>\$295,386,108</b>

**SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES.**—For the first time in a long while there has been a decrease in the total stock of money in the country, a decrease of \$3,500,000 being reported for May. There was a loss of \$5,500,000 in gold, partly offset by gains from silver coinage and the issue of bank notes.

**SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES.**

	Mar. 1, 1901.	Apr. 1, 1901.	May 1, 1901.	June 1, 1901.
Gold coin and bullion.....	\$1,117,032,760	\$1,124,157,897	\$1,129,267,647	\$1,123,738,871
Silver dollars.....	512,467,590	514,009,940	515,959,940	518,493,940
Silver bullion.....	51,790,726	52,407,220	50,769,506	48,890,894
Subsidiary silver.....	88,867,880	89,869,906	90,082,284	90,496,312
United States notes.....	346,681,016	346,681,018	346,681,016	346,681,016
National bank notes.....	348,855,256	350,101,406	350,764,257	351,861,465
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$2,467,295,228</b>	<b>\$2,477,227,185</b>	<b>\$2,483,524,650</b>	<b>\$2,479,962,998</b>

Certificates and Treasury notes represented by coin, bullion, or currency in Treasury are not included in the above statement.

**FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COIN AND BULLION—QUOTATIONS IN NEW YORK.**

	Bid.	Asked.		Bid.	Asked.
Trade dollars.....	\$ .60	\$ .65	Twenty marks.....	\$4.73	\$4.76
Mexican dollars.....	.48	.50	Spanish doubloons.....	15.50	15.70
Peruvian soles, Chilian pesos..	.42	.46	Spanish 25 pesos.....	4.78	4.80
English silver.....	4.82	4.87	Mexican doubloons.....	15.50	15.70
Victoria sovereigns.....	4.85	4.87	Mexican 20 pesos.....	19.53	19.58
Five francs.....	.93	.96	Ten guilders.....	3.96	4.02
Twenty francs.....	3.84	3.86			

Fine gold bars on the first of this month were at par to  $\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. premium on the Mint value. Bar silver in London, 27 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per ounce. New York market for large commercial silver bars, 59 $\frac{1}{2}$  & 60 $\frac{1}{2}$ c. Fine silver (Government assay), 60 & 61c. Official price, 59 $\frac{1}{2}$ c.

# ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.

The following table shows the highest, lowest and closing prices of the most active stocks at the New York Stock Exchange in the month of May, and the highest and lowest during the year 1901, by dates, and also, for comparison, the range of prices in 1900:

	YEAR 1900.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1901.				MAY, 1901.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.	Lowest.			High.	Low.	Closing.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe.	48 3/4	18 3/4	90 1/4 - May 3	42 1/4 - Jan. 21	90 1/4	43	83 3/4		
" preferred	89 3/4	58 3/4	108 - May 3	70 - May 9	108	70	101 1/2		
Baltimore & Ohio	89 3/4	53 1/4	114 1/4 - May 3	81 1/4 - Jan. 4	114 1/4	84	105 3/4		
Baltimore & Ohio, pref.	90	72 3/4	95 - May 3	83 3/4 - Feb. 28	95	85	95		
Brooklyn Rapid Transit	88 1/4	47 1/4	88 3/4 - Apr. 22	68 1/4 - May 9	87 3/4	68 1/4	77 1/4		
Canadian Pacific	99 3/4	84 3/4	117 1/4 - May 7	87 - May 9	117 1/4	87	105		
Canada Southern	61 1/4	47 3/4	78 1/4 - Apr. 19	54 1/4 - Jan. 4	78 1/4	64	68		
Central of New Jersey	150 1/4	115	164 - May 13	145 1/4 - Jan. 4	164	155	160		
Ches. & Ohio vtg. cts.	42 3/4	24	52 3/4 - May 3	29 - May 9	52 3/4	29	49 3/4		
Chicago & Alton	42	31	50 1/4 - Apr. 30	27 - May 9	49 1/4	27	43		
" preferred	78 1/4	68 1/4	82 1/4 - Apr. 30	72 1/4 - Jan. 4	82	74 1/4	80		
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy	144	119 3/4	190 3/4 - Apr. 30	138 1/4 - Jan. 4	190 3/4	178	195 3/4		
Chicago & E. Illinois	109 1/4	88	135 1/4 - Apr. 29	91 - Jan. 2	132	113	125		
" preferred	125	119 3/4	135 - Apr. 22	120 1/4 - Jan. 3	134	130	130		
Chicago, Great Western	18	9 3/4	24 1/4 - Apr. 29	16 - Jan. 3	25 3/4	17 1/4	22 1/4		
Chic., Indianapolis & Lou'ville	29	14	40 1/4 - Mar. 25	23 - Jan. 21	40	23	39 3/4		
" preferred	64	45 1/4	75 1/4 - Apr. 2	58 1/4 - Jan. 21	74	65	73 1/4		
Chic., Milwaukee & St. Paul	148 1/4	108 1/4	188 - May 6	134 - May 9	188	134	162 1/4		
" preferred	184	169 1/4	200 - May 3	175 - May 9	200	175	184 1/4		
Chicago & Northwestern	172 3/4	150 1/4	215 - May 1	168 1/4 - Jan. 21	215	190	199 3/4		
" preferred	220	195 3/4	248 - Apr. 11	207 - Mar. 1	233	214	221		
Chicago, Rock I. & Pacific	122 3/4	102	160 3/4 - May 3	117 1/4 - Jan. 3	160 3/4	125	156		
Chic., St. Paul, Minn. & Om.	126	110	145 - Apr. 11	125 - Mar. 2	145	145	145		
" preferred	175	172	201 - Apr. 11	180 - Mar. 29	201	180	199 3/4		
Chicago Terminal Transfer	14 1/4	8 3/4	31 - Apr. 16	10 1/4 - Jan. 19	25	16	22 1/4		
" preferred	39 3/4	26 1/4	57 1/4 - Apr. 15	33 - Jan. 18	49	39	43 3/4		
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. Louis	78	55	90 - Apr. 19	72 1/4 - May 15	86	72 1/4	82 1/4		
Col. Fuel & Iron Co.	56 1/4	29 3/4	108 1/4 - Apr. 30	41 1/4 - Jan. 21	107	85	97 1/4		
Consolidated Gas Co.	201	164	238 - Apr. 15	187 - Jan. 18	228	196	222 1/4		
Delaware & Hud. Canal Co.	184 1/4	106 1/4	185 1/4 - Apr. 3	105 - May 9	180 3/4	105	168 1/4		
Delaware, Lack. & Western	194 3/4	171 1/4	244 - May 29	189 1/4 - Jan. 3	244	200 1/4	241		
Denver & Rio Grande	84 1/4	16 1/4	53 1/4 - May 6	29 1/4 - Jan. 21	53 1/4	29 1/4	49		
" preferred	87 1/4	64 1/4	100 - Mar. 27	80 - Jan. 11	99 1/4	89 3/4	95		
Erie	27 1/4	10 1/4	43 1/4 - Apr. 30	24 1/4 - May 9	42 1/4	24 1/4	42 1/4		
" 1st pref.	63 1/4	30 3/4	72 1/4 - Apr. 30	59 1/4 - Jan. 21	72 1/4	59 1/4	69 3/4		
" 2d pref.	43 1/4	15	61 - Mar. 21	39 1/4 - Jan. 4	59 1/4	46 1/4	55 1/4		
Evansville & Terre Haute	54 3/4	38 1/4	68 - Apr. 12	41 - Jan. 31	63 1/4	50	59		
Express Adams	150	111	187 1/4 - May 13	145 - Jan. 8	187 1/4	168	185		
" American	191	142	205 - Apr. 19	170 - Jan. 12	200	184	186		
" United States	59	45	100 - Apr. 10	53 - Jan. 26	89 1/4	80	81 1/4		
" Wells, Fargo	140	120	150 - Apr. 30	130 - Jan. 11	142	142	142		
Great Northern, preferred	191 1/4	144 3/4	208 - Mar. 15	167 1/4 - May 9	191 1/4	167 1/4	189 3/4		
Hocking Valley	42 3/4	30	57 - May 6	40 1/4 - May 9	57	40 1/4	54		
" preferred	74 3/4	58	80 - May 2	69 3/4 - Jan. 21	80	70	77 3/4		
Illinois Central	133	110	149 1/4 - May 1	124 - May 9	149 1/4	124	141		
Iowa Central	27 3/4	11 3/4	38 1/4 - May 31	21 - Jan. 21	36 1/4	23 1/4	36 3/4		
" preferred	58	39	64 1/4 - Apr. 10	48 - Jan. 21	62 1/4	53	68		
Kansas City Southern	17 1/4	7	25 - Apr. 30	12 1/4 - Jan. 4	24	19 3/4	21 1/4		
" preferred	43 3/4	27 1/4	49 - Apr. 30	35 - Jan. 4	48 1/4	41	44 1/4		
Lake Erie & Western	52	20 1/4	68 1/4 - Apr. 19	39 3/4 - Jan. 21	67	49	57		
" preferred	115	83 1/4	130 - Mar. 29	108 1/4 - Jan. 21	127	109	128		
Long Island	89	47 1/4	78 - Mar. 6	67 - Jan. 3	74 3/4	70	70		
Louisville & Nashville	89 3/4	68 3/4	111 1/4 - Apr. 30	76 - May 9	111	76	105 1/4		
Manhattan consol.	117	84	131 1/4 - Apr. 23	83 - May 9	129	83	117 3/4		
Metropolitan Street	182	143 3/4	176 1/4 - Apr. 22	150 - May 9	174 1/4	150	169 3/4		
Mexican Central	17 3/4	10 1/4	30 - May 2	12 1/4 - Jan. 21	30	19	25 3/4		
Minneapolis & St. Louis	71 1/4	45 1/4	100 - May 31	67 1/4 - Jan. 19	100	89	99 1/4		
" preferred	104 1/4	87 1/4	114 1/4 - Mar. 21	101 1/4 - Jan. 7	114 1/4	113	114 1/4		
Missouri, Kan. & Tex.	17 3/4	9	35 1/4 - Apr. 20	15 - Jan. 21	33 3/4	21	30 3/4		
" preferred	47 1/4	25 3/4	63 3/4 - Apr. 19	37 - May 9	67 1/4	37	61 3/4		
Missouri Pacific	72 1/4	38 3/4	118 1/4 - May 7	69 - Jan. 4	116 3/4	72	109 3/4		
Mobile & Ohio certificates	49	35	83 - Apr. 13	78 - May 9	82	78	81 1/4		
N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River	145 3/4	125 3/4	170 - May 2	139 3/4 - Jan. 21	170	140	159 3/4		

## ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.—Continued.

	YEAR 1900.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1901.				MAY, 1901.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.	Lowest.			High.	Low.	Closing.
N. Y., Ontario & Western.....	22½	18½	40¾—May 1	24 —May 9			40¾	24	34¾
Norfolk & Western.....	45¾	22¾	57¾—May 2	42 —Jan. 10			57¾	43	52
" preferred.....	88	67	90 —Apr. 30	52 —Feb. 15			90	87	88
North American Co.....	22¾	18¾	81¾—Mar. 25	77¾—Mar. 14			81¾	78	80¾
Northern Pacific.....	86½	45¾	700 —May 9	77¼—Jan. 21			700	107	143
" pref.....	91½	67	113¾—May 7	84¼—Jan. 21			113¾	97¾	98
Pacific Mail.....	57	25¾	47¼—Jan. 29	30¼—May 9			41	30¼	37¼
Pennsylvania R. R.....	149¼	124¾	161¼—Apr. 22	137¼—May 9			153	137¼	143
People's Gas & Coke of Chic.	111¼	81¾	119¼—Apr. 30	85¼—Jan. 21			119¼	98¾	115¾
Pullman Palace Car Co.....	204	176	217 —Apr. 1	165¼—Jan. 21			211	198	208
Reading.....	28	15	46¾—May 7	24¼—Jan. 4			46¾	34	42¾
" 1st preferred.....	71¾	49	80¼—May 1	65 —May 9			80¼	65	77
" 2d preferred.....	39½	23¾	59¼—May 1	38 —Jan. 3			59¼	39	54¼
St. Louis & San Francisco.....	24¼	8¾	50¼—Apr. 30	21¼—Jan. 4			50	41	46
" 1st preferred.....	78¼	64	88 —Mar. 12	78¼—Jan. 2			87	81	86¼
" 2d preferred.....	55	31¼	74¼—Apr. 30	53¾—Jan. 4			73	59	70¾
St. Louis & Southwestern.....	18¼	6¾	39¼—Apr. 30	16 —May 9			39	16	35
" preferred.....	45¼	21¾	63¼—May 6	41¼—Jan. 3			63¼	50	64¼
Southern Pacific Co.....	45¼	30¾	57¾—Apr. 30	29 —May 9			57¾	29	55¼
Southern Railway.....	22¾	10¾	34¾—May 1	18 —Jan. 21			34¾	20	33¾
" preferred.....	73¾	40¼	88¾—May 1	67¼—Jan. 21			88¾	76	86
Tennessee Coal & Iron Co....	104	49	69¾—Apr. 16	49¾—Mar. 7			87	50	60¾
Texas & Pacific.....	28¾	18¾	52¼—May 3	23¼—Jan. 3			52¼	27	47¾
Union Pacific.....	81¾	44¾	133 —May 2	76 —May 9			133	76	108¾
" preferred.....	85¾	70¾	99¼—May 1	81¾—Jan. 21			99¼	85	90¼
Wabash R. R.....	14	6¾	25¼—May 31	11¼—Jan. 3			25¼	17	25
" preferred.....	27	16	45¼—May 1	23¼—Jan. 4			45¼	24	43¾
Western Union.....	98¼	77¾	100¼—May 6	81 —Jan. 21			100¼	85	94¾
Wheeling & Lake Erie.....	13¼	8	21¾—Mar. 29	11¾—Jan. 31			19¼	15¼	17¾
" second preferred.....	38¾	21¾	38 —Mar. 28	24 —May 9			38	24	32
Wisconsin Central.....	20¾	10	24¾—Apr. 29	14¼—Jan. 21			23¾	15	30¼
" preferred.....	57	30	49¼—Apr. 17	38¼—Jan. 17			49¾	39	44
"INDUSTRIAL"									
Amalgamated Copper.....	99¼	89¾	128¼—Apr. 20	83¾—Jan. 21			125	90	118¼
American Car & Foundry.....	25¼	12¼	29 —May 29	19 —Jan. 21			29	20	23¼
" pref.....	72	57¾	83¼—Apr. 4	67 —Jan. 18			83	75	82¾
American Co. Oil Co.....	37¼	30	31¼—Jan. 3	24 —Mar. 8			28¼	24¾	23¾
American Ice.....	49¼	27¼	41¾—Mar. 15	30 —May 9			39¾	36	37
Am. Smelting & Refining Co.	56¼	34¼	69 —Apr. 20	36¾—May 9			61¾	39¾	57¾
" preferred.....	99	85	100 —Jan. 16	88 —Feb. 26			98	90	98
American Steel Hoop Co.....	50¼	17	49 —Apr. 2	23 —Jan. 18			.....	.....	.....
" preferred.....	86	64¼	97¼—Apr. 2	69 —Jan. 18			.....	.....	.....
American Steel & Wire Co.....	59¾	23¾	53¾—Feb. 11	38 —Jan. 14			.....	.....	.....
" preferred.....	95	69¼	112¼—Apr. 1	83¾—Jan. 17			.....	.....	.....
American Sugar Ref. Co.....	149	95¼	152 —Apr. 17	131¼—Jan. 18			150¼	136	147
American Tin Plate Co.....	57¾	13	80 —Apr. 2	55 —Jan. 4			.....	.....	.....
American Tobacco Co.....	114¾	84¼	139¼—May 23	99 —May 9			139¼	99	137
Anaconda Copper Mining.....	54¾	37¾	54¼—Apr. 16	37 —May 9			51¼	37	50¼
Continental Tobacco Co.....	40¼	21¼	68¼—May 29	38¼—Jan. 4			68¼	43	66¾
" preferred.....	96	70	114 —May 25	93¼—Jan. 2			114	103	112
Federal Steel Co.....	58¼	28¾	59 —Jan. 2	41 —Jan. 29			.....	.....	.....
" preferred.....	79¼	60¾	105¼—Apr. 1	68 —Jan. 21			.....	.....	.....
General Electric Co.....	200	120	234 —Apr. 10	183¼—Jan. 10			233	200	230¼
Glucose Sugar Refining Co...	60	44	65 —May 2	45 —Feb. 16			65	48¼	56¾
International Paper Co.....	287½	14¼	28 —Mar. 22	18¼—May 10			25	18¼	24
" preferred.....	75	58	81 —Mar. 25	69 —Jan. 21			79¼	72¾	78¾
National Lead Co.....	28¼	15¾	23¼—May 21	15 —Mar. 14			23¼	15¾	16¾
National Steel Co.....	53¼	20	60¼—Apr. 2	37 —Jan. 21			.....	.....	.....
" preferred.....	97	79¾	120 —Apr. 2	80 —Jan. 18			.....	.....	.....
National Tube.....	69¾	40¾	70¾—Feb. 6	51¼—Feb. 28			.....	.....	.....
Pressed Steel Car Co.....	54¾	32¼	52 —Jan. 2	30 —Mar. 7			46¼	37¾	46
Republic Iron & Steel Co.....	27¼	8¾	22¼—Apr. 2	12¼—Jan. 22			21¼	15	19¾
" preferred.....	70¼	49	82 —Apr. 1	55¼—Jan. 22			78	67	74¼
Standard Rope & Twine Co..	10¼	4¼	7¼—May 28	3¼—Mar. 6			7¼	5	5¾
U. S. Leather Co.....	19	7¾	16¾—May 2	11 —Jan. 21			16¾	7¾	14¼
" preferred.....	79¼	65	80 —May 31	69¼—May 9			80	66¼	70¾
U. S. Rubber Co.....	44	21	34 —Jan. 2	18¼—Mar. 11			24	19¼	21¾
" preferred.....	104¾	74¾	85 —Jan. 2	55 —Apr. 8			67	60	62

# RAILWAY, INDUSTRIAL AND GOVERNMENT BONDS.

LAST SALE, PRICE AND DATE AND HIGHEST AND LOWEST PRICES AND TOTAL SALES FOR THE MONTH.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ann Arbor 1st g 4's.....1905		7,000,000	Q J	96	May 31, '01	96½	95	98,000
Atch., Top. & S. F.								
Atch Top & Santa Fe gen g 4's.....1905	138,062,500		A & O	103¼	May 31, '01	108¼	101¼	1,517,500
" adjusted.....1905			A & O	102½	May 24, '01	102½	102¼	3,000
" adjustment, g. 4's.....1905	43,482,000		NOV	95	May 31, '01	96¼	95¾	818,500
" registered.....1905			NOV	95	May 17, '01	95	94	22,000
" stamped.....1905	8,246,000		M & N	92¾	May 31, '01	94	92	120,500
" Equip. tr. ser. A. g. 5's.....1902	250,000		J & J					
" Chic. & St. L. 1st 6's.....1915	1,500,000		M & S					
Atl. Knox. & Nor. Ry. 1st g. 5s.....1946	1,000,000		J & D	108	May 18, '01	108	108	4,000
Balt. & Ohio prior lien g. 3½s.....1925			J & J	96¼	May 31, '01	97	95¼	449,500
" registered.....1948	60,798,000		J & J	95¼	Mar. 18, '01			
" g. 4s.....1948			A & O	102¾	May 31, '01	102¾	99	622,500
" g. 4s registered.....1948	65,963,000		A & O	104	Mar. 8, '01			
Pitt Jun. & M. div. 1st g. 3½s.....1925	11,293,000		M & N	89¾	May 29, '01	89¾	87¾	102,000
" registered.....1925			Q Feb					
" Southw'd div. 1st g. 3½s.....1925	41,990,000		J & J	90¼	May 31, '01	90¼	89	722,000
" registered.....1925			Q J					
Monongahela River 1st g. 5's.....1919	700,000		F & A	104¼	July 1, '02			
Cen. Ohio. Georg. 1st c. g. 4½s.....1930	1,018,000		M & S	111	Feb. 28, '99			
Buffalo, Roch. & Pitts. g. g. 5's.....1907	4,407,000		M & S	118	May 27, '01	118	118	6,000
" deb. 6's.....1947	1,000,000		J & J					
Alleghany & Wn. 1st g. gtd 4's.....1908	2,000,000		A & O					
Clearfield & Mah. 1st g. g. 5's.....1943	650,000		J & J	130¼	Mar. 8, '01			
Rochester & Pittsburg. 1st 6's.....1921	1,800,000		F & A	130¼	Feb. 28, '01			
" cons. 1st 6's.....1922	3,820,000		J & D	129	May 28, '01	129	129	10,000
Buffalo & Susquehanna 1st g. 5's.....1913	1,056,500		A & O	100	Nov. 18, '99			
" registered.....1913			A & O					
Burlington, Cedar R. & N. 1st 5's.....1906	6,500,000		J & D	107¼	May 28, '01	107¼	107	7,500
" con. 1st & col. 1st 5's.....1934	7,250,000		A & O	123¼	May 31, '01	124	123	20,000
" registered.....1934			A & O	117	Nov. 20, '99			
Ced. Rap la. Falls & Nor. 1st 5's.....1921	1,905,000		A & O	113¼	Dec. 6, '99			
Minneap's & St. Louis 1st 7's, g. 1927	150,000		J & D	140	Aug. 24, '95			
Canada Southern 1st int. gtd 5's.....1908	14,000,000		J & J	107¼	May 31, '01	108	107¼	111,000
" 2d mortg. 5's.....1918	6,000,000		M & S	108¼	May 31, '01	108¾	107¾	98,000
" registered.....1918			M & S	106¾	Apr. 17, '01			
Central Branch U. Pac. 1st g. 4's.....1948	2,500,000		J & D	92¼	May 24, '01	94	92¼	16,000
Cent. R. & Bkg. Co. of Ga. c. g. 5's.....1987	4,880,000		M & N	99¼	May 21, '01	101¼	99	38,000
Central Ry of Georgia, 1st g. 5's.....1945			F & A	120¼	Mar. 25, '01			
" registered \$1,000 & \$5,000.....1945	7,000,000		F & A					
" con. g. 5's.....1945			M & N	103¼	May 31, '01	105	101	324,000
" con. g. 5's, reg. \$1,000 & \$5,000.....1945	16,700,600		M & N	96	Oct. 30, '99			
" 1st pref. inc. g. 5's.....1945	4,000,000		OCT 1	70	May 29, '01	70	67	108,000
" 2d pref. inc. g. 5's.....1945	7,000,000		OCT 1	27	May 29, '01	29	26	127,000
" 3d pref. inc. g. 5's.....1945	4,000,000		OCT 1	15	May 29, '01	15¼	14	29,000
" Macon & Nor. Div. 1st g. 5's.....1946	840,000		J & J	95	Dec. 27, '99			
" Mid. Ga. & Atl. div. g. 5s.....1947	413,000		J & J	102	June 29, '99			
" Mobile div. 1st g. 5's.....1946	1,000,000		J & J	108	Oct. 24, '99			
Central Railroad of New Jersey, 1st convertible 7's.....1902	1,167,000		M & N	108	Apr. 9, '01			
" gen. g. 5's.....1987			J & J	132	May 29, '01	134	132	106,000
" registered.....1987	43,924,000		Q J	131¼	May 29, '01	131¼	131	6,000



BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Am. Dock & Improvm't Co. 5's. 1921		4,987,000	J & J	114½	May 22, '01	114½	114½	12,000
Lehigh & H. R. gen. gtd g. 5's. 1920		1,082,000	J & J	108	Mar. 15, '19	108½	108½	73,000
Lehigh & W.-B. Coal con. 5's. 1912		2,691,000	Q M	103½	May 31, '01	103½	102¾	73,000
con. extended gtd. 4½'s. 1910		12,175,000	Q M	103½	May 31, '01	103½	102¾	73,000
N.Y. & Long Branch gen. g. 4's. 1941		1,500,000	M & S	108¾	Dec. 18, '99	108¾	108¾	73,000
Charleston & Sav. 1st g. 7's. 1936		1,500,000	J & J	108¾	Dec. 18, '99	108¾	108¾	73,000
Ches. & Ohio 6's, g., Series A. 1908		2,000,000	A & O	114½	Apr. 10, '01	114½	114½	58,000
Mortgage gold 6's. 1911		2,000,000	A & O	115½	May 15, '01	115½	115½	157,000
1st con. g. 5's. 1939		25,858,000	M & N	119½	May 31, '01	119½	119½	324,000
registered.			M & N	116	Apr. 20, '01	109½	104½	324,000
Gen. m. g. 4½'s. 1922		28,810,000	M & S	103½	May 31, '01	103½	103½	14,000
registered.			M & S	103	Apr. 18, '01	103	103	1,000
Craig Val. 1st g. 5's. 1940		650,000	J & J	103	Nov. 29, '19	106	105	1,000
(H. & A. d.) 1st c. g. 4's. 1939		6,000,000	J & J	105	May 29, '01	105	105	1,000
2d con. g. 4's. 1939		1,000,000	J & J	101½	Feb. 27, '01	101½	101½	14,000
Warm S. Val. 1st g. 5's. 1941		400,000	M & S	101½	Apr. 29, '99	101½	101½	14,000
Elz. Lex. & B.S. g. g. 5's. 1902		3,007,000	M & S	101½	May 28, '01	101½	101½	14,000
Greenbrier Ry. 1st gtd. 4's. 1940		2,600,000	M & N	105¾	Jan. 9, '01	105¾	105¾	14,000
Chic. & Alton R. R. fund g. 6's. 1903		1,671,000	M & N	105¾	Jan. 9, '01	105¾	105¾	14,000
refunding g. 5's. 1949		17,433,000	A & O	90	Apr. 4, '01	90	90	831,000
registered.			A & O	105½	Oct. 30, '95	105½	105½	831,000
Miss. Riv. Bdge 1st a. f'd g. 6's. 1912		437,000	A & O	86	May 31, '01	86	84½	831,000
Chic. & Alton Ry 1st lien g. 3½'s. 1950		22,000,000	J & J	86	May 31, '01	86	84½	831,000
registered.			J & J	109½	May 29, '01	109½	109½	41,000
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy con. 7's. 1903		23,101,000	J & J	109½	May 29, '01	109½	109½	41,000
5's, sinking fund. 1901		2,291,000	A & O	100½	Apr. 23, '01	100½	100½	41,000
Chic. & Iowa div. 6's. 1905		2,320,000	F & A	104½	Apr. 11, '19	104½	104½	2,000
Denver div. 4's. 1922		5,467,000	F & A	102½	May 16, '01	102½	102½	2,000
Illinois div. 3½'s. 1949		26,214,000	J & J	103	May 28, '01	103½	103	8,000
registered.			J & J	114	Apr. 12, '01	105	105	8,000
(Iowa div.) sink. f'd 5's. 1919		2,840,000	A & O	105	May 20, '01	105	105	8,000
4's. 1919		8,544,000	A & O	105	May 20, '01	105	105	8,000
Nebraska extens'n 4's. 1927		26,077,000	M & N	110½	May 28, '01	110½	110½	19,000
registered.			M & N	112½	Apr. 17, '01	112½	112½	19,000
Southwestern div. 4's. 1921		2,960,000	M & S	100½	Oct. 15, '19	109½	109	14,000
convertible 5's. 1908		718,700	M & S	106½	Apr. 25, '01	106½	106½	14,000
5's, debentures. 1913		9,000,000	M & N	109½	May 23, '01	109½	109	14,000
Han. & St. Jos. con. 6's. 1911		8,000,000	M & S	121½	May 31, '01	121½	121½	5,000
Chicago & E. Ill. 1st s. f'd c'y. 6's. 1907		2,989,000	J & D	115	May 10, '01	115	115	10,000
small bonds. 1904		2,989,000	J & D	112	Apr. 2, '96	112	112	10,000
1st con. 6's, gold. 1904		2,653,000	A & O	138½	Apr. 18, '01	138	122¾	24,000
gen. con. 1st 5's. 1937		12,996,000	M & N	123	May 31, '01	123	123	2,000
registered.			M & N	115	Aug. 28, '19	115	115	2,000
Chicago & Ind. Col. 1st 5's. 1933		4,626,000	J & J	123	May 14, '01	123	123	2,000
Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville.								
refunding g. 6's. 1947		4,700,000	J & J	124	May 24, '01	124	124	1,000
ref. g. 5's. 1947		3,542,000	J & J	112	May 24, '01	113¾	110	13,000
Louisv. N. Alb. & Chic. 1st 6's. 1910		3,000,000	J & J	117	Apr. 26, '01	117	117	13,000
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul.								
Mil. & St. Paul 1st 7's \$ g. R.d. 1902		920,000	J & J	180	May 31, '01	180	180	5,000
1st 7's 2. 1902		398,000	J & J	172½	Apr. 10, '19	172½	172½	11,000
1st C. & M. 7's. 1903		3,518,000	J & J	180	May 8, '01	182	190	11,000
Chicago Mil. & St. Paul con. 7's. 1906		4,748,000	J & J	115½	May 2, '01	115½	115½	2,000
terminal g. 5's. 1914		23,676,000	J & J	112	May 29, '01	112	112	64,000
gen. g. 4's, series A. 1939			J & J	105½	Feb. 19, '98	105½	105½	64,000
registered.			Q	105½	Feb. 19, '98	105½	105½	64,000
gen. g. 3½'s, series B. 1939		2,500,000	J & J	121	Apr. 13, '01	121	121	76,000
registered.			J & J	121½	Apr. 9, '01	121½	121½	76,000
Chic. & Lake Sup. 5's. 1921		1,280,000	J & J	118½	May 28, '01	118½	118	54,000
Chic. & M. R. div. 5's. 1925		3,000,000	J & J	119½	May 21, '01	119½	119½	1,000
Chic. & Pac. div. 6's. 1910		25,340,000	J & J	115	May 27, '01	115	115	1,000
1st Chic. & P. W. g. 5's. 1921		2,856,000	J & J	117½	July 18, '98	117½	117½	1,000
Dakota & Gt. S. g. 5's. 1916		1,250,000	J & J	123½	Apr. 13, '01	123½	123½	1,000
Far. & So. g. 6's assu. 1924		5,680,000	J & J	110½	May 24, '01	110½	110½	3,000
1st H't & Dk. div. 7's. 1910		990,000	J & J	188	Apr. 9, '01	188	188	15,000
1st 7's. 1906		1,580,000	J & J	118½	Apr. 29, '01	118½	118½	23,000
1st 5's, La. C. & Dav. 1919		2,500,000	J & J	118	May 15, '01	118	118	8,000
1st So. Min. div. 6's. 1910		2,840,000	J & J	117½	May 29, '01	117½	117½	10,000
Mineral Point div. 5's. 1910		7,432,000	J & J	117½	May 29, '01	117½	117½	10,000
1st So. Min. div. 6's. 1908		4,000,000	J & J	119	May 23, '01	119	119	2,000
1st 6's, Southw'n div. 1908		7,755,000	J & J	118½	May 18, '01	118½	118½	2,000
Wis. & Min. div. g. 5's. 1921		2,155,000	J & D	121½	Mar. 12, '01	121½	121½	2,000
Mil. & N. 1st M. L. 6's. 1910		5,092,000	J & D	121½	Mar. 12, '01	121½	121½	2,000
1st con. 6's. 1913			J & D	121½	Mar. 12, '01	121½	121½	2,000

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Chic. & Northwestern con. 7's...1915		12,832,000	Q F	142	May 29, '01	142	140	4,000
gold 7's.....1902		7,576,000	J & D	107½	May 27, '01	107½	107	11,000
registered gold 7's.....1902			J & D	108	Apr. 12, '01			
extension 4's.....1886-1926		18,632,000	F A 15	108	May 17, '01	108	108	2,000
registered.....			F A 15	107	Mar. 7, '19'			
gen. g. 3½'s.....1987		12,111,000	M & N	110	Apr. 26, '01			
registered.....			Q F	103	Nov. 19, '98			
sinking fund 6's.....1879-1929		5,878,000	A & O	114½	May 22, '01	114½	113½	2,000
registered.....			A & O	111	Oct. 18, '19'			
sinking fund 5's.....1879-1929		6,982,000	A & O	108½	May 13, '01	109	108½	2,000
registered.....			A & O	107½	May 24, '19'	107½	107½	49,000
deben. 5's.....1900		5,000,000	M & N	109	May 29, '01	109	109	2,000
registered.....			M & N	108½	Apr. 17, '01			
deben. 5's.....1921		10,000,000	A & O	117	Apr. 10, '01			
registered.....			A & O	107	Nov. 20, '95			
sinking f'd deben. 5's.....1933		9,800,000	M & N	122	May 13, '01	122	121½	12,000
registered.....			M & N	123	May 28, '01	123	123	28,000
Des Moines & Minn. 1st 7's.....1907		600,000	F & A	127	Apr. 8, '84			
Milwaukee & Madison 1st 6's.....1905		1,600,000	M & S	113	Jan. 23, '01			
Northern Illinois 1st 5's.....1910		1,500,000	M & S	111	Mar. 20, '01			
Ottumwa C. F. & St. P. 1st 5's.....1900		1,600,000	M & S	111½	Apr. 24, '19'			
Winona & St. Peters 2d 7's.....1907		1,592,000	M & N	120½	Nov. 10, '19'			
Mil., L. Shore & We'n 1st g. 6's.....1921		5,000,000	M & N	135½	May 29, '01	137½	135½	53,000
ext. & Impt. s.f'd g. 5's.....1929		4,148,000	F & A	127	May 21, '01	127	127	2,000
Ashland div. 1st g. 6's.....1925		1,000,000	M & S	143½	Apr. 8, '19'			
Michigan div. 1st g. 6's.....1924		1,281,000	J & J	142½	May 23, '10	142½	142	14,000
con. deb. 5's.....1907		436,000	F & A	107½	Feb. 21, '01			
incomes.....1911		500,000	M & N	113	Apr. 25, '01			
Chic., Rock Is. & Pac. 6's coup.....1917		12,100,000	J & J	131	May 23, '01	131½	130½	9,000
registered.....1917			J & J	132½	May 27, '01	132½	132½	40,000
gen. g. 4's.....1988		54,581,000	J & J	107½	May 31, '01	108½	107½	293,000
registered.....			J & J	107½	May 31, '01	108	107½	72,000
Des Moines & Ft. Dodge 1st 4's.....1905		1,200,000	J & J	99½	Feb. 20, '01			
1st 2½'s.....1905		1,200,000	J & J	86½	Aug. 25, '19'			
extension 4's.....		672,600	J & J	96	Dec. 19, '19'			
Keokuk & Des M. 1st mor. 5's.....1923		2,750,000	A & O	110½	May 31, '01	110½	110½	8,000
small bond.....1923			A & O	100	Apr. 15, '97			
Chic., St. P., Minn. & Oma. con. 6's.....1930		14,341,000	J & D	141½	May 24, '01	142	141½	19,000
Chic., St. Paul & Minn. 1st 6's.....1918		2,076,000	M & N	138½	May 23, '01	138½	138½	1,500
North Wisconsin 1st mort. 6's.....1930		796,000	J & J	140	Mar. 22, '01			
St. Paul & Sioux City 1st 6's.....1919		6,070,000	A & O	131½	May 28, '01	131½	131½	10,000
Chic., Term. Trans. R. R. g. 4's.....1947		13,585,000	J & J	95½	May 31, '01	95½	93½	465,000
Chic. & Wn. Ind. 1st s'k. f'd g. 6's.....1919		370,000	M & N	106	Oct. 4, '99			
gen'l mortg. g. 6's.....1932		1,868,000	Q M	120	Apr. 23, '01			
Chic. & West Michigan R'y 5's.....1921		5,753,000	J & D	100	Oct. 28, '93			
Choc., Okinoma & Gif. gen. g. 5's.....1919		4,800,000	J & J	103	Jan. 17, '19'			
Cin., Ham. & Day. con. s'k. f'd 7's.....1905		990,000	A & O	115	Dec. 14, '19'			
2d g. 4½'s.....1937		2,000,000	J & J	113	Oct. 10, '19'			
Cin., Day. & In'n 1st pt. dg. 5's.....1941		3,500,000	M & N	113	May 22, '01	113	113	2,000
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. L. gen. g. 4's.....1933		12,634,000	J & D	104	May 24, '01	104½	104	37,000
do Cairo div. 1st g. 4's.....1939		5,000,000	J & J	99	Jan. 10, '01			
Cin., Wab. & Mich. div. 1st g. 4's.....1991		4,000,000	J & J	102	Apr. 30, '01			
St. Louis div. 1st col. trust g. 4's.....1900		9,750,000	M & N	103	May 29, '01	103	100	15,000
registered.....			M & N	99	May 4, '99			
Sp'ngfield & Col. div. 1st g. 4's.....1940		1,035,000	M & S	100	Apr. 2, '01			
White W. Val. div. 1st g. 4's.....1940		650,000	J & J	83	Nov. 22, '99			
Cin., Ind., St. L. & Chic. 1st g. 4's.....1936		7,685,000	Q F	104	May 7, '19'	104	104	2,000
registered.....				95	Nov. 15, '94			
con. 6's.....1920		689,000	M & N	107½	June 30, '93			
Cin., S'dusky & Clev. con. 1st g. 5's.....1928		2,571,000	J & J	115	Mar. 1, '01			
Clev., C. & Ind. con. 7's.....1914		3,991,000	J & D	133½	May 24, '01	133½	130	11,000
sinking fund 7's.....1914			J & D	119½	Nov. 19, '89			
gen. consol 6's.....1934		3,205,000	J & J	136½	Mar. 21, '01			
registered.....			J & J					
Ind. Bloom. & West. 1st pfd 4's.....1940		981,500	A & O					
Ohio, Ind. & W., 1st pfd. 5's.....1938		590,000	Q J					
Peoria & Eastern 1st con. 4's.....1940		8,103,000	A & O	97	May 31, '01	97	95	22,000
income 4's.....1990		4,000,000	A	66	May 23, '01	66	60	362,000

## 938

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

Digitized by Google

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Eureka Springs R'y 1st 6's, g.....1983		500,000	F & A	85	Nov. 10, '97	....	....	.....
Evans. & Terre Haute 1st con. 6's.1921		3,000,000	J & J	123½	Mar. 25, '01	....	....	.....
1st General g 5's.....1942		2,238,000	A & O	108	May 29, '01	108½	107	44,000
Mount Vernon 1st 6's.....1923		875,000	A & O	110	May 10, '98	....	....	.....
Sul. Co. Bch. 1st g 5's.....1980		450,000	A & O	95	Sept. 15, '91	....	....	.....
Evans. & Ind'p. 1st con. g 6's.....1926		1,591,000	J & J	108	Feb. 21, '01	....	....	.....
Florida Cen. & Penins. 1st g 5's...1918		3,000,000	J & J	100	Sept. 6, '99	....	....	.....
1st land grant ex. g 5's...1980		423,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
1st con. g 5's.....1943		4,370,000	J & J	80½	May 14, '96	....	....	.....
Ft. Smith U'n Dep. Co. 1st g 4½'s.1941		1,000,000	J & J	105	Mar. 11, '98	....	....	.....
Ft. Worth & D. C. t'fa. dep. 1st 6's.1921		8,176,000	....	110½	May 31, '01	111	101	608,000
Ft. Worth & Rio Grande 1st g 5's.1923		2,863,000	J & J	89	May 31, '01	89	85	261,000
Galveston H. & H. of 1882 1st 5's.1913		2,000,000	A & O	101	May 31, '01	101	101	1,000
Geo. & Ala. Ry. 1st pref. g 5's...1945		2,360,000	A & O	106	Dec. 12, '88	....	....	.....
1st con. g 6's.....1945		2,622,000	J & J	96½	Nov. 27, '19	....	....	.....
Ga. Car. & N. Ry. 1st gtd. g 5's...1927		5,360,000	J & J	96½	Jan. 22, '19	....	....	.....
Hock. Val. Ry. 1st con. g 4½'s...1999		10,287,000	J & J	106	May 29, '01	106½	104½	111,000
registered.....		1,401,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Col. Hock's Val. 1st ext. g 4's.1848		1,401,000	A & O	104½	May 18, '01	104½	104½	8,000
Illinois Central, 1st g 4's.....1961		1,500,000	J & J	115½	Apr. 3, '01	....	....	.....
registered.....		1,500,000	J & J	113½	Mar. 12, '19	....	....	.....
1st gold 3½'s.....1961		2,499,000	J & J	107½	Apr. 15, '01	....	....	.....
registered.....		2,499,000	J & J	102½	Apr. 15, '98	....	....	.....
1st g 3½ sterl. 2,500,000...1961		2,500,000	M & S	92½	July 13, '98	....	....	.....
registered.....		2,500,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	.....
total outstg... 313,950,000		....	....	....	....	....	....	.....
collat. trust gold 4's...1952		15,000,000	A & O	104	May 20, '01	104	104	5,000
regist'd.....		15,000,000	A & O	104½	Jan. 30, '99	....	....	.....
coll. t. g. 4 L. N. O. & Tex.1953		24,679,000	M & N	102½	May 23, '01	102½	102	26,000
registered.....		24,679,000	M & N	100½	Dec. 18, '99	....	....	.....
Calro Bridge g 4's.....1960		3,000,000	J & D	128	May 24, '99	....	....	.....
registered.....		3,000,000	J & D	101½	May 15, '01	101½	101½	2,000
Louisville div. g 3½'s.1953		14,320,000	J & J	88½	Dec. 8, '99	....	....	.....
registered.....		600,000	F & A	95	Dec. 21, '99	....	....	.....
Middle div. reg. 5's...1921		4,980,000	J & J	90½	Apr. 17, '01	....	....	.....
St. Louis div. g 3's...1961		4,980,000	J & J	101½	Jan. 31, '19	....	....	.....
registered.....		6,321,000	J & J	102½	Apr. 18, '01	....	....	.....
g 3½'s.....1961		6,321,000	J & J	101½	Sept. 10, '95	....	....	.....
registered.....		2,000,000	J & J	100	Nov. 7, '19	....	....	.....
Sp'gfield div 1st g 3½'s.1961		2,000,000	J & J	124	Dec. 11, '99	....	....	.....
registered.....		5,425,000	F & A	114½	Mar. 25, '01	....	....	.....
West'n Line 1st g 4's.1961		5,425,000	F & A	101½	Jan. 31, '19	....	....	.....
registered.....		470,000	J & D	124	May 16, '01	124	124	1,000
Belleville & Carrott 1st 6's...1923		241,000	M & S	105	Jan. 22, '19	....	....	.....
Carbondale & Shaw'n 1st g 4's.1982		16,555,000	J & D	123½	Feb. 14, '01	128	128	5,000
Chic., St. L. & N. O. gold 5's...1961		1,352,000	J & D	100½	Nov. 14, '19	....	....	.....
gold 5's, registered.....		1,352,000	J & D	108½	Aug. 17, '99	....	....	.....
g 3½'s.....1961		3,500,000	J & D	105½	Sept. 10, '19	....	....	.....
registered.....		538,000	J & D	121	Feb. 24, '99	....	....	.....
Memph. div. 1st g 4's.1961		538,000	M & S	102½	Nov. 16, '19	....	....	.....
registered.....		1,634,000	J & J	107	May 27, '01	107	107	2,000
Ind., Dec. & West. 1st g 5's.....1985		933,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
1st gtd. g 5's.....1985		4,500,000	J & J	99½	Apr. 25, '01	....	....	.....
Indiana, Illinois & Iowa 1st g 4's...1950		7,964,000	M & N	124	May 29, '01	124	124	7,000
Internat. & Gt. N'n 1st 6's, gold.1919		6,593,000	M & S	96½	May 31, '01	100	96	150,000
2d g 5's.....1909		2,725,000	M & S	75	May 31, '01	75	74	5,500
8d g 4's.....1921		7,650,000	J & D	117½	May 31, '01	117½	117	12,000
Iowa Central 1st gold 5's.....1983		3,000,000	A & O	....	....	....	....	.....
Kansas C. & M. R. & B. Co. 1st		26,197,000	A & O	69½	May 31, '01	69½	67½	143,000
gtd g 5's.....1929		26,197,000	A & O	68½	Oct. 16, '19	....	....	.....
Kansas City Southern 1st g 3's...1960		7,250,000	J & J	122	May 29, '01	122½	121	17,000
registered.....		3,625,000	J & J	120	May 27, '01	120	118½	19,000
Lake Erie & Western 1st g 5's...1987		2,500,000	A & O	110	May 28, '01	110	110	4,000
2d mtge. g 5's.....1941		....	....	....	....	....	....	.....
Northern Ohio 1st gtd g 5's...1945		....	....	....	....	....	....	.....

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Lehigh Val. (Pa.) coll. g. 5's.....1997		8,000,000	M & N	110½	May 13,'01	110½	110½	6,000
" registered.....			M & N					
Lehigh Val. N. Y. 1st m. g. 4½'s.1940		15,000,000	J & J	111	May 21,'01	111	110½	15,000
" registered.....			J & J	111	Mar. 25,'01			
Lehigh Val. Ter. R. 1st gtd g. 5's.1941		10,000,000	A & O	112	July 9,'19			
" registered.....			A & O	109½	Oct. 18,'99			
Lehigh V. Coal Co. 1st gtd g. 5's.1933		10,280,000	J & J	103¾	Nov. 21,'99			
" registered.....1933			J & J					
Lehigh & N. Y., 1st gtd g. 4's.....1945		2,000,000	M & S	96¾	May 28,'01	96¾	95	6,000
" registered.....			M & S					
{ Elm., Cort. & N. 1st g. 1st pfd 6's 1914		750,000	A & O					
" g. gtd 5's.....1914		1,250,000	A & O	101½	Sept. 1,'99			
Long Island 1st cons. 5's.....1931		3,610,000	Q J	122¼	May 6,'01	122¼	122¼	5,000
" 1st con. g. 4's.....1931		1,121,000	Q J	101	Nov. 22,'99			
{ Long Island gen. m. 4's.....1938		3,000,000	J & D	103	May 23,'01	104	103	8,000
" Ferry 1st g. 4½'s.....1922		1,500,000	M & S	104	May 7,'01	104	104	2,000
" g. 4's.....1932		325,000	J & D	102½	May 5,'97			
" unified g. 4's.....1949		5,685,000	M & S	99	May 27,'01	99½	98½	39,000
" deb. g. 5's.....1934		1,135,000	J & L	95	Feb. 15,'01			
{ Brooklyn & Montauk 1st 6's.....1911		250,000	M & S					
" 1st 5's.....1911		750,000	M & S	110	Aug. 3,'96			
" N. Y. B'kln & M. B. 1st c. g. 5's.....1935		1,601,000	A & O	107	Jan. 31,'99			
" N. Y. & Rock'y Beach 1st g. 5's.1927		883,000	M & S	105	May 4,'19			
{ Long Isl. R. R. Nor. Shore Branch								
" 1st Con. gold garn't'd 5's.1932		1,425,000	QJAN	113	Dec. 28,'19			
{ Louis. & Nash. gen. g. 6's.....1930		9,380,000	J & D	120	May 22,'01	120	119¾	26,000
" gold 5's.....1937		1,764,000	M & N	112	May 22,'01	112	112	18,000
" Unified gold 4's.....1940		23,494,000	J & J	103½	May 29,'01	103½	102½	161,000
" registered.....1940			J & J	83	Feb. 27,'93			
" collateral trust g. 5's.1931		5,129,000	M & N	113¾	Apr. 8,'01			
" coll. tr 5-20 g. 4's.1903-1918		11,500,000	A & O	100	May 25,'01	100	99½	121,000
" Cecilian branch. 7's.....1907		380,000	M & S	106	Dec. 31,'19			
" E. Hend. & N. 1st 6's.1919		1,895,000	J & D	116	Apr. 9,'01			
" N. O. & Lex. g. 4½'s.....1931		3,258,000	M & N	103	Jan. 18,'98			
" N. O. & Mobile 1st g. 6's.1930		5,000,000	J & J	120¼	Feb. 11,'01			
" 2d g. 6's.....1930		1,000,000	J & J	119¼	May 17,'01	119¼	119½	10,000
" Pensacola div. g. 6's.....1920		580,000	M & S	115	Dec. 5,'19			
" St. Louis div. 1st g. 6's.1921		3,500,000	M & S	120¼	Jan. 22,'01			
" 2d g. 3's.....1980		3,000,000	M & S	63½	Oct. 1,'19			
" Ken. Cent. g. 4's.....1987		6,742,000	J & J	100	May 17,'01	100	100	1,000
" L. & N. & Mob. & Montg								
" 1st g. 4½'s.....1945		4,000,000	M & S	110¼	Mar. 28,'01			
" N. Fla. & S. 1st g. g. 5's.1937		2,066,000	F & A	115	May 28,'01	115	115	25,000
" Pen. & At. 1st g. g. 6's.1921		2,659,000	F & A	113	Apr. 18,'01			
" S. & N. A. con. gtd. g. 5's.1936		3,673,000	F & A	112¼	May 6,'01	112¼	112¼	10,000
" So. & N. Ala. st'fd. g. 6s.1910		1,942,000	A & O	92¼	Sept. 30,'96			
Lo. & Jefferson Bdg. Co. gtd. g. 4's.1945		3,000,000	M & S	100	Mar. 19,'01			
Manhattan Railway Con. 4's.....1990		28,065,000	A & O	105	May 31,'01	105¼	104¼	114,000
" registered.....			A & O	105¼	May 7,'01	105¼	105¼	10,000
Metropolitan Elevated 1st 6's.....1908		10,818,000	J & J	116¾	May 23,'01	117¼	116	14,000
Manitoba Sw'n. Coloniza'n g. 5's.1934		2,544,000	J & D					
Mexican Central.								
" con. mtg. 4's.....1911		65,643,000	J & J	85	May 31,'01	86¼	83¼	655,000
" 1st con. inc. 3's.....1939		20,511,000	JULY	32¾	May 31,'01	34¼	27¼	6,750,000
" 2d 3's.....1939		11,310,000	JULY	22	May 31,'01	23¾	18¾	4,151,000
" equip. & collat. g. 5's.....1917		800,000	A & O					
" 2d series g. 5's.....1919		915,000	A & O					
Mexican Internat'l 1st con g. 4's.1942		4,635,000	M & S	90¼	May 31,'01	90¼	89¼	272,000
Mexican Nat. 1st gold 6's.....1927		10,955,000	J & D	103¾	Apr. 19,'19			
" 2d inc. 6's "A" 1917 coup. due		12,265,000	M & S	86	Apr. 23,'01			
" Sept. 1, 1880, stamped 1½% paid								
" 2d inc. 6's "B".....1917		12,265,000	A	17	Apr. 25,'19			
" Northern 1st g. 6's.....1910		1,182,000	J & D	105	May 2,'19			
" registered.....			J & D					

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Minneapolis & St. Louis 1st g. 7's. 1927		960,000	J & D	147½	Feb. 15, '01			.....
Iowa ext. 1st g. 7's. .... 1909		1,015,000	J & D	122½	May 22, '01	123½	122½	4,000
Pacific ext. 1st g. 6's. .... 1921		1,382,000	J & A	124½	Nov. 14, '01			.....
Southw. ext. 1st g. 7's. .... 1910		636,000	J & D	123½	Feb. 7, '01			.....
1st con. g. 6's. .... 1964		5,000,000	M & N	117	May 29, '01	117	117	9,000
1st & refunding g. 4's. .... 1949		7,600,000	M & S	106½	May 28, '01	104	108	80,000
Minneapolis & Pacific 1st m. 5's. .... 1936		3,208,000	J & J	102	Mar. 26, '87			.....
stamped 4's pay. of int. gtd.								.....
Minn., S. S. M. & Atlan. 1st g. 4's. .... 1928		8,280,000	J & J	108½	Apr. 3, '01			.....
stamped pay. of int. gtd.				89½	June 18, '91			.....
Minn., S. P. & S. S. M., 1st c. g. 4's. .... 1838		6,710,000	J & J	96	Apr. 3, '01			.....
stamped pay. of int. gtd.								.....
Missouri, K. & T. 1st mtg. g. 4's. .... 1980		39,718,000	J & D	99	May 31, '01	99	97	1,166,500
2d mtg. g. 4's. .... 1990		20,000,000	F & A	82	May 31, '01	83½	80	631,000
1st ext. gold 5's. .... 1944		1,668,000	M & N	102	May 31, '01	103	100	37,000
Booneville Bdg. Co. gtd. g. 7's. .... 1906		510,000	M & N	100½	Nov. 22, '90			.....
Dallas & Waco 1st gtd. g. 5's. .... 1940		1,340,000	M & N	100	Mar. 5, '01			.....
Mo. K. & T. of Tex 1st gtd. g. 5's. .... 1942		3,285,000	M & S	102	May 29, '01	104½	102	28,000
Sher. Shreveport & Solist gtd. g. 5's. .... 1943		1,689,000	J & D	105½	Apr. 24, '01			.....
Kan. City & Pacific 1st g. 4's. .... 1990		2,500,000	F & A	90	Apr. 10, '01			.....
Tebco. & Neosho 1st 7's. .... 1908		187,000	J & D					.....
Mo. Kan. & East'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. .... 1942		4,000,000	A & O	106½	May 25, '01	106½	106½	29,000
Missouri, Pacific 1st con. g. 6's. .... 1920		14,904,000	M & N	121½	May 28, '01	123½	121½	37,000
3d mortgage 7's. .... 1906		3,828,000	M & N	114	May 31, '01	114	114	5,000
trusts gold 5's stamp'd 1917		14,376,000	M & S	106	May 31, '01	106½	103½	285,000
registered								.....
1st collateral gold 5's. .... 1920		9,636,000	F & A	106	May 31, '01	106½	105	108,000
registered								.....
Leroy & Caney Val. A. L. 1st 5's. .... 1926		520,000	J & J	100	May 1, '01	100	100	25,000
Pacific R. of Mo. 1st m. ex. 4's. .... 1968		7,000,000	M & S	111	May 29, '01	111	106	8,000
2d extended g. 5's. .... 1968		2,573,000	F & A	115	Mar. 26, '01			.....
St. L. & I. g. con. R.R. & I. gr. 5's. .... 1981		35,716,000	A & O	115½	May 29, '01	115½	114	298,000
stamped gtd gold 5's. .... 1981		9,945,000	A & O	114½	Apr. 3, '01			.....
unify'g & rfd'g g. 4's. .... 1929		28,090,000	J & J	94	May 31, '01	96	92	515,000
registered								.....
Verdigris Vly Ind. & W. 1st 5's. .... 1996		750,000	M & S					.....
Mob. & Birm., prior lien, g. 5's. .... 1945		374,000	J & J	109	Aug. 31, '19			.....
small		228,000	J & J					.....
inc. g. 4's. .... 1945		700,000	J & J					.....
small		500,000						.....
Mob. Jackson & Kan. City 1st g. 5's. .... 1946		1,000,000	J & D					.....
Mobile & Ohio new mort. g. 6's. .... 1927		7,000,000	J & J	131	May 27, '01	131	131	4,000
1st extension 6's. .... 1927		974,000	J & D	126	Mar. 20, '01			.....
gen. g. 4's. .... 1938		9,472,000	Q & J	95	May 20, '01	96	96	27,500
Montg'ry div. 1st g. 5's. .... 1947		4,000,000	F & A	115½	May 27, '01	115½	115½	1,000
St. Louis & Cairo gtd g. 4's. .... 1881		4,000,000	M & S	101½	Apr. 24, '19			.....
Nashville, Chat. & St. L. 1st 7's. .... 1913		6,300,000	J & J	129	May 22, '01	129	129	3,000
1st cons. g. 5's. .... 1928		7,412,000	A & O	114½	May 29, '01	114½	113½	58,000
1st g. 6's Jasper Branch. .... 1923		871,000	J & J	123	Mar. 28, '01			.....
1st 6's McM. M.W. & A. .... 1917		750,000	J & J	108	Mar. 24, '96			.....
1st 6's T. & P. .... 1917		800,000	J & J	110	Dec. 20, '99			.....
N. O. & N. East. prior lien g. 6's. .... 1915		1,320,000	A & O	106½	Aug. 13, '94			.....
N. Y. Cent. & Hud. R. 1st c. 7's. .... 1908		18,881,000	J & J	108	May 24, '01	108	107½	40,000
1st registered. .... 1908			J & J	107½	May 22, '01	107½	107½	55,000
g. mortgage 8's. .... 1997		87,987,000	J & J	110½	May 21, '01	110½	110	40,000
registered			J & J	109½	May 20, '19	109½	108½	50,000
debenture 5's. .... 1884-1904		4,573,000	M & S	105½	May 24, '01	105½	105½	48,000
debenture 5's reg. .... 1904		649,000	M & S	105½	May 20, '01	105½	105½	27,000
reg. debent. 5's. .... 1899-1904			M & S	103½	Apr. 30, '01			.....
debenture g. 4's. .... 1890-1905		5,275,000	J & D	103½	Apr. 30, '01			.....
registered			J & D	102½	Jan. 16, '01			.....
deb. cert. ext. g. 4's. .... 1906		3,675,000	M & N	102½	Apr. 30, '01			.....
registered			M & N	106½	Sept. 26, '99			.....
Lake Shore col. g. 3's. .... 1996		90,578,000	F & A	97	May 31, '01	97½	96	353,000
registered			F & A	96½	May 29, '01	96½	94½	115,000
Michigan Central col. g. 3's. .... 1996		18,900,000	F & A	95½	May 31, '01	95½	94	180,000
registered			F & A	97	Jan. 11, '01			.....
Beech Creek 1st gtd. 4's. .... 1936		5,000,000	J & J	111	Mar. 1, '01			.....
registered			J & J	106	June 17, '98			.....
2d gtd. g. 5's. .... 1936		500,000	J & J					.....
registered			J & J					.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Carthage & Adiron. 1st gtd g. 4's 1881		1,100,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Clearfield Bit. Coal Corporation, {		770,000	J & J	95	July 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st s. f. int. gtd. g. 4's ser. A. 1940 {		38,100	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
small bonds series B. ....		300,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Gouv. & Oswega. 1st gtd g. 5's 1942		2,500,000	M & S	107½	July 6, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Mohawk & Malone 1st gtd g. 4's 1991		3,900,000	Sept.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
inc. 5's. .... 1992		1,650,000	F & A	102	Feb. 3, '97	.....	.....	.....
N. Jersey Junc. R. R. g. 1st 4's 1966		4,000,000	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
reg. certificates. ....		180,000	A & O	103	May 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Putnam 1st con. gtd g. 4's 1993		50,000,000	A & J	114	May 31, '01	115½	113	86,000
Nor. & Montreal 1st g. gtd 5's. 1916		8,428,000	J & J	114	May 20, '01	115	114	55,000
West Shore 1st guaranteed 4's 2381		40,780,000	J & D	110½	Mar. 9, '01	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....		.....	J & D	110½	Mar. 8, '01	.....	.....	.....
Lake Shore con. 2d 7's. .... 1903		14,000	J & D	111	May 2, 19'	111	111	10,000
con. 2d registered. .... 1908		14,000	J & D	117½	May 15, '01	117½	117½	14,000
g 8½'s. .... 1997		924,000	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....		840,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Detroit, Mon. & Toledo 1st 7's 1906		1,500,000	J & J	130	Dec. 17, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Kal., A. & G. R. 1st gtd c. 5's. 1938		2,250,000	J & J	145½	Apr. 12, '01	.....	.....	.....
Mahoning Coal R. R. 1st 5's. .... 1934		900,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pitt Mck'port & Y. 1st gtd 6's. 1932		600,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
2d gtd 6's. .... 1934		8,000,000	M & N	103	May 29, '01	108½	102½	18,000
McKsp't & Bell. V. 1st g. 6's. .... 1918		2,000,000	M & N	103½	Mar. 11, '01	.....	.....	.....
Michigan Cent. 1st con. 7's. .... 1902		1,500,000	M & S	118½	Apr. 19, '01	.....	.....	.....
1st con. 5's. .... 1902		3,578,000	M & S	130½	Apr. 12, '01	.....	.....	.....
6's. .... 1909		2,600,000	Q M	127½	Nov. 8, 19'	.....	.....	.....
coup. 5's. .... 1931		476,000	J & J	110	Mar. 8, '01	.....	.....	.....
reg. 5's. .... 1931		11,444,000	J & J	106½	Nov. 28, 19'	.....	.....	.....
mort. 4's. .... 1940		1,200,000	M & N	102½	Mar. 13, 19'	.....	.....	.....
mtge. 4's reg. .... 1940		1,000,000	M & N	102½	Apr. 6, 19'	.....	.....	.....
Battle C. Sturgis 1st g. g. 3's. .... 1986		1,200,000	A & O	122½	May 8, '01	122½	122½	5,000
N. Y. & Harlem 1st mort. 7's c. 1900		9,061,000	A & O	126	May 27, '01	126	125½	38,000
7's registered. .... 1900		400,000	F & A	113	Apr. 13, '94	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Northern 1st g. 5's. .... 1927		375,000	M & N	110	Oct. 15, 19'	.....	.....	.....
R. W. & Og. con. 1st ext. 5's. .... 1922		1,800,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
coup. g. bond currency. ....		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Oswego & Rome 2d gtd gold 5's 1915		19,425,000	A & O	108	May 16, '01	108	107½	32,000
R. W. & O. Ter. R. 1st g. gtd 5's 1918		2,000,000	A & O	107	Apr. 8, '01	.....	.....	.....
Utica & Black River gtd g. 4's 1922		15,007,500	J & D	102	Feb. 28, '01	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., Chic. & St. Louis 1st g. 4's. .... 1987		1,430,000	A & O	200	May 6, '01	200	199½	2,000
registered. ....		2,838,000	.....	195	Feb. 21, '01	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., N. Haven & H. 1st reg. 4's 1903		675,000	M & N	134½	May 25, '01	134½	134½	1,000
con. deb. receipts. .... \$1,000		.....	M & N	115½	Oct. 15, '94	.....	.....	.....
small certifs. .... \$100		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Housatonic R. con. g. 5's. .... 1937		6,000,000	J & J	114	Jan. 5, 19'	.....	.....	.....
New Haven and Derby con. 5's. .... 1918		4,000,000	J & J	110	Apr. 12, '01	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & New England 1st 7's. .... 1905		16,937,000	M & S	104½	May 29, '01	105½	104	109,000
1st 6's. .... 1905		1,350,000	M & S	101½	Nov. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., Ont. & W'n. ref'ding 1st g. 4's 1932		1,350,000	M & N	110½	May 15, '01	110½	110½	2,000
registered. .... \$5,000 only.		7,283,000	M & N	132	May 21, '01	132½	132	3,000
Norfolk & Southern 1st g. 5's. .... 1941		5,000,000	F & A	133½	Apr. 23, '01	.....	.....	.....
Norfolk & Western gen. mtg. 6's 1931		2,000,000	A & O	131½	Apr. 20, '01	.....	.....	.....
imp'ment and ext. 6's. .... 1934		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
New River 1st 6's. .... 1932		30,704,800	A & O	101½	May 31, '01	101½	100	422,500
Norfolk & West. Ry 1st con. g. 4's 1996		.....	A & O	97½	July 18, '99	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....		600,000	A & O	107	Nov. 26, 19'	.....	.....	.....
small bonds. ....		5,000,000	J & J	101½	May 27, '01	102½	101½	8,000
C. C. & T. 1st g. t. g. g 5's 1922		94,007,500	Q J	105½	May 31, '01	106	105	547,000
Sci'o Val & N.E. 1st g. 4's 1989		56,000,000	Q J	105	Apr. 19, '01	.....	.....	.....
N. P. Ry prior In ry. & Id. gtd g. 4's. .... 1997		.....	Q F	71½	May 31, '01	73½	70	1,750,500
registered. ....		.....	Q F	70½	Dec. 10, 19'	.....	.....	.....
gen. lien g. 3's. .... 2047		9,215,000	J & D	102	May 23, '01	102	102	1,000
registered. ....		7,985,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul & Duluth div. g. 4's. .... 1996		1,000,000	F & A	131½	Feb. 18, '01	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....		2,000,000	Q F	132	July 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul & N. Pacific gen g. 6's 1923		1,000,000	F & A	122½	Feb. 13, '01	.....	.....	.....
registered certificates. ....		1,000,000	A & O	112	Apr. 16, '01	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul & Duluth 1st 5's. .... 1931		1,000,000	J & D	102	Feb. 16, '01	.....	.....	.....
2d 5's. .... 1917		1,538,000	Q MCH	88½	May 31, 19'	.....	.....	.....
1st con. g. 4's. .... 1968		3,787,000	J & J	117½	May 31, '01	117½	117½	11,000
Washington Cen. Ry 1st g. 4's. .... 1948		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Nor. Pacific Term. Co. 1st g. 6's. .... 1933		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Duc.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High	Low.	Total.
Ogd. & L. Ch. Ry. 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1948		4,400,000	J & J					
Ohio River Railroad 1st 5's. 1936		2,000,000	J & D	112	Feb. 27, '01			
"    gen. mortg. g 6's. 1937		2,428,000	A & O	95	Dec. 12, '19			
Omaha & St. Lo. 1st g 4's. 1901		2,370,000	J & J	75	Apr. 4, '19			
Pacific Coast Co. 1st g. 5's. 1946		4,446,000	J & D	111	May 22, '01	111	109½	28,000
Panama 1st sink fund g. 4½'s. 1917		1,636,000	A & O	102	May 17, '01	102	102	2,000
"    s. f. subsidy g 6's. 1910		1,346,000	M & N	101	Dec. 15, '09			
Pennsylvania Railroad Co.								
{ Penn. Co.'s gtd. 4½'s. 1st. 1921		19,467,000	J & J	115½	May 27, '01	115½	114½	14,000
"    reg. 1921			J & J	113	Apr. 8, '01			
"    gtd. 3½ col. tr. reg. cts. 1937		5,000,000	M & S	114½	Feb. 15, '99			
"    gtd. 3½ col. tr. cts. ser B 1941		10,000,000	F & A					
{ Chic., St. Louis & P. 1st c. 5's. 1932		1,506,000	A & O	122½	Apr. 15, '01			
"    registered. 1932			A & O	110	May 3, '92			
{ Clev. & P. gen. gtd. g. 4½'s Ser. A 1942		3,000,000	J & J	121	Oct. 22, '19			
"    Series B. 1942		2,000,000	A & O					
"    Series C 3½'s. 1948		3,000,000	M & N					
"    Series D 3½'s. 1950		828,000	F & A					
{ E. & Pitts. gen. gtd. g. 3½'s Ser. B 1940		2,250,000	J & J	102	Nov. 7, '19			
"    C. 1940		1,508,000	J & J					
{ Newp. & Cin. Bge Co. gtd. g. 4's. 1945		1,400,000	J & J					
{ Pitts., C. C. & St. L. con. g 4½'s. 1940			A & O	115	May 17, '01	115	115	5,000
"    Series A. 1940		10,000,000	A & O	115	Apr. 26, '01			
"    Series B gtd. 1942		8,786,000	M & N	116½	Feb. 14, '01			
"    Series C gtd. 1942		1,379,000	M & N	109	Apr. 12, '19			
"    Series D gtd. 4's. 1945		4,983,000	F & A	97	May 16, '19	97	97	1,000
"    Series E gtd. g. 3½'s. 1949		5,859,000	J & J	136½	Apr. 12, '19			
{ Pitts., Ft. Wayne & C. 1st 7's. 1912		2,917,000	J & J	130½	Apr. 29, '01			
"    2d 7's. 1912		2,546,000	J & J	130½	Apr. 12, '19			
"    3d 7's. 1912		2,000,000	A & O	130	Apr. 11, '01			
Penn. RR. Co. 1st RI Est. g 4's. 1923								
{ con. sterling gold 6 per cent. 1905		1,675,000	M & N	108	May 12, '97			
{ con. currency, 6's registered. 1905		22,762,000	J & J					
{ con. gold 5 per cent. 1919		4,718,000	Q M 15					
"    registered. 1919		4,998,000	M & S					
"    con. gold 4 per cent. 1943		3,000,000	Q M					
{ Allegh. Valley gen. gtd. g. 4's. 1942		5,389,000	M & S	110	Aug. 28, '19			
{ Clev. & Mar. 1st gtd. g. 4½'s. 1935		1,250,000	M & N	112½	Mar. 7, '19			
{ Del. R. RR. & Bge Co 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1936		1,300,000	F & A					
{ G. R. & Ind. Ex. 1st gtd. g. 4½'s. 1941		4,455,000	J & J	112	Jan. 30, '01			
{ Sunbury & Lewistown 1st g. 4's. 1936		509,000	J & J					
{ U'd N. J. RR. & Can Co. g 4's. 1944		5,646,000	M & S	117	May 1, '19			
Peoria & Pekin Union 1st 6's. 1921								
{ 2d m 4½'s. 1921		1,495,000	Q F	133½	Jan. 26, '01			
"    1921		1,499,000	M & N	101	Oct. 31, '19			
Pere Marquette.								
{ Flint & Pere Marquette g. 6's. 1920		3,999,000	A & O	127	Feb. 4, '01			
"    1st con. gold 5's. 1930		2,850,000	M & N	112	May 7, '01	112	112	4,000
"    Port Huron d 1st g 5's. 1939		3,325,000	A & O	114	May 20, '01	114	114	20,000
{ Sag'w Tusc. & Hur. 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1931		1,000,000	F & A					
Pine Creek Railway 6's. 1932		3,500,000	J & D	137	Nov. 17, '93			
Pittsburg, Clev. & Toledo 1st 6's. 1922		2,400,000	A & O	107½	Oct. 26, '93			
Pittsburg, Junction 1st 6's. 1922		478,000	J & J	121	Nov. 23, '96			
Pittsburg & L. E. 2d g. 5's ser. A. 1928		2,000,000	A & O	112	Mar. 25, '93			
Pittsburg, Pains. & Fpt. 1st g. 5's. 1916		1,000,000	J & J	90	June 24, '99			
Pitts., Shenando & L. E. 1st g. 5's. 1940		3,000,000	A & O	113½	Mar. 8, '01			
"    1st cons. 5's. 1943		408,000	J & J	87½	Jan. 12, '19			
Pittsburg & West'n 1st gtd 4's. 1917		1,589,000	J & J	100½	Apr. 4, '01			
"    J. P. M. & Co. cfts. 1917		8,111,000	.....	100%	May 21, '01	100%	100%	1,000
Pittsburg, Y & Ash. 1st cons. 5's. 1927		1,562,000	M & N	121½	Mar. 8, '01			
Reading Co. gen. g. 4's. 1907								
{ registered. 1907		63,146,000	J & J	96½	May 31, '01	96½	93½	1,699,000
"    1907			J & J	92	Apr. 16, '19			
Rio Grande West'n 1st g. 4's. 1939								
{ mce & col. tr. g. 4's ser. A 1949		15,200,000	J & J	100¾	May 29, '01	101½	100¾	120,000
"    Utah Cen. 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1917		4,000,000	A & O	94½	May 31, '01	94½	94½	20,000
"    1917		550,000	A & O	88½	Sept. 27, '19			



**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Rio Grande June'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1939		1,850,000	J & D	105	Feb. 27, '01			
Rio Grande Southern 1st g. 4's. 1940		2,233,000	J & J	84	May 31, '01	84	83½	16,000
" guaranteed.....		2,277,000		93½	Mar. 22, '01			
Salt Lake City 1st g. sink fu'd 6's. 1913		297,000	J & J					
St. Jo. & Gr. Isl. 1st g. 2.342.....	1947	3,500,000	J & J	94	May 28, '01	95	94	23,000
St. L. & Adirondack Ry. 1st g. 5's. 1906		800,000	J & J					
" 2d g. 6's.....	1906	400,000	A & O					
St. Louis & San F. 2d 6's. Class A. 1906		500,000	M & N	112	May 6, '01	112	112	2,000
" 2d g. 6's. Class B.....	1906	2,683,000	M & N	114½	May 31, '01	114½	112½	9,000
" 2d g. 6's. Class C.....	1906	2,399,000	M & N	114½	May 31, '01	114½	112½	4,000
" gen. g. 6's.....	1931	7,807,000	J & J	135½	May 23, '01	135½	134	33,000
" gen. g. 5's.....	1931	12,202,000	J & J	118½	May 31, '01	119	117½	97,000
" 1st Trust g. 5's.....	1987	1,099,000	A & O	102½	Oct. 17, 19			
" 1st g. 6's P. C. & O.....	1919	1,020,000	F & A	118	May 23, '02			
St. Louis & San F. R. R. g. 4's. 1906		6,388,000	J & D	100	May 24, '01	101	100	24,000
" Central div. 1st g. 4's. 1929		1,062,000	A & O	109	Apr. 29, '01			
" N. W. div. 1st g. 4's. 1930		1,100,000	A & O	101	May 23, '01	101	100	11,000
" S. W. div. g. 5's.....	1947	1,500,000	A & O	100	June 19, 19			
Kansas, Midland 1st g. 4's. 1937		1,608,000	J & D					
St. Louis S. W. 1st g. 4's Bd. cts. 1980		20,000,000	M & N	96½	May 29, '01	98½	95½	682,000
" 2d g. 4's inc. Bd. cts. 1989		10,000,000	J & J	79½	May 31, '01	81	76	443,000
Gray's Point, Term. 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1947		339,000	J & D					
St. Paul, Minn. & Manito'a 2d 6's. 1909		7,927,000	A & O	118½	Feb. 20, '01			
" 1st con. 6's.....	1933	13,344,000	J & J	140½	May 29, '01	140½	140½	2,000
" 1st con. 6's, registered....			J & J	137½	Feb. 23, '99			
" 1st c. 6's, red'd to g. 4½'s.....		20,827,000	J & J	115½	May 31, '01	115½	115½	2,000
" 1st cons. 6's registered....			J & J	115½	Apr. 15, '01			
" Dakota ext'n g. 6's.....	1910	5,676,000	M & N	116	May 17, '01	116	116	4,000
" Mont. ext'n 1st g. 4's. 1937		7,907,000	J & D	107½	May 6, '01	107½	103	8,000
" registered.....			J & D	106	May 6, '01	106	106	5,000
Eastern R'y Minn. 1st d. 1st g. 5's. 1908		4,700,900	A & O	107½	Apr. 23, '01			
" registered.....			A & O					
" Minn. N. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		5,000,300	A & O					
" registered.....			A & O					
Minneapolis Union 1st g. 6's. 1922		2,150,000	J & J	128	Apr. 4, 19			
Montana Cent. 1st 6's int. gtd. 1937		6,000,000	J & J	140	May 24, '01	140	140	3,000
" 1st 6's, registered.....			J & J	115	Apr. 24, '97			
" 1st g. g. 5's.....	1937	2,700,000	J & J	121½	May 20, '01	121½	121½	6,000
" registered.....			J & J					
Willmar & Sioux Falls 1st g. 5's. 1938		3,625,000	J & D	120	Apr. 11, '99			
" registered.....			J & D					
San Fe Pres. & Phoe. Ry. 1st g. 5's. 1942		4,940,000	M & S	104	Jan. 11, '01			
San Fran. & N. Pac. 1st s. f. g. 5's. 1919		3,872,000	J & J	112	June 9, 19			
Sav. Florida & Wn. 1st c. g. 6's. 1934		4,056,000	A & O	126½	Jan. 13, 19			
" 1st g. 5's.....	1934	2,444,000	A & O	112	Mar. 17, '99			
" St. John's div. 1st g. 4's. 1934		1,350,000	J & J	94½	Feb. 15, '01			
Alabama Midland 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1928		2,800,000	M & N	106½	Feb. 25, '01			
Brunsw. & West. 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1938		3,000,000	J & J	87	Jan. 12, '01			
Sil. S. Oc. & G. R. R. & Ig. gtd. g. 4's. 1918		1,107,000	J & J					
Seaboard & Roanoke 1st 5's. 1926		2,500,000	J & J	104½	Feb. 5, '98			
Carolina Central 1st con. g. 4's. 1949		2,847,000	J & J					
Sodus Bay & Sout'n 1st 5's, gold. 1924		500,000	J & J	105	Sept. 4, '86			
Southern Pacific Co.								
" 2-5 year col. trust g. 4½'s. 1905		15,000,000	J & D	101½	May 31, '01	101½	100	230,000
" g. 4's Central Pac. coll. 1949		28,818,500	J & D	95½	May 31, '01	95½	89	3,099,000
" registered.....			J & D					
Austin & Northw'n 1st g. 5's. 1941		1,920,000	J & J	138½	May 31, '01	108½	105½	411,000
Cent. Pac. 1st refund. gtd. g. 4's. 1949		58,012,500	F & A	101½	May 31, '01	101½	100	493,500
" registered.....			F & A	99½	June 1, 19			
" mtge. gtd. g. 3½'s. 1929		19,405,000	J & D	88½	May 31, '01	88½	88	388,000
" registered.....			J & D					
Gal. Harrisb'gh & S. A. 1st g 6's. 1910		4,756,000	F & A	113	May 28, '01	113	113	5,000
" 2d g 7's.....	1905	1,000,000	J & D	107½	Feb. 26, '01			
" Mex. & P. div 1st g 5's. 1931		13,418,000	M & N	104½	May 25, '01	104½	103½	92,000
Gila Val. G. & N'n 1st gtd g 5's. 1924		1,514,000	M & N	105½	May 29, '01	105½	105½	5,000
Houst. E. & W. Tex. 1st g. 5's. 1933		501,600	M & N	106½	Feb. 26, '01			
" 1st gtd. g. 5's.....	1933	2,190,000	M & N	104½	July 13, 19			
Houst. & T. C. 1st g 5's int. gtd. 1937		6,394,000	J & J	113	May 31, '01	113	111½	25,000
" con. g 5's int. gtd.....	1912	3,161,000	A & O	111½	May 2, '01	111½	111½	6,000
" gen. g 4's int. gtd.....	1921	4,287,000	A & O	92	May 28, '01	92½	91½	71,000

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Morgan's La & Tex. 1st g 6's....	1920	1,494,000	J & J	125	Feb. 29, '01	.....	.....	.....
1st 7's.....	1918	5,000,000	A & O	130	Apr. 29, '01	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. Tex. & Mex. gtd. 1st g 4's....	1912	1,465,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Nth'n Ry of Cal. 1st gtd. g. 6's....	1907	3,964,000	J & J	94	Nov. 30, '97	.....	.....	.....
gtd. g. 5's.....	.....	4,751,000	A & O	113	Jan. 4, '01	.....	.....	.....
Oreg. & Cal. 1st gtd. g 5's.....	1927	19,417,000	J & J	107½	Mar. 23, '01	88½	82½	772,000
San Ant. & Aran Pass 1st gtd. 4's....	1943	18,900,000	J & J	88	May 31, '01	111½	111½	4,000
South'n Pac. of Ariz. 1st g 6's....	1909-1910	10,000,000	J & J	111½	May 16, '01	.....	.....	.....
of Cal. 1st g 6's ser. A....	1905	.....	APR.	108½	Jan. 21, '01	.....	.....	.....
ser. B....	1905	30,217,500	OCT.	109½	Apr. 22, '01	.....	.....	.....
ser. C & D....	1906	.....	A & O	111½	Jan. 30, '01	.....	.....	.....
E. & F....	1902	.....	A & O	114½	Nov. 3, '99	.....	.....	.....
1st con. gtd. g 5's.....	1937	6,800,000	M & N	120	Feb. 15, '01	.....	.....	.....
stamped.....	1905-1937	20,420,000	.....	108	May 25, '01	108	106½	10,000
So. Pacific Coast 1st gtd. g 4's....	1937	5,500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
of N. Mex. c. 1st g 6's....	1911	4,180,000	J & J	110	Apr. 22, '01	.....	.....	.....
Tex. & New Orleans 1st 7's.....	1905	1,094,000	F & A	110	Apr. 11, '01	.....	.....	.....
Sabine div. 1st g 6's.....	1912	2,575,000	M & S	106½	Nov. 17, '97	.....	.....	.....
con. g 5's.....	1943	1,620,000	J & J	108½	May 31, '01	108	107	487,000
Southern Railway 1st con. g 5's....	1904	33,271,000	J & J	116½	May 31, '01	117½	115½	421,000
registered.....	.....	.....	J & J	108	Aug. 3, '19	.....	.....	.....
Memp'h. div. 1st g 4½ 5's....	1906	5,083,000	J & J	109	Apr. 24, '01	.....	.....	.....
registered.....	.....	.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Alabama Central, 1st 6's.....	1918	1,000,000	J & J	120	Mar. 25, '01	.....	.....	.....
Atlantic & Danville 1st g. 4's....	1948	3,175,000	J & J	94½	Mar. 6, '01	95½	94½	50,000
Atlantic & Yadkin, 1st gtd. g 4's....	1949	1,500,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Col. & Greenville, 1st 5-8's.....	1916	2,000,000	J & J	120	Mar. 29, '01	.....	.....	.....
East Tenn., Va. & Ga. div. g 5's....	1930	3,105,000	J & J	118	May 17, '01	118	118	3,000
con. 1st g 5's.....	1956	12,770,000	M & N	117	May 29, '01	118½	117	15,000
reorg. lien g 4's.....	1938	4,500,000	M & S	114½	Apr. 29, '01	.....	.....	.....
registered.....	.....	.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ga. Pacific Ry. 1st g 5-6's.....	1922	5,660,000	J & J	127½	May 15, '01	127½	127½	10,000
Knoxville & Ohio, 1st g 6's.....	1925	2,000,000	J & J	129	Apr. 11, '01	.....	.....	.....
Rich. & Danville, con. g 6's.....	1915	5,597,000	J & J	123½	May 29, '01	123½	122½	5,000
equip. sink. f'd g 5's....	1909	818,000	M & S	101½	July 20, '19	.....	.....	.....
deb. 5's stamped.....	1927	3,368,000	A & O	109	Apr. 10, '01	.....	.....	.....
Rich. & Mecklenburg 1st g. 4's....	1948	15,000	M & N	83	Dec 10, '19	.....	.....	.....
South Caro'n & Ga. 1st g. 5's.....	1919	5,250,000	M & S	109	May 27, '01	109	108	6,000
Vir. Midland serial ser. A 6's....	1906	600,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
small.....	.....	.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
ser. B 6's.....	1911	1,900,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
small.....	.....	.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
ser. C 6's.....	1916	1,100,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
small.....	.....	.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
ser. D 4½ 5's.....	1921	950,000	M & S	102	Oct. 13, '99	.....	.....	.....
small.....	.....	.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
ser. E 5's.....	1926	1,775,000	M & S	109	Jan. 12, '99	.....	.....	.....
small.....	.....	.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
ser. F 5's.....	1931	1,310,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Virginia Midland gen. 5's.....	1936	2,392,000	M & N	113	May 29, '01	113½	113	11,000
gen. 5's gtd. stamped.....	1926	2,466,000	M & N	113½	Dec. 14, '19	.....	.....	.....
W. O. & W. 1st cy. gtd. 4's.....	1924	1,025,000	F & A	91½	Sept. 14, '99	.....	.....	.....
W. Nor. C. 1st con. g 6's.....	1914	2,531,000	J & J	119½	May 21, '01	119½	116	2,000
Spokane Falls & North. 1st g 6's....	1939	2,812,000	J & J	117	July 25, '19	.....	.....	.....
Staten Isl. Ry. N. Y. 1st gtd. g 4½ 5's....	1943	500,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ter. R. R. Assn. St. Louis 1g 4½ 5's....	1939	7,000,000	A & O	116	Mar. 18, '99	.....	.....	.....
1st con. g 5's.....	1894-1944	4,500,000	F & A	116½	May 23, '01	116½	116½	4,000
St. L. Mers. bldg. Ter. gtd. g 5's....	1939	3,500,000	A & O	115	Mar. 6, '01	.....	.....	.....
Tex. & Pacific, East div. 1st 6's....	1905	3,178,000	M & S	104	Feb. 15, '19	.....	.....	.....
fm. Texarkana to Ft. Worth.....	2000	21,822,000	J & D	120½	May 24, '01	120½	119	53,000
1st gold 5's.....	2000	997,000	MAR.	99	May 23, '01	100	99	17,000
2d gold income, 5's.....	2000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Toledo & Ohio Cent. 1st g 5's.....	1935	3,000,000	J & J	115½	May 31, '01	115½	114½	21,000
1st M. g 5's West. div.....	1935	2,500,000	A & O	115½	Jan. 14, '01	.....	.....	.....
gen. g 5's.....	1935	2,000,000	J & D	108½	May 21, '01	108½	107½	25,000
Kunaw & M. 1st g. g. 4's....	1900	2,469,000	A & O	97½	May 22, '01	97½	97½	4,000

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Toledo, Peoria & W. 1st g 4's.....1917		4,400,000	J & D	93½	May 29, '01	94	93	21,000
Tol., St. L. & Wn. prior lien g 3¼'s. 1925		9,000,000	J & J	91	May 21, '01	91½	90	68,000
" registered.....			J & J					
" fifty years g. 4's.....1925		6,500,000	A & O	84½	May 31, '01	85½	82	1,049,000
" registered.....			A & O					
Toronto, Hamilton & Buff 1st g 4s. 1946		3,280,000	J & D	99½	Apr. 13, '01			
Ulster & Delaware 1st c. g 5's.....1925		1,852,000	J & D	108	Apr. 12, '01			
Union Pacific R. R. & id g 4's.....1947		99,543,000	J & J	106½	May 31, '01	106	105	844,000
" registered.....			J & J	105½	May 28, '01	106½	104½	66,000
" Oreg. Ry. & Nav. 1st s. f. g. 6's. 1909		547,000	J & J	110	Apr. 25, '01			
" Oreg. R. R. & Nav. Co. con. g 4's. 1946		19,684,000	J & D	104½	May 29, '01	105	104½	137,000
" Oreg. Short Line Ry. 1st g. 6's. 1922		13,651,000	F & A	128½	May 28, '01	129½	127½	28,000
" Oreg. Short Line 1st con. g. 5's. 1946		10,337,000	J & J	118½	May 27, '01	119½	117½	48,500
" non-cum. Inc. A 5's.....1946		849,000	SEPT.	106	Jan. 21, '01			
" Utah & Northern 1st 7's.....1908		4,993,000	J & J	119	Mar. 1, '01			
" g. 5's.....1923		1,877,000	J & J	113	Mar. 7, '01			
Wabash R.R. Co., 1st gold 5's.....1939		31,664,000	M & N	117½	May 29, '01	118½	117	134,000
" 2d mortgage gold 5's.....1939		14,000,000	F & A	110	May 21, '01	110½	110	84,000
" debent. mtg series A.....1939		3,500,000	J & J	100½	Apr. 16, '01			
" series B.....1939		25,740,000	J & J	99½	May 31, '01	99½	98	13,400,000
" 1st g. 5's Det. & Chi. ex. 1940		3,411,000	J & J	110	May 21, '01	110	110	15,000
" Des Moines div. 1st g. 4s. 1939		1,600,000	J & J	98½	May 16, '01	98½	98½	5,000
" St. L., Kan. C. & N. St. Chas. B.								
" 1st 5's.....1908		1,000,000	A & O	110	May 4, '01	110	110	1,000
Western N.Y. & Penn. 1st g. 5's.....1937		10,000,000	J & J	120½	May 25, '01	120½	120½	4,000
" gen. g. 4's.....1943		9,798,000	A & O	98½	May 31, '01	99	98	52,000
" Inc. 5's.....1943		10,000,000	Nov.	40	Mar. 21, '01			
West Va. Cent'l & Pitts. 1st g. 6's. 1911		3,250,000	J & J	115	Apr. 24, '01			
Wheeling & Lake Erie 1st g. 5's. 1926		2,000,000	A & O	114	May 20, '01	115	114	20,000
" Wheeling div. 1st g. 5's. 1923		894,000	J & J	113	May 28, '01	113	112	6,000
" exten. and imp. g. 5's.....1930		343,000	F & A	108	Sept. 12, '01			
Wheel. & L. E. RR. 1st con. g. 4's. 1949		10,211,000	M & S	92	May 29, '01	94	90½	611,000
Wisconsin Cen. R'y 1st gen. g. 4s. 1949		24,635,600	J & J	89½	May 31, '01	91½	96½	580,000
<b>STREET RAILWAY BONDS.</b>								
Brooklyn Rapid Transit g. 5's.....1945		6,825,000	A & O	108	May 27, '01	109	107½	14,000
" Atl. av. Bkn. imp. g. 5's. 1984		1,500,000	J & J	110	Jan. 20, '99			
" City R. R. 1st c. 5's. 1916. 1941		4,373,000	J & J	115	Apr. 17, '01			
" Qu. Co. & Sur. con. gtd. g. 5's.....1941		2,253,000	M & N	101	May 21, '01	101	100½	9,000
" Union Elev. 1st. g. 4-5s. 1950		12,860,000	F & A	101½	May 31, '01	101½	99½	597,000
" Kings Co. Elev. R. R. 1st g. 4's. 1949		7,000,000	F & A	92½	May 31, '01	94½	91½	448,000
" Nassau Electric R. R. gtd. g. 4's. 1951		10,474,000	J & J					
" City & Sub. R'y. Balt. 1st g. 5's. 1922		2,430,000	J & D	105½	Apr. 17, '95			
" Denver Con. T'way Co. 1st g. 5's. 1933		730,000	A & O	97½	June 18, '19			
" Denver T'way Co. con. g. 5's.....1910		1,219,000	J & J					
" Metropoli'n Ry Co. 1st g. 6's. 1911		918,000	J & J					
" Grand Rapids Ry 1st g. 6's.....1916		2,500,000	J & D					
" Louisville Railway Co. 1st c. g. 5's. 1930		4,600,000	J & J	109	Mar. 19, '98			
" Market St. Cable Railway 1st 6's. 1913		3,000,000	J & J					
" Metro. St. Ry N.Y. g. col. tr. g. 5's. 1997		12,500,000	F & A	119½	May 31, '01	120½	119½	94,000
" B'way & 7th ave. 1st con. g. 5's. 1943		7,650,000	J & D	120½	May 23, '01	121	120½	26,000
" registered			J & D	119½	Dec. 3, '19			
" Columb. & 8th ave. 1st gtd g 5's. 1993		3,000,000	M & S	122½	May 31, '01	122½	122½	5,000
" registered			M & S					
" Lex ave & Pav Fer 1st gtd g 5's. 1993		5,000,000	M & S	122	May 14, '01	123	122	3,000
" registered			M & S					
" Third Ave. R.R. 1st c. gtd. g. 4's. 2000		35,000,000	J & J	104½	Apr. 23, '01			
" registered			J & J					
" Met. West Side Elev. Chic. 1st g. 4's. 1938		10,000,000	F & A	101½	May 22, '01	101½	101½	25,000
" registered			F & A					
" Mil. Elec. R. & Light con. 30yr. g. 5's. 1926		6,500,000	F & A	106	Oct. 27, '99			
" Minn. St. R'y (M. L. & M.) 1st con. g. 5's.....1919		4,050,000	J & J	110	Apr. 9, '01			
" St. Paul City Ry. Cable con. g. 5's. 1937		2,480,000	J & J	111½	Jan. 24, '01			
" gtd. gold 5's.....1937		1,138,000	J & J	112	Nov. 28, '99			
" Third Avenue R'y N.Y. 1st g. 5's. 1937		5,000,000	J & J	124	May 15, '01	124	124	1,000
" Union Elevated (Chic.) 1st g. 5's. 1945		4,397,000	A & O	106½	Dec. 14, '99			
" West Chic. St. 40 yr. 1st cur. 5's. 1928		3,869,000	M & N					
" 40 years con. g. 5's.....1936		6,031,000	M & N	99	Dec. 28, '97			

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

## MISCELLANEOUS BONDS.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Adams Express Co. col. tr. g. 4's. 1948		12,000,000	M & S	105	May 31, '01	106	105	24,000
B'klyn Ferry Co. of N. Y. 1st g. 5's. 1948		6,500,000	F & A	80	May 22, '01	80½	87	42,000
B'klyn W. & W. Co. 1st g. tr. cts. 5's. 1945		17,084,000	F & A	71½	May 31, '01	76½	71	101,000
Chic. Junc. & St'k Y'ds col. g. 5's. 1915		10,000,000	J & J	111	Mar. 7, '01	....	....	....
Det. Mack. & Mar. Id. gt. 3½ S A. 1911		3,021,000	A & O	31½	May 31, '01	32	31	77,000
Hackensack Wtr Reorg. 1st g. 5's. 1928		1,090,000	J & J	107½	June 3, '02	....	....	....
Hend'n Bdg Co. 1st s'k. f'd g. 6's. 1981		1,681,000	M & S	112	Nov. 14, '99	....	....	....
Hoboken Land & Imp. g. 5's. 1910		1,440,000	M & N	102	Jan. 19, '94	....	....	....
Iron Steamboat Co. 6's. 1901		500,000	J & J	75½	Dec. 4, '95	....	....	....
Madison Sq. Garden 1st g. 5's. 1919		1,250,000	M & N	102	July 8, '97	....	....	....
Manh. Beh H. & L. lim. gen. g. 4's. 1940		1,300,000	M & N	55	Aug. 27, '95	....	....	....
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock 5's. 1900-1900		2,000,000	J & J	94	May 21, '94	....	....	....
N. Y. & Ontario Land 1st g 6's. 1910		443,000	F & A	90	Oct. 3, '99	....	....	....
St. Louis Term. Station Cuples. & Property Co. 1st g 4½'s 5-30. 1917		3,000,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	....
So. Y. Water Co. N. Y. con. g 6's. 1923		478,000	J & J	101	Feb. 19, '97	....	....	....
Spring Valley W. Wks. 1st 6's. 1906		4,975,000	M & S	113½	Dec. 18, '19	....	....	....
U. S. Mortgage and Trust Co. Real Estate 1st g col. tr. bonds.								
Series D 4½'s. 1901-1916		1,000,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
" E 4's. 1907-1917		1,000,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	....
" F 4's. 1908-1918		1,000,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
" G 4's. 1903-1918		1,000,000	F & A	100	Mar. 15, '19	....	....	....
" H 4's. 1903-1918		1,000,000	M & N	....	....	....	....	....
" I 4's. 1904-1919		1,000,000	F & A	....	....	....	....	....
" J 4's. 1904-1919		1,000,000	M & N	....	....	....	....	....
(Small bonds. ....)		....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Vermont Marble, 1st s. fund 5's. 1910		400,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	....
BONDS OF MANUFACTURING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS.								
Am. Bicycle Co. sink. fund deb. 5's. 1919		9,000,243	M & S	80½	May 28, '01	82	80	92,000
Am. Cotton Oil deb. ext. 4½'s. 1915		2,919,000	....	100	May 29, '01	100½	100	16,000
Am. Hide & Lea. Co. 1st s. f. 6's. 1919		8,375,000	M & S	95	May 31, '01	96	94½	229,000
Am. Spirit Mfg. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1915		1,869,000	M & S	80	May 24, '01	80	80	5,000
Am. Thread Co. 1st coll. trust 4's. 1919		5,798,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
Barney & Smith Car Co. 1st g. 6's. 1942		1,000,000	J & J	105	Jan. 10, '19	....	....	....
Gramercy Sugar Co., 1st g. 6's. 1923		1,400,000	A & O	99½	Apr. 30, '01	....	....	....
Illinois Steel Co. debenture 5's. 1910		6,200,000	J & J	99	Jan. 17, '99	....	....	....
" non. conv. deb. 5's. 1910		7,000,000	A & O	100	Apr. 1, '01	....	....	....
Internat'l Paper Co. 1st con. g 6's. 1918		9,229,000	F & A	108½	May 29, '01	109½	108	90,000
Knickerbocker Ice Co. (Chic) 1st g 5's. 1928		2,000,000	A & O	98	Aug. 25, '19	....	....	....
Nat. Starch Mfg. Co., 1st g 6's. 1920		3,002,000	J & J	107	May 1, '01	107	107	1,000
Nat. Starch. Co's fd. deb. g. 5's. 1925		3,724,000	J & J	95	May 6, '01	95	94½	8,000
Standard Rope & Twine 1st g. 6's. 1948		2,835,000	F & A	62½	May 31, '01	65½	57	115,000
" inc. g. 5's. 1948		7,500,000	....	10	May 31, '01	11½	7½	921,000
U. S. Env. Co. 1st s'k. fd. g. 6's. 1918		2,000,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
U. S. Leather Co. 6½ g s. fd deb. 1915		5,280,000	M & N	114	Apr. 24, '01	....	....	....
BONDS OF COAL AND IRON COMPANIES.								
Colo. Coal & Iron 1st con. g. 6's. 1900		2,766,000	F & A	103	Apr. 20, '01	....	....	....
Colo. C'l & I'n Devel. Co. gtd g. 5's. 1909		701,000	J & J	55	Nov. 2, '19	....	....	....
" Coupon off. ....		....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Colo. Fuel Co. gen. g. 6's. 1919		1,043,000	M & N	108½	Feb. 14, '01	....	....	....
Col. Fuel & Iron Co. gen. sf g 5's. 1943		2,308,000	F & A	108½	May 31, '01	108½	101½	47,000
Grand Riv. Coal & Coke 1st g. 6's. 1919		949,000	A & O	....	....	....	....	....

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		MAY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Jefferson & Clearfield Coal & Ir.								
1st g. 5's.....1928		1,777,000	J & D	105½	Oct. 10, '98			
2d g. 5's.....1928		1,000,000	J & D	80	May 4, '97			
Pleasant Valley Coal 1st g. s. f. 5's. 1928		1,218,000	J & J	106	Oct. 24, '19			
Roch & Pitts. Cl. & Ir. Co. pur my 5's. 1946		1,082,000	M & N					
Sun. Creek Coal 1st sk. fund g's. 1912		879,000	J & D					
Ten. Coal, I. & R. T. d. 1st g 6's.....1917		1,244,000	A & O	105	May 22, '01	106	105	15,000
{ Bir. div. 1st con. 6's.....1917		3,898,000	J & J	111	Apr. 29, '01			
{ Cah. Coal M. Co. 1st gtd. g 6's. 1922		1,000,000	J & J	105	Feb. 10, '19			
{ De Bard. C & I Co. gtd. g 6's.....1910		2,771,000	F & A	101	May 20, '01	101	101	4,600
Wheel L. E. & P. Cl Co. 1st g 5's. 1919		848,000	J & J	82	Jan. 15, '19			
<b>GAS &amp; ELECTRIC LIGHT CO. BONDS.</b>								
Atlanta Gas Light Co. 1st g. 5's. 1947		1,150,000	J & D					
Boat. Un. Gas & t. c. f. s'k f'd g. 5's. 1939		7,000,000	J & J	80½	Feb. 20, '01			
B'klyn Union Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's. 1945		14,210,000	M & N	118	May 29, '01	119	115	76,000
Columbus Gas Co., 1st g. 5's.....1932		1,215,000	J & J	104½	Jan. 28, '98			
Detroit City Gas Co. g. 5's.....1923		5,808,000	J & J	101½	May 29, '01	102	101	44,000
Detroit Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's.....1918		881,000	F & A	102	Apr. 8, '99			
Equitable Gas Light Co. of N. Y. 1st con. g. 5's.....1932		3,500,000	M & S	104	Feb. 14, '01			
Gas. & Elec. of Bergen Co. c. g. 5's. 1949		1,146,000	J & D	102	Apr. 24, '01			
General Electric Co. deb. g. 5's.....1922		968,000	J & D	185½	Apr. 9, '01			
Grand Rapids G. L. Co. 1st g. 5's. 1915		1,228,000	F & A	107½	Dec. 17, '19			
Kansas City Mo. Gas Co. 1st g 5's. 1922		3,750,000	A & O					
Kings Co. Elec. L. & Power g. 5's. 1937		2,500,000	A & O					
{ purchase money 6's.....1997		5,000,000	J & J	125	May 31, '01	125½	124½	18,000
{ Edison El. Ill. Bkln 1st con. g. 4's. 1939		4,275,000	J & J	98½	Dec. 4, '19			
Lac. Gas L't Co. of St. L. 1st g. 5's. 1919		10,000,000	Q F	107½	May 25, '01	108	107½	8,000
{ small bonds.....1938				97½	Nov. 1, '96			
Newark Cons. Gas. con. g. 5's.....1948		5,472,000	J & D					
N. Y. Gas EL. H & P Col steel tr g 5's. 1948		11,500,000	J & D	114½	May 29, '01	114½	114	30,000
{ registered.....1948			J & D					
{ purchase mny col tr g 5's. 1949		20,389,000	F & A	97	May 31, '01	98	95½	368,000
{ Edison El. Illu. 1st con. v. g. 5's. 1910		4,312,000	M & S	108	May 8, '01	108	108	3,000
{ 1st con. g. 5's.....1995		2,156,000	J & J	121½	Apr. 23, '01			
N. Y. & Qus. Elec. Lg. & P. 1st. c. g. 5's. 1930		1,980,000	F & A	104½	May 31, '01	104½	104	10,000
Paterson & Pas. G. & E. con. g. 5's.....1949		3,317,000	M & S					
Peop's Gas & C. Co. C. 1st g. g 6's. 1904		2,100,000	M & N	107	July 13, '19			
{ 2d gtd. g. 6's.....1904		2,500,000	J & D	104	Mar. 29, '01			
{ 1st con. g. 6's.....1948		4,900,000	A & O	128	May 21, '01	126	124	10,000
{ refunding g. 5's.....1947		2,500,000	M & S	108	Dec. 16, '98			
{ refunding registered.....1947			M & S					
{ Chic. Gas L't & Coke 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1937		10,000,000	J & J	111	May 22, '01	111	109	15,000
{ Con. Gas Co. Chic. 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1936		4,348,000	J & D	108½	May 27, '01	110	108½	7,000
{ Eq. Gas & Fuel. Chic. 1st gtd. g. 6								

## UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	YEAR 1901.		MAY SALES.		
				High.	Low.	High.	Low.	Total.
United States con. 2's registered...1980			Q J	106½	105½			
con. 2's coupon...1980			Q J	106½	105½	106¼	105¼	22,000
con. 2's reg. small bds. 1980		445,940,750	Q J					
con. 2's coupon small bds. 1980			Q J	106½	105½			
3's registered...1908-18			Q F	111½	109	109½	109	22,500
3's coupon...1908-18			Q F	112	109½	110¼	109¼	74,500
3's small bonds reg. 1908-18		99,912,940	Q F					
3's small bonds coupon. 1908-18			Q F	112	110			
4's registered...1907			J A J & O	114½	113	113½	113½	10,400
4's coupon...1907		264,209,350	J A J & O	115	113½	113½	113½	500
4's registered...1925			Q F	138½	137½	138½	138½	20,000
4's coupon...1925		162,315,400	Q F	138½	137½	138½	138½	11,000
5's registered...1904			Q F	111½	111½	110	110	10,000
5's coupon...1904		22,938,400	Q F	113½	110½	110	110	16,000
District of Columbia 3-45's...1924			F & A	125	125			
small bonds...1924		14,224,100	F & A					
registered...1924			F & A					
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.								
Quebec 5's...1908		3,000,000	M & N					
U. S. of Mexico External Gold Loan of 1890 sinking fund 5's...								
Regular delivery in denominations of £100 and £200...		£22,555,720	Q J	96	96			
Small bonds denominations of £20...								
Large bonds denominations of £500 and £1,000...								

## BANKERS' OBITUARY RECORD.

**Blackburn.**—Hon. W. F. Blackburn, Cashier of the Hunnewell (Mo.) Bank, and a former member of the Missouri Legislature, died May 21, aged seventy-six years.

**Burch.**—George B. Burch, President of the Second National Bank, Dubuque, Iowa, and one of the well-known bankers of the State, died May 2.

**Burditt.**—Alfred L. Burditt, Cashier of the Leominster (Mass.) National Bank, and Treasurer of the Leominster Savings Bank, died May 18. He was born at Leominster in 1831. In 1863 he became connected with the National bank, and was made Cashier in 1870, and the following year Treasurer of the Savings bank.

**Cass.**—Wm. T. Cass, President of the Citizens' National Bank, Tilton, N. H., and Treasurer of the Iona Savings Bank, of that place, died May 26. He had been connected with these banks for forty-five years, and was one of the oldest bankers in the State.

**Childs.**—Charles Henry Childs, for sixteen years Cashier of the Exchange Bank, Tekonsha, Mich., died May 15.

**Cocker.**—W. J. Cocker, President of the Commercial Savings Bank, Adrian, Mich., a regent of the State University, a former member of the executive council of the American Bankers' Association, and a well-known writer on banking and economic subjects, died May 19.

**Kelley.**—Capt. John R. Kelley, President of the First National Bank and the People's Safe Deposit and Savings Bank, Bath, Me., died May 12, aged seventy-three. He followed the sea for almost forty years, and commanded many vessels.

**Lyman.**—Henry H. Lyman, State Commissioner of Excise, of New York, and Vice-President of the First National Bank of Oswego, died May 4.

**Nazro.**—H. H. Nazro, Cashier of the Ninth National Bank, New York city, died May 3, in his fifty-ninth year. He had been in the employ of the bank since its incorporation in 1864, and Cashier for the last fifteen years.

**Park.**—G. Edward Park, Assistant Cashier of the Bank of Biloxi, Miss., and a widely-known and respected member of the Masonic fraternity, died May 7.

**Rockwell.**—D. L. Rockwell, President of the City Banking Company, Kent, Ohio, from its organization in 1881, died May 20. He was born at Kent in 1843.

**Stocks.**—Hon. Fred. A. Stocks, President of the State Bank, Blue Rapids, Kas., died May 8. Mr. Stocks was formerly connected with the Treasury Department, and was also a member of the Kansas State Senate.

**Uhl.**—Hon. Edwin F. Uhl, President of the Grand Rapids (Mich.) National Bank, died May 17. Mr. Uhl was prominent as a lawyer and business man and also in public life. In 1886 President Cleveland appointed him First Assistant Secretary of State, and after serving in this capacity for two years he was appointed United States Ambassador at Berlin. He was twice elected Mayor of Grand Rapids.

**Vance.**—Peter H. Vance, head of the banking firm of P. H. Vance & Sons, Danvers, Ill., died May 16, aged eighty-four years.















14 DAY USE  
RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED  
**LOAN DEPT.**

This book is due on the last date stamped below, or  
on the date to which renewed.  
Renewed books are subject to immediate recall.

**ICLF (N)**

NOV 25 1966 35

15 67-4 PM

EQ'D LD

LD 21A-60m-7,'66  
(G4427s10)476B

General Library  
University of California  
Berkeley

YD 07282

150878



